Edward Westermarck · 1906–1908 · Macmillan and Co., Limited, London — Vol. I (1906) and Vol. II (1908); Archive.org DjVu OCR text layers (identifiers in.ernet.dli.2015.22400 and bwb_KV-062-511_2) · Public Domain · uncorrected OCR — being verified against the scan
Two volumes (Macmillan, London): Vol. I 1906, Vol. II 1908; informed by Westermarck's four years of fieldwork in Morocco (per his preface).
Served verbatim, era-bound vocabulary and all — the house frames, it never
paraphrases; what a passage does and does not show rides its receipt.
Introduction
The mail! object of this book will perhaps be best
explained by a few words concerning its origin.
Its author was once discussing with some friends the point
how far a bad man ought to be treated with kindness.
The opinions were divided, and, in spite of much deli-
beration, unanimity could not be attained. It seemed
strange that the disagreement should be so radical, and
the question arose, Whence this diversity of opinion ? Is
it due to defective knowledge, or has it a merely senti-
mental origin ? And the problem gradually expanded.
Why do the moral ideas in general differ so greatly ?
And, on the other hand, why is there in many cases such
a wide agreement ? Nay, why are there any moral ideas
at all ?
• Since then many years have passed, spent by the author
in trying to find an answer to these questions. The pre-
sent work is the result of his researches and thoughts.*
The first part of it will comprise a study of the moral
concepts : right, wrong, duty, justice, virtue, merit, &c.
Stfch a study will be found to require an examination into
the moral emotions, their nature and origin, as also into
the relations between these emotions and the various
YOl..'*! 6
moral concepts. T^ere will then be a discussion of the
phenomena to whfch such concepts are applied — the
subjects of moral judgments. The general character of
these phenomena will be scrutinised, and an answer
sought to the question why facts of a certain type are
matters of moral concern, while other facts are not.
Finally, the most important of these phenomepa will
be classified, and the moral ideas relating to each clas6
will be stated, and, so far as possible, explained.
An investigation of this kind cannot be confined to
feelings and ideas prevalent in any particular society
or at any particular stage of civilisation. Its subject-
matter is the moral consciousness of mankind at large.
It consequently involves the survey of an unusually rich
and varied field of research — psychological, ethnogra-
phical,* historical, juridical, theological. In the present
state of our knowledge, when monographs on most of the
subjects involved are wanting, I presume that such an
undertaking is, strictly speaking, too big for any man ; at
any rate it is so for the writer of this book. Nothing like
completeness can be aimed at. Hypotheses of varying
degrees of probability must only too often be resorted to.
Even the certainty of the statements on which conclusions
are based is not always beyond a doubt. But though fully
conscious of the many defects of his attempt, the author
nevertheless ventures to think himself justified in placing
it before the public. It seems to him that one of the
most important objects of human speculation cannot be
left in its present state of obscurity ; that at least a
glimpse of light must be thrown upon it by researches
which have extended over some fifteen years ; and that‘
the main principles underlying the various customs of
manicind may be arrived at even without subjecting
these customs to such a full and minute treatment as
would be required of an anthropological monograph.
Possibly this essay, in spite of its theoretical chaV- '
acter, may even be of some practical use. Though
rooted in the emotional side of our nature, our moral
• *
opinions are in a large measure amen$ble to reason. Now
in every society the traditional nolions as to what is
good or bad, obligatory or indifferent, are commonly
accepted by the majority of people without further re-
flection. By tracing them to their source it will be found
that not a few of these notions have their origin in senti-
mental likings and antipathies, to which a scrutinising
and enlightened judge can attach little importance ; whilst,
on the other hand, he must account blameable many an
act and omission which public opinion, out of thought-
lessness, treats with indifference. It will, moreover, appear
that a moral estimate often survives the cause from which
it sprang. And no unprejudiced person can help changing
his views if he be persuaded that they have no foundation
in existing facts.
B 2
Chapter I
THE EMOTIONAL ORIGIN OF kORAL JUDGMENTS
That the moral concepts are ultimately based on
emotions either of indignation or approval, is a fact which a
certain school of thinkers have in vain attempted to deny.
The terms which embody these concepts must originally
have been used — indeed they still constantly are so used —
as direct expressions of such emotions with reference to the
phenomena which evoked them. Men pronounced certain
acts to be good or bad on account of the emotions those
acts aroused in their minds, just as they called sunshine
warm and ice cold on account of certain sensations which
they experienced, and as they named a thing pleasant or
painful because they felt pleasure or pain. But to attri-
bute a quality to a thing is never the same as merely to
state the existence of a particular sensation or feeling in
the mind which perceives it. Such an attribution must
mean that the thing, under certain circumstances, makes a
certain impression on the mind. By calling an object
warm or pleasant, a person asserts that it is apt to produce
in him a sensation of heat or a feeling of pleasure. Simi-
larl]^, to name an act good or bad, ultimately implies
that it is apt to give rise to an emotion of approval or
disapproval in him who pronounces the judgment. Whilst
not affirming the actual existence of any specific emotion
in the mind of the person judging or of anybody else,'
the predicate of a moral judgment attributes to the
subject a tendency to arouse an emotion. The moral
CHAP. I OR4GIN OF MORAL JUDGMENT® c
concepts, then, are essentially generalisations or tenaencies
in certain phenomena to call forth moral emotions.
However, as is frequently the case with general terms,
these concepts are mentioned without any distinct idea* of
their contents. The relation in which many of them stand
to the moral emotions is complicated ; the use of them is
often vague ; and ethical theorisers, instead of subjecting
them to a careful analysis, have done their best to increase
the confusion by adapting the meaning of the terms to
fit their theories. Very commonly, in the definition of
the goodness or badness of acts, reference is made, not to
their tendencies to evoke emotions of approval or indigna-
tion, but to the causes of these tendencies, that is, to those
qualities in the acts which call forth moral emotions. Thus,
because good acts generally produce pleasure and bad acts
pain, goodness and badness have been identified with the
tendencies of acts to produce pleasure or pain. The follow-
ing statement of Sir James Stephen is a clearly expressed
instance of this confusion, so common among utilitarians; —
“ Speaking generally, the acts which are called right do
promote, or are supposed to promote general happiness,
and the acts which are called wrong do diminish, or are
supposed to diminish it. I say, therefore, that this is
what the words ‘ right ' and ‘ wrong ’ mean, just as the
words ‘ up ’ and ‘ down ’ mean that which points from
or towards the earth’s centre of gravity, though they are
used by millions who have not the least notion of the fact
that such is their meaning, and though they were used for
centuries and millenniums before any one was or even could
be aware of it.” ’ So, too, Bentham maintained that words
•like “ ought,” “ right,” and “ wrong,” have no meaning
unless interpreted in accordance with the principle of
utility ; ^ and James Mill was of opinion that “ the* very
morality ” of the act lies, not in the sentiments raised in
the breast of him who perceives or contemplates it, but in
“Ithe consequences of the act, good or evil, and their being
^ Stephen, Liberty ^ Equality^ Lim- Bentliam, Principles of Morals and
ternity^ p. 338. Legislation^ p, 4.
THE^".EMOTIONAL ORIGIN
within the intention of the agent/’ ^ He adds that a
rational assertor of the principle pf utility approves of an
action because it is good,” and calls it good ‘‘because it
conduces to happiness/’ ^ This, however, is to invert the
sequence of the facts, since, properly speaking, an act is
called good because it is approved of, and is approved of
by an utilitarian in so far as it conduces to happiness.
Such confusion of terms cannot affect the real meaning
of the moral concepts. It is true that he who holds
that “actions are right in proportion as they tend to
promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the
reverse of happiness,” may, by a merely intellectual
process, pass judgment on the moral character of par-
ticular acts ; but, if he is an utilitarian from conviction,
his first principle, at least, has an emotional origin. Vhc
case is similar with many of the moral judgments
ordinarily passed by men. They are applications of some
accepted general rule: conformity or non-conformity to
the rule decides the rightness or wrongness of the act
judged of. But whether the rule be the result of a
person’s independent deductions, or be based upon
authority, human or divine, the fact that his moral con-
sciousness recognises it as valid implies that it has an
emotional sanction in his own mind.
Whilst the import of the predicate of a moral judg-
ment may thus in every case be traced back to an emotion
in him who pronounces the judgment, it is generally
assumed to possess the character of universality or “ objec-
tivity” as well. The statement that an act is good or
bad does not merely refer to an individual emotion ; as
will be shown subsequently, it always has reference to an'
emotion of a more public character. Very often it even
implies some vague assumption that the act must be
recognised as good or bad by everybody who possesses a
sufficient knowledge of the case and of all attendant
circumstances, and who has a “sufficiently developed”
* James Mill, Fragment on Afackin- ^ Ibid. p. 368.
tosh., pp. 5, 376. 3 Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism^^. 9^^,
OF MORAL JUDGMENTS
moral consciousness. We are not willing to admit that
our moral convictions are a mere matter of taste, and
we are inclined to regard convictions differing from our
own as errors. This characteristic of our moral judgments
has been adduced as an argument against the emotionalist
theory of moral origins, and has Ted to the belief that
the moral concepts represent qualities which are discerned
.by reason.
Cudworth, Clarke, Price, and Reid are names which
recall to our mind a theory according to which the
morality of actions is perceived by the intellect, just as
are number, diversity, causation, proportion. “ Morality
is eternal and immutable,” says Richard Price. “ Right
and wrong, it appears, denote what actions are. Now
whatever any thing is, that it is, not by will, or decree, or
power, but by nature and necessity. Whatever a triangle
or circle is, that it is unchangeably and eternally. . . .
The same is to be said of right and wrong, of moral good
and evil, as far as they express real characters of actions.
They must immutably and necessarily belong to those
actions of which they are truly affirmed.” ^ And as
having a real existence outside the mind, they can only
be discerned by the understanding. It is true that this
discernment is accompanied with an emotion: — “Some
impressions of pleasure or pain, satisfiction or disgust,
generally attend our perceptions of virtue and vice. But
these are merely their effects and concomitants, and not
the percepti^ons themselves, which ought no more to be
confounded with them,* than a particular truth (like that
for which Pythagoras offered a hecatomb) ought to be
confounded with the pleasure that may attend the dis-
covery of it.” '
According to another doctrine, the moral predicates,
though not regarded as expressions of “ theoretical ”
truth, nevertheless derive all their import from reason — •
from “practical” or “moral’' reason, as it is variously
^ Price, Keviezv of the Principal Questions in Morals^ pj:). 63, 74 sq.
“ Ibid. p. 63.
THE EMOTIONAL ORIGIN
called. Thus Professor Sidgwick holds that the funda-
mental notions represented by the word ought ’’ or
right,” which moral judgments contain expressly or by
implication, are essentially different from all notions
representing facts of physical or psychical experience, and
he refers such judgments to the ‘‘reason,” understood as
a fficuity of cognition. By this he implies “ that what
ought to be is a possible object of knowledge, that
what I judge ought to be, must, unless I am in error, be
similarly judged by all rational beings who judge truly of
the matter.” dTe moral judgments contain moral truths^
and “cannot legitimately be interpreted as judgments
respecting the present or future existence of human
feelings or any facts of the sensible world.” ^
Yet our tendency to objectivise the moral judgments is
no sufficient ground for referring them to the province of
reason. If, in this respect, there is a difference between
these judgments and others that are rooted in the sub-
jective sphere of experience, it is, largely, a difference in
degree rather than in kind. The aesthetic judgments,
which indisputably have an emotional origin, also lay
claim to a certain amount of “ objectivity.” By saying
of a piece of music that it is beautiful, we do not merely
mean that it gives ourselves aesthetic enjoyment, but we
make a latent assumption that it must have a similar
effect upon everybody who is sufficiently musical to
appreciate it. This objectivity ascribed to judgments
which have a merely subjective origin springs in the first
place from the similarity of the mental constitution of
men, and, generally speaking, the tendency to regard
them as objective is greater in proportion as the impres-
sions vary less in each particular case. If “ there is no
disputing of tastes,” that is because taste is so extremely
variable ; and yet eve||,^in this instance we recognise a
certain “ objective ” st#rakm by speaking of a “ bad ” and
a “ good ” taste. On the other hand, if the appearance
of objectivity in the moral judgments is so illusive as to
^ Sidgwick, Methods of Ethics^ pp. 25, 33 S(^.
OF MORAL JUDGMENTS
make it seem necessary to refer them to reason, that is
partly on account of the comparatively uniform nature of
the moral consciousness.
Society is the school in which men learn to distinguish
between right and wrong. The headmaster is Custom,
and the lessons are the same for all. The first moral
judgments were pronounced by public opinion ; public
indignation and public approval are the prototypes of the
moral emotions. As regards questions of morality, there
was, in early society, practically no difference of opinion ;
hence a character of universality, or objectivity, was from
the very beginning attached to all moral judgments. And
when, with advancing civilisation, this unanimity was to
some extent disturbed by individuals venturing to dissent
from the opinions of the majority, the disagreement was
largely due to facts which in no way affected the moral
principle, but had reference only to its application.
Most people follow a very simple method in judging
of an act. Particular modes of conduct have their
traditional labels, many of which are learnt with language
itself; and the moral judgment commonly consists simply
in labelling the act according to certain obvious charac-
teristics which it presents in common with others belonging
to the same group. But a conscientious and intelligent
judge proceeds in a different manner. He carefully
examines all the details connected with the act, the
external and internal conditions under which it was per-
formed, its consequences, its motive ; and, since the moral
estimate in a large measure depends upon the regard paid
to these circumstances, his judgment may differ greatly
from that of the man in the street, even though the moral
standard which they apply be exactly the same. But to
acquire a full insight into all the details which are apt to
influence the moral value of an.o;act is in many cases any-
thing but easy, and this natufaiff increases the disagree-
Inent, There is thus in every advanced society a diversity
of opinion regarding the moral value of certain modes
of conduct which results Yrom circumstances of a purely
lO
THE EMOTIONAL ORIGIN
intellectual character — from the knowledge or ignorance
of positive facts, — and involves no discord in principle.
Now it has been assumed by the advocates of various
ethical theories that all the differences of moral ideas
originate in this way, and that there is some ultimate
standard which must be recognised as authoritative by
everybody who understands it rightly. According to
Bentham, the rectitude of utilitarianism has been con-
tested only by those who have not known their own
meaning : When a man attempts to combat the prin-
ciple of utility . . . his arguments, if they prove anything,
prove not that the principle is wrong, but that, according
to the applications he supposes to be made of it, it is
misapplied/’ ' Mr. Spencer, to whom good conduct is
that which conduces to life in each and all,” believes
that he has the support of the true moral consciousness,”
or moral consciousness proper,” which, whether in
harmony or in conflict with the pro-ethical ” sentiment,
is vaguely or distinctly recognised as the rightful ruler.^
Samuel Clarke, the intuitionist, again, is of opinion that
if a man endowed with reason denies the eternal and
necessary moral differences of things, it is the very same
“ as if a man that has the use of his sight, should at the
same time that he beholds the sun, deny that there is any
such thing as light in the world ; or as if a man that
understands Geometry or Arithmetick, should deny the
most obvious and known proportions of lines or
numbers/’^ In short, all disagreement as to questions of
morals is attributed to ignorance or misunderstanding.
The influence of intellectual considerations upon moral
judgments is certainly immense. We shall find that the
evolution of the moral consciousness to a large extent
consists in its development from the unreflecting to the
reflecting, from the unenlightened to the enlightened.
All higher emotions are determined by cognitions, they arise
v.
^ Bentham, Pyincipics of Alorals and Ckiikc, Discourse confernin^ the
Legislation^ p. 4 sq. Unchangeable Obligations of Natural
Principles of Ethiesfx, Pflii^-ion, p. 179.
• OF MORAL JUDGMENTS
1 1
from the presentation of determinate objective condi-
tions”;^ and moral enlightenment Implies a true and com-
prehensive presentation of those objective conditions by
which the moral emotions, according to their very nature,
are determined. Morality may thus in a much higher
degree than, for instance, beauty be a subject of instruc-
tion and of profitable discussion, in which persuasion is
•carried by the representation of existing data. But al-
though in this way many differences may be accorded,
there are points in which unanimity cannot be reached
even by the most accurate presentation of facts or the
subtlest process of reasoning.
Whilst certain phenomena will almost of necessity
arouse similar moral emotions in every mind which per-
ceives them clearly, there are others with which the case is
different. The emotional constitution of man does not
present the same uniformity as the human intellect.
Certain cognitions inspire fear in nearly every breast ; but
there are brave men and cowards in the world, indepen-
dently of the accuracy with which they realise impending
danger. Some cases of suffering can hardly fail to awaken
compassion in the most pitiless heart ; but the sympathetic
dispositions of men vary greatly, both in regard to the
beings with whose sufferings they are ready to sympathise,
and with reference to the ijitensity of the emotion. The
same holds good for the moral emotions. The existing
diversity of opinion as to the rights of different classes
of men, and of the lower animals, which springs from
emotional differences, may no doubt be modified by a
clearer insight into certain facts, but no perfect agreement
can be expected as long as the conditions under which the
emotional dispositions are formed remain unchanged.
Whilst an enlightened mind must recognise the complete
or relative irresponsibility of an animal, a child, or a
madman, and must be influenced in its moral judgment by
Ihe motives of an act- — no intellectual enlightenment, no
scrutiny of facts, can decide how far the Interests of the
^ Marshall, Pain, Pleasure, and Aesthetics, p. 83.
THE EMOTIONAL ORIGIN
I 2
lower animals should be regarded when conflicting with
those of men, or how far a person is bound, or allowed,
to promote the welfare of his nation, or his own welfare,
at the cost of that of other nations or other individuals.
Professor Sidgwick’s well-known moral axiom, “ 1 ought
not to prefer my own lesser good to the greater good
of another/' ^ would, if explained to a Fuegian or a
Hottentot, be regarded by him, not as self-evident, but as
simply absurd ; nor can it claim general acceptance even
among ourselves. Who is that ^‘Another” to whose
greater good I ought not to prefer my own lesser good ?
A fellow-countryman, a savage, a criniinal, a bird, a fish
— all without distinction ? It will, perhaps, be argued
that on this, and on all other points of morals, there
would be general agreement, if only the moral conscious-
ness of men were sufiiciently developed. But then, when
speaking of a sufficiently developed '' moral conscious-
ness (beyond insistence upon a full insight into the
governing facts of each case), we practically mean nothing
else than agreement with our own moral convictions.
The expression is faulty and deceptive, because, if intended
to mean anything more, it presupposes an objectivity of
the moral judgments which they do not possess, and at
the same time seems to be proving what it presupposes.
We may speak of an intellect as sufficiently developed to
grasp a certain truth, because truth is objective ; but it is
not proved to be objective by the fact that it is recognised
as true by a ‘‘sufficiently developed" intellect. The
objectivity of truth lies in the recognition of facts as true
by all who understand them fully ^ whilst the appeal to a
siijficioit knowledge assumes their objectivity. To the
verdict of a perfect intellect, that is, an intellect which
knows everything existing, all would submit ; but we can
form no idea of a moral consciousness which could lay
claim to a similar authority. If the believers in an all-
^ Sicl^wick, op. cit. p. 383. a conversation which I had willi him
" This, in fact, was tlie cxjdanalion rcgiirding his moral axioms,
i^ivei^ by Professv)r Sidgwick himself in
OF MORAL JUDGMPZNTS
good God, who has revealed his will to mankind, maintain
that they in this revelation possess a perfect moral
standard, and that, consequently, what is in accordance
with such a standard must be objectively right, it may be
asked what they mean by an ’■^all-good” God. And in
their attempt to answer this question, they would in-
evitably have to assume the objectivity they wanted to
prove.
The error we commit by attributing objectivity to
moral estimates becomes particularly conspicuous when
we consider that these estimates have not otily a certain
quality, but a certain quantity. There are different
degrees of badness and goodness, a duty may be more or
less stringent, a merit may be smaller or greater.’ These
quantitative differences are due to the emotional origin of
all moral concepts. Emotions vary in intensity almost
indefinitely, and the moral emotions form no exception to
this rule. Indeed, it may be fairly doubted whether the
same mode of conduct ever arouses exactly the same
degree of indignation or approval in any two individuals.
Many of these differences are of course too subtle to be
manifested in the moral judgment ; but very frequently
the intensity of the emotion is indicated by special words,
or by the way in which the judgment is pronounced. It
should be noticed, however, that the quantity of the
estimate expressed in a moral predicate is not identical
with the intensity of the moral emotion which a certain
mode of conduct arouses on a special occasion. We are
liable to feel more indignant if an injury is committed
before our eyes than if we read of it in a newspaper, and
yet we admit that the degree of wrongness is in both
cases the same. The quantity of moral estimates is
determined by the intensity of the emotions which their
objects tend to evoke under exactly similar external
circumstances.
•
^ It. will he shown in a follown’n^ cordance willi the moral law. The
chapter why there are no degree^ of adjeeliv(‘ '' right means that duly is
rightness. This concept implies ac- fulfilled.
THE EMOTIONAL ORIGIN
Besides the relative uniformity of moral opinions, there
is another circumstance which tempts us to objectivise
moral judgments, namely, the authority which, rightly or
wrongly, is ascribed to moral rules. From our earliest
childhood we are taught that certain acts are right and
that others are wrong. Owing to their exceptional im-
portance for human welfare, the facts of the moral
consciousness are emphasised in a much higher degree
than any other subjective facts. We are allowed to have
our private opinions about the beauty of things, but we
are not so readily allowed to have our private opinions
about right and wrong. The moral rules which are
prevalent in the society to which we belong are supported
by appeals not only to human, but to divine, authority,
and to call in question their validity is to rebel against
religion as well as against public opinion. Thus the
belief in a moral order of the world has taken hardly less
firm hold of the human mind, than the belief in a natural
order of things. And the moral law has retained its
authoritativeness even when the appeal to an external
authority has been regarded as inadequate. It filled Kant
with the same awe as the star-spangled firmament. Ac-
cording to Butler, conscience is ‘Li faculty in kind and in
nature supreme over all others, and which bears its own
authority of being so.” ‘ Its supremacy is said to be
‘‘ felt and tacitly acknowledged by the worst no less than
by the best of men.”‘'^ Adam Smith calls the moral
faculties the vicegerents of God within us,” who ‘‘ never
fail to punish the violation of them by the torments of
inward shame and self-condemnation ; and, on the con-
trary, always reward obedience with tranquillity of mind,
with contentment, and self-satisfaction.”^ Even Hutche-
son, v/ho raises the question why the moral sense should
not vary in different men as the palate does, considers it
‘ Buller, ‘Sermon 11 . — Upon Hu-
man Nature,’ in Analogy of Religion y
p. 403.
- Dugald Stewart, Philosophy of the
Active and Aforal Pozvers of A fan, i'.
302.
^,,Adam Smith, Theory of Aloral
Sentiments, p. 235.
“to be naturally destined to command all the other
powers.” ^
Authority is an ambiguous word. It may indicate
knowledge of truth, and it may indicate a rightful power
to command obedience. The authoritativeness attributed
to the moral law has often reference to both kinds of
authority. The moral lawgiver lays down his rules in
order that they should be obeyed, and they are authorita-
tive in so far as they have to be obeyed. But he is also
believed to know what is right and wrong, and his
commands are regarded as expressions of moral truths.
As we have seen, however, this latter kind of authority
involves a filse assumption as to the nature of the moral
predicates, and it cannot be justly inferred from the
power to command. Again, if the notion of an external
lawgiver be put aside, the moral law does not generally
seem to possess supreme authority in either sense of the
word. It does not command obedience in any exceptional
degree ; ' few laws are broken more frequently. Nor can
the regard for it be called the mainspring of action ; it
is only one spring out of many, and variable like all others.
In some instances it is the ruling power in a man’s life, in
others it is a voice calling in the desert ; and the majority
of {K‘ople seem to be more afraid of the blame or ridicule
of their fellowmen, or of the penalties with which the
law threatens them, than of ‘‘the vicegerents of God”
in their own hearts. That mankind prefer the possession
of virtue to all other enjoyments, and look upon vice as
worse than any other misery is unfortunately an imagina-
tion of some moralists who confound men as they are
with men as they ought to be.
It is said that the authority of the moral law asserts
itself every time the law is broken, that virtue bears in
itself its own reward, and vice its own punishment. But,
to be sure, conscience is a very unjust retributer. The
ifiore a person habituates himself to virtue the more he
^ Hutchesonj Sys/eni of ]\Ioi-al Phito-
sophy^ i. 61.
Idem, Inquiry irtio ihc Original of
our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue, p. 248.
i6 THE EMOTIONAL ORIGIN chap.
sharpens its sting, the deeper he sinks in vice the more he
blunts it. Whilst the best men have the most sensitive
consciences, the worst have hardly any conscience at all.
It is argued that the habitual sinner has rid himself of
remorse at a great cost ; ^ but it may be fairly doubted
whether the loss is an adequate penalty for his wickedness.
We are reminded that men are rewarded for good and
punished for bad acts by the moral feelings of their neigh-
bours. But public opinion and law judge of detected
acts only. Their judgment is seldom based upon an
exhaustive examination of the case. They often apply
a standard which is itself open to criticism. And the
feelings with which men regard their fellow-creatures,
and which are some of the main sources of human happi-
ness and sufFering, have often very little to do with
morality. A person is respected or praised, blamed or
despised, on other grounds than his character. Nay, the
admiration which men feel for genius, courage, pluck,
strength, or accidental success, is often superior in intensity
to the admiration they feel for virtue.
In spite of all this, however, the supreme authority
assigned to the moral law is not altogether an Illusion,
It really exists in the minds of the best, and is nominally
acknowledged by the many. By this I do not refer to
the universal admission that the moral law, whether obeyed
or not, ought under all circumstances to be obeyed ; for
this is the same as to say that what ought to be ought to
be. But it is recognised, in theory at least, that morality,
either alone or in connection with religion, possesses
a higher value than anything else ; that rightness and
goodness are preferable to all other kinds of mental
superiority, as well as of physical excellence. If this
theory is not more commonly acted upon, that is due to its
being, in most people, much less the outcome of their own
feelings than of instruction from the outside. It is ulti-'
mately traceable to some great teacher whose own mind
was ruled by the ideal of moral perfection, and whose
^ Ziegler, Social Ethics^ p. 103.
OF MORAL JUDGMENTS
words became sacred on account of his supreme wisdom,
like Confucius or Buddhad or on religious grouncis, like
Jesus. The authority of the moral law is thus only an
expression of a strongly developed, overruling moral con-
sciousness. It can hardly, as Mr. Sidgwick maintains, be
said to depend upon the conception of the objectivity
of duty." On the contrary, it must be regarded as a cause
of this conception — not only, as has already been, pointed
out, where it is traceable to some external authority, but
where it results from the strength of the individuars own
moral emotions. As clearness and distiiictness of the
conception of an object easily produces the belief in its
truth, so the intensity of a moral emotion makes him
who feels it disposed to objcctivise the moral estimate to
which it gives rise, in other words, to assign to it universal
validity. The enthusiast is more likely titan anybody
else to regard his judgments as true, and so is the moral
enthusiast with reference to his moral judgments. The
intensity of his emotions makes him the victim of an
illusion.
The presumed objectivity of moral judgments thus
being a chimera, there can be no moral truth in the sense
in which this term is generally understood, d'he ulti-
mate reason for this is, that the moral concepts are based
upon emotions, and that the contents of an emotion fall
entirely outside the category of truth. But it may be
true or not that we have a certain emotion, it may be true
or not that a given mode of conduct has a tendency to
evoke in us moral indignation or moral approval. Hence
a moral judgment is true or false according as its subject
has or has not that tendency which the predicate attri-
butes to it. If 1 say that it is wrong to resist evil, and
yet resistance to evil has no tendency whatever to call
^ “ Besides the ideal king, the per- the })evsoniricati()n of Wisdom, the
^onificadon of Power and Justice, Buddha.” (Rliys Davids, Lec-
inoaicr ideal has played an important hires oii Some Points in the History oj
)art ii\ the formation of early Buddhist Buddhism^ p. i4l).
deas regarding their Master. ... It, *’ Sidgwick, op, rif. ]). 104.
vas the ideal of a perfectly Wise Man,
• VOL. !• C
forth in me an emotion of moral disapproval, then my
judgment is false.
If there are no general moral truths, the object of
scientific ethics cannot be to fix rules for human conduct,
the aim of all science being the discovery of some truth.
It has been said by Bentham and others that moral prin-
ciples cannot be proved because they are first principles
which are used to prove everything else.’ But the real
reason for their being inaccessible to demonstration is
that, owing to their very nature, they can never be true.
If the word “ Ethics,” then, is to be used as the name
for a science, the object of that science can only be to
study the moral consciousness as a fact.'^
Ethical subjectivism is commonly held to be a dan-
gerous doctrine, destructive to morality, opening the door
to all sorts of libertinism. If that which appears to each
man as right or good, stands for that which is right or
good ; if he is allowed to make his own law, or to make
no law at all ; then, it is said, everybody has the na'tural
right to follow his caprice and inclinations, and to hinder
him from doing so is an infringement on his rights, a
constraint with which no one is bound to comply provided
that he has the power to evade it. This inference was
long ago drawn from the teaching of the Sophists,” and
it will no doubt be still repeated as an argument against any
theorist who dares to assert that nothing can be said to be
truly right or wrong.
To this argument may, first, be objected that a scientific
theory is not invalidated by the mere fact that it is likely
to cause mischief. The unfortunate circumstance that
there do exist dangerous things in the world, proves that
soniething may be dangerous and yet true. Another
question is whether any scientific truth really is mis-
^ Bentham, Principles oj Morals and Kthik,’ in Driller Tnternationaler Con-
Legislation, p. 4. llolfding, Etik, p. gress fur Psychologic in Munchen.^^}^,^
Sijq,
*’ Cf. Simmel, Einleiliing in die LLislory of Greek iViilosophy,
Mornlwissenschajf i. p. iii. jy, ; VVe.ster- ci. 475.
inarck, * Normative und psychologisclie
OF MORAL JUDGMENTS
chievous on the whole, although it may cause much
discomfort to certain people. I venture to believe that
this, at any rate, is not the case with that form of ethical
subjectivism which I am here advocating. The charge
brought against the Sophists does not at all apply to it.
I do not even subscribe to that beautiful modern sophism
which admits every man’s conscience to be an infallible
guide. If we had to recognise, or rather if we did recog-
nise, as right everything which is held to be right by any-
body, savage or Christian, criminal or saint, morality
would really suffer a serious loss. But we do not, and
we cannot, do so. My moral judgments are my own
judgments ; they spring from my own moral conscious-
ness ; they judge of the conduct of other men not from
their point of view, but from mine, not with primary
reference to their opinions about right and wrong, but
with reference to my own. Most of us indeed admit that,
when judging of an act, we also ought to take into con-
sideration the moral conviction of the agent, and the
agreement or disagreement between his doing and his idea
of what he ought to do. But although we hold it to be
wrong of a person to act against his conscience, we may at
the same time blame him for having such a conscience as
he has. Ethical subjectivism covers all such cases. It
certainly does not allow everybody to follow his own in-
clinations ; nor does it lend sanction to arbitrariness and
caprice. Our moral consciousness belongs to our mental
constitution, which we cannot change as we please. We
approve and we disapprove because we cannot do other-
wise, Can we help feeling pain when the fire burns us ?
*Can we help sympathising with our friends ? Are these
phenomena less necessary, less powerful in their conse-
quences, because they fall within the subjective sphere
of experience ? So, too, why should the moral law com-
mand less obedience because it forms part of our own
H^tiare ?
Far from being a danger, ethical subjectivism seems to
me more likely to be an acquisition for moral practice.
ORIGIN OF MORAL JUDGMENTS
CH. 1
Could it be brought home to people that there is no
absolute standard in morality, they would perhaps be
somewhat more tolerant in their judgments, and more
apt to listen to the voice of reason. If the right has an
objective existence, the moral consciousness has certainly
been playing at blindman’s buff* ever since it was born,
and will continue to do so until the extinction of the
human race. But who does admit this ? The popular
mind is always inclined to believe that it possesses the
knowledge of what is right and wrong, and to regard
public opinion as the reliable guide of conduct. We have,
to be sure, no reasoti to regret that there are men who
rebel against the established rules of morality ; it is more
deplorable that the rebels are so few, and that, conse-
quently, the old rules change so slowly. Far above the
vulgar idea that the right is a settled something to which
everybody has to adjust his opinions, rises the conviction
that it has its existence in each individual mind, capable of
any expansion, proclaiming its own right to exist, if needs
be, venturing to make a stand against the whole world.
Such a conviction makes for progress.
Chapter II
THH NATURE OF THE MORAL EMOTIONS
In the preceding chapter it was asserted, in general
terms, that the moral concepts are based on emotions, and
the leading arguments to the contrary were met. We shall
now proceed to examine the nature of the moral emotions.
These emotions arc of two kinds : disapproval, or
indignation, and approval. They have in common
characteristics which make them moral emotions, in dis-
tinction from others of a non-moral character, but at the
same time both of them belong to a wider class of emo-
tions, which I call retributive emotions. Again, they
differ from each other in points which make each of them
allied to certain non-moral retributive emotions, disap-
proval to anger and revenge, and approval to that kind
of retributive kindly emotion which in its most developed
form is gratitude. They may thus, on the one hand, be
regarded as two distinct divisions of the moral emotions,
whilst, on the other hand, disapproval, like anger and
revenge, forms a sub-species of resentment, and approval,
like gratitude, forms a sub-species of retributive kindly
emotion. The following diagram will help to elucidate
the matter : —
Uetril mti vo I\niolion.s.
Resentment.
Retrilnitive Kindly Emotion.
Moral
di.sapjnuval.
Moral
a|:)])roval.
•Aii^^er and
Revenge.
Moral limotions.
Non-moral retri-
]>ittive Kindly Emotion,
including Clratitude.
THE NATURE OF
That moral disapproval is a kind of resentment and
akin to anger and revenge, and that moral approval is a
kind of retributive kindly emotion and akin to gratitude,
are, of course, statements which call for proof. An analysis
of all these emotions, and a detailed study of the causes
which evoke them, will, I hope, bear out the correctness
of my classification. In this connection only the analysis
can be attempted. The study of causes will be involved in
the treatment of the subjects of moral judgments.
Resentment may be described as an aggressive attitude
of mind towards a cause of pain. Anger is sudden resent-
ment, in which the hostile reaction against the cause of
pain is unrestrained by deliberation. Revenge, on the
other hand, is a more deliberate form of non-moral resent-
ment, in which the hostile reaction is more or less
restrained by reason and calculation.^ It is impossible,
however, to draw any distinct limit between these two
types of resentment, as also to discern where an actual
desire to inflict pain comes in. In its primitive form,
anger, even when directed against a living being, con-
tains a vehement impulse to remove the cause of pain
without any real desire to produce suffering.^ Anger
is strikingly shown by many fish, and notoriously by
sticklebacks when their territory is invaded by other
sticklebacks. In such circumstances of provocation the
whole animal changes colour, and, darting at the tres-
passer, shows rage and fury in every movement ; ^ but we
can hardly believe that any idea of inflicting pain is
present to its mind. As we proceed still lower down the
scale of animal life we find the conative element itself
gradually dwindle away until nothing is left but mere
reflex action.
That the fury of an injured animal turns against the
real or assumed cause of its injury is a matter of notoriety,
and everybody knows that the same is the case with the
' C'J\ Ribot , Psychology of the Emo~ the Evolutmia>y Psychology of Feelhigy
tioNS, p. 220 sqq. , p. I38 -Vr/.
“ There are some ^ood remarks on Romanes, Animal hitelligence^ p.
this in iMr. Hiram Stanley’s Similes in 246 S{qq,
TI
THE MORAL EMOTIONS
anger of a child. No doubt, as Professor Sully observes,
hitting out right and left, throwing things down on the
floor and breaking them, howling, wild agitated move-
ments of the arms and whole body, these are the outward
vents which the gust of childish fury is apt to take.” ^
But, on the other hand, we know well enough that
Darwin’s little boy, who became a great adept at throwing
books and sticks at any one who offended him,“ was in
this respect no exceptional child. Towards the age of
one year, according to M. Perez, children ‘‘ will beat
people, animals, and inanimate objects if they are angry
with them ; they will throw their toys, their food, their
plate, anything, in short, that is at hand, at the people
who have displeased them.”^ That a similar discrimina-
tion characterises the resentment of a savage is a fact
upon which it is necessary to dwell at some length
for the reason that it has been disputed, and because
there are some seeming anomalies which require an
explanation.
In a comprehensive work,^ Dr. Steinmetz has made the
feeling of revenge the object of a detailed investigation,
which cannot be left unnoticed. The ultimate conclusions
at which he has arrived are these : — Revenge is essentially
rooted in the feeling of power and superiority. It arises
consequently upon the experience of injury, and its aim
is to enhance the self-feeling ” which has been lowered
or degraded by the injury suffered. It answers this
purpose best if it is directed against the aggressor himself,
but it is not essential to it that it should take any deter-
minate direction, for, per sCy and originally, it is
“ undirected.” ^
Sully, Studies in Childhood, p. 232 Kfiistehnrii^ dos Cewissem, h^as [)ro-
sq. noiinced revenge to be a reaction
" Darwin, ‘ Ibograpbieal Sketch of against the feeling of inferiority which
an Infant,’ in Mind^ ii. 288. the aggressor impresses upon liis victim.
^ Perez, h'irst 'fhroe Years oji Child- Tlie injured man, lie says [ibid, ]>. 40),
ikood, p. 66 sq. is naturally reluctant to feel himself in-
Ethnoloj^isihe Sludien ztir i rsteti ferior to another man, and conse(|uently
Entwickliing der Strafe. strives, by avenging the aggression, to
® Strictly speaking, tins theory is*u>t show liimsclf etpial or even superior to
new. Dr. Paul Ree, in his )a>ok /)/e the aggressor. A similar view was pre-
THE NATURE OF
We are told, in fact, that the first stage through which
revenge passed within the human race was characterised
by a total, or almost total, want of discrimination. The
aim of the offended man was merely to raise his injured
“ self-feeling ” by inflicting pain upon somebody else, and
his savage desire was satisfied whether the man on whom
he wreaked his wrath was guilty orlnnocentd No doubt,
there were from the outset instances in which the offender
himself was purposely made the victim, especially if he
was a fellow-tribesman ; but it was not really due to the
feeling of revenge if the suffering was inflicted upon
him, in preference to others. Even primitive man must
have found out that vengeance directed against the actual
culprit, besides being a strong deterrent to others, was a
capital means of making a dangerous person harmless.
However, Dr. Steinmetz adds, these advantages should not
be overestimated, as even indiscriminate revenge has a
deterring influence on the malefactor. “ In early times,
then, vengeance, according to Dr. Steinmetz, was in the
main ‘‘ undirected.”
At the next stage it becomes, he says, somewhat less
indiscriminate. A proper victim is sought for even in
cases of what we should call natural death, which the
savage generally attributes to the ill-will of some foe
skilled in sorcery ; ’■ though indeed Dr. Steinmetz doubts
whether in such cases the unfortunate sufferer is really
supposed to have committed the deed imputed to him.^
At all events, a need is felt of choosing somebody for a
victim, and “undirected’' vengeance gradually gives way
to “ directed ” vengeance. A rude specimen of this is the
blood-feud, in which the Individual culprit is left out of
consideration, but war is carried on against the group of
which he is a member, either his fimily or his tribe. And
vic.'usly expressed Ijy Scliupenhauer ^ vSteimiietz, op. di. i. 355, 356, 359,
{ rarerga iimi J\rralipo/?iena, ii. 475 av/.). 561.
But Dr. Steinmetz lias elaboraled his “ i. 362.
theory with an independence and fulness Ibid. i. 356 5</.
vvhicli make any question of priority ^ Ibid. i. 359 .vy.
cjuite insignificant.
•THE MORAL EMOTIONS
from tnis system of joint responsibility we finally come,
by slow degrees, says Dr. Steinmetz, to the modern concep-
tion, according to which punishment should be inflicted
upon the criminal and nobody else/ Dr. Steinmetz
believes that the vis agens in this long process of evolu-
tion lies in the intellectual development of the human
race : man found out more and more distinctly that the
best means of restraining wrongs was to punish, a certain
person, namely, the wrong-doer." On this utilitarian calcu-
lation our author lays much stress in the latter part of his
investigation ; whereas in another place he observes that a
revenge which is directed against the offender is particularly
apt to remove the feeling of inferiority, by effectually
humiliating the hitherto triumphant foe.’'’
In this historical account the main points of interest
are the initial stage of undirected ” vengeance, and the
way in which such vengeance gradually became discriminate.
If, in primitive times, a man did not care in the least on
whom he retaliated an injury, then of course the direction
of his vengeance could not be essential to the revenge
itself, but would be merely a later appendix to it. The
question is, what evidence can Dr. Steinmetz adduce to
support his theory ? *"Of primitive man we have no direct
experience ; no savage people now existing is a faithful
representative of him, either physically or mentally. Yet
however greatly the human race has changed, primitive
man is not altogether dead. Traits of his character still
linger in his descendants ; and of primitive revenge, we are
told, there are sufficient survivals left.‘^
Under the heading Perfectly Undirected Revenge,” Dr.
Steinmetz sets out several alleged cases of such so-called sur-
vivals.'"' I. An Indian of tlic Omaha tribe, who was kicked out
of a trading establishment which he had been forbidden to enter,
declared in a rage that he would revenge himself for an injury so
gross, and, seeking some object to destroy, he encountered a
^ vSteinnictz, 0/). cif. i. 361.
" Ibid, i. 358, 359, 361 -v./.
^ Ibid. i. Ill,
Ibid i. 3O4.
® Ibid. i. 318 s',p/.
THE NATURE OF
SOW atid pigs, and appeased his rage by putting them all to
death.’' 2. The people of that same tribe believe that if a
man who has been struck by lightning is not buried in the
proper way, and in the place where he has been killed, his
spirit will not rest in peace, but will walk about till another
person is slain by lightning and laid beside him. 3. At the
burial of a Loucheux Indian, the relatives sometimes will cut
and lacerate their bodies, or, as sometimes happens, will, in a
fit of revenge against fate,” stab some poor, friendless person
who may be sojourning among them. 4. The Navahoes, when
jealous of their wives, are apt to wreak their spleen and ill-will
upon the first person whom they chance to meet. 5. 'Fhe
Great Eskimo, as it is reported, once after a severe epidemic,
swore to kill all white people who might venture into their
country. 6. I'he Australian father, whose little child happens
to hurt itself, attacks his innocent neighbours, believing that he
thus distributes the pain among them and consequently lessens
the sufi'ering of the child. 7. 'Hie Brazilian J'upis ate the
vermin which molested them, for the sake of revenge ; and if
one of them struck his foot against a stone, he raged over it and
bit it, whilst, if he were wounded with an arrow, he plucked it
out and gnawed the shaft. 8. TJie Dacotahs avenge theft by
stealing the property of the thief or of somebody else. 9. Among
the I'shatrali (Pamir if a man is robbed of his meat by a neigh-
bour’s dog, he will, in a fit of rage, not only kill the offending
dog, but will, in addition, kick his own. 10. In New Guinea
the bearers of evil tidings sometimes get knocked on the head
during the first outburst of indignation evoked by theif news.
11. Some natives of Motu, who had rescued two shipwrecked
crews and safely brought them to their home in Port Moresby,
were attacked there by the very friends of those tliey had saved,
the reason for this being that the Port Moresby people were
angry at the loss of the canoes, and could not bear that the
Motuans were happy while they themselves were in trouble.
12. Another story from New Guinea tells us of a man who
killed some innocent persons, because he had been disappointed
in his plans and deprived of valuable property. 13. Among
the Maoris it sometimes happened that the friends of a mur-
dered man killed the first man who came in their way, whether
eiiemy or friend. 14. Among the same people, chiefs who had
suft'ered some loss often used to rob their subjects of property
in order to make good the damage, 15, If the son of a Maori
is hurt, his maternal relatives, to. whose tribe he is considered
to belong, come to pillage his father’s house or village. 16. If
THE MORAL EMOTIONS
a tree falls on a Kiiki his fellows chop it up, and if one of that
tribe kills himself by falling from a tree the tree from which he
fell is promptly cut down. 17. In some parts of Daghestan,
when the cause of a death is unknown, the relatives of the
deceased declare some person chosen at random to have murdered
him, and retaliate his death upon that person.
I have been obliged to enumerate all these cases for the reason
that a theory cannot be satisfactorily refuted unless on its own
ground. I may confess at once that I scarcely ever saw an
hypothesis vindicated by the aid of more futile evidence. The
cases 7 and 16 illustrate just the reverse of ‘Sindirected ”
revenge, and, when we take into consideration the animistic
beliefs of savages, present little to astonish us. In case 17 the
guilt is certainly imputed to somebody at random, but only when
the culprit is unknown. Cases 1,4, 10 and 12 and perhaps also
II, imply that revenge is taken upon an innocent party in a fit
of passion ; in cases i and 12 the offender himself cannot be
got at, in case 10 the man who is knocked on the head appears
for the moment as the immediate cause of the grief or indigna-
tion evoked, while case 11 exhibits envy combined with extreme
ingratitude. In case 9 the anger is chiefly directed against the
‘^guilty dog, and against the innocent’' one evidently by an
association of ideas. Cases 8 and 14 illustrate indemnification
for loss of property, and in case 8 the thief himself is specifically
mentioned first. Iji case 15 the revenging attack is made upon
the property of those people among whom the child lives, and
who may be considered responsible for the loss its maternal claii
sustains by the injury. Case 6 merely shows the attempt of a
superstitious father to lessen the suffering of his child. As
regards case 5, Petitot, who has recorded it, says expressly that
the wliite people were supposed to liave caused the epidemic by
displeasing the god Tornrark.^ Case 2 points to a superstitious
belief which is interesting enough in itself, but wliich, so far as
I can see, is without any bearing whatever on the point we are
discussing. Case 3 looks like a death-offering. Tlie stabbing
of an innocent person is mentioned in connection with, or
rather as an alternative to, the self-laceration of the mourners,
which last has probably a sacrificial character. Moreover, there
is in this case no question of a culprit. In case 13, finally,
the idea of sacrifice is very conspicuous. Dr. Steinmetz has
borrowed his statement from Waitz, whose account is incom-
plete. Dieftenbach, the original authority, says that the custom
in question was called by the Maori tana tapu^ sacred fight,
^ Pctilot, Les Grands EsifitiniatiXy p. 207 57.
THE NATURE OF
or taua toto^ i.e.^ blood. He desciibes it as follows : —
If blood has been shed, a party sally forth and kill the first
person they fall in with, whether an enemy or belonging to
their own tribe ; even a brother is sacrificed. If they do not
fall in with anybody, the tohunga (that is, the priest) pulls up
some grass, throws it into a river, and repeats some incantation.
After this ceremony, the killing of a bird, or any living thing
tliat comes in their way, is regarded as sufficient, provided that
blood is actually shed. All wiio participate in such an excur-
sion arc tapu^ and are not allowed either to smoke or to eat
anything but indigenous food.” ^ It seems probable that this
ceremony was undertaken in order to appease the enraged
spirit of the dead,“^ and at the same time it may have been
intended to refresh the spirit with blood."* The question,
Jiowever, is, W])v was not his deatlt avenged upon the actual
culprit ? To this Dr. Steinmetz would answer that the de-
ceased was thought to be indiscriminate in his craving for
vengeance.^ But so far as the resentment of the dead is con-
cerned, the sacred fight ’’ of the Maoris only seems to illustrate
the impulsive character of anger. From Dieffenbach’s descrip-
tion of it, it is obvious that the friends of the slain man con-
sidered it to be a matter of paramount importance that blood
should be shed immediately. If no human being came in their
way, an animal was killed, but then an incantation was uttered
beforehand. I presume that the reason for this was the terror
which tlie supposed wrath of the dead man’s spirit struck into
the living, combined pcrliaps with the idea that it was in
immediate need of fresh blood. The Maoris considered all
spirits of the dead to be maliciously inclined towards them,^ and
the gliost of a person who had died a violent death was certainly
looked upon as especially dangerous. 'Fhc craving for instan-
taneous shedding of blood is even more conspicuous in anotlier
case which may be appropriately mentioned in this connectioji.
The Aetas of the Philippine Islands, we are told, do not always
^ Dieffcnljacli, 'fraijels in New
Zealand y ii. 127.
■’ Cf. ihid. ii, 129.
I'he latter object is suggested by
some funeral ceremonies which will be
noticed in a following chapter. Among
the Dyaks, “a fatlier who lost his child
would go out and kill the lir.st man he
met, as a funeral ceremony,” believing
that he thus provided the deceased with
a slave to accompany him to the habita-
tion of st)uls (Tylor, PriinKroe Culftirey
i. 459). Among the (laros, it was
formerly the practice, ‘^whenever the
death of a great man amongst them
occurred, to send out a party of assas-
sins to murder and bring back the head
of the first Bengali they met. The
victims so immolated would, it was
supposed, be acceptable to their gods”'
(Dalton, Descriptive Ethnology of
Bengal y p. 68).
■* 'Cf Steinmetz, op. clt. i. 343.
Taylor, Te Ika a A/auiy p. 221.
THE MORAL EMOTIONS
wait for the death of the afflicted before they bury hiin.
Immediately after the body has been deposited in the grave, it
becomes necessary, according to their usages, that his death
should be avenged. The hunters of the tribe go out with their
lances and arrows to kill the first livi/ig creature they meet witli,
whether a man, a stag, a wild hog, or a buffalo.”^ Dr.
Stcinmetz liimself quotes some other instances from the same
group of islands, in which, when a man dies, his iiearest kinsmen
go out to requite his death by the death of the hist man who
comes in their way.^ It is worth noticing that tlic Philippine
Islanders have the very worst opinion of their ghosts, and
believe that these are particularly bI(X)dthirsty soon after
death. ^
Dr. Steinmetz also refers to some statements according to
which, among certain Australian tribes, the relatives of a jierson
who dies avenge his death by killing an innocent man.*^ But
in these cases the avenged death, though natural ” according
to our terminology, is, in the belief of the savages, caused by
sorcery, and the revenge is not so indiscriminate as Dr.
Steinmetz seems to assume. Among the Wellington tribe, as
appears from a statement which he quotes himself, it is the
sorcerer’s life that must be taken for satisfaction.'''^ In New
South Wales, after the dead man has been interrogated as to
the cause of his death, his kinsmen are resolute in taking ven-
geance, if they ‘^imagine that they have got sure indications of
the perpetrator of the wrong.” ^ Among the Central Australian
natives, ‘’Diot infrec|ucntly the dying man will v/hisper in the
ear of a RaUtchawa^ or medicine man, the name of the man
whose magic is killing him,” and if this be not done, there is
no difficulty, by some other method, of fixing sooner or later
on the guilty party but only after the culprit has been
revealed by the medicine man is it decided by a council of the
old men whether an avenging party is to be arranged or not."^
Among the aborigines of West Australia, the survivors are
pretty busy in seeking out ” the sorcerer who is supposed to
have caused the death of their friend.^
^ Karl, Papuan Sy p. 132.
Steinmetz, op. cit, i. 335 sq.
^ Blumentrilt, ‘ Dcr Ahncncultii.s tier
Malaieu des Idiilipj'iinen- Archipcls,’ in
Miltheilungen dc 7 - Ges^Jhih, in
,, VVieHy XXV. 166 sqij. De Mas, Infornie
sobre id estado de las Is las Pilipinas en
1842, Orije?ty IPc. p. 15.
Steinmetz, op. cit. i. 337 sq.
® Hale, U.S. Exploring Expediiion.
Vol. VI . — El/inography and Philology.
p. 115; quoted l)y Sleinmety, op. cil.
i 337-
I* rase r, Alnvignics oj iVezv Siafth
J Vales, j). 86,
^ Spencer and ( iillen, AV/Z/zr 7 Vibes
of' Cif/tral ylns//-alia, j). 476 sq.
^ Calvert, Ahorigijies of Western
Australia^ p. 20 sq.
3 °
THE NATURE OF
To sum up : all the facts which Dr. Steinmetz nas
adduced as evidence for his hypothesis of an original stage
of “ undirected ” revenge only show, that under certain
circumstances, either in a fit of passion, or when the
actual offender is unknown or out of reach, revenge may
be taken on an innocent being, wholly unconnected with
the inflicter of the injury which it is sought to revenge.
There is such an intimate connection between the ex-
perience of injury, and the hostile reaction by which the
injured individual gives vent to his passion, that the
reaction does not fail to appear even when it misses its
aim. Anger, as Seneca said, “ does not rage merely
against its object, but against every obstacle which it
encounters on its way.” ’ Many infants, when angry and
powerless to hurt others, “strike their heads against doors,
posts, walls of houses, and sometimes on the floor.” "
Well known are the “ amucks ” of the Malays, in which
“the desperado assails indiscriminately friend and foe,”
and, with dishevelled hair and frantic look, murders or
wounds all whom he meets without distinction.^ But all
this is not revenge ; it is sudden anger or blind rage. Nor
is it revenge in the true sense of the word if a person who
has been humiliated by his superior retaliates on those
under him. It is only the outburst of a wounded “ self-
feeling,” which, when not directed against its proper
object, can afford no adequate consolation to a revengeful
man.
In the institution of the blood-feud some sort of
collective responsibility is usually involved.'* If the
^ Seneca, De ira^ iii. i.
Stanley Hall, ‘A Study of Anger,’
in AvicHcaji Jour, of Psychoh^^yj x. 554.
^ Crawfurd, History of the Indian
Archipel&^gOy i. 67. Cf. Ellis, ‘The
Amok of the Malays,’ in Jour, of
Mental Science^ xxxix. 325 sqq. In the
Andaman Islands, it is not uncommon
for a nuin “to vent his ill-temper, or
show his resentment at any act, by
destroying his own property as well as
that of his neighbours” (Man, ‘ Abori«
ginal Inhabitants of the Andaman
Islands,’ in Jour. Ant hr. Inst. xii.
III). Among the Kar Nicobarcse,
when a quarrel takes place, in .serious
ca.ses, a man will probably burn his own
house down (Kloss, In the Andamans
and Nicobars^ p. 310). But in these
instances it is not certain whether the
offended party destroys his own pro-
perty in blind rage, or with some defi-
nite object in view.
^ Cf Post, Anfange des Staats- und
Reehtsleben, p. 180 ; Ree, op. cit. p.
49 sq. ; Steinmetz, op. cit. i. ch. vi.
.THE MORAL EMOTIONS
offender is of another family than his victim, some of his
relatives may have to expiate his deed3 If he belongs to
another clan, the whole clan may be held responsible
for it.‘“ And if he is a member of another tribe, the
vengeance may be wreaked upon his fellow-tribesmen
indiscriminately.^
‘‘Among the Fuegians,” says Mr. Bridges, “ etiquette and
custom require that all the relatives of a murdered person
should . . . visit their displeasure upon every connection of
the manslayers, each personally.’’ The avengers of blood
would by no means be satisfied with a party of natives if they
sliould actually deliver up into their hands a manslayer, or kill
him themselves, “ but would yet exact from all the murderer’s
friends tribute or infliction of injuries with sticks or stones.”^
Among the Indians of British Columbia and Vancouver
Island, “ grudges are handed down from father to son for
generations, and friendly relations are never free from the risk
of being interrupted.”*'' Among the Greenlanders, the revenge
for a murder generally “costs the executioner himself, his
children, cousins, or other relatives their lives ; or, if these are
inaccessible, some other acquaintance in the neiglibourhood.”
Among the Maoris, blood-revenge might be taken on any
relative of the homicide, “no matter how distant.”" In Tana,
^ Besides the authorities cjuoted Godwin-Austen, ii. 394 ((iaro Hill
infni^ see Leuschner, in Sleinmetz, tribes).
Jvtu'hf S7>erh() Itnisse tinxeborenen ^ von Martiu.s, Beitriige zur Eihno-
Vb/kern in Afrika told Ozcatiieiiy p. 23 graphie AfiierikcC s^ \. 12'] sqq. (Brazilian
(Bakwiii) ; ibid. ]). 49 (Banaka and Indians). Crawfurd, op. cit. iii. 124
Bapuku) ; Kautanen, ibid. p. 341 (On- (natives of Celebes). Kohler, in
donga) ; Walter, ibid. p. 390 (natives Zoitschr. f 7>g/. /\e(ddy7vi.t\\ vii. 383
of Nossi-Be and Mayotte, Jiear Mada- (Goajiros of Columbia), kbid. vii. 376
gascar) ; von T.angsdorf, Voyages and (I'apuans of New Guinea). Curr, 7'he
Tra7jels.,\. 132 (Nukahivans) ; Forbes, Australian Raci\ i. 70. Scaramucci
A JVaturalisfs IVanderings in the and Giglioli, ‘ Notizie sui Danakil,’ in
p. 473 (Timorese) ; Archivio per Pantropologia e la etno-
Foreman, B/iilippine Islands.^ p. 213 login, xiv. 39. Leuschner, in Stein-
(Igorrotes of Luzon); Kovalcwsky, in inetz, Kechtsverhaltnisse, p. 23 (Bak-
Joiir. Anthr. Inst. xxv. 113 (j)eople wiri). Ibid. p. 49 (Banaka and
of Daghestan) ; Idem, Coutione con- Bapuku).
temporaine et loi ancienne, p. 248 sq. ^ Bridges, in South Auiericaii Alis-
(Ossetes) ; Merzbacher, Aus den Hock- sionary Magazine, xiii. 15 1 sqq.
regionen des Jiaukasus, ii. 51 (Khev- ® Maclie, Idneourjcr Island and
siirs). ^ British Colnnibia, p. 470.
Bridges, in A Voice for South ® Vuxnz, History of Greenland, \. 178.
America, xiii. 207 (Fuegians). Dorsey, ^ Short land, Traditions and Snper-
‘ Omaha Sociology,’ in Ann. Rep. Bur. stitions of the New Zealanders, p, 213
Ethn. iii. 369. Ridley, in four. Antjqr. sq. Cf. ibid. p. 2i8 sq.
Inst. ii. 268 (Kamilaroi in Australia).
THE NATURE OF
revenge “ is often sought in the death of the brother, or some
other near relative of the culprit.” ^ Among the Kabyles,
vengeance pent porter sur chacun dcs membrcs de la famille dii
meurtrier, quel qif il soit.” ^ The Bedouins, according to
Burckhardt, claim the blood not only from the actual
homicide, but from all his relations ; and it is these claims that
constitute the right of thh\ or the blood-revenge.^’*^ Among
tlie people of Ibrim, in Nubia, on the other hand, the same
traveller observes, it is not considered as sufficient to retaliate
upon any person withiji the fifth degree ot consanguinity, as
among the Bedouins of Arabia ; only the brother, son, or
first cousin can supply the place of the murderer.”^ Traces
of collective responsibility in connection with blood-revenge
are found among the Hebrews.^ It has prevailed, or still pre-
vails, among the Japanese and CoreansJ the Persians® and
Hindus,'^ the ancient Greeks and Tl'eutons.^^ It was a rule
among the Welsh and the Scotch in former days,^’^ and is so
still in CorsicaJ'^ Albania, and among some of the Soutliern
Slavs.^^ In Montenegro, if a homicide who cannot be caught
himself has no relatives, revenge is sometimes taken on some
inhabitant of the village or district to which he belongs, or even
on a person who only is of the same religion and nationality as
the murdererd^ In Albania, under similai' circumstances, the
victim may be a person vvlio has had nothing else to d : with
the offender than that he has perhaps once been s]:>eaking to
him.^®
There is no difficulty in explaining these facts. The
following statement made by Mr. Romilly with reference
’ Turner, Sanioa^ ]). 317. J\'ople of India, p. 195.
tianoleau and Letoinneux, La lanst, Ali-ayindtes Gentium,
Kabylie, iii. 6r. p. 42c\.
Biirckhardl, A'otes on the Bedouins Gotlaaids-Lagoi, 13.
a/ni JfA/ndys, ]}. Sg See, also, Layaul, Walter, Das ait e I Gales, p. 138.
Disco 7 'enes in the Kuins of Ninneeh 1 s\‘aG^\x\U-)A\, Ilistoi y of Ci^dlisation
and Babylon, 306 ; Lane, Alunners in Seotland, ii. 279.
and Customs of the iModeni Egyptians, ( 'ri e^oroviu.s, IVanderings in Cor-
i. 133- Eea, i. 179.
iiurckhardt, Travels in Nubia, (iopcevie, Obaralbanien und seine
p. p 28 .... P- 324
^ 2 iHimuel, xiv. 7, Cf. ibid. xxi. Miklosich, ‘ Die EIu( niche bei den
'' Daiilremcr, ‘ I'he Vendetta or l.er^al Slaven,’ in Denkschriften der kaiserl.
Revenge in Japan,’ in Trans. Asiatic Akadeniie d. Wissenseh. Philos. -histor.
Sue. Japan, xiii. 84. Classe, Vienna, xxxvi. 131, 146 sq.
" Gritlls, Corea, p. 227. Krauts, Sit/e und Braueh der Sndslaz’en.
^ J 3 piegel, Eranische Allerlhums- p. 39.
kuna’c, iii, 687. Polak, Persien, ii. 96. Lago, A/eniorie. sulla Dahnazia, ii.
Dubois, Description of the Cha- 90..^
raeter, Manners, and Customs of the Gopcevic, op. cit. p. 325,
ir TH^ MORAL EMOTIQNS
to the Solomon Islanders has, undoubtedly, a much wider
application In the cases which call for punishment,
the difficulties in the way of capturing the actual culprits
\are greater than any one, who has not been engaged in this
/disagreeable work, can imagine.’’ ‘ Though it may happen
’ that a manslayer is abandoned by his own people," the
system of blood-revenge more often seems to imply, not
only that all the members of a group are engaged, more
or less effectually, in the act of revenge, but that they
mutually protect each other against the avengers. A
homicide frequently provokes a war," in which family
stands against family, clan against clan, or tribe against
tribe. In such cases the whole group take upon them-
selves the deed of the perpetrator, and any of his fellows,
because standing up for him, becomes a proper object of
revenge. The guilt extends itself, as it were, in the eyes
of the offended party. So, also, any person who lives on
friendly terms with the offender, or is supposed to sym-
pathise with him, is liable to arouse a feeling of resent-
ment, and may consequently, in extreme cases, have to
expiate his crime. Moreover, because of the close rela-
tionship which exists between the members of the same
group, the actual culprit will be mortified by any success-
ful attack that the avengers make on his people, and, if he
be dead, its painful and humiliating effects may still be
supposed to reach his spirit. When the offender him-
self is beyond the reach of direct attack,” says Mr. Wilkins,
‘‘ it is not beneath a Bengali’s view to try to wound him
through his children or other members of his family.” ^
Among the South Slavonians, in a similar case, the
avengers of blood first attempt to kill the father, brother.
' Rotnill)-, IVcsU'ni Pacific and A-cw
Guinea, ]■». 8i. Cf. Varied richs, ‘ Mensch
iiml Person.’ in Dac: ylns/and, 1891,
p. 299.
* * See, t’.i,''. , SeolL I\(jt>eit.son, I'hc
Kdfirs of the Hindu Kush ,, ]). 440.
^ Dr. statement {Die Ge-
schleclitsgenosscnschaft der ilrzeit, jT.
156) that the blood -revenge “ charac-
• VOL. I
terisilt sich . . . ganz und gar als cin
Privatkrieg zwischen zwei Gescldechts-
genossensehaften,” Itowcver, is not ([uite
rx)rrect in this un(|ualilicd form, as may
be seen, born von Martins’s de-
scrijition of the f)loocl-rcvcnge of the
Ih'azihan Indiatrs, of. ciL i. 127 .vyy.
Wilkins, Modern Hinduisni, p.
4JI.
D
THE NATURE OF
CHAl’.
or grown-up son of the murderer, “ so as to inflict upon
him a very heavy and painful loss”; and only when this
has beeii tried in vain, are more distant relatives attacked.'
The Bedouins of the Eiuphrates even prefer killing the
chief man among the murderer’s relations within the
second degree to taking his own life, on the principle,
“You have killed my cousin, I will kill yours.”' And
the Californian Nishinam “ consider that the keenest and
most bitter revenge which a man can take is, not to
slay the murderer himself, but his dearest friend.” In
these instances vengeance is exacted with reference rather
to the loss suffered by the survivors than tc> the injury
committed against the murdered man, the culprit being
subjected to a deprivation similar to that which he has
inflicted himself. So, also, among the Marea, if a com-
moner is slain by a nobleman, his death is not avenged
directly on the slayer, but on some commoner who is sub-
servient to him.^ If, again, among the Quianganes of
Luzon, a noble is killed by a plebeian, another nobleman,
of the kin of the murderer, must be killed, while the
murderer himself is ignored.'^ If, among the Igorrotes,
a man slays a woman of another house, her nearest kins-
man endeavours to slay a woman belonging to the house-
hold of the homicide, but to the guilty man himself he
does nothing." In all these cases the culprit is not lost
sight of; vengeance is invariably wreaked upon somebody
connected with him. But any consideration of guilt or
innocence is overshadowed by the blind subordination to
that powerful rule which requires strict equivalence
between injury and punishment — an eye for an eye and
a tooth for a tooth — and which, when strained to the
utn.'ost, cannot allow the life of a man to be sacrificed
for that of a woman, or the life of a nobleman to be
‘ Krau.ss, o/\ nL p. 39. ^ Munzinj^cr, O^lafnhanisthr
■’ i^>lunt, Bcdoniii of the dioi^ *» ,
f up/i rates, \{. 20b S(f. HImnentriu, (juuted by .S|)oricer,
•’ Powers, ’/')-ihes 0/ Calijornia, p. Pri nci p/rs of El hies, sej .
f' rave Is in I he Philippines,
p. 213,
THF. MORAL EMOTIONS
sacrificed for that of a commoner, or the life of a com-
moner to expiate the death of a noble. This rule, as we
shall see later on, is not suggested by revenge itself, but is
due to the influence of other factors which intermingle
with this feeling, and help, with it, to determine the
action.
Nevertheless, the strong tendency to discrimination
which characterises resentment, is not wholly lost even
behind the veil of common responsibility. Mr. Howitt
has come to the conclusion that, among the Australian
Kurnai, if a homicide has been committed by an alien tribe,
the feud ‘‘ cannot be satisfied but by the death of the
offender,'’ although it is carried on, not against him alone,
but against the whole group of which he is a member.^
It is only “if they fiil to secure the guilty person that
the natives of Western Victoria consider it their duty to
kill one of his nearest relatives." Concerning the West
Australian aborigines, Sir (jcorge Cirey observes, “ The
first great principle with regard to punishments is, that all
the relations of a culprit, in the event of his not being
found, are implicated in his guilt ; if, therefore, the
principal cannot be caught, his brother or father will
answer nearly as well, and, failing these, any other male
or female relative, who may fall into the hands of the
avenging party.” ‘‘ Atnong the Papuans of the Tami
Islands, revenge may be taken on some other member of
the murderer’s family only if it is absolutely impossible
to catch the guilty person himself ^ That the blood-
revenge is in the first place directed against the malefactor,
and against some relative of his only if he cannot be
found out, is expressly stated with reference to various
peoples in different parts of the world ; ’ and it* is
‘ f'isojt mid Hovvitf, k^unilivoi and
/\nrnaf\ p. 22 r.
” Diiwson, Aushalian
" ( lrc\ , fom-naJs oj ions^ ii.
239 .
Itinilcr, (juc)l(j({ by Ivohicr, iiT
Zelischr. /'. 7’ero-/, Etchtswiss, xi\', jS’o.
Uicdtd, /K‘ sinik- rn /vv;, .v/^r/y vp^
/VT'.Otv/ iiissc/icn Svitdk’s en Papna, [.
434 (iuili\ (.*.s of Welti Ty. ( ')ialinei '
Pioticerinq' in Axw Oiiinea, p, lyt),
Kohler, ill Zia (si hr. J . Prrhhwiss
xiv. 4.'|(> (some Marshall Islanders)
Merker, ijiioIk! In Kohler, ? 7 nd. \\\
S 3 ( vVid.-haega). MreU, Inaian
i:) 2
THE NATURE OF
probable that much more to the same effect might have
been discovered, if the observers of savage life had paid
more attention to this particular aspect of the matter.
Among the h\iegians, the most serious riots take place
when a manslayer, whom some one wishes to punish, takes
refugee with his relations or friendsd Von Martius
remarks of the Brazilian Indians in general that, even
when an intertribal war ensues from the committing of
homicide, the nearest relations of the killed person
endeavour, if possible, to destroy the culprit himself and
his family." With reference to the Creek Indians, Mr.
Plawkins says that though, df a murderer flies and cannot
be caught, they will take revenge upon some innocent
individual belonging to his family, they are “ generally
earnest of themselves, in their endeavours to put the
guilty to death.’’ Fhe same is decidedly the case
in those parts of Morocco where the blood-feud still
prevails.
Not only has Dr. Steinmetz failed to prove his
hypothesis that revenge was originally undirected,” but
this hypothesis is quite opposed to all the most probable
ideas we can form with regard to the revenge of early man.
For my own part I am convinced that we may obtain a
good deal of knowledge about the primitive condition of
the human race, but not by studying modern savages only.
I have dealt with this question at some length in another
place, ^ and wish now merely to point out that those
general physical and psychical qualities which are not only
common to all races of mankind, but which are shared by
them with the animals most allied to man, may be
assumed to have been present also in the earlier stages of
j
'jyilft’S of (iiiiana^ p. 357. Bcnuiu, ich, loc. tit. p. 131 (Slavs). Wilda,
Missionary Labours i}i British iiitiana., Strafrecht dor Gerniajion, ]>. 173 sq.
[). 57. Dali, Alasha, p. 416. Boas, (ancient Teutons).
‘The Oeiilral Tvskiino,’ in Atm. Kef. ^ Ilyades and Deniker, Mission
Bur. Ethn. vi. 582. Jacob, Leben so ienfifujiic du Cap Horn., vii. 375.
dor 7 >oris/dniisohon. Bodz/inen, |>. 144. vt»n Marlins, of. cit. i. 128.
Kovalewsky, Coufunie oojitefnforaino, Hawkins, in 7 Lans. Ainorioan
p. 248 (Ossetes). [‘opcndc, Kecht und fithn, St'o. iii. 67.
Gcrioht in Montonoyroy p. 69 ; Tago, History of Huriazi Marriage, p.
op, (it, ii. 90 (Monlenegrines). Miklos- 3 .>v/c/.
THE MORAL EMOriONS
human development. Now^ concerning revenge among
animals, more especially among monkeys, many anecdotes
have been told by trustworthy authorities, and in every
case the revenge has been clearly directed against the
offender.
On the authority of a zoologist “ wliose scrupulous accuracy
was known to many persons,” Darwin relates tlie following
story : — At the Cape of Good Hope an officer had often
plagued a certain baboon, and the animal, seeing him approach-
ing one Sunday for parade, poured water into a hole and hastily
made some thick mud. which he skilfullv dashed over the officer
as he passed by, to tlie amusement of many bystanders. For
long afterwards the baboon rejoiced and triumphed whenever
he saw his victim.”^ Prof. Romanes considers this to be a good
instance of what may be called brooding resentment deliber-
ately preparing a satisfactory revenge.” ^ Fhis, I think, is to
put into the statement somewhat more than it really contains ;
but at all events it records a case of revenge, in the sense in
whicli Dr. Steinmetz uses the word, d'he same ma)^ be said
of other instances mentioneti by so accurate observers as Brchm
and Rengger in their descriptions of African and American
monkevs, and of various exam|)les of resentment in elephants
and even in camels.-^ According to Palgrave, the camel
possesses the j^tassion of revenge, ami in carrying it out shows
an unexpected degree of far-thouglited malice, united meanwhile
with all the cold stupidity of his usual character.” 'The follow-
ing instance, which occurred in a small Arabian town, deserves
to be cjuoted, since it seems to ha\ e escaped the notice of the
students of animal psvchology. A lad of about fourteen had
conducted a large camel, laden with wood, fiaun that very
t illage to another at half an hour’s distance or so. As the
^ Daiwin, DcWcc’?!/ of Jllafi, )>. 69.
Ronuines, .-liriffial r ^ p.
47 ^‘
nrelmi, J 7 i iorh/u’ri, i. 156.
From N'mih Foie (o F(/i<aIot\ |). 305.
{AFli/ri^esr/rie/i/e der
t hi ere voii Fara^iiay, p. 52) ^ives iIh-
following infonaation ll\eCay
“ Kiirclilet er . . . seinon ( Icyni'r, so
iftnmU er seine /ufUiclU ziir \\‘rstellunj4,
und sitclu sich ersl danu an iliin zii
uichen, wenn er ihn unvernuitlicl.
fallen kann. So hatle ich einen Cjfy,
welcher melirere Personen die ihn oft
auf cine j;rol)e Art L;cncckt liallcn, in
einetn Auycnblicke hiss, wosie im heslcii
Vernchinen niit. ihin zii sein plauhtcn.
Nacli vcriihtcr That kleUcMe er sclinell
anf einen holien Ikdken, wo ni-m ihni
niclit heikoininen konnle, vind grinste
schadenfroh den (degenstand seiner
Raehe an.’’ See, moreover, Watson,
'J'hc Feasoniny l\nve}- in AnimaF^
especially pj). 20, 21, 24, 156 .0/. ;
Romanes, of . oi /. p. 387 s ////. ; hut also
Morgan, minima! f ife and /nieiiiyrnee,
p. 401 iV/.
THE NATURE OE
CHAI’.
animal loitered or turned out of the way, its conductor struck
it repeatedly, and harder than it seems to liavc thought lie had
a right to do. But not finding the occasion favourable for
taking immediate quits, it ^ bode its time ; ’ nor was that time
long in coming. A few days later the same lad had to re-
conduct the beast, but unladen, to his own village. When ihey
were about half-way on the road, and at some distance from
any habitation, the camel suddenly stopped, looked deliberately
round in every direction to assure itself that lu) one was within
sight, and, finding the road far and near clear of passers-by,
made a step forward, seized the unlucky boy’s head in its
monstrous mouth, and lifting him up in the air flung him down
again on the earth with the upper part of his skull completely
torn off, and his brains scattered on the ground.”^ We are also
told that elephants, though very sensitive to insults, are never
provoked, even under the most painful or distracting circum-
stances, to hurt those from whom they have received no harm.*^
Sometimes animals show a remarkable degree of discrimination
in finding out the proper object for their resentment. It is
hardly surprising to read that a baboon, which was molested in
its cage witli a stick, tried to seize, not the stick, but the hand
of its tormentor,'^ More interesting is the revenge” which
an elephant at Versailles inflicted upon a certain artist who had
employed liis servant to tease the animal by making a feint of
throwing apples into its mouth : — This conduct enraged the
elephant ; and, as if it knew that the painter was the cause of
this teasing impertinence, instead of attacking the servant, it
eyed the master, and squirted at him from its trunk such a
quantity of water as spoiled the paper on which he was
drawing.” *
I find it inconceivable that anybody, in the face of such
facts, could still believe that the revenge of early man
was at first essentially indiscriminating, and became
gradually discriminating from considerations of social
expediency. But by this I certainly do not mean to deny
that violation of the “ selt-feeling ” is an extremely
common and powerful incentive to resentment. It is so
^ Palgrave, Narrative of a Year'^s ■'* Aas, Sjaeleliv og intclligens hos
Journey through Central and Eastern Dyr, \. 72.
Arabia^ i. 40. -A Smellic, Philosophy of Natural
“ Watson, op. dt. p. 26 sq. /Jisto?’y., i. 448,
The moral, emotions
among savage ^ and civilised men alike ; even dogs and
monkeys get angry when laughed at. Nothing more
easily rouses in us anger and a desire for retaliation,
nothing is more difficult to forgive, than an act which
indicates contempt, or disregard of our feelings. l.ong
after the bodily pain of a blow has ceased, the mental
suffering caused by the insult remains and calls for
vengeance. This is an old truth often told. According
to Seneca, the greater part of the things which enrage
us are insults, not injuries.”^ Plutarch observes that,
though different persons fall into anger for different
reasons, yet in nearly all of them is to be found the
idea of their being despised or neglected. “ Contempt,”
says Bacon, is that which putteth an edge upon anger,
as much, or more, than the hurt itself.” ' But, indeed,
there is no need to resort to different principles in order
to explain the resentment excited by different kinds of
pain. In all cases revenge implies, primordial ly and
essentially, a desire to cause pain or destruction in return
for hurt suffered, whether the hurt be bodily or mental ;
and, if to this impulse is added a desire to enhance the
wounded ‘‘self-feeling,” that does not interfere with the
true nature of the primary feeling of revenge. 'Phere
are genuine specimens of resentment without the co-
operation of self-regarding pride;" and, on the other
hand, the reaction of the wounded “self-teeling ” is not
necessarily, in the first place, concerned with the infliction
of pain. If a person has written a bad book which is
severely criticised, he may desire to repair his reputation
by writing a better book, not by humiliating his critics ;
and if he attempts the latter rather than the former, he
docs so, not merely in order to enhance his “ self-feeligg,”
' a’urncr, ‘ Elhnolo^^y of the Ungava of Sierra Leone, i, 21 1,
Districl,' in Ami. Rep- Rirr. lit/ui. xi. " Soneca, De ira, iii. 28.
2K) (Hudson Bay Indians). Oeorgi, Plutarch, De eohibenda ira, 12.
^ Ktiisia,' iii. 205 (Aleuts). Sarasin, Bacoji, ‘Essay lA’II. Of Anger,’
Rr<^ebnisse nainrwiss. L'orsehunt^en einf in Es'says', p 5r4.
Ceylon, ill. 537 (Wnldahs). \a)n Wrede, Bain, L/no/ions and the Will, {).
Reise in Iladhramaiit , jc 1 5 7 ( Bedouin?). 177-
WinlcrboUyin, Natii'e Africans in the
THE NATURE OF
but because he is driven on by revenge. Dr. Boas tells
us that the British Columbia Indian, when his feelings are
hurt, sits down or lies down sullenly for days without
partaking of food, and that, ‘‘when he rises his first
thought is, not how to take revenge, but to show that he
is superior to his adversary.’’ '
In the feeling of gratification which results from
successful resentment, the pleasure of power or superiority
also may form a very important element, but it is never
the exclusive element.' As the satisfaction of every
desire is accompanied by pleasure, so the satisfaction of
the desire involved in resentment gives a pleasure by
itself. The angry or revengeful man who succeeds in
what he aims at, delights in the pain he inflicts for the
very reason that he desired to inflict it.
Revenge thus only forms a link in a chain of emotional
phenomena, for which “ non-moral resentment ” may be
used as a common name. In this long chain there is no
missing link. Anger without any definite desire to cause
suffering, anger with such a desire, more deliberate resent-
ment — all these phenomena are so inseparably connected
with each other that no one can say where one passes into
another. Their common characteristic is that they are
mental states marked by an aggressive attitude towards
the cause of pain.
As to their origin, the evolutionist can hardly entertain
a doubt. Resentment, like protective reflex action, out
of which it has gradually developed, is a means of pro-
tection tor the animal. Its intrinsic object is to remove
a cause of pain, or, what is the same, a cause of danger.
Two different attitudes maybe taken by an animal towards
another which has made it feel pain : it may either shun
or attack its enemy. In the former case its action is
prompted by fear, in the latter by anger, and it depends
on the circumstances which of these emotions is the actual
^ Boas, /'Vrs/ Coicral Report ofi the ihe British As.sociafi^Mi, 1889, p. 19,
Indians of Hrilisk Columbia^ read at * - Cf. RiBol. op. eit. p. 221 sq.
the Nc\vcasiIc-u})oii-Tync meeting- of
‘THE MORAl. EMOTIONS
determinant. Both of them are of supreme importance
for the preservation of the species, and may consequently
be regarded as elements in the animars mental constitution
which have been acquired by means of natural selection
in the straggle for existence. We have already noted that,
originally, the impulse of attacking the enemy could hardly
have been guided by a representation of the enemy as
suffering. But, as a successful attack is necessarily accom-
panied by such suffering, the desire to produce it natur-
ally, with the increase of intelligence, entered as an
important element in resentment. The need for protec-
tion thus lies at the foundation of resentment in all its
forms.
Tliis view is not new. iVlorc than one lunuired and fifty
years before ii)arwin, Shaftesbury wrote of resentment in these
words : — Notwithstanding its immediate aim be indeed tlie ill
or punishment of another, yet it is plainly of the sort of
those [affections] which tend to the advantage and interest of
the self-system, the animal himself ; and is withal in other
respects contributing to the good and inteiest of the species.’’ ^
A similar opinion is expressed by Ihitlei*, according to whom
the reason and end for which man was made liable to anger
is, that he might be better (jiialiiied to prevent and resist \'io-
lence and opposition, while deliberate resentment “ is to be
considered as a weapon, put into our hands by nature, against
injury, injustice, and cruelty.”-' Adam Smith, also, believes
that resentment has been given us by nature for defence, ami
for defence only,” as being the safeguard of justice and the
security of innocence.”'^ Exactly the same view is taken by
several modern evolutionists as regards the ^N*nd” of resent-
ment, tlunigh they, of course, do not rest contented with saying
that this feeling has been given us by nature, but try to ex|)lain
in what way it has deyeloped. “Among members of the same
species,” says Mr. Herbert Spencer, “ tliose individuals which
have not, in any considerable degree, resented aggiessions,*must
have ever tended to disappear, and to liave left behind those
which have with some effect made counter-aiZ'^ressions.” ^ Mr.
* ‘ Shalteslniry, ‘ Uicjuiry concerning ^Vdani Sinith, 'J'heory of Moral
V^irUle or Merit,’ ii. 2. 2, in C/iaraoter' Sonti///i:?ils, jc 113.
islici's, ii. 145. ^ Spencer, Principh'S of lit hies, i.
“ Butler, ‘Seinion V'lII. — Upon fve- 361.
sentinentj’^c/. lit. p. 457.
THl^: NATURE OI-'
Hiram Stanley, too, quoting Junker’s statement regarding the
pigmies of Africa, that ‘‘they are much feared for their re-
vengeful spirit,” 1 observes that, “other things being equal, the
most revengeful are the most successful in the struggle for self-
conservation and self-furtherance.” This evolutionist theory
of revenge has been criticised by Dr. Steinmetz, but in my
opinion with no success. He remarks that the feeling of revenge
could not have been of any use to the animal, even though the
act of Vengeance might have been useful.'^ But this way of
reasoning, according to wliich the whole mental life would be
excluded from tlie influence of natural selection, is based on a
false conception of tlie relation between mind and body, and,
ultimately, on a wrong idea of cause and effect.
From non-moral resentment we shall pass to the emotion
of moral indignation. That this is closely connected with
anger is indicated by language itself: we may feel indig-
nant on other than moral grounds, and we may feel
“ righteous anger.” The relationship between these
emotions is also conspicuous in their outward expressions,
which, when the emotion is strong enough, present similar
characteristics. When possessed with strong moral indig-
nation, a person looks as if he were angry, '' and so he
really is, in the wider sense of the term. This relation-
ship has not seldom been recognised by moralists, though
it has more often been forgotten. Some two thousand
years ago Polybius wrote : — “ If a man has been rescued or
helped in an hour of danger, and, instead of showing
gratitude to his preserver, seeks to do him harm, it is
clearly probable that the rest will be displeased and
offended with him when they know it, sympathising with
their neighbour and imagining themselves in his case.
Hence arises a notion in every breast of the meaning and
theory of duty, which is in fact the beginning and end of
justice.’’ - Hartley regarded resentment and gratitude
’ junkLA*, Travels in Africa during ^ Steinmetz, EthtwL Stiidien, ^
the Years 1882-1886, p. 85. i. 135.
“ Minim Stanley, op, cit, p. 1 80. Cf. Notice, for instance, Michelani^elo’.s
also ( liiyaii, Ksqitissc d' line Morale sans M^i.ses.
obligation ni sanction^ p. 162 sq. “ l^olybius, Historiae, vi. 6.
n
THE MORAL EMOTIONS
as intimately connected with the moral sense.” ’ Adam
Smith made the resentment of the impartial spectator ”
a corner-stone of his theory of the moral sentiments.
Butler found the essential difference between sudden and
deliberate anger to consist in this, that the “ natural
proper end ” of the latter is to remedy or prevent only
that harm which implies, or is supposed to imply, injury
or moral wrong.” And to Stuart Mill, the sentiment of
justice, at least, appeared to be derived from ^‘the animal
desire to repel or retaliate a hurt or damage to oneself,
or to those with whom one sympathises.” ^
Moral indignation, or disapproval, like non-moral re-
sentment, is a reactionary attitude of mind directed towards
the cause of inflicted pain. In a subsequent chapter we
shall see that both are in a similar way determined by the
answer given to the question. What is the cause of the
pain -a fact which, whilst strongly confirming their
affinity, throws light upon some of the chief character-
istics of the moral consciousness. Nay, moral indignation
resembles non-moral resentment even* in this respect that,
in various cases, the aggressive reaction turns against
innocent persons who did not commit the injury which
gave rise to it. The collective responsibility assumed in
certain types of blood-revenge is an evidence of this in so
far as such revenge is not merely a matter of individual
practice, but has the sanction of custom. And even
punishment, which, in the strict sense of the term, is a
more definite expression of public, or moral, indignation
than the custom of private retaliation, is often similarly
indiscriminate.
Like revenge, and for similar reasons, punishment
sometimes falls on a relative of the culprit in cases when
he himself cannot be caught. In Fiji, says Mr. Williams,
the virtue of vicarious suffering is recognised.” It once
^hjippened that a warrior left his charged musket so
^ Hartley, Observaiions on Man^ i. ^ Jkiller, op. cit. p. 458.
520. " ^ Stuart Mill, Uii/ihinaNisfN , p. 79.
“ Adam op. cit. passim.
THE NATURE OF
carelessly that it went off and killed and wounded some
individuals, whereupon he fled himself. His case was
judged worthy of death by the chiefs of the tribe, and
the offender’s aged father was in consequence seized and
strangled.'
In other cases an innocent person is killed for the
offence of another, not because the offender cannot be
seized, but with a view to inflicting on him a loss, accord-
ing to the rule of like for like. The punishment, then, is
meant for the culprit, though the chief sufferer is some-
body else. According to the Laws of Hammurabi, if a
builder has built a house for a man and has not made
strong his work, and the house he built has fallen, and he
has caused the death of the owner, that builder shall be
put to death.” But ‘‘if he has caused the son of the
owner of the house to die, one shall put to death the son
of that builder.” “ Similarly, “ if a man has struck a
gentleman’s daughter and caused her to drop what is in
her womb, he shall pay ten shekels of silver for what was
in her womb.” But*“if that woman has died, one shall put
to death his daughter.'’ The following custom which
Mr. Gason reports as existing among the Australian
Dieyerie, in case a man should unintentionally kill another
in a fight, is probably based on a similar principle : —
“Should the offender have an elder brother, then he
must die in his place ; or, should he have no elder
brother, then his father must be his substitute ; but in
case he has no male relative to suffer for him, then he
himself must die.” ^
This extreme disregard of the suffering of guiltless
persons is probably not so much due to downright
callousness as to a strong feeling of family solidarity. The
same feeling is very obvious in those numerous instances
in which both the criminal himself and members of his
family are implicated in the punishment.
' Williams arid Calverl, /’>//, p. 24.
“ f.au's' of oiurafiy 229 stj.
Ihui, 209 s(/.
Crason, ‘ Manners and Customs of
tlic Dieycrie Tribe,’ in Woods, Native
Tribes of South Australias 265.
n
THE MORAL EMOTIONS
Among the Atkha Aleuts, the punisliment for certain offences
was sometimes carried so far as to include the wife of the
offender.^ Among the Ewc-speaking peoples of the Slave
Coast, a person found guilty of having procured, or en-
deavoured to procure, the death of another through the agency
of the gods Huntin and Loko, is put to death, and his family is
generally enslaved as well.” -^' Among the Matabele, if a person
is declared by the witch-doctor to have caused ifijury to some-
body else by making charms, he is immediately put to death,
his wife and the whole of his family sharing his fate.” Among
the Shilluks of the White Nile, ‘‘ murder is punished witli
death to the criminal and the forfeiture of wives and children
to the Sultan, who retains them in bondage.” ‘ Among the
Kafirs, in cases of trespasses against the kijig, the sentence falls
not only on the individual, but on his whole liouse.'* In Mada-
gascar, the code of native laws, up to recent time, reduced for
many offences the culprit’s wife and cliildren to slavery.^' In
some parts of the Malay Archipelago, according to Crawfurd,
a father and child arc considered almost inseparable, hence when
the one is punished the other seldom escapes.'^ In Bali, the law
prescribes that for certain kinds of sorcery the offender shall be
put to death. It adds, If the matter be very clearly made out,
let the punishment of death be extended to his father and In’s
mother, to his children and to his grand-children ; let none of
them live ; let none connected with one so guilty remain on
the face of the land, and let their goods he in like manner
confiscated.”
The Chinese doctrine of responsibility is to a great extent
based upon family solidarity ; in great crimes all the male rela-
tives of the offender are held responsible for his deed. Every
male relative, of whatever degree, who may he dwelling under
tlic roof of a man guilty of treason, is doomed to death, with
the exception of young boys, who are allowed their lives, but
oji the condition that they are made eunuchs for service in the
imperial palace.'^ In ancient Mexico, traitors and conspirators
were not only themselves killed, but their children and relatives
^ Petrofg ‘ Report on Alaska,’ in
Tenth Census of the United States^ p.
158.
Ellis, Eii^e- speaking Peoples pf the
Coast, p. 225.
^ Decle, I'hree Years in Sarage
Africa, p. 153.
^ Petherick, Travels in Central
Africa, ii. 3.
•'* Kat/.el, History of Mankind, ii. 445.
Sila'ee, The Great African Island,
]). iSi. Ellis, History of Madagascar,
i. 174, 175, 193.
" C'ravvfurd, op. cit. i. 82,
Ibid. iii. 138.
'■ Douglas, Society in China, p. 71
sq. Ta Tsing Leu Lee, sec. ccliv. }).
270.
THE NATURE OF
were made slaves to the fourth generation^ According to an
Athenian law, a man who committed sacrilege or betrayed his
country was banished with all his children. “ , Aristotle mentions
a case of sacrilege in which the bones of the guilty dead were
disentombed and cast beyond the borders of Attica ; the living
clan were condemned to perpetual exile, and the city was sub-
sequently purified.”'^ The Macedonian law involved iji punish-
ment the kindred of conspirators against the monarch.^ Diony-
sius of Halicarnassus states that some of the Greeks ‘‘think it
reasonable to put to death the sons of tyrants together with
their fathers, whereas otliers punish them witli perpetual banish-
ment ” ; and he contrasts this with the Roman principle that
“ the sons sliall be exempted from all punishment, whose fathers
are offenders, wh(;ther they happen to be the sons ot tyrants, of
parricides, or of traitors.” '' But after the end of the Marsic,
and civil wars, this nde was transgressed and later on Arca-
dius, though expressly ordaining that the pimisliment of the
crime shall extend to the criminal alone,^ took a different view
of the punishment for treason. By a special extension of his
imperial clemency, he allows the sons of the criminal to live,
although in strict justice, being tainted with hereditary guilt,
they ought to suffer tlie punishment of their fatlier. But they
shall be incapable of inheritance ; they shall be abandoned to
the extreme of poverty and perpetual ijuligence ; they shall be
excluded from all honours and from the participation of religious
rites ; the infamy of their father shall ever attend them, and
such shall be the misery of their condition, tliat life shall be a
punishment, and death a comfort,'^ Among the Anglo-Saxons,
before the time of Cnut, the child, even the infant in the cradle,
was liable to be sold into slavery for the payment of penalties
incurred by the father, being “ held by the covetous to he
equally guilty as if it had discretion.”'^ Even later, the child
of an outlaw^, following the condition of the father, also became
an outlaw ; and this grievance was only partly remedied by
Edward the Confessor, who relieved from the consequences of
the father’s outlawry such children as were born before he was
' barici ofu Nafivt’ Races of the Pad-
fic States, ii. 459.
■' Meursi us, Pheuiis St/i'ea, ii. 2, in
( irttiioviiis, 'J'hesaufits (jfaeearam
Aiitiqifitaiuiii , v. 1968.
Aristotle, De repiihiiea AtJienien-
sifiui. I. Cf. ibid, 20,
^ Ciirlius Kurus, Oe p-est/s A/exa;u/d
vi. n, 20,
^ Dionysius of f lalicavnassus, Anti-
(jiiitates Ro/nanae^ viii. 80.
Jbid, viii. 80.
" Codex lusiinianns, i\. 47. 22.
Ibid, ix. 8. 5.
•’ f.atvs of Cnut, ii. 77. Cf. I.appen-
l)eij4, History of England under the
Anglo-Saxon Kings, ii. 414 ; Wilda,
op. di. p. 906.
THE MORAL EMOTIONS
outlawed, but not such as were born afterwards.^ During the
Middle Ages it was the invariable rule to confiscate the entire
property of an impenitent heretic, a rule which was justified on
the ground that his crime is so great that something of his im-
purity falls upon all related to him.^ The Pope Alexander IV.
also excluded the descendants of an heretic to the second gener-
ation from all offices in the Church.’^ Owing to religious
influence, illegitimate children were not only deprived of the
title of inheritance, but they were treated by some law-books as
almost rightless beings, on a par with robbers and thieves.'^ If
a pers )n committed suicide, his goods were confiscated, and,
according to a French mediieval law, In's wife was besides de-
prived of her own private property.'' Even in the latter half of
the eighteenth century, in France, in the case of an attempt
made against the life of the king, the whole family of the
criminal was banished.*^ Nay, in various European countries,
up to quite recent times — in England till 1 870— forfeiture of
property has been the punishment prescribed for certain crimes,
including suicide ; ^ which means, if not actually the imposition
of penalties on the survivors in a case where the culprit himself
is out of reach, at least a gross disregard of their ordinary
rights of property. It is hardly necessary to point out how
often, in the very society in which we live, ^‘social punish-
ments ” are inflicted upon children for their father^s wrongs.
For the explanation of these facts we have to remember
what has been said before about collective responsibility
in the case of revenge. Speaking of the Chinese doctrine
of family solidarity, Dr. de Groot observes that, under
the influence of this doctrine, families, not men indivi-
dually, came to be regarded, from the Government's point
of view, as the smallest particles, the molecules of the
nation, each individual being swallowed up in the circle
of his kinsfolk.” ^ Such a doctrine assumes that the
other members of the family-group are, in a way, acces-
^ I.ti'ges Edwardi Conf 'ssoris^ 19. J)ii l-ioys, llist(dre. dit d)'i)i/ n-iniitu l
“ Lecky, History of Rationalisffi in dcs penples inoderne.u ii. 236.
Hiiropef\\. I. Geschichte Hertz, Voltaire loid die fnDizYisiscJtc
itnd System der miUelaltcrlichen \Vclt- Sfrafrcefitspfle^^e im aeJitzetuden Jahr-
^aiischaunng, p. 572 ,sv/. Paramo, De hundert^ p. 27.
orii^ine et progressii Sancti Inqnisitionis, ™ Stephen, History oj the Criminal
P- 5S7 sq. • Law of EngkrmL i. 487 sq, ; iii. 105.
Kicken, op. cit. p. 573. ^ ^ do Grout, Religions System of
^ Ibid. p. 573. China (vol, ii. book) i. 539.
THE NATURE OF
series to any crime committed by a fellow-member.
Human nature/' says Lord Kames, is not so perverse,
as without veil or disguise to punish a person acknow-
ledged to be innocent. An irregular bias of imagination,
which extends the qualities of the principal to its acces-
sories, paves the way to that unjust practice. This bias,
strengthened by indignation against an atrocious criminal,
leads the mind hastily to conclude, that all his connections
are partakers of his guilt.'' ’ Among the ancients we
also meet with a strong belief that, according to the course
of nature, wicked fathers have wicked sons. “ That
which is begot,” says Plutarch, is not, like some pro-
duction of art, unlike the begetter, for it proceeds from
him, and is not merely produced by him, so that it ap-
propriately receives his share, whether that be honour or
punishment.” " To destroy, or to make harmless, the
family of an odender may be, not only an act of retalia-
tion, but a precaution ; according to an old Greek adage,
‘‘ a man is a fool if he kills the father and leaves the sons
alive .” This especially holds good for treason, which
generally suggests accomplices ; and of all crimes for
which penalties are imposed upon other individuals
besides the culprit, treason is probably the most common.
This crime is also particularly apt to evoke the hatred
of those who have the power to punish, hence the punish-
ment of it, being closely allied to an act of revenge, is
often inflicted without due discrimination. Moreover,
by being extended to the criminal’s family, the punish-
ment falls more heavily upon himself as well. Again, in
case the crime is of a sacrilegious character, it is supposed
to pollute everybody connected with the criminal, and
even the whole community where he dwells.
In their administration of justice, gods are still more
indiscriminate than men. They hold the individual re-
sponsible for the whole to which he belongs. They
^ Kaint's, Sketi/ie.'^ of the History of op. cit. viii. 8o.
Man^ iv. 148. Schnudt, Ethik der alten Griech-
" De so iniuoiinisvindieta^ eti fu. 126.
16. Cf. Dionysius of Halicarnassus,
THE MORAL EMOTIONS
+9
punish the community for the sins of one of its members.
They visit the iniquity of the fathers and forefathers upon
the children and descendants.
The Sibuyaus, a tribe belonging to the Sea Dyaks, are of
opinion tluit an an married girl proving with child must be
offensive to the superior powers, who, instead of always chas-
tising the individual, punish the tribe by misfortunes happening
to its members. I'hey, therefore, on the discovery of the
pregnancy fine the lovers, and sacrifice a pig to propitiate
offended Heaven, and to avert that sickness or those misfortunes
that might otherwise follow ; and they inflict heavy mulcts for
every one who may have suffered from any severe accident, or
who may have been drowned within a month before the
religious atonement was made.” ^ According to Chinese
beliefs, whole kingdoms are punished for the conduct of their
rulers by. spirits who act as avengers with orders or ap})roval
from the or Heaven.^*^ Prevalent opiniem in China, con-
tinuously inspired anew by literature of all times and ages,
further admits that spiritual vengeance may come down upeJn
the culprit’s offspring in the form of disease or death.’^ When a
maimed or deformed child is born the Jafianese say that its
parents or ancestors must have committed some great sin.'*
The Vedic people ask Varuna to forgive the wrongs committed
hy their fathers,'^ Says the poet : — What we ourselves have
sinned in mercy pardon ; my own misdeeds do thou, C) god,
take from me, and for another’s sin let me not suffer.”
Accortling to the ancient Greek theory of divine retribution,
the community has to suffer for the sins of some c^f its members,
children for the sins of their fathers." Hesiod says that often a
whole town is punished with finnine, pestilence, barrenness of
its women, or loss of its army or vessels for the misdeeds of a
single individual.''^ Creesus atoned by the forfeiture of his
kingdom for the crime of Gyges, his fifth ancestor, who had
murdered liis master and usurped his tlirone.’^ Cytissorus
brought down the anger of gods upon his descendants by
SL John, fJfc in the Forests of the '' Rig-l'eda^ ii. 28. 9. Cf. ibid. vi.
Far East, i. 63. 51-7 ; vii. 52. 2.
*■“’ dc (.iroot, op. fit. (vol. iv. l)ook) ” Nagelsbach, Nac/thomerische 7 'heo-
ii. 432, 435. Davis, China, ii. 34 looie des hisehen I 'olksg-faidnnis, p.
^ ’.^de (irool, op. cit. (v<d. iv, book) ii, 34 sq. Schmiilt, op. cit. i. 67 sqq.
4 S-- Farncll, Cnfts nj the Creeh States, i.
^ tirihis, Mihadd s Knipirc, p. 472. 7O sq.
Rig- Veda, vii. 86. 5. Cf. AtJiai'Shi-^ llvsiod, Opera ct dies, 240 .sy//.
Veda, V. 30. 4 ; \. 3. 8. ‘‘ Herodotus, i. 91.
• VOL. I
E
rescuing Athainas, whom the Achaians intended to offer up as
an expiatory sacrifice on behalf of their country.^ When hear-
ing of the death of his wife, Theseus exclaims, This must be a
heaven-sent calamity in consequence of the sins of an ancestor,
which from some remote source I am bringing on myself.” “
According to Hebrew notions, sin affects the nation through tlie
individual and entails guilt on succeeding generations.*^ "I'he
anger of the Lord is kindled against the cln’ldren of Israel on
account of Achan’s sin.^ The sin of the sons of Eli is visited
on his wliole house from generation to generation.*' Because
Saul has slain the Gibeonites, the Jvord sends, in the days of
David, a three years’ famine, wliich ceases only when seven
of Saul’s sons arc hanged/' 'The siiis of Manasseh arc expiated
even by the better generation under JosiahC The notion of a
jealous God who visits the iniquity of the fathers upon the
children unto the third and fourth generation of them that hate
Him,"^ is also frequently met witli in the Old Testament
Apocrypha. ff"he inheritance of sinners’ children shall
perish, and their posterity shall have a perpetual reproach.”*’
‘•‘The seed of an unrighteous bed shall be rooted out.” /Fhe
same idea has survived among Christian peoples. It was
referred to in Canoii Law as a principle to be imitated by
human justice, and by Innocent III. in Justification of a bull
whicli autliorised the cofifiscatio?i of the goods of heretics.^“
Up to quite recent times it was a common belief in Scotland
that tlie punishment of the cruelty, oppression, or misconduct
of an individual descended as a curse on Ins children to tlie
third and fourth generation. It was not confined to the
common people ; “all ranks were influenced by it ; and many
believed that if the curse did not fall upon the first or second
generation it would inevitably descend upon the succeeding.”
In the dogma that the whole human race is condemned on
' vii, 197.
“ Euripides, (S^^i sq.
^ Ocliler, I'heoioyy of I he Old Testa-
nienf, i. 236. Dorncr, Sys/ejfi of Chris-
tian Doctrine^ ii. 325. Montefiore,
HUdcrt Lectnres^ p. 103. Robertson
Smith, Relief on of the SeDiifcs, p. 421.
Schultz, Old I'estameJit Theology ^ ii.
308. Bernard, ‘Sin,’ in Hastinj^cs,
Dii'!io)iary of the Bible ^ \v. 530,
534.
^ Joshua, vii. i.
^ I Santnel, ii, 27 sqq.
2 Sam net, xxi. i sqq.
” Deuteronomy., i. 37 ; iii. 26 ; iv. 21.
2 Kinys., 26 ; xxiv. 3. fere/niah ,
XV. 4 sqq.
^ Jtxodns, XX. 5 ; xxiv, 7. N^umhers,
xiv. 18. Dei(teronomy , 9, Cf.
Lei' it ions, xxvi. 39.
Ideclesiastieiis, xli. 6. Cf. ibid.
xvi. 4 ; xli. 5, 7
IVisdo)}! of Solomon, iii. 16. Cf.
ibid. iii. 12, 13, \q sqq.
hdeken, op. cit. }). 572.
LecIvYj History of Rational is tn f Oi
Europe, ii. 37 n.
wStewart, Sketches of the Character,
of the High landers of Scotland, p.
127.
THE MORAL EMOTIONS
iiccouiit of the sin of its first parents, the doctrine of collective
responsibility has reached its pitch.
Men originally attribute to their gods mental cjualities
similar to their own, and imagine them to be no less
fierce and vindictive than they are themselves. Thus the
retribution of a god is, in many cases, nothing but an
outburst of sudden anger, or an act of private revenge,
and as such particularly liable to comprise, not only the
offender himself, but those connected with him. Plutarch
even argued that the punishments inflicted by gods on
cities for ill-deeds committed by their former inhabitants
allowed of a just defence, on the ground that a city is
"‘one continuous entity, a sort of creature that never
changes from age, or becomes different by time, but is
ever sympathetic with and conformable to itself,” and
therefore “ answerable for whatever it does or has done for
the public weal, as long as the community by its union
and federal bonds preserves its unity.” ^ He further
observes that a bad man is not had only when he breaks
out into crime, but has the seeds of vice in his nature, and
that the deity, knowing the nature and disposition of
every man, prefers stifling crime in embryo to waiting till
it becomes ripe.“
But there are yet special reasons for extending the
retribution of a god beyond the limits of individual guilt.
Whilst the resentment of a man is a matter of experience,
that of a god is a matter of inference. That some
particular case of suffering is a divine punishment, is
inferred either from its own peculiar character, suggesting
the direct interference of a god, or from the assumption
that a certain act, on account of its offensiveness, cannot
be left unpunished. Now experience shows that, in nufny
instances, the sinner himself escapes all punishment,
leading a happy life till his death ; hence the conclusion
is^near at hand that any grave misfortune which befalls
his descendants, is the delayed retribution of the offended
’ V\u[:uch, D(: Sera z'/'/rd/r/df “ /did. 20.
».v
E 2
THE NATURE OF
52 .
god.^ Such a conclusion is quite in harmony with the
common notions of divine power. It especially forces
itself upon a mind which has no idea of a hell with
post mortem punishments for the wicked. And, where the
spirit of a man after his death is believed to be still
ardently concerned for the welfare of his family, the
affliction of his descendants naturally appears as a punish-
ment inflicted upon himself. As Dr. de Groot observes,
the doctrine of the Chinese, that spiritual vengeance mav
descend on the oflender’s offspring, tallies perfectly with
their conception that the severest punishment which may
be inflicted on one, both in his present life and the next,
is decline or extermination of his male issue, leaving no-
body to support him in his old age, nobody to protect
him after his death from misery and hunger by caring for
his corpse and grave, and sacrificing to his manes.’’
The retributive sufferings which innocent persons have
to undergo in consequence of the sins of the guilty, are
not always supposed to be inflicted upon them directly, as
a result of divine resentment. I'hey are often attributed
to infection. Sin is looked upon in the light of a con-
tagious matter which may be transmitted from parents to
children, or be communicated by contact.
This idea is well illustrated by the funeral ceremonies of the
Taliitians. When the house for the dead had been erected,
and the corpse placed upon the platform or bier, the priest
ordered a hole to be dug in the earth or floor near the foot of
the platform. Over this he prayed to the god by whom it was
supposed tlie spirit of the deceased had been required. The
purport of his prayer was that all the dead man's sins, and
especially that for which his soul liad been called to the po^
tnight be deposited there, that they might not attach in any
degree to the survivors, and that the anger of the god might be
appeased.” All who were employed in embalming the dead
were also, during the process, carefully avoided by every person,
‘ Cj. Isocrates, Oratio dd pme, 120; - Cf. Scljntidl, op. cit. i. 71 .sv/. (an-
( iceio, /)c iiatitra Dforuiii., iii. 38 ; cienl Greeks).
Xai^elsbiK'h, op. oil. p. 33 sq. ■■ de Gn)ot, e/’. oit. (vol. iv. book) ii.
452.
THE MORAL EMOTIONS
Hs the guilt of the crime for which the deceased had died was
believed to contaminate such as came in contact with the
corpse ; and as soon as the ceremony of depositing the sins in
the hole was over, all who l\ad touched the body or the garments
of the deceased, whicli were buried or destroyed, fled precipi-
tately into the sea to cleanse themselves from the pollution.^
In one part of New Zealand a service was pty-formed over an
individual, by which all the sins of the tribe were supposed to
be transferred to him, a fern stalk was previously tied to his
person, with which he jumped into the river and there unbinding,
allowed it to float away to the sea, bearing their sins with it.”
The Iroquois White Dog Feast, which was held every year in
January, February, or early in March,'^ implied, according to
most authorities, a ceremony of sin-transference.^ The follow-
ing description of it is given by Mrs. Jem Ison, a white woman
who was captured by the Indians in the year 1755: — Two
white dogs, without spot pr blemish, are strangled and hung
near the door of the council-Jiouse. Oji the fourth or fifth
day the committee,” consisting of from ten to twenty active
men who have been appointed to superintend the festivities,
“ collect the evil spirit, or drive it off entirely, for the present,
and also concentrate within themselves all the sins of their
tribe, however numerous or heinous. On the eight or ninth
day, the committee having received all the sin, as before ob-
served, into their own bodies, they take down the dogs, and
after having transfused the whole of it Into one of their own
number, he, by a peculiar sleight of hand, or kind of magic,
works it all out of himself into the dogs. The dogs, thus
loaded with all tlie sins of the people, are placed upon a pile of
wood that is directly set on fire. Here they are burnt,
together with the sins with which they were loaded.” ^ Among
the Badagas of India, at a burial, ‘‘an elder, standing by the
corpse, offers up a prayer that the dead may not go to hell, that
the sins committed on eartJi may be forgiven, and that the sins
may be borne by a calf, which is let loose in tlie jungle and
used thenceforth for no manner of work.” At Utcli-Kurgan,
in Turkestan, Mr. Schuyler saw an old man, constantly
^ Ellis, Polynesian Researches, i. 401
S(jq.
Taylor, Te Ika a Mam, p. loi.
^ Beauchamp, ‘ Iroquois White T>og
•r* 0 ast,’ in' American Antiquarian, vii.
236 sq. Hale, ‘Iroquois Sacrifice of
the White Dog,’ ibid. vii. 7.
Beauchamp, loc. cit, [). 237 sq. '•
Seaver, AArrath'c of (he Life of
Mrs. Mary Jeniison, p. 158 sqq. Cf
Mr. Clark’s description, quoted by
Beauchamp, loc. cit. p. 238.
•'Thurston, ‘Badagas of the Nib
giris,’ ill the Madras Government Mu-
seum’s Bulletin, ii. 4. Cf. Metz,
'Bribes inhabiiing the Neilyherry Hills,
p. 78 ; Graul, Rrise nach Ostindicn,
iii. 296 sqq.
THE NATURE OF
engaged in prayer, who was said to be an iskatchi^ that is, a
persoji who gets his living by taking on liinisclf the sins of the
dead, and thenceforth devoting his life to, prayer for their
souls.” ^
In ancient Peru, an Inca, after confession of guilt, bathed in
a neighbouring river, and repeated this formula : — O thou
River, receive the sins I have this day confessed unto the Sun,
carry them down to the sea, and let them never more appear.” '-^'
According to Vedic beliefs, sin is a contamination which may
be inherited, or contracted in various ways,'^ and of which the
sinner tries to rid himself by transferring it to some enemy,* or
by invoking the gods of water or fire.'"' It is washed out by
Varuna, in his capacity of a water-god,*' and by I'rita, another
water-god,’^ and even by the Waters ” in general, as appears
from the prayer addressed to them : — “ O Waters, carry off
whatever sin is in me and untruth.” For a similar reason, as
it seems, water became in the later, Brahmanic age, the essence
(sap) of immortality ” and tlie belief in its purifying power
still survives in modern India. No sin is too heinous to be
removed, no character too black to be washed clean, by the
waters of Ganges.^** At sacred places of pilgrimage on the
banks of rivers, the Hindus perform special religious shavings
for the purpose of purifying soul and body from pollution ; and
persons who liave committed great crimes or are troubled by
uneasy consciences, travel lumdreds of miles to such holy places,
where they may be released from every sin by first being re-
lieved of every hair and then plunging into the sacred stream.”
So, also, according to Hindu beliefs, contact with cows purifies,
and, as in the Parsi ritual, the dung and urine of cows have the
power of preventing or cleansing away not only material, but
moral defilements.^*'^ In post-Homeric Greece, individuals and a
whole people were cleansed from their sins by water or some
other material means of purification.*'^ Plutarch, after observing
^ Schuyler, 'rurki.stan, ii. 28.
- 1 ylor, rrimidvc Culture^ ii. 435.
Athaj va- Veda^ v. 30. 4 ; x. 3. 8 ;
vii. 64. I sq. Cf. Ol( 1 enl)erg, Religion
des fdda, 290.
** Rig- Veda, x. 36. 9; x. 37. 12.
/bid. X. 164. 3. Alharva- Idda,
vii. 64. 2. , Cf. Kaegi, /\ ig- Veda, p.
157; Oklenbcrg, op. oil. pj). 291-298,
319 sqq.
‘‘ Cy. Hopkins, Religions of India,
]')p. 65 n. I, 66-
" Alharva- ]dda, vi. 113. i sq(f.
Rig- Veda, i. 23. 22. Sin is also
looked upon as a galling chain from the
captivity of which release is besought
{ibid. i. 24. 9, 13 sq. ; n.^27. 16 ; ii.
2 ^. S ; V. 85. 8 ; vi. 74. 3 ; ike.).
Hopkins, oj). eit. p. 196.
Mother Williams, Rrdhtnanisni and
Ilindiiism, p. 347.
Ibid. p. 375.
Ikirtli, Religions of India, p. 264.
Laws of Plan It, iii. 206; v. 105, li'i,
124 ; xi. no, 203, 213.
Stengel, Die gricehischen KuUns-
a\fertii liter, p. 138 sqq.
THE MORAL EMOTIONS
that there are other properties that have connection and
communication, and that transfer themselves from one thing to
another with incredible quickness and over immense distances,”
asks whether it is more wonderful that Athens should have
been smitten with a plague which started in Arabia, than that,
when the Delphians and Sybarites became wicked, vengeance
should have fallen on tlieir descendants.”^ The Hebrews
annually laid the sins of the people upon the head of a goat, and
sent it away into the wilderness ; ^ and they cleansed every
impurity with consecrated water or the sprinkling of blood.^
'Fo this day, the Jews in Morocco, on their New-Year’s day,
go to the sea-shore, or to some spring, and remove their sins by
throwing stones into the water. 'Die words of the Psalmist,
^^Wash me thoroughly from mine iniquity, and cleanse me
from my sin,”^ were not altogether a ligiire of speech ; nor is
Christian baptism originally a mere symbol. Its result is
forgiveness of sins; by the water, as a medium of the Holy
Ghost, the stains of sin are waslied away.” That sin is
contagious has been expressly stated by Christian writers.
Novatian says that the one is defiled by the sin of the other,
and the idolatry of the transgressor passes over to him who does
not transgress.” ”
In this materialistic conception of sin there is an obvious
confusion between cause and effect, between the sin and
its punishment. Sin is looked upon as a substance charged
with injurious energy, which will sooner or later discharge
itself to the discomfort or destruction of anybody who is
infected with it. 'The sick Chinese says of his disease,
“ it is my sin,” instead of saying, it is the punishment of
my sin.” Both in Hebrew and in the Vedic language
the word for sin is used in a similar way. ’’ ‘‘ In the con-
sciousness of the pious Israelite,” Professor Schultz
observes, ‘‘ sin, guilt, and punishment, are ideas so directly
connected that the words for them are interchangeable.”
* I^lularch, Dt; sera mini ini sviiidieta^
14,
“ Leviticus^ xvi.
N timbers^ viii. 7 ; xix. 4 9, r^.sv/^/. ;
,^xi. 23.' lA'vitiens^ xvi. 14 .svyy.
Psalms, li. 2.
llarnack, o/^. ciL ii. 140
Calcehism of the Council of I'rokJl,
ii. 2. 10, p. 162.
' by llarnack, op. cil. ii.
1 19.
Edkins, China, p. 134.
^ Hol/.inaii, ‘ Siiiule Lind Siihne in den
Rij^vcdahyiiinen und den P.salnien,’ in
Zeitschr. /'. Volkerpsyc hoi oi^ie , x\'. 9.
Schult/., op. l it. ii. 306. Cy’ Curtiss,
Primitive Semilie Religion To-day, ]i.
124 jv/y.
I’HE NATURE OF
The prophets frequently and emphatically declare that
there is in sin itself a power which must destroy the
sinner.' So, too, as M. Bergaigne points out, there is in
the Vedic notion of sin,. “ la croyance a une sorte de vertu
propre du pt^che, grace a laquelle il produit de lui-meme
son effet necessaire, a savoir le chatiment du pc^ch'eur.” -
Sins are thus treated like diseases, or the germs of diseases,
of which patients likewise try to rid themselves by washing
or burning, or which are described — in the very language
often applied to sins- — as fetters which hold them chained.
All kinds of evil are in this way materialised. The
Shamanistic peoples of Siberia, says Georgi, “ hold evil to
be a self-existing substance which they call by an infinitude
of particular names.” *' According to Moorish ideas,
l-hasy or “ misfoi'tune,” is a kind of infection, which may
be contracted by contact and removed by water or fire ;
hence in all parts of Morocco water- and fire-ceremonies
are performed annually, either on the Gj/z^r-eve or at
midsummer, l-anuira^ for the purpose of purifying men,
animals, and fruit-trees.'^ And just as the Moors, on these
^ Ibid. ii. 308 S(j. that they alternate with lu.stralion l)y
“ Bergaigne, Judixion VtUiiqne, iii. water (see (Irirnin, Teutonic Alytliology.,
163. Cf. Rig-Veda, 132. 5. ii. 588 .vyy. ). On the t)lher hand, in
Oldenberg, op. cit, p. 288. J >r. Fra/er\s exliaustive description of
Cieorgi, Russia, iii. 257. these ceremonies I hril to discover a
The various methods of transferring single fact which would make iMann-
or expelling evil, which abundantly il- hardt’s hypothesis at all probable. • Dr.
lustrate the materialistic notions held I'dazer says {op. cit. iii. 301), “The
about it, have been treated by Dr. cu.stom of rolling a burning wheel down
PVazer with unrivalled learning { 7 Vic a hillside, which is often observed at
Golden Bough, iii. i sqq.). 1 have little these times, seems a very natural imita-
doubt that the fire- and water-ceremo- lion of the sun’s course in the sky.” To
nics, once practised all over Europe on me it appears as a method of distributing
a certain day e\'ery year, belong to the the purificatory energy over the fields
.same group of rites. “ The be.st gene- or vineyards. Notice, for instance, the
ral ex|)lanation of these Euroj^ean fire- following statements: — In the Rhdn
festivals,” says Dr. J^'razer {ibid. iii. Mountains, Bavaria, “ a w heel wrapt in
300)^ “seems to be the one given by combu.stibles, was kindled and rolled
Mannhardt, namely, that they are sun- down tlie hill; and the young {people
charms or magical ceremonies intended rushed about the fields wdth their biirn-
to ensure a proper supply of sun.shine ing torches and brooms. . . . In neigh-
for men, animals, and plants.” But it bouring villages of Iles.se ... it is
should be noticed that m Europe, as in thought that wherever the Imrniftg
Morocco, a purificahjry [lurpo.sc is ex- wheels roll, the fields will be .safe from
pressly ascribed to them by the very hail and storm ” iii. 243 .yy. }. At
persons by whom they are practised \>:;>lkmar.sen, in Ilcsse, “ in some places
(see Frazer, e/. cit, iii. 238 ), and tar-barrels or wTeels wrapt in straw used
THE MORAL EMOTIONS
occasions, rid themselves of l-bas^ so, in modern Greece,
the women make a fire on Midsummer Eve, and jump
over it, crying, I leave my sins.” ^
Closely connected with the primitive conception of sin,
is that of a curse. In fact, the injurious energy attributed
to a sinful act, is in many cases obviously due to the curse
of a god. The curse is looked upon as a baneful substance,
as a miasma which injures or destroys anybody to whom it
cleaves. The curse of Moses was said to lie on mount
Ebal, ready to descend with punishments whenever there
was an occasion for it.‘^ The Arabs, when being cursed,
sometimes lay themselves down on the ground so that the
curse, instead of hitting them, may fly over their bodies.*^
According to Teutonic notions, curses alight, settle,
cling, they take flight, and turn home as birds to their
nests.'* It is the vulgar opinion in Ireland “ that a curse
once uttered must alight on something : it will float in
the air seven years, and may descend any moment on the
party it was aimed at ; if his guardian angel but forsake
him, it takes forthwith the shape of some misfortune,
sickness or temptation, and strikes his devoted head.” ^
We shall later on see that curses are communicated
through material media. In some parts of Morocco, if a
man is not powerful enough to avenge an infringement on
his marriage-bed, he leaves seven tufts of hair on his head,
and goes to another tribe to ask for help. This is l-ar^
a conditional curse, which is first seated in the tufts, and
t<j l)e scl oil and llieii scnl. rolling was to disperse tlic aerial dragons
down the l)illside. In <jthers the boys iii. 267). It would carry me too far
light torches and whisps of straw at the from my sul>jccl to enter into further
bonfires and rush alioul brandishing details. 1 hope t ) deal with the matter
them in their hands” {ibid. iii. 254). on another oecasi m
In Miinsterland, “ lioys with blazing * (Irimin, 7/V ii. 623.
bundles of straw run over the fields to “ Deiiti'rononiy xi. 29. »
make them fruitful {ibid. iii. 255). Abha}idlii)igc)i zur arab-
Dr, Frazer says [ibid. iii. 301), The ischcii Philologie^ i. 29. VVellhausen,
custom of throwing blazing discs, shaped Reste arabischcn }{cidenlitfns\ p. 139,
like suns, into the air is probably also 11. 4.
irfi»piece of imitative magic.” Ihit why ^ (Irimm, op. riL iv. 7690.
should it not, in conformity with other Jbid. iii. 1227. Wood-Martin,
practices, be regarded as a means of IPaces of the Eider Faiths of lreta 7 idy
purifying the air? According to oid ii. 57 .v//.
writers, the object of Midsummer fires
THE NATURE OF
from there transferred to those whom he ^ invokes.
Similarly, a person under the vow of blood-revenge lets
his hair grow until he has fulfilled his vow. The oath
clings to his hair, and will fall upon his head if he
violates it.'
Generally, a curse follows the course which is indicated
by the curser. But it does not do so in every case, and it
has a tendency to spread. In ancient India, and among
the Arabs ^ and Hebrews,'^ there was a belief that a curse,
especially if it was undeserved, might fall back on the
head of him who uttered it. The same belief prevailed,
or still prevails, among the Irish ; so, also, according to
an Ivnglish proverb, curses, like chickens, come home
to roost.” According to Plato, the curse of a father
or mother taints everything with which it comes in con-
tact. Any one who is found guilty of assaulting a
parent, shall be for ever banished from the city into
the country, and shall abstain from the temples ; and
‘‘ if any freeman eat or drink, or have any other sort of
intercourse with him, or only meeting him have volun-
tarily touched him, he shall not enter iiTto any temple,
nor into the agora, nor into the city, until he is purified ;
for he should consider that he has become taiiited by a
curse.”*’ Plutarch asks whether Jupiter’s priest was for-
bidden to swear for the reason that “ the peril of perjury
would reach in common to the whole commonwealth, if
a wicked, godless, and forsworn person should have the
charge and superintendence of the prayers, vows, and sacri-
fices made in the behalf of the city.”' The Romans
believed that certain horrid imprecations had such power,
that not only the object of them never escaped their in-
fluence, but that the person who used them also was sure
^ The same practice prevailed among
the ancient Aralis (Wellhausen, op. cif.
p. 122), and some other cases are re-
corded by Dr. h'razer [op. cit. i. 370
«V(/. ). I cannot accept Wellhausen’s
explanation {op. cit. p. 1 24) that tlie
hair is tellovved to grow for the purpose
of being sacrificed wlien the vow is
fidfdled:
Atharva- Veda., ii. 7. 5.
■" Ooldzilier, Abhainiltnip^ea.^ i. 38 .sy.
^ /tec/esias/icus, xxi. 27.
Wood- Martin, op. cit. ii. 57 sv/.,
Plato, Leges ix, 881.
" Plutarch, Qttesiiones Rornanae., 44.
THE MORAL EMOTIONS
to be unhappy.* Among the Arinzes, an oath is reckoned
a terrible thing : — “ They do not suffer a person, who
has been under the necessity of expurgating himself in so
dreadful a manner, to remain among them : he is sent
into exile.” ^ According to Bedouin notions, a solemn
oath should only be taken at a certain distance from the
camp, “ because the magical nature of the oath might
prove pernicious to the general body of Arabs, were
it to take place in their vicinity.”'* “To take an
oath of any sort,” says Burckhardt, “ is always a
matter of great concern among the Bedouins. It seems
as if they attached to an oath consequences of a super-
natural kind. ... A Bedouin, even in defence of his
own right, will seldom be persuaded to take a solemn
oath before a kadhy, or before the tomb of a sheikh
or saint, as they are sometimes required to do ; and
would rather forfeit a small sum than expose himself to
the dreaded consequences of an oath.” ’ Exactly the
same holds good for the Moors. The conditional self-
curse is supposed in some degree to pollute the swearer
even though the condition referred to in the oath be only
imaginary, in other words, though he do not perjure
himself. This, I think, is the reason why, among the
Berbers in the South of Morocco, persons who have been
wrongly accused of a crime, sometimes entirely undress
themselves in the sainthouse, when going to swear. I'hey
believe that, if they do so, the saint will punish the
accuser ; and I conclude that, at the bottom of this belief
there is a vague idea that the absence of all clothes will
prevent the oath from clinging to themselves. They say
that it is bad not only to swear, but even to be present
when an oath is taken by somebody else. And at Demnat,
in the Great Atlas, I was told that when a person has made
oath in a sainthouse, he avoids going back to his house
the same way as he came, since otherwise, at least if he
'' Burckhardt, Bedouins and ll'd/td-
AJ'-''. P- 7;5-
^ /hid. p.
^ Idem., 1 1 hi Cas.v/., 1 6 .
Geor^i, o/>. cit. iii. 54 sq.
6o
THE NATURE OF
has sworn false, his family as well as himself would have
to suffer.
If a curse is infectious, it is naturally liable to con-
taminate those who derive their origin from the infected
individual. Fhe house of Glaucus was utterly extirpated
from Sparta, in accordance with the words of the oracle,
“ There is a nameless son of the Oath-god who has neither
hands nor feet ; he pursues swiftly, until, having seized,
he destroys the whole race, and all the house.” ' So, too,
the Erinyes visited the sins of the fathers even on the
children and grandchildren and the Erinyes were origi-
nally only personifications of curses.'* It is said in the
Ecclesiasticus ; — “ A man that useth much swearing shall
be filled with iniquity, and the plague shall never depart
from his house. ... If he swear in vain, he shall not be
innocent, but his house shall be full of calamities.” ■*
Casalis remarks of the Basutos, that “ the dreadful con-
sequences that the curse of Noah has had for Ham and
his descendants appear quite natural to these people.”
The Dharkar and Majhwar in Mirzapur, believe that a
person who forswears himself will lose his property and
his children but as we do not know the contents of the
oath, it is possible that the destruction of the latter is not
ascribed to mere contagion, but is expressly imprecated on
them by the swearer." Among the Rejangs of Sumatra,
^ Ifcrodotii.s, vi. 86. Cf, Ife.sitxl,
Opera et dies^ 282 sijq.
~ Aescbylii.s, Eunioiides, 934 sqq.
Ae.scliylu.s {Eunietiides^ 416 sq.)
fxprcs.sly dcsignatc.s the Erinyes by the
title of “ curses'’ {apal), and Paiisanias
(viii. 25, 6) derives the name Erinys
from an Arcadian vv<jrd signifying a fit
<jf anger. CY. von La.saulx, ‘ l,>er Eluch
Itei Griechen und Rdmern,’ in Eer-
zeichaiis dcr Vorksungen an der jnlius-
Maxiniilians- Universilaet zn IViirz-
bnrg ini Sonnner-Seniester 1843, p. 8;
M liller, Dissertations on the Junnen ides
of Aeschy/us, p. 1 55 sqq. ; Rohde,
‘ Paralipomena,’ in 1 \ heinisches Museiun
fiir rhiloloyie^ 1895, 1^*
^ Ecclesiastieus^ xxiii. ir. Cf. ibid.
xli. 5 sqq. ; IVisdoni of So/onion, iii.
12 sq.y xii. 1 1.
^ Casalis, Easiitos, p. 305.
^ Crooke, 7 'ribes and Castes of the
AErth-lVestern 1 -rovinces and Oiidhy
ii. 287 ; iii. 444. Cf ibid. i. 132.
" Among these tribes it is usual to
swear by “ putting a Immboo on the
head,” or “ touching a broad-sword,
touching the feet of a Brahman, holding
a cow’s tail, touching Ganges water.”
But among many of the other tribes
de.scribed by Mr. Crooke, persons
swear on the heads of their children
(ihiti. I. II, 130, 172; ii. 96, 138, 339,
357 ; iii. 40, 113, 251. 262 ; iv. 35), or
vvjth a .son or grandson in the arms
{ibid. ii. 428), and in such cases the
n THE MORAL EMOTIONS 6i
^‘any accident that happens to a man, who has been
known to take a false oath, or to his children or grand-
children, is carefully recorded in memory, and attributed
to this sole cause.” ^ Among the Karens the following
story is told : — ‘‘ Anciently there was a man who had ten
children, and he cursed one of his brethren, who had done
him no injury ; but the curse did the man no harm, and
he did not die. Then the curse returned to the man who
sent it, and all his ten children died.” ^ Fhe Moors are
fond of cursing each other’s father or mother, or grand-
father, or grandfather’s father, such a curse being under-
stood to involve their descendants as well. The Rev.
R. Taylor says of the Maoris, ‘‘ To bid you go and cook
your father would be a great curse, but to tell a person
to go and cook his great-grandfather would be far worse,
because it included every individual who has sprung from
him.”
Thus, from the conception that sins and curses are
contagious it follows that an innocent person may have to
suffer for the sin of another. His suffering does not
necessarily relieve the sinner from punishment ; sin, like
an infectious disease, may spread without vacating the
seat of infection. But, as we have seen, it may also be
transferred, and sin-transference involves vicarious suffer-
ing. At the same time, this kind of vicarious suffering
must not be confounded with vicarious expiatory sacrifice.
As a general rule, the scapegoat is driven or cast away,
not killed. The exceptions, to this rule seem to be due
to two different causes. On the one hand, the scapegoat
may be chased to death, or perhaps be pushed over a
precipice,^ for the sake of ridding the community as
death of the child would naturally be Taylor, 7 > Ika a Afaui^ ]>. 2(^.
expected to follow perjury as a direct ^ AccfU'din^ to the Minima, the
result of it. Among the Kol, the Iltdnew scapegoat was not allowed to
usual form of an oath is, “ M^y my go free in the wilderness, 1 nil was killed
,«ii.hildren die if I lie ” iii. 313). hy being pushed over a })reciijice
' Marsden, History of Sti?nafra, I'l. (Robertson Smith, Religioji oj the
240. Semites^ p. 418}. See also the am-
" /our. Asiatic Soc. Hr l>iguous passage in Servius, fn J t'rgi/ii
xxxvii. pt. ii. 137. Aencidos^ iii. 57,
THE NATURE OF
effectively as possible of the evils loaded on the victim.
Thus the Bhotiyas of Juhar take a dog, make him drunk,
‘‘ and having fed him with sweetmeats, lead him round
the village and let him loose. They then chase and kill
him with sticks and stones, and believe that by so doing
no disease or misfortune will visit the village during the
year.” ^ On the other hand, the transference of evil may
be combined with a sacrifice. But of such a combination
only a few instances are recorded, and most of them are
ambiguous. Considering further that in these cases, or at
least in the best known of them, the act of transference
takes place after the victim has been killed, it seems to me
extremely probable that we have here to do with a fusion
of two distinct rites into one, and that the victim is not
offered up as a sacrifice in its capacity of a scapegoat, but,
once sacrificed, has been made use of as a conductor for
all the evils with which the people are beset.
In his list of scapegoats^ Dr. Frazer refers to a case of human
sacrifice witnessed by the Rev. J. C. Taylor at Onitsha, on
the Niger.- A young woman was drawn, witli her face to
the earth, from the king’s house to the river. As the people
drew her along, they cried, Wickedness ! wickedness ! ” so
as to notify to the passers-by to screen themselves from wit-
nessing the dismal scene. The sacrifice was to take away the
iniquities of the land. 'The body was dragged along in a
merciless manner, as if the weight of all their wickedness
were thus carried away”; and it was finally drowned in the
river. Our informant also lieard that there was a man killed,
as a sacrifice for the sins of t]ic king. ‘‘Thus two human
beings were offered as sacrifices, to propitiate their heathen
deities, thinking that they would thus atone for the individual
sins of those who had broken God’s laws during the past year.
. . . Those who had fallen into gross sins during the past year
—such as incendiarisms, thefts, fornications, adulteries, witch-
crafts, incests, slanders, &:c. — were expected to pay in twenty-
eight ngugus^ or £2 os, as a fine ; and this money was
taken into the interior, to purchase two sickly persons, to be
^ Atkinson, ‘Notes on the History N.W. iVovinces,’ in Asiatic Soc.
of in the lliindhiya of the Hungal^ liii. ])t. i. 62.
- Frazer, op. cit. iii. 109 sq.
THE MORAL EMOTIONS
offered as a sacrifice for all these aboinioahle crimes — one for
the land, and one for the river.” ^ As will be seen in a follow-
ing chapter, human sacrifices to rivers are very common in the
Niger country. In the cases mentioned by the English mis-
sionary, the idea of vicarious expiation is obvious. JLt I find
no evidence of actual siji-transference.
IJ r. Frazer further mentions a custom which, according to
Strabo, prevailed among the Albanians of the Eastei'ii Caucasus."
In the temple of the Moon they kept a number of sacred slaves,
of whom many were inspired and prophesied. When one of
these men exhibited more than usual symptoms of inspiration
or insajiity, the lugh priest had him bound with a sacred chain
and maintained him in luxury for a year. At the end of tlie
year he was anointed with unguents and led fortli to be sacri-
ficed, A man thrust a sacred spear into his side, piercing his
heart. From the manner in which the victim fell, omens were
drawn as to the welfare of the commonwealth. I 'hen the
body was carried to a certain spot where all tlie people stood
upon it as a purificatory ceremony.*^ Dr. Frazer maintains
that “ the last circumstance clearly indicates that the sins of
tlie people were transferred to the victim, just as the Jewish
priest transferred tlic sins of the people to the scapegoat by
laying his hand on the animaPs head.”^ So it may be, although,
in my opinion, the purificatory ceremony described by Strabo
also allows of another interpretation. "Fhe victim was evidently
held to be saturated with magic energy ; this is commonly
the case with men, or animals, or even inanimate things, that
are offered in sacrifice, and in the present instance the man
was regarded as holy already, long before lie was slain. To
stand on the corpse, then, might have been regarded as puri-
fying in consequence of the benign virtue inherent in it, just
as, according to Muhammedan notions, contact with a saint
cures disease, not by transferring it to the saint, but by anni-
hilating it or expelling it from the body of the patient. But
whether the ceremony in question involved the idea of sin-
transference or not, there is no indication that the sacrifice of
the slave was of an expiatory character. The same may be
said both of the Egyptian sacrifice of a bull, mentioned ’•by
Herodotus, and of the white dog sacrifice performed by the
Iroquois. The Egyptians first invoked the god and slew the
bull. They then cut offs'll is head and flayed the body. Next
^ Crovvlher and Taylor, Gospt:/ on
the Hanks of the Niger^ p. 344 sq.
" Frazer, op. cit. iii. 112 sq.
Sliabo, xi. 4. 7.
^ I'razer, op. eif. iii, 1 13.
THE NATURE OF
they took the head, and heaped imprecations on it, praying that,
if any evil was impending either o\'er those who sacrificed or
over the land of Egypt, it might be made to fall upon that
head. And, finally, they either sold the head to Greek traders
or threw it into the river ^ — which shows that the real scape-
goat, the head, was not regarded as a sacrifice to the god.
Among the Iroquois, also, the victims were slain before the sins
of the people were transferred to them. According to Hale’s
and Morgan’s accounts of this rite, which have reference to
different tribes of the Iroquois, no mention of sin-transference
is made in the hymn which accompanied the sacrifice. ^ Only
blessings were invoked. 'Fhis was the beginning of tlie chant :
— Now we are about to offer this victim adorned for the
sacrifice, in hope that the act will be pleasing and acceptable
to the All-Ruler, and that he will so adorn his children, the
red men, with his blessings, when they appear before him.”
Mr. Morgan even denies that the burning of the dog had the
slightest connection with the sins of the people, and states that
the religious system of the Iroqiiois, there is no recognition
of the doctrine of atonement for sin, or of the absolution or
forgiveness of sins.”
I think we can see the reason why, in some cases, a
sacrificial victim is used as scapegoat. The transference
of sins or evils is not looked upon as a mere natural
process, it can hardly be accomplished without the aid of
mysterious, magic energy. Among the Berbers of Ait
Zeltn, in Southern Morocco, sick people used to visit a
miracle-working wild olive-tree, growing in the immediate
vicinity of the supposed grave of Sidi Butlila. They there
relieve themselves of their complaints by tying a woollen
string to one of its branches ; in case of headache the
patient previously winds the string three times round the top
of his head, whilst, in case of fever, he spits on the string,
and, when tying it to the tree, says, I left my fever in
thee, O wild olive-tree.’' Pie believes that he may thus
transfer his disease to this tree because there is baraka^
‘‘ benign virtue,” in it ; he would not expect to be cured
' I Ici'otlouis, ii. 39. p. 217 St/.
'' Mule, in A/neruan An/ii/itariaii , ' Male, loi. vit. [>. 10.
vii. 10 sqcj. Morgan, League of the Morgan, ot>. eit. p. 216.
THE MORAL EMOTIONS
by tying the string to any ordinary tree. This illustrates
a principle of probably world-wide application. In
Morocco, and, I presume, in other countries where disease-
transference is believed in, rags tied to a tree are a sure
indication that the tree Is regarded as holy. Similarly I
venture to believe that the transference of sins and evils to
a scapegoat is generally supposed to require magic aid of
some kind or other. Among the Hebrews, it took place
on the Day of Atonement only, and the act was per-
formed by the high-priest.^ Among the Iroquois, It was
by a kind of magic ” that the sins of the people
were worked into the white dogs ; and that the animals
themselves were held to be charged with supernatural
energy, appears from the fact that, according to one
account, the ashes of the pyre on which one of them was
burnt were ^‘gathered up, carried through the village,
and sprinkled at the door of every house. Considering,
then, that sacrificial victims, owing to their close contact
with the deities to whom they are offered, are held more
or less sacred, the idea of employing them as scapegoats is
certainly near at hand. But this does not make the
sacrifice expiatory. In fact, I know of no instance of an
expiatory sacrifice being connected with a ceremony of
sin-transference. Hence the materialistic conception of
sin hardly helps to explain the belief that the sins of a
person may be atoned by another person being offered as a
sacrifice to the offended god.
A sacrifice Is expiatory If its object is to avert the
supposed anger or indignation of a superhuman being
from those on whose behalf it is offered. In various cases the
offended god is thought to be appeased only by the death
of a man. But it is not always necessary that the victim
should be the actual offender. The death of a substitute
may expiate his guilt. The expiatory sacrifice may be
vicarious.
We shall see, in a subsequent chapter, that, as a general
^ Lc7nticM^, xvi. 21. Heaurlianip, loc. n't. p. 236.
“ Seaver, op. rit. p. 1 60.
VOL. I
F
THE NATURE OF
rule, human victims are sacrificed for the purpose of saving
the lives of the sacrificers : before the beginning of a
battle or during a siege, previously to a dangerous sea-
expedition, during epidemics, famines, or on other similar
occasions, when murderous designs are attributed to some
superhuman being on whose will the lives of men are
supposed to depend. But these sacrifices are not always
expiatory in nature. A god may desire to cause the death
of men not only because he is offended, but because he
delights in human flesh, or because he wants human
attendants, or — no one knows exactly why. It is impos-
sible to find out in each particular case whether the sacri-
fice is meant to be an expiation or not ; it is not certain
that the sacrificers know it themselves. Yet in many
instances there can be no doubt that its object is to serve
as a vicarious atonement.
In Eastern Central Africa, ‘‘if a freeman were to set fire to
the grass or reeds beside a lake, and cause a great conflagration
close to the chosen abode of the deity, he is liable to be oifered
up to the god that is thus annoyed,” but if he be tlie owner of
many slaves he can easily redeem himself by offering one of
them in his place.^ The Ojibways, it is said, were once visited
with an epidemic, which they regarded as a divine punishment
sent them on account of their wickedness ; and when all other
efforts failed, “ it was decided that the most beautiful girl of the
tribe should enter a canoe, push into the channel just above the
Sault, and throw away her paddle.” - In Bceotia, a drunken
man having killed a priest of Dionysus Aegobolus, and a pesti-
lence having broken out immediately after, the calamity was
regarded as a judgment on the people for the sacrilege, and the
oracle of Delphi ordered them to expiate it by sacrificing to the
god a blooming boy.'^ In his work on the Jews, Philo of Byblus
states that “ it was the custom among the ancients in cases of
^great dangers, that the rulers of a city or a nation, in order to
avert universal destruction, should give the dearest of their
children to be killed as a ransom offered to avenging demons.”^
The idea that sins could be expiated by the death of one who
^ Macdonald, Afncana, i. 96 sq, ^ Eusebius, Praeparatio Evangeltcay
2 Dorman, Origin of Primitive i. 10. 40. (Migae, Patrologiny Ser. Gr.
Superstitions y p. 208. Sxi. 85).
^ Pausanias, ix. 8. 2.
rr
THE MORAL EMOTIONS
had not deserved it, was familiar to the Hebrews. It was said
that the death of the righteous makes atonement.” ^ The
passage in Isaiah liii. 12 was interpreted of Moses, who poured
out his soul unto death and was numbered with the trans-
gressors (the generation that died in the wilderness) and bare
the sin of many” that he might atone for the sin of the golden
calf.^ Ezekiel suffered that he might wipe out tlie trans-
gressions of Israel.” ^ And of the Maccabaean martyrs it is
said, Having become as it were a vicarious expiation for the
sins of the nation, and through the blood of those godly men
and their atoning death, divine providence saved Israel which
had before been evil entreated.” In these cases, of course,
there was no sacrifice in the proper sense of the term, but they
obviously illustrate the same characteristic of the divine mind.
In fact, the death of Christ, by which he atoned and obliterated
the sins of all ages, was conceived as a sacrifice, or spoken of
in sacrificial figures.^'
It is said that, according to early ideas, it did not
essentially concern divine justice that the punishment of
faults committed should fall precisely on the guilty ; what
did concern it was that it should fall on some one, that it
should have its accomplishment.” Men, we are told,
could not fail to discern that a transgression produces
suffering as its consequence, and, seeing this, they
“ associate suffering with the expiation of sin, and, in
atoning for their transgressions, they mark their contrition
by the suffering which they inflict vicariously on the
victim. They argue thus : ‘ I have broken a law of God.
God exacts pain as a consequence of such a breach. I
will therefore slay this Jamb, and its sufferings shall make
the atonement requisite.’ ” ^ But, so far as I can see, this
interpretation of the idea of vicarious expiation is not
supported by facts. The victim whose suffering or death
is calculated to appease the wrathful god is not anybody
^ Moore, in Cheyne and Black, Ency- * 4 Maccabaeans, xvii. 22, quoted
clopaedia Biblica^ iv. 4226. ^ ibid. col. 4232.
Exodus^ xxxii. 32. ^ See Moore, loc. cit. col. 4229 sqq.
Sdtdhy 14 A, quoted by Moore, loc, ^ Reville, Pi'olegomena of the History
cit. col. 4226. of EeligioiiSy p. 135.
^ Sauhedriji , 39 A, quoted ibid, col^ ^ Bar inj^- Gould, Origin and Develop-
4226. ment of Keiigiotis Beliefs i. 387 sq.
F 2
THE NATURE OF
at random, whosoever he may be. He is a representative
of the community which has incurred the anger of the
god, and is accepted as a substitute on the principle of
social solidarity. So, also, according to the Western
Church, Christ discharged the punishment due to the sins
of mankind and propitiated the justice of his Father, in
his capacity of a man, as a representative of the human
race ; whereas in the East, where it was maintained that
the deity suffered (though he suffered through the human
nature which he had made his own), the idea of substi-
tution could hardly take root, since, as Harnack remarks,
“ the dying Gt?dl-man really represented no one.” ' The
Greek Church regarded the death of Christ as a ransom
for mankind paid to the devil, and this doctrine was also
accepted by the most important of the Western Fathers,
although it flatly contradicted their own theory of atone-
ment.^ There can be no doubt that expiatory sacrifices
are frequently offered as ransoms, in other words, that the
god or demon is supposed to be appeased, not by the
suffering of the victim, but by the gift. Among men it
often occurs that the offended party is induced by some
material compensation to desist frdni avenging the injury
— in many societies such placability is even prescribed by
custom, — and something similar is naturally believed to be
the case with gods. From this point of view, of course,
it is not necessary that the victim should be a person who
is connected with the offender by ties of social solidarity,
although he may still be regarded as in a way a substitute.
He may be an alien or a slave ; or animals or inanimate
things may be offered to expiate the sins of men Among
the Dacotahs, “ for the expiation of sins or crimes a sacri-
fice is made of some kind of an animal.” Of the
Melanesian sacrifices, says Dr. Codrington, “ some are
propitiatory, substituting an animal for the person who
has offended.” The Shanafs of Tinnevelly offer up a
^ Harnack, op, cit. iii. 312 ^ Sclioolcraft, Indian Tribes of the
^ Ibid. iii. 307, 315 2. *'Uni(ed States ^ ii. 196.
^ Codrington, Melanesians,, p. 127.
goat, a sheep, or a fowl, in order “ to appease the angry
demon, and induce him to remove the evil he has inflicted,
or abstain from the infliction he may meditate,” ^ It
would be almost absurd to suppose that in similar cases
the suffering or death of the animal is looked upon in the
light of a vicarious punishment. Of the Hebrew sin-
offering, Professor Kuenen aptly remarks :— ■* “ According
to the Israelite’s notion, Jahveh in his clemency permits
the soul of the animal sacrificed to take the place of that
of the sacrificer. No transfer of guilt to the animal
sacrificed takes place ; the blood of the latter is clean and
remains so, as is evident from the very fact that this blood
is put upon the altar ; it is a token of mercy on Jahveh’s
part that he accepts it. . . . Nor can it be asserted that
the animal sacrificed undergoes the punishment in the
place of the transgressor : this is said nowhere, and there-
fore, in any case, gives another, more sharply defined idea
than that which the Israelite must have formed for him-
self ; moreover, it is irreconcilable with the rule that the
indigent may bring the tenth part of an ephah of fine flour
as a sin-offering.”'^ It should also be noticed that a
purifying effect was ascribed to contact with the victim’s
blood : the high priest should put or sprinkle some blood
upon the altar “ and cleanse it, and hallow it from the
uncleanness of the children of Israel.” ^
To sum up : — The fact that punishments for offences
are frequently inflicted, or are supposed to be inflicted, by
men or gods upon individuals who have not committed
those offences, is explicable from circumstances which in
no way clash with our thesis that moral indignation is, in
its essence, directed towards the assumed cause of inflicted
pain. In many cases the victim, in accordance with the
doctrine of collective responsibility, is punished because
he is considered to be involved in the guilt — even when
he is really innocent — or ‘because he is regarded as a fair
^ Perciv^al, Lmtd of the Veda., p. 309 ^ Kuenen, Religion of Israel^ ii.
-vy. Cf. Caldwell, Tinucvelly S/idndrs, 266 sg.
p. 37, « Levitieus^ v. 1 1 sqq.
■* Ibid. xvi. 18 sq.
THE NATURE OF
representative of an offending community. In other cases,
he is supposed to be polluted by a sin or a curse, owing to
the contagious nature of sins and curses. The principle
of social solidarity also accounts for the efficacy ascribed
to vicarious expiatory sacrifices ; but in many instances
expiatory sacrifices only have the character of a ransom or
bribe.
And whilst thus our thesis as to the true direction of
moral indignation is not in the least invalidated by facts,
apparently, but only apparently, contradictory, it is, on
the other hand, strongly supported by the protest which
the moral consciousness, when sufficiently guided by dis-
crimination and sympathy, enters against the infliction of
penal suffering upon the guiltless. Such a protest is heard
from various quarters, both with reference to human
justice and with reference to the resentment of gods.
Confucius taught that the vices of a father should not
discredit a virtuous son.' Plato lays down the rule that
“ the disgrace and punishment of the father is not to be
visited on the children ” ; on the contrary, he says, if the
children of a criminal who has been punished capitally
avoid the wrongs of their father, they shall have glory,
and honourable mention shall be made of them, “ as
having nobly and manfully escaped out of evil into
good.” ” According to Roman law, “ crimen vel poena
paterna nullam maculam filio infligere potest.”® “No-
thing,” says Seneca, “ is more unjust than that any one
should inherit the quarrels of his father.” ' The Deutero-
nomist enjoins, “The fathers shall not be put to death for
the children, neither shall the children be put to death for
the fathers : every man shall be put to death for his own
1 J.2m 37 /, vi. 4. Cj. T/iiu'-S/iani^\ their appoinleH lot’’ [ihid. ix. 856).
■’ rUito, Leges, ix. 854 [Mato Jhit this enactineiil liad no doul)t a
nuikes an exception for those whose purely utilitarian foundation, the off-
fathers, grandfathers, and great-grand- spring of a thoroughly wicked family
fathers have successively undergone the being considered a danger to the cityr“"
penally of death: “Such persons the Digesia, xlviii. 19. 26. Cf. ibid.
city shall send away with all their pos- xlviii. 19. 20.
sessions to the city and country of their ^ Seneca, De ira, ii. 34. Cf. Cicero,
ancestors, retaining only and wholly De officiis, i. 25.
•THE MORAL EMOTIONS
sin.” ^ Lawgivers have been anxious to restrict the blood-
feud to the actual culprit. The Koran forbids the avenger
of blood to kill any other person than the manslayer him-
self.'^ In England, according to a law of Edmund, the
feud was not to be prosecuted against the kindred of the
slayer, unless they made his misdeed their own by har-
bouring him.® So, also, in Sweden, in the thirteenth
century, the blood-feud was limited by law to the guilty
individual;' and we meet with a similar restriction in
Slavonic law-books.®
Passing to the vengeance of gods ; according to the
Atharva-Veda, Agni who forgives sin committed through
folly and averts Varuna’s wrath, also frees from the con-
sequence of a sin committed by a man’s father or mother.®
Theognis asks, “ How, O king of immortals, is it just
that whoso is aloof from unrighteous deeds, holding no
transgression, nor sinful oath, but being righteous, should
suffer what is not just ? ” ’ According to Bion, the deity,
in punishing the children of the wicked for their fathers’
crimes, is more ridiculous than a doctor administering a
potion to a son or grandson for a father’s or grandfather’s
disease.® The early Greek notion of an inherited curse
was modified into the belief that the curse works
through generations because the descendants each com-
mit new acts of guilt.® The persons who prohibited
the sons of such as had been proscribed by Sylla, from
standing candidates for their fathers’ honours, and from
being admitted into the senate, were supposed to have
been punished by the gods for this injustice : — “ In pro-
cess of time,” says Dionysius of Halicarnassus, “a blame-
less punishment, the avenger of their crimes, pursued
^ Deitterouofny^ xslv. 16. C/. 2
/vings^ xiv. 6.
Koran.) xvii. 35.
^ Laws of E dm 14 nd.) ii. i.
^ Nordstrom, Bidrag till den svey.ska
^amhdllsfdrfattningens historia, ii.
103. 334. 335. 399- Wilda, op. cit.
p. 174.
^ Kovalew.sky, Coutu^ne conteinpp-
raine.) p. 248. In Montenegro, it was
enjtwned by Daniel T. (i’ost, -d/fgngt'
des St aatS’ nnd Eeihtslebefi) p. 181).
^ Alhar 7 U 2 ‘ ^rda, v. 30. 4. Cf. Alac-
donell, Irdic Mythology^ p. 98.
” Theognis, 743 sgq.
^ Plutarch, De sera ntiminis vindicta^
19. Cf. ibid, 12; Cicero, Be nalura
Deoruni) iii. 38.
^ Fame]], op. di. i. 77. Maine,
Ancient p. 127.
THE MORAL EMOTIONS chap, ii
them, by which they themselves were brought down from
the greatest height of glory, to the lowest degree of
obscurity ; and none, even, of their race are now left, but
women.” ^ Among the Hebrews, Jeremiah and Ezekiel
broke with the old notion of divine vengeance. The law
of individual responsibility, which had already previously
been laid down as a principle of human justice, was to be
extended to the sphere of religion." “ Every one shall
die for his own iniquity : every man that eateth the sour
grape, his teeth shall be set on edge.” ^ ‘‘The soul that
sinneth, it shall die. The son shall not bear the iniquity
of the father, neither shall the father bear the iniquity
of the son : the righteousness of the righteous shall be
upon him, and the wickedness of the wicked shall be upon
him.” ^
^ Dionysius of llalicarnassus, o/>. n't. ferennaJi., xxxi. jo.
viii. tSo, Ezekiel, xviii. 20. t’or Dalinudic
~ Cf. IMontefiorc, op. eit. p. 220 : views, see Deiilseli, f/iteraiy /le/z/oiNs,
Kiienen, op. eit. ii. 35 s</. p. 52.
Chapter III
THE NATURE OF THE MORAL EMOTIONS (^Continued')
It was said in the last chapter that moral disapproval
is a sub-species of resentment, and that resentment is, in
its essence, an aggressive attitude of mind towards an
assumed cause of pain. It was shown that, in the course
of mental evolution, the true direction of the hostile re-
action involved in moral disapproval has become more
apparent. We shall now see that, at the same time, its
aggressive character has become more disguised.
This is evidenced by the changed opinion about anger
^nd revenge which we meet at the higher stages of moral
development. Retaliation is condemned, and forgiveness
of injuries is laid down as a duty.
The rule that a person should be forbearing and kind
to his enemy has no place in early ethics.
Let those that speak evil of vis perish. l.ct the enemy be
clubbed, swept away, utterly destroyed, piled in heaps. Let
their teeth be broken. May they fall headlong into a pit. Let
ns live, and let our cnemit^s perish.” Sucli were the requests
which generally concluded the prayers of the Fijians.^ A
savage would find nothing objectionable in tliem. On the coji-
trary, he regards revenge as a duty,‘‘^ and forgiveness of enemies
as a sign of weakness, or cowardice, or want of honour.^ Nor
» ' E'ison^ quoted l)y Codrington, cotah.s) ; Boas, Fi?'sf Ue?i€ral Report on
Melanesians ^ p. 147, n. 1. the Indians of Rritish Colufnbia^ p. 38 ;
See infra^ on Blood-revenge. Baker, Albert A^yanza^ i. 240 sq.
CJ. Domenech, Great Deserts qp‘ (I.atiikas).
North Am eric ay ii. 97, 338, 438 (Da-
THE NATURE OF
is this opinion restricted to the savage world. In the Old
Testament the spirit of vindictiveness pervades both the men
and their god. The last thing with which David on his death-
bed charged Solomon was to destroy an enemy whom he
himself had spared.^ Sirach counts among the nine causes of
a man’s happiness to see the foil of his enemy.‘^ "Fhe enemies
of Yahveh can expect no mercy from him, but utter destruction
is their lot.'* To do good to a friend and to do harm to an
enemy was a maxim of the ancient Scandinavians.^ It was
taken for a matter of course by popular opinion in Greece and
Rome. According to Aristotle, ‘fo't belongs to the courageous
man never to be worsted ” ; to take revenge on a foe rather
than to he reconciled is just, and therefore honourable.^' Cicero
defines a good man as a person who serves whom he can, and
injures none except whcii provoked by injury.” Except in
domestic life and in the case of friends, Professor Seeley ob-
serves, people not only did not forgive their enemies, but did
not wish to do so, nor think better of themselves for having
done so. That man considered himself fortunate who on his
deathbed could say, in reviewing his past life, that no one had
done more good to liis friends or more mischief to his enemies.
This was the celebrated felicity of Sulla ; this the crown of
Xenophon’s panegyric on Cyrus the Younger.” ®
But side by side with the doctrine of resentment, we
meet, among peoples of culture, the doctrine of forgive-
ness.
Recompense injury with kindneSvS,” says Lao-Tsze.^ Ac-
cording to Mencius, ‘‘a benevolent man does not lay up anger,
nor cherish resentment against his brother, but only regards him
with affection and love.” In the Laws of Manu the follow-
ing rule is laid down for the twice-born man : — Against an
angry man let him not in return show anger, let him bless
^ I Kings, ii. 8 sq.
^ Ecclcsiasticus, xw. 7.
i CJ. Mojitefiorc, IJibboi Ixciures,
p. 40.
^ Maurer, Bckefirung des Norweg-
i sc ben Stain nics, ii, 154 sq.
Maury, Histoire des religions de la
Grhe antique, i. 383. Schmidt, Eihik
der alien Griechen, ii. 309 sqq.
^ Aristotle, Rhetorica, i. 9. 24. Cf.
Aeschylus, Choeophori, 309 sqq. ; Plato,
]\Ieno, p. 71 ; Memorabilia,
h. 6. 35-
^ Ciicero, De ojficiis, iii. 19. Cf. ibid.
ii. 14 ; but cf. also ibid. i. 25, where it
is said that notliing is more worthy of a
great and a good man than placability
and moderation.
^ Seeley, Ecce Plonio, p. 273.
T(h Teh King, ii. 63. I. According
to ThdiEhang, 4, a bad man ‘ ‘ broods
over resentment without ceasing.”
Mencius, v. i. 3. 2.
Ill
THE MORAL EMOTIONS
when he is cursed.” ^ It is said in the Buddhistic Dhamma-
pada : — “ Hatred does not cease by hatred at any time ; hatred
ceases by love, this is an old rule .... Among men who
hate us we dwell free from hatred. . . . Let a man overcome
anger by love, let him overcome evil by good ; let him over-
come the greedy by liberality, the liar by truth.” ^ According
to one of the Pahlavi texts, we ought not to indulge in
wrathfulness ; wrath is one of the fiends besetting man, and
“ goodness is little in the mind of a man of wrath.”
In Leviticus hatred is condemned : — Thou shalt not hate
thy brother in thine heart. . . . Thou shalt not avenge, nor
bear any grudge against the children of tliy people.” ^ Sirach,
whom I have already quoted, says in another passage, For-
give thy neighbour the hurt that he has done unto thee, so
shall thy sins also be forgiven when tliou prayest.” ^ Accord-
ing to the Talmud, whosoever does not persecute them that
persecute him, whosoever takes an offence in silence, he wlio
does good because of love, he who is cheerful under his suffer-
ings — they are the friends of God, and of them the Scripture
says. And they shall shine forth as docs the sun at noon-
day.”^ The Koran, whilst repeating the old rule, an eye
for an eye and a tooth for a tooth," at the same time teaches
that Paradise is ^Tor those who repress their rage, and those
who pardon men; God loves the kind.”® Muhammedan
‘tradition puts the following words in the mouth of the Pro-
phet : — Say not, if people do good to us, we will do good
to them, and if people oppress us, we will oppress them : but
resolve that if people do good to you, you will do good to
them, and if they oppress you, oppress them not again.” Pro-
fessor Goldziher emphasises Muhammed’s opposition to the
traditional rule of the Arabs that an enemy is a proper object
of hatred and Syed Ameer Ali has collected various passages
from the writings of Muhammedan scholars, which prove that,
^ Laws of A/anu, vi. 4S. Cf ihid.
viii. 313; INTonier-Williams, Imihin
IVisdom, pp. 444, 446 ; Muir, Additio) 7 -
al A! oral and Jlel/gions J^assai^ts, ren-
dered from the Sanskrit^ p. 30.
£>hainmapada^ i. 5 ; xv. 197 ; xvii.,
223. Cf. Jdtaka Tales i. 22 ; Oklcii-
berg, Buddhay [). 298.
^ .Dmd-i‘Alaindg-i Ivhirad, ii^ l6 ;
xU. 1 1 ; xxxix. 26.
'* Leviticus y xix. 17 sq. Cf Exodus ^
xxiii. 4,
Ecclesiasticusy xxviii. 2. Cf ibkL
X. 6; Proverbs y xxv. 21.
Dcutscli, Literary Remains^ p. 58.
Cf. Katz, Der wahre 7 'ahuudjudey p. 1 1
s]j,
' /xoran, ii. 190: “Whoso trans-
gresses against you, transgress ag:«nst
him like as he transgressed against
you.’’
^ Ibid, iii. 125. Cf ibid, xxiii. 98 ;
xxiv. 22 ; xli. 34.
I.ane-Poole, Speeches and Table-
Talk of Aloha nnnady p. 1 47.
Goldziher, Ahihaminedanische Stu-
dieiiy i. I'iiSqq.
THE NATURE OF
in spite of what has often been said to the contrary, forgiveness
of injuries is by no means foreign to the spirit of Islam.^ I hus
the author of the Kashshaf prescribes, Seek again him who
drives you away ; give to him who takes away from you ;
pardon him who injures you : for God loveth that you should
cast into the depth of your souls the roots of His perfections.”
That “ the sandal-tree perfumes the axe that fells it,” is a
saying in everyday use among the Muhammedcins of India,’^
And Lane often heard Egyptians forgivingly say, on receiving
a blow from an equal, God bless thee,” “ God requite thee
good,” Beat me again.”
The principles of forgiveness had also advocates in Greece
and Rome. In one of the Platonic dialogues, Socrates says,
We ought not to retaliate or render evil for evil to any one,
whatever evil we may have suffered from him ” ; though he
wisely adds that “ this opinion has never been held, and never
will be held, by any considerable number of persons.^ The
Stoics strongly condemned anger as unnatural and unreasonable.
Mankind is born for mutual assistance, anger for mutual riiin.”’^
“ Anger is a crime of the mind ; ... it often is even more
criminal tJian the faults with which it is angry.” ^ He is the
best and purest “who pardons others as if he sinned himself
daily, but avoids sinning as if he never pardoned.” ^ “ If any
one is angry with you, meet his anger by returning benefits
for it.”'^^ “ The cynic loves those who beat him.”
Forgiveness of enemies is thus by no means an exclusively
Christian tenet, although it has never before or after been
inculcated with the same emphasis as it was by Jesus. “ Love
your enemies, bless them that curse you, do good to tliem that
hate you, and pray for them which despitefully use you, and
persecute you.”^^ When St. Peter asked, “ Lord, how oft shall
my brother sin against me, and I forgive him ? till seven
times?” Jesus replied, “Isay not unto thee, Until seven
times ; but, Until seventy times seven,” — that is, as often as
he repeats the offence. It would seem that Jesus by these
sentences expressly forbade men to avenge themselves, or even
^ ^\mcer AH, Ethics of Islam ^ p. 26
W-
Ibid, p. 7. Idem^ Life and I'each-
rngs of Mohammed^ p. 280.
Poole, Studies in Afohammeda?tism,
p. 226.
Lane, Modern Egyptians, p. 314
sq.^
Plato, Crito, p. 49.
^ Seneca, Ee ira, i. 5.
" Ibid. i. 16 ; ii. 6.
® Pliny, Epistoht, ix. 22 (viii. 22).
^ Seneca, op. eit. ii. 34.
Epictetus, Dissertationes, iii. 22,
54 -
AA Matthew, v. 44. Cf ihid. v.
39 sq, ; vi. 14 sq, ; St. Luke, vi. 27
sqq. ; xvii. 3 sq. ; St. Mark, xi. 25 sq,
^'i St. Matthew, xviii. 21 sq.
THE MORAL EMOTIONS
HI
to feel resentment on their own behalf; and so also he was
understood by St. Paul.^
The rule of retaliation and the rule of forgiveness,
however, are not so radically opposed to each other as
they appear to be. What the latter condemns is, in reality,
not every kind of resentment, but non-moral resentment ;
not impartial indignation, but personal hatred. It pro-
hibits revenge, but not punishment. According to the
Laws of Manu, crime was so indispensably to be followed
by punishment, that if the king pardoned a thief or a
perpetrator of violence, instead of slaying or striking him,
the guilt fell on the king ; and if Lao-tsze was an
enemy to the infliction of any kind of suffering, it was
because he held that in a well-governed State the necessity
for punishment could not arise, as crime would cease to
exist.** The Chinese book. Merits and Errors Scrutinised,
which regards it as a merit to refrain from avenging an
injury, adds that, “ if a man should omit to avenge the
injuries of his parents, it would become an error.”'' Jesus
was certainly not free from righteous indignation. It does
not appear that he ever forgave the legalists who sinned
against the kingdom of God, and he told his disciples that,
if a brother who had trespassed against his brother neglected
to hear the church, he should be looked upon as a heathen
and a publican . '' Christian writers have laid much stress
upon the circumstance that Jesus enjoined men to for-
give their own enemies, but not to abstain from resenting
injuries done to others. According to Thomas Aquinas,
“ the good bear with the wicked to this extent, that, so
far as it is proper to do so, they patiently endure at their
hands the injuries done to^ themselves ; but they do not
bear with them to the extent of enduring the injuries ddne
to God and their neighbours. For Chrysostom says, ‘ It
^ Romqns, xii. 19 sqq. ; i Thessalo-
nians^ v. sq, ; Colossiansy iii. 12 sq,
" Laws of Manu ^ viii, 316, 346 sq,
Cf Gautama,, xii. 45 ; Apastamba, i. 9.
25. 5-
^ Douglas, Confucianism and Taou-
ism, p. 204.
^ ‘ Merits and Errors Scrutinised,’ in
/ndo- Chinese Gleaner, iii. 153.
* St, Matthew, xviii. 15 sqq.
is praiseworthy to be patient under one’s own wrongs, but
the height of impiety to dissemble injuries done to God.’ ” ^
Practically, at least, Christianity has not altered the validity
of the Aristotelian rule that anger admits not only of an
excess, but of a defect, and that we ought to feel angry at
certain things." As Plutarch says, we even think those
worthy of hatred who are not vexed at hateful indi-
viduals ; and we can sympathise with the man who, hear-
ing somebody -praise Charillus, king of Sparta, for his
gentleness, replied, “ How can Charillus be good, who is
not harsh even to the bad ? ” •* Moreover, the belief in a
transcendental retributive justice, in an ultimate punish-
ment of badness, which we meet with in Taouism,^
Brahmanism, Buddhism,'' Christianity, “ side by side with
the doctrine of forgiveness, is based upon the demand that
wrong should be resented.
It is easy to see why enlightened and sympathetic minds
disapprove of resentment and retaliation springing from
personal motives. Such resentment is apt to be partial.
It is too often directed against persons whom impartial
reflection finds to be no proper objects of indignation, and
still more frequently it is unduly excessive. As Butler
says, “ we are in such a peculiar situation, with respect to
injuries done to ourselves, that we can scarce any more see
them as they really are, than our eye can see itself.” ”
“ As bodies seem greater in a mist, so do little matters in
a rage ” ; hence the old rule that we ought not to punish
whilst angry.® The more the moral consciousness is
influenced by sympathy, the more severely it condemns
any retributive infliction of pain which it regards as
undeserved ; and it seems to be in the first place with a
^ Thomas Aquinas, Su/nnia Theo^ ^ Cf, Kojiians^ xii, 19: ‘‘Vengeance
logica, ii.-ii. 108. i. 2. Cf. Lactantius, is mine; I will repay, saith the Lord.”
De ira Dei^ 17. Butler, ‘Sermon IX, — Upon For-
^ Aristotle, Ethica Nicomacheay ii. 7. giveness of Injuries,’ in Analogy of
to ; iii. I. 24 ; iv. 5. 3 sqq. Religiojiy Cf'c. p. 469.
^ V\\\{iA.xc\\, De iftvidla et odioy 5. ^ Plutarch, De cohibenda ira, ii.
Douglas, op. cit. p. 257. Montaigne, Essaisy ii. 31 {OeuvreSy p.
Dhanimapaday i. 15, 17 ; x. 137 3^96).
sqq.
[(I
THE MORAL EMOTIONS
view to preventing such injustice that teachers of morality
have enjoined upon men to love their enemies. It would,
indeed, be absurd to blame a person for expressing moral
indignation at an act simply because he himself happens to
be the offended party ; practically we allow him to be
even more indignant than the impartial spectator would
be, whereas excessive placability often meets with censure.
Like Aristotle, we maintain that “ to submit to insult, or
to overlook an insult offered to our friends, shows a slavish
spirit ” ^ ; and we agree with the Confucian maxims, that
injuries should be recompensed, not with kindness, but
with justice, and that nobody but he who deserves it
should be an object of hatred."
At the same time, the injunctions of moralists that
unjust resentment should be suppressed, are far from
introducing any absolutely new element into the estima-
tion of conduct. They only represent a higher stage of a
process of moral development the early phases of which
are found already in primitive societies. Even the savage
who enjoins revenge as a duty, regards revenge under
certain circumstances as wrong.^ The restraining rule of
like for like, as we shall see, is an instance of this.
The aggressive character of moral disapproval has
become more disguised, not only by the more scrutinising
attitude towards resentment and retaliation which dis-
tinguishes the moral consciousness of a higher type, but
by the different way in which the aggressiveness displays
itself. The infliction of suffering merely for the sake of
retribution is condemned, and the rule is laid down that
we should hate, not the sinner, but only the sin.
Punishment, which expresses more or less faithfully the
moral indignation of the society which inflicts it, is extern-
ally similar to an act of revenge ; it causes, or Is Intended
* Aristotle, Ethica Nicomachea^^ iv.
.5.6.
Lun Yu, xiv. 36. 3 ; xvii.9. i, 5 ;
xvii. 24. I. Douglas, Confucianism
and Taouism, p. 91. Cf. Chimg Yung,
X. 3 ; xxxi. I ; xxxiii. 4.
* Concerning the Dacotalis, Prescott
observes, “ There are cases where the
Indians say retaliation is wrong, and
they try to prevent it ” (Schoolcraft,
Indian Tribes, ii. 197).
8o
THE NATURE OF
to cause, pain in return for inflicted pain. For ages it
was looked upon as a matter of course that if a person
had committed an offence he should have to suffer for it.
Thi s is still the notion of the multitude, as also of a host
of theorisers, who, by calling punishment an expiation, or
a reparation, or a restoration of the disturbed equilibrium
of justice, only endeavour to give a philosophical sanctioi
to a very simple fact, the true nature of which they too
often have failed to grasp. The infliction of pain, how-
ever, is not an act which the moral consciousness regards
with indifference, even in the case of a criminal ; and to
many enlightened minds with keen sympathy for human
suffering, it has appeared both unreasonable and cruel that
the State should wilfully torment him to no purpose.
But whilst retributive punishment has been condemned,
punishment itself has been defended ; it is only looked
upon in a different light, not as an end by itself, but as a
means of attaining an end,. It is to be inflicted, not
because wrong has been done, but in oi'der that wrong be
not done. Its object is held to be, either to deter from
crime, or to reform the criminal, or, by means of elimina-
tion or seclusion, to make it physically impossible for him
to commit fresh crimes.
These views were expressed already in Greek and Roman
antiqiiity.'^ According to Plato, a reasonable man punishes for
the sake of deterrinii from wickedness, or with a view to
correcting the offender.’^ Aristotle looks upon punishment as
a moral medicine/' Seneca maintains that the law, in punishing
wrong, aims at three ends ; either that it may correct him
whom it punishes, or that his punishment may render other
men better, or that, by bad men being put out of the way, the
rest may live without fear.” In modern times all these theories
^ have had, and still have, their numerous adherents. According
to Hugo Grotius, ‘‘^men are so bound together by their common
^ Cf. Lai.stner, Das Rec/it in der 479. Idem, Leges, ix. 854; xi. 934:
St)‘afe, p. 9 sqq. ; Thonissen, Le droit xii, 944.
final de la ripnhliqne Atliinioine, ]■>. ^ Aristotle, Etliica Nicomachea, ii.' '
4l^sqq. 3 . 4 .
“ Plato, D/vta^oras, p. 324. Idem, ^ Seneca, De elemenda , i. 22.. Cf,
Politiciis, p. 293. Idem, Gorgias, p. Idem, De ira, i. 19.
HI
THE MORAL EMOTIONS
8i
nature, that they ought not to do each other harm, except for
the sake of some good to be attained”; hence man is not
rightly punished by man merely for the sake of punishing ” ;
advantage alone makes punishment right — either the advan-
tage of the offender, or of him who suffers by the offence, or
of persons in general.” ^ P'or a long time the view taken by
Hobbes, that the aym of Punishment is not a revenge, but
terrour,” “ remained the leading doctrine on the subject, among
philosophers, as well as legislators. It was shared by Montes-
quieu,*^ Beccaria,^ and Filangieri,*'' by Anselm von Feuerbach ^
and Schopenhauer,^ and, in the main, by Bentham/^ During the
nineteenth century the principle of determent was largely super-
seded by the principle of reformation ; whilst certain contem-
porary criminologists — like some previous ones^ — are of opinion
that punishment should aim to repress crime by an ‘‘ absolute ”
or relative elimination ” of the criminal, that is, in extreme
cases by killing him, but generally by incarcerating him in a
criminal lunatic asylum, or by banishing him for ever or for a
certain period, or by interdicting him from a particular neigh-
bourhood.’**
The advocates of these various theories are unanimous
n condemning retributive punishment as wrong. With-
out the grounds of social defence, says M. Guyau, “the
punishment would be as blameworthy as the crime,
and . . . the lawgivers and the judges, by deliberately con-
demning the guilty to punishment, would become their
fellows.”'^ For my own part I believe, on the other hand,
that those who would venture to carry out all the conse-
quences to which the theories of social defence or of
^formation might lead, would be regarded even as more
criminal than those they punished, not only by the
^ (irotius, De jure belli et pads, ii,
20 . 4 sqt].
“ Hobbes, Le 7 >iathaii, ii. 28, p. 243.
Montesquieu, Lettres Persajies, 81.
-Ik'ccaria, Dei delitti e dellc pene,
passim.
'' I'ilangieri, La scienza della legisla-
zwjie, iii. 2. Tpj, vol. iv. 13 sq.
^ von Feiierl)ach-Milteni)aier, l.ehr-
biteh des j^eaieineii in Deutschland
giiltigen Peinlichoi Rechts, p. 38 sqq.
' Sciiopenhauer, Die Welt als VVille
^ VOL, I
nnd Vorstellung, ii. 683 sqq.
^ Bentham, Idinciples of Morals and
Legislation, p. 170 sq. n. I : “ Ex-
ample is the most important end of all.”
Idem, Rationale of Punishment, p. 19
sqq.
See von Feuerbacb-MiUermaier,
op. dt. p. 40.
Oarofalo, Cri?ninologie,\>. 251 sqq,
Ferri, Criminal Sociology, p. 204 sqq.
Ciuyau, Esqnisse d'etat e morale sans
obligation ni sanction, p. 148.
G
THE NATURE OF
opponents, but probably by the very supporters of the
theories in question. A brief statement of some of
those consequences will, I hope, suffice to prove that
punishment can hardly be guided exclusively by utilitarian
considerations, but requires the sanction of the retributive
emotion of moral disapproval.
The principle of repressing crime by eliminating the
criminal may at once be put aside, because it has no
reference to punishment of criminals, although it contains
a suggestion — and a most excellent one indeed— as to the
proper mode of treating them. Their exclusion from the
company of their fellow-men — not to speak of their elimi-
nation by death — certainly entails suffering, but, according
to the principle with which we are dealing, this suffering
is not intended. On the other hand, punishment, in the
ordinary sense of the word, always involves an express
intention to inflict pain, whatever be the object for which
pain is inflicted. We do not punish an ill-natured dog
when we tie him up so as to prevent him from doing
harm, nor do we punish a lunatic by confining him in a
madhouse.
According to the principle of determent, the infliction
of suffering in consequence of an offence is justified as a
means of increasing public safety. The offender is sacri-
ficed for the common weal. But why the offender only ?
It is quite probable that a more effective way of deterring
from crime would be to punish his children as well ; and
if the notion of justice derived all its import from the
result achieved by the punishment, there would be nothing
unjust in doing so. The only objection which, from this
point of view, might ever be raised against the practice
of visiting the wrongs of the fathers upon the children,
ns that it is needlessly severe ; the innocence of the
children could count for nothing. Nor do I see why
the law should not allow our own judges now and then to
follow the example of their Egyptian colleague who in
intricate lawsuit caused a person avowedly innocent to be
bastinadoed with the hope ’^that whoever was the real
Ill
THE MORAL EMOTIONS
culprit might be induced to confess out of compassion^
MoreoVfer^ if the object of punishment is merely preven-
tive, the heaviest punishment should be threatened where
the strongest motive is needed to restrain. Consequently,
an injury committed under great temptation, or in a
passion, should be punished with particular severity ;
whereas a crime like parricide might be treated with more
indulgence than other kinds of homicide, owing to the
restraining influence of filial affection. Could the moral
consciousness approve of this ?
Again, if punishment were to be regulated by the prin-
ciple of reforming the criminal, the result would in some
cases be very astonishing. There is no more incorrigible
set of offenders than habitual vagrants and drunkards,
whereas experience has shown that the most easily re-
formed of all offenders is often some person who has
committed a serious crime. According to the reformation
theory, the latter should soon be set free, whilst the petty
offender might have to be shut up for all his life. Nay
more, if the criminal proves absolutely Incorrigible, and
not the slightest hope of his reformation is left, there
would no longer be any reason for punishing him at all."'
The reformationist may also be asked why he does not
try some more humane method of improving people’s
characters than by the infliction of suffering.
It may seem strange that theories which are open to
such objections should have been able to attract so many
intelligent partisans. These theories must at least possess
a certain plausibility. If punishment on the one hand
springs from moral Indignation, and on the other hand is
frequently interpreted as a means either of deterring from
crime or of reforming the criminal, there must obviously
be some connection between these ends and the retributive
aim of moral resentment. There must be certain facts
which, to some extent, fil] up the gap between the theory
^f retribution and the other theories of punishment.
^ Burckhardt, Arabic ProverbSj p. p. 203 ; DurkheiiiL Dii'ision dii travail
103 sq, 0 social i p. 94.
Cf. Morrison, Crime and its Causes,
G 2
THE NATURE OF
The doctrine of determent regards punishment as a
means of preventing crime. A crime always involves the
infliction of pain ; and the one thing which men try to
prevent for its own sake is pain. The one thing which
arouses resentment is likewise pain. There must con-
sequently be a general coincidence between the acts which
people resent and the acts which the law would punish if
it were framed on the principle of determent. But the
resemblance between the desire to deter and resentment is
greater still. Resentment is not only aroused by pain,
but is a hostile attitude towards its cause, and its intrinsic
object is to remove this cause, that is, to prevent pain.
An act of moral resentment is therefore apt to resemble a
punishment Inflicted with a view to deterring from crime,
provided that the punishment is directed against the cause
of crime — the criminal himself — and is not unduly
severe.
The doctrine of reformation aims at the removal of a
criminal disposition of mind by improving the offender.
Moral resentment likewise aims at the removal of a
volitional cause of pain, by bringing about repentance in
the offender. That repentance ought to be followed by
forgiveness, partial or total, is a widely recognised moral
claim.
According to the Chinese Penal Code, whoever, having
committed an injury wliich can be repaired by restitution or
compensation, surrenders himself voluntarily, and acknowledges
his guilt to a magistrate, before it is otherwise discovered, shall
be freely pardoned, though all claims upon his property shall be
duly liquidated.^ In Madagascar, according to a law made in
1828, all the fines shall be reduced one-half, according to the
nature of the fines, if the persons guilty accuse themselves.”
According to Zoroastrianism, one element of atonement con-
sists in repentance, as manifested by avowal of the guilt and by
the recital of a formula, the PatetJ^ It is said in the Laws of
Manu : — ‘‘In proportion as a man who has done wrong, himself
^ Ta 'J'shig Leii I.ee, sec. xxv. p. 27 s<]. ^ Darmesteter, in Sacf ed Books of the
~ Kllis, Histoy of Afaciamscar, i. Bast, iv. p. Ixxxvi.
386.
in
THE MORAL EMOTIONS
confesses it, even so far he is freed from guilt, as a snake from
its slough. . . . He who has committed a sin and Jras repented,
is freed from that sin, but he is purified only by the resolution
of ceasing to sin and thinking H will do so no more.’ ” ^ Ac-
cording to the Rig-Veda, Varuna inflicts terrible punishments
on the hardened criminal, but is merciful to him who repents ;
to Varuna the cry of anguish from remorse ascends, and before
him the sinner comes to discharge himself of the burden of his
guilt by confession.^ So, also, Zeus pardons the repentant.-^
The main doctrine of Judaism on the subject of atonement is
comprised in the single word Repentance. No teachers, says
Mr. Montefiore, exalted the place and power of repentance
more than the Rabbis. 'Fhere was no sin for which in their
eyes a true repentance could not obtain forgiveness from God.” ^
According to the Talmud, a space of only two fingers’ breadth
lies between Hell and Heaven : the sinner has only to repent
sincerely, and the gates to everlasting bliss will spring open.'’
Jesus commanded his disciples to forgive injuries if followed by
repentance : — If thy brother trespass against thee, rebuke
him ; and if he repent, forgive him. And if he trespass against
thee seven times in a day, and seven times in a day turn again
to thee, saying, I repent ; thou shalt forgive him.”^
But repentance not only blunts the edge of moral
indignation and recommends the offender to the mercy of
men and gods : it is the sole ground on which pardon can
be given by a scrupulous judge. When sufficiently guided
by deliberation and left to itself, without being unduly
checked by other emotions, the feeling of moral resent-
ment is apt to last as long as its cause remains unaltered,
that is, until the will of the offender has ceased to be
offensive ; and it ceases to be offensive only when he
acknowledges his guilt and repents. It is true that the
mere performance of certain ceremonies is frequently
supposed to relieve the performer of his sins,' and that the#
^ Laivs of Alan li, xi, 229, 231. Cf. Cf, ibid. p. 56; Katz, Der wahre Tal-
ibid. xi. 228, 230. mudjude., p. 87 sq. ; Kohler, ‘ Atone-
- Rig- Veda^ i. 25. I sq. ; ii. 28. 5 nienl,’ in Jcivish Encyclopedia^ ii. 279 ;
^aq. ; V. 85^. 7 sq. ; vii. 87. 7, 88. 6 .rr/., Moore, ‘ vSncrificc ’ in Cheyne and
09. I sqq. Barth, Religions of Jndia^ Black, Encyclopcedia Bildica, iv. 4224
p. 17. ^ sq.
^ Ilias^ ix. 502 sqq. ® St. Luke^ xvii. 3 sq.
^ Montefiore, op. eit. pj'). 524, 335 n. * ^ Supra, ]). 53 sqq. l leriot, Travels
Deutsch, Literary Remains, j). 53. through the Canadas, p, 378 (ancient
THE NATURE OF
same end is thought to be attained by pleasing God in
some way or other, by sacrifice, or alms-giving, or the
like. Men even lay claim to divine forgiveness as a
right belonging to them in virtue of some meritorious
deeds of theirs, according to the doctrine of opera
super erogativa — a doctrine which, in substance, is not
restricted to Roman Catholicism, but is found, in a more
or less developed form, in Judaism,^ Mohammedanism,^
Brahmanism,'^ and degenerated Buddhism/ But all such
ideas are objectionable to the moral consciousness of a
higher type. They are based on the crude notion that
sin is a material substance which mav be removed by
material means ; or on the belief that an offender may
compound with the deity for sinning against him, in the
same way as he pacifies his injured neighbour, by bribery
or flattery ; or on the assumptions that by a good or
meritorious deed a man has done more than his duty, that
a good deed stands in the same relation to a bad deed as a
claim to a debt, that the claim is made on the same person
to whom the debt is due, namely, God — even though it
be only by his mercy — and that the debt consequently
may be compensated by the claim in the same way as the
payment of a certain sum may compensate for a loss
inflicted. This doctrine attaches badness and goodness to
external acts rather than to mental facts. Reparation
implies compensation for a loss. The loss may be com-
pensated by the bestowal of a corresponding advantage ;
but no reparation can be given for badness. Badness can
only be forgiven, and moral forgiveness can be granted
only on condition that the agent’s mind has undergone a
radical alteration for the better, that the badness of the
Vill has given way to repentance.'"' Hence the Reformation
Mexicans). Adair, History of (he “ little sins 'Mhal are forgiven if some
America)}. Jndiafis^ 1 50. Krashenin- good actions are done, whereas “ great
riikoft', IIisto)y of A'a))ischalha^ \). \"J^. sins” can only l>e forgiven after due
Williams and Calvert, Fiji, p. 24. re])entance [ihid. p. 214).
’ Montefjore, op. cit. p. 525 sqq. ^ W'^heeler, History of India^ ii. 475.
Korany xi. 1 16. Sell, Faith of ^ Indo-Chinese Gteanery\\\, 159, 161,
IsidtHy p. 220 sq. According to Mu- ' 164. Davis, Chinay ii. 4k
hammedanism, however, it is only ® Thi.s point was certainly not over-
Ill
fkE MORAL EMOTIONS
proscribed offerings for the redemption of sins, together
with the trade in indulgences ; and we meet with an
analogous movement in other comparatively advanced
forms of religion. In reformed Brahmanism, repentance
is declared to be the only means of redeeming trespasses/
The idea expressed in the Psalms, that God delights not
in burnt offerings, but that the sacrifices of God are a
broken and a contrite heart, became the prevailing opinion
among the Rabbis, most of whom regarded repentance as
the conditio sine qua non of expiation and the forgiveness
of sins.^ Let us also remember that he who commanded
his followers to forgive a brother for his sin, at the same
time pronounced the qualification : if he repent.”
ITat moral indignation is appeased by repentance, and
that repentance is the only proper ground for forgiveness,
is thus due, not to the specifically moral character of such
indignation, but to its being a form of resentment. This
is confirmed by the fact that an angry and revengeful man
is apt to be in a similar way influenced by the sincere
apologies of the offender. As Aristotle said, men are
placable in regard to those who acknowledge and repent
their guilt : ‘‘ there is proof of this in the case of chastising
servants ; for we chastise more violently those who con-
tradict us, and deny their guilt ; but towards such as
acknowledge themselves to be justly punished, we cease
from our wrath.” 'Fo take an instance from the savage
world. The Caroline Islander, according to Mr. Christian,
‘‘is inclined to be revengeful, and will bide his time
patiently until his opportunity comes. Yet he is not
implacable, and counts reconciliation a noble and a princely
thing. There is a form of etiquette to be observed on
looked by die Calholic moralists, but {Cateihism of the Council of Trent ^ n.
e\'cn the most ardent apology cannot 5. 22).
explain away the idea of reparation in ^ (loblet d’Alviella, Hibhert Lectures
the Catholic doctrine of the justification on the Origin and Gnnvth of the Con-
of man (e/. Manzoni, Osservazioni Sulla ceptuni of Cod^ p. 263.
^ Morale Cattolica, p. icx)). Penance l^alins, li. r6 sq.
consists of contrition, confession, and ^ Moore, toe. < it, col. 4225.
satisfaction, and contrition itself is ^ Cf Martineau, lypcs of Ethieal
chiefly “ a willingness to compensate^’ 'Theory ^ ii. 203.
® Aristotle, Khetorica^ ii. 3. 5.
these occasions — a present {katom) is made, an apology
olFered — a piece of sugar-cane accepted by the aggrieved
party — honour is satisfied and the matter ends.” ^ In the
case of revenge, external satisfaction or material compensa-
tion is often allowed to take the place of genuine repent-
ance, and the humiliation of the adversary may be sufficient
to quiet the angry passion. But the revenge felt by a
reflecting mind is not so readily satisfied. It wants to
remove the cause which aroused it. The object which
resentment is chiefly intent upon, Adam Smith observes,
“ is not so much to make our enemy feel pain in his turn,
as to make him conscious that he feels it upon account of
his past conduct, to make him repent of that conduct, and
to make him sensible, that the person whom he injured
did not deserve to be treated in that manner.” ■ The
delight of revenge, says Bacon, “ seemeth to be not so
much in doing the hurt, as in making the party repent.”
We can now see the origin of the idea that the true end
of punishment is the reformation of the criminal. This
idea merely emphasises the most humane element in
resentment, the demand that the offender’s will shall
cease to be offensive. The principle of reformation has
thus itself a retributive origin. This explains the fact,
otherwise inexplicable, that the amendment which it has
in view is to be effected by the infliction of pain. It also
accounts for the inconsistent attitude of the reformationist
towards incorrigible offenders, already commented upon.
Resentment gives way to forgiveness only in the case of
repentance, not in the case of incorrigibility. Hence,
not even the reformationist regards incorrigibility as a
legitimate ground for exempting a person from punish-
rqent, although this flatly contradicts his theory about the
true aim of all punishment.
Thus the theories both of determent and of reformation
are ultimately offspring of the same emotion that first
^ Christian, Caroline Islands y p. 72. . ^ Bacon, ‘ Ivs.say IV. Of Revenge,’
- Adam Smith, Theory of Moral iir Essays^ p. 45. Cf. IMontaighe,
Sentiments y p. 138.^7/. Essaisy ii. 27 {Oeuvres y p. 384).
lu The moral emotions 89
induced men to inflict punishment on their fellow-
creatures. It escaped the advocates of these theories that
they themselves were under the influence of the very
principle they fought against, because they failed to grasp
its true import. Rightly understood, resentment is pre-
ventive in its nature, and, when sufficiently deliberate,
regards the infliction of sufiering as a means rather than
as an end. It not only gives rise to punishment, but
readily suggests, as a proper end of punishment, either
determent or amendment or both. But, first of all, moral
resentment wants to raise a protest against wrong. And
the immediate aim of punishment has always been to give
expression to the righteous indignation of the society
which inflicts it.
Now it may be thought that men have no right to give
vent to their moral resentment in a way which hurts their
neighbours unless some benefit may be expected from it.
In the case of many other emotions, we hold that the
conative clement in the emotion ought not to be allowed
to develop into a distinct volition or act ; and it would
seem that a similar view might be taken with refer-
ence to the aggressiveness inherent in moral disapproval.
It is a notion of this kind that lies at the bottom of the
utilitarian theories of punishment. They are protests
against purposeless infliction of pain, against crude ideas
of retributive justice, against theories hardly in advance of
the low feelings of the popular mind. Therefore, they
mark a stage of higher refinement in the evolution of the
moral consciousness ; and if the principles of determent
and of reformation are open to objections which will be
shared by almost everyone, that is due to other circum-
stances than their demand that punishment should serye
a useful end. As we have seen, they ignore the fact that
a punishment, in order to be recognised as just, must not
transgress the limits set 'down by moral disapproval, that
it must not be inflicted on innocent persons, that it must
be proportioned to the guilt, that offenders who are
amenable to discipline must not be treated more severely
THE NATURE OF
than incorrigible criminals. These theories also seem to
exaggerate the deterring or reforming influence which
punishments exercise upon criminals/ whilst, in another
respect, they take too narrow a view of its social use-
fulness. Whether its voice inspire fear or not, whether it
wake up a sleeping conscience or not, punishment, at all
events, tells people in plain terms what, in the opinion of
the society, they ought not to do. It gives the multitude
a severe lesson in public morality ; and it is difficult to see
how quite the same effect could be attained by any other
method. Retaliation is such a spontaneous expression of
indignation, that people would hardly realise the offensive-
ness of an act which evokes no signs of resentment. Of
course, punishment, in the legal sense of the term, is only
one form — the most concrete form — of public retaliation ;
it is, indeed, probable that public opinion exercises a
greater influence on men than punishment would do
without its aid.'"' But punishment, in combination with
public opinion, has no doubt to some extent an educating,
and not merely a deterring, influence upon the members
of a society. As Sir James Stephen observes, “ the
sentence of the law is to the moral sentiment of the public
in relation to any offence what a seal is to hot wax. It
converts into a permanent final judgment what might
otherwise be a transient sentiment.”’^ Finally, it must
not be overlooked that the infliction of punishment upon
the perpetrator of a grave offence gratifies a strong general
desire, and, even though the pain which always accompanies
an unsatisfied desire would by itself afford no sufficient
justification for subjecting the offender to such intense
^ On the liniitncl cflicicncy tjf punish-
as a deterrent, see Veni, op. cif.
p. 82 sqq. On the moral insensibility
of tlie instinc'tive and habitual criminal,
and al):sence of remorse, see Havelock
Kills, The CriifiiuaP p. 124 sqq.
Cf. Locke, Essay eoJiccnuiiy JJn-
1)1 a)! l/))de}'sta?idi)jgj ii. 28. 12 {Philo-
sophical IVor/cSj p. 2S3) ; Shaftesbury,
‘ Incpiiry concerning Virtue aJid Merit,’
3 * 3 ) Charac/cris/ichsy ii. 64.
■' Stejilien, History of the Criminal
Law of England, ii. 81. Cf Shaft es-
Iniry, op. cif. ii. 64; “As to punish-
ments and rewards, their efiicac)’ is not
so nuu'h from the fear or exjK'Ctalion
which they raise, as from a natural
esteem of virtue, and detestation of
villajiy, which is awaken’d and excited
by these }ml)lic]c expressions of the
approbation and hatred of mankind in
each case.”
in
tHE MORAL EMOTIONS
suffering, other more serious consequences might easily
result from leaving him unpunished. The public indigna-
tion might find a vent in some less regular and less
discriminating mode of retaliation, like lynching ; or, on
the other hand, by remaining unsatisfied, the desire might
dwindle away from want of nourishment, and the moral
standard suffer a corresponding loss.
However, it is not to be believed that, in practice, the
infliction of punishment is, or ever will be, regulated
merely by considerations of social utility, even within the
limits of what is recognised as legitimate by the moral
sentiment. The retributive desire is so strong, and
appears so natural, that we can neither help obeying it,
nor seriously disapprove of its being obeyed. The theory
that we have a right to punish an offender only in so
far as, by doing so, we promote the general happiness,
really serves in the main as a justification for gratifying
such a desire, rather than as a foundation for penal
practice. Moreover, this theory refers, and pretends to
refer, only to outward behaviour — to punishment, not to
the emotion from which punishment springs. It condemns
the retributive act, not the retributive desire.
But at the same time the aggressive element in the
emotion itself has undergone a change, which tends to
conceal its true nature by partly leading it into a new
channel, or, rather, by narrowing the channel in which it
discharges itself. Resentment is directed against the
cause of the offence by which it was aroused — broadly
speaking, the offender. But when duly reflecting upon
the matter, we cannot fail to admit that the real cause was
not the offender as a whole, but his will. Deliberate and
discriminating resentment is therefore apt to turn agaipst
the will rather than against the wilier ; as we have seen,
it is desirous to inflict pain on the offender chiefly as a
means of removing the cause of pain suffered, the
existence of the bad will. If this is the case with deliberate
resentment in general, it must particularly be the case
with moral indignation,' which is more likely to be
' THE NATURE OF
influenced by sympathy, and hence more discriminate,
than non-moral resentment. This fact gives rise to the
moral commandment that we should hate, not the sinner,
but the sin. The hostile reaction should be focussed on
the will of the offender, and his sensibility should be
regarded merely as an instrument through which the will
is worked upon. But there is little hope that such a
demand can ever be strictly enforced. Professor Sidgwick
justly remarks that, though moralists try to distinguish
between anger directed “ against the act ” and anger
directed “ against the agent,” it may be fairly doubted
whether it is within the capacity of ordinary human nature
to maintain this distinction in practice.’ The will which
offends, and the sensibility which suffers, cannot seriously
be looked upon as two different entities the one of which
should not be punished for the fault of the other. 'I'he
person himself is held responsible for the offence. The
hostile reaction turns against his will because only by
acting upon the will can the cause of pain be removed.
But since the remotest ages the aggressive attitude towards
this cause has been connected with an instinctive desire to
produce counter-pain ; and, though we may recognise that
such a desire, or rather the volition into which it tends to
develop, may be morally justifiable only if it is intended
to remove the cause of pain, we can hardly help being
indulgent to the gratification of a human instinct which
seems to be well nigh ineradicable. It is the instinctive
desire to inflict counter-pain that gives to moral indigna-
tion its most important characteristic. Without it,
moral condemnation and the ideas of right and wrong
would never have come into existence. Without it, we
should no more condemn a bad man than a poisonous
plant. The reason why moral judgments are passed on
volitional beings, or their acts, is not merely that they are
volitional, but that they are sensitive as well ; and how-
ever much we try to concentrate our indignation on the
act, it derives its peculiar flavour from being directed
^ Sidgwick, Methods of Ethics ^ p. 364.
Ill
THE MORAL EMOTIONS
against a sensitive agent. I have heard persons of a highly
sympathetic cast of mind assert that a wrong act awakens
in them only sorrow, not indignation ; but though sorrow
be the predominant element in their state of mind, I
believe that, on a close inspection, they would find there
another emotion as well, one in which there is immanent
an element of hostility, however slight. It is true that
the intensity of moral indignation cannot always be
measured by the actual desire to cause pain to the
offender ; but its intensity seems nevertheless to be con-
nected with the amount of suffering which the indignant
man is willing to let the offender undergo in consequence
of the offence. Which of us could ever, quite apart from
any utilitarian considerations, feel the same sympathy with
a person who suffers on account of his badness as with one
who suffers innocently ? It is one of the most interesting
facts related to the moral consciousness of a higher type,
that it in vain condemns the gratification of the very
desire from which it sprang. It is like a man of low
extraction, who, in spite of all acquired refinement, bears
his origin stamped on his face.
Whilst resentment is a hostile attitude of mind towards
a cause of pain, retributive kindly emotion is a friendly
attitude of mind towards a cause of pleasure. Just as in
the lower forms of anger there is hardly any definite desire
to produce suffering, only a vehement desire to remove
the cause of pain, so in the lower form of retributive kindly
emotion there is hardly any definite desire to produce
pleasure, only a friendly endeavour to retain the cause of
the pleasure experienced. When the emotion contains a
definite desire to give pleasure in return for pleasure
received, and at the same time is felt by the favoured
party in his capacity of being himself the object of the
benefit, it is called gratitude. We often find intermingled
with gratitude a feeling of indebtedness ; he upon whom
a benefit has been conferred feels himself as a debtor, and
regards the benefactor aa his creditor. This feeling has
• THE NATURE OF '
even been represented as essential to, or as a condition of,
gratitude ; ^ but it is not implied in what I here under-
stand by gratitude. It is one thing to be grateful, and
another thing to feel that it is one’s duty to be grateful.
A depression of the “ self-feeling,” a feeling of humilia-
tion, also frequently accompanies gratitude as a motive for
requiting the benefit ; but it is certainly not an element in
gratitude itself.
Retributive kindly emotion is a much less frequent
phenomenon in the animal kingdom than is the emotion
of resentment. In many animal species not even the germ
of it is found, and where it occurs it is generally restricted
within narrow limits. Anybody may provoke an animal’s
anger, but only towards certain individuals it is apt to
feel retributive kindliness. The limits for this emotion
are marked ^ff by the conditions under which altruistic
sentiments in general tend to arise — a subject which will
be discussed in another connection. Indeed, social affec-
tion is itself essentially retributive. Gregarious animals
take pleasure in each other’s company, and with this
pleasure is intimately associated kindly feeling towards its
cause, the companion himself. Social affection presupposes
reciprocity ; it is not only a friendly sentiment towards
another individual, but towards an individual who is
conceived of as a friend.
The intrinsic object of retributive kindliness being to
retain a cause of pleasure, we may assume that the definite
desire to produce pleasure in return for pleasure received
is due to the fact that such a desire materially promotes
the object in question — exactly in the same way as the
definite desire to inflict pain in return for pain inflicted
has become an element in resentment because such a desire
pfomotes the intrinsic object of resentment, the removal
of the cause of pain. And as natural selection accounts
for the origin of resentment, so it also accounts for the
* Morwicz, Psychologische Analysen^ barkeit aufkomracn.” Cf. Milton, /’am-
333 • “ Ohne die.ses Gefiihl de.s Ver- disc Lost, iv. 52 S(/q.
bundenseins ... * kann keine Dank-
Ill
THE MORAL EMOTIONS
origin of retributive kindly emotion. Both of these
emotions are useful states of mind ; by resentment evils
are averted, by retributive kindliness benefits are secured.
That there is such a wide difference in their prevalence is
explicable from the simple facts that gregariousness —
which is the root of social affection, and, largely at least,
a condition of the rise of retributive kindly emotions — is
an advantage only to some species, not to all, and that even
gregarious animals have many enemies, but few friends.
In some cases the friendly reaction in retributive kind-
liness is directed towards individuals who have in no
way been the cause of the pleasure which gave rise to the
emotion. So intimate is the connection between the
stimulus and the reaction, that he who is made happy
often feels a general desire to make others happy. ^ But
such an indiscriminate reaction is only an offset of the
emotion with which we are here concerned. Moreover,
retributive kindly emotion often confers benefits upon
somebody nearly related to the benefactor, if he himself
be out of reach, or in addition to benefits conferred on him.
But in such cases the gratitude towards the benefactor is
the real motive.
That moral approval — by which I understand that
emotion of which moral praise or reward is the outward
manifestation — is a kind of retributive kindly emotion,
and as such allied to gratitude, will probably be admitted
without much hesitation. “ Its friendly character is not,
like the hostile character of moral disapproval, disguised
by any apparently contradictory facts. To confer a benefit
upon a person is not generally regarded as wrong, unless,
indeed, it involves an encroachment on somebody’s rights
or is contrary to the feeling of justice. And that moral
approval sometimes bestows its favours upon undeserving
^ Tliat a jiappy man wants to see i?)ad
faces around him, is also due to another
cause, wlhcli lias been pointed out by
Dr. Him [Origins of Art, p, 83) : from
their expression he wants to derive
iurther nourishment and increase for 4 iis
own feeling.
“ The relationship between gratitude
and moral approval has lieen recognised
by Hartley [Observations on. Man^ i.
520) and Adam Smith ( 'fheory of Moral
Sentiments, passim).
THE NATURE OF
individuals for the merits of others, can no more invalidate
the fact that it is essentially directed towards the cause of
pleasure, than the occasional infliction of punishments upon
innocent individuals invalidates the fact that moral dis-
approval is essentially directed against the cause of pain.
Unmerited rewards are explicable on grounds analogous to
those to which we have traced unmerited punishments.
The doctrine of family solidarity leads, not only to
common responsibility for crimes, but to common enjoy-
ment of merits.
In Madagascar, exemption from punishment was claimed by
the descendants of persons who had rendered any particular
service to the sovereign or the State, as also by other branches
of the family, on the same plea.^ According to Chinese ideas,
the virtuous conduct of any individual will result, not only in
prosperity to himself, but in a certain quantity of happiness to
his posterity, unless indeed the personal wickedness of some of
the descendants neutralise the benefits which would otherwise
accrue from the virtue of the ancestor and, conversely, the
Chinese government confers titles of nobility upon the dead
parents of a distinguished son.-^ The idea that the dead share
in punya or that is, the merit or demerit of the living,
and that the happiness of a man in the next life depends on the
good works of his descendants, was early familiar to the civilised
natives of India ; almost all legal deeds of gift contain the
formula that the gift is made for the increase of the piinya of
the donor and that of his father and mother.” ^
But the vicarious efficacy of good deeds is not necessarily
restricted to the members of the same family.
In a hymn of the Rig- Veda we find tlie idea that the merits of
the pious may benefit their neighbours.'" According to one of the
Pahlavi texts, persons who are wholly unable to perform good
’i^works are supposed to be entitled to a share of any supererogatory
good works performed by others.^’ The Chinese believe that
^ Ellis, History of Aladagascar, i. ^ Giles, op. at. i. 305, n. 6. Wells
376. Williams, Aliddle Kingdom.^ i. 422.
“ Giles, Strange Stories from a Barth, Keiigions of India, p. 52,
Chinese Studio, i. 426, n. 3 ; ii. 384, 11. 4.
n. 63. Doolittle, Social Life of the •'* AVv* Veda, vii. 35. 4.
Chinese, ii. 398. Dind-i Mainog-'i Khirad, xv. 3.
in
THE MORAL EMOTIONS
whole kingdoms arc blessed by benevolent spirits for the virtuous
conduct of their rulers.^ Yahvch promised not to destroy Sodom
for the sake of ten righteous, provided that so many righteous
could be found in the town/^ 'Flic doctrine of vicarious reward
or satisfaction througli good works is, in fact, more prevalent
than tlie doctrine of vicarious punisliment. Jewish theology
has a great deal more to say about the acceptance of the merits
of the righteous on behalf of the wicked, than about atone-
ment through sacrifice.'^ The Muhammedans, who know
nothing of vicarious suffering as a means of expiation, confer
merits upon their dead by reciting chapters of the Koran and
almsgiving, and some of them allow the pilgrimage to Mecca
to be done by proxy. * Christian theology itself maintains that
salvation depends on the merit of the passion of Christ ; and
from early times tlie merits of martyrs and saints were believed
to benefft other members of the Church.-^
For the explanation of these and similar facts various
circumstances have to be considered. Good deeds may be
so pleasing to a god as to induce him to forgive the sins
of the wicked, in accordance with the rule that anger
yields to joy. There is solidarity not only between
members of the same family, but between members of the
same social unit ; hence the virtues of individuals may
benefit the whole community to which they belong. The
Catholic theologian argues that, since we are all re-
generated unto Christ by being washed in the same
baptism, made partakers of the same sacraments, and,
especially, of the same meat and drink, the body and
blood of Christ, we are all members of the same body.
“As, then, the foot docs not perform its functions solely
for itself, but also for the benefit of the eyes ; and as the
eyes exercise their sight, not for their own, but for the
common benefit of all the members ; so should works c£
satisfaction be deemed common to all the members of the
* cU' Oroot, Sysilenu oj
China (vol. iv. hook ii.) 435.
Genesis^ xviii. 52,
■' Roberlsoii Smith, /\cIij^io}i of the
Semites^ p. 424, n. l. ^
^ Lane, Modern Ey;yptians^ pp. 247,
248, 532. St'll, op. eit. PI). 242, 278,
287, 288, 298. Cf, Wallin, For si a
A'esa frdn Cairo fill Aj-ahiska oknoi., p.
■' Ilaniack, History of Doi^nia., ii.
133, n. 3.
VOL. I
H
THE NATURE OF
Church.” ' Moreover, virtues, like sins, are believed to
be in a material way transferable, In Upper Bavaria,
when a dead person is laid out, a cake of flour is placed on
his breast in order to absorb the virtues of the deceased,
whereupon the cake is eaten by the nearest relatives.'"’ And
we are told that, in a certain district in the north of
England, if a child is brought to the font at the same time
as a body is committed to the ground, whatever was
“ good ” in the deceased person is supposed to be trans-
ferred to the little child, since God does not allow any
“ goodness ” to be buried and lost to the world, and such
“ goodness ” is most likely to enter a little child coming
to the sacrament of Baptism.'' A blessing, also, no less
than a curse, is looked upon in the light of material
energy ; goodness is not required for the acquisition of it,
mere contact will do. Blessings are hereditary: — “The
just man walketh in his integrity : his children are blessed
after him.” '
It is no doubt more becoming for a god to pardon the
sinner on account of the merits of the virtuous, than to
punish the innocent for the sins of the wicked. It shows
that his compassion overcomes his wrath ; and the mercy
of the deity is, among all divine attributes, that on which
the higher monotheistic religions lay most stress. Allah
said, “ Whoso doth one good act, for him are ten rewards,
and I also give more to whomsoever I will ; and whoso
doth ill, its retaliation is equal to it, or else I forgive
him.”'’ Nevertheless, the moral consciousness of a higher
type can hardly approve that the wicked should be
pardoned for the sake of the virtuous, or that the reward
for an act should be bestowed upon anybody else than the
♦agent. The doctrine of vicarious merit or recompense is
not just ; it involves that badness is unduly ignored ; it is
based on crude ideas of goodness and merit. The theory
of opera supererogativa, as we have seen, attaches badness
’ Cati'ifiisni of the Council of I'jcnt, Kolk-Medicine,’ in Fo[k-Lo)c, vii. 280.
ii. 5 ' 7 -- Proverbs^ xx. 7.
“ Am Urcjuell^ ii. loi. . Lane-Poole, Speethes atid 'Pahle-
Pcacuck, ‘ KxccuWxI ( .'liniinals and Talk of A/ohammad, p. 147.
Ill
T*HE MORAL EMOTIONS
and goodness to external acts rather than to mental facts,
and assumes that reparation can be given for badness,
whereas the scrutinising moral judge only forgives badness
in case it is superseded by repentance. If thus a bad act
cannot be compensated by a good one, even though both
be performed by one and the same person, it can still less
be compensated by the good act of another man. From
various quarters we hear protests against the notion of
vicarious merit — protests which emphasise the true
direction of moral reward. Ezekiel, who reproved the
old idea that the children’s teeth are set on edge because
the fathers have eaten sour grapes, also taught that a
wicked son is to reap no benefit from the blessing bestowed
upon a righteous father/ ‘‘Fear the day,” says the
Koran, “wherein no soul shall pay any recompense for
another soul.” ^ The Buddhistic Dhammapada contains the
following passage, which sums up our whole argument : —
“By oneself the evil is done, by oneself one suffers ; by
oneself evil is left undone, by oneself one is purified. The
pure and the impure stand and fall by themselves, no one
can purify another.”^
^ Kzckii'l^ xviii. 5 >v/y. Dliavuuatada^ xii. 165.
/\ or (1)1^ ii. 44.
H 2
Chapter IV
THE NATURE OF THE MORAL EMOTIONS (^concluded)
We have seen that moral disapproval is a form of
resentment, and that moral approval is a form of retribu-
tive kindly emotion. It still remains for us to examine
in what respects these emotions differ from kindred non-
moral emotions- -disapproval from anger and revenge,
approval from gratitude — in other words, what charac-
terises them as specifically moral emotions.
It is a common opinion, held by all who regard the
intellect as the source of moral concepts, that moral
emotions only arise in consequence of moral judgments,
and that, in each case, the character of the emotion is
determined by the predicate of the judgment. We are
told that, when the intellectual process is completed,
when the act in question is definitely classed under such
or such a moral category, then, and only then, there
follows instantaneously a feeling of either approbation or
disapprobation as the case may be.^ When we hear of a
murder, for instance, we must discern the wrongness of
the act before we can feel moral indignation at it.
It is true that a moral judgment may be followed by a
moral emotion, that the finding out the tendency of a
certain mode of conduct to evoke indignation or approval
is apt to call forth such an emotion, if there was none
before, or otherwise to increase the one existing. It is,
moreover, true that the predicate of a moral judgment, as
^ Fleming, Alan it al of Moral Philosophy, p. 97 sqq. F'nwler, Principles of
Morals, ii. 198 sqq.
CH. IV
tHE MORAL EMOTIONS
lOI
well as the generalisation leading up to such a predicate,
may give a specific colouring to the approval or dis-
approval which it produces, quite apart from the general
characteristics belonging to that emotion in its capacity of
a moral emotion ; the concepts of duty and justice, for
instance, no doubt have a peculiar flavour of their own.
But for all this, moral emotions cannot be described as
resentment or retributive kindliness called forth by
moral judgments. Such a definition would be a meaning-
less play with words. Whatever emotions may follow
moral judgments, such judgments could never have been
pronounced unless there had been moral emotions ante-
cedent to them. Their predicates, as was pointed out
above, are essentially based on generalisations of ten-
dencies in certain phenomena to arouse moral emotions ;
hence the criterion of a moral emotion can in no case
depend upon its proceeding from a moral judgment.
But at the same time moral judgments, being definite
expressions of moral emotions, naturally help us to dis-
cover the true nature of these emotions.
The predicate of a moral judgment always involves a
notion of disinterestedness. When pronouncing an act to
be good or bad, I mean that it is so, quite independently of
any reference it might have to my own interests. A moral
judgment may certainly have a selfish motive ; but then
it, nevertheless, pretends to be disinterested, which shows
that disinterestedness is a characteristic of moral concepts
as such. This is admitted even by the egoistic hedonist,
who maintains that we approve and condemn acts from
self-love. According to Helvetius, it is the love of con-
sideration that a virtuous man takes to be in him the love
of virtue ; and yet everybody pretends to love virtue for*
its own sake, “ this phrase is in every one’s mouth and in
no one’s heart.” ^
If the moral concepts 'are essentially generalisations of
tendencies in certain phenomena to call forth moral
emotions, and, at the same time, contain the notion of
^ Helvetius, De V Homme ^ i. 263.
THE NATURE OF
disinterestedness, we must conclude that the emotions
from which they spring are felt disinterestedly. Of this
fact we find an echo — more or less faithful^ — in the maxims
of various ethical theorisers, as well as practical moralists.
We find it in the utilitarian demand that, in regard to his
own happiness and that of others, an agent should be
“ as strictly impartial as a disinterested and benevolent
spectator;”’ in the “rule of righteousness” laid down
by Samuel Clarke, that “ We so deal with every man, as in
like circumstances we could reasonably expect he should
with us” ; * in Kant’s formula, “ Act only on that maxim
which thou canst at the same time will to become a
universal law ” ; “ in Professor Sidgwick’s so-called axiom,
“ I ought not to prefer my own lesser good to the greater
good of another” ; ’ in the biblical sayings, “ Thou shalt
love thy neighbour as thyself,” and, “ Whatsoever ye
would that men should do to you, do ye even so to
them.” ” The same fact is expressed in the Indian
Mahabharata, where it is said : — “ Let no man do to
another that which would be repugnant to himself ; this
is the sum of righteousness ; the rest is according to
inclination. In refusing, in bestowing, in regard to
pleasure and to pain, to what is agreeable and disagree-
able, a man obtains the proper rule by regarding the case
as like his own.” ' Similar words are ascribed to Confucius.”
When Tsze-kung asked if there is any one word which
may serve as a rule of practice for all one’s life, the
Master answered, “ Is not Reciprocity such a word ?
What you do not want done to yourself, do not do to
^ Stuart Mill, Utiliiarianisn} , p. 24.
“ Clarke, D is course couceniing the
^^Unchaugcabte Obligations of Natural
Religion y p. 20 1.
^ Kant, Grundiegung zur Meta-
physik der SitteUy sec. 2 {Siimndlirhe
IVerke^ iv. 269).
Sklgwick, Methods of Ethics^ p.
383. However, as we have seen above,
this so-called “axiom” is not a cor-
rect representation of the disinterested-
ness of moral emotions.
Leviticus, xix. 18. St, Matthew,
xxii. 39.
St,. Matthew, vii. 12. Cf. St.
Luke, vi. 31.
Alahahharata, xiii. 557 ^
Muir, Religious and Aloral Sentiments,
rendered from Sanskrit Writers, p. 107.
Cf Panchatantra, iii. 104 (Benfey’s
translation, ii. 235).
^ Lun Yu, XV. 23. Cf ibid, xii. 2 ;
Chung Yung, xiii. 3.
THE MORAL EMOTIONS
others.” And in another utterance Confucius showed
that the rule had for him not only a negative, but a
positive form. He said that, in the way of the superior
man, there are four things to none of which he himself
had as yet attained ; to serve his father as he would
require his son to serve him, to serve his prince as he
would require his minister to serve him, to serve his elder
brother as he would require his younger brother to serve
him, and to set the example in behaving to a friend as he
would require the friend to behave to him.'
This “ golden rule ” is not, as has been sometimes
argued, a rule of retaliation.^ It does not say, “ Do to
others what they wash to do to you ” ; it says, “ Do to
others what you wish, or require, them to do to you.”
It brings home to us the fact that moral rules are general
rules, which ought to be obeyed irrespectively of any
selfish considerations. If formulated as an injunction
that we should treat our neighbour in the same manner
as we consider that he, under exactly similar circum-
stances, ought to treat us, it is simply identical with the
sentence, “ Do your duty,” with emphasis laid on the
disinterestedness which is involved in the very conception
of duty. So far, St. Augustine was right in saying that
“ Do as thou wouldst be done by ” is a sentence which all
nations under heaven are agreed upon.®
Disinterestedness, however, is not the only characteristic
by which moral indignation and approval are distinguished
from other, non-moral, kinds of resentnient or retributive
kindly emotion. It is, indeed, itself a form of a more
comprehensive quality which characterises moral emotions
— apparent impartiality. If I pronounce an act done to
a friend or to an enemy to be either good or bad, that_
implies that I assume it to be so independently of the
fact that the person to whom the act is done is my
friend or my enemy. Conversely, if I pronounce an
^ Chu}ig xiii. 4. St. Augustine, (juoted l)y lully,
“ Lctourneau, f\^volution relii^ictise Ri<^ht and Wrotig^ p. 106.
da 7 is Ay dlvcrses races hiimaines^ p. 553.
THE NATURE OF '
act done by a friend or by an enemy to be good or
bad, that implies that I assume the act to be either good
or bad independently of my friendly or hostile feelings
towards the agent. All this means that resentment and
retributive kindly emotion are moral emotions in so far as
they are assumed by those who feel them to be unin-
fluenced by the particular relationship in which they
stand, both to those who are immediately affected by the
acts in question, and to those who perform those acts.
A moral emotion, theii, is tested by an imaginary change
of the relationship between him who approves or disap-
proves of the mode of conduct by which the emotion was
evoked and the parties immediately concerned, whilst the
relationship between the parties themselves is left un-
altered. At the same time it is not necessary that the
moral emotion should be really impartial. It is sufficient
that it is tacitly assumed to be so, nay, even that it is not
knowingly partial. In attributing different rights to
different individuals, or classes of individuals, we are often,
in reality, influenced by the relationship in which we
stand to them, by personal sympathies and antipathies ;
and yet those rights may be moral rights, in the strict sense
of the term, not mere preferences, namely, if we assume
that any impartial judge would recognise our attribution
of rights as just, or even if we are unaware of its partiality.
Similarly, when the savage censures a homicide committed
upon a member of his own tribe, but praises one com-
mitted upon a member of another tribe, his censure and
praise are certainly influenced by his relations to the
victim, or to the agent, or to both. He does not reason
thus : it is blamable to kill a member of one’s own tribe,
^nd it is praiseworthy to kill a member of a foreign tribe
— whether the tribe be mine or not. Nevertheless, his
blame and his praise must be regarded as expressions of
moral emotions.
Finally, a moral emotion has a certain flavour of
generality. We have previously noticed that a moral
judgment very frequently implies some vague assumption
tHE MORAL EMOTIONS
that it must be shared by everybody who possesses both
a sufficient knowledge of the case and a ‘‘sufficiently
developed ” moral consciousness. We have seen, however,
that this assumption is illusory. It cannot, consequently,
be regarded as a conditio sine qua non for a moral judg-
ment, unless, indeed, it be maintained that such a judgment,
owing to its very nature, is necessarily a chimera — an
opinion which, to my mind, would be simply absurd.
But, though moral judgments cannot lay claim to uni-
versality or “objectivity,” it does not follow that they
are merely individual estimates. Even he who fully sees
their limitations must admit that, when he pronounces an
act to be good or bad, he gives expression to something
more than a personal opinion, that his judgment has
reference, not only to his own feelings, but to the feelings
of others as well. And this is true even though he be
aware that his own conviction is not shared by those
around him, nor by anybody else. He then feels that it
zvould be shared if other people knew the act and all its
attendant circumstances as well as he does himself, and if,
at the same time, their emotions were as refined as are his
own. This feeling gives to his approval or indignation a
touch of generality, which belongs to public approval and
public indignation, but which is never found in any merely
individual emotion of gratitude or revenge.
The analysis of the moral emotions which has been
attempted in this and the two preceding chapters, holds
good, not only for such emotions as we feel on account of
the conduct of others, but for such emotions as we feel
on account of our own conduct as well. Moral self-
condemnation is a hostile attitude of mind towards one’s self
as the cause of pain, moral self-approval is a kindly
attitude of mind towards one’s self as a cause of pleasure.
Genuine remorse, though focussed on the will of the
person who feels it, involves, vaguely or distinctly, some
desire to suffer. The repentant man wants to think of
the wrong he has committed, he wants clearly to realise
io6
THE NATURE OF
its wickedness ; and he wants to do this, not merely
because he desires to become a better man, but because it
gives him some relief to feel the sting in his heart. If
punished for his deed, he willingly submits to the punish-
ment. The Philippine Islander, says Mr. F'oreman, if he
recognises a fault by his own conscience, will receive a
flogging without resentment or complaint, although, if
he is not so convinced of the misdeed, he will await his
chance to give vent to his rancour.” ^ We may feel
actual hatred towards ourselves, we may desire to inflict
bodily suffering upon ourselves as a punishment for what
we have done ; ^ nay, there are instances of criminals,
guilty of capital offences, having given themselves up to
the authorities in order to appease their consciences by
suffering the penalty of the law.'^ Yet the desire to
punish ourselves has a natural antagonist in our general
aversion to pain, and this often blunts the sting of the
conscience. Suicide prompted by remorse, which some-
times occurs even among savages,'^ is to be regarded rather
as a method of putting an end to agonies, than as a kind
of self-execution ; and behind the self-torments of the
sinner frequently lurks the hopeful prospect of heavenly
bliss. Self-approval, again, is not merely joy at one’s
own conduct, but is a kindly emotion, a friendly attitude
towards one’s self. Such an attitude, for instance, lies at the
bottom of the feeling that one's own conduct merits praise
or reward.
Not every form of self-reproach or of self-approval is a
moral emotion — no more than is every form of resentment
or retributive kindly emotion towards other persons. We
may be angry with ourselves on account of some act of
i^urs which is injurious to our own interests. lie w^ho has
lost at play may be as vexed at himself as he who has
^ t'oreman, Philippijie Islands, p. ® von Fouerbach, Akfejifndsslgc
185. Cp'. Hinde, The Last of tlni DarsttLlufn^- uicrksviirdiger I 'crhreclien,
Masai, p. 34 ; Zdller, Das Togoland, i. 249 ; ii. 473, 479 sq. von Lasaiilx,
p. 37. Siihnopfer der Griechen and Ronier,
Cf Jodi, Lchrlnuh der Fsychologit:, p. 6.
p. 675. See infra, on Suicide.
fHE MORAL EMOTIONS
cheated at play, and the egoist may bitterly reproach him-
self for having yielded to a momentary impulse of benevo-
lence, or even to conscience itself. In order to be moral
emotions, our self-condemnation and self-approval must
present the same characteristics as make resentment and
retributive kindliness moral emotions \vhen they are felt
with reference to the conduct of other people. A person
does not feel remorse when he reproaches himself from an
egoistic motive, or when he afterwards regrets that he has
sacrificed the interests of his children to the impartial
claim of justice. Nor does a person feel moral self-
approval when he is pleased with himself for having
committed an act which he recognises as selfish or unjust.
And besides being disinterested and apparently impartial,
remorse and moral self-approval have a flavour of gene-
rality. As Professor Baldwin remarks, moral approval or
disapproval, not only of other people, but of one’s self, is
never at its best except when it is accompanied, in the
consciousness which has it, with the knowledge or belief
that it is also socially shared.” ^ Indeed, almost inseparable
from the moral judgments which we pass on our own
conduct seems to be the image of an impartial outsider
who acts as our judge.
' Baldsvin, SocialaUiilithiiallnlcrJ^i-^faiiou in I^Icntal J)cvch)pnii'nt^ p. 314.
Chapter V
THE ORIGIN OF THE MORAL EMOTIONS
We have found that resentment and retributive kindly
emotion are easily explicable from their usefulness, both of
them having a tendency to promote the interests of the
individuals who feel them. This explanation also holds
good for the moral emotions, in so far as they are retributive
emotions : it accounts for the hostile attitude of moral
disapproval towards the cause of pain, and for the friendly
attitude of moral approval towards the cause of pleasure.
But it still remains for us to discover the origin of those
elements in the moral emotions by which they are distin-
guished from other, non-moral, retributive emotions.
First, how shall we explain their disinterestedness ?
We have to distinguish between different classes of con-
ditions under which disinterested retributive emotions
arise. In the first place, wc may feel disinterested resent-
ment, or disinterested retributive kindly emotion, on
account of an injury inflicted, or a benefit conferred, upon
another person with whose pain, or pleasure, we sympa-
thise, and in whose welfare we take a kindly interest. Our
retributive emotions are, of course, always reactions against
pain, or pleasure, felt by ourselves ; this holds true for the
moral emotions as well as for revenge and gratitude. The
question to be answered, then, is. Why should we, quite
disinterestedly, feel pain calling forth indignation because
our neighbour is hurt, and pleasure calling forth approval
because he is benefited ?
CH. V
THE MORAL EMOTIONS
That a certain act causes pleasure or pain to the by-
stander is partly due to the close association which exists
between these feelings and their outward expressions.
The sight of a happy face tends to produce some degree
of pleasure in him who sees it ; the sight of the bodily
signs of suffering tends to produce a feeling of pain. In
either case the feeling of the spectator is the result of a
process of reproduction^ the perception of the physical
manifestation of the feeling recalling the feeling itself on
account of the established association between them.
Sympathetic pain or pleasure may also be the result of
an association between cause and effect, between the cogni-
tion of a certain act or situation and the feeling generally
produced by this act or situation. A blow may cause
pain to the spectator before he has witnessed its effect on
the victim. The sympathetic feeling is of course stronger
when both kinds of association concur in producing it,
than when it is the result of only one. As Adam Smith
observes, “ general lamentations which express nothing
but the anguish of the sufferer, create rather a curiosity to
inquire into his situation, along with some disposition to
sympathise with him, than any actual sympathy that is
very sensible.” ^ On the other hand, the sympathy which
springs from an association between cause and effect is
much enhanced by the perception of outward signs of
pleasure or pain in the individual with whom we sym-
pathise.
But the sympathetic feeling which results from associa-
tion alone is not what is generally understood by sympathy.
Arising merely from the habitual connection of certain
cognitions with certain feelings in the experience of the
spectator, it is, strictly speaking, not at all concerned with
the feelmgs of the other person. It is not a reflex of
what he feels — which, indeed, is a matter of complete in-
difference — and the activity which it calls forth is thor-
* oughly' selfish. If it is a feeling of pain, the spectator
naturally, for his own sake, tries to get rid of it ; but this
^ Adam Smith, l'heo}y of Aloral Sentiments^ p. 7.
I lO
THE ORIGIN OF
may be done by turning the back upon the sufferer, and
looking out for some diversion. The sympathetic feeling
which springs from association alone, may also produce a
benevolent or hostile reaction against its immediate cause :
the smiling face often evokes a kindly feeling towards the
smiler, and “ the sight of suffering often directs irritation
against the sufferer.” ^ In such cases it is the other person
himself, rather than his benefactor or his tormentor, that
is regarded as cause by the sympathiser. When based on
association alone, the sympathetic feeling thus lacks the
most vital characteristic of sympathy, in the popular sense
of the term : it lacks kindliness."
Sympathy, in the ordinary use of the word, requires the
co-operation of the altruistic sentiment or affection — a dis-
position of mind which is particularly apt to display itself
as kindly emotion towards other beings. This sentiment,'^
only, induces us to take a kindly interest in the feelings of
our neighbours. It involves a tendency, or willingness,
and, when strongly developed, gives rise to an eager desire,
to sympathise with their pains and pleasures. Under its
influence, our sympathetic feeling is no longer a mere
matter of association ; we take an active part in its pro-
duction, we direct our attention to any circumstance
which we believe may affect the feelings of the person
whom we love, to any external manifestation of his emo-
tions. We are anxious to find out his joys and sorrows,
so as to be able to rejoice with him and to suffer with
him, and, especially, when he stands in need of it, to con-
sole or to help him. For the altruistic sentiment is not
merely willingness to sympathise; it is above all a conative
^ Leslie Stej^hen, of Ethics y
r- 243-
The difference between sympathy
and kindly ( “ tender'’) emotitin has been
C('mmented upon by FiaTessor Ribot
{Psychology of the E motions ^ p. 233),
and by Mr. fShand, in his excellent
chapter on the ‘ Sources of Tender
E)notion/ in Stout’s Croujidivorh of
Psychology^ p. 198 S(jq.
^ I use the vv^ord “sentiment” in the
sense proposed l)y Mr. Shand, in his
article, ‘ (diaracter and the Emotions,'*
in A! indy N.S. v. 203 jvyy. , and adopted
by Professor Stout, op, cit. p. 221 sqq.
Sentiments cannot be actually felt at
any one moment ; “ they are complex
mental dispositions, and may, as divers
occasions arise, give birth to the whole
gamut of the emotions ” [ibid. p. 223
TjHE moral emotions
1 1 1
disposition to do good. The latter aptitude must be re-
garded rather as the cause than as the result of the former;
affection is not, as Adam Smith maintained,^ merely habitual
sympathy, or its necessary consequence. It is true that
sympathetic pain, unaided by kindliness, may induce a
person to relieve the suffering of his neighbour, instead of
shutting his eyes to it ; but then he does so, not out of
regard to the feelings of the sufferer, but simply to free
himself of a painful cognition. Nor must it be supposed
that the altruistic sentiment prompts to assistance only by
strengthening the sympathetic feeling. The sight of the
wounded traveller may have caused no less pain to the
Pharisee than to the good Samaritan ; yet it would have
been impossible for the Samaritan to dismiss his pain by
going away, since he felt a desire to assist the wounded,
and this desire would have been left ungratilieci if he had
not stopped by the wayside. To the egoist, the relief
offered to the sufferer is a means of suppressing the sym-
pathetic pain ; to the altruist, the sympathetic pain is, so
to say, a means of giving relief. The altruist wants to
know, to feel the pain of his neighbour, because he desires
to help him. Why are the most kind-hearted people
often the most cheerful, if not because they think of
alleviating the misery of their fellow-creatures, instead of
indulging in the sympathetic pain which it evokes ?
It is obvious, then, that sympathy aided by the altruistic
sentiment — sympathy in the common sense — tends to pro-
duce disinterested retributive emotions. When we to some
extent identify, as it were, our feelings with those of our
neighbour, we naturally look upon any person who causes
him pleasure or pain as the cause of our sympathetic pleasure
or pain, and are apt to experience towards that person a
retributive emotion similar in kind, if not always in degree,
to the emotion which we feel when we are ourselves bene-
fited or injured. In all animal species which possess
altruistic sentiments in some form or other, we may be
sure to find svmpathetic resentment as their accompani-
^ Adam Smith, ci/. p. 323.
1 12
THE ORIGIN OF
ment. A mammalian mother is as hostile to the enemy
of her young as to her own enemy. Among social
animals whose gregarious instinct has developed into social
affection,^ sympathetic resentment is felt towards the enemy
of any member of the group ; they mutually defend each
other, and this undoubtedly involves some degree of sym-
pathetic anger. With reference to animals in confinement
and domesticated animals, many striking instances of this
emotion might be quoted, even in cases when injuries have
been inflicted on members of different species to which
they have become attached. Professor Romanes’ terrier,
‘‘ whenever or wherever he saw a man striking a dog,
whether in the house, or outside, near at hand or at a
distance, .... used to rush in to interfere, snarling and
snapping in a most threatening way.'’ -' Darwin makes
mention of a little American monkey in the Zoological
Gardens of London which, when seeing a great baboon
attack his friend, the keeper, rushed to the rescue and by
screams and bites so distracted the baboon, that the man
was able to escape.^ The dog who flies at any one who
strikes, or even touches, his master, is a very familiar
instance of sympathetic resentment. The Rev. Charles
Williams mentions a dog at Liverpool who saved a cat
from the hands of some young ruffians who were maltreat-
ing it : he rushed in among the boys, barked furiously at
them, terrified them into flight, and carried the cat off in
his mouth, bleeding and almost senseless, to his kennel,
where he laid it on the straw, and nursed it.^ In man,
sympathetic resentment begins at an early age. Professor
Sully mentions a little boy under four who was indignant
at any picture where an animal suffered.-
The altruistic sentiments of mankind will be treated at
‘ I'hc connection l»cl\veen social xxxiii. 6i8. A curious instance of a
affection and the gregarious instinct terrier “ avenging ” the death of another
will be discussed in a subsequent terrier, his inseparable friend, is men-
chapter, tioru'd by Captain Medwin
“ Romanes, Aiiijiial p. ITa/es^ ii, 162-164, 197, 2165^.),
440. Williams, Doi^s and /heir Ways\
^ Darwin, Descent of Alan, p, ,.103. p. 43.
Cf. Fisher, in Kevuc Scie 7 itifiqney ^ Sully, Studies of Childhood^ p. 250.
THE MORAL EMOTIONS
length in subsequent chapters. We shall find reason to
believe that not only maternal, but to some extent, paternal
and conjugal affection, prevailed in the human race from
ancient times, and that social affection arose in those days
when the conditions of life became favourable to an expan-
sion of the early family, when the chief obstacle to a
gregarious life — scarcity of food — was overcome, and
sociality, being an advantage to man, became his habit.
There are still savages who live in families rather than in
tribes, but we know of no people among whom social
organisation outside the family is totally wanting. Later
discoveries only tend to confirm Darwin’s statement that,
though single families or only two or three together, roam
the solitudes of some savage lands, they always hold
friendly relations with other families inhabiting the same
district ; such families occasionally meeting in council and
uniting for their common defence/ But as a general rule,
to which there are few exceptions, the lower races live in
communities larger than family groups, and all the mem-
bers of the community are united with one another by
common interests and common feelings. Of the harmony,
mutual good-will, and sense of solidarity, which under
normal conditions prevail in these societies, much evidence
will be adduced in following pages. Mr. Melville’s remark
with reference to some Marquesas cannibals may be quoted
as to some extent typical. With them,’' he says, ‘‘there
hardly appeared to be any difference of opinion upon any
subject whatever. . . . They showed this spirit of unanimity
in every action of life : everything was done in concert and
good fellowship.” When a member of the group is hurt,
the feeling of unanimity takes the form of public resent-
ment. As Robertson observed long ago, “ in small com-
munities, every man is touched with the injury or affront
offered to the body of which he is a member, as if it were
a personal attack upon his own honour or safety. The
desire of revenge is communicated from breast to breast,
' Darwin, 4?/. cit, p. loS. “ Melville, Typee, p. 297 sq.
THE ORIGIN OF
CFiAP.
and soon kindles into rage.’' ' Speaking of some Australian
savages, Mr. Fison remarks : — “ To the savage, the whole
gens is the individual, and he is full of regard for it.
Strike the gens anywhere, and every member of it con-
siders himself struck, and the whole body corporate rises
up in arms against the striker.”- Nobody will deny that
there is a disinterested element in this public resentment,
even though every member of the group consider the
enemy of any other member to be actually his own enemy
as well, and, partly, hate him as such.
Our explanation of what has here been called sympa-
thetic resentment,” however, is not yet complete. This
emotion, as we have seen, may be a reaction against
sympathetic pain ; but it may also be directly produced
by the cognition of the signs of anger. In the former
case it is, strictly speaking, independent of the emotioyi of
the injured individual ; we may feel resentment on his
behalf though he himself feels none. In the latter case
it is a reflected emotion, felt independently of the cause
of the original emotion of which it is a reflection — as
when the yells and shrieks of a street dog-fight are heard,
and dogs from all sides rush to the spot, each dog being
apparently ready to bite any of the others. In the former
case, it is, by the medium of sympathetic pain, closely
connected with the inflicted injury ; in the latter case it
may even be the reflection of an emotion which is itself
sympathetic, and the origin of which is perhaps out of
sight. In an infuriated crowd the one gets angry because
the other is angry, and very often the question, Why is
hardly asked. This form of sympathetic resentment is
of considerable importance both as an originator and as a
communicator of moral ideas. To teach that a certain
act is wrong is to teach that it is an object, and a proper
object, of moral indignation, and the aim of the instructor
^ Rohertson, History of America^ \. anybody treads on his foot, but when->
350. Cf. ('li('ford\s theory of the anybod}^ treads on his tiiVje.”
“ tribal self” { Led uf’es ajid Essays Fison and flowitt, KafnHaroi and
290 Sijq), He says [ibid. p. 291), lOti nai, p. 170,
rtiE MORAL EMOTIONS
is to inspire a similar indignation in the mind of the
pupil. An intelligent teacher tries to attain this end by
representing the act in such a light as to evoke disapproval
independently of any appeal to authority ; but, unfortu-
nately, in many cases where the duties of current morality
are to be enjoined, he cannot do so — for a very obvious
reason. Of various acts which, though inoffensive by
themselves, are considered wrong, he can say. little more
than that they are forbidden by God and man ; and if,
nevertheless, such acts are not only professed, but actually
felt, to be wrong, that is due to the fact that men are
inclined to sympathise with the resentment of persons for
whom they feel regard. It is this fact that accounts for
the connection* between the punishment of an act and the
consequent idea that it deserves to be punished. We shall
see that the punishment which society inflicts is, as a rule,
an expression of its moral indignation ; but there are in-
stances in which the order is reversed, and in which human,
or, as it may be, supposed divine, punishment or anger is
the cause, and moral disapproval the effect. Children, as
everybody knows, grow up with their ideas of right and
wrong graduated, to a great extent, according to the temper
of the father or mother ; ^ and men are not seldom, as
Hobbes said, “like little children, that have no other rule
of good and evill manners, but the correction they receive
from their Parents, and Masters.’’ “ The case is the same
with any outbreak of public resentment, with any punish-
ment inflicted by society at large. However selfish it
may be in its origin, to whatever extent it may spring
from personal motives, it always has a tendency to become
in some degree disinterested, each individual not only being
angry on his own behalf, but at the same time reflecting
the anger of everybody else.
Any means of expressing resentment may serve as a
communicator of the emotion. Besides punishment, lan-
guage deserves special mention. Moral disapproval may
^ Cf. Bariiig-Gould, Origin and Dc~ Hobbes, J xviai han,, i. 2, p. 76.
'^eiopfnent of Reiigions Beliefs i. 212.
I 2
THE ORIGIN OF
f HAP.
I l6
be evoked by the very sounds of certain words, like
“ murder,” “ theft,” “ cowardice,” and others, which not
merely indicate the commission of certain acts, but also
express the opprobrium attached to them. By being called
a “ liar,” a person is more disgraced than by any plain
statement of his untruthfulness ; and by the use of
some strong word the orator raises the indignation of a
sympathetic audience to its pitch.
All the cases of disinterested resentment which we have
hitherto considered fall under the heading of sympathetic
resentment. But there are other cases into which sympathy
does not enter at all. Resentment is not always caused
by the infliction of an injury ; it may be called forth by
any feeling of pain traceable to a living being as its direct
or indirect cause. apart from our sympathy with
the sufferings of others, there are many cases in which we
feel hostile towards a person on account of some act of
his which in no way interferes with our interests, which
conflicts with no self-regarding feeling of ours. There are
in the human mind what Professor Bain calls “disinter-
ested antipathies,” sentimental aversions “ of which our
fellow-beings are the subjects, and on account of which
we overlook our own interest quite as much as in display-
.ing our sympathies and affections.” ^ Differences of taste,
habit, and opinion, are particularly apt to create similar
dislikes, which, as will be seen, have played a very promi-
nent part in the moulding of the moral consciousness.
When a certain act, though harmless by itself (apart from
the painful impression it makes upon the spectator), fills
us with disgust or horror, we may feel no less inclined to
inflict harm upon the agent, than if he had committed an
offence against person, property, or good name. And
here, again, our resentment is sympathetically increased by
our observing a similar disgust in others. We are easily
affected by the aversions and likings of our neighbours.
As Tucker said, “ we grow to love things we perceive
^ Bain, Emotions and the IVill^ p. 26S.
tHE MORAL EMOTIONS
them fond of, and contract aversions from their
dislikes,” ^
We have already seen that sympathy springing from an
altruistic sentiment may produce, not only disinterested
resentment, but disinterested retributive kindly emotion
as well. When taking a pleasure in the benefit bestowed
on our neighbour, we naturally look with kindness upon
the benefactor ; and just as sympathetic resentment may
be produced by the cognition of the outward signs of re-
sentment, so sympathetic retributive kindly emotion may
be produced by the signs of retributive kindliness. Lan-
guage communicates emotions by terms of praise, as well
as by terms of condemnation ; and a reward, like a punish-
ment, tends to reproduce the emotion from which it sprang.
Moreover, men have disinterested likings, as they have
disinterested dislikes. As an instance of such likings may
be mentioned the common admiration of courage when
felt irrespectively of the object for which it is displayed.
Having thus found the origin of disinterested retributive
emotions, we have at the same time partly explained the
origin of the moral emotions. But, as we have seen, dis-
interestedness is not the sole characteristic by which moral
indignation and approval are distinguished from other
retributive emotions : a moral emotion is assumed to be.
impartial, or, at least, is not knowingly partial, and it is
coloured by the feeling of being publicly shared. How-
ever, the real problem which we have now to solve is not
how retributive emotions may become apparently impartial
and be coloured by a feeling of generality, but why dis-
interestedness, apparent impartiality, and the flavour of
generality have become characteristics by which so-called
moral emotions are distinguished from other retributive
emotions. The solution of this problem lies in the fact that
society is the birthplace of the moral consciousness ; that
^the first moral judgm'ents expressed, not the private
emotions of isolated individuals, but emotions which were
^ Tucker, Light of Nature I'^itrsucd^ j. 154.
ii8
THE ORIGIN OF
felt by the society at large ; that tribal custom was the
earliest rule of duty.
Customs have been defined as public habits, as the
habits of a certain circle, a racial or national community,
a rank or class of society. But whilst being a habit,
custom is at the same time something else as well. It
not merely involves a frequent repetition of a certain
mode of conduct, it is also a rule of conduct. As Cicero
observes, the customs of a people “ are precepts in them-
selves.” ‘ We say that “ custom commands,” or “ custom
demands,” and speak of it as “strict ” and “ inexorable ” ;
and even when custom simply allows the commission of a
certain class of actions, it implicitly lays down the rule that
such actions are not to be interfered with.
The rule of custom is conceived of as a moral rule,
which decides what is right and wrong.* “ Les loix de la
conscience,” says Montaigne, “ que nous disons naistre de
nature, naissent de la coustume.” ^ Mr. Howitt once said
to a young Australian native with whom he was speaking
about the food prohibited during initiation, “ But if you
were hungry and caught a female opossum, you might eat
it if the old men were not there.” The youth replied, “ I
could not do that ; it would not be right ” ; and he could
give no other reason than that it would be wrong to dis-
regard the customs of his people."* Mr. Bernau says of the
British Guiana Indians ; — “ Their moral sense of good
and evil is entirely regulated by the customs and practices
inherited from their forefathers. What their predecessors
believed and did must have been right, and they deem it
the height of presumption to suppose that any could think
and act otherwise.” '' The moral evil of the pagan Green-
landers “ was all that was contrary to laws and customs, as
^ Cicero, De Officiis, i. 41, view is expre.ssed hy Wundt {Ethiky
Cf Austin, J.ectures on Ji/rispru^ p. 128.?//. )
de?nc, i. 104; Tdnnies, ‘ Philosophical ^ Montaigne, Essa/s, i. 22 {CEtivreSy
Terminology,’ in Af/nd, N.S., viii. 304. p. 48), «
Von Jhering {Z 7 veck im Reehfy ii. 23) ** Fi.son and Howitt, t/V. p, 256
defines the (iennan as ‘'die im ^ Bernau, Missionary Labours in
LeVien des Yolks sich bildende ver- British Guiana^ p. 60.
pflicblende Gevvuhnheit and a similar
regulated by the angakoks/’ and when the Danish mis-
sionaries tried to make them acquainted with their own
moral conceptions, the result was that they ‘‘ conceived the
idea of virtue and sin as what waspleasing or displeasing to
Europeans, as according or disaccording with their customs
and laws.”^ ‘‘The Africans, like most heathens,” Mr.
Rowley observes, “ do not regard sin, according to their
idea of sin, as an offence against God, but simply as a
transgression of the laws and customs of their country.” -
The Ba-Ronga call derogations of universally recognised
custom yila^ prohibited, tabooed."’ The Bedouins of the
Euphrates “make no appeal to conscience or the will of
God in their distinctions between right and wrong, but
appeal only to custom.” '^ According to the laws of Manu,
the custom handed down in regular succession since time
immemorial “is called the conduct of virtuous men.”"'
'Fhe Greek idea of the customary, to vdfiLfxov^ shows the
close connection between morality and custom ; and so do
the words e 0 o 9 , }}dos^ and the Roman mos and moralisj
the German SiUe and SittUchkeitd' Moreover, in early
society, customs are not only moral rules, but the only
moral rules ever thought of. llie savage strictly com-
plies with the Hegelian command that no man must have
a private conscience. The following statement, which
refers to the Tinnevelly Shanars, may be quoted as a
typical example : — “ Solitary individuals amongst them
rarely adopt any new opinions, or any new course of
procedure. They follow the multitude to do evil, and
they follow the multitude to do good. They think in
herds.” '
Disobedience to custom evokes public indignation. In
^ Rink, CreeiiltDid.; p. 201 sq. of custom, see Maclean, Conipoidi tt»i
Rowley, Religion of the Africans^ of Kafr Laws and Customs, p, 34
p. 44. (Amaxosa); Mac[)her.son, AJemorials oj
Junod, Jia-Rong'd, p. 477. Seri'iee in India, p. 94 (Kandhs) ;
Blunt, Bedouin Brides of*the Eu- Kuliary, Ethnographisehe Beitrdge zur
phrates, ii, 224. Kenntniss der Karoliiiischen InseL
■'* Laws of ARinu, ii. 18. 73 ( I’elew Islanders) ; Smith,
*’ f'or the history of these words, sec Chinese C ha raeteri sties, p. 119.
Wundt, op. eit. p. 19 sqq. For other " Caldwell, Tinnevelly Shanars, p.
instances illustrating the moral character 69.
THE ORIGIN OF
the lower stages of civilisation, especially, custom is a
tyrant who binds man in iron fetters, and who threatens
the transgressor, not only with general disgrace, but often
with bodily suffering. “To believe that man in a savage
state is endowed with freedom either of thought or action,”
says Sir G. Grey, “ is erroneous in the highest degree ” ; ^
and this statement is corroborated by an array of facts from
all quarters of the savage world." Now, as the rule of
custom is a moral rule, the indignation aroused by its
transgression is naturally a moral emotion. Moreover,
where all the duties incumbent on a man are expressed in
the customs of the society to which he belongs, it is ob-
vious that the characteristics of moral indignation are to
be sought for in its connection with custom. The most
salient feature of custom is its generality. Its transgres-
sion calls forth public indignation ; hence the flavour of
generality which characterises moral disapproval. Custom
is fixed once for all, and takes no notice of the preferences
of individuals. By recognising the validity of a custom, I
implicitly admit that the custom is equally binding for me
and for you and for all the other members of the society.
This involves disinterestedness ; 1 admit that a breach of
the custom is equally wrong whether I myself am im-
mediately concerned in the act or not. It also involves
apparent impartiality ; I assume that my condemnation of
the act is independent of the relationship in which the
parties concerned in it stand to me personally, or, at least,
I am not aware that my condemnation is influenced by any
^ ( >vey, foiDiiah of li.xfedUiois in
North- West and Western Australia^ ii.
217.
- Tylor, ‘ riimili\’e Society,’ in Co)i-
ieniporary Review, xxi. 706. Idem,
Anthropology, p. 408 sq, Avebury,
Origin of Civilisation, p. 466 .sv/t/.
Eyre, fonrnals of Expeditions into Cen-
tral Anstra/ia, ii. 384, 385, 388. Curr,
The Anstralian Race, i. 51. Mathew,
‘ Australian Aborigines,’ in four, and
Proceed. Roy. Soc. NS. Wales, xxiii.
398. Idem, Eaglehaivk and Crow,
p. 93. Taplin, ‘ Narrinyeri,’ in Woods,
Nat we Tribes of South Australia, pp.
35, 136 .sv/. ilawlrey, ‘ Lengua Indians
of tlic baniguayan Chaco,’ in four,
Anthr, Inst, xx.xi. 292. Murdoch,
‘ Ethnological Result.s of the Point
Ikirrow Expedition/ in Ann. Rep, Bur.
Ethn. ix. 427 S(j, ( i‘oint Harrow Eskimo).
Holm, ‘ Iuhnologi.sl< Skiz/x' af Ang-
magsalikerne,’ in Meddelelser om Cron-
land, X. 85. Nansen, Eirst Crossing
of Creeniajui, ii. 295. Johnston, British
Central Africa, p. 452. New, life,
Wanderings, and Labours in Eastcr/i
Africa, sq. iio(Wanika). Scott Robert-
son, Kafirs of the Hindu- Kush, p. 183
sq.
tHE MORAL EMOTIONS
I2I
such relationship. And this holds good whatever be the
origin of the custom. Though customs are very frequently
rooted in public sympathetic resentment or in public dis-
interested aversions, they may have a selfish and partial
origin as well. At first the leading men of the society
may have prohibited certain acts because they found them
disadvantageous to themselves, or to those with whom they
particularly sympathised. Where custom is an oppressor
of women, this oppression may certainly be traced back to
the selfishness of men. Where custom sanctions slavery,
it is certainly not impartial to the slaves. Yet in the one
case as in the other, I assume custom to be in the right,
irrespectively of my own station, and I even expect the
women and slaves themselves to be of the same opinion.
Such an expectation is by no means a chimera. Under
normal social conditions, largely owing to men’s tendency
to share sympathetically the resentment of their superiors,
the customs of a society are willingly submitted to, and
recognised as right, by the large majority of its members,
whatever may be their station. Among the Rejangs of
Sumatra, says Marsden, “ a man without property, family,
or connections, never, in the partiality of self-love, con-
siders his own life as being of equal value with that of a
man of substance.” * However selfish, however partial a
certain rule may be, it becomes a true custom, a moral
rule, as soon as the selfishness or the partiality of its
makers is lost sight of.
It will perhaps be argued that, by deriving the charac-
teristics of moral indignation from its connection with
custom, we implicitly contradict our initial assumption
that moral emotions lie at the bottom of all moral judg-
ments. But it is not so. Custom is a moral rule only
on account of the indignation called forth by its trans-
gression. In its ethical aspect it is nothing but a general-
isation of emotional tendencies, applied to certain modes
of conduct, and transmitted from generation to generation.
Public indignation lies at the bottom of it. In its capacity
' Maistltrij IIis(o)'v of Sumatra^ p. 247.
THE ORIGIN OF
of a rule of duty, custom, ynos^ is derived from the emotion
to which it gave its name.
As public indignation is the prototype of moral dis-
approval, so public approval, expressed in public praise, is
the prototype of moral approval. Like public indignation,
public approval is characterised by a flavour of generality,
by disinterestedness, by apparent impartiality. But of
these two emotions public indignation, being at the root
of custom and leading to the infliction of punishment, is
by far the more impressive. Hence it is not surprising
that the term ‘‘ moral is etymologically connected with
mos^ which always implies the existence of a social rule
the transgression of which evokes public indignation.
Only by analogy it has come to be applied to the emotion
of approval as well.
Though taking their place in the system of human
emotions as public emotions felt by the society at large,
moral disapproval and approval have not always remained
inseparably connected with the feelings of any special
society. The unanimity of opinion which originally
characterised the members of the same social unit was
disturbed by its advancement in civilisation. Individuals
arose who found fault with the moral ideas prevalent in
the community to which they belonged, criticising those
ideas on the basis of their own individual feelings. Such
rebels, to be sure, are no less justified in speaking in the
name of morality true and proper, than is society itself.
The emotions from which their opposition against public
opinion springs may be, in nature, exactly similar to the
approval or disapproval felt by the society at large, though
they are called forth by different facts or, otherwise, differ
from these emotions in degree. They may present the
same disinterestedness and apparent impartiality — indeed,
dissent from the established moral ideas largely rises
from the conviction that the apparent impartiality of
public feelings is an illusion. As will be seen, the evo- *
iution of the moral consciousness involves a progress in
impartiality and justice ; it tends towards an equalisation
tHE MORAL EMOTIONS
of rights, towards an expansion of the circle within which
the same moral rules are held applicable ; and this process
is in no small degree effected by the efforts made by
high-minded individuals to raise public opinion to their
own standard of right. Nay, as we have already noticed,
individual moral feelings do not even lack that flavour
of generality which characterises the resentment and ap-
proval felt unanimously by a body of men. Though,
perhaps, persecuted by his own people as an outcast, the
moral dissenter does not regard himself as the advocate
of a mere private opinion.^ Even when standing alone,
he feels that his conviction is shared at least by an ideal
society, by all those who see the matter as clearly as he
does himself, and who are animated with equally wide
sympathies, an equally broad sense of justice. Thus the
moral emotions remain to the last public emotions — if
not in reality, then as an ideal.
The fact that the earliest moral emotions were public
emotions Implies that the original form of the moral
consciousness cannot, as is often asserted, have been the
individuars own conscience. Dr. Martineau’s observation,
that the inner springs of other men’s actions may be
read off only by inference from our own experience, by
no means warrants his conclusion that the moral con-
sciousness is at its origin engaged in self-estimation, in-
stead of circuitously reaching this end through a prior
critique upon our fellow-men. The moral element which
may be contained in the emotion of self-reproach or self-
approval, is generally to such an extent mixed up with
other and non-moral elements, that it can be disentangled
only by a careful process of abstraction, guided by the
feelings of other people with reference to our conduct or
by our own feelings with reference to the conduct ot
others. The moral emotion of remorse presupposes some
notion of right and Wrong, and the application of this
notion to one’s own conduct. Hence it could never have
^ Cf. Pollock, Essays in Jurispru- - W^xXsvut^vxEEypes oj Ejhual Theory^
dence and Ethus^ p. 309. ii. 29 sqq.
THE ORIGIN OF
it necessary to scrutinise the facts which Lord Avebury has
adduced in support of his conclusion.
Mr. Neighbors states that, among the Comanchcs of Texas,
no individual action is considered a crime, but every man
acts for liimself according to his own judgment, unless some
superior power — for instance, that of a popular chief— should
exercise authority over Iiim.” Another writer says, ‘‘The
Redskin has no moral sense whatever.” Among the Basutos,
according to Casalis, morality “depends so entirely upon social
order that all political disorganisation is immediately followed
by a state of degeneracy, which the re-establishment of order
alone can rectify.” Similar accounts are given as regards Central
Africa and some other places. Thus at Jenna, and in the
surrounding districts, “ whenever a town is deprived of its chief,
the inhabitants acknowledge no law — anarcliy, troubles, and
confusion immediately prevail, and till a successor is appointed
all labour is at an end.” Tlie Damaras “seem to have no
perceptible notion of right or wrong.” The Tasmanians were
“without aiiy moral views and impressions.” Eyre says of the
Australians tliat they have “ no moral sense of what is just and
equitable in the abstract”; and a missionary had very great
difficulty in conveying to those natives ai;y idea of sin. 'Ehe
Kacliaris had “ in their own language no words for sin, for
piety, for prayer, for repentance ” ; and of another of the ab-
original tribes of India Mr. Campbell remarks that they “are
. . . said to be without moral sense.” Lord Avebury in this
connection even quotes a statement to the effect that the ex-
pressions which the "Eonga Islanders have for ideas like vice
and injustice “ arc equally applicable to other things.” 7"hc
South American Indians of the Gran Chaco are said by the
missionaries to “ make no distinction between right and wrong,
and have therefore neither fear nor hope of any present or future
punishmejit or reward, nor any mysterious terror of some super-
natural power.” Finally, Lord Avebury observes that religion,
except in the more advanced races, has no moral aspect or
influence, that tlie deities are almost invariably regarded as evil,
and that the belief in a future state is not at first associated
with reward or punishment.^
Many of the facts referred to by Lord Avebury do not at
all presuppose the absence of moral feelings. It is difficult to
see why the malevolence of gods should prevent men from
having notions of right and wrong, and we know from the Old
Testament itself that there may be a moral law without Para-
^ Avebury, r?/. rz/, p. 417 .'yy.
tHE MORAL EMOTIONS
disc and Hell. The statement concerning the Conianches only
implies that^ among them, individual freedom is great ; whilst
the social disorder which prevails among various peoples at times
of political disorganisation indicates that the cohesiveness of the
political aggregate is weak, as well as a certain discrepancy be-
tween moral ideas and moral practice. In Morocco, also, the
death of a Sultan is immediately followed by almost perfect
anarchy, and yet the people recognise both the moral tenets of
the Koran and the still more stringent temets of tlieir ancient
customs. As to the Basutos, Casalis expressly states that they
have the idea of moral evil, and represent it in tlicir language
by words which mean ugliness, or damage, or debt, or incapa-
city ; ^ and M. Arbousset once heard a Basuto say, on an unjust
judgment being pronounced, The judge is powerful, therefore
we must be silent ; if lie were weak, we should all cry out about
his injustice.”- Moreover, a people may be unconscious of
what is just in the abstract,” and of moral notions,” in
the strict sense of tlie term, and at the same time, in concrete
cases, distinguish between right and wrong, just and unjust.
Of the Western Australians, Mr. Chauncy expressly says that
they have a keen sense of justice, and mentions an instance of
it ; whilst our latest authorities on the Central Australians
observe that, though their moral code difters radically from
ours, it cannot be denied that their conduct is governed by
it, and that any known breaches are dealt with both surely and
severely.” ^ As regards the 'Fonga Islanders, Mariner states
that ‘‘ their ideas of honour and justice do not very much differ
from ours except in degree, they considering some things more
honourable tlian we should, and others much less so”; and in
anotlier place lie says that the notions of the Tonga people,
in respect to honour and justice . , . are tolerably well defined,
steady and universal,” though not always acted upon.^ The
statement that the American Indians have no moral sense
whatever,” sounds very strange wlien compared with what is
known about their social and moral life ; Buchanan, for instance,
asserts that they have a strong innate sense of justice.”^ Of
course, there may be diversity of opinion as to what constitutes
the moral sense ” ; if the conception of sin or other theo-
logical jiotions are regarded as essential to it, it is probably
^ Casali.s, /nis/z/df, p. 304. ^ ^ Central Aus fra/ ta, 46.
- AiVj(jiissel and Dauinas, op, cit. ^ Mariner, N'alives of the Tonga
j>- 3‘^9- /s/ajn/s\ ii. 159, 163.
" Brough Sinylh, Aborigines of Vic- Buchanan, Sketches of the History^
toria, ii. 228. i 5 rv,, of the jVorth American fjictia 7 is^
Spencer and Gillen, N'ative Tribes p. 158.
THE ORIGIN OF
wanting in a large portion of mankind, and not only in the least
civilised. When missionaries or travellers deny to certain
savages moral feelings and ideas, they seem chiefly to mean
feelings or ideas similar to their own.
Of many savage and barbarous peoples it is directly affirmed
that they have a sense of justice. Mr. Man says concerning
the Andaman Islanders, Certain traits wliich have been notice-
able in their dealings with us would give colour to the belief
that they are not altogether lacking in the sense of honour, and
have some faint idea of the meaning of justice.”^ Colonel
Dalton states that, among the Korwas on the highlands of
Sirgiija, wlien several persons are implicated in one offence, he
has found them most anxious that to each should be ascribed
his fair share of it, and no more, the oldest of tlie parly invari-
ably taking on liimself the chief responsibility as leader or
instigator, and doing his utmost to exculpate as unaccountable
agents the young members of the gang.”“ 'Fhe Aleuts, accord-
ing to Veniaminof, are “naturally inclined to be just,” and feel
deeply undeserved injuries.-^ Kolbcn, wlio is nowadays recog-
nised as a good authority,'^ wrote of the Hottentots, “The
strictness and celerity of the Hottentot justice are things in
which they outshine all Christendom.”’'^’ Missionaries have
wondered that, among the Zulus, “ in the absence for ages of all
revealed truth and all proper religious instruction, tliere sliould
still remain so mucli of mental integrity, so much ability to
discern truth and justice, and withal so much regard for these
principles in their daily intercourse with one another.”^’ Zoller
ascribes to the Negro a well-developed feeling of justice.
“No European,” he says, “at least no European child, could
discriminate so keenly between just and unjust punishment.”^
Mr. Hinde observes; — “One of the most marked characteristics
of black people is their keen perception of justice. They do
not resent merited punishment where it is coupled with justice
upon other matters. The Masai liavc their sense of justice
particularly strongly developed.” ^ Dieffenbach writes of the
Maoris, “ There is a high natural sense of justice amongst them ;
^ Man, in Jour. jUithr. lust. xii. 92.
- Dalton, Descriptive EtJmoIogy of
Bengal , p. 230.
3 V^eniaminof, quoted by Dali,
Aiaska, p. 398.
^ Theophilus Hahn remarks {The
Supreme Being of the Khoi-Khoi , p.
40) that Kolbcn\s reports have been
doubted by European writers without
any good reason.
Kolben, Present State of the Cape
of Good Hope^ i- 30i. Cf. ibid. i. 339.
(Quoted by Tyler, B'orty Years
among the Zulus ^ p. 197.
^ Zoller, ICanienm, ii. 92. Cf Idem,
Das Togoland., p. 37.
^ Hinde, The Last of the Masai., p.
34. Cf, F(jreman, Philippine Islands,
V- 185.
fHE MORAL EMOTIONS
and it is from us that they have learnt that many forbidden
things can be done with impunity, if they can only be kept
secret.’"^ Justice is a virtue which always commands respect
among the Bedouins, and injustice on the part of those in
power is almost impossible. Public opinion at once asserts
itself ; and the Sheykh, who should attempt to override the
law, would speedily find himself deserted,” ^
Much less conspicuous than the emotion of public re~
sentment is the emotion of public approval. These public
emotions are largely of a sympathetic character, and,
whilst a tendency to sympathetic resentment is always
involved in the sentiment of social affection, a tendency
to sympathetic retributive kindly emotion is not. Among
the lower animals this latter emotion seems hardly to occur
at all, and in men it is often deplorably defective. Resent-
ment towards an enemy is itself, as a rule, a much stronger
emotion than retributive kindly emotion towards a friend.
And, as for the sympathetic forms of these emotions, it is
not surprising that the altruistic sentiment is more readily
moved by the sight of pain than by the sight of pleasure,^
considering that its fundamental object is to be a means of
protection for the species. Moreover, sympathetic retri-
butive kindliness has powerful rivals in the feelings of
jealousy and envy, which tend to make the individual
hostile both towards him who is the object of a benefit
and towards him who bestows it. As an ancient writer
observes, ‘‘ many suffer with their friends when the friends
are in distress, but are envious of them when they
prosper.” ^ But though these circumstances are a hin-
drance to the rise of retributive kindly emotions of a sym-
pathetic kind, they do not prevent public approval in a
case when the whole society profits by a benefit, nor have
they any bearing on those disinterested instinctive likings
of which I have spoken above. I think, then, we may
^ Dicffenbach , 7 'ravels in JVew Zea~ Cf. Jodi, Lehr buck der Psycho-
'and, ii. 106. Jogie, p. 686.
“ Blunt, Bedouin Tribes of the Schmidt, Eihik der alien Griechen,
Euphrates^ ii. 224 sqq, i, 259,
K
THE MORAL EMOTIONS c^ap. v
safely conclude that public praise and moral approval
occurred, to some degree, even in the infancy of human
society. It will appear from numerous facts recorded in
following chapters, that the moral consciousness of
modern savages contains not only condemnation, but
praise.
Chapter VI
ANALYSIS OF THE PRINCIPAL MORAL CONCEPTS
We have assumed that the moral concepts are essentially
generalisations of tendencies in certain phenomena to call
forth moral emotions. We have further assumed that
there are two kinds of moral emotions : indignation and
approval. If these assumptions hold good, either indig-
nation or approval must be at the bottom of every moral
concept. That such is really the case will, I think, be-
come evident from the present chapter, in which the
principal of those concepts will be analysed.
Our analysis will be concerned with moral concepts
formed by the civilised mind. Whilst the most represen-
tative of English terms for moral estimates have equivalents
in the other European languages, I do not take upon
myself to decide to what extent they have equivalents
in non-Iiuropean tongues. That all existing peoples,
even the very lowest, have moral emotions is as certain
as that they have customs, and there can be no doubt
that they give expression to those emotions in their speech.
But it is another question how far their emotions have led
to such generalisations as are implied in moral concepts.
Concerning the Fuegians M. Hyades observes, ‘‘ Les id6es
abstraites sont chez eux a peu pres nulles. II est difficile de
,definir exactement ce qu’ils appellent un homme bon et un
homme m(!;chant ; mais a coup sur ils n’ont pas la notion
de ce qui est bon ou mauvais, abstraction faite de Tindi-
vidu ou de I’objet auquel ils appliqueraient Tun ou Tautre
K 2
ANALYSIS OF THE
de ces attributs.” ^ The language of the Californian
Karolc, though rich in its vocabulary, is said to possess
no equivalent for “virtue.”^ In the aboriginal tongues
of the highlanders of Central India “ there seem to be
no expressions for abstract ideas, the few such which they
possess being derived from the Hindi The nomen-
clature of religious ceremony, of moral qualities, and of
nearly all the arts of life they possess, are all Hindi.” ®
On a strict examination of the language of the Tonga
Islanders, Mariner could discover “ no words essentially
expressive of some of the higher qualities of human merit,
as virtue, justice, humanity ; nor of the contrary, as vice,
injustice, cruelty, &c. They have indeed expressions for
these ideas,” he adds, but these expressions “ are equally
applicable to other things. To express a virtuous or good
man, they would say, tangata lilU, a good man, or tangata
loto alley a man with a good mind ; but the word lille,
good (unlike our word virtuous), is equally applicable to
an axe, canoe, or anything else.” ' Of the Australian
natives about Botany Bay and Port Jackson Collins
wrote, “ That they have ideas of a distinction between
good and bad is evident from their having terms in their
language significant of these qualities.” A fish of which
they never ate, was wee-rCy or bad, whereas the kangaroo
was bood-yer-rCy or good ; and these expressions were used
not only for qualities which they perceived by their senses,
but for all kinds of badness and goodness, and were the
only terms they had for wrong and right. “ Their enemies
were wee-re ; their friends bood-yer-re. On our speaking
of cannibalism, they expressed great horror at the mention,
and said it was wee-re. On seeing any of our people
punished or reproved for ill-treating them, they expressed
their approbation, and said it was bood-yer-re, it was
right.” ®
^ llyades and Deniker, Mission India^ p. 139.
scientifique du Cap Horn^ vii. 251. ^ Mariner, Natives of the Tont^a
Powers, Tribes of California^ p. Islands^ ii. 147 sq.
22. ® Collins, English Colony in New
^ Forsyth, Highlands of Ce 7 ttral South IValeSy i. 548 sq.
VI . PRINCIPAL MORAL CONCEPTS
Considering, moreover, that even the European lan-
guages make use of such general terms as good ’’ and
“ bad for the purpose of expressing moral qualities, it
seems likely that, originally, moral concepts were not
clearly differentiated from other more comprehensive
generalisations, and that they assumed a more definite
shape only by slow degrees. At the same time we must
not expect to find the beginning of this process reflected
in the vocabularies of languages. There is every reason
to believe that a savage practically distinguishes between
the “ badness ” of a man and the “ badness’’ of a piece of
food, although he may form no clear idea of the dis-
tinction. As Professor Wundt observes, ‘‘the phenomena
of language do not admit of direct translation back again
into ethical processes : the ideas themselves are different
from their vehicles of expression, and here as everywhere
the external mark is later than the internal act for which
it stands.”^ Language is a rough general iser ; even
superficial resemblance between different phenomena often
suffices to establish linguistic identity between them.
Compare the rightness of a line with the rightness of
conduct, the wrongness of an opinion with the wrongness
of an act. And notice the different significations given
to the verb “ought” in the following sentences: — “They
ought to be in town by this time, as the train left Paris
last night “ If you wish to be healthy you ought to rise
early;” “You ought always to speak the truth.”
Though it may be shown that in these statements the
predicate “ ought ” signifies something which they all have
in common — the reference to a rule,“ — we must by no
means assume that this constitutes the essence of the moral
“ ought,” or gives us the clue to its origin.
Discarding all questions of etymology as irrelevant to
our subject,^ we shall, in our analysis of moral concepts,
^ ^ Wundt, Ethik, p. 36 (English moral concepts has, in my opinion,
translation, p. 44). proved a failure — which may be seen
Cf. Stephen, Liberty^ Equality^ from Mr. iJaynes’ hook on The Idea
Fraternity ^ p. 343 sq. of God and the Moral Sense in the
^ The attempt to apply the philo- Light of Language.
logical method to an examination of
ANALYSIS OF THE
endeavour to fix the true import of each concept by
examining how, and under what circumstances, the term
expressing it is generally applied. We shall restrict
ourselves to the principal, typical terms which are used as
predicates in moral judgments. If we succeed in proving
that they are all fundamentally derived from either moral
indignation or moral approval, there can be no reasonable
doubt as to the origin of the rest.
The tendency in a phenomenon to arouse moral in-
dignation is directly expressed by the term had^ and a
disposition of mind which is characterised by some special
kind of badness is called Closely allied to the term
‘‘ bad ” is the term wrong. But there is a difference in
the use of these words. Whilst bad may be applied
both to a person’s character and to his conduct, only his
conduct may be said to be ‘‘wrong.’' The reason for this
is that the concept of moral wrongness is modelled on the
idea of a moral law, the breach of which is regarded as
“ wrong.’’ And, by laying down a moral law, we only
enjoin a certain mode of conduct ; we do not command a
person to have a certain character.
The moral law is expressed by the term ought.^ a term
which, in modern ethics, generally occupies a central
position among moral predicates. The notion which
it embodies is frequently looked upon as ultimate and
incapable of analysis — “too elementary” (to quote
Professor Sidgwick) “to admit of any formal definition.”^
This view, I think, instead of simplifying the matter, has
been one of the chief causes of the prevailing confusion in
ethical thought.
Far from being a simple notion, “ ought ” appears to me
clearly decomposable, even though it have a special flavour
of its own. First of all, it expresses a conation. When
I feel that I ought to do a thing, I experience an impulse
to do it, even though some opposite impulse may finally
determine my action. And when I say to another man,
“You ought to do this, or that,” there is certainly implied
^ Sidgwick, Methods of Ethics^ p. 32.
a purpose to influence his action in a certain direction.
In the notion of duty, the ethical import of which is
identical with that of “ ought,” this conative element is
not so obvious.
Closely connected with the conative nature of “ought”
is the imperative character it is apt to assume. But,
though frequently used imperatively, “ ought ” is not
necessarily and essentially imperative. Even if the
“ ought ” which I address to myself, in a figurative sense,
may be styled a command, it is hardly appropriate to
speak of a present command with reference to past actions.
ThQ common phrase, “ You ought to have done this, or
that,” cannot be called a command.
The conation expressed in “ ought ” is determined by
the idea that the mode of conduct which ought to be per-
formed is not, or will possibly not be, performed. It is
also this idea of its not being performed that determines
the emotion which gives to “ ought ” the character of a
moral predicate. The doing of what ought not to be
done, or the omission of what ought not to be omitted, is
apt to call forth moral indignation — this is the most essen-
tial fact involved in the notion of “ ought.” Every
“ ought ’’-judgment contains implicitly a negation. No-
body would ever have dreamt of laying down a moral rule
if the idea of its transgression had not presented itself to
his mind. We may reverse the words of the Apostle,' and
say that where no transgression is, there is no law. When
Solon was asked why he had specified no punishment for
one who had murdered a father, he replied that he sup-
posed it could not occur to any man to commit such a
crime.^ Similarly, the modern Shintoist concludes that
the primaeval Japanese were pure and holy from the fact
that they are represented as a people who had no moral
commandments.® It is this prohibitive character of
“ ought ” that has imparted to duty that idea of antagonism
to inclination which has found its most famous expression
^ Romans y iv. 1 5. Cicero, Pro S. Roscio A merino ^ 25.
^ Diogenes Laertius, So/on, 10. ® Criffis, Religions of Japan,, p. 72.
in the Kantian ethics, and which made Bentham look upon
the word itself as having in it “ something disagreeable
and repulsive.” ^ It is the intrinsic connection between
“ ought ” and “ wrong ” that has given to duty the most
prominent place in ethical speculation whenever moral
pessimism has been predominant. Whilst the ancient
Greeks, with whom happiness was the state of nature,
never spoke of duty, but held virtue to be the Supreme
Good, Christianity, on the other hand, which looked upon
man as a being born and bred in sin, regarded morals pre-
eminently as the science of duty. Then, again, in modern
times, Kant’s categorical imperative came as a reaction
against that moral optimism which once more had given
the preference to virtue, considering everything in the
world or in humanity as beautiful and good from the very
beginning.^ It is also worth noting that the feeling of
self-complacency connected with the consciousness of
having acted in accordance with the law of duty, has no
distinctively expressive name in ordinary language, while
the opposite feeling is known by so familiar and distinctive
a term as “remorse.” This is not, as has been said,® “ a
significant indication of the moral condition of mankind,”
but a significant indication of the true import of the
notion of duty itself.
It is not, then, in the emotion of approval that we
must seek for the origin of this concept. We may un-
doubtedly applaud him who is faithful to his duty, but
the idea of duty involves no applause. There is no
contradiction in the omission of an act being disapproved
of and the performance of it being praised. “ Ought ”
and “ duty ” express only the tendency of an omis-
sion to call forth disapproval, and say nothing about
the consequences of the act’s performance. I'he con-
scientious man refuses the homage paid to him, by
saying, “ I have only done my duty.” Duty is a “ stern
^ Bentham, Deontology^ i, lO. * Murray, Introdnctioti to Ethics y x>.
^ Ziegler, Social Ethics, pp. 22, 75 io8.
sq.
lawgiver/’ who threatens with punishment, but promises
no reward/
The ideas of “ ought ” and duty ” thus spring from
the same source as the ideas of ‘‘ bad ” and ‘‘ wrong.” To
say that a man ought to do a thing is, so far as the
morality of his action is concerned, the very same thing
as to say that it is bad, or wrong, of him not to do it —
in other words, that the not-doing of it has a tendency to
call forth moral disapproval.
Wrong” is popularly regarded as the opposite of
rights and they are really contradictories, but only within
the sphere of positive moral valuation. We do not call
the actions of irresponsible beings, like animals or infants,
‘‘ right,” although they are not wrong ; nor do we pro-
nounce morally indijfferent actions of responsible beings
to be ‘‘right,” unless we wish thereby especially to mark
their moral value as not being wrong. An act which is
permissible is of course not wrong, and so far it may be
said to be right ; but it would be more accurate to say
that people have a right to do it. The adjective “ right,”
in its strict sense, refers to cases from which the indifferent
is excluded. A right action is, on a given occasion, the
right action, and other alternatives are wrong. “ Right ”
is thus closely related to “ ought,” but at the same time
“ right ” and “ obligatory ” are not identical. I cannot
quite subscribe to the view of Professor Sidgwick, that “ in
the recognition of conduct as ‘ right ’ is involved an authori-
tative prescription to do it.” “ What is right is in accord-
ance with the moral law; the adjective “right” means
that duty is fulfilled. It is true that the super-obligatory
also is right. But “ right ” takes no notice of the super-
obligatory as distinct from the obligatory, and what goes
^ The intrinsic connection between wrong, without regtirding the person
duty and disapproval has previously who commits the wrong and violates
been noticed by Stuart Mill (in a note the duty as a fit object of punishment.”
•to James Mill’s Analysis of the fliiinan Cf also Bain, Evioiions and the IVill^
Mindt ii. 325), according to whom ch. 15, and Gizyeki, Introduction to
“no case can be pointed out in which the Study of Ethics^ English adaptation
we consider anything as a duty, and by Stanton Coit, p. 102 sq.
any act or omission as immoral or Sidgwick, op. cit. p. 106.
beyond duty always involves the fulfilment of some duty.
It may be admitted to be “ not only right,” but not to be
more right. Right has no comparative. A duty is either
fulfilled or not, and unless it be perfectly fulfilled the
conduct is wrong. There are degrees of wrongness and
of goodness, as the moral indignation and the moral
approval may be stronger or weaker, but there are no
degrees of rightness.
The fact that the right action is a duty fulfilled accounts
for the erroneous opinion so generally held by ethical
writers that “ right ” is intrinsically connected with moral
approval.' The choice of the right alternative may give
us satisfaction and call forth in us an emotion of approval.
This emotion may be the motive for our pointing out the
rightness of the act, and the judgment in which we do so
may even intrinsically contain applause. The manner in
which the judgment, “That is right,” is pronounced, often
shows that it is meant to be an expression of praise. But
this does not imply that the concept “ right ” by itself has
reference to moral approval and involves praise. It only
means that in one word is expressed a certain concept —
the concept that a duty is fulfilled — plus an emotion of
approval. That “ right ” per se involves no praise is
obvious from the fact that we regard it as perfectly right
to pay a debt and to keep a promise, or to abstain from
killing, robbing, or lying, although such acts or omissions
generally have no tendency whatever to evoke in us an
emotion of moral approval.
The concept of “ right,” then, as implying that the
opposite mode of conduct would have been wrong,
ultimately derives its moral significance from moral
disapproval. This may seem strange considering that
“right” is commonly looked upon as positive and
“ wrong ” as its negation. But we must remember that
language and popular conceptions in these matters start
^ Hutcheson, Essay on the Nature Essays^ pp. 294, 304 sq. Fowler and
and Conduct of the Passions and Affec- Wilson, Principles of Morals ii. 1 99.
tions^ with Illustrations on the Moral Alexander, Moral Order and Progress^
Senses p. 279. Clifford, Lectures and p. 399.
from the notion of a moral rule or command. It is a
matter of paramount importance that such modes of
conduct as are apt to arouse moral indignation should be
avoided. People try to prevent them by prohibitions and
injunctions, often emphasised by threats of penalties for
the transgressors. The whole moral and social discipline
is based upon commands ; customs are rules of conduct,
and so are laws. It is natural, then, that the notion of a
command should figure uppermost in popular conceptions
of morality. Obedience to the command is right, a
breach of it is wrong. But the fact which gives birth to
the command itself is the indignation called forth by the
act which the command forbids, or by the omission of
that which it enjoins.
I have spoken here of ** right ” as an adjective. Used
as a substantive, to denote a rights it also, -in whatever
sense it be used, expresses a concept which is rooted in the
emotion of moral disapproval. To have a right to do a
thing is to be allowed to do it, either by positive law,
in the case of a legal right, or by the moral law, in the
case of a moral right ; in other words, to have a moral
right to do a thing means that it is not wrong to do it.
But generally the concept of ‘‘a right” means something
more than this. From the fact that an act is allowable,
that it is not wrong, it follows, as a rule, that it ought
not to be prevented, that no hindrance ought to be put in
the way of its performance ; and this character of in-
violability is largely included in the very concepts of
rights. That a man has a right to live does not merely
mean that he commits no wrong by supporting his life,
but it chiefly means that it would be wrong of other
people to prevent him from living, that it is their duty
not to kill him, or even, as the case may be, that it is
their duty to help him to live. And in order to constitute
a right in him, the duty in question must be a duty to
Viim.. That a right belonging to A is not merely a duty
incumbent on B, but a duty to A incumbent on B, will
become evident from an example. To kill another
ANALYSIS OF THE
1 40
person’s slave may be condemned as an injury done to the
slave himself, in which case it is a duty to the slave not to
kill him; or to kill another person’s slave may be
condemned on account of the loss it causes to the master,
in which case it is deemed a duty to the master not to kill
the slave. In the latter case we can hardly say that the
duty of not killing the slave constitutes a right of life in
the slave— it only constitutes a right in the master to
retain his slave alive, not to be deprived of him by an act
causing his death.
So commonly does the conception of a right belonging
to a person contain the idea of a duty which other persons
owe him, that it seems necessary to point out the existence
of rights in which no such idea is involved, A man’s
right to defend his country, for instance, does not in-
trinsically imply that it is wrong of the enemy to disable
him from doing so. But, on the other hand, there are
rights which are nothing else than duties towards those
who have the rights. A right is not always a person’s
right to a certain activity, or to abstaining from a certain
activity ; it may have exclusive reference to other people’s
acts or omissions. I'hat a man has the right to be re-
warded by his country only means that his country is
under an obligation to reward him. That a father has a
right to be obeyed by his children only means that it is
a duty incumbent on his children to obey him. That a
person has the right of bodily integrity only means that
it is wrong to inflict on him a bodily injury. These
rights may, no doubt, if violated, give rise to certain
rights of activity : a man may have a right to claim the
reward which is due to him, a father to exact from his
children the obedience which they owe him, a person
who is wronged to defend himself. But the rights of
claiming a reward, of exacting obedience, of resisting
wrong, are certainly not identical with the rights of being
rewarded, of being obeyed, of not being wronged.
It is commonjy said that rights have their corresponding
duties. But if this expression is to be used, it must be
PRINCIPAL MORAL CONCEPTS
remembered that the duty which “ corresponds ” to a right,
as a matter of fact, is either included in that right or
simply identical with it. The identity between the right
and the duty, then, consists in this, that the notion
of a right belonging to a person is identical with the
notion of a duty towards him. Rights and duties are
not identical in the sense that it is always a duty to
insist on a right, though this has been urged. ^ If
anybody prevents me from making use of my right it
may no doubt be deemed a duty on my part not to
tolerate the wrong committed against me, but nothing of
the kind is involved in the concept of a right. And
the same may be said with reference to the assertion that
a right to do a thing is always, at the same time, a duty
to do it — an assertion which is a consequence of the doc-
trine that there is nothing morally indifferent and nothing
that goes beyond duty ; in other words, that all conduct of
responsible beings is either wrong or obligatory. Even if
this doctrine were psychologically correct — which it is
not — even if there were a constant coincidence between
the acts which a person has a right to perform and acts
which it is his duty to perform, that would not constitute
identity between the concepts of rights and duties. Ac-
cording to the meaning of a right, A’s right may be B’s
duty towards A, but A’s right cannot be A’s duty towards
B or anybody else.
Closely connected with the notions of wrongness and
rightness are the notions of injustice and justice. Injustice,
indeed, is a kind of wrongness. To be unjust is always
to be unjust to somebody, and this implies a doing of
wrong to somebody, a violation of somebody’s right.
“Justice,” again, is a kind of rightness. It involves the
notion that a duty to somebody, a duty corresponding to
a right, is fulfilled we say that justice “demands” that
it should be fulfilled. As an act is “ right " if its omission
1 Alexander, op. cit. p. 146 stj. each one hi.s right,” — “ justitia est con-
“ According to the Insiitutiones of stans et perpetua voluntas jus suum
Justinian (i. i. i) “ justice is the con- cuique tribuens.”
stant and perpetual will to render to
ANALYSIS OF THE
is wrong, so an act is “just,” in the strict sense of the
word, if its omission is unjust. But, like the adjective
“right,” the adjective “just” is also sometimes used in
a wider sense, to denote that something is “ not unjust.”
As non-obligatory acts that are “ not wrong ” can hardly
be denied to be “ right,” so non-obligatory acts that are
“ not unjust” can hardly be denied to be “just,” although
they are not demanded by justice.
At the same time, “ injustice ” and “justice ” are not
simply other names for violating or respecting rights.
Whenever we style an act “unjust,” we emphasise that it
involves partiality. We do not denominate murder and
robbery unjust, but wronger criminal, because the partiality
involved in their commission is quite obscured by their
general wrongness or criminality ; but we at once admit
their gross injustice when we consider that the murderer
and robber indulged their own inclinations with utter
disregard of their neighbours’ rights. And we look upon
“ unjust ” as an exceedingly appropriate term for a judge
who condemns an innocent man with the intention to save
the culprit, and for an employer who keeps for himself a
profit which he ought to share with his employees. Again,
when we style an act “just,” in the strict sense of the
term, we point out that an undue preference would have
been shown to somebody by its omission. It is true that,
as Adam Smith observes, “ we may often fulfil all the
rules of justice by sitting still and doing nothing,” * and
that the man who barely abstains from violating either the
person or the estate or the reputation of his neighbours so
far does justice to them ; but in such a case we hardly
apply the epithet “just,” simply because there is no reason
for emphasising the partiality involved in the opposite
mode of conduct. On the other hand, we say it is just,
or, more emphatically, that justice demands, that the inno-
cent should not suffer in the place of the guilty, or that,
the employer should give his employees all their dues.
It is necessary to note that the impartiality which justice
^ Adam Smith, Theory of Moral Senii 7 ?tents^ p. 117.
PRINCIPAL MORAL CONCEPTS
demands is impartiality within the recognised order of
rights, whether these rights themselves have a partial origin
or not. A father is unjust if he gives away property to
one of his children in preference to others, in case all of
them are recognised to have a right to an equal share
in his property, even though it be only a conditional
right ; and a man is unjust if he keeps for himself a
profit to which another man has an equal right. But
in a society which regards slavery as a morally permis-
sible institution, a man is not necessarily deemed unjust
if he beats a slave in a case where it would have been
wrong to beat a freeman. However, in the case of un-
equal rights, justice admits of no greater difference of
treatment than what the difference in rights implies. It
may be just to punish a man who by a crime has forfeited
that right to be protected from wilfully inflicted pain which
every law-abiding citizen possesses, but it is unjust to
extend the inequality between his condition and the con-
dition of others beyond the inequality of their rights by
inflicting upon him a punishment which is unduly severe.
It is the emphasis laid on the duty of impartiality that
gives justice a special prominence in connection with punish-
ments and rewards. A man's rights depend to a great
extent upon his actions. Other things being equal, the
criminal has not the same rights to inviolability as regards
reputation, or freedom, or property, or life, as the innocent
man ; the miser and egoist have not the same rights as the
benefactor and the philanthropist. On these differences in
rights due to differences in conduct, the terms “just" and
“ unjust " lay stress ; for in such cases an injustice would
have been committed if the rights had been equal. When
we say of a criminal that he has been “justly " imprisoned,
we point out that he was no victim of undue partiality, as
he had forfeited the general right to freedom on account
^ of his crime. When we say of a benefactor that he has
been “justly ” rewarded, we point out that no fivour was
partially bestowed upon him in preference to others, as he
had acquired the special right of being rewarded. But the
ANALYSIS OF THE
“justice” of a punishment or a reward, strictly speaking,
involves something more than this ; as we have seen, what
is strictly “just” is always the discharge of a duty cor-
responding to a right which would have been in a partial
manner disregarded by a transgression of the duty. If it
is just that a person should be rewarded, he ought to be
rewarded, and to fulfil this duty is to do him justice.
Again, if it is just that a person should be punished, he
ought to be punished, and his not being punished is an in-
justice to other persons. It is an injustice towards all those
whose condemnation of the wrong act finds its recognised
expression in the punishment, inasmuch as their rightful
claim, that the criminal should be punished, their right of
resisting wrong, is thereby violated in favour of the wrong-
doer. Moreover, his not being punished is an injustice
towards other criminals, who have been punished for similar
acts, in so far as they have a right to demand that no un-
due preference should be shown to anybody whose guilt is
equal to theirs. Retributive justice may admit of a certain
latitude as to the retribution. It may be a matter of small
concern from the community’s point of view whether men
are fined or imprisoned for the commission of a certain crime.
But it may be a demand of justice that, under equal cir-
cumstances, all of them should be punished with the same
severity, since the crime has equally affected their rights.
The emphasis which “injustice” lays on the partiality of
a certain mode of conduct always involves a condemnation
of that partiality. Like every other kind of wrongness,
“ injustice ” is thus a concept which is obviously based on
the emotion of moral disapproval. And so is the concept
of “justice,” whether it involves the notion that an in-
justice would be committed if a certain duty is not ful-
filled, or it is simply used to denote that a certain mode of
conduct is “ not unjust.” But there is yet another sense
in which the word “just ” is applied. It may emphasise
the impartiality of an act in a tone of praise. Consider-
ing how difficult it is to be perfectly impartial and to give
every man his due, especially when one’s own interests are
PRINCIPAL MORAL CONCEPTS
H5
concerned, it is only natural that men should be applauded
.for being just, and consequently that to call a person just
should often be to praise him. So, also, “justice ” is used
as the name for a virtue, “ the mistress and queen of all
virtues.” ^ But all this does not imply that an emotion of
moral approval enters into the concept of justice. It
only means that one word is used to express a certain
concept — a concept which, as we have seen, ultimately
derives its import from moral disapproval - — plus an
emotion of approval. That the concept of justice by
itself involves no reference to the emotion of moral ap-
proval appears from the fact that it is no praise to say of
an act that it is “ only just.”
From the concepts springing from moral disapproval
we pass to those springing from moral approval. F'ore-
most among these ranks the concept goodl^
Though “ good,” being affixed to a great variety of
objects, takes different shades of meaning in different
cases, there is one characteristic common to everything
called “good.” This is hardly, as Mr. Spencer maintains,^
its quality of being well adapted to a given end. It is
true that the good knife is one which will cut, the good
gun one which carries far and true. But I fail to see
that “ good ” in a moral sense involves any idea of an
adaptation to a given purpose, and, by calling conduct
^ Cicero, De offictis, iii. 6.
" Profe.ssor Bain, who take.? a very
legal view of the moral con.scioiisness,
maintains {Evioiions and the Will, p.
292) that positive good deeds and
self-. sacrifice . . . transcend the region
of morality proper, and occupy a
sphere of their own.” A similar opinion
has been expre.ssed by Prof. Durkheim
{Division dit travail social), and, quite
recently, by Dr. Lagerborg, in his inter-
esting essay, ^ La nature de la morale ’
tfRcvue internationale de Sociologie, xi.
466). .Prof. Durkheim argues (p. 30)
that it would be “ contraire a toute
methode ” to include under the same
heading acts which are obligatory and
acts which are objects of admiration,
and at the same time exempt from all
regulation. “Si done, pour rester
fidele k fiisagc, on reserve aux pre-
miers la qualification de moraux, on
ne saurait la donner egalement aux
seconds.” But I fail to see that
ordinary usage recognises regulation as
the test of morality. On the contrary,
terms like “goodness” and “virtue,”
though having no reference whatever
to any moral rule, have always hitherto
been applied to qualities avowedly
moral.
® Spencer, Principles of Ethics, \. 21
sqq.
ANALYSIS OF THE
“ good,” we certainly do not mean that it “ conduces to
life in each and all.” “ Good ” simply expresses approval
or praise of something on account of some quality which
it possesses. A house is praised as “good” because it
fulfils the end desired, a wine because it has an agreeable
taste, a man on account of his moral worth. “ Good,” as
a moral epithet, involves a praise which is the outward
expression of the emotion of moral approval, and is affixed
to a subject of moral valuation on account of its tendency
to call forth such an emotion,
“ Good ” has commonly been identified with “ right,”
but such an identification is incorrect. A father does
right in supporting his young children, inasmuch as he,
by supporting them, discharges a duty incumbent upon
him, but we do not say that he docs a good deed by
supporting them, or that it is good of him to do so.
Nor do we call it good of a man not to kill or rob his
neighbours, although his conduct is so far right. The
antithesis between right and wrong is, in a certain sense
at least, contradictory, the antithesis between good and
bad is only contrary. Every act — provided that it falls
within the sphere of positive moral valuation — that is not
wrong is right, but every act that is not bad is not neces-
sarily good. Just as we may say of a thing that it is
“ not bad,” and yet refuse to call it “ good,” so we may
object to calling the simple discharge of a duty “ good,”
although the opposite mode of conduct would be bad.
On the other hand, no confusion of ethical concepts is
involved in attributing goodness to the performance of a
duty, or, in other words, praising a man for an act the
omission of which would have incurred blame. To say of
one and the same act that it is right and that it is good,
really means that we look upon it from different points
of view. Since moral praise expresses a benevolent
attitude of mind, it is commendable for a man not to be
niggard in his acknowledgment of other people’s right
conduct ; whereas, self-praise being objectionable, only the
other point of view is deemed proper when he passes a
PRINCIPAL MORAL CONCEPTS
judgment upon himself. He may say, without incurring
censure, “ I have done my duty, I have done what is
right,” but hardly, I have done a good deed” ; and it
would be particularly obnoxious to say, ‘‘ I am a good
man.” The best man even refuses to be called good by
others: — Why callest thou me good ? there is none good
but one, that is, God.” ^
Whilst “goodness ” is the general expression for moral
praise, virtue denotes a disposition of mind which is
characterised by some special kind of goodness. He who
is habitually temperate possesses the virtue of temperance,
he who is habitually just the virtue of justice. And even
when a man is simply said to be “ virtuous,” this epithet
Is given to him, more or less distinctly, with reference to
some branch of goodness which constitutes his virtue. A
Supreme Being, to whom is attributed perfect goodness, is
not called virtuous, but good.
It was the opinion of Aristotle that virtue Is Imperfect
so long as the agent cannot do the virtuous action without
a conflict of impulses. Others maintain, on the contrary,
that virtue essentially expresses effort, resistance, and
conquest. It has been represented as “mediation through
pain ” ; ^ according to Kant, It Is “the moral disposition
in struggle.”^ But I do not see that virtue presupposes
struggle, nor that it is lessened by being exercised with
little or no effort. A virtue consists in the disposition to
will or not to will acts of a certain kind, and is by no
means reduced by the fact that no rival impulses make
themselves felt. It is true that by struggle and conquest
a man may display more virtue, namely, the virtue of
self-restraint In addition to the virtue gained by it. The
vigorous and successful contest against temptation con-
stitutes a virtue by itself. For instance, the quality of
mind which is exhibited in a habitual and victorious effort
K) conquer strong sexual passions is a virtue distinguish-
able ' from that of chastity. But even this virtue of
^ St. Aiatthezv, xix. 17. ^ Kantj Kriiik der praktischen Ver~
• ^ Laurie, Mthica, p. 253 nunft^ i. i. 3 {Sdnuntliche VVerkejS. 89).
L 2
ANALYSIS OF THE
resisting seductive impulses is not greater, ceteris paribus^
in proportion as the victory is more difficult. Take two
men with equally strong passions and equally exposed to
temptations, who earnestly endeavour to lead a chaste life.
He who succeeds with less struggle, thanks to his greater
power of will, is surely inferior neither in chastity nor in
self-restraint. Suppose, again, that the two men were
exposed to different degrees of temptation. He who
overcomes the greater temptation displays more self-
restraint ; yet the other man may possess this virtue in an
equal degree, and his chastity is certainly not made greater
thereby. He may have more merit, but merit is not
necessarily proportionate to virtue.
The virtues are broad generalisations of mental disposi-
tions which, on the whole, are regarded as laudable.
Owing to their stereotyped character, it easily happens, in
individual cases, that the possession of a virtue confers no
merit upon the possessor ; and, at least from the point of
view of the enlightened moral consciousness, a man’s
virtues are no exact gauge of his moral worth. In order
to form a just opinion of the value of a person’s character,
we must take into account the strength of his instinctive
desires and the motives of his conduct. There are virtues
that pay no regard to this. A sober man, who has no
taste for intoxicants, possesses the virtue of sobriety in no
less degree than a man whose sobriety is the result of a
difficult conquest over a strong desire. He who is brave
with a view to being applauded is not, as regards the
virtue of courage, inferior to him who faces dangers
merely from a feeling of duty. The only thing that the
possession of a virtue presupposes is that it should have
been tried and tested. We cannot say that people
unacquainted with intoxicants possess the virtue of
sobriety, and that a man who never had anything to spend
distinguishes himself for frugality. For to attribute %
virtue to somebody is always to bestow upon him some
degree of praise, and it is no praise, only irony, to say of
a man that he ‘‘ makes a virtue of necessity.”
Attempts have been made to reconcile the Aristotelian
and the Kantian views of the relation between virtue and
effort, by saying that virtue is the harmony won and
merit is the winning of it/ This presupposes that a man
to whom virtue is natural has had his fights. But, to
be sure, it is not always so. Who could affirm that every
temperate, or charitable, or just man has acquired the
virtue only as a result of inward struggle ? There are
people to whom some virtues at least are natural from the
beginning, and others who acquire them with a minimum
of effort.
There has been much discussion about the relation
between virtue and duty. It has been said that “ they
are co-extensive, the former describing conduct by the
quality of the agent’s mind, the latter by the nature of the
act performed ” ; that they express the same ideal, virtue
subjectively, duty objectively ; ^ or that virtue, in its
proper sense, is the quality of character that fits for the
discharge of duty,” and that it only lives in the perform-
ance of duty.” ^ At the same time it is admitted that
the distinctive mark of virtue seems to lie in what is
beyond duty,” and that, though every virtue is a duty,
and every duty a virtue, there are certain actions to which
it is more natural to apply the term virtuous.”^ Prof.
Sidgwick, again, in his elaborate chapter on ‘Virtue and
Duty,’ remarks that he has “thought it best to employ
the terms so that virtuous conduct may include the
performance of duty as well as whatever good actions
may be commonly thought to go beyond duty ; though
recognising that virtue in its ordinary use is most con-
spicuously manifested in the latter.”
It can be no matter of surprise that those who regard
the notion of “duty” as incapable of being analysed, or
^ Dewey, Study of Ethics^ p. 133 ^ Grote, Treatue on the Aloral Ideals^
Jq, Simmel, Einleitung in die Moral- p. 22, Cf. Seth, Study of Ethical
*wissenschafiy i. 228. Cf also Shaftes- Principles^ p. 239.
bury, ' ‘ Inquiry concerning Virtue and Muirhead, Elements of Ethics ^ p.
Merit/ i. 2. 4, in Characleristicks, ii. 19011.*
36 sqq, " Alexander, op. cit. p. 243 sq,
Alexander, op. cit. p. 244. Sidgwick, op. ctt. p. 221.
ANALYSIS OF THE
who fail to recognise its true import, are embarrassed by
its relation to virtue. We do not call it a virtue if a man
habitually abstains from killing or robbing, or pays his
debts, or performs a great number of other duties. We
do call chastity and temperance and justice virtues,
although we regard it as obligatory on a man to be chaste,
temperate, just. We also call hospitality, generosity, and
charity virtues in cases where they go beyond the strict
limits of duty. “ The relation of virtue and duty is com-
plicated,” says Professor Alexander.^ In its common use
each term seems to include something excluded from the
other,” observes Professor Sidgwick.“ But, indeed, the
relation is not complicated, for there Is no other intrinsic
relation between them than their common antagonism to
‘‘ wrong.” That something is a duty Implies that its non-
performance tends to evoke moral indignation, that it is a
virtue implies that its performance tends to evoke moral
approval. That the virtues actually cover a comparatively
large field of the province of duty is simply owing to their
being dispositions of mind. We may praise the habits of
justice and gratitude, even though we find nothing praise-
worthy in an isolated just or grateful act.
There has been no less confusion with regard to the
relation between duty and merit. Like the notions of
"‘good” and “virtue,” the “meritorious” derives its
origin from the emotion of moral approval ; but while the
former merely express a tendency to give rise to such an
emotion, “ meritorious ” implies that the object to which
it refers merits praise, that it has a just claim to praise, or,
in other words, that it ought to be recognised as good.
This makes the term “ meritorious ” more emphatic than
the term “ good,” but at the same time it narrows its
province in a peculiar way. Just as the expression that
something ought to be done implies the idea of its
not being done, so the word “ meritorious ” suggests the
idea of goodness which may fail of due recognition. And *
as it is meaningless to speak of duty in a case where the
^ Alexander, op. cit. p. 244. Sidgvvick, op. cit. p. 219.
PRINCIPAL MORAL CONCEPTS
^ 5 ^
opposite mode of conduct is entirely out of the question,
so it would be an absurdity to attribute merit to some-
body for an act the goodness of which is universally
admitted. Thus ^‘meritorious” involves a restriction.
It would be almost blasphemous to call the acts of a God
conceived to be infinitely good meritorious, since it would
suggest a limitation of his goodness.
The emphatic claim to praiseworthiness made by the
“ meritorious ” has rendered it objectionable to a great
number of moralists. It has been identified with the
“ super-obligatory ” — a conception which is to many an
abomination. From what has been said above, however,
it is manifest that they are not identical. As the dis-
charge of a duty may be regarded as a good act, so it
may also be regarded as an act which ought to be recog-
nised as good. Practically, no doubt, there is a certain
antagonism between duty and merit. We praise, and,
especially, we regard as deserving praise, only what is
above the average,^ and we censure what is below it. No
merit is conferred upon him who performs a duty which
is seldom transgressed, or the transgression of which would
actually incur punishment or censure. We do not think
that a man ought to be praised for what his own interest
prompts him to perform ; and, since the transgression of a
moral command which is usually obeyed is generally cen-
sured or punished, there is under ordinary circumstances
nothing meritorious in performing a duty. But though
thus probably most acts which are deemed meritorious fall
outside the limits of duty as roughly drawn by the popular
mind, we are on the other hand often disposed to attribute
merit to a man on account of an act which, from a strict
point of view, is his duty, but a duty which most people,
under the same circumstances, would have left undis-
charged. This shows that the antagonism between duty
and merit is not absolute. And in the concept of merit
* per se no such antagonism is involved.
^ Merit, as Professor Alexander puts interval which separates the rneri-
it {op, cit, p. 196), expresses the torious from the average.”
I confess that I fail to grasp what those writers really
mean who identify the “ meritorious ” with the “ super-
obligatory,” and at the same time deny the existence of
any super- obligatory. Do they shut their eyes to the
important psychical fact indicated by the term “ merit,”
or do they look upon it as a chimera inconsistent with a
sufficiently enlightened moral consciousness ? For my
own part, I cannot see how the moral consciousness could
dispense with the idea that there are actions which merit
praise or reward, which ought to be praised or rewarded.
The denial of merit can be defended from a purely theo-
logical point of view, but then only with regard to man’s
relation to God. It is obvious that a fallen being who is
sinning even when he does his best, could not be recog-
nised as good by God and could have no merit. But it is.
hardly just, nor is it practically possible, that a man should
measure his fellow-man by a superhuman standard of
perfection, and try to suppress the natural emotion of
moral approval and the claims springing from it, by
persuading himself that there is no mortal being who ever
does anything which ought to be recognised as good.
Quite distinct from the question of merit, then, is that
of the super-obligatory. Can a man do more than his duty,
or, in other words, is there anything good which is not at
the same time a duty ? The answer depends on the con-
tents given to the commandments of duty, hence it may
vary without affecting the concept of duty itself. If we
consider that there is an obligation on every man to pro-
mote the general happiness to the _yery utmost of his
ability, we must also maintain that nobody can ever do any-
thing good beyond his duty. The same is the case if we
regard “ self-realisation,” or a “ normal ” exercise of his
natural functions, as a man’s fundamental duty. In all
these cases “to aim at acting beyond obligation,” as Price
puts it,^ is “ the same with aiming at acting contrary to
obligation, and doing more than is fit to be done, the
same with doing wrong.” It can hardly be denied, how-
^ Price, Review oj the Principal Questions in Morals, }). 204 stj.
PRINCIPAL MORAL CONCEPTS
ever, that those who hold similar views have actually two
standards of duty, one by which they measure man and his
doings in the abstract, with reference to a certain ideal of
life which they please to identify with duty, and another
by which they are guided in their practical moral judg-
ments upon their own and their neighbours’ conduct. The
conscientious man is apt to judge himself more severely
than he judges others, partly because he knows his own
case better than theirs,’ and partly because he is naturally
afraid of being intolerant and unjust. He may indeed be
unwilling to admit that he ever can do more than his duty,
seeing how difficult it is even to do what he ought to do,
and impressed, as he would be, with the feeling of his own
shortcomings. Yet I do not see how he could conscienti-
ously deny that he has omitted to do many praiseworthy
or heroic deeds without holding himself blamable for such
omissions.
Professor Sidgwick observes that we should not deny
that it is, in some sense, a man’s strict duty to do what-
ever action he judges most excellent, so far as it is in his
power.” This, as it seems to me, is not a matter of
course, and nothing of the kind is involved in the notion
of duty itself. We must not confound the moral law
with the moral ideal. Duty is the minimum of morality,
the supreme moral ideal of the best man is the maximum
of it. Those who sum up the whole of morality in the
word “ought” identify the minimum and the maximum,
but I fail to see that morality is better for this. Rather
it is worse. The recognition of a “ super-obligatory ”
does not lower the moral ideal ; on the contrary it raises
it, or at any rate makes it more possible to vindicate
the moral law and to administer it justly. It is nowa-
days a recognised principle in legislation that a law loses
part of its weight if it cannot be strictly enforced. If the
realisation of the highest moral ideal is commanded by a
moral law, such a law will always remain a dead letter,
and morality will gain nothing. Far above the anxious
^ Cf, Sidgwick, op, cit, p, 221. Ibid, p. 219.
^54
ANALYSIS OF THE
effort to fulfil the commandments of duty stands the free
and lofty aspiration to live up to an ideal, which, un-
attainable as it may be, threatens neither with blame nor
remorse him who fails to reach its summits. Does not
experience show that those whose thoughts are constantly
occupied with the prescriptions of duty are apt to become
hard and intolerant ?
Those who deny the existence of anything morally
“ praiseworthy ” which is not a duty, are also generally
liable to deny the existence of anything morally indifferent
in the conduct of responsible beings. The super-
obligatory ” and the '‘indifferent” have this in common
that they are “ultra-obligatory,” and the denial of the
one as well as of the other is an expression of the same
tendency to look upon the moral law as the sole fact of
the moral consciousness. Even Utilitarianism cannot
consistently admit of anything indifferent within the
province of moral valuation, since two opposite modes of
conduct can hardly produce absolutely the same sum of
happiness. Such a repudiation of the “ indifferent ” being
quite contrary to the morality of common sense, which,
after all, no ethical theory can afford to neglect, consider-
able ingenuity has been wasted on vain attempts to show
that the “ indifferent ” is nothing but a rude popular
conception unable to keep its ground against a thorough-
going examination. Professor Ziegler ironically asks : — -
“Such outward matters as eating and drinking are surely
morally indifferent ? And yet — is eating and drinking
too much, is spending too much time in outdoor exercise,
is lounging idly about, morally indifferent ? or, on the
other hand, is it morally allowable or wholesome to reduce
oneself and make oneself weak and ill by fasting, or
to become a hypochondriac by continually staying in-
doors ^ This argument, however, involves a confusion
of different volitions. The fact that eating or drinking
generally, or eating or drinking too much or too little,
are no matters of indifference, surely does not prevent
^ Ziegler, op, cit, p. S5.
PRINCIPAL MORAL CONCEPTS
eating or drinking on some certain occasion from being in-
different. Mr. Bradley again observes : — ‘‘ It is right and
a duty that the sphere of indifferent detail should exist.
It is a duty that I should develop my nature by private
choice therein. Therefore, because that is a duty, it is a
duty not to make a duty of every detail ; and thus in
every detail I have done my duty.” ^ This statement also
shows a curious confusion of entirely different facts. It
may be very true that it is a duty to recognise certain
actions as indifferent. This is one thing by itself. But
it is quite another thing to perform those actions. And if
it is a duty to recognise certain actions as indifferent, how
could it possibly at the same time be held a duty to per-
form them }
It has been maintained that the sphere of the indifferent
forms the totality of ‘‘ ought ” ; that when the same end
may be reached by a variety of means, an action may be
indifferent merely in relation to the choice of means, but
not so far as regards the attainment of the end, and hence
is only apparently indifferent.*'^ If it is my moral duty
to go from one town to another,” says Mr. Bradley, and
there are two roads which are equally good, it is indiffer-
ent to the proposed moral duty zvhich road I take ; it is
not indifferent that I do take one or the other ; and
whichever road I do take, I am doing my duty on it, and
hence it is far from indifferent : my walking on road A is
a matter of duty in reference to the end, though not a
matter of duty if you consider it against walking on
road B ; and so with B — but I can escape the sphere of
duty neither on A nor on B.” All this is true, but forms
no argument against the “ indifferent.” The statement,
“You ought to go to the town and to take either road
A or B,” refers to two volitions which are regarded as
wrong, namely, the volition not to go to the town at all,
and the volition to take any road not A or B ; and it
^ Bradley, Ethical Studies^ p. 195, andcr, op. cit. p. 50 sqq. Murray, op.
11. I. cit. p. 26 S(/. Bradley, op. cit. p. 195
^ Simmel, op. cit. i. 35 sqq. Alex- sq.
refers also to two pairs of volitions in reference to which
it indicates that the choice between the volitions con-
stituting each pair is indifferent. You may choose to
take road A or not to take it ; you may choose to take
road B or not to take it. The “ indifferent ” is always
an alternative between contradictories. It can therefore
never form part of an “ ought ’’-totality, being itself a
totality as complete as possible. This is somewhat dis-
guised by a judgment which makes an obligation of a
choice between A and B, but becomes conspicuous if we
consider a simple case of indifference. Suppose that it is
considered indifferent whether you speak or do not speak
on a certain occasion. What is here the “ ought ” that
forms the totality of the indifferent Would there be
any sense in saying that you ought either to speak or not
to speak ? Or is the alternative, speaking — not speaking,
only a link in an indefinite chain of alternatives, each of
which is by itself indifferent, in a relative sense, but the
sum of which forms the “ ought You maybe per-
mitted — it will perhaps be argued — in a given moment to
speak or to abstain from speaking, to write or to abstain
from writing, to read or to abstain from reading, and so
on ; but however wide the province of the permissible
may be, there must always be a limit inside which you
ought to remain. That you do this or that may be a
matter of indifference, but only of relative indifference,
for it is not indifferent w/ia/ you do on the whole ; hence
there is nothing absolutely Indifferent. Such an argument,
however, involves a misapprehension of the true meaning
of the “ indifferent.” The predicate expressing indiffer-
ence refers to certain definite volitions and their contra-
dictories, not to the whole of a man’s conduct in a certain
moment. The whole of a man’s conduct is never indif-
ferent. But neither is the whole of a man’s conduct ever
wrong. In the moment when a murderer kills his victim
he is fulfilling an endless number of duties : he abstains
from stealing, lying, committing adultery, suicide, and so
on. The predicate “wrong” only marks the moral
PRINCIPAL MORAL CONCEPTS
character of a special mode of conduct. Why should not
the indifferent be allowed to do the same ?
It has, finally, been observed that the so-called ‘‘ indif-
ferent ” is something ‘‘the morality of which can only be
individually determined.”^ This remark calls attention
to the fact that no mode of conduct can be regarded as
indifferent without a careful consideration of individual
circumstances, and that much which is apparently indif-
ferent is not really so. This, however, does not involve
an abolition of the indifferent. Such an abolition would
be the extreme of moral intolerance. He who tried to
put it into practice would be the most insupportable of
beings, and to himself life would be unbearable. Fortun-
ately, such a man has never existed. The attempts to
make every action, even the most trivial, of responsible
beings a matter of moral concern, are only theoretical
fancies without practical bearing, a hollow and flattering
tribute to the idol of Duty.
^ Marlensen, C/irtsfian 7 £//iicSy p, 415.
Chapter VII
CUSTOMS AND LAWS AS EXPRESSIONS OF MORAL IDEAS
Moral ideas are expressed in moral judgments. We
have hitherto examined the predicates of such judgments,
the import and origin of the moral concepts. Now a
much wider field of research remains for us to traverse.
We shall direct our attention to the subjects of moral
judgments, to the mass of phenomena which, among
different peoples and in different ages, have had a ten-
dency to call forth moral blame and moral praise. We
shall discuss the general characteristics which all these
phenomena have in common. We shall classify the most
important of them, and study the moral ideas held with
reference to the phenomena of each class separately. And
in both cases we shall not only analyse, but try to find an
answer to the question. Why ? — the ultimate aim of all
scientific research. But before entering upon this vast
undertaking, we must define the lines on which it is to be
conducted. How can we get an insight into the moral
ideas of mankind at large ?
In answering this question I need not dwell upon such
obvious means of information as direct experience, or
records of moral maxims and sentiments found in proverbs,
literary and philosophical works, and religious codes.
The sources which, from an evolutionary point of view,
are of the most comprehensive importance for our study,
are tribal and national customs and laws. It is to these
sources that the present chapter will he devoted.
CH. V.Il
CUSTOMS AND LAWS
(We have seen that a custom, in the strict sense of the
word, is not merely the habit of a certain circle of men,
but at the same time involves a moral rule. There is a
close connection between these two characteristics of
custom : its habitualness and its obligatoriness. Whatever
be the foundation for a certain practice, and however
trivial it may be, the unreflecting mind has a tendency
to disapprove of any deviation from it for the simple
reason that such a deviation is unusual. As Abraham
Tucker observes, it is a constant argument among the
common people, that a thing must be done, and ought to
be done, because it always has been done.’' ^ J Children
show respect for the customary,^ and so do savages. ‘‘ If
you ask a Kaffir why he does so and so, he will answer —
‘How can I tell It has always been done by our
forefathers.’ ” 'Fhe only reason which the Eskimo can
give for some of their present customs, to which they
adhere from fear of ill report among their people, is that
“ the old Innuits did so, and therefore they must.” ^ In
the behaviour of the Aleut, who “ is bashful if caught
doing anything unusual among his people,” ^ and in the
average European’s dread of appearing singular, we
recognise the influence of the same force of habit.
On the other hand, it should be remembered that not
every public habit is a custom, involving an obligation ;
certain practices, though very general in a society, may be
even reprobated by almost every one of its members.
The habits of a people must therefore be handled with
discretion by the student of moral ideas. Yet when he
has no reason to conclude as to some special habit that it
is held obligatory, he may, probably always, be sure that
it is either allowed, or, in spite of all assurances of its
wickedness, that the disapproval of it is not generally
very deep or genuine. In a community where lying is a
* ^ Tucker, Light of Nature^ if. 593. 3 Leslie, Among the Zulus and
Cf als6 Simmel, Einleilung in die Amatongas, p. 146.
Moralwissenschaft , i. 65 sig]. 4 j-fail, Antic Lies ear ches^ p. 569.
^ Sully, Studies of Childhood^ p. 280 5 Dali, Alaska^ p. 396.
5 ( 1 .
i6o
GUSTOMS AND LAWS AS
prevailing vice, truthfulness cannot be regarded as a very
sacred duty ; and where sexual immorality is widely
spread, the public condemnation of it always smacks of
hypocrisy. Men’s standard of morality is not independent
of their practice. The conscience of a community follows
the same rule as the conscience of an individual.
“ Commit a sin twice,” says the Talmud, “ and you will
think it perfectly allowable.” ‘ Hence for the study of
the inmost convictions of a nation, its “ bad habits ” form
a valuable complement to its professed opinions.
The dictates of custom being dictates of morality, it
is obvious that the study of moral ideas will, to a large
extent, be a study of customs. But at the same time it
should be borne in mind that custom never covers the
whole field of morality, and that the uncovered space
grows larger in proportion as the moral consciousness
develops. Being a rule of duty, custom may only in-
directly be an expression of moral approval, by claiming, in
certain cases, that goodness should be rewarded. But
even when demanding praise, custom is not always a reli-
able exponent of merit ; it includes politeness, and polite-
ness is a great deceiver. Custom may compel us to
praise a man for form’s sake, when he deserves no
praise, and to thank him when he deserves no thanks.
Moreover, custom regulates external conduct only. It
tolerates all kinds of volitions and opinions if not openly
expressed. It does not condemn the heretical mind, but
the heretical act. It demands that under certain circum-
stances certain actions shall be either performed or omitted,
and, provided that this demand is fulfilled, it takes no
notice of the motive of the agent or omitter. Again, in
case the course of conduct prescribed by custom is not
observed, the mental facts connected with the transgression,
if regarded at all, are dealt with in a rough and ready
manner, according to general rules which hardly admit of
individualisation. Yet the incongruity between custom *
and morality which ensues from these circumstances is on
^ Deutsch, Lito'ary ReniainSy p. 58.
. EXPRESSIONS OF MORAL IDEAS
i6i
the whole more apparent than real. It Is rather an incon-
gruity between different moral standards. The unreflect-
ing moral consciousness, like custom, cares comparatively
little for the internal aspect of conduct. It does not ask
whether a man goes to church on Sunday from a religious
motive or from fear of public opinion ; it does not ask
whether he stays at home from love of ease or from dissent
of belief and avoidance of hypocrisy. It is ready to blame
as soon as the dictate of custom is disobeyed. The rule
of custom is the rule of duty at early stages of develop-
ment. Only progress in culture lessens Its sway.
Finally, the moral ideas which are expressed in the
customs of a certain circle of men are not necessarily shared
by every one of its members. This may, in the present
connection, be considered a matter of slight importance
by him who regards morality as objectively '' realised in
the customs of a people, and who denies the individual
the right to a private conscience. But from the subjective
point of view which I am vindicating, individual convic-
tion has a claim to equal consideration with public opinion,
nay frequently, to higher respect, representing as it
does In many cases a higher morality, a moral standard
more purified by reflection and impartiality. At the lower
stages of civilisation, however, where a man is led by his
feelings more than by his thoughts, such a differentiation
of moral ideas hardly occurs. The opinions of the many
are the opinions of all, and the customs of a society are
recognised as rules of duty by all its members.
In primitive society custom stands for law, and even
where social organisation has made some progress it may
still remain the sole rule for conduct.^ The authority of
^ Cranz, History of Greenland^ i. Archivio per P antropoloyia e la clno~
170. Dal), op. cil. p. 381 (Tiiski). lofa, xiv. 39. tkirl, jfpiians^ }). 105
Dobrizboffer, Accottni of the AbiponeSy (Arrii Islaiulcrs). F()rl)es, A Nainra'l-
ii. 9=5. Shooter, Kafirs of Natal and isPs Wanderings in the Eastern Archi-
4 he Zulu Country^ p. loi 5</. Holden, pelago, p. 473 (Timorese). l)alton.
East and Future of the Kaffir Races ^ Ethnology of Ih:ngaf\>.
p, 336. Muni^o Park, Travels in the Rockhill, I .and of the I.an/as^ p. 220
Interior of Africa., l6. Scaramucci (Eastern Tibetans),
and Giglioli, ‘ Notizie sui Danakil,’ in
VOL. I
M
i 62
CUSTOMS AND LAWS AS
a chief does not necessarily involve a power to make laws.
Even kings who are described as autocrats may be as
much tied by custom as is any of their subjects.
The Rejangs of Sumatra do not acknowledge a right in
the chiefs to constitute what laws they think proper, or to
repeal or alter their ancient usages, of which they are extremely
tenacious and jealous.” There is no word in their language
which signifies law, and the chiefs, in pronouncing their deci-
sions are not ^heard to say, So the law directs,” but, Such
is the custom.” ^ According to Ellis, the veneration of the
Malagasy for the customs derived from tradition, or any accounts
of their ancestors . . . influences both their public and private
habits ; and upon no individual is it more imperative than upon
their monarch, who, absolute as he is in other respects, wants
either the will or the power to break through the long-estab-
lished regulations of a superstitious people.” The king ot
Ashanti, although represented as a despotic monarch, is never-
theless under an obligation to observe the national customs
which have been handed down to the people from remote
antiquity, and a practical disregard of this obligation, in the
attempt to change some of the old customs, cost one of the
kings his throne.*^ ‘‘The Africans,” says Mr. Winwood Reade,
with special reference to Dahomey, “ have sometimes their
enlightened kings, as the old barbarians had their sages and
their priests. But it is seldom in the power of the heads of
a people to alter those customs which have been held sacred
from time immemorial.” The Basutos, among whom “the
chiefs have the right of making laws and publishing regula-
tions required by the necessities of the times,” regard such laws,
ov molaos^ as inferior to the mekhoas^ “the use and wont,”
which constitute the real laws of the country.*'* Among the
ancient Irish, there was no sovereign authority competent to
enact a new law, the function of the king being merely, as
chief of the tribal assembly, to see that tlie proper customs
were observed.^
^ Marsden, History of SumabUy p.
217.
” Ellis, History of Madagascar y i.
359 -
^ Beccham, Ashantee and the Gold
Coasty p. 90 sq. Cf. Stuhlmann, Mit
Emin Pascha ins Herz von Afrikuy p.
523 (A-lur).
* Reade, Savage Africa, p. 52 sq.
^ Casalis, Basutos, p. 228.
Ancient Laws of Ireland, iii, p.
Ixxxvi. sq. Cherry, Growth of Criminal
Law, p. 33.
In competition with law, custom frequently carries the
day. In India, especially in the South, custom has
always been to a great extent superior to the written law.”
In the Ramnad case, the Judicial Committee expressly
declared that, ‘‘ under the Hindu system of law, clear
proof of usage will outweigh the written text of the law.”^
It was also a maxim of the Roman jurists that laws may
be abrogated by desuetude or contrary usage and in
modern times the same doctrine is acted upon in Scot-
land.^ Moreover, when a custom cannot abrogate the
law, it may still have a paralysing influence on its execu-
tion. According to the laws of European nations, a man
who has killed another in a duel is to be treated as a
homicide ; yet wherever the duel exists as a custom, the
law against it is ineffective. So it is on the Continent, and
so it was in England in the eighteenth century, when a
well-informed writer could affirm that he had not
found any case of an actual execution in England in
consequence of a duel fairly fought.” ^ In this instance
the ineffectiveness of the law is owing to the fact that the
law has not been able to abolish an old custom. But the
superiority of custom also shows itself in cases where the
law itself is getting antiquated, and a new custom, en-
forced by public opinion, springs up in opposition to it.
Thus, contrary to law and earlier usage, it is nowadays the
custom of certain European countries that a sentence of
death is not carried into execution. Even ‘‘bad habits”
tend to weaken the authority of the law. Probably the
two most prominent civil vices of the Chinese are bribery
and gambling. Against both these vices their penal code
speaks with no uncertain sound ; and yet, according to
^ Burnell, quoted by Nelson, View
of the Hindu Law^ p. 136.
“ IMayne, Treatise on Hindit Law
and Usage ^ p. 41.
• Institutiones, i. 2. ll. Di^csia^
i- 3- 32^-
Mackenzie, Studies in Konian Law^
P- ^54.
Quoted by Bosquett, I'reatise on
Dndling^ p. 80. Cf. A Short Treatise
tipflii the Ff'opricty and Hecessity of
Duellings printed at Bath in 1779.
In 1808, however, Major Campbell
was sentenced to death and executed
for killing Captain Bioyd in a duel
(Storr, ‘ Duel,’ in Encyclopicdia Bri-
tannica^ vii. 5*4)-
M 2
CUSTOMS AND LAWS AS
Professor Douglas, it is no exaggeration to say that if the
law were enforced, it would make a clean sweep of ninety-
nine of every hundred officials in the empire.^ Other
illustrations of the same principle may be found much
nearer home.
Custom has proved stronger than law and religion com-
bined. Sir Richard Burton writes of the Bedouins,
“ Though the revealed law of the Koran, being insufficient
for the Desert, is openly disregarded, the immemorial
customs of the Kazi al-Arab (the Judge of the Arabs)
form a system stringent in the extreme.” ^ So, also, the
Turkomans are ruled, often tyrannised over, by a mighty
sovereign, invisible indeed to themselves, but whose
presence is plainly discerned in the word deb — “ custom,”
“ usage.” Our authority adds : — “ It is very remarkable
how little the ‘ Deb ’ has suffered in its struggle of eight
centuries with Mahommedanism. Many usages, which
are prohibited to the Islamite, and which the Mollahs
make the object of violent attack, exist in all their
ancient originality.” ^
The laws themselves, in fact, command obedience more
as customs than as laws. A rule of conduct which, from
one point of view, is a law, is in most cases, from another
point of view, a custom ; for, as Hegel remarks, “ the
valid laws of a nation, when written and collected, do not
cease to be customs.” '* There are instances of laws that
were never published, the knowledge and administration
of which belonged to a privileged class, and which
nevertheless were respected and obeyed.'"" And among
ourselves the ordinary citizen stands in no need of study-
ing the laws under which he lives, custom being generally
the safe guiding star of his conduct. Custom, as Bacon
said, is “ the principal magistrate of man’s life,” ® or, as
the ancients put it, “ the king of all men.”
^ Doiiglii-s, Society ill China^ p, 82. ^ IJegel, Philosophie des Rechts^*%
Ikuton, Pilgrima^^e to Al-Madinah 21 1, p. 199. ® Japan^ p. 314.
and A/eccah, ii. 87. Bacon, ‘ E.s.say xxxix. Of Custom
^ Vamhery, I'rnvels in Central Asia^ and Kducation,’ in Essays^ p. 372,
p. 2^10 sqq. ^ Herodotus, iii. 38,
Many laws were customs before they became laws.
Ancient customs lie at the foundation of all Aryan law-
books. Mr. Mayne is of opinion that Hindu law is based
upon customs which existed even prior to and independent
of Brahmanism.^ The Greek word voixos means both
custom and law, and this combination of meanings was
not owing to poverty of language, but to the deep-rooted
idea of the Greek people that law is, and ought to be,
nothing more and nothing less than the outcome of national
custom.'^ A great part of the Roman law was founded on
the mores majorum ; in the Institutes of Justinian, it is
expressly said that ‘‘ long prevailing customs, being sanc-
tioned by the consent of those who use them, assume the
nature of Laws.”^ The case was similar with the ancient
laws of the Teutons and Irish.'^
The transformation of customs into laws was not a mere
ceremony. Law, like custom, is a rule of conduct, but,
while custom is established by usage and obtains, in a more
or less indefinite way, its binding force from public opinion,
a law originates in a definite legislative act, being set, as
Austin says, by a sovereign person, or a sovereign body of
persons, to a person or persons in a state of subjection to
its author.''^ By becoming laws, then, the customs were
expressly formulated, and were enforced by a more definite
sanction. It seems that the process in question arose
both from considerations of social utility and from a sense
of justice. Cicero observes that It was for the sake of
equity that “ laws were invented, which perpetually spoke
to all men with one and the same voice. From these
points of view it was neither necessary nor desirable that
more than a limited set of customs should pass into laws.
There are customs which are too indefinite for assuming
the stereotyped shape of law.^ There are others, the breach
1 Mayne, op. cit. p. 4. Austin, Leclurcs on JuHsprudence^
* Ziegler, Social Ethics, p. 30. i. 87, 18 r, &c.
Schmidt, Ethik der altoi Griechen, i. ** Cicero, Dc officiis, ii. 12.
201. ^ Instilutioncs, i. 2. 9. ^ Cf. Aristotle, Et/iica Nico/nachea^
^ Joyce, Social History of Ancient v. 10. 6.
Irehijtd, i, 1 81.
CUSTOMS AND LAWS AS
of which excites too little public indignation, or which are
of too little importance for the public welfare, to be proper
objects of legislation. And there are others which may be
said to exist unconsciously, that is, which are universally
observed as a matter of course, and which, never being
transgressed, are never thought of.
\Laws which are based on customs naturally express
moral ideas prevalent at the time when they are estab-
lished. On the other hand, though still in existence, they
are not necessarily faithful representatives of the ideas of
a later age. Law may be even more conservative than
custom. Though the latter exercises a very preservative
influence on public opinion, it co ipso changes when public
opinion changes. Even among savages, in spite of their
extreme regard for the customs of their ancestors, it is
quite possible for changes to be introduced ; the traditions
of the Central Australian Arunta, for instance, indicate
their own recognition of the fact that customs have varied
from time to time.^ But the legal form gives to an
ancient custom such a fixity as to enable it to survive,
as a law, the change of public opinion and the intro-
duction of a new custom. In all progressive societies,
as Sir Henry Maine observes, social necessities and
social opinion are always more or less in advance of
law. We may come indefinitely near to the closing of
the gap between them, but it has a perpetual tendency
to re-open.” “
The moral ideas of a people are less extensively repre-
sented in its laws than in its customs. This is a corollary
of the fact that there are always a great number of
customs which never become laws. Moreover, whilst law,
like custom, directly expresses only what is obligatory,
it hardly ever deals with merit, even indirectly. The
Chinese have a method of rewarding and commemorating
meritorious and virtuous subjects by erecting gates in their
honour, and conferring upon them marks of public dis-
1 Spencer and Oillen, Native Tribes - Maine, Amient Law, p. 24.
of Central Australia, p. 12 sqij.
tinction ; ‘ and the Japanese and Coreans award prizes in
the form of money or silver cups or monumental columns
to signal exemplars of filial piety, arguing that, if the law
punishes crime, it ought also to reward virtue.^ In Europe
we have titles and honours, pensions for distinguished
service, and the like ; but the distribution of them is not
regulated by law, and has often little to do with morality.
Law, like custom, only deals with overt acts, or omis-
sions, and cares nothing for the mental side of conduct,
unless the law be transgressed. Yet, as will be seen sub-
sequently, though this constitutes an essential difference
between law and the enlightened moral consciousness, it
throws considerable light on the moral judgments of the
unreflecting mind.
Being a general, and at the same time a strictly defined,
rule of conduct, a law can even less than a custom make
special provision for every case so as to satisfy the demand
of justice. This disadvantage, however, was hardly felt
in early periods of legislation, when little account was
taken of what was behind the overt act ; and at later
stages of development, the difficulty was overcome by
leaving greater discretion to the judge. The history of
legal punishments in England, for instance, shows a change
from a system which, except in cases of misdemeanour,
left no discretion at all to judges, to a system under which
unlimited discretion is left to them in all cases except
those which are still liable to capital punishment — practi-
cally, high treason and murder.® The study of law, then,
must for our purpose be supplemented by the study of
judicial practice.
Laws which represent public opinion are no more than
customs safe exponents of the moral ideas held by parti-
cular members of the society. But on the other hand,
there are cases in which a law, unlike a custom, may
express the ideas, or simply the will, of a few, or even of
^ de Groot, Religious System oj ® Stephen, History of the Crhnmal
China (vol. ii. book) i. 769, 789 sq. Law of England^ ii. 87.
Griffis, Corea, p. 236.
i68
CUSTOMS AND LAWS AS
a single individual, that is, of the sovereign power only.
It is obvious that laws imposed upon a barbarous people
by civilised legislators may difFer widely from the people’s
own ideas of right and wrong. For instance, when
studying the moral sentiments of the Teutonic peoples
from their early law-books, we must carefully set aside all
elements of Roman or Christian origin. At the same
time, however, it should be remembered that the moral
consciousness of a people may gradually be brought into
harmony with a law originally foreign to it. If the law is
in advance of public opinion — as Roman law undoubtedly
was in Teutonic countries — it may raise the views of the
people up to its own standard by awaking in them dormant
sentiments, or by teaching them greater discrimination in
their judgments. And, as has been already noticed, what
is forbidden and punished may, for the very reason that
it is so, come to be regarded as wrong and worthy of
punishment.
Finally, a law may enjoin or forbid acts which by
themselves are regarded as indifferent from a moral point
of view. This is, for instance, the case with the laws
which require marriages to be celebrated at certain times
and places only, and which forbid the cultivation of
tobacco in England. Jurists divide crimes into mala in se
and mala quia proliibita. The former would be wrong
even if they were not prohibited by law, the latter are
wrong only because they are illegal.
A law expresses a rule of duty by making an act or
omission which is regarded as wrong a crime, that is, by
forbidding it under pain of punishment. Law does not
in all cases directly threaten ^ with punishment — I say
directly, since all law is coercive, and all coercion at some
stage involves the possibility of punishment. Sanctions,
or the consequences by which the sovereign political
authority threatens to enforce the laws set by it, may
^ “Not every sovereign can make ( I’oJlock, in Jt(risprude7ice and
sure of enforcing his commands; and Ethics^ p. 9 jy. ).
sometimes laws are made without even " CJ. Stej^hen, op, < ii. i, 2.
any great intention of enforcing them ”
have in view either the indemnification of the injured
party, or the suffering of the injurer. In the latter case
the sanctions are called punishments. But, though 'highly
important, the distinction between indemnification and
punishment is not absolute. A person who causes harm
to another would hardly have to pay damages unless
some kind of guilt or quasi-guilt were imputed to him ;
and, on the other hand, punishment may actually consist
in the damages he has to pay. Moreover, the suffering
involved in punishment must be regarded as a kind of
indemnification in so far as it is intended to gratify the
injured party’s craving for revenge. The pleasure of
vengeance, says Bentham, ‘^is a gain; it calls to mind
Samson’s riddle — it is sweet coming out of the terrible, it
is honey dropping from the lion’s mouth.” ^ In cases
where the injured party is allowed to decide whether the
injurer shall be punished some g qj- ^hat punishment
(within certain limits) shalfP jiflicted upon him, it is
obvious that punishment looked upon as a
means of indemnification. I^^vveyer, the fact that such a
privilege is granted to the (injured party indicates the
existence of some degree of sympathetic resentment in the
public. Punishment, in all its forms, is essentially an
expression of indignation in the society which inflicts it.'"^
tience it is of extreme importance for the study of moral
ideas, and calls for our careful consideration.
By punishment I do not understand here every
suffering inflicted upon an offender in consequence of his
offence, but only such suffering as is inflicted upon him in
a definite way by, or in the name of, the society of which
he is a permanent or temporary member. This definition
holds good whatever may be the opinion about the final
object of punishment. Whether its purpose is, or is
supposed to be, either reformation, or determent, or
retribution, its immediate aim is always to cause suffering.
^ Bentham, I'lieory of Leg i slat iou, p. lagen des Sfrafrcchls, p. 4). “ La
309. peine consiste dans une rt^action pas-
- “ Die Miss 1 >il]igini^ isi das Wesenl- sionnelle d’inlensitci gVadiu*e” (Durk-
liche ader Strafe ” (von Bar, /J/e Crund- heiin, Divisioji dn Iravail soe/en/, p. 96).
0 «AP.
1^0 (yUSTOMS AND LAWS AS
We should not' punishment if the reformation of
the criminal wen' attempted, say, by means of hypnotism.
It is a commoi^ opinion that punishment, in this sense
of the word is d social institution of comparatively
modern origin, has sprung fiom, and gradually
superseded, the ‘^^stom of individual or family
revenge This opid^*^*^ seem plausible to the student
of European and l-astern law, but, as we shall see, the
early history of civii*^^*^^ races is apt to give a somewhat
erroneous idea of td^ evolution of punishment. Even
among savages pub'*'^ indignation frequently assumes
that definite shape whi^^*^ constitutes the difference between
punishment and mere dotidemnation. , ,
Savage punishment simply consists in publicly
putting the offender to fhame.
\
In Greenland the assemblies,
which at the same time su . . , n<ttional sports and enter-
tainments. Here “ nith-sc^jof. all sorts
of crimes or breaches of ■ in' order or custom, with the
exception of timse which asta^. ""’f, expiated by dcatli ; by
means of cutting capers and si ^he offender was told of his
faults, and the opposite virtue'^ ^o ‘^1/ who were
present.^ The same institute >s found, with only incidental
differences, among several oth':^'- tribes within and beyond the
Arctic circlc.3 A^id, knowing sensitiveness of these peoples,
we may assume that the punishJ’nont in question is by no means
lenient. In Greenland “it nowl/”'^ ^^PP^'”/ dt^t some
one or other, wounded, perhaps, ^ d'om one of
his kinsfolk, runs away to the mo
days at least.” ^ And Adair, speak''”g
which North American Indians u^'^^ P'^^P’^'
who were guilty of petty crimes, sayf' they would sooner
die by tofture, than renew their t.diame by repeating the
actions.” ^
’ Sec Steinmetz, Fj/ifiologiscke Slii-
dien znr erslen Entwickliuig der Skrafe^
ii. 327 sqq . ; Makarewicz, Evolution de
la p eine^ pasnm.
^ Rink, Eskimo 'Iribes^ p. 24 sq.
Jdern^ Cremland^ pp. 14 1, 150. Cranz,
op. cit, i. 165 sq. ilolm, ‘ Ethnologisk
f-
f Ancrmansalikevne/ in Afed-
Skizze af 1 87.
deUiU am Exploratiom,\\. 128'
iNaiie, Ti
.T 'Eskimo Life., p. 267 sq.
ansen, ij2^^ American
sq._
Adair, Ll ^
Indians, p. 429
In other instances the community as a whole expresses
its indignation by inflicting suffering of a more material
kind upon the culprit.
In certain Australian tribes, when a native for any trans-
gression incurs the displeasure of his tribe, custom compels
him to stand punishment,” as it is called ; that is, he stands
with a shield at a fair distance, while the whole tribe, either
simultaneously or in rapid succession, cast their spears at him.
Their expertness generally enables those who are exposed to
this trial to escape without serious injury, though instances of a
fatal result occasionally occur ; however, there is a certain pro-
priety even in this extraordinary punishment, as the accuracy and
force with which the weapons are thrown will depend very
much on the opinion entertained of the enormity of the offence.^
Among the North- West-Central Queensland aborigines, though
each individual, within certain limits, can do what he pleases,
he has to reckon not only with the particular person injured,
or his relatives, but also, in some cases, with the whole camp
collectively. Thus the camp as a body, as a camp council,
will take upon itself to mete out punishment in crimes of
murder, incest, or the promiscuous use of fighting-implements
within the precincts of the camping-ground : death, and pro-
bably the digging of his own grave, awaits the delinquent in
the former case, while ‘ crippling,’ generally with knives, con-
stitutes the penalty for a violation of the latter.” Again, if
a woman makes herself obnoxious in the camp, especially to
the female portion of it, she is liable to be set upon and ham-
mered” by her fellow-sisters collectively, tlie men on such
occasions not interfering.- Among the Bangerang tribe of
Victoria, any one who had suffered a wrong complained of
it, if at all, at night aloud to the camp, which was silent and
attentive. 'Fhen the accused was heard. Afterwards those
who chose, men or women, expressed their views on the sub-
ject ; and if general opinion pronounced the grievance a good
one, the accused accepted the penalty sanctioned by custom.” ^
Among various tribes in Western Victoria, should a person,
through bad conduct, become a constant anxiety and trouble
^ Hale, 17 . S, Explori} 7 g Expedition.
VoL VI. Ethnography and Philology,
p. 114, Cf. My XQ, /our rials of Expedi-
tions of Disc'07'ery into Central Aus-
tralia, ii. 388 ; Collins, English Colony
in New South Wales, i. 586 ; Brough
Smyth, Aborigines of Victoria, ii. 295.
Roth, Ethnological Studies aviong
the North- West-Central Queensland
Aborigines, pp. 139, 141. Curr, The
Australian Race, i. 61 sq,
^ Curr, Squatting in Victoria, p.
245.
T72
CUSTOMS AND LAWS AS
GHAP.
to the tribe, a consultation is held, and he is put to death,” ^
Among the Mpongwe, if a man murders another, he is put
to death, not by the nearest of kin, but by tlie whole com-
munity, being either drowned or burned alive. ^ Among the
Hudson Bay Eskimo, when a person becomes so bad in
character that the community will no longer tolerate his
presence he is forbidden to enter the huts, partake of food, or
hold any intercourse with the rest. Nevertheless, as long as
he threatens no one’s life, but little attention is paid to him.
Should he be guilty of a murder, several men watch their
opportunity to surprise him and put him to death, usually by
stoniiig. The executioners make no concealment of their action
and are supported by public opinion in the community.”
Among various savage peoples expulsion from the tribe
is the punishment of persons whose conduct excites great
public indignation, and among others such persons are
outlawed-
'Fhe Chippcwyans, among whom “order is maintained in
the tribe solely by public opinion,” the chief having no power
to punish crimes, occasionally expel from the society individuals
whose cojiduct is exceptionally bad and threatens the general
peace, 7"he Salish, or Flathead Indians, sometimes punished
notorious criminals by expulsion from the tribe or band to
which they belonged. Mr. Im Thuni, whilst praising the
Indians of Guiana for their admirable morality as long as they
remain in a state of nature, adds that there are exceptions to
the rule, and that such individuals “ are soon killed or driven
out from their tribe.” ^ Among the Bedouins of the Euphrates,
“ in extreme cases, and as the utmost penalty of the law, the
offender is turned out of the tribe ” ; ^ and the same is the case
among the Beni Mzab.^ In the Scotch Highlands, even to
this day, ijistances are common of public opinion operating as
a punishment, to the extent of forcing individuals into exile.^
7'here are cases reported from various parts of the savage world
of banishment being inflicted as a punishment for sexual
^ Dawson, Australian Aborigines^ p.
76;
" Burton, 7 wo IVips to Gorilla Land,
i. 105.
Turner, ‘ Ethnology of the Ungava
District,’ in Ann. Hep. Jlnr. Eihn. xi.
186.
Ricivarclson, Searching Ex-
pedition., ii. 26 sq.
^ Hale, op. cit. p. 208.
^ Im Thurn, Among the Indians oj
Guiana, p. 213.
^ Blunt, Ecdouin 7 Vibes of the Eu-
phrates, ii. 206.
^ Chavanne, Sahara, p. 315. Tris-
tram, Great Sahara, p. 207.
^ Stewart, Highlanders of Scotland,
p. 380.
EXPRESSIONS OF MORAL IDEAS
*73
offences ; ^ and other instances ot expulsion are mentioned by
Dr. Steinmetz.2 In some cases, however, expulsion is to be
regarded rather as a means of ridding the community from a
pollution, than as a punishment in the proper sense of the
term.^
Nearly related to the punishment of expulsion is that of out-
lawry. Von Wrede states that the Bedouins of Hadhramaut
give a respite of three days to the banislied man, and that after
the lapse of this period every member of the tribe is allowed
to kill him.‘^ Among the Wyandots the lowest grade of out-
lawry consists in a declaration that, if the offender shall con-
tinue in the commission of crimes similar to that of which he
has been guilty, it will be lawful for any person to kill him,
whilst outlawry of the highest degree makes it the duty of any
member of the tribe who may meet with the offender to kill
him.^ Among the ancient Xeutons, also, outlawry was originally
a declaration of war by the commonwealth against an offending
member, and became only later on a regular means of com-
pelling submission to the authority of the courts.^^
Most generally, however, punishment is inflicted upon
the culprit, not by the whole of the community, but by
some person or persons invested with judicial authority.
Indeed, it is not only civilised races who have judges and
courts of justice. Among savages and barbarians justice
is very frequently administered by a council of elders or
by a chiefs Even people of so low a type as the Australian
aborigines have their tribunals.
^ Westermarck, History of Huinan
JMarrtago^ p. 6i stjq.
SLcinnictz, op. cit. ii. ch. 5.
See infra., 011 Homicide,
von Wrede, Keise in Hadhrajnanty
P- 51-
^ J’owcll, ‘ Wyandot Government, in
Ann. Rep. Bur. Eihn. i. 68.
® Pollock and Maitland, History oj
English Law before the Time of Eii-
wara I. i. 49.
^ Petroff, ‘ Report on Alaska,’ in
Tenth Census of the United Statcsy ]>.
152 (Aleuts). Morgan, Leag j(e of the
Iroquois y p. 330. Powell, in Ann. Rep.
Bur. Ethn. i. 63, 66 sq. (Wyandots).
Ideniy ‘ Socioloj^y,’ in American An-
tJiropologisty N.S. i. 706 (North Amer-
ican tribes). Schoolcraft, Indian 'I'ribes
of the United StateSy i. 277 (Creeks),
von Martins, Beitriig' zur Elhnoqraphie
Amerihalfy i. 88 (Brazilian Indians).
Cook, Journal of a J byage round the
World y p. 41 (Tahitians). Lister, in
four. Antlir. hist. xxi. 54 (Bowditch
Islanders). Codrinj^ton, Alclanesiansy
p. 345 (Solomon Islanders). Hunt, in
Jour. Anthr. Inst, xxviii. 6 (Murray
Islanders). Kohler, in Zeitschr.f. vergl.
Rechtszviss. xiv. 448 ; Senfft, in Steiii-
metz, Rechtsverhdltnisscy p. 448 ; Ku-
bary, ‘ Die Kbon^rupjie im Marshall’s
Archijiei,’ in Journal dcs Museiun
Godejfroyy i. 37 (Marshall Islanders).
Ideniy Ethnographische Beitnige zur
R'enntn/ssdi r/\ 'arolinisclien I usclqnmppCy
p. 73 sqq.: Ideiiiy ‘ Die Palau-Inseln,’
in fournal dcs Pluscuin Godefrogy iv.
CUSTOMS AND LAWS AS
c;hap.
Speaking of the native tribes of Central Australia, Messrs.
Spencer and Gillen observe : — ‘‘Should any man breakthrough
the strict marriage laws, it is not only an ‘impersonal power’ which
he has to deal with. The head men of the group or groups
concerned consult together with the elder men, and, if the
offender, after long consultation, be adjudged guilty and the
determination be arrived at that he is to be put to death — a by
no means purely hypothetical case — then the same elder men make
arrangements to carry the sentence out, and a party, which is
called an Ininja^ is organised for the purpose.”^ We hear of
similar councils from various parts of the Australian continent.
In his description of the aborigines of New South Wales, Dr.
Fraser states, “The Australian council of old and experienced
men — this aboriginal senate and witenagemot — has the power
to decree punishment for tribal offences.” The chiefs sit
as magistrates to decide all cases which are brought before
them, such as the divulging of sacred things, speaking to a
mother-in-law, the adultery of a wife ; and there is even a
42 (Pelcw Islanders), von Kotzebue,
Voyage of Discovery^ iii. 208 (Caroline
Islanders). Worcester, Philippine Is-
lands^ p. 107 (Tagbanuas of Palawan).
Marsden, Hisfo)y of Su}}i air p. 21 7
(Rejangs). von Besuch bei den
Kannibalen Sufnatras, p. 21 1 (Batak.s).
Forbes, A NaturaUsP s IVanderings in
the Eastern Archipelago, p 243 (Kubiis
of Sumatra). Man, SonthaUa, p. 88
sq. Cooper, Mishniee Hills^ p. 238.
Maepherson, Alenioriah of Sej'^nce in
India, p, 83 (Kandhs). Stewart, in
Pour, As. Soc. Bengal, xxiv. 609, 620
(Nagas, Old Kukis). Dalton, Eihno-
logy of Bengal, p. 45 (Kukis). Forsyth,
Hi gh lands of Central India, p. 361
(Bygas). Shortt, in Trafis. Etlin. Soc,
N.S. vii. 241 (Todas). Batchelor,
Ainu and their Folk-Lore, p. 278 ; von
Siebold, Die Aino auf der Insel Vesso,
p. 34. P"rom Africa a great number of
instances might be quoted, e.g.: — Nach-
tigal, Sahara und Sudan, i. 449(Tcda)-
Petherick, Egypt, the Soudan-, and
Cefitral Afidca, i. 320 (Nouaer tribes).
Beltrame, II Fiume Bianco, p. 77 (Shil-
luk). Laing, Travels in the Timannee,
tSre. Countries, p. 365 (Soolimas).
Mungo Park, 7 ravels hr the Interior of
Africa, p. 15 sq, (Mandingoes). Lcu-
schner, in Steinmetz, Rcchtsverhal I nisse ,
p. 22 (Bakwiri). Ibid, p. 47 (Banaka
and Bapuku). Tellier, ibid, p. , 175
(Kreis Kita, in the French Soudan).
]k:)sman, Nciv Description of the Coast
of Gziinea, p. 331 (Negroes of Fida).
Casati, I'ezi Years in Equatoria , i. 158,
163 (Akkas, Mambettu). Stuhlmann,
Mit Effiin Base ha ins Herz von Africa,
p. 523 (A-lur). Emin Pasha in Cen-
tral Africa, p. 89 (Wanyoro). Basker-
ville, in Steinmetz, Rccliisverhaltnisse,
p. 193 (Waganda). Beverley, ibid. p.
214 (Wagogo). Lang, ibid. }>. 253 sqq.
( Washambala). Desoignies, ibid. p.
279 sq. (Msalala). Decle, Phree Years
in Savage Africa, pp. 71, 73, 74, 4S7
(Barotse, Wakainba). Junod, Les Ba-
Ronga, p. 155 sqq. Burton, Zanzibar,
ii. 94 (Wanika). llolub, Seven Years
in Soulh Africa, ii. 319 (Marutse).
Kohler, in Zeitschr.f, vergl. Rcchtswiss.
xiv. 316 (llcrero). Andersson, I.ake
Nganii, p. 197 (Ovambo). Rautanen,
in Steinmetz, Rechtsver halt nisse, p.
340 (Ondonga). Kolben, 1 'resent Stale
of the Cape of Good Hope, i. 86, 297
(Hottentots). Kohler, in Zeitschr. f
vergl. Reehtswiss. xv. 333 (Bcchuanas).
Casalis, Baszilos, pp. 224, 226. Mac-
lean, Conipcndimn of Kafir Laws and
Customs, })p. 35, no. Holden, Past
and Fuiitre of the Kajfir Races, pp.
333, 336. Shooter, Kafirs of Natal, p.
99 ry.
^ Spencer and Gillen, op. cit. p. 15.
tribal executioner. At the same time, many grievances are
arranged without the intervention of the chiefs ; for instance,
if a man has been found stealing from his neighbour, or two
men quarrel about a woman, a fight ensues, the one or the other
gets his head broken, and there the matter ends.^ The Nar-
rinyeri have a judgment council of the elders of the clan, called
tendi^ which is presided over by the chief of the clan ; and
when any member of the tendi dies, tlie surviving members
select a suitable man from the clan to succeed him. All
offenders are brought to tin's tribunal for trial. In cases of the
slaying by a person or persons of one clan of the member of
another clan in time of peace, the fellow-clansmen of the mur-
dered man will send to the friends of the murderer and invite
them to bring him to trial before the united tendies. If, after
full inquiry, he is found to have committed the crime, he will
be punished according to the degree of guilt.” Among another
Australian tribe, the Gournditch-mara, again, the headman,
whose office was hereditary, settled all quarrels and disputes
in the tribe. When he had heard both sides, and had given his
decision in a matter, no one ever disputed it.”^
Among the Australian aborigines, then, we find cases in
which punishment is inflicted by the whole community,
and other cases in which it is inflicted by a tribunal or a
chief. There can be little doubt that the latter system has
developed out of the former ; there are obvious instances
of transition from the one to the other. Among the
North- West-Central Queensland natives, for instance, in
cases of major offences, such as murder, incest, or physical
violence, the old men are only said to ‘‘influence” aboriginal
public opinion.'^ It is an inconvenient, and in larger com-
munities a difficult, procedure for the whole group to in-
flict punishments in common, hence the administration of
justice naturally tends to pass into the hands of the
leading men or the chief. But the establishment of
a judicial authority within the society may also have a
different origin. Very frequently judicial organisation
^ Fraser, Aborigines of New South
Wales, p. 39.
Taplin, ‘ Narrinyeri,’ in Woods,
Native Tribes of South Australia, p.
^ Flson rind ITowitt, Kannlaroi and
Auniai, p. 277.
^ Rotli, Ojb. eit. p. 14 1.
CUSTOMS AND LAWS AS
seems to have developed, not out of a previous system
of ]ynch-law, but out of a previous system of private
revenge.
An act of individual or family revenge is by itself, of
course, an expression of private, not of public, feelings — of
revenge, not of moral indignation. But the case is different
with the custom of revenge. We shall see in a following
chapter that blood-revenge is regarded not only as a right,
but, very frequently, as a duty incumbent upon the rela-
tives of the slain person. So, also, revenge may be deemed
a duty in cases where there is no blood-guiltiness. Among
the Australian Geawe-gal tribe, for instance, the offender,
according to the magnitude of his offence, was to receive
one or more spears from men who were relatives of the
deceased person ; or the injured man himself, when he had
recovered strength, might discharge the spears at the
offender. And our authority adds, Obedience to such
laws was never withheld, but would have been enforced,
without doubt, if necessary, by the assembled tribe.” ^ The
obligatory character of revenge implies that its omission
is disapproved of. It is of course the man on whom the
duty of vengeance is incumbent that is the immediate object
of blame, when this duty is omitted ; and the blame may
partly be due to contempt, especially when there is a sus-
picion of cowardice. But behind the public cetisure there is
obviously a desire to see the injurer suffer. Instances may
be quoted in which the society actually assists the avenger,
in some way or other, in attaining his object. Speaking
of the Fuegians, M. Hyades observes: — “Nous avons
entendu parler ddndividus coupables de meurtre sur leur
femme, par exemple, et qui, poursuivis par tout un groupe
de families, finissaient, quelquefois un an ou deux apres
leur crime, par tomber sous les coups des parents de la
victime. II s’agit la plutot d^un acte de justice que d’une
satisfaction de vengeance. Nous devons faire remarquer
en outre que, dans ces cas, le meurtrier cst abandonne de
tons, et qu’il ne pent se soustraire que pendant un temps
^ Fison and llowilt, op. cii. p. zS2.
vii ^ EXPRESSIONS OF MORAL IDEAS
relativement assez court au chatiment qui le menace.” ^
Amongst the Central Eskimo, who have ‘‘no punishment
for transgressors except the blood vengeance,” if a man
has committed a murder or made himself odious by other
outrages, “ he may be killed by any one simply as a
matter of justice. The man who intends to take revenge
on him must ask his countrymen singly if each agrees in
the opinion that the offender is a bad man deserving death.
If all answer in the affirmative he may kill the man thus
condemned, and no one is allowed to revenge the murder.” '
Among the Greenlanders, in cases of extreme atrocity,
the men of a village have been known to make common
cause against a murderer, and kill him, though it other-
wise is the business of the nearest relatives to take re-
venge.’^ It is also noteworthy that, among the crimes
which in savage communities are punished by the com-
munity at large, incest is particularly prominent. The
chief reason for this I take to be the absence of an indi-
vidual naturally designated as the avenger.
Thus public indignation displays itself not only in
punishment, but, to a certain extent, in the custom of
revenge. In both cases the society desires that the offender
shall suffer for his deed. Strictly speaking, the relation-
ship between the custom of revenge and punishment is
not, as has been often supposed, that between parent and
child- It is a collateral relationship. They have a com-
mon ancestor, the feeling of public resentment.
But whilst public opinion demands that vengeance shall
be exacted for injuries, it is also operative in another way.
Though in some cases the resentment may seem to out-
siders to be too weak or too much checked by other
impulses, it may in other cases appear unduly great. As
a matter of fact, we frequently find the practice of revenge
being regulated by a rule which requires equivalence be-
tween the injury and the suffering inflicted in return for
Ilyades and Denikcr, JMlssion " Boas, ‘Central Eskimo,’ in /Inn.
srienti-^iquc du Cap Horn, vii. 240 sq. J\ep. Bur, Elhn. vi. 582.
^ Nansen, Eskimo Life, [). 163.
• VOL. I
N
CUSTOMS AND LAWS AS
it. Sometimes this rule demands that only one life shall
be taken for one sometimes that a death shall be avenged
on a person of the same rank, sex, or age as the deceased;^
sometimes that a murderer shall die in the same manner as
his victim ; ^ sometimes that various kinds of injuries shall
be retaliated by the infliction of similar injuries on the
offender.^ This strict equivalence is not characteristic of
resentment as such.^ There is undoubtedly a certain pro-
portion between the pain-stimulus and the reaction ; other
things being equal, resentment increases in intensity along
with the pain by which it is excited. The more a person feels
offended, the greater is his desire to retaliate by inflicting
counter-pain, and the greater is the pain which he desires to
inflict. But resentment involves no accurate balancing of
suffering against suffering, hence there may be a crying dis-
proportion between the act of revenge and the injuryevoking
it.^’ As Sir Thomas Browne observes, a revengeful mind
“ holds no rule in retaliations, requiring too often a head
for a tooth, and the supreme revenge for trespasses, which
a night’s rest should obliterate.”^ If, then, the rule of
' Krause, Tlinkit-lndiaucr\ p. 245 Al)reu, Canary Islands, j). 27 (abori-
sq. Macfie, Vancottver Island and gines of Ferro).
British Colnnihia, p. 470. Foreman, ^ Im Thurn, r/V. p. 213 .^f/. (Guiana
Philippine Islands, f). 213 (Negrito Indians). Glimpses of the Eastern
and Igorrote tribes in the province of p. 86 (bataks). Arbousset
La Isabela). Low, Sarawak, p. 212 and Dainnas, Eonr to the North-East
(Dyaks). von Langsdorf, Voyages and of the Colony of Good Hope, p. 67
Travels, i. 132 (Nukalnvans). (Mantelis). Munzinger, op, cit, p. 502
^ Travels in the Philippines, (Larea and Kunama). Post, Afrika-
p. 213 (Igorrotes). Blumentritt, (]uote(I nisehe Jnrispn(denz, ii. 27 (various other
by Spencer, Principles of Ethics, i. 370 African peoples), de Abreu, op. f it. p.
sq, (r)uianganes of Luzon). Munzinger, 71 (aborigines of Gran Canaria).
(,bA07/v7;//.s77/ci//r^//V;7,p. 243(Alarea). Cf. I’issot, Le droit pdnal, i. 226;
Kot'an, ii. 173. Steinmetz, Ethnol. Stndien zur ersten
^ von Martins, op. fit. i. 129 (Brazil- Enlzvieklung dcr Strafe, i. 401 ;
ian Indians). Wallace, Travels on the Makarewicz, op, cit. p. 13.
p. 499 (Uaupes). Schoolcraft, von Martins, op. eit. i. 128
Indian Tribes of the United States, iii. (Brazilian aborigines). Calder, in four.
246 (Dacotahs). Stellcr, Kamtschatka, Anthr, Inst. iii. 21 (Tasmanians).
P- 355 - Hickson, A Naturalist in Forbes, A Naturalises Wanderings
North Celebes,^ p. 198 (Sangirese of in the Eastern Archipelago, p. 473
Manganitu). Journal of a Tour (Timorese). Sarasin, Eorschungen auf
ihroui^h Part of the Himdld Mountains, Ceylon, iii. 539 (Veddahs). Jacob*
P- 339 (Butias). Ellis, History of Das Leben der vorisldmischcn Bedui-
Madagascar, i. 371. Munzinger, op. p, 144
fit, p. 502 (Barea and Kunama). de ^ Browne, Christian Morals, iii. 12,
P* 94 *
vn
EXPRESSIONS OF MORAL IDEAS
T79
equivalence is not suggested by resentment itself, this rule
must be due to other factors, which intermingle with re-
sentment, and help, with it, to determine the action. One
of these factors, I believe, is self-regarding pride, the desire
to pull down the humiliating arrogance of the aggressor
naturally suggesting the idea of paying him back in his
own coin ; and It seems probable that the natural disposi-
tion to imitate, especially in cases of sudden anger, acts in
the same direction. But besides this qualitative equiva-
lence between injury and retaliation, the lex talionis requires,
in a rough way, quantitative equivalence, and this demand
has no doubt a social origin. If the offender is a person
with whose feelings men are ready to sympathise, their
sympathy will keep the desire to see him suffer within
certain limits ; and if, under ordinary circumstances, they
tend to sympathise equally with both parties, the injurer
and the person injured, and, in consequence, confer upon
these equal rights, they will demand a retaliation which is
only equal in degree to the offence. By suffering a loss
the offender compensates, as it were, for the loss which he
has inflicted ; and when equal regard is paid to his feelings
and to those of his victim, it is deemed just that the loss
required of him as a compensation should be equivalent to
the loss for which he compensates, anything beyond equiva-
lence being regarded as undeserved suffering. If this ex-
planation is correct, the rule of equivalence must originally
have been restricted to offences within the social group ;
for, according to early custom and law, only members of
the same society have equal rights. In speaking of the
tit-for-tat system prevalent among the Guiana Indians,
Mr. Im Thurn expressly says, Of course all this refers
chiefly to the mutual relations of members of the same
tribe.” ^ And when we find savages acting according to
the same principle in their relations to other tribes, the
reason for this may be , sought partly in the strong hold
which' that principle has taken of their minds, and
partly in the dangers accompanying intertribal revenge,
^ Ini Thurn, op. cit, p. 214.
N 2
i8o CUSTOMS AND LAWS AS chap.
which make it desirable to restrict it within reasonable
limits.
The regulations to which the practice of revenge is
subject, help us to understand the transition from revenge
to punishment, and the establishment of a special judicial
authority. As long as retaliation is in the hands of private
individuals, there is no guarantee, on the one hand, that
the offender will have to suffer, on the other hand, that
the act of retaliation will be sufficiently discriminate.
The injured party may be too weak, or otherwise
unable, to avenge himself. His readiest course, then, is
to appeal to the chief for help. The chief, on his part,
has an interest in interfering — he may of course expect a
handsome reward for his assistance,^ — and, in so far as the
community at large wishes that the offender shall suffer,
the chief may even be bound to interfere. Thus in the
Sandwich Islands, the family or the friends of an injured
person — who in cases of assault or murder were by
common consent justified In taking revenge — used to
appeal to the chief of the district or to the king, when
they were too weak to attack the offender themselves.^
Among the Wanyoro, according to Emin Pasha, should
the murderer escape, the nearest relatives of the murdered
man apply to the chief of the tribe to procure the
punishment of the culprit.® The Indians of Brazil, when
offended, sometimes bring their cause before the chief;
but they do it seldom, since they consider it disgraceful for
a man not to be able to avenge himself.'* The judicial
authority granted to the Basuto chief “ also insures justice
to foreigners, and to individuals who, having no relations,
are deprived of their natural defenders and avengers.” ®
In ancient Greece, in early times, special care was taken by
the State for the protection of the weak and helpless, who
otherwise had been unavenged.'* In the Middle Ages, the
1 Steinmetz, Kechtsverhiiltnisse^ p. p. 86.
31 1. Cf. Brunner, Deutsche Nechts- ^ von Martins, op. at. i. 132.
i^esfhifhte, i. 165. Ca.salis, op. cit. p. 226.
“ 7 our t/irou^Pi //await, p. 42(). ® Leist, Grueo-italische /vechtsoe-
^ Emin 7 *asha in Central Africa, scJiichte, p. 372,
EXPRESSIONS OF MORAL IDEAS
i8i
poor and the weak were placed under the King’s pro-
tection ; the intervention of royal justice, as Du Boys
observes, “ apparaissait comme un bienfait pour les faibles
et un secours pour les opprimes.” ^
Whilst resentment on behalf of injuries inflicted upon
persons who are unable to avenge themselves has thus, to
some extent, contributed towards the establishment of a
central judicial and executive authority, the sympathy natur-
ally felt for the object of an improper and immoderate re-
venge undoubtedly tended to bring about a similar result.
I'he same feeling which checked indiscriminate revenge by
establishing the rule of strict equivalence, restricted it
once more, and in a more effective way, by referring the
case to a judge who was less partial, and more discriminate,
than the sufferer himself or his friends. Speaking of the
feuds of the Teutons, Kemble remarks, “Setting aside the
loss to the whole community which may arise from private
feud, the moral sense of men may be shocked by its
results : an individual’s own estimate of the satisfaction
necessary to atone for the injury done to him, may lead to
the commission of a wrong on his part, greater than any
he hath suffered ; nor can the strict rule of ‘ an eye for an
eye, and a tooth for a tooth,’ be applied where the ex-
action of the penalty depends upon the measure of force
between appellant and defender.” ^ In the island of Bali
the judge steps in between the prosecutor and the person
whom he pursues, “ so as to restrain the indiscriminate
animosity of the one, and to determine the criminality of
the other.” ® Crawfurd, in his account of native customs
in the Malay Archipelago, says that “ the law even
expressly interdicts all interference when there appears a
character of fairness in the quarrel.” A Karen, we are
told, always thinks himself right in taking the law into
his own hands, this being the custom of the country, and
“he is never interfered with, unless he is guilty of some
^ Du Boys, Histoire du droit criminel ^ Raffles, History of Java, ii. p.
de V Espagne, p. 237. ccxxxvii.
Kemble, Saxons in England, i. * Crawfurd, History of the Indian
J268 sq. Archipelago, iii. 120.
i 82
CUSTOMS AND LAWS AS
act contrary to Karen ideas of propriety, when the elders
and the villagers interfere and exercise a check, upon
him.” ^ Among the Basutos the authority of the chief
is stated to be “ sufficiently respected to protect criminated
persons, until their cases have been lawfully examined.”
Among the Californian Gallinomero the avenger of blood
has his option between money and the murderer’s life ;
“ but he does not seem to be allowed to wreak on him a
personal and irresponsible vengeance,” the chief taking
the criminal and executing the punishment.'^
Besides the desire that the offender shall suffer and the
desire that his suffering shall correspond to his guilt, there
is a third factor of importance which has contributed to
the substitution of punishment for revenge and to the rise
of a judicial organisation. For every society it is a
matter of great consct]uencc that there should be peace
between its various members. Though the system of
revenge helps to keep down crime, it also has a tendency
to cause disturbance and destruction. Any act of vengeance
which goes beyond the limits fixed by custom is apt to call
forth retaliation in return. Among the Ossetes, says Baron
von Haxthausen, “ if the retaliation does not exceed the
original injury the affair terminates ; but if the wound
given is greater than the one received, the feud begins
afresh from the other side.” ^ The custom of blood-
revenge certainly does not imply that the avenger of un-
justifiable homicide may himself be a proper object of
retaliation ; but in the absence of a tribunal it may be
^ Mason, in /our. Asialfc Soc, Ben-
gal^ xxxvii. pt. ii. 145. Cf. MacMahon,
Far Cathay and Farther Jndia, p. 188.
“ Casalis, op. cit. p. 226.
Powers, Tribes of California., p.
177.
Taylor, Te Ika a Mam, p. 96
(Maori). Im Ttiurn, op. cit. pp. 213,
330 (Guiana Indians). Purckhardl,
Bedouins andWahabys, p. 84 S(j.; Blunt,
Bedouins of the Fupln-ates, ii. 207 ;
La}?ard, Discoveries in the Ruiifs of
Nineveh and Babylon, p. 305 ‘ sq.
(Bedouins). Kohl, Reise nach Istricn,
i. 409 sq. (Montenegrines). Stephen,
History of the Criminal Law of Ene^-
land, i. 60 (Anglo-Saxons). Nordstrimi,
Svens ka samhalls-l'brfatfningens his-
ioria, ii. 228 (ancient Scandinavians).
Steinmetz, Etlinol. Studien zur ersten
Entxvicklung der Strafe, ii. 125 sqq.
® von Haxthausen, Transcazuasia,
p. 411.
^ Among the ai)origines of Western
Victoria, when life has been taken for
life, the feud is ended (Dawson, op. cit.
p. 7 o)* Among llie Greenlanders, if
the victim of revenge “be a notorious
no easy thing to decide the question of guilt, and, besides,
the dictate of custom may be overruled by passion. As
a matter of fact, the blood-feud often consists of a whole
series of murders, the revenge itself calling forth a new
act of redress, and so on, until the state of hostility may
become more or less permanent.^ In the long run this
will prove injurious both to the families implicated in the
feud and to society as a whole, and some method of putting
a stop to the feud will readily be adopted. One such
method is to substitute the payment of blood-money for
revenge ; another is to submit the cause to an authority
invested with judicatory power. Casalis tells us that the
Basutos are often heard to say, “ If we were to revenge
ourselves, the town or community would soon be dis-
persed ” ; and he adds that the instinctive fear of the
disorders that might arise from the exercise of individual
law has induced them to allow the chief of the tribe a
certain right over the person of every member of the
community."
As may be expected, it is only by slow degrees that
revenge has yielded to punishment, and the private avenger
has been succeeded by the judge and the public executioner
of his sentence. Among many savages the chief is said
to have nothing whatever to do with jurisdiction.'^ Among
uffentkr, or haled for Ills hlotxly deeds,
or if he have no relations, the matter
rests’" ; but more fretiuently the act of
vengeance costs the avenger him.self his
life (Cranz, op. cit. i. 178). Among
the Bedouins, “ if the family of the man
killed should in revenge kill two of the
daintnawy\ or homicide’s family, the
latter retaliate l>y the death of one. If
one only Vjc killed, the affair re.sts there
and all is quiet ; but the quarrel is soon
revived by hatred and revenge ” ( Burck-
hardt, Bedouins and Wahdbys.^ p. 86),
In his book, Das Leben der vot'is-
Idntischen Beduinen, Dr. Jacoby like-
wise obs^irves (p. 144) : - Irrtiimlich ist
die Ansicht, da.ss Blut imnier neues
Blut fordere. War fur einen Getdd-
telen ein Anderer er.schlagen, so gait
die Sache in der Regel damit fiir erledigt
und abgetan.” CJ. Achelis, AJoderne
Vdlkcrkunde., p. 407, n. i.
^ Nekson, ‘ Eskimo aljout Bering
Strait,’ in Ann. Bep. Bur. Eihn. xviii.
293. Miklosich, ‘ Blutrache bei den
Slaven,’ in Denkschriften d. kaiser!.
Akadeniie d. Wissensch. Phil. -hist.
CiassOy Vienna, xxxvi. 132 ; &c.
Ca.salis, op. cit. p. 225. C/. Boyle,
Adventures among the Dyaks of Borneo.,
p. 217 ; Marsden, op. cit. p. 249 sq.
(Rejangs).
^ Keating, Expedition to the Source
of St. Feted s River ^ i. 123 (Potawa-
tomis). Richardson, Arctic Searching
Expedition, ii. 27 (Chippewyans).
Carver, 7 rave/s, p. 259 {Naudowessies).
Dol)rizhofifer, Account of the Abipones,
ii, 103 ; &c.
others he acts merely as an adviser, or is appealed to as an
arbiter ; ^ or the injured party may choose between avenging
himself and appealing to the chief fqr redress;*^ or the
judicial power with which the chief is invested is stated
to be more nominal than reaL*^ It is also interesting to
note that in several cases the injured party or the accuser
acts as executioner, but not as judge.
Thus among some Australian tribes, a man accused of a
serious offence gets a month’s citation to appear before the
tribunal, on pain of death if he disobeys. If he is found guilty
of a private wrong, he is painted white, and made to stand out
at fifty paces in front of the accuser and his friends, all fully
armed. They throw at him a shower of spears and ^bumarangs,’
from which he protects himself with a light shield.” ^ Among
the Aricara Indians of the Missouri, who, for the most part,
punished murder with death, the nearest relative of the mur-
dered man was deputed by the council to act the part of
executioiier.^'’ With reference to the natives of Bali, Raffles
says tliat “ in the execution of the punishment awarded by the
court there is this peculiarity, that the aggrieved party or his
friends are appointed to inflict it.”^ In some parts of Af-
ghanistan, ^Mf the oft’ended party complains to the Sirdar, or if
he hears of a murder committed, he first endeavours to bring
about a compromise, by offering the Khoon Behau, or price of
blood ; but if the injured party is inexorable, the Sirdar lays the
affair before the King, who orders the Gauzy to try it , and, if
the criminal is convicted, gives him up to be executed by the
relations of the deceased.” ^ Among the peoples round Lake
Nyassa and Tanganyika and among the Bantu tribes generally,
“ when a murderer is caught and proved guilty he is given over
^ Lewis and Clarke, Travels to the
Source of the Missouri River, p, 306 S(j,
(Shoshones). I\>wers, 'J'ribes of Cali-
fornia, p. 45 (Karok and Yiirok),
Dunbar, ‘ Pawnee Indians,’ in Magazine
of American History, iv. 261. Ar-
l>ousset and Daiinias, op. cit, p. 67
(Mantetis), Ellis, Yoruba-speaking
Peoples of the Slave Coast, p. 300 (Tshi-
and Ewe-speaking peoples 01 the
African West Coast). Burckhardt,
Bedouins and Wahdbys, pp. 68, 70.
Blunt, op, cit. ii. 232 sq, (Bedouins of
the Euphrates). von Haxthaiisen,
Transcaucasia, p. 415 (Ossetes).
2 Ellis, Tour through Ilazuaii, p.
429. Williams and Calvert, Fiji and
the Fijians, p. 23. Forbes, A Natur-
alisfs Wanderings in the Eastern
Archipelago, p. 473 (Timorese).
Falkner, Description of Patagonia,
p. 123. Andensson, Lake Ngami, p.
231 (Damaras).
Fraser, Aborigines of Nezv South
Wales, p, 40 sq.
Bradbury, Travels in the Interior
of America, p. 168.
Raffles, op. cit. ii. p. ccxxxvii.
^ Elpliinstone, Kingdom of Cxzubul,
ii. 105 sq.
to the relatives of tlic person murdered, who have power to
dispose of him as they choose.” ^ A similar practice prevails
among the Mishmis5‘^ Bataks/^ and Kamchadales.'^ It was also
recognised by early Slavonic,^ Teutonic, and English codes.^'
According to the provisions of a code granted so late as 1231, by
the Abbey of St. Bertin to the town of Arques, when a man was
convicted of intentional homicide, he was handed over to the
family of the murdered person, to be slain by them.'^
But although, in innumerable cases, punishment and
judicial organisation have succeeded a previous system of
revenge, and thus are products of social development,
their existence or non-existence among a certain people is
no exact index to the general state of culture which that
people has attained. Even among low savages we have
noticed instances of punishments which are inflicted by the
community as a whole, as also by special judicial autho-
rities. On the other hand, we are taught by the history of
European and Oriental nations, that the system of revenge
is not inconsistent with a comparatively high degree of cul-
ture.^ We can now see the reason for this apparent anomaly.
In a small savage community, all the members of which are
closely united with each other, an injury inflicted upon one
is readily felt by all. The case may be different in a State
consisting of loosely-connected social components, which,
though forming a political unity, have little communica-
tion between themselves, and take no interest in each
other’s private dealings. And, whilst in the smaller society
public resentment is thus more easily aroused, such a
society also stands in more urgent need of internal peace.
Our assumption that punishment is, in the main, an
expression of public indignation, is opposed to another
theory, according to which the chief object of punish-
ment, not only ought to be, but actually is, or has been,
^ Macdonald, in Jour, Aiiihr, Inst. Wilda, tStrafrcclit der Ger///anen,
xxii. 108. " p. 167. It\x Sa/ita, 68. l.atvs of
* “ Cooper, Mishnico Hills,, p. 238. Cniit, i. 53. Leges Hcnriei L Ixxi. i.
^ von Premier, op. eit. p. 212. ^ Leges vilhe de Arles al> ablate S,
^ Georgi, Russia, iii. 137. Betiini concessee, 28 (d’Achery, Spiel-
^ Macieiowski, Slavische Rechts- legitim, iii. 608}.
geschichte, ii. 127. ^ See infra, on lilood-revenge.
i86
CUSTOMS AND LAWS AS
to prevent crime by deterring people from committing
it. We are even told that punishment, inflicted for such
a purpose, is, largely, at the root of the moral conscious-
ness ; that punishment is not the result of a sense of
justice, but that the sense of justice is a result of punish-
ment ; that, by being punished by the State, certain acts
gradually came to be regarded as worthy of punishment,
in other words, as morally wrong.^
There are certain facts which seem to support the sup-
position that punishment has, to a large extent, been in-
tended to act as a deterrent. We find that among various
semi-civilised and civilised peoples the criminal law has
assumed a severity which far surpasses the rigour of the
lex talionis.
Speaking of the Azteks, Mr. Bancroft observes that ‘^tlie greater
part of their code miglit, like Draco’s, have been written in
blood — so severe were the penalties inflicted for crimes that
were comparatively slight, and so brutal and bloody were tlie
ways of carrying those punishments into execution.” ^ 'phe
punishment of death was inflicted on the man who dressed him-
self like a woman, on the woman who dressed lierself like a
man,'^ on tutors who did not give a good account of the estates
of their pupils,^ on those who carried oft’, or changed, the
boundaries placed in the fields by public authority ; and should
an adulterer endeavour to save himself by killing the injured
husband, his fiite was to be roasted alive before a slow fire, his
body being basted with salt and water that death might not
come to his relief too soon.^^ Nor did the ancient Peruvian code
ccojiomise human suft*ering by proportioning penalties to crimes;
the punishment most commonly prescribed by it was death. ^
The penal code of China, though less cruel in various respects
than the European legislation of the eighteenth century, awards
death for a third and aggravated theft, for defacing the branding
inflicted for former offences,^ and for privately casting copper
coin ; ^ whilst for the commission of the most heinous crimes
^ Ree, Ursprun^ der moj'alischen
Empfinditngen^ P* 45 -W* Eiem^ Ent-
stehiing des Gewissens^ p. 190
Bancroft, Native Races of the Pacific
States y ii. 454.
Clavigero, History of Mexico y i. 358.
^ Ibid. i.
« Ibid. i. 355.
^ Bancroft, op. cit. ii. 465 sq.
^ Garci lasso de la Vega, First Part
of the Royal Covimentaries of the Yncas,
i. 145, 151 sq.
^ Wells Williams, Muhlle Kingdomy
i. 512.
•* I 'a Tsirig Leu LeCy sec. ccclix. p.
397-
the penalty is to be cut into ten thousand pieces,” which
appears to amount, at least, to a licence to the executioner to
aggravate and prolong the sufferings of the criminal by any
species of cruelty he may think proper to inflict.^ In Japan,
before the revolution of 1871, the punishments for crime had
been both rigorous and cruel ; death was the usual punishment,
and death accompanied by tortures was the penalty for aggra-
vated crimes.” According to the Mosaic law, death is inflicted
for such offences as breach of the Lord’s day,^ wizards,^
eating the fat of a beast of sacrifice,^ eating blood, ^ approaching
unto a woman as long as she is put apart for her uncleanness,”
and various kinds of sexual offences.^ The Laws of Manu pro-
vide capital punisJiment for those who forge royal edicts and
corrupt royal ministers 3 ^ for those who break into a royal store-
house, an armoury, or a temple, and those who steal elephants,
Jiorses, or chariots ; for thieves who are taken with the stolen
goods and the implements of burglary ; for cut-purses on the
third conviction ; whilst a wife, who, proud of the greatness of
her relatives or her own excellence, violates the duty which she
owes to her lord, shall be devoured by dogs in a place frequented
by many, and the male offender shall be burnt on a red-hot iron
bed.i’^
Increasing severity has been a characteristic of European
legislation up to quite modern times. Towards the end of the
thirteenth century, the English law knows some seven crimes
which it treats as capital, namely, treason, homicide, arson, rape,
robbery, burglary, and grand larceny ; but the number of capital
offences grew rapid ly.^'^ From the Restoration to the death ot
George III. — a period of 160 years — no less than 187 such
offences, wholly different in character and degree, were added
to the criminal code; and when, in 1837, the punishment of
death was removed from about 200 crimes, it was still left
applicable to exactly the same offences as were capital at the end
of the thirteenth century. Pocket-picking was punishable with
death until the year 1808;^^ horse-stealing, cattle-stealing,
^ Ibid, sec, ccliv. p. 269 n. t
^ Reed, Japan^ i. 323. Thuiiberg,
Travels y iv. 65.
^ Exodtis^ XXX i. 14.
^ Leviticus^ xx. 6.
^ Ibid. vii. 25.
® Ibid. vii. 27.
^ Ibid, xviii. 19.
® Ibid, xviii. 6 sqq.
^ Lazvs of Mann., ix. 232.
Ibid. ix. 280.
Ibid. ix. 270.
Ibid. ix. 277.
Ibid. viii. 371 sq.
Pollock and Maitland, op. cit. ii.
511.
May, Constitutional History oj
England., ii. 595. Mackenzie, Studies
in Kornan lazv, p. 424 sq.
Pike, History of Crime in England.,
ii. 450.
i88
CUSTOMS AND LAWS AS
sheep-stealing, stealing from a dwelling-house, and forgery, until
1832 ; ^ letter-stealing and sacrilege, until 1835 rape, until
1841 robbery with violence, arson of dwelling-houses, and
sodomy, until 1861.'^ And not only was human life recklessly
sacrificed, but the mode of execution was often exceedingly
cruel. In the beginning of the fifteenth century, the Peine
forte et dure^ or pressing to death with every aggravation of tor-
ture, was adopted as a manner of punishment suitable to cases
where the accused refused to plead. ^ Burning alive of female
offenders still occurred in England at the end of the eighteenth
century,^ being considered by the framers of the law as a com-
mutation of the sentence of hanging required by decency.^
Still more cruel was the punishment inflicted on male traitors :
they were first hanged by the neck and cut down before life
was extinct, their entrails were taken out and burned before
their face, then they were beheaded and quartered, and the
quarters were set up in diverse places.^ This punishment con-
tinued to exist in England as late as in the reign of George III.,
and even then Sir Samuel Romilly, the great agitator against its
continuance, brought upon himself the odium of the law officers
of the Crown, who declared that he was breaking down the
bulwarks of the Constitution.” ^ Such cruelties were not
peculiar to the English. On the contrary, as Sir James Stephen
observes, though English people, as a rule, have been singularly
reckless about taking life, they have usually been averse to the
infliction of death by torture.^^ In various parts of the Continent
we find such punishments as breaking on the wheel, quartering
alive, and tearing with red-hot pincers, in use down to the end
of the eighteenth century.
It is interesting to compare these punishments with
those practised among savages. Wanton cruelty is not a
general characteristic of their public justice.
^ IhuL ii. 451. Stephen, History of
the Criminal Law of Engiand, i. 474.
“ Pike, op. cit. ii. 451. Stephen, op.
cit. i. 474.
Stephen, op. cit. i. 475.
^ Ibid. i. 475.
® P'or the manner in which this tor-
ture was inflictecl, see Andrews, Ctd^
Time Pitttis /intents^ p. 203 sq.
^ Ibid. p. 198. Stephen, op. cit. i.
477 -
^ Andrews, op. cit. p. 192.
^ I lolin-shed, Chronicles oj England^
C>~c. i. 310. Thomas Smith, Common-
wealth of Engl a 7 id^ p. 198.
Andrews, op. cit. p. 203. An
earlier method of punishing traitors was
boiling to death, which was adopted
by Henry VIII. as a punishment for •
poi.soners as well (Holinshed, op. cit.
1. 31 1).
Stephen, op. cit. i. 478. Cf
Thomas Smith, op. cit. p. 193 sq'.
Vll
EXPRESSIONS OF MORAL IDEAS
Among several uncivilised peoples capital punishment is said
to be unknown or almost so.^ Among others it is restricted to
a few particularly atrocious offences. Among the Greenlanders
none are put to death but murderers, and such witches as arc
thought to have killed some one by their art.” The Aleuts
punished with death murderers and betrayers of community
secrets.^ In Samoa and New Guinea murder and adultery
are punished capitally ; ^ among the Bataks, open robbery and
murder, provided that the offender is unable to redeem his
life by a sum of money among the Kukis, only treason or
an attempt at violence on the person of the King.^ Among
tlie Misliinis, adultery committed against the consent of the
husband is punished with death, but all other crimes, including
murder, are punished by fines ; however, if the amount is not
forthcoming, the offender is cut up by the company assembled."
In Kar Nicobar the only cause for a ‘‘death penalty” that
Mr. Distant could discover was madness.® Among the Soolimas
“murder is the only crime punishable with death.” Among
the Congo natives “ the only capital crimes are stated to be
those of poisoning and adultery.” Of the kingdom of Fida
Bosnian writes, “Here are very few capital crimes, which are
only murthers, and committing adultery with the King’s or his
great men’s wives.” Among the Wanika two crimes are
visited with capital punishment — murder and an improper use
of sorcery ; among the Wagogo^® and Washambala,^^ witch-
craft only. Among the Basutos every murderer is by law
liable to death, but the sentence is generally commuted into
confiscation ; an incorrigible thief sometimes pays with his
head, but is generally fined, whereas treason and rebellion
against authority are treated with more severity. Among the
Kafirs, cases of assault on the persons of wives of the chiefs,
^ von Siel)()ld, EtJinol. Studien liber
die Ai/io auf Yesso, [). 35 ; Batchelor,
Aiiui and their Eolk-i.ore p. 284.
Dalton, op. cit. p. 115 (Kakhyens).
Marsden, op. cit. p. 248 (Rejangs of
Sumatra). Riedel, Ee slnik- en
kroesharige rasse 7 t tnsschen Seiches en
Papua., p. 103 (Serangese). Worcester,
op. cit. pp. 413, 492 (Mangyans and
Tagbanuas). Kubary, ‘ Die Palau-
Inseln,’ va Journal des Museum Godef-
froy, iv. 42 (Pelew Islanders), de
Abreu, ap. cit. p. 152 (Canary Islanders).
Vx\K.?>(A\, Die Eingeborenen Sud-Afrikds,
p. 322 (Hottentots).
2 Cranz, op. cit. i. I 77 *
^ Petroff, loc. cit. p. 152.
^ Turner, Samoa, [). 178. Clialniers,
Pioneering in New Guinea, j). 179.
Marsden, op. cit. p. 389.
Dalton, op. cit. p. 45, Stewart, in
Tour. As. Soc. Bengal, xxiv. p. 627.
7 Griffith, ibid. vi. 332.
^ Distant, in Jour. Anthr. Inst. iii. 6.
^ Laing, Travels, p. 365.
Tucker, Expedition to Explore the
River Zaire, p. 383.
Bosman, op. cit. p. 331.
New, op. cit. p. III.
Beverley, in Steininetz, Rechlsvcr-
hiiltnisse, p. 215.
Lang, ibid. p. 259.
Casalis, op. cit. p. 228.
CUSTOMS AND LAWS AS
ajid what are deemed aggravated cases of witchcraft, are the
only crimes which usually inv^olve the punishment of death,
very summarily inflicted ; whereas this punishment seldom
follows even murder, when committed without the supposed aid
of supernatural powers.^
Nor, as it seems, is savage justice fond of torturing its victims
before they are killed. The Maoris exclaimed loudly against
the English method of executing criminals, first telling them
that they are to die, then letting them lie for days and nights
in prison, and finally leading them slowly to the gallows, If
a man commits a crime worthy of death,” they said, we shoot
him, or chop off* his head ; but we do not tell him first that we
are going to do so.” ^ Dr. Codrington gives the following
description of the cases of burning persons alive which have
occasionally happened in Pentecost Island : — ‘‘ In fighting time
there, if a great man were very angry with the hostile party,
he would burn a wounded enemy. When peace had been made,
and the chiefs had ordered all to behave well that tlie country
might settle down in quiet, if any one committed such a crime
as would break up the peace, such as adultery, they would tie
him to a tree, heap fire-wood round him, and burn him alive, a
proof to the opposite party of their detestation of his wicked-
ness. This was not done coolly as a matter of course in tlie
execution of a law, but as a horrible thing to do, and done for
the horror of it ; a horror renewed in the voice and face of the
native who told me of the roaring flames and shrieks of agony,”
This story is not without interest when compared with the
cold-blooded burning of female criminals and women suspected
of witchcraft in Christian Europe.
There is sufficient evidence to show that the severe
punishments adopted by peoples of a higher culture have
been regarded by them as beneficial to society. The legis-
lators themselves often refer to the deterrent effects of
punishment.
The Peruvian Incas considered that light punishments gave
confidence to evil-doers, whilst through their great care in
punishing a man’s first delinquency, they avoided the effects of
his second and third, and of the host of others that are com-
mitted in every commonwealth where no diligence is observed"
^ Maclean, Compendium of Kafir ^ Yale, Account of New Zealand^ p.
Laws and Customs^ p. 35 105.
^ Codrington, op, cit, p. 347.
EXPRESSIONS OF MORAL IDEAS
to root up the evil plant at the commencement,” ^ According
to the Prefatory Edict of the Emperor Kaung-hee, published
in 1679, the chief ends proposed by the institution of punish-
ments in the Chinese Empire have been to guard against
violence and injury, to repress inordinate desires, and to secure
the peace and tranquillity of an honest and unoffending com-
munity.” ^ In the Laws of Mami punishment is described as a
protector of all creatures : — If the king did not, without
tiring, inflict punishment on those worthy to be punished, the
stronger would roast the weaker, like fisli on a spit ; the crow
would eat the sacrificial cake and the dog would lick the sacrifi-
cial viands, and ownership would not remain with any oiie, the
lower ones would usurp the place of the higher ones. The
whole world is kept in order by punishment, for a guiltless
man is hard to find ; through fear of punishn'ent the whole
world yields the enjoyments which it owes.”'^ Even the gods,
the Danavas, the Gandharvas, the Rakshasas, the bird and snake
deities, give the enjoyments due from them only if they are
tormented by the tear of punishment.'^ In mediaeval law-books
determent is frequently referred to as an object of punishment.^
And in more modern times, till the end of the eighteenth cen-
tury at least, the idea that punishment should inspire fear was
ever present to the minds of legislators.
The same idea is also conspicuous in the practice of
punishing criminals in public.^’ A petty thief in the
pillory and a scold on the cucking-stool were, in earlier
times, spectacles familiar to everybody, whilst persons still
living remember seeing offenders publicly whipped in the
streets. “ A gallows or tree with a man hanging upon
it,” says Mr. Wright, '' was so frequent an object in the
country that it seems to have been almost a natural
ornament of a landscape, and it is thus introduced by no
' Garcilasso de la Vega, op. cit. i.
^ 7(2 Tsuiii Iaui I.e(\ p, Ixvii.
^ Laivs of Manu^ vii, 14, 15, 20-22,
24 sq.
^ Ibid. vii. 23.
® Leges Bttrgundionu}?/, Leges (nin-
'•del>ati, 52 : “ Reclius enim paucorum
conderripnatione mulliUido corregitur,
quam sub specie incongniae civilitatis
intromittaUir occasio, quae licentiam
tribuat delinquendi,” Capitulare Aiptis-
gran 02 sc An. 802, 33 : “ Sed taliter hoc
corripiantur, ut caeteri metuin habeant
talia perpetrandi” (Migne, Patrologiic
cursfis, xcvii. 230). Chlotar II. Edictum
de Synodo Parisiensi 24 : “ In ipsum
capitali senLcntia judiceUir, qualiter alii
non debeantsimiliaperpetrare ” (Migne,
op. cit. Ixxx. 454). For other instances,
see Brunner, Deutsche Rcchtsgcschichte.
ii. 588, n. 6.
^ Giinther, Die Idee der Wiederver-
gcltuftg, i. 21 1 sq. n. 31,
CUSTOMS AND LAWS AS
means uncommonly in mediasval manuscripts.” ^ I
atrocious cases it was usual for the court to direct the
murderer, after execution, to be hung upon a gibbet in
chains near the place where the fact was committed,
“ with the intention of thereby deterring others from
capital offences ” ; and in order that the body might all
the longer serve this useful purpose, it was saturated
with tar before it was hung in chains.” The popularity
which mutilation as a punishment enjoyed during the
Middle Ages was largely due to the opinion, that “a
malefactor miserably living was a more striking example
of justice, than one put to death at once.” ®
We shall now consider whether these facts really
contradict our thesis that punishment is essentially an
expression of public indignation.
It may, first, be noticed that the punishment actually
inflicted on the criminal is in many cases much less severe
than the punishment with which the law threatens him.
In China the execution of the law is, on the whole,
lenient in comparison with its literal and fr'ma facie in-
terpretation.''^ “ Many of the laws seem designed to
operate chiefly in terrorem^ and the penalty is placed
higher than the punishment really intended to be inflicted,
to the end that the Emperor may have scope for mercy,
or, as he says, ‘ for leniency beyond the bounds of the
law.’ ” '' In Europe, during the Middle Ages, malefactors
frequently received charters of pardon, and in later times
it became a favourite theory that it was good policy, in
framing penal statutes, to make as many oflisnees as
possible capital, and to leave to the Crown to relax the
severity of the law. In England, about the beginning of
the .nineteenth century, the punishment of death was
actually inflicted in only a small proportion of the cases in
^ Wright, History of Domestic Alan- Chains/ in llie Antiquary ^ xxii. 2131^.
ners and Sentiments in England during ^ Strutt, View of the AJanners^ fsfe.
the Middle Ages, p. 346. of the Inhabitants of England, ii. 8.
I l.t>linshcd, op. cit. i. 31 1. Black- ^ Staunton, in his rrcface to Ta
stone, Commentaries on the Laius of Tsing Leu Lee, p. xxvii. sq.
England, iv. 201. Cox, ‘ Hanging in ® Wells Williams, op. eit. id 392 sq.
EXPRESSIONS OF MORAL IDEAS
^93
MI
nich sentence was passed ; indeed, ‘‘ not one in twenty of
,he sentences was carried into execution.”^ This dis-
crepancy between law and practice bears witness, not only
to the extent to which the minds of legislators were
swayed by the idea of inspiring, fear, but to the limitation
of determent as a penal principle. It has been ob-
served that the excessive severity of laws hinders their
execution. Society revolted against barbarities which
the law prescribed. Men wronged by crimes, shrank
from the shedding of blood, and forbore to prosecute :
juries forgot their oaths and acquitted prisoners, against
evidence: judges recommended the guilty to mercy.” ^
Yet, in spite of all such deductions, there can be no doubt
that the hangman had plenty to do. Hanging persons,
says Mr. Andrews, was almost a daily occurrence in the
earlier years of the nineteenth century, ‘‘ for forging
notes, passing forged notes, and other crimes which we
now almost regard with indifference.”'^
Another circumstance worth mentioning is, that in
earlier times the detection of criminals was much rarer and
more uncertain than it is now.^ It has been argued on
utilitarian grounds that, to enable the value of the punish-
ment to outweigh that of the profit of the offence, it must
be increased, in point of magnitude, in proportion as it falls
short in point of certainty.” But the rareness of detection
would also for purely emotional reasons tend to increase
the severity of the punishment. When one criminal
out of ten or twenty is caught, the accumulated indigna-
tion of the public turns against him, and he becomes a
scapegoat for all the rest.
However, the chief explanation of the great severity
of certain criminal codes lies in their connection with
despotism or religion or both.^ An act which is pro-
^ Stephen, op, cit. i. 471. May, op. ^ Bentham, Principles of Morals and
}^t. ii. 597. ‘ Legislation,, p. 184. Cf, Paley, Moral
2 May; op. cit. ii. 597. and Political Philosophy,, vi. 9 {Coni-
3 Andrews, op. cit. p. 218. Cf. pUte Works, ii. 371).
Olivecrona, Om dikisstraffet, p. x. ^ Tliis has been previously pointed
^ Cf. M orrison , Crime and its Causes, out by Ihof. Durkheim, in his interest-
p. 175. ing essay, ‘ Deux lois de revolution
VOL. I O
CUSTOMS AND LAWS AS
hibited by law may be punished, not only on account
of its intrinsic character, but for the very reason that
it is illegal. When the law is, from the outset, an
expression of popular feelings, the severity of the
penalty with which it threatens the transgressor depends,
in the first place, on the public indignation evoked by
the act itself, independently of the legal prohibition of
it. But the case is different with laws established by
despotic rulers or ascribed to divine lawgivers. Such
laws have a tendency to treat criminals not only as
offenders against the Individuals whom they injure or
against society at large, but as rebels against their
sovereign or their god. Their disobedience to the will of
the mighty legislator incurs, or is supposed to incur, his
anger, and is, in consequence, severely resented. But
however severe they be, the punishments inflicted by the
despot on disobedient subjects are not regarded as mere
outbursts of personal anger. In the archaic State the
king is an object of profound regard, and even of religious
veneration. He is looked upon as a sacred being, and
his decrees as the embodiment of divine justice. The
transgression of any law he makes is, therefore, apt to
evoke a feeling of public indignation proportionate to the
punishment which he pleases to inflict on the transgressor.
Again, as to acts which are supposed to arouse the anger
of invisible powers, the people are anxious to punish
them with the utmost severity so as to prevent the divine
wrath from turning against the community itself. But the
fear which, in such cases, lies at the bottom of the
punishment, is certainly combined with genuine indignation
against the offender, both because he rebels against God
and religion, and because he thereby exposes the whole
community to supernatural dangers.
penalc ’ aniit^e sociohgiqtie, iv. [1899- proiiycr qiie, tlan.s tons ou prcstjue tons
1900J, p. 64 jt/ty. ), with which I became les Ktats d’Enrope, les peines oiU di-
acqiiainled only when the pre.scnt chap- miniie ou augmente a mesiirc qu’on
ter was already in type. Montesquieu s’est plus approche ou plus eloigne de
observes [De resprit des lois^ vi. 9 la libcrte,”
\<EiivreSy p. 231]), “II serait ais^ de
vil
• EXPRESSIONS OF MORAL IDEAS
^95
Various facts might be quoted in support of this
explanation. Whilst the punishments practised among
the lower races generally, are not conspicuous for their
severity, there are exceptions to this rule among peoples
who are governed by despotic rulers.
Under the AsJianti code, even the most trivial offences are
punishable with death. ^ In Madagascar, also, death was
formerly inflicted for almost every offence.” ^ In Ugajida the
ordinary punishments were death by fire, being hacked to
pieces by reed splinters, fine, imprisonment in the stocks mvubay
or in the slove fork kaligOy also mutilation. It is most common
to see people deprived of an eye, or in some cases of botli eyes ;
persons lacking their ears are also frequently met with.” ^
Among the Wassukuma, whose chieftains used to have power
of life and death over their subjects, a person who was guilty
of disobedience to his ruler, or of some action which the ruler
considered wicked and punishable, was condemned to death.
In the Sandwich Islands, a chief takes the life of one of his
own people for any offence he may commit, ajid no one thinks
he has a right to interfere.”
In the old monarchies of America and Asia there was
an obvious connection between the punishments prescribed
by their laws and the religious-autocratic form of their
governments. According to Garcilasso de la Vega, the
Peruvians — among whom the most common punishment
was death — maintained ‘‘ that a culprit was not punished
for the delinquencies he ha^d committed, but for having
broken the commandment of the Ynca, who was respected
as God,” and that, viewed in this light, the slightest
offence merited to be punished with death. In China
the Emperor “ is regarded as the vice-gerent of heaven,
especially chosen to govern all nations, and is supreme in
everything, holding at once the highest legislative and
executive powers, without limit or control.”' According
^ Ellis, 7 'ski-s/>eaking Peoples of the
aphl Coast, p. 1 66.
“ 'Ellis, History of Madayasear, i.
374*
^ Ashe, Ttvo Kings of Uganda, p.
293. Cf Wilson and FCkiu, Uganda
a^td the Egyptian Soudan, i. 201.
Kolljnann, I'ictoria Nyanza, p.
® Ellis, Tour through IKnvaii, p.
431-
^ Garcilasso de la Vega, op. cit. i.
^ Wells Williams, op. at, i. 393.
O 2
CUSTOMS AND LAWS AS
to ancient Japanese ideas, “ the duty of a good Japanese
consists in obeying the Mikado, without questioning
whether his commands are right or wrong. The Mikado
is god and vicar of all the gods, hence government and
religion are the same.” ^ In Rome the criminal law,
which for a long time was characterised by great modera-
tion,- gradually grew more severe according as absolutism
made progress. Sylla, the dictator, not only put thousands
of citizens to death by proscription without any form of
trial, but fixed, in the Cornelian criminal code, for heinous
offences the punishment called aqu,c et ignis interdictio.
Under the Emperors some new and cruel capital
punishments were introduced, such as burning alive and
exposing to wild beasts ; whilst at the same time offences
such as driving away horses or cattle were made capital.'^
In mediaeval and modern Europe the increase of the royal
power was accompanied by increasing severity of the penal
codes. Every crime came to be regarded as a crime
against the King. Indeed, breach of the King’s peace
became the foundation of the whole Criminal Law of
England ; the right of pardon, for instance, as a preroga-
tive of the Crown, took its origin in the fact that the
King was supposed to be injured by a crime, and could
therefore waive his remedy And the King was not only
regarded as the fountain of social justice, but as the
earthly representative of the heavenly lawgiver and judge.®
Of the connection between punishment and the belief
in supernatural agencies many instances are found already
in the savage world.*’ The great severity with which cer-
^ Griffis, Religions of Japan ^ p. 92. dcs dcutschcii peinlichen Rechts^ ii. 310.
Cf Idem, Mikado s Empire, p. 100. Abegg, Die verse hiede^ien Strafrechts-
- Cf. Livy, X. 9; Polybius, vi. 14; theoricen, p. 117. Du Boys, Histoire
Gil)l)on, History of the Decline and dn droit criminel de P Espaggie, 323,
Rail of the Roman Empire.^ v. 318, ^ Steinmetz, EthnoL Studien zur
326. ersten EntwickUiny der Strafe, ii. 340
Studies i}i Roman Laiv, sq. The connection Ifctwecn punish-
pp. 408, 409, 414. Gibbon, op. cit. v. inent and religion has been etnj)hasi.sed*
320. Cf. Momm.scn, Roniisches Straf- hy {Division dtt trainiil
recht, p, 943. social, p. 97 sqq.) and M. Mauss (‘La
Cherry, Growth of Criminal Law religion et Ics origines da droit penal,’
in Ancient Communities, pj). 68, 105. in Revue de P histoire des religions, vols.
^ Plenke, Gritndriss einer Geschichte xxxiv. and xxxv.). But Prof. Durkheim *
vir . EXPRESSIONS OF MORAL IDEAS
tain infractions of custom are punished has obviously a
superstitious origin. In Polynesia, according to Ellis,
“ the prohibitions and requisitions of the tabu were
strictly enforced, and every breach of them punished
with death, unless the delinquents had some very powerful
friends who were either priests or chiefs.” ^ Among the
western tribes of Torres Straits, “death was the penalty
for infringing the rules connected with the initiation period,
i.e., for sacrilege.” ^ Among the Port Lincoln aborigines
the women and children are not allowed to see any of the
initiation ceremonies, and “ any impertinent curiosity on
their part is punishable with death, according to the
ancient custom.”® Among the Masai, who believe that
the boiling of milk will cause the cows to run dry, “ any
one caught doing so can only atone for the sin with a
fearfully heavy fine, or, failing that, the insult to the holy
cattle will be wiped out in his blood.” ^ The penalty of
death which is frequently imposed on incest or other sexual
offences is largely due to the influence of religious or
superstitious beliefs.® And in various cases of sacrilege
the offender is offered up as a sacrifice to the resentful
god.®
According to Hebrew notions, it is man’s duty to
avenge offences against God ; every crime involves a
breach of God’s law, and is punishable as such, and hardly
any punishment is too severe to be inflicted on the
ungodly. These ideas were adopted by the Christian
Church and by Christian governments.® The principle
cxaggcrate.s the importance of this con- Kilinia-njaro Expedition^
nection by assuming (p. 97) that ‘Me p. 425,
droit penal a I’origine etait essenticlle- ® See infra, on Sexual Morality,
ment religieux.” ^ See infra, on Human Sacrifice.
^ Ellis, Tour through Hawaii, p. ^ Cf Robertson Smitli, Religion of
394. Cf Olmsted, Jncidenis of a the Semites, p. 162 sq,
Whalmg Voyage, p. 248 sq. ; Maii.ss, ® von Kicken, Gcschichte iind System
in op. cit. XXXV. 55. der mittelalter/iihen IVeltanschauung,
Haddon, ^Ethnography of the p. 563 sqq. Abegg, op. cit. p. Ill sq.
Western Tribes of Torres Straits,’ in Strafrecht der Germanen,
four. Anthr. Inst. xix. 335 « sq. Gunther, e/. c/A ii. 12 sqq. Henke,
^ Schiirmann, ‘ Aboriginal Tribes of op. cit, ii. 310 sq. Brunner, op. cit. ii.
Port Lincoln,’ in Woods, Native Tribes 587.
of South Australia, p. 234.
CUSTOMS AND LAWS AS
. CHAP.
Stated in the Laws of Cnut, that “ it belongs very rightly
to a Christian king that he avenge God’s anger very
deeply, according as the deed may be,”'^ was acted upon
till quite modern times, and largely contributed to the
increasing severity of the penal codes. It was therefore
one of the most important steps towards a more humane
legislation when, in the eighteenth century, this principle
was superseded by the contrary doctrine, “ II faut faire
honorer la Divinite, et ne la venger jamais.” ^
From the fact, then, that crimes are punished not only
as wrongs against individuals, but as wrongs against the
State, and, especially, as wrongs against some despotic or
semi-divine lawgiver, or against the Deity, it follows that
even seemingly excessive punishments may, to a large
extent, be regarded as manifestations of public resentment.
TJiis emotion does not necessarily demand like for like.
The law of talion presupposes equality of rights ; it is not
applicable to impersonal offences, nor to offences against
kings or gods. And as the demands of public resentment
may exceed the lex talioniSy so they may on the other hand
fall short of it. Moreover, though the degree of punishment
on the whole more or less faithfully represents the degree of
indignation aroused by any particular crime in comparison
with other crimes belonging to the same penal system, we
must not take the comparative severity of the criminal
laws of different peoples as a safe index to the intensity of
their reprobation of crime. As we have seen before, the
strength of moral indignation cannot be absolutely mea-
sured by the desire to cause pain to the offender. When
the emotion of resentment is sufficiently refined, the in-
fliction of suffering is regarded as a means rather than as
an end.
By all this I certainly do not mean to deny that
punishment, though in the main an expression of public
indignation, is also applied as a means of deterring fron\
crime. Criminal law is preventive, its object is to forbid and
' l.aiui of Omit, ii. 40. ^ Montesquieu, De. Fesfrit des lois,
xii. 4 ( Gitivt'es^ p. 282).
vn , EXPRESSIONS OF MORAL IDEAS
to warn, and it uses punishment as a threat. But the acts
which the law forbids are, as a rule, such as public opinion
condemns as wrong, and it is their wrongness that in all
ages has been regarded as the justification of the penalties
to which they are subject. It is true that there are in-
stances in which the law punishes acts which in themselves
are not apt to evoke public resentment, and others in
which the severity of the punishment does not exactly
correspond with the resentment they evoke. The State
may have a right to sacrifice the welfare of individuals in
order to attain some desirable end. It may have a right
to do so in cases where no crime has been committed, it
would therefore seem to be all the more justified in doing
so when the evil has been preceded by a warning. And
yet, in the case of punishment, it is only within narrow
limits that such a right is granted to the State. To punish
a person could not simply mean that he has to suffer for
the benefit of the society ; there is always opprobrium
connected with punishment. Hence the scope which
justice leaves for determent pure and simple is not wide.
Sir James Stephen observes : — “ You cannot punish anything
which public opinion, as expressed in the common practice
of society, does not strenuously and unequivocally con-
demn. To try to do so is a sure way to produce gross
hypocrisy and furious reaction.” ' Experience shows that
the fate of all disproportionately severe laws which make
too liberal use of punishment as a deterrent is that they
come to be little followed in practice and are finally
annulled. As Gibbon says, “ whenever an offence in-
spires less horror than the punishment awarded to it, the
rigour of penal law is obliged to give way to the common
feelings of mankind.”
Numerous data, to be referred to in following chapters,
will show how faithfully punishment reflects the emotion
of resentment, and how impossible it would be to explain
*it from considerations of social utility without close refer-
' Stephen, Liberty^ Equality^ Fra- Romisches Strafrecht^ P* 9 ^
ternity^ p. 159. Cf. Mommsen,
CUSTOMS AND LAWS AS
ence to the feeling of justice. Why, for instance, should
the attempt to commit a crime, when its failure obviously
depends on mere chance, be punished less severely than
the accomplished crime, if not because the indignation it
arouses is less intense Would not the same amount of
suffering be requisite to deter a person from attempting
to murder his neighbour as to deter him from actually
committing the murder ? And is there any reason to
suppose that the unsuccessful offender is less dangerous
to society than he who succeeds? All the facts referring
to criminal responsibility, as we shall see, suggest resent-
ment, not determent, as the basis of punishment, and
so does the gradation of the punishment conformably
to the magnitude of the crime. ^ According to the
principle of determent, as expressed by Anselm von
Feuerbach and others, punishment should be neither more
nor less severe than is necessary for the suppression of
crime.'^ But if this rule were really acted upon, the
penalties imposed, especially on minor offences, which the
law has been utterly unable to suppress, would certainly
be much less lenient than they actually are. Moreover,
if there were no intrinsic connection between punishment
and resentment, how could we explain the predilection of
early law for the principle of talion — an eye for an eye, a
tooth for a tooth, a life for a life — ® which, as we have
seen, so frequently regulates the custom of revenge ?
The criminal law of a society may thus, on the whole,
be taken for a faithful exponent of moral sentiments
prevalent in that society at large. The attempt to make
law independent of morality, and to allot to it a kingdom
of its own, is really, I think, only an excuse for the moral
shortcomings which it reveals if scrutinised from the
standpoint of a higher morality. Law does not show us
the moral consciousness in its relinement. But refinement
^ Cf, Durkheiin, Division du travail von Gizycki, Introduction to the Study
social, p. 93 jv/. of Ethics^ p. i88.
- von Feuerbach, Ueher die St 7 ‘afe ^ On this subject, see Gunther, op,
als Sicherimgsmittel vor kiinftigen Be- cit. passim,
leidigungen des Verbrechers^ p. 83.
VII ^ EXPRESSIONS OF MORAL IDEAS
is a rare thing, and criminal law is in the main on a level
with the unreflecting morality of the vulgar mind. Philo-
sophers and theorisers on law would do better service to
humanity if they tried to persuade people not only that
their moral ideas require improvement, but that their laws,
so far as possible, ought to come up to the improved
standard, than they do by wasting their ingenuity in
sophisms about the sovereignty of Law and its independence
of the realm of Justice.
Chapter VIII
THE GENERAL NATURE OF THE SUBJECTS OF
ENLIGHTENED MORAL JUDGMENTS
The subjects of moral judgments call for a very com-
prehensive investigation, which will occupy the main part
of this work. As already said, we shall first discuss the
general nature, and afterwards the particular branches, of
those phenomena which have a tendency to evoke moral
condemnation or moral praise ; and in each case our inves-
tigation will be both historical and explanatory. The
present chapter, however, will be neither the one nor the
other. It seems desirable to examine the general nature
of the subjects of moral valuation from the standpoint of
the enlightened moral consciousness before dealing with
the influence which their various elements have come to
exercise upon moral judgments in the course of evolution.
By doing this, we shall be able, from the outset, to dis-
tinguish between elements which are hardly discernible, or
separable, at the lower stages of mental development, as
also to fix the terminology which will be used in the
future discussion.
Moral judgments are commonly said to be passed upon
conduct and character. This is a convenient mode of
expression, but the terms need an explanation.
Conduct has been defined sometimes as acts adjusted
to ends,’' ^ sometimes as acts that are not only adjusted to.
ends, but definitely willed.‘^ The latter definition is too
’ Spencer, Principles of Ethics, i. 5. ® E.g.,yLax}».^xvL\f:, Manual of Ethics,
p. 85.
narrow for our present purpose, because, as will be seen,
it excludes from the province of conduct many phenomena
with reference to which moral judgments are passed. The
same may be said of the former definition also, which,
moreover, is unnecessarily wide, including as it does an
immense number of phenomena with which moral judg-
ments are never concerned. Though no definition of
conduct could be restricted to such phenomena as actually
evoke moral emotions, the term “ conduct ” seems, never-
theless, to suggest at least the possibility of moral valua-
tion, and is therefore hardly applicable to such “ acts
adjusted to ends ” as are performed by obviously irrespon-
sible beings. It may be well first to fix the meaning of
the word “act.”
According to Bentham, acts may be distinguished as
external, or acts of the body, and internal, or acts of the
mind. “ Thus, to strike is an external or exterior act :
to intend to strike, an internal or interior one.” ' But
this application of the word is neither popular nor con-
venient. The term “ act ” suggests something besides
intention, whilst, at the same time, it suggests something
besides muscular contractions. To intend to strike is no
act, nor are the movements involved in an epileptic fit
acts.
An act comprises an event and its immediate mental
cause. The event is generally spoken of as the outward
act, but this term seems to be too narrow, since the inten-
tional production of a mental fact — for instance, a sensa-
tion, or an idea, or an emotion like joy or sorrow or
anger — may be properly styled an act. The objection
will perhaps be raised that I confound acts with their
consequences, and that what I call the “event” is, as
Austin maintains, nothing but bodily movements. But
Austin himself admits that he must often speak of “ acts ”
when he means “ acts and their consequences,” since
“ most of the names which seem to be names of acts, are
names of acts, coupled with certain of their consequences,
^ Bentham, Principles of Morals and Legislation >> p. 73.
THE SUBJECTS OF
and it is not in our power to discard these forms of
speech.” ^ I regard the so-called consequences of acts, in
so far as they are intended, as acts by themselves, or as
parts of acts.
The very expression “ outward act ” implies that acts
also have an inner aspect. Intention, says Butler, “ is
part of the action itself.” ^ By intention I understand a
volition or determination to realise the idea of a certain
event ; hence there can be only one intention in one act.
Certain writers distinguish between the immediate and the
remote intentions of an act. Suppose that a tyrant, when
his enemy jumped into the sea to escape him, saved his
victim from drowning with a view to inflicting upon him
more exquisite tortures. The immediate intention, it is
maintained, was to save the enemy from drowning, the
remote intention was to inflict upon him tortures.’^ But I
should say that, in this case, we have to distinguish be-
tween two acts, of which the first was a means of producing
the event belonging to the second, and that, when the
former was accomplished, the latter was still only in
preparation. A distinction has, moreover, been drawn
between the direct and the indirect intention of an act : —
“ If a Nihilist seeks to blow up a train containing an
Emperor and others, his direct intention may be simply
the destruction of the Emperor, but indirectly also he
intends the destruction of the others who are in the train,
since he is aware that their destruction will be necessarily
included along with that of the Emperor.” In this case
we have two intentions, and, so far as I can see, two
acts, provided that the nihilist succeeded in carrying out
his intentions, namely (i) the blowing up of the train,
and (2) the killing of the emperor ; the former of these
acts does not even necessarily involve the latter. But I
fail to see that there is any intention at all to kill other
^ Austin, Lectures ou lurisprudence, example is borrowed from Stuart Mill, •
i. 427, 432 s<j. Utilitarianism^ p. 27 note.
- Butler, ‘ Dissertation II. Of the ^ Mackenzie, op. cit. p. 61. Cf.
Nature of Virtue,’ in Analogy of Sidgwick, Methods of EthieSy p. 202,
EeEi^iony &^c. p. 336. n. i.
^ Mackenzie, op. cit. p. 60. The
persons. Professor Sidgwick maintains that it would be
thought absurd to say that, in such a case, the nihilist
“did not intend ” to kill them but the reason for this
is simply the vagueness of language, and a confusion
between a psychical fact and the moral estimate of that
fact. It might be absurd to bring forward the nihilist’s
non-intention as an extenuation of his crime ; but it
would hardly be correct to say that he intended the death
of other passengers, besides that of the emperor, when he
only intended the destruction of the train, though this
intention involved an extreme disregard of the various
consequences which were likely to follow. He knowingly
exposed the passengers to great danger ; but if we speak
of an intention on his part to expose them to such a
danger, we regard this exposure as an act by itself.
A moral judgment may refer to a mere intention, inde-
pendently of its being realised or not. Moreover, the
moral judgments which we pass on acts do not really
relate to the event, but to the intention. In this point
moralists of all schools seem to agree." Even Stuart Mill,
who drew so sharp a distinction between the morality of
the act and the moral worth of the agent, admits that
“ the morality of the action depends entirely upon the
intention.”^ The event is of moral importance only in
so far as it indicates a decision which is final. From the
moral point of view there may be a considerable difference
between a resolution to do a certain thing in a distant
future and a resolution to do it immediately. However
determined a person may be to commit a crime, or to
perform a good deed, the idea of the immediacy of the
event may, in the last moment, induce him to change his
mind. “ The road to hell is p^ved with good intentions.”
External events are generally the direct causes of our
moral emotions ; indeed, without the doing of harm and
.the' doing of good, the moral consciousness would never
^ Sidgwick, op, cit, p. 202, n. i. On ^ Sidgwick, op, cit. p. 2or.
the subject of ‘Mndircct intention,” cf. ^ Stuart Mill, UtilUarianisniy 27
also Bentham, op. cif, pp. 84, 86. note. Cf. James Mill, Fragment on
Mackintosh^ p. 376.
2o6 the subjects OF chap.
have come into existence. Hence the ineradicable ten-
dency to pass moral judgments upon acts, even though
they really relate to the final intentions involved in acts.
It would be both inconvenient and useless to deviate, in
this respect, from the established application of terms.
And no misunderstanding can arise from such application
if it be borne in mind that by an “act,” as the subject of
a moral judgment, is invariably understood the event plus
the intention which produced it, and that the very same
moral judgment as is passed on acts would also, on due
reflection, be recognised as valid with reference to final
decisions in cases where accidental circumstances prevented
the accomplishment of the act.
It is in their capacity of volitions that intentions are
subjects of moral judgments. What is perfectly indepen-
dent of the will is no proper object of moral blame or
moral praise. On the other hand, any volition may have
a moral value. But, so far as I can see, there are volitions
which are not intentions. A person is morally accountable
also for his deliberate wishes, and the reason for this is
that a deliberate wish is a volition. I am aware that, by
calling deliberate wishes “ volitions,” I offend against the
terminology generally adopted by psychologists. How-
ever, a deliberate wish is not only from a moral point of
view — as being a proper subject of moral valuation — but
psychologically as well, so closely akin to a decision, that
there must be a common term comprising both. In the
realm of conations, deliberate wishes and decisions form
together a province by themselves. In contradistinction
to mere conative impulses, they are expressions of a
person’s character, of his will. A deliberate wish may
just as well as a decision represent his “ true self.” It
has been argued .that a person may will one thing and yet
wish the opposite thing. Locke observes : — “ A man
whom I cannot deny, may oblige me to use persuasions to
another, which, at the same time I am speaking, I may
wish may not prevail upon him. In this case it is plain
the will and desire run counter. I will the action that
tends one way, whilst my desire tends another, and that
the direct contrary way.” ^ Yet in this case I either do
not intend to persuade the man, but only to discharge my
office by speaking to him words which are apt to have a
persuasive effect on him ; or, if I do intend to persuade
him, I do not in the same moment feel any deliberate wish
to the contrary, although I may feel such a wish before
or afterwards. We cannot simultaneously have an inten-
tion to do a thing and a deliberate wish not to do it.
If it is admitted that moral judgments are passed on*
acts simply in virtue of their volitional character, it seems
impossible to deny that such judgments may be passed on
the motives of acts as well. By “motive” I understand
a conation which “moves” the will, in other words, the
conative cause of a volition.^ The motive itself may be,
or may not be, a volition. If it is, it obviously falls
within the sphere of moral valuation. The motive of an
act may even be an intention, but an intention belonging
to another act. When Brutus helped to kilb Caesar in
order to save his country, his intention to save his country
was the cause, and therefore the motive, of his intention
to kill Caesar. The fact that an intention frequently acts
as a motive has led some writers to the conclusion that
the motive of an act is a part of the intention. But if
the intention of an act is a part of the act itself, and a
motive is the cause of an intention, the motive of an
intention cannot be a part of that intention, since a part
cannot be the cause of the whole of which it forms a
part.
But even motives which, being neither deliberate wishes
^ Locke, £ssay concerning Human gfouiid or reason of our decision when
Understandings \\. 21. ya {Philosophical it has been fully formed.” Motive, in
fVorhs, p. 219). the former sense ^of the term, is not
“The term ‘motive,’” says Pro- implied in what I here understand by
fessor Stout {Groundwork of* Psycho- motive. On the other hand, it sliould
'P' 233 aml)iguous. It be ob.served that there are m( 3 tives not
may refer to the various conations which only for decisions, but for deliberate
come into play in the proce.ss of de- wishes — another circumstance which
liberation and tend to influence its shows the affinity bclvveen these two
result. Or it may refer to the cona- cla.sses of mental tacts,
tions which we mentally assign as the
2o8
THE SUBJECTS OF
nor intentions, consist of non-volitional conations, and,
therefore, are no proper subjects of moral valuation, may
nevertheless indirectly exercise much influence on moral
judgments. Suppose that a person without permission
gratifies his hunger with food which is not his own. The
motive of his act is a non-volitional conation, an appetite,
and has consequently no moral value. Yet it must be
taken into account by him who judges upon the act. Other
things being equal, the person in question is less guilty in
proportion as his hunger is more intense. The moral
judgment is modified by the pressure which the non-
volitional motive exercises upon the agent’s will. The
same is the case when the motive of an act is the conative
element involved in an emotion. If a person commits a
certain crime under the influence of anger, he is not
so blameable as if he commits the same crime in cold
blood. Thus, also, it is more meritorious to be kind to an
enemy from a feeling of duty, than to be kind to a friend
from a feeling of love. No man deserves blame or praise
for the pressure of a non-volitional conation upon his will,
unless, indeed, such a pressure is due to choice, or unless
it might have been avoided with due foresight. But a
person may deserve blame or praise for not resisting that
impulse, or for allowing it to influence his will for evil or
good.
It is true that moral judgments are commonly passed
on acts without much regard being paid to their motives
but the reason for this is only the superficiality of ordinary
moral estimates. Moral indignation and moral approval
are, in the first place, aroused by conspicuous facts, and,
whilst the intention of an act is expressed in the act itself,
its motive is not. But a conscientious judge cannot, like
the multitude, be content with judging of the surface only.
Stuart Mill, in his famous statement that “ the motive has
nothing to do with the morality of the action, though
much with the worth of the agent,” ^ has drawn a distinc-
^ Cf. James Mill, Fragment on p. 364.
Mackintosh, p. 376 ; Sidgwick, op, cit. 2 Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism, p. 26.
tion between acts and agents which is foreign to the moral
consciousness. It cannot be admitted that “ he who saves
a fellow creature from drowning does what is morally
right, whether his motive be duty, or the hope of being
paid for his trouble.” He ought, of course, to save the
other person from drowning, but at the same time he
ought to save him from a better motive than a wish for
money. It may be that “ he who betrays his friend that
trusts him is guilty of a crime, even if his object be to
serve another friend to whom he is under greater obliga-
tions ” ; ’ but surely his guilt would be greater if he
betrayed his friend, say, in order to gain some personal
advantage thereby. Intentions and motives are subjects of
moral valuation not separately, but as a unity ; and the
reason for this is that moral judgments are really passed
upon men as acting or willing, not upon acts or volitions
in the abstract. It is true that our detestation of an act
is not always proportionate to our moral condemnation of
the agent ; people do terrible things in ignorance. But
our detestation of an act is, properly speaking, a moral
emotion only in so far as it is directed against him who
committed the act, in his capacity of a moral agent. We
are struck with horror when we hear of a wolf eating a
child, but we do not morally condemn the wolf.
A volition may have reference not only to the doing
of a thing, but to the abstaining from doing a thing. It
may form part not only of an act, but of a forbearance,
A forbearance is morally equivalent to an act, and the
volition involved in it is equivalent to an intention.
“Sitting still, or holding one’s peace,” says Locke, “when
walking or speaking are proposed, though mere forbear-
ances, requiring as much the determination of the will,
and being as often weighty in their consequences as the
contrary actions, may, on that consideration, well enough
pass for actions too.” ^ Yet it is hardly correct to call
them acts. Bentham’s division of acts into acts of com-
^ Ibid, p. 26. " Locke, op. cii. ii. 21. 28 {Philo-
^ sophical IVorkSy p. 218).
VOL. I
P
THE SUBJECTS OF
CHAF\
mission and acts of omission or forbearance ^ is not to be
recommended. A not-doing I do not call, an act, and the
purpose of not doing I do not call an intention/^ But the
fiict remains that a forbearance involves a distinct volition,
which, as such, may be the subject of moral judgment
no less thaii the intention involved in an act.
Willing not to do a thing must be distinguished from
not willing to do a thing ; forbearances must be distin-
guished from omissions. An omission — in the restricted
sense of the word — is characterised by the absence of
volition. It is, as Austin puts it, ‘‘the not doing a
given act, without adverting (at the time) to the act
which is not done.”'" Now moral judgments refer not
only to willing, but to not-willing as well, not only to
acts and forbearances, but to omissions. It is curious that
this important point has been so little noticed by writers
on ethics, although it constitutes a distinct and extremely
frequent element in our moral judgments. It has been
argued that what is condemned in an omission is really a
volition, not the absence of a volition ; that an omission is
bad, not because the person did not do something, but
because he did something else, or was in such a condition
that he could not will, and is condemned for the acts
which brought him into that condition,” ^ In the latter
case, of course, the man cannot be condemned for his
omission, since he cannot be blamed for not doing what
' Ik'nllTuni, ofy. tH. ]>. 72. A .similar view is taken hy the moral
' Cf Clark, A)ialysis of (.'li miiial ])liilosoj'jliy of Roman Catholici.sm
((n.ipfert, IMorall hcoloyic^ i. 113)-
^ .Austin, of cit. i. 43S. Binding, again, assiime.s (./j/e Nornieu.,
^ iVlexander, Aloral Order (xrul Pro- ii. 105 .vc/y. ) that a person may have a
g’77.9.r, p. 34 sq. So, alsf>, I'rofes.sor volition without having an idea of wliat
Sidgwick maintains (e/e cit. p, 60) that he wills, and that ca.rele.ssne.ss implies
“ tlie jiroper immediate ohjects of a volition of tliis Ivind. Otherwise, he
moral approval or disap[)roval would .says, the will could not he held re-
seem to ];e always the results of a spousihle for the result. But, as we
man’s vaditions so far as they were shall see immediately, the alvsence of a
intended , represented in thought volition may very well be altrilnited to
as certain or proliahle consecjuence.s of a defect of the will, and the will thu.s
sucA volitions,” and that, in cases of l)e rt?garded as llie cause of an im-
carelessness, moral Idame, strictly intended event. To speak of a vadition
speaking, attaches to the agent, only or will to do a thing of wltich the
“ in far as his carelessness is the person who wills it has no idea seems
result of some wilful neglect of duty.” absurd.
vni £NLIGHTENED MORAL JUDGMENTS 21 1
he “ could not will ” ; but to say that an omission is con-
demned only on account of the performance of some act is
undoubtedly a psychological error. If a person forgets to
discharge a certain duty incumbent on him, say, to pay a
debt, he is censured, not for anything he did, but for what
he omitted to do. He is blamed for not doing a thing
which he ought to have done, because he did not think of
it ; he is blamed tor his forcretfulness. In other w^ords,
his guilt lies in his negligence.
Closely related to negligence is heedlessncss, the differ-
ence between them being seemingly greater than it really
is. Whilst the negligent man omits an act which he ought
to have done, because he does not thiifc of it, the heed-
less man does an act from which he ought to have forborne,
because he does not consider its probnble or possible con-
sequences^ In the latter case there Is acting, in the
former case there is absence of actino;. But in both cases
the moral judgment refers to Avant of attention, in other
words, to not- willing. Idle fault of the negligent man is
that he does not think of the act which he ought to
perform, the fault of the heedless man is that he does not
think of the probable or possible consequences of the act
which he performs. In rashness, again, the party adverts
to the mischief which his act may cause, but, from insuf-
ficient advertence assumes that it will not ensue; the fault
of the rash man is partial want of attention.’^' Negligence,
heedlessness, and rashness, are all included under the
common term carelessness.”
Our moral judgments of blame, however, are concerned
with not-willing only in so far as this not-willing is
attributed to a defect of the will, not to the influence of
intellectual or other circumstances for which no man can
be held responsible. That power in a person which we
call his ^^will” is regarded by us as a cause, not only of
^ The meaning of Uic word “ negli- was applied })y Austin {op. cit. i. 439
gcncc,” in the common use of language, sq . ).
is very indefinite. It often stands for Austin, op. oil. i. 440 sq. Clark,
heedlessness as well, or for carelessness. op. oil., p. tot.
use it here in the sense in which it
P 2
THE SUBJECTS OF
such events as are intended, but of such events as we think
that the person could '' have prevented by his will.
And just as, in the case of volitions, the guilt of the party
is affected by the pressure of non-voluntary motives, so
in the case of carelessness mental ficts falling outside the
sphere of the will must be closely considered by the con-
scientious judge. But nothing is harder than to apply
this rule in practice.
Equally difficult is it, in^many cases, to decide whether
a person’s behaviour is due to want of advertence, or is
combined with a knowledge of what his behaviour implies,
or of the consequences which may result from it — to
decide whether it is due to carelessness, or to something
worse than carelessness. For him who refrains from
performing an obligatory act, though adverting to it,
“ negligent ” is certainly too mild an epithet, and he who
knows that mischief will probably result from his deed is
certainly worse than heedless. Yet even in such cases the
immediate object of blame may be the absence of a volition
— not a want of attention, but a not-willing to do, or a
not-willlng to refrain from doing, an act in spite of ad-
vertence to what the act Implies or to its consequences.
I may abstain from performing an obligatory act though I
think of it, and yet, at the same time, make no resolution
not to perform it. So, too, if a man is ruining his family
by his drunkenness, he may be aware that he is doing so,
and yet he may do it without any volition to that effect.
In these cases the moral blame refers neither to negligence
or heedlessness, nor to any definite volition, but to dis-
regard of one’s duty or of the interests of one’s family.
At the same time, the transition from conscious omissions
into forbearances, and the transition from not-willing
to refrain from doing into willing to do, are easy and
natural ; hence the distinction between willing and
not-willing may be of little or no significance from an
ethical point of view. For this reason such consequences
of an act as are foreseen as certain or probable have
commonly been included under the term “ inten-
tion,” ^ often as a special branch of intention — “ oblique,”,
or “ indirect,” or “ virtual ” intention but, as was already
noticed, this terminology is hardly appropriate. I shall
call such consequences of an act as are foreseen by the
agent, and such incidents as afe known by him to be
involved in his act, “ the known concomitants ” of the
act. When the nihilist blows up the train containing an
emperor and others, with a view to killing the emperor,
the extreme danger to which he exposes the others is a
known concomitant of his act. So, also, in most crimes,
the breach of law, as distinct from the act intended, is a
known concomitant of the act, inasmuch as the criminal,
though aware that his act is illegal, does not perform it
for the purpose of violating the law. As Bacon said,
“ no man doth a wrong for the wrong’s sake, but thereby
to purchase himself profit, or pleasure, or honour, or the
like.”
Absence of volitions, like volitions themselves, give rise
not only to moral blame, but to moral praise. We may,
for instance, applaud a person for abstaining from doing a
thing, beneficial to himself but harmful to others, which,
in similar circumstances, "would have proved too great a
temptation to any ordinary man ; and it does not neces-
sarily lessen his merit if the opposite alternative did not
even occur to his mind, and his abstinence, therefore,
could not possibly be ascribed to a volition. Very fre-
quently moral praise refers to known concomitants of acts
rather than to the acts themselves. The merit of saving
another person’s life at the risk of losing one’s own, really
lies in the fact that the knowledge of the danger did not
prevent the saver from performing his act ; and the merit
of the charitable man really depends on the loss which he
inflicts upon himself by giving his property to the needy.
In these and analogous cases of self-sacrifice for a good
^ncl, the merit, strictly speaking, consists in not-willing to
^ Cf. Sidgwick, op. cit. p. 202. ^ ^ ]vss;iy IV. Of Revenge,’
“ Benthain, op. ciL p. 84. in Essays^ ]). 45. Cf. Cirotiiis, De jure
op. cit. i. 480. Clark, op. cit. pp. 97» ei pads, ii. 20. 29. i : “ Vix
100. tjuistptam gratis mains est, ”
THE SUBJECTS OF
avoid a known concomitant of a beneficial act. But there
are instances, though much less frequent, in which moral
praise is bestowed on a person for not-willing to avoid a
known concomitant which is itself beneficial. Thus it
may on certain conditions be magnanimous of a person
not to refrain from doing a thing, thoug*h he knows that
his deed will benefit somebody who has injured him, and
towards whom the average man in similar circumstances
would display resentment.
All these various elements into which the subjects of
moral judgments may be resolved, are included in the
term ^‘conduct.” By a man's conduct in a certain case is
understood a volition, or the al)sence of a volition in him
— which is often, but not always or necessarily, expressed
in an act, forbeara?ice, or omission — viewed with reference
to all such circumstances as may influence its moral char-
acter. In order to form an accurate idea of these circum-
stances, it is necessary to consider not only the case itself,
but the man’s character, if by character is understood a
person’s will regarded as a continuous entity.' The sub-
ject of a moral judgment is, strictly speaking, a person’s
will conceived as the cause either of volitions or of the
absence of volitions ; and, since a man's will or character
is a continuity, it is necessary that any judgment passed
upon him in a particular case, should take notice of his
will as a whole, his character. We impute a person’s acts
to him only in so far as wc regard them as a result or
manifestation of his character, as directly or indirectly due
to his will. Hume observes : — Actions are, by their very
nature, temporary and perishing ; and where they proceed
not from some cause in the character and disposition of
the person who performed them, they can neither redound
to his honour, if good ; nor infamy, if evil. . . . 'Fhc
person is not answerable for them ; and as they proceeded
^ Cf\ Alcxancior, op. cit. p. 49: According to John (Jrotc
“ (hiaraclcv is simply tliat ot wlilch {'J'lWitisc on the Moral lUcals., \y. 4.^2)^
iudivianal pieces of conduct arc the a persoivs character “is liis hkbitnal
m:ii\ifestali()n.’' To the word “char- way of thinking, feeling, and acting.”
acLcr” has also teen given a broader
from nothing in him, that is durable and constant, and
leave nothing of that nature behind them, it is impossible
he can, upon their account, become the object of punish-
ment or vengeance/’^ There is thus an intimate connec-
tion between character and conduct as subjects of moral
valuation. When judging of a man's conduct in a special
instance, we judge of his character, atid when judging of
his character, we judge of his conduct in general.
It will perhaps be remarked that moral judgments are
passed not only on conduct and character, but on emotions
and opinions ; for instance, that resentment in many cases
is deemed wrong, and love of an enemy is deemed praise-
worthy, and that no punishment has been thought too
severe for heretics and unbelievers. But even in such
instances the object of blame or praise is really the will.
Idle person who feels resentment is censured because his
will has not given a check to that emotion, or because the
hostile attitude of mind has led up to a definite volition.
Very frequently the irascible impulse in resentment or the
friendly impulse in kindly emotion develops into a volition
to inflict an injury or to h^estow a benefit on its object ;
and the words resentment and love themselves are often
used to denote, not mere emotions, but states of mind
characterised by genuine volitions. An emotion, or the
absence of an emotion, may also, when viewed as a symp-
tom, give rise to, and be the apparent subject of, a moral
judgment. VVe arc apt to blame a [person whose feelings
are not affected by the news of a misfortune which has
befallen his friend, because we regard this as a sign of an
uncharitable character. VVe may be mistaken, of course.
The same person might have been the first to try to
prevent the misfortune if it had been in his power ; but
we judge from average cases.
As for opinions and beliefs, it may be said that they
involve responsibility in so far as they are supposed to
^ WmwQ^ KiiiliurVconcLDiiiv^ IliiiiKDi See also S('lioj)e)ihauer, Die bciden
Understa)idij!!^j viii. 2 {PJiilosophicnl Gruiidprohlenie dcr Dlhik [Sdnuiifltche
IVor/es^ iv. 8o). Cf. Idcni^ '/'jradse of //vr/v, vol. vii ), p|), £2 p 124, 2S1.
Jdtintan Nature iii. 2 {ibid. ii. 191).
2i6 subjects of moral judgments c^. VIII
depend on the will. Generally it is not so much the
opinion itself but rather the expression, or the outward
consequence, of it that calls forth moral indignation ; and
in any case the blame, strictly speaking, refers either to
such acts, or to the cause of the opinion within the will.
That a certain belief, or unbelief,” is never as such a
proper object of censure is recognised both by Catholic
and Protestant theology. Thomas Aquinas points out
that the sin of unbelief consists in contrary opposition
to the faith, whereby one stands out against the hearing
of the faith, or even despises faith,” and that, though such
unbelief itself is in the intellect, the cause of it is in the
will. And he adds that in those who have heard nothing
of the faith, unbelief has not the character of a sin, “ but
rather of a penalty, inasmuch as such ignorance of divine
things is a consequence of the sin of our first parent.” ^
Dr. Wardlaw likewise observes : — The Bible condemns
no man for not knowing what he never heard of, or for
not believing what he could not know. . . . Ignorance is
criminal only when it arises from wilful inattention, or
from aversion of heart to truth. Unbelief involves guilt,
when it is the effect and manifestation of the same aver-
sion — of a want of will to that which is right and good.”^
To shut one’s eyes to truth may be a heinous wrong, but
nobody is blameable for seeing nothing with his eyes shut.
After these preliminary remarks, which refer to the
scrutinising and enlightened nioral consciousness, we shall
proceed to discuss in detail, and from an evolutionary
point of view, the various elements of which the subjects
of moral judgments consist.
^ Thomas Aquinas, Sitnuna Theo- Accoiiniabicness for his Beliefs Ssfc, p.
logica^ ii.-ii. lo. i sq, 38.
Wardlaw, Sermons on Afan^s
Chapter IX
THE WILL AS THE SUBJECT OF MORAL JUDGMENT AND
THE INFLUENCE OF EXTERNAL EVENTS
However obvious it may be to the reflecting moral
consciousness that the only proper object of moral blame
and praise is the will, it would be a hasty conclusion to
assume that moral judgments always and necessarily relate
to the will. There are numerous facts which tend to show
that such judgments are largely influenced by external
events involved in, or resulting from, the conduct of men.
Some peoples are said to make no distinction between
intentional and accidental injuries. Most statements to
this effect refer to revenge or compensation.
Von Martins states that, among the Arawaks, “the blood-
revenge is so blind and is practised so extensively, that many
times an accidental death leads to tlie destruction of whole
families, both the family of him who killed and of the family of
the victim ” ; ^ and, according to Mr. Im 'riiurn, the smallest
injury done by one Guiana Indian to anotlier, even if uninten-
tional, must be atoned by the suffering of a similar injury.‘^
Adair, in his work on the North American Indians, says that
they pursued the law of retaliation with such a fixed eagerness,
that formerly if a little boy shooting birds fin the high and
thick cornfields unfortunately chanced slightly to wound
another with his childish arrow, “the young vindictive fox was
excited by custom to watch his ways with the utmost
earnestness, till the wound was returned in as equal a manner
^ von Martins, Beiirage zu?' Etkno- Im Thurn, Amotig the Indians of
graphie Amerikd'Sj i. 693 j//. Guiana^ p. 214.
2i8
THE WILL AS THE
as could be expected.” ^ Among the Ondonga in South Africa,^
the Nissan Islanders in the Bismarck Archipelago,^ and certain
Marshall Islanders,"^ the custom of blood-revenge makes no
distinction between wilful and accidental homicide. Among
the Kasias destruction of human life, whether by accident or
design, in open war or secret, is always the cause of feud among
the relations of the parties.” ^ It seems that the blood-revenge
of the early Greeks was equally indiscriminate.^^ As for the
blood- feuds of the ancient Teutons, Wilda maintains that, even
in prehistoric times, it was hardly conformable to good
custom to kill the involuntary manslayer ; ^ but there is every
reason to believe that custom made no protest against it.
According to the myth of Balder, accident was no excuse for
shedding blood. Loke gives to Hodur tlie mistletoe twig, and
asks him to do like the rest of the gods, and sliow Balder
honour, by shooting at him with the twig, tiodur tlirows the
mistletoe at Balder, and kills him, not knowing its power.
According to our notions, blind Hodur is perfectly innocent of
his brother’s death; yet the avenger, Vali, by the usual
Germanic vow, neither washes nor combs his liair till he has
killed Hthlur. It is also instructive to note that the narrator
of this story finds himself called upon to explain, and, in a
manner, to excuse the Asas for not punisliing Hodur at once,
the place where they were assembled being a sacred place.^
We find survivals of a similar view in laws of a compara-
tively recent date. The earliest of tlie Norman customals
declares quite plainly that tlie man who kills his lord
by misadventure must die.’^ And, according to a passage in
Leges Henrici I., in case A by mischance falls from a tree upon
B and kills him, then, if B’s kinsman must needs have
vengeance, he may climb a tree and fall upon A.^^ This
provision has been justly rcprcs(?nted as a curious instance of a
growing appreciation of moral ditrerences, which lias not dared
to abolish, but has tried to circumvent the ancient rule.^^
* Adair, History of the American
Indians^ p. 150.
Raulanen, in Sleininctz, Rechts-
vcrhdltnissey ]X 341.
^ Sorj^e, ibid. p. 4i(S.
^ Koldcr, in Zeitschr. f veri^d.
Recht SWISS, xiv. 443. See also Idem.,
Shakespeare vor dem P'oriim dcr Juris-
priidcnz., p. 1 88,
^ Kisher, in four. Asiatic Soc.
Bengaf ix. 835.
^ Rohde, Psyche., pp. 237, 238, 242.
” Wilda, Strafrccht dcr Germancn^
P- 174 -
'^Snorri Sturluson, ‘ Gylfaginning,’
50, in Edda, p. 59. Cf. Brunner,
P'orschituycn zur Geschichle des dent'
schen und franzbsischen Rcchtes, p.
489.
Pollock and Maitland, History of
ICny'/isk Paw before the Time of
Edivard /. ii. 482.
Leges Henrici 1. xc. 7.
Pollock and Maitland, op. cit. ii,
471.
Among the Kandlis ‘‘similar compensation is made in all
cases both of excusable homicide and of manslaughter.” ^ And
the same is said to be the case among various other savages or
barbarians.
However, this want of discrimination between inten-
tional and accidental injuries is not restricted to cases of
revenge or compensation. Early punishment is sometimes
equally indiscriminate.
Among the Kafirs of the Hindu-Kiish, “murder, justifiable
homicide, and killing by inadvertence in a quarrel, are all classed
as one crime, and pimished in the same way. Extenuating
circumstances are never cojisidered. "Ehe single question asked
is, Did the man kill the other ? 'The penalty is an extremely
heavy blood-ransom to the family of the slain man, or perpetual
exile combiiied with spoliation of the criminal’s property.” ^
Parkyns tells us t]\c following story from Abyssinia : — A boy
who had climbed a tree, happened to fall down right on the
head of his little comrade standing below. 'Fhe Gomrade died
immediately, and the unlucky climber was in consequence
sentenced to be killed in the same way as he had killed the
other boy, that is, the deatl boy’s brother should climb the tree
in his turn, and tumble down on the other’s head till he killed
him.'^ 'Ehe Cameroon tribes do not recognise the circumstance
of accidental death : — “ He who kills another accidentally must
die, Tdien, they say, the friends of each are equal mourners.”^’
Among the negroes of Accra, according to Monrad, accidental
homicide is punished as severely as intentional.^’
Yet it would obviously be a mistake to suppose that, at
early stages of civilisation, people generally look only at
the harm done, and not in the least at the will of him
who did it. Even in the system of private redress we often
^ Maepherson, Mei/ioriah of Service ® Riebardson, ' Ol).sej-vaLions among
in India^ p. <S2. the ('amcroon Tribes of West Central
Crawfurd, IJisiory of Ihc Indian iXfrica,’ in Memoirs of the Jnter-
Arihihclago, iii. 123. Ellis, Ewe- national Congress of Anthropology,
Speaking Peoples of the Slcpoe Coast, ]>. Chicago, p. 203. Sec also Leuschner,
22'3. Munzingcr, Ostafrikanisehc St it- in .Stcinmetz, Reehtsverhaltmsse, [). 24
dien, p. 502 (Barea and Kiinania). (Ijakwiri) ; ilnd, p. 51 (Banaka and
^ Scott Rol)ertson, Kafirs of the Bapuku).
Hindu- Knsh, p. 440. ® Monrad, Guinea- Kysten og dens
^ Parkyns, Life in Ahyssmia, ii. Lndhyggere, p. 8S.
236 sqq.
find a distinction made between intentional or foreseen
injuries on the one hand, and unintentional and unforeseen
injuries on the other. In many instances, whilst blood-
revenge is taken for voluntary homicide, compensation is
accepted for accidental infliction of death. ^ And some-
times the chief or the State interferes on behalf of the
involuntary manslayer, protecting him from the persecu-
tions of the dead man’s family.
Among the African Wapokomo intention makes a difference
in the revenge.^ Among the Papuans of the Tami Islands
blood-revenge is common in the case of murder, but is not
exacted in the case of accidental homicide ; the involuntary
manslayer has only to pay a compensation and to leave the
community for a certain length of time.^ Among the Namaqua
Hottentots custom demands that compensation should be
accepted for unintentional killing.^ We meet with the same
principle among the Albanians ^ and the Slavs, ^ in the past
history of ^ther European peoples,^ in ancient Yucatan,® and in
the religious law of Muhammedanism.^^ Among the Kabyles
of Algeria, ^^si les moeurs n’autorisent jamais la famille victime
d’un homicide volontaire a amnistier un crime, elles lui permet-
tent presque toujours de pardonner la mort qui ne rdsulte que
d’une maladresse ou d’un accident.” They have a special
ceremony by which the family of the deceased grant pardon to
the involuntary manslayer, but the pardon must be given
unanimously. The manslayer then becomes a member of the
kharuba^ or gens^ of the deceased.^® Among the Omahas,
when one man killed another accidentally, he was rescued by
the interposition of the chiefs, and subsequently was punished
as if he were a murderer, but only for a year or two.” The
^ Cf. Kohler, Shakespem'e vor defji
Fortun der JtirisprttdenZy 188,11. i.
^ Kraft, in Steinmetz, Rechtsver-
haltnisse^ p. 292.
* Bamler, quoted by Kohler, in
Zeitschr. f. vergL Rechtswiss. xiv. 380.
^ Fritsch, Die Eingehorenen Sild-
Afrikds.y.
® (jopcevid, Oheralbanien and seme
Urn, p. 327.
® Miklosich, ‘ Blutrache bei den
Slaven,’ in Denksekriften der kaiserl,
Akademie der Wissensch. Philos.-
histor. Classe^ Vienna, xxxvi. 131.
^ Leist, Grcuo-italische Rechtsge-
schichtey p. 324. Ancient Laws of
Irelandy iii. p. exxiv. F or the ancient
Teutons, see infray p. 226.
® de Landa, Relacion de las cosas de
Yucatan, p. 134.
® Koran, iv. 94. Cf Sachau,
Mithammedanisckes Rechi nach Scha-
fiitischer Lelire, p. 761 sq.
Hanoteau and Letoumeux, La
Kabylie, iii. 68 sq.
Dorsey, ‘ Omaha Sociology,’ in
An 7 t. Rep. Bur. Ethn. iii. 370.
^ SUBJECT OF MORAL JUDGMENT
ancient law of the Hebrews, which recognised the right and
duty of private revenge in cases of intentional homicide, laid
down special rules for homicide by misfortune. He who killed
another unawares and unwittingly might flee to a city of refuge,
where he was protected against the avenger of blood as long
as he remained there.^ In ancient Rome the involuntary
manslayer seems to have been exposed to the blood-feud until a
law attributed to Numa ordained that he should atone for the
deed by providing a ram to be sacrificed in his place.^
Among some peoples who accept compensation even for
wilful murder, the blood-price is lower if life is taken
unintentionally.^
According to Bowdich, “ a person accidentally killing ’
another in Ahanta, pays 5 oz. of gold to the family, and defrays
the burial customs. In the case of murder, it is 20 oz. of gold
and a slave ; or, he and his family become the slaves of the
family of the deceased. Ancient Irish law imposed an Eric
fine for accidental or unintentional homicide, to be paid to the
relatives of the dead man, whilst a double fine was due for
homicide where anger was shown, where probably there
was what we should call malice.’^
In the punishments Inflicted by many savages, a similar
distinction is made between intentional and accidental
harm, although, at the same time, some degree of guilt is
frequently imputed to persons who, in our opinion, are
perfectly innocent.
Speaking of the West Australian aborigines. Sir G. Grey
observes ; — If a native is slain by another wilfully, they kill the
murderer, or any of his friends they can lay hands on. If a
native kills another accidentally, he is punished according to
the circumstances of the case.” And the punishment may be
severe enough. “ For instance, if, in inflicting spear wounds as
a punishment for some offence, one of the agents should spear
the culprit through the thigh, and accidentally so injure the
^ Deuteronomy^ iv. 42. Numbers^ halinissey p. 215 (Wagogo). Dareste,
X.3CXV. II sqq. /oshuay xx"!! sqq, Nouvelles tHudes dHiistoire dii droity p.
2 Servius, In Virgilii Bucolica, iv. 237 (Swanetians of the Caucasus).
43. Cf, von Jhering, Das Schuld- ^ Bowdich, Mission from Cape
moment im rbmiseken Privairechty p. Castle to As/iantecy p. 258 n. X.
II. ^ Cherry, Growth of Criminal Law
* Beverley, in Steininetz, Rechtsver- in Ancient CommimitieSy p. 22.
THE WILL AS THE
femoral artery that he dies, the man who did so would have to
submit to be speared through both thighs himself.’'^ In New
Guinea, according to Dr. Chalmers, murder is punished capitally,
whereas a death caused by accident is expiated by a fine.‘^
Among the Mpongwe, ^‘except in the case of a chief or a
very rich man, little or no difference is made between wilful
murder^ justifiable Jiomicide, and accidental manslaughter.”^
Kafir law seems to demand no compensation for wliat is clearly
proved to have been a strictly accidental injury to property, but
the case is different in regard to accidental injuries to persons, if
the injury be of a serious nature. Thus it seems to make
little or no distinction between wilful murder and any other
kind of homicide ; unless it be, perhaps, that in purely accidental
homicide the full amount of the fine may not be so rigidly
insisted upon.”^ Among the A-liir, in the case of accidental
injuries, a compensation is paid to the injured party and a fine
to the cliief. Whilst the strict punishment for murder is deatJ),
the cidprit is allowed to redeem himself if it cannot be proved
that he committed the deed wilfully.^'' The Masai regard
accidental homicide, or injury, as the will of N’gai,” the
Unknown,” and the elders arrange what compensation sliall
be paid to the injured person (if a male) or to the nearest
relative. If a woman is killed by accident, all the killer’s
property becomes the property of the nearest relative.” Tlie
Eastern Central Africans, according to the Rev. D. Adacdonald,
know the difFcrence between an injury of accident and one of
intention.” ^ And so do the natives of Nossi-]5e and Mayotte,
near Madagascar.^
Nay, there are. instances of uncivilised peoples who
entirely excuse, or do not punish, a person for an injury
which he has inflicted by mere accident, even though
they may compel him to pay damages for involuntary
destruction of property.
We are told that the Pennsylvania Indians ^^judge with
calmness on all occasions, and decide with precision, or endeav-
^ Grey, Journals of Expeditions of Laws and Customs^ pp. 113, 67, 60.
Discovery in North-lVest and Western ^ Stiihlniami, A/it Ernin Pascha ins
Australia, ii. 238 st/. IJerz von Afrika, p. 524.
Chalmers, Piojicering in New ^ Ilindc, The I.ast of the A/asai, p.
Guinea, p. 179. loS,
® Barton, /wo L'rips to Gorilla ^ Macdonald, Africa na, i. ii.
/.and, i. 105. 8 Walter, in Steinmetz, Pechtsver-
^ Maclean, Compendium, of Kafir haltnissey p. 393.
our to do so, between an accident and a wilful act; the first,
they say, they are all liable to commit, and therefore it ought
not to be noticed, or punished ; the second being a wilful or
premeditated act, committed witJi a bad design, ought on the
contrary to receive due punishment.” ^ Among some of the
Marshall Islanders unintentional wrongs are punislicd only if
the injured party be a person of note, for instance, a chief, or a
member of a chief’s family. - Among the Papuans of the Tami
Islands, ‘^accidental injuries are not punished. Generally the
culprit confesses Iiis deed, and makes an apology. If he lias
caused the destruction of some valuable, he has to repair
the loss.” Among the Wadshagga there is no punishment
for an accidental hurt ; but if anybody’s property has been
damaged thereby, a compensation amounting to one half of the
damage may be required.'^ Fhe Hottentots do not nowadays
punish accidents, even in the case of liomicidc.^"* Among the
Wasliambala a person is held responsijile only for such injuries
as he has inflicted intentionally or caused by carelessness.^ In
some parts of West Africa, if a man, woman, or child, not
knowing what lie or she does, damages the property of another
person, ‘‘native justice requires, and contains in itself, that if it
can be proved the act was committed in ignorance that was not
a culpable ignorance, the doer cannot be punished according to
the law.” ^
These instances of occasional discrimination in savage
justice are particularly interesting in the face of the fact
that, even among peoples who have attained a higher
degree of culture, innocent persons are often punished by
law for bringing about events without any fault of theirs.
It is a principle of the Chinese law that “all persons
who kill or wound others purely by accident, shall be
permitted to redeem themselves from the punishment of
killing or wounding in an affray, by the payment in each
case of a fine to the family of the person deceased or
wounded.” But there are exceptions to this rule. Any
^ Buchanan, North American ^ Kohler, ihid. xv. 353.
India}is^ p. 160 sq. Steinmetz, 7 \ecktsve?'-
^ Kohler, in Zeitschr. f. vergl. halinisse^ p. 261.
Rechfswiss\ xiv. 448. ^ Miss Kingsley, in her Introduction
^ Bamlcr, (piolcd by Kohler, ibid. to Dennett’s Notes on the Folklore of
xiv. 381. the Jjart, p. xi.
* Merker, (pioted by Kohler, ibid. ® Ta I'sing Leu Lee^ sec. ccxcii. p.
XV. 64. 314,
THE WILL AS THE
person who kills his father, mother, paternal grandfather
or grandmother, and any wife who kills her husband’s
father, mother, paternal grandfather or grandmother,
“purely by accident, shall still be punished with loo
blows and perpetual banishment to the distance of 3,000
lee. In the case of wounding purely by accident, the
persons convicted thereof shall be punished with 100
blows and three years banishment : in these cases, more-
over, the parties shall not be permitted to redeem them-
selves from punishment by the payment of a fine, as usual
in the ordinary cases of accident.” ^ Again, slaves who
accidentally kill their masters, “ shall suffer death, by being
strangled at the usual period.” ^ It is also a characteristic
provision of the Chinese law that an act of grace is
necessary for relieving all those from punishment who
have offended accidentally and inadvertently.^
It is said in the Laws of Hammurabi : — “ If a man
has struck a man in a quarrel, and has caused him a
wound, that man shall swear ‘ I did not strike him know-
ing ’ and shall answer for the doctor. If he has died of
his blows, he shall swear, and if he be of gentle birth he
shall pay half a mina of silver. If he be the son of a poor
man, he shall pay one-third of a mina of silver.”^
It has been observed that the purpose of the Hebrew
law of sanctuary was not merely to protect the involuntary
manslayer from blood-revenge, but at the same time to
punish him and compel him to expiate the blood he has
shed.® If he left the city of refuge before the death of
the high-priest, the avenger of blood might kill him with-
out incurring blood-guiltiness and he was not permitted
to purchase an earlier return to his possession with a money
ransom.^
According to the Laws of Manu, “he who damages the
^ Ibid. sec. cccxix. p. 347. Cf, im biblischen und talmudischen Strafe
ibid. sec. ccxcii. p, 314. recht^ p. 25 sq. Keil, Manual of
Ibid. sec. cccxiv. p. 338. Biblical Archccology^ ii. 371.
^ Ibid. sec. xvi. p. 18. ® Numbers, xxxv. 26 sqq, ^
* Laws of Hammurabi, 206 sqq. ^ Ibid. xxxv. 32.
® Goitein, Das Vergeltungsprincip
goods of another, be it intentionally or unintentionally,
shall give satisfaction to the owner and pay to the king a
fine equal to the damage ” ; ^ and various rites of expiation
are prescribed for a person who kills a Brahmana by
accident,^ whereas the intentional slaying of a Brahmana
is inexpiable.®
Demosthenes praises the Athenian law for making the
penalty of unintentional homicide less than that of in-
tentional. The punishment for murder was death, from
which, however, before the sentence was passed, the
murderer was at liberty to escape by withdrawing from
his country and remaining in perpetual exile. But he
who was convicted of involuntary homicide had to leave
the country only for some shorter time, until he had
appeased the relatives of the deceased.^ As w'ill be seen
subsequently, the real object of this law was not so much
to punish the involuntary manslayer, as to save him from
being persecuted by the dead man’s ghost, and to rid the
community of a pollution. However, the Athenian law
does not represent the ideas of early times. As Dr. Farnell
observes, the constitution and the legend about the founda-
tion of the court at the Palladium, which was established
to try cases of \inintentional blood-shedding, shows that
the ancient practice was susceptible of improvement.'’ Nor
does the Roman law, which, in its developed shape, with
such a remarkable consistency carried out the Cornelian
principle, “ in maleficiis voluntas spectator non exitus,”'’
seem to have been equally discriminate in early times.^ In
the Law of the Twelve Tables there are still some faint
traces left of the notion that expiation was required of a
person who accidentally shed human blood.®
^ Laws of Alanu, viii. 288. * T>Gmo^i\\QnG%^Co>it 7 'a A^'istocratefn^
^ Ibid. xi. 73 sqcj. 71 sqq, p. 643 sq.
^ Ibid. xi. 90. Gautama, xxi. 7. ^ Aristotle, I}e 7 'epiiblica Atheuien-
According to .some authorities, how- sium, 57. Farnell, Cults of the Greek
ever, the wilful slaying of a brahmana States, i. 304.
*was' expiable by a penance of greater ^ Digesta, xlviii. 8. 14.
severity (Buhler’s note, in his translation ^ von Jhering, Das SckuIdmo 77 ient i 77 i
of the Laws of Manu, Sacred Books of roinischeit Pj'ivab'echt , p. 16. Momm-
the East, xxv. 449). sen, Kb??iisches Strafrecht, p. 85.
V 8 Mommsen, op. cit. p. 85.
Q
VOL. I
THE WILL AS THE
The principle of ancient Teutonic law was, “Qui
inscienter peccat, scienter emendet ” — a maxim laid down
by the compiler of the so-called ‘ Laws of Henry I.,’ ^ no
doubt translating an old English proverb.^ In historic
times, the law, distinguishing between vili and vadhi,
treats intentional homicide as worse than unintentional.
In one case there can, in the other there can not, be a
legitimate feud ; and whilst wilful manslaughter can be
expiated only by wtte^ as well as wer^ the involuntary
manslayer has to pay wer to the family of the dead, but
no wUe to the authorities.® Yet the wer to be paid was
not merely compensation for the loss sustained, as Wilda,
niisled by his enthusiasm for Teutonic law, has erroneously
assumed it was punishment as well.® And the character
of criminality attached to accidental homicide survived the
system of wer. When homicide became a capital offence,^
homicide by misadventure was included in the law. How-
ever, the involuntary manslayer was not executed, but
recommended to the “ mercy ” of the prince. This was
the case in England in the later Middle Ages,® and in
France still more recently. And when the English law
was altered, and the involuntary offender no longer was in
need of mercy, he nevertheless continued to be treated as
a criminal. He was punished with forfeiture of his goods.
According to the rigour of the law such a forfeiture might
have been exacted even in the year 1828, when the law was
finally abolished after having fallen into desuetude in the
course of the previous century.®
If men at the earlier stages of civilisation generally
^ Leges Henrici /. xc, ii. ® Bracton, Legibus et Consuetiidi-
2 Pollock and Maitland, History of nibtis Anglia.^ fol. 134, vol. ii. 382 $q, ;
the English Law before the 7Yme of fol. 104 b, vol. ii. 152 sq. Brunner,
Edward /. i. 54. Forschungen, p. 494 sqq, Biener,
® Wilda, op, cit, p. 545 sqq.., 594. Das en^lische Geschwornengericht, i,
Brunner, Forschimgen^ p. 498 sq, 120, 392, Pollock and Maitland, op.
Idem, Deutsche Rechtsgeschichtefi, 165. cit, ii. 479.
Pollock and Maitland, op, cit, ii. 471. ^ Beaumanoir, Les coutumes du
^ Wilda, op. cit. p. 578. Beauvoisis, 69, vol. ii. 483. Esmein,
® Geyer, Die Lehre vo7i der Noth- Histoire de la proc^dicre criminelle en
wehr, p. 87 sq. Trummer, Vortriige Ff'ance, p. 255.
fiber 7'ortur, i. 345. Brunner, ® Stephen, History of the Criminal
Fqrschungen, p. 505 sq. Law of England^ iii. 77.
attach undue importance to the outward aspect of
conduct, the same is still more the case with their
gods.
The Tshi-speaking peoples of the Gold Coast believe that
the god Sasabonsum “ takes delight in destroying all those
who have offended him, even though the offence may
have been accidental and unintentional ” ; whereas, among
the same people, it is the custom that even deaths result-
ing from accidents, not to speak of minor injuries, are
compensated for by a sum of money.^ Miss Kingsley says
she is unable, from her own experience, to agree with Mr.
Dennett’s statement with reference to the Fjort, that
ignorance would save the man who had eaten prohibited
food. From what she knows, Merolla’s story is correct :
the man, though he eat in ignorance, dies or suffers
severely. “It is true,” she adds, “that one of the
doctrines of African human law is that the person who
offends in ignorance, that is not a culpable ignorance, can-
not be punished ; but this merciful dictum I have never
found in spirit law. Therein if you offend, you suffer ;
unless you can appease the enraged spirit, neither Ignorance
nor intoxication is a feasible plea in extenuation.”^ The
Omahas believe that to eat of the totem, even in
ignorance, would cause sickness, not only to the eater, but
also to his wife and children. •'*
Speaking of the sacred animals of the ancient Egyptians,
Herodotus says, “ Should any one kill one of these beasts,
if wilfully, death is the punishment ; if by accident, he
pays such fine as the priests choose to impose. But who-
ever kills an ibis or a hawk, whether wilfully or by
accident, must necessarily be put to death. According
to the Chinese penal code, “ whoever destroys or damages,
whether intentionally or inadvertently, the altars, mounds,
or terraces consecrated to the sacred and imperial rites,
shall suffer 100 blows, and be perpetually banished to dis-
^ Ellis, Tshi-speaking Peoples of the p. xxviii.
Gold Coasts pp. 35, 301. ^ Frazer, Totemism, p. 1 6.
^ Miss Kingsley, in her Introduction ** Herodotus, ii. 65. Cf Pompo-
to Dennett’s Folklcn'e of the Fjort^ nius Mela, 9.
Q 2
tance of 2000 In these cases the punishment inflicted
by human hands is obviously a reflection of the supposed
anger of superhuman beings.
The Shintoist prays for forgiveness of errors which he
has committed unknowingly.'** According to the Vedic
hymns, whoever with or without intention offends against
the eternal ordinances of Varuna, the All-knowing and
Sinless, arouses his anger, and is bound with the bonds of
the god — with calamity, sickness, and death.“ Forgiveness
is besought of Varuna for sins that' have been committed
in unconsciousness ; ■* even sleep occasions sin."' The
singer Vasishtha is filled with pious grief, because daily
against his will and without knowledge he offends the
god and in ignorance violates his decree.^’ “ All sages,”
say the Laws of Manu, “ prescribe a penance for a sin un-
intentionally committed ” ; such a sin “is expiated by the
recitation of Vedic texts, but that which men in their folly
commit intentionally, by various special penances.”
Among the present Hindus, “ even in cases of accidental
drinking of spirits through ignorance on the part of any
of the three twice-born classes, nothing short of a repetition
of the initial sacramentary rites, effecting a complete
regeneration, is held sufficient to purge the sin.”*
In the Greek literature there are several instances of
guilt being attached to the accidental transgression of
some sacred law, the transgressor being perfectly unaware
of the nature of his deed. Oedipus is the most famous
example of this. Actaeon is punished for having seen
Diana. Pausanias, the Spartan king, made sacrifice to
Zeus Phyxius, to atone for the death of the maiden whom
he had slain by misfortune.®
The Babylonian psalmist, assuming that one of the
^ 'Fa Tsing Lea LcCy sec. clviii. p. ® Ibid. vii. 86. 6; x. 164. 3.
172. ^ Ibid, vii. 88. 6. Cf. Kaegi, op, at.
^ Selcnka Sonnige Weltaiy p. 210 p. 68.
sij. ^ Laivs 0/ A/ami y xi. 45 s^. Cf.
^ Cf. Kaegi, Rigveday p, 66 sq. ; Vasishthay 20.
Oldenberg, Die Religion des Veda, p. ^ Rajendralala Mitra, Indo‘AryanSy
289. i. 393.
^ Rig- Veduy v. 85. 8, ^ Farnell, op, cit, i. 72.
gods is angry with him because he is suffering pain,
exclaims ; — “ The sin which I committed I know not.
The transgression I committed I know not. The afflic-
tion which was my food — I know it not. The evil
which trampled me down — I know it not. The lord
in the wrath of his heart has regarded me ; the god
in the fierceness of h'ls heart has punished me.” ^ In
another psalm it is said ; — “ He knows not his sin against
the god, he knows not his transgression against the god
and the goddess. Yet the god has smitten, the goddess
has departed from him,” ^
So, also, the Hebrew psalmist cries out, “ Who can
understand his errors ? cleanse thou me from secret
faults.” ^ Unintentional error, as Mr. Montefiore observes,
would be as liable to incur divine punishment as the most
voluntary crime, if it infringed the tolerably wide province
in which the right or sanctity of Yahveh was involved.^
Whilst a deliberate moral iniquity was punished under
the penal law, a sin committed “ through ignorance, in
the holy things of the Lord,” required a sin- or trespass-
offering for its expiation.^ Speaking of the developed
sacrificial system of the Jews, Professor Moore remarks,
“ The general rule in the Mishna is that any transgression
the penalty of which, if wilful, would be that the offender
be cut off, requires, if committed in ignorance or through
inadvertence, a hattcith [or sin-offering] ; the catalogue of
these transgressions ranges from incest and idolatry to
eating the (internal) fat of animals and imitating the
composition of the sacred incense, but does not include
the commonest offences against morals.” “ The Rabbis
also maintained that a false oath, even if made uncon-
sciously, involves man in- sin, and is punished as such.*^
^ Ziminern, Bahylonuche Buss- ^ Montefiore, Hibbert Lectures on
psatmen^ p. 63, # the Religon of the Anctenl Hebrews^ p.
Sayce, Hibbert Lectures on the 10^. Cf. ibid. p. 515 sq.
Religion of the A 7 icient Babylonians^ ** Leviticus, iv. 22 sqq, ; v. 15 sqq.
p. 505. Cf. Murdler-Dclitz.sch, Ge^ Numbers, xv. 24 sqq.
sckichte Babyloniens tmd Assyriens, p. ^ Moore, ‘ Sacrifice,’ in Cheyne and
38. Black, Enclycopcedia Biblica, iv, 4205,
^ Psahns^ xix. 12. Montefiore, op. cit. p. 558.
THE WILL AS THE
We meet with a similar opinion in mediaeval Christianity.
The principle laid down by St. Augustine/ and adopted by
Canon Law'/ that “ ream linguam non facit, nisi mens
rea,” was not always acted upon. Various penitentials
condemned to penance a person who, in giving evidence,
swore to the best of his belief, in case his statement after-
wards proved untrue.® In other “cases, also, the Church
prescribed penances for mere misfortunes. If a person
killed another by pure accident, he had to do penance — in
ordinary cases, according to most English penitentials, for
one year,^ according to various continental penitentials,
for five ® or seven ® years ; whereas, according to the
Penitential of Pseudo-Theodore, he who accidentally
killed his father or mother was to atone his deed with a
penance of fifteen years,^ and he who accidentally killed
his son with a penance of twelve.® The Scotists even
expressly declared that the external deed has a moral value
of its own, which increases the goodness or badness of the
agent’s intention ; and though this doctrine was opposed
by Thomas Aquinas, Bonaventura, Suarez, and other
leading theologians, it was nevertheless admitted by th.pm
that, according to the will of God, certain external deeds
entail a certain accidental reward, the so-called aureola.^
In some cases the secular law, also, punishes misadventure
on religious grounds. Thus the Salic law treated with
great severity any person who accidentally put fire to a
church, although it imposed no penalty on other cases of
^ St. Augustine, Ser?fionesy clxxx. 2
(Migiie, Pairologioe cursus, xxxviii.
973 )-,
Oratian, Decretiim, ii. 22. 2. 3.
^ Pivnitentiale Bedts, v, 3 (Wasser-
schleben, Bussordnungen der abend-
Idndischen Kircke^ p. 226). Pmiit.
Egberti, vi. 3 {ibid, p. 238). Pamit.
Pseudo- 7 'heodori, xxiv. ^{ibid. p. 593).
Pcenit, llieodori^ i. 4. 7 {ibid. p. •
188). Pa nit B edit /\Y. ^ {ibid. 225).
Pamit. Egberti^ iv. 1 1 {ibid. p.
235). According to Panit. Pseudo-
Theodori^ xxi. 2 {ibid, p. 586), the
penance was to la.st for five years.
® Panit. Hubcrtertse, 2 {ibid. p. 377).
Panit. Mersebiirgense., 2 {ibid. p. 391).
Panit. Bobiense^ 4 (ibid. p. 408).
Panit. Pindobonense, 2 {ibid. p. 418).
Panit. Cummeaniy vi. 2 (ibid. p. 478).
Pajtit. XXXV. Capitulorumy i (ibid.
p. 506). Panit. Vigiianumy 27 (ibid.
p- 529)-
® Pamt. Paris lensBy i {ibid. p. 412).
Panit. Floriacenscy 2 {ibid. p. 424).
^ Panit. Pseudo- Theodoriy xxi. 18
{ibid. p. 588).
® Panit. Pseudo-Theodofiy xxi. 1 9
{ibid. 588).
^ Gopfert, MoraltheologiCy i. 185.
unintentional incendiary ; * and even to this day the
Russian criminal law prescribes penitence for homicide by
misadventure, “in order to quiet the conscience of the
culprit.” ^ According to the Koran, he who kills a
believer by mistake shall expiate his deed, not only by
paying blood-money to the family of the dead (unless they
remit it), but by setting free a believing slave ; and as to
him who cannot find the means, “ let him fast for two
consecutive months — a penance this from God.” ®
How shall we explain all these facts Do they faith-
fully represent ideas of moral responsibility ? Do they
indicate that, at the earlier stages of civilisation, the out-
ward event as such, irrespectively of the will of the agent,
is an object of moral blame
Most of the statements which imply a perfect absence
of discrimination between accident and intention, refer to
the system of private redress. Under this system a personal
injury is regarded as a matter which the injured party or
his kin have to settle for themselves. It certainly does
not allow them to treat the offender just as they please ;
as we have seen, it is more or less regulated by custom.
But at the same time it makes considerable allowance for
the personal feelings of the sufferer, and these feelings are
apt to be neither impartial nor sufficiently discriminate.
Whether, in a savage community, public opinion prescribes,
or merely permits, revenge in cases of accidental
injury, is a question which the ordinary observations
of travellers leave unanswered. It is important to
note that one of the first steps which early custom or
law took towards a restriction of the blood-feud was to
saye the life of the involuntary manslayer. Moreover, in
many cases where the system of revenge has been succeeded
by punishment, the injured party may still have a voice in
the matter. In Abyssinia, for instance, “ a life for a life is
the sentence passed upon the murderer ; but, obtaining
^ Lex Salica (Herold’s text), 71. ^tats europiens^ edited by von Liszt, p.
Brunner, Forschtingetiy p. 507, n. i. 531.
® Foinitzki, in Le droit criminel des ® Koran^ iv. 94.
THE WILL AS THE
the consent of the relatives of the deceased, he is authorised
by law to purchase his pardon.”^ According to ancient
Swedish law, an injury could not be treated as accidental
unless the injured party acknowledged it as such.'^ In
England, even in the days of Henry III., the king could
not protect the manslayer from the suit of the dead man’s
kin, although he had granted him pardon on the score
of misadventure.** Indeed, so recently as 1741, a royal
order was made for a hanging in chains “ on the petition
of the relations of the deceased.” * And to this day English
criminal courts, when dealing with some slight offence,
mitigate the punishment “ because the prosecutor does not
press the case,” or even give him leave to settle the
matter and withdraw the prosecution.®
In the case of accidental homicide, deference may also
have to be shown for the supposed feelings of the dead
man’s ghost, which, angry and bloodless, is craving for
revenge and thirsting for blood. To leave its desires
ungratified would be both dangerous and unmerciful.
That this has something to do with the rigid demand of
life for life in the case of homicide by misadventure seems
all the more likely as in some instances when the involun-
tary manslayer is pardoned, other blood is to be shed in-
stead of his. Among the Yao and Wayisa, near Lake
Nyassa, it is the custom “ by way of propitiation to give
up a slave or some relative of the criminal’s, to ‘ go along
with the one who was slain,’ and this seems to be invari-
ably done when one is killed by accident, in which case
the slayer may escape, the deputy taking as it were his
place.”® We may assume that a similar idea underlies the
ancient Roman law which provided a ram to be sacrificed
in the place of the involuntary manslayer.
But the dead man’s ghost not only persecutes his own
family if neglectful of their duty, it also attacks the man-
^ Harris, Highlands of ^Ethiopia y ii. p. 98.
94. ^ Amos, Ruins of 7 'imey p. 23.
von Amira, Nordgermanisckes Ob- ® Kenny, Outlines of Criminal Law,
ligationenrechty i. 382. p. 23.
^ Three Early Assize Rolls for the ® Macdonald, in Jour, Antkr, Inst,
County of Nor i /lumber land y scec. Kill, xxii. 108 sq.
slayer and cleaves to him like a miasma. The manslayer
is consequently regarded as unclean, and has, both for his
own sake and for the sake of the community in which he
lives, to undergo some ceremony of purification in order
to rid himself of the dangerous and infectious pollution.
This notion will be illustrated in a following chapter.
In the present connection 1 merely desire to point out that
the pollution is there, whether the shedding of blood was
intentional or accidental. And, as will be shown, though
this state of uncleanness does not intrinsically involve
guilt, it easily becomes a cause of moral disapproval, whilst
the ceremony of purification is apt to be looked upon in
the light of punishment. We shall also find that the
notion of a persecuting ghost may be replaced by the
notion of an avenging god, it being a fact of common
occurrence that the doings or functions of one mysterious
being are transferred to another. We shall, finally, see
that the infection of uncleanness is shunned by gods even
more than it is shunned by men ; and this largely
helps to explain the attituSe of religion towards uninten-
tional and unforeseen shedding of human blood.
There are other, more general reasons for the want of
discrimination often displayed by religion in regard to the
accidental transgression of a religious law. When a thing
is taboo, in the strict sense of the word, it is supposed to
be charged with mysterious energy which will injure or
destroy the person who eats or touches the forbidden
thing, whether he does so wilfully or by mistake. As
Professor Jevons correctly observes, the action of taboo
is always mechanical ; contact with the tabooed object
communicates the taboo infection as certainly as contact
with water communicates moisture. . . . The intentions
of the taboo-breaker have no effect upon the action of the
taboo ; he may touch in ignorance, or for the benefit of
the person he touches, but he is tabooed as surely as if his
motive were irreverent or his action hostile.” ^ So, also,
according to primitive notions, the effect of a curse or an
^ Jevons, Introduction to the History of Religion, p. 91.
^34
THE WILL AS THE
oath is purely mechanical ; hence a person who swears
falsely in ignorance exposes himself to no less danger
than a person who perjures himself knowingly. As re-
gards religious offences in the strictest sense of the term —
that is, offences against some god which are supposed' to
arouse his resentment — it should be remembered that, just
as a man who is hurt is unable to judge on the matter as
coolly as does the community at large, so a god whosd
ordinances are transgressed is thought to be less dis-
criminating in his anger than a disinterested human judge,
and, consequently, more apt to be influenced by the
external event. And where nearly every calamity is
regarded as a divine punishment, a person who is suffering
without knowing what sin he has committed, naturally
infers that a god is punishing him for some secret fault.
Thus it may be that, in the point which we are dis-
cussing, as in various other respects, the religious beliefs
of a people do not faithfully represent their general
notions- of moral responsibility. It is profoundly wrong
to assume, from the legend of Oedipus and other similar
cases, that the ancient Greeks, in general, held a person
“equally responsible for an accident which occurs to him,
and for an act of which the agent is aware.” Even the
transgression of a sacred law, when committed in ignor-
ance, seems to have excited pitiful horror rather than
moral indignation. Oedipus had killed his father in self-
defence, and married his mother, perfectly ignorant of his
relation to them. The gods punished the Thebans with
pestilence for harbouring such a wretch on their soil. But
when “ time that sees all, found him out in his unwitting
sin,” it was not blame, but terror and deep compassion for
the unhappy man that, according to the tragedian,^ spoke
from the lips of the people. Moreover, in the later
tragedy Oedipus persistently vindicates his innocence : —
“ Whatever I have done was done unwittingly ” — “ Be-.,
fore the law I have no guilt.” And, addressing himself
to Creon, who has accused him of parricide and incest, he
^ Sophocles, CEdipus Tyrannus.
exclaims : — “ O shameless soul, where, thinkest thou, falls
this thy taunt, — on my age, or on thine own ? Bloodshed
— -incest — misery — all this thy lips have launched against
me, — all this that I have borne, woe is me ! by no choice
of mine ; for such was the pleasure of the gods, wroth,
haply, with the race from of old. . . Tell me, now, — if,
by voice of oracle, some divine doom was coming on my
sire, that he should die by a son’s hand, how couldst thou
justly reproach me therewith, who was then unborn, —
whom no sire had yet begotten, no mother’s womb con-
ceived ? And if, when born to woe — as I was born — I
met my sire in strife, and slew him, all ignorant what
I was doing, and to whom, — how couldst thou justly
blame the unknowing deed ^ Never was a more pathetic
appeal made to the court of Justice from the indiscriminate
verdict of angry gods.
While thus the grossest want of discrimination may be
explained from revengeful feelings and superstitious beliefs,
there still remain a multitude of cases which must be
regarded as genuine expressions of moral indignation. As
to these, it should, first, be remembered that even the
reflecting moral consciousness may hold a person blame-
able for the unintentional and unforeseen infliction of an
injury, namely, in cases where it assumes want of proper
foresight. Now, as we know, it is often difficult enough
to discern whether, or to what extent, an unintended
injury is due to carelessness on the part of the agent ; some-
times even it is no easy thing to tell whether an injury
was intended or not. It is not to be expected, then, that
distinctions of so subtle a nature should be properly made
by the uncultured mind, and least of all is it to be expected
that such distinctions should be embodied in early custom
and law, which are based on average cases and allow of no
minute individualisation. It has been observed that the
roughness of Teutonic justice may be partly explained from
the difficulty of getting any proof of intention or of its
absence, from the lack of any proper distinctions between
^ Ide??iy CEdipus ColoneuSy g 6 o sqq. (Jebb’s translation, p. 155),
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misadventure and carelessness, and from the fact that the
so-called misadventures of early times covered many a
blameworthy act.^ And all this holds good not merely
of the ancient Teutons. It may further be said that the
more defective the power of discrimination, the greater is
the tendency to presume guilt. In Morocco a man who
runs away after having killed another is presumed to have
committed the deed intentionally, however innocent he really
may be. Among the Teutons the presumption was
always against the manslayer ; he had to proclaim what he
had done, and to prove that the deed was not intended^ —
unless, indeed, the misadventure belonged to a certain type
of injuries which by their very nature entailed no guilt.
For instance, if a man carried a spear level on his shoulder
and another ran upon the point, he was free from blame;
whereas, if harm ensued by pure accident from a distinct
act, the agent was liable.® As von Amira remarks, the
Swedish notion of vadhav^rk was not a merely negative
conception, but implied that there was danger connected
with the act.^
Where the distinction between guilt and innocence is
difficult to draw, it may be wise policy to presume guilt.
According to Sir R. Burton, the Mpongwe jurists say that
little or no difference is generally made between wilful
murder and accidental manslaughter in order that people
should be more careful ; and a similar idea may lie at the
bottom of the Dahoman law which punishes capitally any
person whose house takes fire, even if it happens accident-
ally.” But the presumption of guilt is not only, nor in
the first place, owing to considerations of social utility,
combined with a reckless indifference to undeserved suffer-
^ l\)llock and Maitland, op, clt, i.
55 ; ii. 475, 483. von Amira, Nord-
gernianisches Obligatioiienrecht , i. 377
sq,
Wilda, op. C2t. p. 594 sqq. Trmnmer,
op. cit. i. 345. Brunner, /^'orsckungen,
p, 5CX3 sq. Bollock and Maitland, op.
cit. ii. 471.
Wilda, op. cit. p. 584. Triimnier,
op. cit. i. 427. Brunner, Forsckungefiy
p. 499 sq. von Amira, ‘ Recht,’in Paul’s
Griindriss der gernianischen rhiloiogie,
ii. pt. ii. 172. Pollock and Maitland,
op. cit. i. 53 sq.
^ von Amira, No}'dger ;n anise hes,
Obligationenrechty i. 377.
® Burton, 7 wo 77 ips^ to Gorilla
Landj i. 105.
® Elli.s, Ewe-speaking Peoples of the
Slave Coast, p. 224.
ing. The unreflecting mind is shocked by the harm done,
and cares little for the rest. It does not press the question
whether the harm was caused by the agent’s will or not.
It does not make any serious attempt to separate the
external event from the will, and it is inclined to assume
that there is a coincidence between the two. This is not
altogether bad psychology since, as a rule, men will
what they do. “ Le fait juge Thomme,” says an old
French proverb ; and in morals, also, “ the tree is known
by the fruit.” However, there are cases of injuries in
which not even uncivilised men can fail to discover, at
once, the absence of any evil intention. This certainly
does not mean that the injurer escapes all censure. Every
feeling of pain, sympathetic pain included, which is caused
by a living being, has a certain tendency to give rise to
an aggressive impulse towards its cause ; hence savages,
even though they distinguish between intentional and un-
intentional harm, are inclined to impute some degree of
guilt to any person who involuntarily commits a forbidden
deed, though he be in reality quite innocent. But the reason
for this is only want of due reflection. If it is clearly under-
stood that a certain event is the result of merely external
circumstances, that it was neither intended by the agent nor
could have been foreseen by him, in other words, that it
in no way was caused by his will — then there could be no
moral indignation at all. It would be simply absurd to
suppose that an outward event as such, assumed to be
absolutely unconnected with any defect of will, could ever
give rise to moral blame. Such an event could not even
call forth a feeling of revenge. Sudden anger itself
cools down when it appears that the cause of the inflicted
pain was a mere accident. Even a dog, as has been
observed, distinguishes between being stumbled over and
being kicked.
That the indiscriminate attitude of early custom and law
towards accidental injuries does not imply any difference in
principle between the enlightened and unenlightened moral
consciousness as regards the subject of moral valuation,
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becomes perfectly obvious when we consider what a great
influence the outward event exercises upon moral estimates
even among ourselves. “ The world judges by the event,
and not by the design,” says Adam Smith. “ Everybody
agrees to the general maxim, that as the event does not
depend on the agent, it ought to have no influence upon
our sentiments, with regard to the merit or propriety of
his conduct. But when we come to particulars, we find
that our sentiments are scarce in any one instance exactly
conformable to what this equitable maxim would direct.”^
Even in the criminal laws of civilised nations chance still
plays a prominent part. According to the present law of
England, though a person is not criminally liable for the
involuntary and unforeseen consequences of acts which are
themselves permissible, the case is different if he commits
an act which is wrong and criminal,'^ or, as it seems, even
if he commits an act which is wrong without being for-
bidden by law.^ Thus death caused unintentionally is
regarded as murder, if it takes place within a year and a
day * as the result of an unlawful act which amounts to a
felony.'’ For instance, a person kills another accidentally
by shooting at a domestic fowl with intent to steal it, and
he will probably be convicted of murder.'’ Again, a near-
sighted man drives at a rapid rate, sitting at the bottom
of his cart, and thereby causes the death of a foot-pas-
senger ; he is guilty of manslaughter,'’ A man recklessly
and wantonly throws a lighted match into a haystack,
careless whether it take fire or not, and so burns
down the stack ; his crime is arson. But if he did not
intend to throw the lighted match on the haystack, he
would probably not be guilty of any offence at all, “ unless
death was caused, in which case he would be guilty of
manslaughter.”^ Even if the unintended death is to some
^ Adam Smith, Theory of Aloral ^ Stephen, History of the Criminal
Sentiments^ p. 152. Law of England ^ iii. 8.
According to Harris {Principles of ® Ibid, iii. 22.
the Criminal Laiv, p. 156), the act ^ Ibid. iii. 83.
should be a malum in se, not merely a ^ Harris, op. cit. p. 157.
malum quia prohibittim. ^ Stephen, op. cit. ii. 113,
^ K-enny, op. cit. p. 41.
extent owing to the negligence of the injured party him-
self, it may be laid to the charge of the injurer. This at
all events was the law in Hale’s time, “ If a man,” he
says, “ receives a wound, which is not in itself mortal, but
either for want of helpful applications, or neglect thereof,
it turns to a gangrene, or a fever, and that gangrene or
fever be the immediate cause of his death, yet, this is
murder or manslaughter in him that gave the stroke or
wound.”*' So far as I know, the severity of the English
law on unintentional homicide — which, in fact, is a survival
of ancient Teutonic law® — is without a parallel in the
European legislation of the present day. Both the
French ® and the German * laws are much less severe ; and
so is the Ottoman Penal Code,*’ and Muhammedan law in
general.® Yet the unintended deadly consequence of a
criminal act always affects the punishment more or less.
I presume that nobody after due deliberation would
maintain that the moral guilt of the offender is enhanced
by the death of him whom he involuntarily happened to
kill. Sir James Stephen, nevertheless, makes an attempt to
defend, from a moral point of view, the severe English
law on the subject, which he thinks “ is much to be pre-
ferred to the law of France.” He asks, “ Is there anything
to choose morally between the man who violently stabs
another in the chest with the definite intention of killing
him, and a man who stabs another in the chest with no
definite intention at all as to the victim’s life or death, but
with a feeling of indifference whether he lives or dies.?"” *
Perhaps not. But I venture to maintain that there is a
considerable moral difference between the man who shoots
at another with the definite intention of killing him, and
the man who, firing at another’s chickens, with the inten-
tion of stealing them, accidentally kills the owner whom
^ Hale, History of the Pleas of the ^ Code Pdnal^ art. 309.
Cro'^Hy i. 428. * ^ Strafgcselzbuch^ art. 226.
* ^ Lex Wisigothoriiui, vi. 5. 6: “Si ® Ottoman Penal Code, art, 177*
dum quis calce, vel pugno, aut qua- ibid. art. 174.
cumque percussione injuriam conatur ® vSachau, op. cit. p. 761 sq.
inferre, homicidii extiterit occasio, pro ^ Stephen, op. cit. iii. 91 sq.
homicidio puniatur.’’
he does not see. It will perhaps be argued that the law
has a utilitarian purpose, its object b^ing to make people
more careful. But if this were the case one would expect
that the law should punish with equal severity acts which
involve the same degree of danger, and which result in
similar injuries. To fire at a sparrow may be as dangerous
to people’s lives as to fire at another person’s chicken, and,
in the latter case, the danger is hardly increased by the inten-
tion to steal the chicken. I take the truth to' be this.
The degree of punishment corresponds to the degree of
indignation aroused by the deed. Public imagination is
shocked by the actual event. The agent, being guilty
either of criminal intention, or of gross disregard of other
people’s interests, or of criminal heedlessness, is a proper
object of punishment. Owing to that want of discrimina-
tion which characterises the popular mind, his guilt is
exaggerated on account of the grave consequences of his
act ; and the result is that he is punished not only
for the fault of his will, but for his bad luck as well.
Sir James Stephen seems to admit this, when saying
that the shock which the offence gives to the public feeling
requires that the offender should himself suffer “ a full
equivalent for what he has inflicted,” from which “ he
ought to be excused only on grounds capable of being
understood by the commonest and most vulgar minds.” *
Though thoroughly dissenting from the opinion that
criminal law should try to gratify the feelings of “ the
commonest and most vulgar minds,” I think that, as a
matter of fact, it is not much above their standard of
justice, being in the main an expression of public
sentiments.
In the cases which we have hitherto considered the
external event which a person brings about involuntarily,
either makes him liable to punishment though he really is
free from guilt, or increases his punishment beyond the'
limits of his guilt; But the influence of chance also shows
^ Ibid, iii. 91,
itself in the opposite way. A person who is guilty of
carelessness generally escapes all punishment if no injurious
result follows, and an unsuccessful attempt to commit a
criminal act, if punished at all, is, as a rule, punished much
less severely than the accomplished act.
The Hottentots nowadays punish attempt, but only
leniently.^ The Wadshagga punish it less severely than
the accomplished act.^ Among some of the Marshall
Islanders it is not punished at all.® The same holds good
of the Ossetes ^ and Swanetians ®. of the Caucasus, as also of
ancient Russian law.® The Teutons, as a general rule, had
no punishment for him who tried to do harm, but failed ;
and if they did punish an unsuccessful attempt, the penalty
was out of proportion lenient.’' This feature of ancient
Teutonic law has had a lasting effect upon European
legislation, largely through the influence it exercised upon
the Italian jurists of the Middle Ages,® whose theories laid
the foundation of modern laws and doctrines on attempt.
In conformity with the Roman law, they held attempts to
commit crimes to be punishable, and in atrocious cases they
even admitted that the attempt might be subject to the
same punishment as the accomplished crime. But their
general theory was that it should be punished less severely,
and that the penalty should be lenient in proportion as the
actual deed was remote from the act intended.® These
views were generally adopted by the^ later legislation.
Among present European lawbooks, the French Code
P^nal is almost the only one that punishes an attempt
^ Kohler, m Zeilschr, f vergL 475, 509.
Recktswiss. xv. 353. h Seeger, Vermch der Verbrechen in
^ Merker, quoted by Kohler, ibid, der IVissensehaft des Mittelalters^ p. 8.
XV. 63. 9 Zacharia, op. cii. i. 169; ii. 141.
^ Kohler, ibid. xiv. 448. von Feuerbach>Mittermaier, Lehrbuch
^ Kovalewsky, Coutume contempo- des Peinlicken Rechts, p. 74.
raine, p. 296 sq. Code Phial ^ art. 2 : “ Toute tenta-
® D^este, Nouvelles Rudes (This- live de crime qui aura 6te manifest^e
toire au droit, p. 237. • par un commencement d’ex^cution, si
® Kovalewsky, op. cit. pp. 291, 299. elle n’a ete suspendue ou si elle n’a
^ Wilda, op. cit. p. 598 sqq. manqu^ son efFet que par des circon-
Zacharia, Die Lehre vom Versuche der stances independantes de la volonte de
Verbrechen, i. 164 sqq. ; ii. 130 sq. son auteur, est consideree comme le
Brunner, Deutsche Rechtsgeschichte, ii. crime meme.”
558 sqq. Pollock and Maitland, ii.
VOL, \
R
THE WILL AS THE
with the same severity as the finished crime.^ And the
French law on the subject is of modern origin ; before the
year IV, the present rule was applied only to the conatus
proximus in a few specified cases of a very heinous
character,^
Besides the provision of the Code P^nal concerning
attempt, there are a few other exceptions, of an earlier date,
to the general rule. The Romans seemed to have followed
the principle “ dolus pro facto accipitur,” * at least if the
crime attempted was a serious one.'* A somewhat similar
line was adopted by ancient Irish law. The general im-
pression produced by the rules in the commentary to
the Book of Aicill is, that the attempt to commit an
injurious act was treated as equivalent to its commis-
sion, unless the result was very insignificant. Thus,
if an attempt was made to slay, or to inflict an injury
which would endure for life, and blood was shed, the fine
was the same as if the attempt had succeeded ; whereas, if
the injury did not amount to the shedding of blood, the
fine was reduced one-half.^ And if a man went to kill
one person and killed another by mistake, a fine for the
intention, in addition to the fine due to the friends of the,
murdered man, was due to him whose death was intended,
even though no injury was actually done to him.® In
England, at the end of the Middle Ages, the will was
taken for the deed in cases of obvious attempts to murder ;
but this rule appears to have been considered too severe —
even in an age when death was the common punishment for
felony — and to have fallen into disuse several centuries
ago.^
^ Chauveau and Helic, Thiorie du perfecta adhuc vindicantiir, cruenta
Code Penaly i. 347 sq, mente, pura manu. Ergo .siciit ad
Ibid. i. 337 sq. poenam sufficit meditari punienda,^’
^ Digestay xlviii. 8. 7. ® Ancient Laws of Ireland, iii. pp.
^ Seeger, Verstich der Verbrechen cviii. sq. 139.
nach rbmischefn Recht, pp. i, 2, 49. ® Cherry, Growth of Crhninal Law,
Idem, Verstich der Verbrechen in der in Ancient Comnmnities, p. 32.
Wissenschaft des Mitielalters^ p. 9. Stephen, op. cit. ii. 222 sq.
Mommsen, Romisches Strafrecht, p. 97 Thomas Smith, Common-ivedlth of Eng-
sq. Apuleius, Florida, iv. 20 ; — In land, p. 194 sq.
jpalefipiis etiaip cogitata sceler3. poij
The question, which attempts should be punished, and
even the elementary question, what constitutes an attempt,
have been answered differently by different jurists and
legislators.^ In England all attempts whatever to commit
indictable offences, whether felonies or misdemeanours, are
punishable by law."* The French * and German ^ codes, on
the other hand, do not punish, except in a few particular
cases, attempts to commit de/ifs or Verbrechen, that is, what
the English jurists would describe as misdemeanours.
Again, should a person be punished for attempting to
commit a crime in a manner in which success is physically
impossible, as if he attempts to steal from a pocket which
is empty, or puts into a cup pounded sugar which he believes
to be arsenic ^ This question has given rise to a whole
literature. Seneca’s statement that “ he who mixes a sleep-
ing draught, believing it to be poison, is a poisoner,” ^
seems to have had the support of Roman law.® In Eng-
land, not long ago, the man who attempted to pick an
empty pocket, was not held liable for an attempt to
steal ; ^ but this case has been overruled, and it appears
now to be the law that an indictment would lie for such an
attempt.® According to the French® and Italian^® codes, it
would not be punished, according to some German law-
books, it would ; whilst the Strafgesetzbuch contains no
special provisions for attempts of a similar character.
Finally, there are different rules as to the stage at
which an attempt begins to be criminal, or as to the dis-
tinction between attempts and acts of preparation. The
Romans, it is supposed, drew no such distinction.*® The
French law regards as permissible acts of preparation many
^ See Cohn, Zur Lehre vom ver-
stichten unci U7iVoIlendeten Verbrechen^
i. 6 sqq.
Stephen, op. cit, ii. 224. ,
^ Code Pinal ^ art. 3.
• ^ Strafgesetzbuch^ art. 43.
® Seneca, De beneficiis^ v. 13, Cf.
Idem.^ Ad Seretitmi^ 7.
® Seeger, Versuch nach rbmischem
Reckt^ p. 50.
» ^ Stephen, op. cit, ii, 225.
® Harris, Principles of the Crifninal
Law., p. 209 n. c.
^ Stephen, op. cit. ii. 225.
Alimena, in Le d^^oit crirninel des
itats europieftSy ed. by von Liszt, p.
123.
von Feuerbach-Mittermaier, op. cit.
p. 76. Cohn, op. cit. i. 14,
Seeger, Versuch 'nach roftiischen
Rechty p. 49.
R 2
THE WILL AS THE
things which in England would be punished as attempts.^
In England lighting a match with intent to set fire to a
haystack has been held to amount to a criminal attempt to
burn it, although the defendant blew out the match on
seeing that he was watched. But it was said in the same
case that, if he had gone no further than to buy a box of
matches for the purpose, he would not have been liable,
the act being too remote from the offence to be criminal.'^
“ Liability will not begin until the offender has done
some act which not only manifests his mens rea but also
goes some way towards carrying it out.” ®
If we go a step further, we come to designs unaccom-
panied by any attempt whatever to realise them. The laws
of all countries agree as to the principle that an outward
event is requisite for the infliction of punishment. “ Cogi-
tationis poenam nemo patitur.” ^
This fact again illustrates the influence which external
deeds exercise upon the moral feelings of men. In the
average man moral emotions are hardly ever called into
existence by calm and penetrating reflection. There are
certain phenomena which for some reason or other are apt
to arouse in him such emotions, but he does not seek for
them. They must force themselves upon his mind, and
the more vigorously they do so, the stronger are the
emotions they excite. Nothing makes a greater impres-
sion on him than facts which are perceptible by the senses.
He will admit that an intention, or even a mere wish, to
do something wrong is wrong by itself, but an outward
event is generally needed for shaking him up. This, I
think, is the original reason why persons have not been
punished for intentions unaccompanied by external deeds.
No doubt, the principle that “ the thought of man shall
not be tried,” is strongly supported by the fact that, as a
mediasval writer puts it, “ the devil himself knoweth not
the thought of man.” ^ But considering how ready people
^ Chauveau and Helie, cit. i. 357 ^ Digesta, xlviii, 19. 18.
Stephen, op, cit. ii. 226. ® Quoted by Pollock and ,Maitland,
Holmes, Common Law, p. 67 sq, op, cit. ii. 474.
^ Kenny, op, cit. p. 79.
have been to presume guilt in cases of unintentional
injuries, it seems very incredible that they originally re-
frained from punishing bare intentions merely on account
of insufficient evidence. Indeed, as an exception to the
rule, in a few cases when the crime designed is regarded
with extreme horror, the very intention may give such
a shock to public imagination as to call for punish-
ment.
According to Chinese law, “ any person convicted of
a design to kill his or her father or mother, grandfather or
grandmother, whether by the father’s or mother’s side ;
and any woman convicted of a design to kill her husband,
husband’s father or mother, grandfather or grandmother,
shall, whether a blow is, or is not struck in consequence,
suffer death by being beheaded.” ^ This exceptional law
obviously owes its origin to the extreme reverence in which
parents and ancestors are held by the Chinese, and to the
wife’s subjection to her husband. In mediaeval laws refer-
ring to heresy we have another instance of punishment
being inflicted for a mere state of mind without any cor-
responding act. According to Julius Clarus, this exception
to the rule is due to the fact that the crime of heresy itself
consists in “sola mentis cogitatione.”“ But the real reason
why the law in this case troubled itself about men’s
thoughts, and even allowed them to be put on their trial
for their tacit opinions on bare suspicion, is the detestation
in which heresy was held and the extreme attention it
attracted. By all this, of course, I do not mean to deny
that a judicious and enlightened legislator may find other
grounds for taking no notice of mere intentions than their
inability to arouse public indignation. I only speak of
matters of fact.
Again, as regards acts of preparation and many cases of
unsuccessful attempts, it may be said that the agent per-
. haps would have altered his mind before he came to the
point, or that the failure of his attempt was possibly due
^ Ta Tsing Lett Lee^ sec. cclxxxiv.
.P- 305-
® Julius Clarus, Practica Criniinalis^
qu. 91 {Opera omnia^ ii. 625).
THE WILL AS THE
to a change of intention in the last moment.^ But there
are innumerable cases in which the attempt, with no less
certainty than the accomplished crime, displays a criminal
intention which is final. And it is particularly instructive
to note that, among the very peoples who treat uninten-
tional injuries with the greatest severity, unsuccessful
attempts are treated with the greatest leniency. This is
well illustrated by a comparison between Teutonic and
Roman law ; in either case the former chiefly looks at the
event, the latter chiefly at the intention of the agent. If there
is no punishment for a bare attempt to commit a crime, that
is because such an attempt makes no impression on the
public. If an attempt is punished more heavily according
as it is more advanced, that is because it calls forth greater
indignation in proportion as it comes near to the crime
intended. And if even the conatus proximus is punished
with less severity than the accomplished crime, that is
because the indignation it evokes is less. This explanation
is corroborated by concessions made by theorisers who
have in vain endeavoured to find more rational grounds
for existing laws on attempt. They have ultimately found
it necessary to resort to phrases such as “ the natural sense
of justice,” or to appeal to the feelings of the multitude.^
^ As a rule, the man who voluntarily
desists from the attempt to commit a
crime would not be punished at all (see
Seeger, Vemtch nac/i rornischem Kecht^
p. 50 ; Charles V/s Peinliche Gerichts
Ordnnng^ art. 178 ; the French Code
art. 2 ; the Italian Codice
Penale^ art. 61 ; Finger, Conipendiiwi
des dste,’reichische 7 L Kechtes — Strafi'echt,
i. 181 ; and, for various German laws,
Zachariii, op. cit. ii. 31 1 sq.^ and Cohn,
op. cit. i. 12 jy.), or he would be
punished more leniently than if there
had been no such desistance (Zacharia,
ii, 239 jyy. Cohn, i. 12 sq.). On this
subject see also Herzog, Riicktritt vom
Versuch ttnd Thatige Retie, passim.
Lelievre, De conatu delinqtundi,
p. 361 (quoted by Zacharia, op. cit. ii.
66, n. 2) : “ Ceterum libenter fateor,
me potius sentire aliquam necessitaten\
paululum levins in perfcctum crimen
ac in maleficium consummaturn ani-
madvertendi, quam reddere posse
claram necessitatis rationem.” Abegg,
Die verse kiedctte ft Strafrechtsthcoricen,
p. 65 : “ FUr uns folgt aber jene
nothwendige Beobachtung der con-
creten Unterschiede, in dem Gebiete
der Erscheinung, nach der aus dem
Gerechtigkeitsprincipe abgeleitcten
Regel, dass Jeder fur seine That, iind
was er verdient babe, leiden solle.”
Zacharia, op. cit. ii. 51 : — “ So macht
sich in dem natliilichen Gerechtigkeits-
Gefiihl des Einzelnen imd des ganzen
Volkes auch von selbst die Unterschei-
dung zwischen der Strafe des vollen-
deten und der des bios versuchten
Verbrechens geltend. . . . Es kann
freilich seyn, dass der grosste Theil
der Menschen fur ein solches natiir-
liches Gefiihl keine Griinde' anzuge-
ben vermag ; allein das ' Strafrecht,
M. Rossi observes, “ Nous pensons que le sens commun et
la conscience publique ont constamment tenu le meme
langage. ‘ Le d^lit n’ a pas consomfn^, done la puni-
tion doit etre moindre.’ Cette id6e de proportion
mat^rielle, ce sentiment de justice, grossiere j’en conviens,
est naturel a Thomme.” ^ This is the view taken by the un-
reflecting moral consciousness. To him whose feelings
are tempered by thought, “ a man,” as Seneca says, “ is no
less a brigand, because his sword becomes entangled in his
victim’s clothes, and misses its mark.” ^
In the same way as moral indignation, is moral approval
influenced by external events. Though we would not
praise a person for some deed of his which we clearly
recognise to reflect no merit on his will, the benefits which
result from a good act easily induce us to exaggerate
the goodness of the agent. On the other hand, it is success
alone that confers upon a man the full reward which he
deserves ; good intentions without corresponding deeds
meet with little applause even when the failure is due to
mere misfortune. “ In our real feeling or sentiment,”
Hume observes, “ we cannot help paying a greater regard
to one whose station, joined to virtue, renders him really
useful to society, than to one who exerts the social virtues
only in good intentions and benevolent affections.”
It is thus only from want of due reflection that moral
judgments are influenced by outward deeds. Owing to its
very nature, the moral consciousness, when sufficiently
influenced by thought, regards the will as the only proper
object of moral disapproval or moral praise. That moral
qualities are internal, is not an invention of any particular
moralist or any particular religion ; it has been recognised
by thoughtful men in many different countries and different
welches ja gerade auf die gro.s.se Finger, op. cit. i. 177.
Menge zu wirken hat, kann desseniin- ^ Ro.ssi, TraiU de droit ptinaly ii.
geachtet solche unwillkuilich im Volke 318.
sich geltend machende Ansichten nicht ^ Seneca, Ad Seremwty 7.
unberlicksichtigt lassen.” Cf. also
ages. ‘‘ He that is pure in heart is the truest priest/' said
Buddha.^ In the Taouist work, ‘ Kan ying peen,’ it is
written : — “ If you form in your heart a good intention,
although you may not have done any good, the good
spirits follow you. If you form in your heart a bad
intention, although you may not have done any harm, the
evil spirits follow you." ^ According to the Thai-Shang,
mere wishes are sufficient to constitute badness.^ One of
the Pahlavi texts puts the following words into the mouth
of the Spirit of Wisdom : — To be grateful in the world,
and to wish happiness for every one ; this is greater and
better than every good work." ^ God, says the Koran,
will not catch you up for a casual word in your oaths,
but He will catch you up for what your hearts have
earned." According to the Rabbis, the thought of sin is
worse than sin, and an unchaste thought is a wicked
thing." ^ It was an ancient Mexican maxim that “ he who
looks too curiously on a woman commits adultery with his
eyes " ^ — a striking parallel to the passage in St. Matthew
V. 28. ‘‘Voluntas remuneratur, non opus," says the
Canonist. “ Licet gladio non occidat, voluntate tamen
interficit." “ Non ideo minus delinquit, cui sola deest
facultas." ®
^ Hopkins, Religions of India, p.
319-
^ Douglas, Confucianism and laoic-
ism, p. 270.
^ 'IVuU-Shang, 4.
^ Dind-i-A/afnSgi Kkirad, Ixiii. ^
sqq. Cf ibid. i. lO, where it is said
that the good work which a man does
unwittingly is little of a good work,
though the sin which a man commits
unwittingly amounts to a sin in its
origin.
® Korajt, ii. 225. Cf Ameer Ali,
Ethics of Is him, p. 26.
Schechter, in Montefiore, op. cit. p.
558. Cf. Deutsch, Literary Remains,
P* ,52-
" Sahagun, llistoi'ia ge^ieral de las
cosas de Nueva Espafia, vi. 22, vol. ii.
147 : “ Dice el refran que el que curio f
$ ament e mira a la niuger adult dr a con
la vista.”
® Gratian, Decretum, ii. 33. 3. 25,
30, 29.
Chapter X
AGENTS UNDER INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY
We hold an agent responsible not only for his inten-
tion, but for any known concomitant of his act, as also
for any such unknown concomitant of it as we attribute
to want of due attention. But for anything which he
could not be aware of he is not responsible. Hence certain
classes of agents — animals, children, idiots, madmen — are
totally or partially exempted from moral blame and legal
punishment.
Though animals are undoubtedly capable of acting, we
do not regard them as proper objects of moral indigna-
tion. The reason for this is not merely the very limited
scope of their volitions and their inability to foresee conse-
quences of their acts, since these considerations could only
restrict their responsibility within correspondingly narrow
limits. Their total irresponsibility rests on the presumption
that they are incapable of recognising any act of theirs as
right or wrong. If the concomitant of an act is imputable
to the agent only in so far as he could know it, it is
obvious that no act is wrong which the agent could not
know to be wrong.
It is a familiar fact that, by discipline, we may teach
domesticated animals to live up to a certain standard of
behaviour, but this by no means implies that we awake in
them moral feelings. When some writers credit dogs and
apes with a conscience,^ we must remember that an
^ Romanes, Mental Evolution in der Thiere^ p. 67. Brehm, From
^ AnimalSy p. 352. Petty, Seelenleben North Pole to Equator^ p. 298.
2§0
AGENTS UNDER
observer’s inference is not the same as an observed fact.^
It seems that the so-called conscience in animals is nothing
more than an association in the animal’s mind between
the performance of a given act and the occurrence of
certain consequences, together with a fear of those con-
sequences/^
The following is one of the most striking instances of what
Professor Romanes regards as conscience in animals ; it
refers to a terrier which had never, even in its puppyhood, been '
known to steal, but on the contrary used to make an excellent
guard to protect property from other animals, servants, and so
forth, even though these were his best friends. “ Nevertheless,”
says Professor Romanes, on one occasion he was very hungry,
and in the room where I was reading and he was sitting, there
was, within easy reach, a savoury mutton chop. I was greatly
surprised to see him stealthily remove this chop and take it
under a sofa. However, I pretended not to observe what had
occurred, and waited to see what would happen next. For
fully a quarter of an hour this terrier remained under the sofa
without making a sound, but doubtless enduring an agony of
contending feelings. Eventually, however, conscience came
off victorious, for, emerging from his place of concealment and
carrying in his mouth the stolen chop, he came across the room
and laid the tempting morsel at my feet. The moment he
dropped the stolen property he bolted again under the sofa, and
from this retreat no coaxing could charm him for several hours
afterwards. Moreover, when during that time he was spoken
to or patted, he always turned away his head in a ludicrously
conscience-stricken manner. Altogether I do not think it
would be possible to imagine a more satisfactory exhibition of
conscience by an animal than this ; for . . . the particular
animal in question was never beaten in its life.” The author
then adds in a note that mere dread of punishment cannot even
be suspected to have been the motive principle of action.” ^ It
may be so, if by punishment be understood the infliction of
physical pain. But it can hardly be doubted that the terrier
suspected his master to be displeased with his behaviour, and
the dread of displeasure or reproof may certainly have been
the sole reason for his bringing back the stolen food. Among
^ C/. Lloyd Morgan, Animal Life ^ Romanes, ‘Conscience in Ani-
and Intelligence^ p. 399. inals,’ in Quarterly fotirnal of Science^
Cf. ibid, p. 405. xiii. 156 sq»
INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY
“ high-life ” dogs, as Professor Romanes himself observes,
“ wounded sensibilities and loss of esteem are capable of pro-
ducing much keener suffering than is mere physical pain.” ^ But
fear of the anticipated consequences of an act, even when mixed
with shame, is not the same as the moral feeling of remorse.
There is no indication that the terrier felt that his act was
wrong, in the strict sense of the word.
However, though most of us, on due reflection, would
deny that animals are proper objects of moral censure,
there is a general tendency to deal with them as if they
were. The dog or the horse that obstinately refuses to
submit to its master’s will arouses a feeling of resentment
which almost claims to be righteous ; and the shock given
to public feeling by some atrocious deed committed by
a beast calls for retribution. As Adam Smith observes,
“ the dog that bites, the ox that gores, are both of them
punished. If they have been the causes of the death of
any person, neither the public, nor the relations of the
slain, can be satisfied, unless they are put to death in their
turn ; nor is this merely for the security of the living,
but, in some measure, to revenge the injury of the
dead.” '
If thus our own resentment towards an animal which
has caused some injury, when not duly tempered by
reason, often comes near actual indignation, it is not
surprising to find that, at the lower stages of human civili-
sation, animals are deliberately treated as responsible
agents. The American Indian who eats the vermin which
molest him defends his action by arguing that, as the
animal has first bitten him, he is only retaliating the
injury on the injurer.® The custom of blood-revenge is
often extended to the animal world. The Kukis, says
Mr. Macrae, “ are of a most vindictive disposition ;
blood must always be shed for blood ; if a tiger kills
^ Idem^ Animal Inlelligence^ p. 439. Travels in the Interior of North
Adam Smith, 7 'heory of Moral America^ p. 327. Southey, History of
Sentimeifts ^ p. 137. Brazil, i. 223. Cf Bastian, Der
^ Harmon, foinmal of Voyages and Mensch in der Geschichte, iii. 25.
AGENTS UNDER
any of them, near a Parah [or village], the whole tribe
is up in arms, and goes in pursuit of the animal ; when
if he is killed, the family of the deceased gives a feast of
his flesh, in revenge of his having killed their relation.
And should the tribe fail to destroy the tiger, in this first
general pursuit of him, the family of the deceased must
still continue the chase ; for until they have killed either
this, or some other tiger, and have given a feast of his
flesh, they are in disgrace in the Parah^ and not associated
with by the rest of the inhabitants. In like manner, if
a tiger destroys one of a hunting party, or of a party of
warriors, on an hostile excursion, neither the one nor the
other (whatever their success may have been) can return
to the Parahy without being disgraced, unless they kill
the tiger.” ^ Of the Sea Dyaks we are told that they will
not willingly take part in capturing an alligator, unless
the alligator has first destroyed one of themselves ; “ for
why, say they, should they commit an act of aggression,
when he and his kindred can so easily repay them But
should the alligator take a human life, revenge becomes a
sacred duty of the living relatives, who will trap the man-
eater in the spirit of an officer of justice pursuing a
criminal. . . . The man-eating alligator is supposed to be
pursued by a righteous Nemesis ; and whenever one is
caught, they have a profound conviction that it must be
the guilty one, or his accomplice, for no innocent leviathan
could be permitted by the fates to be caught by man.” ^
So, also, the Malagasy will never kill a crocodile, except
in retaliation for one of their friends or neighbours who
has been destroyed by a crocodile. “ They believe that
the wanton destruction of one of these reptiles will be
followed by the loss of human life, in accordance with the
principle of lex talionis. The inhabitants living in the
neighbourhood of the lake Itasy, to the west of the
central province, are accustomed to make a yearly pro-
* Macrae, ‘Account of the Kookies,’ Journal of the Straits Branch of the
va Asiatick Researches, vii. 189. Royal Asiatic Society, ro, p. 221
Perham, ‘ Sea Oyak Religion,* in sq, Cf Frazer, Golden Bough, ii, 390.
INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY
clamation to the crocodiles, warning them that they shall
revenge the death of some of their friends by killing as
many voay in return, and warning the well-disposed croco-
diles to keep out of the way, as they have no quarrel with
them, but only with their evil-minded relatives who have
taken human life.” *
Animals are not only exposed to the blood-feud, but
are often exposed to regular punishment. This is the
case among the Mambettu in Central Africa. Casati
mentions the following instance : — “ A goat was chased
and persecuted by a dog, and in the fight for self-defence
the latter received a thrust from the goat’s horn. The
poor dog, which was the valuable property of a powerful
man, died shortly after. This serious matter was much
discussed and commented upon, and finally referred to the
king for judgment. The poor goat was sentenced to be
slaughtered before its victim’s corpse, its flesh was served to
the Mambettu [that is, people of the superior race], and
that of the dog to the Mege [that is, people of the con-
quered race].” Among the Maori, according to Polack,
the crime of impiety is not confined to man only, but
even a pig straying over a sacred place incurs the punish-
ment of death.® In Muhammedan East Africa, some time
ago, a dog was publicly scourged for having entered a
mosque.^ The Bogos kill a bull or cow which causes
the death of a man.® According to the native code of
Malacca, if a buffalo or a head of cattle “ be tied in
the forest, in a place where people are not in the
habit of passing, and there gore anybody to death, it
shall be put to death but the owner of the animal
shall not be held liable!** According to Hebrew law,
“ if an ox gore a man or a woman, that they die :
then the ox shall be surely stoned, and his flesh shall
not be eaten”; and, in the case of sexual intercourse
► ^ Sibree, The Great African Island^ ^ von Amira, Thierstrafen und
p. 269. Thierprocesse, p. 30.
^ Casati, Ten Years in Equatoria, ® Munzinger, Die Siticn und das
i. 176. Recht der Bogos ^ p. 83.
^ Polack, Manners and Customs of ® Newbold, British Settlements in
^ the New Zealanders^ i. 240. the Straits of Malacca^ ii* 257.
AGENTS UNDER
between a man, or woman, and a beast, not only the
human offender, but the beast, is to be put to death. ^ It
is prescribed in the Vendidad that, if a mad dog which
bites without barking, smite a sheep or wound a man,
“ the dog shall pay for the wound of the wounded as for
wilful murder.” Plato had undoubtedly borrowed from
Attic custom or law the idea which underlies the following
regulation in his ‘ Laws ’ : — “ If a beast of burden or other
anirhal cause the death of any one, except in the case of
anything of that kind happening to a competitor in the
public contests, the kinsmen of the deceased shall prosecute
the slayer for murder, and the wardens of the country, such,
and so many as the kinsmen appoint, shall try the cause, and
let the beast when condemned be slain by them, and let them
cast it beyond the borders. ” ® In various European countries
animals have been judicially sentenced to death, and
publicly executed, in retribution for injuries inflicted by
them. Advocates were assigned to defend the accused
animals, and the whole proceedings, trial, sentence, and
execution, were conducted with all the strictest formalities
of justice.^ These proceedings seem to have been par-
ticularly common from the end of the thirteenth till the
seventeenth century ; the last case in France occurred as
late as 1845.'* only domestic animals, but even wild
ones, were thus put on trial.® “In 1565 the Arlesians
asked for the expulsion of the grasshoppers. The case
came before the Tribunal de l’Officialit6, and Maitre Marin
was assigned to the insects as counsel. He defended his
clients with much zeal. Since the accused had been
created, he argued that they wer^ justified in eating what
was necessary to them. The opposite council cited the
serpent in the Garden of Eden, and sundry other animals
^ Exodus^ xxi. 28 sq, Leviticus^ vol. iv. 139.
XX. 15 sq, ® von Amira, Thierstrafe^i^ pp. 2,
2 Vendtddd^ xiii. 31. Cf, ibid, xiii. 15, 16, 28 sq. In England such pro-
32 sqq. ; Yasts, xxiv. 44. ceedings seem to have hardly occurred
^ Plato, Leges, ix. 873. at all (ibid. p. 15), but, as we shall see,
^ Chambers, Book of Days, i. 127. an animal which caused the death of a
Fertile, ‘ Gli animali in giudizio,’ in man was forfeited as deodand.
d^l E. Istituto Venetp, ser. vi. ® See Chambers, of, cit, i. 127 s<^.
INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY
mentioned in Scripture, as having incurred severe penalties.
The grasshoppers got the worst of it, and were ordered to
quit the territory, with a threat of anathematisation from
the altar, to be repeated till the last of them had obeyed
the sentence of the honourable court.” From an earlier
period we have records of maledictions and excommunica-
tions of vermin and obnoxious insects. In 1 1 20 , a bishop
of Laon is reported to have excommunicated the cater-
pillars which were ravaging his diocese, with the same
formula as that employed the previous year by the
Council of Rheims in cursing the priests who persisted in
marrying in spite of the canons.^ Such maledictions and ex-
communications, however, were probably regarded rather
as magical means of expulsion than as punishments.®* Not
long ago, when swarms of locusts ravaged the gardens of
Tangier, the Shereef of Wazzan expelled the injurious
animals by spitting into the mouth of one of them.
• It has been suggested that the mediaeval practice of
punishing animals after human fashion was derived from the
Mosaic law.^ But this hypothesis does not account for
the comparatively late appearance of the practice, nor for
the fact that, in some cases, other punishments short of
death were inflicted upon offending beasts.® It seems
much more probable that the procedure in question de-
veloped out of an ancient European custom, to which it
stood in the relationship of punishment to revenge.®
According to the customs or laws of various so-called Aryan
peoples — Greeks,’^ Romans,® Teutons,® Celts,’® Slavs “ — an
^ Martinengo-Cesaresco, Essays in
the Study of Folk-Songs^ p. 183 sq.
Desmaze, Les phialitils anciefines,
p. 31 sq,
^ This is the opinion of von Aniira,
who, however — as it seems to me,
without sufficient evidence — suggests
that the maledictions did not refer to
ordinary animals, but to human souls
or devils in disguise ( Thferstrafen, p.
sqq.)
^ Ibid. pp. 4, 47 sqq.
® Fertile, loc. cit. p. 148.
® Cf. Brunner, Forschungen zur
Qpschicht^ d^s d^fitschen t*nd franzq-
si sc hen Fee hies, p. 517 sqq.
" Plutarch, Vita Solon is, 24. Xeno-
phon, Hist or ice Grcecce, ii. 4. 41.
^ /nstitiiiioneSyiv. g. Digestafxy.. i.
^ Lex Salica (cod. i. ), 36. Lex Ripu-
ariorum, 46. Grimm, Deutsche Fechts-
alterthumer, p, 664 sqq. Brunner,
Forschungen, p. 5^3
Ancient I.aws of Ireland, i. 16 1 ;
iv. 177, 179, 181. Welsh Imws , iv. i.
17 {Ancient l.aws and Institutes of
Wales, p. 391).
Macieiowski, Slavische Fechts^e-
schichte, iv. 333.
AGENTS UNDER
animal which did some serious damage, especially if it caused
the death of a man, was to be given up to the injured party,
or his family, obviously in order that it might be retaliated
upon.' According to the Welsh Laws, “ that is the only
case in which the murderer is to be given up for his deed.” ^
The fact that afterwards, in the later Middle Ages, this
form of reprisal was in certain instances transformed
into regular punishment, only implies that the principle
according to which punishment succeeded vengeance in the
case of human crimes was, by way of analogy, extended
to injuries committed by animals.
There has been considerable diversity of opinion con-
cerning the purpose of inflicting punishments upon animals.
Some writers suggest that it was possibly done with a view
to deterring other animals from committing similar
injuries.® According to others, the animal was executed
in order that the hateful act should be forgotten ; Gratian,
referring to St. Augustine,'* says, “ Non propter culpam,
sed propter memoriam facti pecus occiditur, ad quod
mulier accesserit.” ® A theory which has gained much
adherence explains the punishment as a symbolic
act, performed for the purpose of inspiring horror
of the crime into the minds of men.® M. Thonissen
maintains that, at Athens, “ on frappait I’animal auteur
d’un homicide, afin que le peuple, en voyant p^rir un etre
privd de raison, con^ut une grande horreur pour I’efFusion
du sang humain.” ' It has also been supposed that the
animal was punished with intention to intimidate those
^ See Lex IVisigothoruni, viii. 4. 20 ;
Schwabenspiegel ^ I^andrcchtbiich, 204 ;
Dirksen, Chnlistische A b hand! tin gen.,
i. 104; von Jherinj;, Geist dcs rbniischen
Rechts,\. 123; Die Znrechtmng
anf dcm Gebiete des CitnlrecJUs , p.
103 ; Grimm, Deutsche Rechtsalter-
ihumer, p. 664 ; Brunner, Deutsche
Rechtsgeschichte^ ii. 556 ; Idem, For-
schungeft, p. 513.
^ IVelsh Laws, iv. i. 17 {Ancient
Laws and Institutes of Wales, p. 391).
^ Leibnitz, Essais de Theodicle,
p. 182 sq, Lessona, quoted by
d’Addosio, Bestie delinquenti, p. 145.
^ St. Augustine, Qucesiiones in L^vi-
ticum, 74 {ad. I.ev. xx. l6) : “Nam
pecora inde credendum cst jussa inter-
fici, quia tali flagitio contaminata,
indignam refricant facti memoriam”
(Migne, Patrologice cur sits, xxxiv. 709)*
® Gratian, Decretum, ii. 15. i. 4.
Cf. Mishna, fob 54, quoted by Rabbi-
no wicz, Ugislaiion cydmmelle du Tal-
mud, p. 1 16.
® Ayrault, Des procH faicts au
cadaver, aux cendres, h la 7 nImoire,
aux besies brutes, fob 24. Ortolan,
Jflllments du droit final, p. 188.
Ti.ssot, Le droit final, i. 19 sq.
^ Thonissen, Le droit final de la,
riftiblique Athini^nne, p. 414.
INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY
who were responsible for its acts/ or that it was killed
because it was dangerous.^ But the true solution of the
problem seems simple enough. The animal had to suffer
on account of the indignation it aroused. It was regarded
as responsible for its deed.^ In early records the punish-
ment is frequently spoken of as an act of ‘‘justice”/
and the protests of Beaumanoir and others against this
opinion ^ only show that it was held in good earnest, if not
by all, at least by many. From certain details we can
also see how closely the responsibility ascribed to animals
resembled the responsibility of men. In some of the
texts of the Salic law the animal is spoken of as “ auctor
criminis.” In an ancient Irish law-tract it is said that,
when a bee has blinded a person’s eye, the whole hive
“ shall pay the fine,” and “ the many become accountable
for the crime of one, although they all have not attacked.” '
Youth was a ground for acquittal, as appears from a
case which occurred at Lavegny in 1457, when a sow and
her six young ones were tried on a charge of their having
murdered and partly eaten a child : whilst the sow, being
found guilty, was condemned to death, the young pigs
were acquitted on account of their youth and the bad
example of their mother.^ In Burgundy, a distinction
was made between a mischievous dog that entered a room
through an open door and one that committed a burglary ;
the latter was a larroriy and was to be punished as such.'^
The repetition of a crime aggravated the punishment.
1 Du Boys, quoted by d’Addosio, ® Lex Salica^ edited by Ilessels,
op. cit. p. 139. coll. 209-212, 215.
2 Lessona, quoted ibid. p. 145. ^ Ancient Laws of Ireland., iv. 179.
^ Cf. Post, Die Grimdlagen des ^ Chambers, op. cit. i. 128.
Rechts, p. 359 ; Friedrichs, ‘ Mcnsch ® Ancient Contnmier de Bourgogne.,
und Person,’ in Das Atcsland, 1891, 23 {Revue historique de droit franfais
pp. 300, 315; and, especially, et Itranger, Vn. 549): “ II deust hauoir
d Addosio, cit. p. 1465^^.: “Nel faire iustice del larron.”
medioevo si puni I’animale perche lo si Fertile, loc. cit. p. 148: “La
ritenne in certo modo conscio delle sue Carta de I.ogic d’ Eleonora giudicessa
azioni, in certo modo Ubero, in certo d’Arborea{i395) prescrive : che venendo
jiiodo responsabile.” ' trovato un asino in danno sui fondi
•* von Amira, op. cit. p. 9. altrui, per la prima volta gli si tagli im
Beaumanoir, Les coutumes du orecchio ; la seconda, I’altro ; e la
Beauvoisis, Ixix. 6, vol. ii. 485 sq. terza, si confischi la bestia consegnan-
Chambers, cit. i. 127. Lichtenberg, dola alia cortc principesca.” Cf.
V^nnischte Schriften, iv. 481. Vendiddd, xiii. 32 sqq.
VOL. I
S
AGENTS UNDER
And the animal “principal ” was punished more severely
than the “ accessories.” ^
Considering the feelings to which even the cultured
mind is susceptible with reference to a mischievous beast,
it is not difficult to understand the attitude of the ignorant.
The savage, not only momentarily, while in a rage, but
permanently and in cold blood, obliterates the boundaries
between man and beast. He regards all animals as practi-
cally on a footing of equality with man. He believes
that they are endowed with feelings and intelligence like
men, that they are united into families and tribes like
men, that they have various languages like human tribes,
that they possess souls which survive the death of the
bodies just as is the case with human souls. He tells of
animals that have been the ancestors of men, of men that
have become animals, of marriages that take place between
men and beasts. He also believes that he who slays an
animal will be exposed to the vengeance either of its dis-
embodied spirit, or of all the other animals of the same
species which, quite after human fashion, are bound to
resent the injury done to one of their number.^ Is it not
natural, then, that the savage should give like for like
If it is the duty of animals to take vengeance upon men,
is it not equally the duty of men to take vengeance upon
animals ?
Nor are these beliefs restricted to savages. Muham-
medans maintain, not only that animals will share with
men the general resurrection, but that they will be
judged according to their works. Their tradition says
that God “ will raise up animals at the last day to receive
^ (TAddosio, op. cit. p. 16.
^ Tylor, Primitive Culture^ i. 467
sqq. Frazer, Golden Bough, ii. 389
sqq. Liebrecht, Zur Volkskunde^ p.
17. Acheli.s, Moderne Volkerktmde, p.
373 Idem-’, ‘Animal Worship/
in Open Court, xi. 705 sq. Waitz,
Anthropologie der Naturvolker, ii. 180
(Negroes), von den Steinen, Unter
den Nattu^blkern Zentral-Brasiliens,
p. 351. Im Thurn, Among the Indians
of Gidana, p. 350 sqq, Donnarj,
Origin of Primitive Super stitions, pp.
223, 253. Lumholtz, Unknown
Mexico, i. 331 (Tarahumares).
Mooney, ‘ Myths of the Cherokee,’ in
Ann. Rep. Bur. Ethn. xix. pp. 250,
261 sq. Nelson, ‘ Eskimo about
Bering Strait,’ ibid, xviii. 423. Ho.se
and McDougall, ‘ Relations between
Men and Animals in Sarawak,’ in
four. Anthr. Inst. xxxi. 473
especially p. 205 sq.
INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY
reward and to show His perfection and His justice. Then
the hornless goat will be revenged on the horned one.”’^
We can hardly wonder that the Zoroastrian law inflicted
punishments on dogs which hurt men or animals, when
we read in the Vendidad that a dog has the characters of
eight sorts of people.^ The fable and the Mdrchen for a
long time related in good earnest their stories of animals
that behaved exactly like men.® Even to this day, in
certain districts of Europe, as soon as a peasant is dead,
it is customary for his heir to announce the change of
ownership to every beast in the stall, and to the bees also ; *
and in some parts of Poland, when the corpse of the rustic
proprietor is being carried out, all his cattle are let loose,
that they may take leave of their old master.® In the
Middle Ages animals were sometimes accepted as witnesses ;
a man who was accused of having committed a murder in
his house appeared before the tribunal with his cat, his
dog, and his cock, swore in their presence that he was
innocent, and was acquitted.® It was not only the common
people that ascribed intelligence to beasts. According to
Porphyry, all the philosophers who have endeavoured to
discover the truth concerning animals have acknowledged
that they to a certain extent participate of reason ; '' and
the same idea is expressed by Christian writers of a much
later date. In the sixteenth century, Benoit wrote that
animals often speak.® In the middle of the following
century, Hieronymus Rorarius published a book entitled
‘ Quod animalia bruta ratione utantur melius homine.’
And about the same time Johann Crell, in his ‘ Ethica
Christiana,’ expressed the opinion that animals at all events
possess faculties analogous to reason and free-will, that they
have something similar to virtues and vices, that they
^ Koran^ vi. 38. Sell, Faith of ® Ralston, op. cit. p. 318.
/s/dm, p. 223. ® Michelet, Origines dtc droit fran-
. ^ Vendiddd, xiii. 44 sqq, * ^ais, pp. 76, 279 sq. Chambers, <?/.
^ See Grimm, Reinhart Ftichs, p. i. cit. i. 129.
sqq. Porphyry, De abstinentia ab esu
^ Ralston, Songs of the Russian animalium, iii. 6.
People, p. 315. Wuttke, Der deutsche ® Benott, quoted by d’Addosio, op.
Volksaberglaube der Gegenwart, p. 428. cit. p. 214.
S 2
26 o
AGENTS UNDER
deserve something like rewards and punishments, and are
consequently punished by God and man.^ This, as it
seems to me, is the correct explanation of the mediaeval
practice of punishing animals, even though, in some cases,
as M. Menabrea observes, the obnoxious animal was
regarded as an embodiment of some evil spirit and was
punished as such.^ The beast or insect was retaliated
upon for the simple reason that it was regarded as a
rational being.
At the earlier stages of civilisation even inanimate
things are treated as if they were responsible agents.
The Kukis take revenge not only on a murderous
tiger, but on a murderous tree. “ If a man should
happen to be killed, by an accidental fall from a tree,
all his relations assemble, and cut it down ; and how-
ever large it may be, they reduce it to chips, which
they scatter in the winds, for having, as they say, been
the cause of the death of their brother.”® Among
the aborigines of Western Victoria, “when the spear or
weapon of an enemy has killed a friend, it is always
burnt by the relatives of the deceased ; but those
captured in battle are kept, and used by the conquerors.”^
The North American Redskins, when struck with an arrow
in battle, “ will tear it from the wound, break and bite it
with their teeth, and dash it on the ground.”® The
British Guiana Indian, when hurt either by falling on a
rock, or by the rock falling on him, “ attributes the blame,
by a line of argument still not uncommon in more
civilised life, to the rock.”® The gods of the Vedic age
cursed the trees which had injured them.’^ Xerxes com-
^ Crell, Ethica Christiana^ ii. I, p. reftdns an tnoyen-age conire les animaux^
65 sq. : — “ Hinc aliquid ctiam virtuti et p. 35. ^
vitio simile, sen recte et prave factum : ^ Macrae, in Asiatick Researches^
quorum illud cst, cum bruta naturae vii. 189 sq.
suce ductum sequuntur, hoc cum a ** Dawson, Atistra/ian Aborigines^
natiirali via exorbitant. Unde tandem p. 53.
etiam aliquid proemio aut poense, et ® Robertson, History of Atnerica, i. *
hide quidem maxime simile. Unde 351 sq.
bestias etiam a Deo punitas, aut pcenas ® Im Thurn, op. cit, p. 354.
certas lege illis constitutas, cernimus.” ^ Oldenberg, Religion des Veda, p.
Menabrea, De Vorigine de /dt 518,
forme et de tesprit des jiigements ^
manded that the Hellespont should be stricken with three
hundred lashes,^ and Cyrus “ wreaked his vengeance ” on
the river Gyndes by dispersing it through three hundred
and sixty channels.^ Pausanias relates that when Thea-
genes had died, one of his enemies went up to his statue
every night, and whipped the brass. At last, however,
“ the status checked his insolence by falling on him ; but
the sons of the deceased prosecuted the statue for murder.
The Thasians sank the statue in the sea, herein following
the view taken by Draco, who, in the laws touching
homicide which he drew up for the Athenians, enacted
that even lifeless things should be banished if they fell
on anybody and killed him.”* As Dr. Frazer remarks,
the punishment of inanimate objects for having accident-
ally been the cause of death was probably much older
than Draco.* At Athens there was a special tribunal for
the purpose.* Demosthenes states that, if a stone or a
piece of wood or iron or any such thing fell and struck a
man, and the person who threw the thing was not known,
but the people knew, and were in possession of, the object
which killed the man, that object was brought to trial at
the court of the Prytaneum.*’ Plato lays down the follow-
ing rule in his ‘ Laws ’ “ If any lifeless thing deprive a
man of life, except in the case of a thunderbolt or other
fatal dart sent from the gods, — whether a man is killed
by lifeless objects falling upon him, or by his falling upon
them, the nearest of kin shall appoint the nearest neigh-
bour to be a judge, and thereby acquit himself and the
whole family of guilt. And he shall cast forth the guilty
thing beyond the border.”^ Teutonic law, which still
recognised the principle of self-revenge, treated the
inanimate murderer with less ceremony.* According to
the Laws of Alfred, when men were at work together in
^ Herodotus, vii. 35. ® Demosthenes, Contra Aristo-
Ibid, i. 190. " cratem^ 76, p. 645.
Pausanias, vi. ii. 6. Cf. ibid. v. ^ Plato, Leges., ix. 873 S(^.
27. 10. ^ See Trummer, Vorhiige iiber
Frazer, Pausanias., ii. 371. Tortur, drr. i. 376 sq. Brunner,
® Aristotle, De republica Athenien- Forschungen, P-521 sqq.
^sium^ 57. Pausanias, i. 28. 10.
AGENTS UNDER
a forest, and by misadventure one let a tree fall on
another, which killed him, the tree belonged to the dead
man’s kinsfolk if they took it away within thirty days.^
Later on, in England, a thing by which death was caused
was “ forfeited to God, that is to the King, God’s Lieu-
tenant on earth, to be distributed in works of charity for
the appeasing of God’s wrath.”^ This law remained in
force till 1 846.®
In some of these cases superstitious dread may have
been a motive for destroying or banishing the instrument
of death. There are facts which prove that such an
object is looked upon as a source of danger. According
to the Ripuarian law, people are forbidden 4 o make use of
a thing which has been “ auctor interfectionis and in
Norway, in quite modern times, sickles, axes, and other
objects with which men have been killed, have been seen
lying about abandoned and unused.® Again, among the
aborigines of West Australia, if a person has been killed
by a thrust of the native wooden spear, ghiciy his country,
men think that his soul remains in the point of the
weapon which caused his death, and they burn it after his
burial, so that the soul may depart.® But it is also obvious
that an inanimate thing which is the cause of a hurt is
apt to evoke a genuine feeling of resentment. We kick
the chair over which we stumble, we curse the stone which
hurts us ; Dr. Nansen says that, when he was crossing
Greenland, it would have caused him “ quite real satis-
faction ” to destroy a sledge which was heavy to draw.’^
When we thus behave as if the offending object were
capable of feeling our resentment, we for a moment vaguely
believe that it is alive.* But our anger very soon passes
^ Laws of Alfred, ii. 13.
^ Coke, Third Part of the Insti-
tutes of the Latvs of England, p. 57.
^ Stephen, History of the Criminal
Law of Engiandy iii. 78. Pollock
and Maitland, History of E^iglish Lmw
before the Time of Edward /. ii. 473.
* Lex Ripuariortim, Ixx. i.
® Liebrecht, Zur Volkskunde,^,
® Salvado, M^mou'es historiques sur
VAustralie, p. 260 sq.
^ Nansen, Eskimo Life, p- 213 sq,
® Cf Dugald Stewart, Philosophy of
the Active and Moral Powers of Man,
i. 125; Hall, ‘Study of Anger, \in
American fournal of Psychology, x.
566 sq.
INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY
away when we realise the true nature of its object. The
case is different with men at earlier stages of civilisation.
They do not suppose that things which hurt them are
senseless ; on the contrary, they personify such things, not
only hastily and momentarily, but deliberately and per-
manently ; hence their resentment lasts. The Guiana
Indian, says Mr. Im Thurn, “attributes any calamity
which may happen to him to the intention of the imme-
diate instrument of its infliction, and he not unnaturally
sees in the action of this instrument evidence of its
possession of a spirit.” ^ Trees, especially, are very
commonly supposed to possess souls similar to those of
men, and are treated accordingly. Pausanias writes that
“ lifeless things are said to have inflicted of their own
accord a righteous punishment on men ” ; and as the
best and most famous instance of this he mentions the
sword of Cambyses.® In England the inanimate murderer
was to be given up to the kinsmen of the slain surely not
as a compensation for the loss they had suffered, but as an
object upon which their vengeance was to be wreaked.^
It was called la bane, that is, “ the slayer ” ; Bracton also
calls it the “ malefactor.”"' It did not matter that its
owner was recognised as innocent ; the punishment was
not intended for him.“ But in some well-defined cases
the “ slayer ” was free from guilt. A ship or other vessel
from which a person was drowned by misfortune was not
forfeited as deodand in case the accident happened in salt
water — as Coke indicates, on account of the great dangers
to which the vessel is exposed “ upon the raging waves
in respect of the wind and tempest.”^ Moreover, if a boy
under fourteen fell from a cart, or from a horse, it was
^ Im Thurn, op. cit. p. 354 -
^ See Frazer, Golden Bought i. 169
sqq.
^ Pausanias, i. 28. ii.
^ Pollock and Maitland, ii. 474.
‘ ® Bracton, De Legibus ei Consue-
tndinihus Anglia, fol. 116, vol. ii.
236 sy.
® Holmes, Common Law, p. 25.
Bracton, op. cit. fol. 122, vol, ii.
286 sq. Coke, op. cit. p. 58. Sir
James Stephen supposes {op. cit. iii.
78) that “deodands were not in use
at sea, because the local customs of
England did not extend to the high
seas.” But Coke expressly says (p. 58)
that there can be no deodand of the
ship even “in aqua salsa, being any
arm of the sea, though it be in the
body of the County.”
AGENTS UNDER
no deodand, “ because he was not of discretion to look to
himself,” and so the cart, or horse, could not be regarded
as blamabJe. But if a cart ran over a boy, or a tree
fell upon him, or a bull gored him, it was deodand,
because, apparently, it went out of its way to kill him.^
The fact of motion was one of considerable importance
in the case of animals and inanimate things, as it was in
the case of men. Thus Bracton would distinguish between
the horse which throws a man and the horse off which a
man tumbles, between the tree that falls and the tree
against which a man is thrown ; and, as a general rule,
a thing was not a deodand unless it could be said “ movere
ad mortem.” ^ If anybody was drowned by falling from
a ship under sail, not only the ship itself but the things
moving in it were deemed the cause of his death ;
whereas the merchandise lying at the bottom of the vessel
was not presumed to be guilty, and consequently was not
forfeited.® But if any particular merchandise fell upon a
person and caused his death, that merchandise became a
deodand, and not the ship.'‘ As Mr. Holmes observes,
a ship is the most persistent example of motion giving
personality to a thing. “ She ” is still personified not
only in common parlance, but in courts of justice. In
maritime cases of quite recent date judges of great repute
have pronounced the proceeding to be, not against the
owner, but “ against the vessel for an offence committed
by the vessel.”
Like the lower animals, human beings in their earliest
childhood are incapable of forming notions of right and
wrong, hence they are not responsible for any act of theirs.
Responsibility commences with the dawn of a moral con-
sciousness, and increases along with the evolution of the
intellect. Only by, slow degrees the capacity of recognis-
^ Coke, op. cit. p. 57. Hale, n. 4. Stephen, op. cit, iii. 77. Holmes,
History of the Pleas of the Crowny i. op. cit. p. sq.
422. Stephen, op. cit. iii. 78. ^ Britton, i. 2. 14, vol. i. 16.
Bracton, op. cit. fol. 136 b, vol. ii. Hale, op. cit. i. 422.
400 sq. Hale, op. cit. i. 420 sqq. ® Holmes, op. cit. p. 29.
Pollock and Maitland, op. cit. ii. 474,
INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY
ing acts as right or wrong develops in the child. It soon
learns that certain acts are forbidden, but to know that an
act is forbidden is not the same as to recognise it as wrong.
Nor does the knowledge of a moral rule involve the
ability to apply that rule in particular cases. Nor can the
youthful intellect be expected to possess the same degree
of foresight as the intellect of a grown-up man. Hence
the total or partial irresponsibility of childhood and early
youth.
This irresponsibility is admitted by the laws of civilised
nations. In England,* Scotland,'^ and the United States,®
children under seven are absolutely exempt from punish-
ment. In other modern countries criminal responsibility
does not commence until the age of nine,^ ten,® twelve,®
or fourteen." In some it is to be decided in each case
whether a child is punishable or not.® Thus the French
Code P^nal provides that a person under sixteen years
of age shall not be punished if it be decided that he has
acted without discernment {sans discerneinent)^ whereas, if he
has acted with discernment {avec discernement), his punish-
ment is to be mitigated according to a fixed scale.**
Most laws set down an intermediate period between that
of complete irresponsibility and that of complete re-
sponsibility. According to English law there is a pre-
sumption that children from seven to fourteen are not
possessed of the degree of knowledge essential to
criminality, though this presumption may be rebutted
by proof to the contrary and, according to the German
Strafgesetzbuch, a person from twelve to eighteen may
be acquitted if, when he committed the offence, he did
’ Stephen, op. cit. ii. 97 sq. iros, ibid. p. 199), Russian (Foinitzki,
Erskine-Rankine, Prificiples of ike ibid. p. 529) law.
Law of Scotland., p. 546. German Strafgesetzbuch, art. 55.
^ Bishop, Cormuentaries on the ^ Swedish (Uppstrom, in Legislation
Criminal Law, § 368, voL i. 209. penale comparde, p. 483), Finnish
^ Italian Codice Penafe, art, 53 * (Forsman, ibid. p. 565) law.
Spanish Codigo Penal reformado, art. 8, ^ French, Belgian, Ottoman law
§ 2. (Riviere, ibid. p. 7).
® Austrian (Finger, op. cit.'i. no), ^ Code Penal, art. 66 sq.
Dutch (van Hamel, in Legislation Stephen, op. cit. ii. 98. Kenny,
penale comparee, edited by von Liszt, Outlines of Criminal Law, p. 50.
p. 444), Portuguese (Tavares de Mede-
AGENTS UNDER
chap.
not possess the intelligence requisite to know that it
was criminal.^ Other laws, again, regard a certain age
eo ipso as a ground of extenuation, its upper limit being
fixed sometimes at sixteen,'^ sometimes at eighteen,® some-
times at twenty,^ sometimes at twenty-one.®
Roman law, as it seems, made out a pr<£Sumptio juris
of general incapacity to commit a crime under puberty,
rebuttable by evidence of capacity, at any rate in the
age called “ next to puberty,” the limits of which are
not clearly settled.® In the Irish Book of Aicill it is
said that “ the man who incites a fool is he who pays
for his crime”; and to this the Commentary adds that
a man is a fool till the end of seven years, and a fool
of half sense till the end of fourteen’ — a provision
similar to that of Canon Law.® According to Muham-
medan law, the rule of talion is applicable only to
persons of age.® In China criminal responsibility is
affected not only by youth, but by old age as well.
“ Offenders whose age is not more than seven nor less
than ninety years, shall not suffer punishment in any case,
except in that of treason or rebellion.” “ Any ofender
whose age is not more ^'han ten nor less than eighty
years, . . . shall, when the crime is capital, but not
^ Strafgesetzbuch, art. 56.
^ Dutch law (van Hamel, loc. cit, p,
444 )-
® Spanish {CSdigo Penal reformadoy
art. 9, § 2), Swedish (Uppstrdin, lot.
cit p. 484), Finnish (Forsman, loc.
cit. p. 566) law.
^ Austrian law (Finger, op. cit. i.
112).
® Italian {Codice Penale.^ art. 56),
Russian (Foinitzki, loc. cit. p. 529),
Portuguese (Tavares de Medeiros, loc.
cit, p. 199), Brazilian {Codigo Penal
dos Estcvdos Unidos do Brazil, art.
42, §11) law. According to the Otto-
man Penal Code, art. 40, “ a guilty
person who has not arrived at the age
of puberty may not be punished with
the punishment enacted against the
offence of which he has been . found
guilty.”
® Clark, Analysis of Criminal
Liability, p. 70. von Jhering, Pas
Schuldmoment hn rbmischen PrivuL
recht, p. 42 sqq. Mommsen, Romisches
Sir afr edit, p. 75 sq. In the Jnstitn-
tiones (i. 22) puberty is fixed at the
completion of the fourteenth year for
males, and of the twelfth for females.
According to the Law of the Twelve
Tables, children were punished for
theft, though less severely than adults
(Gellius, Nodes Attica, xi. 18. 8,
Pliny, Historia naturalis, xviii. 3).
^ Ancient Laws of Ireland, iii. I 57 »
® Katz, Grnndriss des kanonischen
Strafrechts, p. 8,
® Sachau, Muhammedanisckes Recht,
p. 762. Jaffur Shurreef says {Qanoon-e-
Islam, p. 36) that, among the Muham-
medans of India, previous to the period
of puberty all the good and evil deeds
of boys and girls are laid to the charge
of their parents.
INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY
amounting to treason, be recommended to the particular
consideration and decision of His Imperial Majesty.”
And “ any offender whose age is not more than fifteen,
nor less than seventy years . . . shall be allowed to
redeem himself from any punishment less than capital, by
the payment of the established fine, except in the case of
persons condemned to banishment as accessories to the
crimes of treason, rebellion, murder of three or more persons
in one family, or homicide by magic or poisoning, upon all
of which offenders the laws shall be strictly executed.”^
According to early custom, children who have com-
mitted an injury are sometimes,^ but not always,^ subject
to the rule of retaliation. Even in Homeric Greece, man-
slaughter committed in childhood seems to have been
visited with banishment for life.^ In other cases, parents
are responsible for the deeds of their children,® Among
the West African Fjort, for instance, children are not
themselves liable for their actions, but the injured party
can claim compensation from the parents if he likes to do
so.® Among the Teutons, “ like the master for the slave,
the father answered for and made claims on behalf of
the child. The ceremony of investing him with arms as
a wehrhafty or weapon-bearing member of the community,
was the usual period for the assumption of rights and
liabilities ; and this customarily (not always) took place
at the age of twelve.” According to ancient Swedish law,
an injury was treated in the same way as if it had been
accidental, in case the offender was under the age of
fifteen ; ® according to the Icelandic Gragas, in case he was
^ Ta Tsing Leu Lee^ sec. xxii. p. 23 ® Nicole, in Steinmetz, Reehfsver-
s^. halinisse.t p. 132 (Diakite-Sarrakolese).
2 Senfft, in Steinmetz, Rechtsver- Marx, ibid. p. 357 (Amahlubi).
hdltnisse^ p. 449 (Marshall Islanders). ® Dennett, in Jour, African Society ^
Miklosich, ‘ Blutrache bei den Slaven,’ i. 276.
in Denkschriften d. kaiserl. Akademic ^ Wigmore, ‘ Responsibility for Tor-
d, Wtssensch. Philos. -hist, Classe, tious Acts,’ in Harvard Law Review^
Vienna, xxxvi. 13 1 (Tufks of Daghe- vii. 447.
kan). See also supra^ p. 217 ® Wilda, Strafrecht der Germanen,
^ Lang, in Steinmetz, Rechtsver- p. 642 sq, Nordstrom, Bidrag till den
hdltnissey p. 257 (Washambala). svenskasamhdllsjorfattningenshisioriay
^ Iliad ^ xxiii. 85 sqq, Cf, Muller. ii. 73 * Cfyon Amixo.^ Nordgervianisckes
dissertations on the Eumenides, p. 95. Obligationenrechty i. 375 sq.
AGENTS UNDER
under sixteen.’^ However, as we have seen, accidental
injuries had to be paid for. Where offences are dealt
with according to the principle of compensation, it is
impossible to decide how far parents’ liability for their
children involves a recognition of the moral irresponsibility
of the child, or is simply due to the fact that children,
having no property, are themselves unable to compensate.
That the latter point of view was largely adopted by early
custom and law appears from the fact that, when com-
pensation was succeeded by punishment, the period of
irresponsibility was reduced. In England the age-limit
of twelve years, which prevailed in Anglo-Norman days,
was afterwards disregarded in criminal cases.^ We read in
the Northumberland Assize Roll, a.d. i 279, “ Reginald
. . . aged four, by misadventure slew Robert . . . aged
two ; the justice granted that he might have his life and
members because of his tender age.”® A little later we
hear that a child under the age of seven shall not suffer
judgment in a case of homicide.* In 1457, an infant of
four was held liable in trespass, though the language of
the court shows a disposition to exempt the infant.® From
the eighteenth century instances are recorded of a girl of
thirteen who was burnt for killing her mistress, and of a
boy of eight who was hanged for arson.® In 1748, a boy
of ten, being convicted for the murder of a girl of five,
was sentenced to death, and all the judges to whom this
case was reported agreed that, “ in justice to the publick,”
the law ought to take its course. The execution, however,
was respited, and the boy at last had the benefit of His
Majesty’s pardon.'^ It appears from these facts, and from
others of a similar character referring to continental
countries,® that there has been a tendency to raise the age
^ Grdgds^ Vigsloi>i, 32, vol. ii. 63. LaWy p. 124.
2 Wigmore, loc, cit. p. 447. ^ Foster, Report of Crown CaseSy p.
^ Three Early Assize Rolls for the yo sqq.
County of Northuinberlandy p. 323. ® Trummer, op, cit. i. 428, 432 sqq^
^ Pollock and Maitland, op. cit. ii. (Germany). Jousse, Traitd de la jus-
484. tice criniineUe de Franccy^ ii. 617;
® Wigmore, loc, cit. p. 447 sq. n. 7. Tissot, Droit pthiaf i. 30 (France).
^ History of Modern English
INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY
at which full legal responsibility commences. And we
have reason to hope that legislation has not yet said its
last word on the subject.
The principle that intellectual incapacity lessens or
excludes responsibility also applies to idiots and madmen.
Though idiots are able to acquire some knowledge of
general moral rules, the application of those rules is fre-
quently beyond their powers and their capacity of fore-
seeing the consequences of their acts is necessarily very
restricted. The same to some extent holds good of
madmen ; but, as will be shown in the next chapter, there
is another ground for their irresponsibility besides the
derangement of the intellect.
All modern laws admit that, at least under certain cir-
cumstances, idiocy or madness exempts a person from
criminal responsibility. According to Roman law, lunatics
were even free from the obligation of paying indemnities
for losses inflicted by them and so mild was their lot at
Rome, that it became a practice for citizens to shirk their
public duties by feigning madness.® Even savages recog-
nise that lunatics and maniacs are not responsible for their
deeds. The Abipones maintained that it was “ wrong
and irrational to use arms against those who are not in
possession of their senses.” ■* Among the North American
Potawatomis many “ are said to be ‘ foolish,’ and not
sensible of crime.”"’ The Iroquois are “ persuaded that
a person who is not in his right senses is not to be repre-
hended, or at least not to be punished.”® Hennepin states
that “ they had one day in the year which might be called
the Festival of Fools ; for in fact they pretended to be
mad, rushing from hut to hut, so that if they ill-treated
any one or carried off anything, they would say next day,
^ von KrafTt-Ebing, Lehrbuch der ^ Digestay xxvii. 10. 6.
gerichtlichen Psychopat hoiogiCy p. 70. ^ Dobrizhoffer, Account of the Abi-
' ^ von Vangerow, Lehrbuch der Pan- poneSy ii. 234.
dekteUy iii. 36. von Jhering, Das ® Keating, Expedition to the Source
Schuldmoment im romischen Privat- of St. Peteds River y\. 127.
rechty p. 42. Thon, Rechtsnorm und ® Charlevoix, Voyage to North
subjectives Rechty p. 106, n. 70. AmericUy ii, 24 sq.
AGENTS UNDER
‘ I was mad ; I had not my senses about me.’ And the
others would accept this explanation and exact no venge-
ance.”^ The Melanesians “are sorry for lunatics and are
kind to them, though their remedies are rough ” ; at
Florida, for instance, a man went out of his mind, chased
people, stole things and hid them, but “ no one blamed
him, because they knew that he was possessed by a tindalo
ghost.” ^ Among the West African Fjort fools and idiots
are not responsible personally for their actions.^ Among
the Wadshagga crimes committed by lunatics are judged
of more leniently than others. Among the Matabele
madmen, being supposed to be possessed of a spirit,
“ were formerly under the protection of the King.” ^ In
Eastern Africa the natives say of an idiot or a lunatic,
“He has fiends.”® El Hajj ‘ Abdssalam Shabeeny states
that in Hausaland “ a man guilty of a crime, who in
the opinion of the judge is possessed by an evil spirit, is
not punished.”^
The idea that derangement of the mind is due to spiritual
possession, often makes the idiot or the insane an object
of religious reverence.® The Macusis regard lunatics as
holy.® The Brazilian Paravilhana believe that idiots are
inspired.^® According to Schoolcraft, “regard for lunatics,
or the demented members of the human race, is a universal
trait among the American tribes.” “ So, also, the African
Barolong give a kind of worship to deranged persons, who
are said to be under the direct influence of a deity.^^ A
certain kind of madness was regarded by the ancient
Greeks as a divine gift, and consequently as “superior to
a sane mind.”^® Lane states that, among the modern
^ Hennepin, Descriptiort de la ^ * Abdssalam Shabeeny, Account
Louisiane^ Les Moeurs des Sauvages, of Timbuctoo and Housa, p. 49.
p. 71 s(/, ® Cf Tylor, Primitive Culture^ ii.
^ Codrington, Melanesians ^ p. 218. 128.
^ Dennett, in Jour. African Society ^ ® Andree, Ethnographische Paral-
i. 276. leleuy Neue Folge, p. 3.
^ Merker, quoted by Kohler, in von Martius, Beitrdge zur Eihno-
Zeitschr. f vergL Rechtswiss. xv. 64. graphic Amerikd'Sy i. 633.
® Decle, Three Years in Savage Schoolcraft, Indian Tribes of the
Africa^ p. 154. United States^ iv. 49.
® Burton, Labe Regions of Central Tylor, Primitive Culture^ ii. 130.
Africa^ ii. 320. Plato, Phadrus^ p. 244.
Egyptians, an idiot or a fool is vulgarly regarded “as a
being whose mind is in heaven, while his grosser part
mingles among ordinary mortals ; consequently he is con-
sidered an especial favourite of heaven. Whatever enor-
mities a reputed saint may commit (and there are many
who are constantly infringing precepts of their religion),
such acts do not affect his fame for sanctity ; for they are
considered as the results of the abstraction of his mind
from worldly things — his soul, or reasoning faculties, being
wholly absorbed in devotion — so that his passions are left
without control. Lunatics who are dangerous to society
are kept in confinement, but those who are harmless are
generally regarded as saints,”* The same holds good of
Morocco. Lunatics are not even obliged to observe the
Ramadan fast, the most imperative of all religious duties ;
of a person who, instead of abstaining from all food till
sunset, was taking his meal in broad daylight in the open
street, I heard the people forgivingly say, “The poor
fellow does not know what he is doing, his mind is with
God.” '
On the other hand there are peoples who treat their
lunatics in a very different manner. The tribes of Western
Victoria put them to death, “ as they have a very great
dread of mad people.”* In Kar Nicobar madness is said
to be the only cause for a death “ penalty ” that seems to
exist there, the afflicted individual being garrotted with two
pieces of bamboo ; * but this practice seems to be a method
of getting rid of a dangerous individual, rather than a
penalty in the proper sense of the word. Among the
Washambala a lunatic who commits homicide is killed —
as our informant observes, “ not really on account of his
deed, but in order to prevent him from causing further
mischief.”* Among the Turks of Daghestan, we are told,
mad people are subject to the rule of blood-revenge.®
, * Lane, Manners anct Customs of ® Dawson, op. cit, p. 6l.
the Modern Egyptians, p. 237. * Distant, in Jour. Anthr. Inst. iii.
^ Cf, Griberg di Hemso, Specchio 6.
geograjico, e - statistico delP impero ® Lang, in Steinmelz, Rechtsver^
Alaroccoy p. 182 sq* kaiinisse, p. 257.
® Miklosich, loc. cit, p. 131.
AGENTS UNDER
In China lunatics are held responsible for their acts,
although the ordinary penalty applicable is commuted, as,
for instance, in murder to imprisonment with fetters
subject to His Majesty’s pleasure. But when a lunatic
deliberately kills his parents or grandparents, a representa-
tion will not serve ; he is to be executed at once on the spot
where the murder was committed or on the city execution
ground, and the sentence — slicing to pieces — is to be carried
out in all its horror though the lunatic be already dead.’
According to ancient Welsh law, no vengeance is to be
exercised against an idiot,- nor is the king to have any fine
for the act of such a person.® But, “ if idiots kill other
persons, let galanas [that is, blood-money] be paid on their
behalf, as for other persons ; because their kindred ought
to prevent them doing wrong.” ^ The Swedish provincial
laws treated an injury committed by a lunatic in the same
manner as an injury by misadventure, provided that the
relatives of the injurer had publicly announced his mad-
ness, or, according to some laws, had kept him tied in
bonds which he had broken ; but if they had omitted to
do so, the injury was treated as if it had been done wil-
fully.® The Icelandic Gragas even lays down the rule that
a madman who has committed homicide shall suffer the
same punishment as a sane person guilty of the same
crime.® In England, in the times of Edward II. and
Edward III., proof of madness appears not to have
.entitled a man to be acquitted, at least in case of murder,-
but to a special verdict that he committed the offence
when mad, and this gave him a right to pardon. Such a
right, indeed, implies the admission that lunacy has a
claim to forbearance ; but from what we know about the
treatment of lunatics during the Middle Ages and much
later, we cannot be sure that the insane offender escaped
^ AlaJ^astcr, Commentaries on Chi- p. 98).
nese Lchv, pp, 93, 96. Cf. Dougla.s, Welsh Laws, iv. i. 2 {ibid. p.
Society in China, pp. 72, 122. 389)*
^ Dimetian Code, ii. i. 32 {Ancient ® von Amira, Nordgermanisches
Latus and Institutes of Wales, p. Obligationemrecht, i. 375.
200). ^ Grdgds, Vigslot»i, 33, voL ii. 64.
^ V^enedotian Code^ ii. 28. 3 {ibid. ^ Stephen, op. cit. ii. 151.
INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY
all punishment. In a case which occurred in 1315, it was
presented that a certain lunatic wounded himself with a
knife, and finally died of his wounds ; his chattels were
confiscated.^ Lord Bacon says in his ‘ Maxims of the
Law,’ “ If an infant within years of discretion, or a mad-
man, kill another, he shall not be impeached thereof ; but
if he put out a man’s eye, or do him like corporal hurt,
he shall be punished in trespass in these latter cases,
“ the law doth rather consider the damage of the party
wronged, than the malice of him that was the wrong-
doer.”^ In none of the German town-laws before the
beginning of the seventeenth century is there any special
provision for the offences of lunatics ; ® and, according to
the Statutes of Hamburg of 1605, though a madman who
kills a person shall not be punished as an ordinary man-
slayer, he is yet to be punished.'' In Germany recognised
idiots and madmen were not seldom punished with great
severity, and even with death, in the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries.® One of the darkest pages in the
history of European civilisation may be filled with a
description of the sufferings which were inflicted upon
those miserable beings up to quite modern times.” Many
of them were burnt as witches or heretics, or treated as
ordinary criminals. For unruly and crazy people, who
nowadays would be comfortably located in an asylum,
whipping-posts and stocks were made use of. Shakespeare
speaks of madmen as deserving “ a dark house and a
whip ’’ and Swift observes that original people like
Diogenes and others, if they had lived in his day, would
have been treated like madmen, that is, would have in-
curred “ manifest danger of phlebotomy, and whips, and
chains, and dark chambers, and straw.” The writings of
^ Wigmorc, /oc. cit. p. 446.
^ Bacon, Maxims of the Law, reg. 7
( JVorhs, vii. 347 s{j. ).
^ Tru miner, op. cit. i. 428.
\ Ibid. i. 432.
. Ibid, i, 438 s(j(].
See Tuke, Chapiei s in the History
of the Insane in the British Isles, p.
VOL. I
43 sq. ; Maiidsley, Responsibility in
Mental Disease, p. 10 sq. ; Lecky,
History of Etiropean Morals, ii. 85
Shakespeare, As yon Like it, iii. 2.
^ Swift, Tale of a Tnb, sec. 9
{IVorks, X. 163).
T
AGENTS UNDER
Esquirol, the parliamentary debates on the asylums of
Bedlam and York, and the reports presented under the
auspices of La Rochefoucauld to the National Assembly of
1789, contain a picture unique in its sadness — “ a picture
of prisons in which lunatics, criminal lunatics, and criminals
are huddled together indiscriminately without regard to
sex or age, of asylums in which the maniac, to whom
motion is an imperious necessity, is chained in the same
cell with the victim of melancholia whom his ravings soon
goad into furious madness, and of hospitals in which the
epileptic, the scrofulous, the paralytic and the insane sleep
side by side — a picture of cells, dark, foul, and damp,
with starving, diseased, and naked inmates, flogged into
submission, or teased into fury for the sport of idle
spectators.” ^
Whatever share indifference to human suffering may
have had in all these atrocities and all this misery, it is
likely that thoughtlessness, superstition, and ignorance
have had a much larger share. We have noticed that,
when a certain deed gives a shock to public feelings, the
circumstances in which it has been committed are easily
lost sight of. Considering that the Chinese punish per-
sons who have killed their father or mother by pure
accident, it is not surprising that they punish madmen
who kill a parent wilfully. Even a man like Smollett,
the well-known writer, thought it would be neither
absurd nor unreasonable for the legislature to divest all
lunatics of the privilege of insanity in cases of enormity,
and to subject them “ to the common penalties of the
law.” ® Moreover, as we have seen, madness is often
attributed to demoniacal possession,® and in other cases
it is regarded as a divine punishment.'* From a pagan
1 Wood-Renton, ‘ Mural Mania,* in Morocco,* in Jour. Anthr. Inst. xxix.
Laxv Quarterly Heviezv^ iii. 340. 254 ; Andree, op. at. p. 2 sq. ; Tuke,
Smollett, quoted by Tuke, op. cit. op. cit. p. i ; Pike, History of Crime
p. 96. in England., i. 39 ; von Krafft-Ebing,
8 See also Doughty, Arabia Deserta.^ op. cit. p. 5.
i. 258 sq. ; Westermarck, 'Nature of ^ Plato, Leges, ix, 854. Esquirol,
the Arab Ginn illustrated by the maladies mentales, i. ^36,
Present Beliefs of the People of
point of view this would make the lunatic an object of
pity or dread, rather than of indignation ; as the Roman
legislator said, the insane murderer ought not to be
punished, because his insanity itself is a sufficient penalty.^
But in Christian Europe, where up to quite recent times
men were ever ready to punish God’s enemies, a lunatic,
who was supposed to have the devil in him, or whose
affliction was regarded as the visitation of God upon
heresy or sin,^ was a hateful individual and was treated
accordingly. Finally, we have to take into account that
the sensibility of a lunatic was thought to be inferior to
that of a sane person ; ® that the mental characteristics of
insanity were little understood ; and that, in consequence,
many demented persons were treated as if they were sane
because they were thought to be sane, and others, though
recognised as lunatics, were treated as responsible because
they were thought to be responsible. The history of the
English law referring to insanity bears sad testimony to
the ignorance of which lunatics have been victims in the
hands of lawyers.
From the year 1724 there is a dictum of an English
judge to the effect that a man who is to be exempted from
punishment “ must be a man that is totally deprived of his
understanding and memory, and doth not know what he
is doing, no more than an infant, than a brute, or a wild
beast.” * From the beginning of the nineteenth century,
the power of distinguishing right from wrong in the
abstract was regarded as the test of responsibility ; ^ whilst
in the existing doctrine, dating from the trial of
M‘Naughten in 1 843, the question of knowledge of
right and wrong, instead of being put generally and
indefinitely, is put in reference to the particular act
at the particular time of committing it.” This series
of doctrines certainly shows a noteworthy progress
^ Digesta^ i. 18. 14; xlviii. 9. 9. ® Harris, Principles of the Criminal
^ Wood-Renton, loc. cit. p. 339. Law, p. 18. Kenny, op. cit. p. 53.
® Ibid. p. 339, ® Clark and Finnelly, Reports of
^ Howell, Collection of State Trials, Cases decided in the House of Lords,
765. X. 202.
T %
in discrimination. But at the same time the answers
given by the fourteen English judges to the questions
put to them by the House of Lords in consequence
of M‘Naughten’s case still display an ignorance which
would nowadays be hardly possible. In reply to the
question — “If a person under an insane delusion as to
existing facts, commits an offence in consequence thereof,
is he thereby excused ? ” — the judges declared that, on the
assumption “ that he labours under such partial delusion
only, and is not in other respects insane, ... he must be
considered in the same situation as to responsibility as if
the facts with respect to which the delusion exists were
real. P'or example, if under the influence of his delusion
he supposes another man to be in the act of attempting to
take away his life, and he kills that man, as he supposes,
in self-defence, he would be exempt from punishment. If
his delusion was that the deceased had inflicted a serious
injury to his character and fortune, and he killed him in
revenge for such supposed injury, he would be liable to
punishment.” ^ The mistake committed in this answer
does not lie in the conclusion, but in the premise.
“Here,” as Professor Maudsley observes, “ is an unhesi-
tating assumption that a man, having an insane de-
lusion, has the power to think and act in regard to it
reasonably ; that, at the time of the offence, he ought to
have and to exercise the knowledge and self-control which
a sane man would have and exercise, were the facts with
respect to which the delusion exists real ; that he is, in
fact, bound to be reasonable in his unreason, sane in his
insanity.” ^ Modern science, however, teaches us another
lesson. It has shown that a delusion of the kind suggested
never stands alone, but is in all cases the result of a disease
of the brain which interferes more or less with every
function of the mind, and that few insane persons who do
violence can be truly said to have a full knowledge of the
nature and quality of their acts at the rime they are per-
^ /drc^. X. 21 1 ,
^ Maudsley, 0/. cit. p. 97.
INTELLECTUAL DISABILI FY
forming them.^ A perhaps still greater defect in the
doctrine of the fourteen judges is the absence of all refer-
ence to the influence of insane impulses ; but with this
subject we are not concerned at present. In this connection
my object has been merely to show that the irresponsibility
of the insane, in so far as it consists in intellectual derange-
ment, has been generally recognised in proportion as their
intellectual derangement has been recognised, and that the
exceptions to this rule are explicable from beliefs which,
though materially affecting the treatment of the insane,
have no reference to the principle of responsibility itself.
There are temporary states of mind in which the agent
no more knows what he is doing than an idiot or a mad-
man, such as somnambulism, narcosis, fury. For these
states, of course, the rule holds good, that nobody is
responsible for what he does in ignorance, although he
may be responsible for his ignorance. Responsibility in
connection with anger and rage will be more appropriately
dealt with in another place. I shall here restrict myself
to the case of drunkenness.
A person is irresponsible, or only partly responsible,
for what he does when drunk, according as he is ignorant
of the nature of his act, as also in so far as the intoxicant
contributed to the rise of some powerful impulse which
determined his will. If he commits an offence in a state
of extreme intoxication, he can reasonably be blamed only
for what he did when sober. If he made himself drunk
for the purpose of committing the offence, then the offence
is intended, and he is equally responsible for his act as if
he had accomplished it straightway. If he became in-
toxicated without any fault of his, for instance, if he did
not know, and could not know, the intoxicating quality of
the liquor which made him drunk, he is free from blame.
But in other cases ^he is guilty of heedlessness, or rashness,
or, if he foresaw the danger, of blamable indifference to
^ Griesinger, Mental Pathology and Therapeutics^ p. 72 sq. Maudsley, op,
cit, p. 96,
AGENTS UNDER
the probable consequences of his act. This is the clear
theory of the question. But we cannot expect to find it
accurately expressed in practice.
Very generally drunkenness is recognised as a ground
of extenuation. We hear from various sources that the
North American Indians were exceedingly merciful to
intoxicated offenders. According to Charlevoix, the
Iroquois “ suffer themselves to be ill used by drunken
people, without defending themselves, for fear of hurting
them. If you endeavour to shew them the folly of this
conduct, they say, ‘ Why should we hurt them They
know not what they do. ’ ” Even “ if a savage kills
another belonging to his cabin, if he is drunk (and they
often counterfeit drunkenness when they intend to commit
such actions),^ all the consequence is, that they pity and
weep for the dead. ‘ It is a misfortune (they say), the
murderer knew not what he did.’ ” ^ James makes a
similar statement with reference to the Omahas.® In his
description of the aborigines of Pennsylvania, Blome
observes, “ It is rare that they fall out, if sober ; and
if drunk they forgive it, saying, it was the drink,
and not the man. that abused them.”^ Benjamin
Franklin tells us of some Indians who had misbehaved in
a state of intoxication, and in consequence sent three of
their old men to apologise ; “ the orator acknowledged
the fault, but laid it upon the rum, and then endeavoured
to excuse the rum.” ® The detestable deeds which men
did under the influence of fulcre, or the native Mexican
wine, the Aztecs attributed to the god of wine or to the
wine itself, and not in the least to the drunken man.
Indeed, if anybody spoke ill of or insulted an intoxicated
person, he was liable to be punished for disrespect to the
god by which that person was supposed to be possessed.
^ Cf. Hennepin, op, cit. p. 71. murder committed in drunkenness.
^ Charlevoix, op. cit. ii. 23, 25. 2 Expedition from Pittsburgh
According to X^oskiel {Histo 9 y of the to the Rocky Mountains.^ i. 265.
Mission of the United Brethren among ^ Rlome, in Buchanan, North
the Indians in North America, i. 16), American Indians, p. 328.
the Iroquois, though they laid all the ® Franklin, Autobiography, c\i, ix,
blame on the rum, punished severely ifVorkSyX. 164),
INTELLECrUAL DISABItli Y
Hence, says Sahagun, it was believed, not without ground,
that the Indians made themselves drunk on purpose to
commit with impunity crimes for which they would have
been punished if they had committed them sober.^
Among the Karens of India “ men are not unfrequently
killed in drunken broils ; but such cases are not allowed
by Karen custom to be a cause of action. No price can
be demanded for persons who lose their lives in such cir-
cumstances. It is argued there was no malice, no intention
to kill ; and the person who died was perhaps as much to
blame as the man who killed him ; and people are not
well responsible for what they do in a state of intoxica-
tion.” ^ Among the Kandhs, “ for wounds, however
serious, given under circumstances of extreme provocation,
or in a drunken squabble, slight compensation is awarded.”®
Among some of the Marshall Islanders blood-revenge is
generally not taken for an act of homicide which has been
committed in drunkenness, compensation being accepted
instead.^ So, also, according to the ancient law, of the
East Frisians, a man who has killed another when
drunk is allowed “ to buy off his neck by a sum of money
paid to the king and to the relatives of the slain.” ®
Roman law regarded drunkenness as a ground of
extenuation ; the Jurist Marcian mentions ebrietas as an
example of impetus y thereby intimating that a drunken
person, when committing a crime, should not be put on
the same footing with an offender acting in cold blood,"?
and calculating his act with clear consciousness.’^ In
Canon law drunkenness is said to be a ground which
deserves the indulgence of a reasonable judge, because
whatever is done in that state is done without conscious-
ness on the part of the actor.® Indeed, had not God shown
^ Sahagun, Hist or ia general de las f vergl, Recktswiss. xiv. 446.
cosas de Niieva Espafla^ i. 22, vol. I. ® Das Ostfriesische Land-Recht, iii,
40. . 18.
2 Mason, in Joiir. As, Soc, Bengal^ ® Digesla, xlviii. 19. ri. 2; xlix, 16.
XXX vii. pt. ii. 146. 6. 7. Mommsen, Rbmisches Straf-
^ Maepherson, Memorials of Ser- recht^ p. 1043.
vice in India^ p. 82. ^ Digesta^ xlviii, 19. ii. 2.
* Jung, quoted by Kohler, in ® Gratian, Decretum^ ii, 15. r. 7.
28 o agents under chap.
indulgence for the offence committed by Lot when
drunk Partly on the authority of Roman law, partly
on that of Canon law, the earliest practitioners of the
Middle Ages followed the principle that drunkenness is a
ground of extenuation ; and this doctrine remained
strongly rooted in the later jurisprudence, in which a
drunken person was likened to one under the influence of
sleep, or drunkenness was regarded as equivalent to in-
sanity.^ It was not until the sixteenth century that a
mere general rule, with regard to drunkenness as a ground
of extenuation, was felt to be insufficient. Since the time
of Clarus, especially, the opinion began to prevail, that the
effect of the highest degree of drunkenness was, indeed, to
exempt from the punishment of dolus, but that the offender
was still subject to the punishment of culpa, except in two
cases, namely, first, when he inebriated himself intentionally,
and with a consciousness that he might commit a crime while
drunk, in which case the drunkenness was not allowed to
be any ground of exculpation at all ; and, secondly, when
he became intoxicated without any fault on his part, as,
for example, in consequence of inebriating substances having
been mingled with his wine by his comrades, in which
case he was relieved even from the punishment of culpad'
These views, in the main, gradually determined the
German practice, and similar opinions prevailed in the
practice of Italy, Spain, Portugal, and the Netherlands.*
In the annals of Prussian criminal justice of 1824, a case
is reported of a man who was punished with only one year’s
imprisonment for having killed his little child in a state of
drunkenness.® In other countries a different principle was
acted upon. An ordinance of Francis I. declared that
drunkenness should not in any case absolve from the
ordinary punishment ; ® and this rule was sanctioned and
^ Ibid, ii. 15. I. 9. Penaie, art. 46 S(/q. Spanish Codigo
^ Mittermaier, Effect of Drunkenness I^enal ref or tnado, art. 9, §6.
on Criffiinal Responsibility, p, 6. ® Zeitschr. f die Criminal- Rechts-
Clams, Practica criminalis, qu. lx. Pflege in den Preussischen Staaten,
nr. II {Opera omnia, ii. 462). edited by Ilitzig, iii. 60.
^ Mittermaier, op. cit. p. 7. Du ® Isambert, Decrusy, and Armet,
Boys, Histoirc du droit criminel de Recited giniral des anciennes lots
V Espagne, p. 290. Italian Codice fran^aises, xii. 527.
INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY
applied by the later French jurisprudence^ In Code
P^nal, the state of drunkenness is not mentioned as a
mitigating circumstance ; yet the rigour of the law has
been tempered by the doctrine that intoxication produces
a temporary insanity and that every kind of insanity is a
ground of exculpation/^ In F/ngland/ Scotland/ and the
United States/ a state of voluntary drunkenness is no
excuse for crime. Speaking of a person who commits
homicide when drunk, Hale says that ‘‘ by the laws of
England such a person shall have no privilege by this
voluntary contracted madness, but shall have the same
judgment as if he were in his right senses.^’ However,
in a case where the intention with which the act was done
is the essence of the offence, the drunkenness of the accused
may be taken into account by the jury when considering
the motive or intent with which he acted. ^ Accoraing to
Chinese law, also, intoxication does not affect the question
of responsibility.^
The great forbearance with which injuries inflicted in a
state of intoxication are treated by various peoples at com-
paratively low stages of civilisation, is no doubt, to some
extent, due to lack of foresight. Failing to anticipate the
harmful consequences which may follow from drunkenness,
they also fail to recognise the culpability of indulging in
it. The American Indians are notorious drunkards, and
look upon drunkenness as a ‘delightful frolick.” Among
the Kandhs drunkenness is likewise universal, and their
“ orgies are evidently not regarded as displeasing to their
gods.” The belief that an intoxicated person is possessed
with a demon and acts under its influence, also helps
^ Mittermaier, op, cit. p. 8.
2 Ibid, p. 12 sq. Riviere, !oc, cit,
p. 7.
3 Stephen, History of the Criminal
Law of England^ ii. 165,
^ Hume, Comnientaries ^on the Law
of Scotland^ i. 38. Erskine-Rankine,
op, cit, p. 545.
® Bishop, op. cit. §4CX) sq, vol. 1. 231
° Hale, op. cit. i. 32.
^ Harris, op. cit, p. 21. Stephen,
Digest,^ art. 32, p. 22.
^ Giles, Strange Stories from a
Chinese Studio, ii. 30, n. 2.
^ Adair, Lli story of the American
Indians y p. 5. North American
Indians, ii. 251. Golden, in School-
craft, Indian Tribes, iii. 19 1. Pres-
cott, ibid, iii. 242. James, op, cit. i.
265.
10 Campbell, Wild Tribes of Khon^
distan, p. 165. Macpherson, op. cit,
p. 81 sq.
to excuse him.^ On the other hand, where the law makes
no difference between an offender who is sober and an
offender who is drunk, the culpability of the latter is
exaggerated in consequence of the stirring effect which the
outward event has upon public feelings. So great is the
influence of the event that certain laws, most unreason-
ably, punish a person both for what he does when drunk
and for making himself drunk. Thus Aristotle tells us
that legislators affixed double penalties to crimes committed
in drunkenness.^ The same was done by Charles V., in
an edict of 1531,® and by Francis I. in 1536.^ Hardly
more reasonable is it that the very society which shows
no mercy whatever to the intoxicated offender, is most
indulgent to the act of intoxication itself when not
accompanied by injurious consequences. ,Of course it may
be argued that drunkenness is blamable in proportion as
the person who indulges in it might expect it to lead to
mischievous results. It has also been said that, if drunken-
ness were allowed to excuse, the gravest crimes might be
committed with impunity by those who either counter-
feited the state or actually assumed it. Some people even
maintain that inebriation brings out a person’s true charac-
ter. In a Chinese story we read, “ Many drunkards will
tell you that they cannot remember in the morning the
extravagances of the previous night, but I tell you this is
all nonsense, and that in nine cases out of ten those extravag-
ances are committed wittingly and with malice prepense.”®
However, with all allowance for such considerations, I
venture to believe that in this, as in many other cases
where an injury results from want of foresight, the extreme
severity of certain laws is largely due to the fact that the
legislator has been more concerned with the external deed
than with its source.
^ Cf. Dorsey, ‘ Siouan Cults,’ in nalium^ Ixxxiv. 20, p. 241.
Ann, Kep, Bur, Ethii. xi. 424. ^ Isambert, Decrusy, and Armet, op,
^ Aristotle, Eihica Nicomacheay iii. cit, xii. 527.
5 * ® Giles, op, cit. ii. 30.
^ Damhouder, Praxis rerwn crimi-
Chapter XI
MOTIVES
No enlightened and conscientious moral judge can
regard his judgment as final, unless he know the motive,
or motives, of the volition by which his judgment is
occasioned. But in ordinary moral estimates little atten-
tion is paid to motives. Men desire that certain acts
should be performed, and that certain other acts
should be abstained from. The conative causes of acts
or forbearances are not equally interesting, and they are
often hidden. They are considered only in proportion as
the moral judgment is influenced by reflection.
Take, for instance, acts which are performed from a
sense of duty. It is commonly said that a person ought
to obey his conscience. Yet, in point of fact, by doing so
he may expose himself to hardly less censure than does the
greatest villain. The reason for this is not far to seek.
A man’s moral conviction is to some extent an expression
of his character, hence he may be justly blamed for having
a certain moral conviction. And the blame which he may
deserve on that account is easily exaggerated, partly
because people are apt to be very intolerant concerning
opinions of right and wrong which differ from their own,
partly owing to the influence which external events
exercise upon their minds.
Somewhat greater discrimination is shown in regard to
motives consisting of powerful non-volitional conations
which in no way represent the agent’s character, but to which
MOTIVES
he yields reluctantly, or by which he is carried away on the
spur of the moment. In many such cases even the law —
which regards it as no excuse if a person commits a crime
from a feeling of duty ’ — displays more or less indulgence
to the perpetrator of a harmful deed.
Thus, in the eye of the law, compulsion is oftentimes a
ground of extenuation. Strictly speaking, a volition can
never be compelled into existence ; ^ to act under compul-
sion really means to act under the influence of some
non-voluntary motive, so powerful that every ordinary
human will would yield to it. As Aristotle puts it, pardon
is given when “ a man has done what he ought not to have
done through fear of things beyond the power of human
nature to endure, and such that no man could undergo
them. And yet, perhaps, there are some things which a
man must never allow himself to be compelled to do, but
must rather choose death by the most exquisite torments.” ®
This principle has been in some degree recognised by
legislation. In many cases of felony, if a married woman
commits the crime in the presence of her husband, the law
of England presumes that she acts under his coercion, and
therefore excuses her from punishment, unless the pre-
sumption of law is rebutted by evidence ; * but children
and servants are not acquitted if committing crimes by the
command of a parent or a master.® Besides the presump-
tion made in favour of married women, compulsion by
threats of injury to person or property is recognised as an
excuse for crime only, as it seems, in cases in which the
compulsion is applied by a body of rebels or rioters, and
in which the offender takes a subordinate part in the
offence.® In a time of peace, on the other hand, though
a man be violently assaulted, and have no other possible
^ Cf. the case Reg. v. Morby, Law Crown^ i. 44 434. Harris, Prin-
Reports ^ Cases determined in the Queen^s ciples of the Critninal Law, p. 25.
Bench Division, viii, 571 sqq. Stephen, History of the Criminal I^aw
2 Bradley, Ethical Studies, p. 40, of England, ii. 105 sq.
n. I. ® Hale, op, cit. i. 44. Harris, op. cit,
® Aristotle, Ethica Nicomachea, iii. p. 26.
i. q sq, ® Stephen, op, cit. ii. 106.
^ Hale, History of the Pleas of the
MOTIVES
means of escaping death but by killing an innocent person,
if he commit the act he will be guilty of murder ; “ for he
ought rather to die himself, than kill an innocent.” ^ It
has even been laid down as a general principle that “ the
apprehension of personal danger does not furnish any
excuse for assisting in doing any act which is illegal.” ^ But
the English law relating to duress per minas^ and to con-
straint in general, seems to be harsher both than most
modern continental laws ® and than Roman law.^ Some
of the Italian practitioners were even of opinion that a
person who committed homicide by the command of his
prince or some other powerful man was exempt from all
punishment.® According to the Talmud, any offence per-
petrated under compulsion or in mortal fear is excusable
in the eye of the law, excepting only murder and adultery.®
Suppose, again, that the motive of breaking the law is
what has been called “compulsion by necessity.” The old
instance of shipwrecked persons in a boat unable to carry
them all is a standing illustration of this principle. Sir
James Stephen says, that “ should such a case arise, it is
impossible to suppose that the survivors would be subjected ,
to legal punishment.” ’’ Yet, in a very similar case, occur-
ring in the year 1884, they were. Three men and a boy
escaped in an open boat from the shipwreck of the yacht
Mignonette. After passing eight days without food, and
seeing no prospect of relief, the men killed the boy, who was
^ Hale, op. cit. i. 51. Harris, op,
cit, p. 24 $q.
^ Denman, C. J., in Reg. v. Tyler,
reported in Carrington and Payne, Re-
ports of Cases argued and ruled at Nisi
Prius^ viii. 621.
* Code PMal, art. 64 ; Chauveau and
H61ic, Thiorie du Code Pinal ^ i. 534
sqq, Italian Codice Penale^ art. 49.
Spanish Cddigo Penal reformado^ art.
^> § 9 Finger, Compendium des
osterreichischen Rechtes—*Das Sir of -
rechty i. 119. Foinitzki, in Ligislation
pinale comparie^ edited by von Liszt,
p. 530 (Russian law). Ottoman Penal
Code., art. 42.
Mommsen, Romisehes Strafrecht^
P ^53* Janka, Der strafrechtliche
Not stands p. 48,
® Janka, op, cit. p. 60. A different
view, however, is expressed by Covar-
riivias i^De matri??ioniis^ ii. 3. 4. 6 sq.
[Opera ofmiia., i. 139]) : — “ Metusnum-
quam excusat nec a mortali, nec a
veniali crimine. Peccatum maximum
malum, nec eo quid grauius.”
® Benny, Criminal Code of the [ews
according to the Talmud Massecketk
Synhedriny p. 125.
^ Stephen, op. cit. ii. 108. So, also,
according to Bacon’s Maxims of the
Law, reg. 5 { IVorks, vii. 344), homi^
cide is in such a case justifiable,
MOTIVES
on the verge of death, in order to feed on his body. Four
days later they were rescued by a passing ship ; and, on
their arrival in England, two of the men w6re tried for the
murder of the boy. The defence raised was that the act
was necessary for the purpose of self-preservation. But it
was held by the Court for Crown Cases Reserved, that
such necessity was no justification of the act of causing
death when there was the distinct intention to take away
the life of another innocent person. However, the sentence
of death was afterwards commuted by the Crown to six
months’ imprisonment^ In the same case it was even said
that if the boy had had food in his possession, and the
others had taken it from him, they would have been guilty
of theft.^ Bacon’s proposition that “ if a man steal viands
to satisfy his present hunger, this is no felony nor
larceny,” ® is not law at the present day.^ It was expressly
contradicted by Hale, who'laysdown the following rule ; —
“ If a person, being under necessity for want of victuals,
or clothes, shall upon that account clandestinely, and «»/»»(?
furandi steal another man’s goods, it is felony and a crime
by the laws of England punishable with death ; altho
the judge, before whom the trial is, in this case (as in other
cases of extremity) be by the laws of England intrusted
with a power to reprieve the offender before or after
judgment, in order to the obtaining the king’s mercy.” ®
Britton excuses “ infants under age, and poor people, who
through hunger enter the house of another for victuals
under the value of twelve pence.”® According to the
Swedish Westgota-Lag, a poor man who can find no other
means of relieving himself and his family from hunger
may twice with impunity appropriate food belonging to
somebody else, but if he does so a third time he is punished
for theft. ^ The Canonist says, “ Necessitas legem non
^ Reg. V. Dudley and Stephens, in Law Reports^ QueetPs Bc?ich Division^
Law Reports^ Cases deternimed in the xiv 286.
Queen's Bench Division ^ xiv. 273 sqcj. ® Hale, op, cit. i. 54.
Ibid, xiv. 276. ® Britton, i. II, vol. i. 42.
^ Bacon, Maxims of the Law 3 reg. 5 ^ Westgdta-I^gen IL c|>iufua bolker,
{IVorhs, vil 2^2)- 14, p. 164
* Reg. V. Dudley and Stephens, in
MOTIVES
habet ” ^ — “ Raptorem vel furem non facit necessitas, sed
voluntas.” ^ This principle has the sanction of the Gospel,
Jesus said to the Pharisees, “ Have ye not read what David
' did, when he was an hungred, and they that were with him ;
How he entered into the house of God, and did eat the
shewbread, which was not lawful for him to eat, neither
for them which were with him, but only for the
priests ? ” ®
According to Muhammedan law, the hand is not to be
cut off for stealing any article of food that is quickly
perishable, because it may have been taken to supply the
immediate demands of hunger.^ We are told that “ no
Chinese magistrate would be found to pass sentence upon
a man who stole food under stress of hunger.” ® In
ancient Peru, according to Herrera, “ he that robb’d
without need was banish’d to the Mountains Andes, never
to return without the Inga’s leave, and if worth it paid the
value of what he had taken. He that for want stole
eatables only was reprov’d, and receiv’d no other punish-
ment, but enjoyn’d to work, and threatened, that if he did
so again, he should be chastiz’d by carrying a stone on
his back, which was very disgraceful.” “ We even hear of
savages who regard “ compulsion by necessity ” as a ground
of extenuation. Among the West African Fjort robbery
of plantations, committed in a state of great hunger, is
exempt from punishment in case there is no deception or
secrecy in the matter; however, payment for damage done
is expected.^ Cook says of the Tahitians: — “Those who
steal clothes or arms, are commonly put to death, either by
hanging or drowning in the sea; but those who steal pro-
visions are bastinadoed. By this practice they wisely vary
the punishment of the same crime, when committed from
different motives.” ®
^ Gratian, iii. I. II. ® General IJistory of ih$
^ Ibid, iii. 5. 26. * West Indies^ iv. 337.
' ^ St. Matthew,, xii. i sqq. ’’ I >ennett, in Jotir, African Society ^
^ Lane, Matiners and Ctisioms of the i. 276.
Modern Egyptians, p. I2i. ® CooV, Journal of a Voyage round
® Giles, Strange Stories from a the World, p. 4^
Chinese St^idio^ ii. 217, n. 5.
MOTIVES
A special kind of self-preservation is self-defence. Here
the ground of justification is not merely the motive of the
agent, but also the wrongness or criminality of the act
which he tries to prevent. Hence the right of inflicting
injuries as a necessary means of self-preservation has been
more generally recognised in the case of self-defence than
in other cases of “ compulsion by necessity.” “ Vim vi
repellere ” was regarded by the ancients as a natural
right/ as a law “ non scripta, sed nata” and the same view
was taken by the Canonist.® Even in the savage world
self-defence and killing in self-defence are not unfrcquently
justified by custom.^ But in other instances the influence
of the external event makes itself felt also in the case of
self-defence. Among the Fjort, though a person who
kills another in self-defence is exempt from punishment,
he is expected to pay damages.® Among the Hottentots
self-defence is regarded as a mitigating circumstance, but
not as an excuse in the full sense of the word.® Among
other peoples it is not considered at all.’^ Among the
ancient I'eutons a person who committed homicide in
self-defence had to pay wer\^ and in Germany such a
person seems to have been subject to punishment still in
the later Middle Ages.® In England, in the thirteenth
century, he was considered to deserve royal pardon, but he
also needed itd®
^ Digesta^ xUii. i6. i. 27 : “Vim vi ® Geyer, Lehrc von der Nothwchr^ p.
repellere licere Ca.ssius scrihit idque ius 88 sqq, Trummer, Vorirdge iiber 7 br~
natura comparatur/’ tur^ i, 430. Stemaiin, Den danske
^ Cicero, Pro Af Hone ^ 4 (10). Retshisiorie ijidtil Christian Vds Lov,
^ Gratian, Decretur/i, i. i. 7, p. 659. Cf. Leges Henrici 1 , Ixxx. 7 >
^ Merker, quoted by Kohler, in Ixxxvii. 6.
'Leitschr, f, vergl. Rechtswiss. xv. 64 ® Trummer, op. cit. i. 428 sqq. von
(Wadshagga). Lang, in Steinmetz, Feuerbach-Mittermaier, Lehrbtich des
Rechtsverhallnisse^ p. 257 ( Washam- Pcinlichen Rechts^ p. 64. Brunner ob-
bala). serves {Deutsche Recktsgeschichte., ii.
® Dennett, in Jour. African Society^ 630), “ Nicht das Benehmen des Getd-
i. 276. teten war die causa des Tod.schlags,
® Kohler, in Zeitschr. /. vergl, sondern nur die feindselige Absicht des
Rechtswiss. xv. 353. Tod.sch lagers.”
^ Steinmetz, Rechtsverhdltnisse, p. Bracton, De Legibus et Consuetu-
50 (Banaka and Bapuku). Tellier, dinibus Anglia^ fob 132 b, vol. ii. 366
ibid, p. 176 (Kreis Kita). Marx, ibid, sqq. Pollock and Maitland, History of
P- 357 (Amahlubi). Senfft, ibid. p. 450 English Law before the Time of, Ed-
(Marshall Islanders). %vard I. ii. 574.
MOTIVES
In self-defence there should of course be a proportion
between the injury which the aggressor intended to inflict
and the injury inflicted on him by the person attacked. The
most widely-recognised ground on which life is allowed to
be taken in self-defence is danger of death. But it is not
the exclusive ground. Among the Wakamba “ a thief
entering a village at night can be killed”; though, if he
is, the incident generally gives rise to a blood-feud between
his family and the family of the slayer.^ In Uganda
“ there is no penalty for killing a thief who enters an
enclosure at night ” ; ^ and among various peoples at
higher stages of culture we likewise find the provision
that a nocturnal thief or house-breaker may be killed with
impunity, though a diurnal thief may not.® This law,
however, seems to have been due not so much to the fact
that by night the proprietor had less chance of recovering
his property, as to the greater danger to which he was
personally exposed. The Roman Law of the Twelve
Tables allows the diurnal thief also to be killed, in case
he defends himself with a weapon ; ^ and, as regards the
nocturnal thief, Ulpian expressly says that the owner of the
property Is justified in killing him only if he cannot spare
the life of the thief without peril to himself.® The same
rule was laid down by Bracton ’’ and by Grotius. The latter
observes, “No one ought to be slain directly for the sake
of mere things, which would be done if I were to kill an
unarmed flying thief with a missile, and so recover my
goods ; but if I am myself in danger of life, then I may
repel the danger even with danger to the life of another;
nor does this cease to hold, however I have come into that
danger, whether by trying to retain my property, or to
^ Decle, Thvi’e Years in Savage (Spanish Partidas).
Africa, 488. Cf Gregory IX. Dec retaies,v. 12.3;
/Vshe, Tzvo A'ifr^s of Uganda^ p. Mishna, fol. 72, quoted by Rabbino-
294. wicz, Legislation crimittelle dti Tal-
^ 7 a 7 'sing I.cti I,ec, «cc. cclxxvii. mud, p. 122.
p. 297 (Chinese). Exodus, xxii. 2 sq. ® i.ex Diiodecim 7 'abularum, viii.
Lex Duodecini Tabzilarum, viii. ii sq, 12. Cicero, Pro Milone, 3 (9),
Plato, Ixges, ix. 874. Ixx Baiuwar- ^ Digestay xlviii. 8. 9.
iorufu, ix. (viii). 5. Du Boys, Hisioire ^ Bracton, op, cit, fol. 144 b, vol. ii.
dn droit criininel de PEspagney p. 288 464 sq,
VOL. 1 U
recover it, or to capture the thief; for in all these cases
I am acting lawfully according to my right.”*
According to the law of England, a woman is justified
in killing one who attempts to ravish her ; and so also
the husband or father may kill a man who attempts a
rape on his wife or daughter, if she do not consent.^ We
meet with similar provisions in many other laws, modern
and ancient.® St. Augustine says that the law allows the
killing of a ravisher of chastity, either before or after the
act, in the same manner as it permits a man to kill a
highwayman who makes an attempt upon his life.^ Ac-
cording to the Talmud, it is permissible to kill a would-be
criminal, in order to prevent the commission of either
murder or adultery — “ to save an innocent man’s life, or
a woman’s honour ” ; but when the crime has already
been accomplished, the criminal cannot be thus disposed of.®
Among many peoples who in other cases prohibit self-
redress, an adulterer and an adulteress may be put to
death by the aggrieved husband, especially if they be
caught flagrante delicto. Such a custom prevails in various
uncivilised societies where justice is generally administered
by a council of elders or the chief.® Among the ancient
^ Grotius, De jtire belli et pach, ii. i.
12. I.
Harris, op. cit. p. 145.
^ Erskine-Rankine, Principles of the
Law of Scotland p. 558. Ottofnan
Penal Code^ art. 186. Nord.slrom, Bi-
drag till den svenska samhiills-fbrfatt-
ningens hisioria^ ii. 349 (ancient
Swedish laws). Plato, Leges ^ ix. 874.
* St. Augustine, Be libero arbitrio.^
i. 5 (Migne, Patrologice cursus^ xxxii.
1227).
® Benny, op. cit. p. 125. Rabbino-
wicz, op. cit. p. 124.
® Dalton, Descriptive Ethnology of
Bengal.^ p. 45 ; Stewart, in Jour. As.
Soc. Bengal, 628 (Kuki.s). Mac-
pherson. Memorials of Service in India,
p. 83 ; Hunter, Annals of Rural Ben-
gal, iii. 76 (Kandhs). Anderson, Man-
dalay to Momien, p. 140 (Kakhyens).
Mac Mahon, Far Cathay and Farther
India, p. 273 (Indo-Burmese border
tribes). Crawfurd, History of the hidian
Archipelago, iii. 130. von Brenner,
Besuch bei den Kannibalett Sumairas,
pp. 21 1, 213. Modigliani, Viaggio a
Nias, p. 495. Dorsey, ‘ Omaha Soci>
ology,’ in Ami, Rep. Bur. Ethn. iii.
364. Dyveyrier, Exploration du Sa-
hara, p. 429 (Touareg). Barrow,
Travels into the Interior of Southern
Africa, i. 207 (Kafirs). Among the
Gaika tribe of the Kafirs, however, “a
man is fined for murder, if he kills an
adulterer or adulteress in the act, al-
though he be the husband of the adul-
teress” (Maclean, Compendium of Kafir
Laws and Customs, p. in). Among
the Wakamba, “ if a man is caught in
adultery at night, the husband has a
right to kill him ; but if the injured
man thus takes the law into his own
hands in the daytime, he is dealt with
as a murderer” (Decle, op. cit. p. 487).
MOTIVES ‘
Peruvians “ a man killing his wife for adultery was free ;
but if for any other fault he died for it, unless he were
a man in dignity, and then some other penalty was in-
flicted.” ^ According to Chinese penal law, “ when a
principal or inferior wife is discovered by her husband in
the act of adultery, if such husband at the very time that
he discovers kills the adulterer, or adulteress, or both, he
shall not be punishable.” ^ By the law of Nepal, the
Parbattia husband retains the privilege of avenging, with
his own hand, the violation of his marriage bed, and
anyone, save a learned Brahman or a helpless boy, who,
instead of using his own sword, should appeal to the
courts, would be covered with eternal disgrace.® In all
purely Moslem nations custom “ overwhelms with igno-
miny the husband or son of an adulteress who survives the
discovery of her sin ; he is taboo’d by society ; he becomes
a laughing-stock to the vulgar, and a disgrace to his
family and friends.” * According to the ‘ Lex Julia de
adulteriis,’ a Roman father had a right to kill both his
married daughter and her accomplice if she was taken in
adultery either in his house or in her husband’s, provided
that both of them were killed, and that it was done at
once. The husband, on the other hand, had no such
right as to his wife in any case, and no such right as to
her accomplice unless he was an infamous person or a
slave, taken, not in his father-in-law’s house, but in his
own." However, it seems that in more ancient times the
husband was entitled to kill an adulterous wife ; ® and his
right of self-redress in the case of adultery was again
somewhat extended by Justinian beyond the very narrow
limits set down by the Lex Julia.^ According to an
Athenian law, “if one man shall kill another . . . after
catching him with his wife, or with his mother, or with a
’ J'lerrera, op. cit. iv. 33^.
Ta Tsing Leu Lee^ sec. cclxxxv.
P-.307.
^ Hodgson, Miscellaneous Essays^ ii.
235, 236, 272.
^ Burton, Sind Revisited^ ii. 54 sq.
® Digesta^ xlviii, 5. 2t sqq.
® Gellius, Nodes Afliccr^ x. 23. 5.
Cf. Mommsen, Roniisch s Strafrecht.^
p. 625.
“ Noz^ellce^ cxvii. 15.
U 2
MOTIVES
sister, or with a daughter, or with a concubine whom he
keeps to beget free-born children, he shall not go into
exile for homicide on such account.” ^ Ancient Teutonic
law allowed a husband to kill both his unfaithful wife and
the adulterer, if he caught them in the act ; ^ according
to the Laws of Alfred, an adulterer taken flagrante delicto
by the woman’s lawful husband, father, brother, or son,
might be killed without risk of blood-feud.® In the
thirteenth century, however, there are already signs that,
in England, the outraged husband who found his wife in
the act of adultery might no longer slay the guilty pair
or either of them, although he might emasculate the
adulterer.'* The present law treats the killing of an adul-
terer taken in the act in the same way as homicide
committed in a quarrel ; by slaying him, the husband is
guilty of manslaughter only, though, if the killing were
deliberate and took place in revenge after the fact, the
crime would be murder. This seems to be the only case
in English law in which provocation, other than by actual
blows, is considered sufficient to reduce homicide to man-
slaughter, if the killing be effected by a deadly weapon.®
There are corresponding provisions in other modern laws.®
As a rule, flagrant adultery does not justify homicide, but
serves as an extenuating circumstance.^ But according to
the French Code Penal, “ dans le cas d’adultere . . . le
meurtre commis par I’dpoux sur son epouse, ainsi que sur
le complice, a I’instant ou il les surprend en flagrant ddlit
dans la maison conjugale, est excusable.” ® And in Russia,
though the law does not exempt from punishment a
^ Demosthenes, Contra Aristocra- dit droit criminel de f Espagne, p.
tern, 53, p, 637. 93),
“ Wilda, Slrafrecht der Ger marten^ Hale, op. cii. i. 486. Harris, op.
p. S23. Nordstrom, op. cit. ii. 62 sq. cit. p. 145. Cherry, Lectures on the
Stemann, op. cit. p. 325. Groivtk of Criminal Law., p. 82 sq,
^ Laws of Alfred f\\. 42. Italian Codice Pcnalei art. 377.
Pollock and Maitland, op. cit. ii. Spanish Codigo Penal reformadoy art.
484. The same right is granted by a 438. Ottofuan Penal Code, art, 188.
Spanish mediaeval law to a father, or a ^ Gunther, Idee der IViedetwergeP
husband, who finds a man having ille- Ittftg, iii. 233 sqq,
gitimate sexual intercourse with his ® Code PMal, art. 324.
daughter, or wife (Hu Hoys, LListoire
MOTIVES
husband who thus avenges himself, the jury show great
indulgence to himd
Whilst the law referring to self-defence has gradually
become more liberal, the law referring to self-redress in
the case of adultery has thus, generally speaking, become
more severe. The reason for this is obvious. A husband
who slays his unfaithful wife or her accomplice does not
defend, but avenges himself ; and it is to be expected that
a society in which punishment has only just succeeded
revenge should still admit, or tolerate, revenge in extreme
cases. The privilege granted to the outraged husband is not
the sole survival of the old system of self-redress lingering
on under the new conditions. According to Kafir custom
or law, the relatives of a murdered man become liable only
to a very light fine if they kill the murderer.'^ The
ancient Teutons, at a time when their laws already pro-
hibited private revenge, did not look upon an avenger of
blood in the same light as an ordinary manslayer ; ® and
even the Church recognised the distinction.^ Some
of the ancient Swedish laws entirely excused homicide
committed in revenge immediately after the crime.^’ Ac-
cording to the Ostgota-Lag, an incendiary taken in
flagrancy might be at once burnt in the fire/’ and ancient
Norwegian law permitted the slaying of a thief caught in
the act.’’ In the Laws of Ine there is an indication that
a thief s fate was at the discretion of his captor,** and a
law of Aithelstan implies that the natural and proper
course as to thieves was to kill them.'* In the Laws
of King Wihtrasd it is said, “ If any one slay 'a layman
while thieving ; let him lie without ‘ wergeld.’ ” So
also, according to Javanese law, if a thief be caught in the
act it is lawful to put him to death.*^ For our present
^ P'oinilzki, loc, cit. p. 548. ® Nordstrom, op. cit. ii. 414 sq.
Maclean, op. cit, p. ^143. Cf.y ® Ibid. ii. 416.
ho^Tver, ibid, p. no. * ^ Wilda, op, cit. p. 889.
^ Wilda, op. cit, p. 562. Stemann, ^ Laws of Ine^ 12. Cf. Stephen,
op. cit. p. 582 sq. op. cit. i. 62.
^ Wilda, op. cit. pp. 180, 565, Laws of Astheis tarty iv. 4.
Labbe-Mansi, Sacrorum Conciliorum Laws of fVibtncdy 25.
collexHoy xii, 289. Crawfurd, op. cit. iii. 1 1 5,
MOTIVES
purpose it is important to note that all such cases imply
a recognition of the principle that an act committed
on extreme provocation requires special consideration. To
declare that an adulterer or adulteress caught in flagrancy,
or a manifest thief, may be slain with impunity, is a con-
cession to human passions, which are , naturally more
easily aroused by the sight of an act than by the mere
knowledge of its commission. It was for a similar reason
that the Law of the Twelve Tables punished fur turn
manifestum much more heavily than fur turn nec manifestumf
and that the Laws of Alfred imposed death as the
penalty for fighting in the King’s hall if the offender
was taken in the act, whereas he was allowed to pay for
himself if he escaped and' was subsequently apprehended.^
The difference between an injury which a person
inflicts deliberately, in cold blood, and one which he
inflicts in the heat of the moment, under the disturbance
of great excitement caused by a wrong done to himself,
has been widely recognised. There are instances reported
of savages who distinguish between murder and man-
slaughter. And the laws of all civilised nations agree
in regarding, on certain conditions, passion aroused by
provocation as a mitigating circumstance at the commis-
sion of a crime.
The Australian Narrinyeri, as we have seen, have a tribunal,
called ttndi^ consisting of the elders of the clan, to which all
offenders are brought for trial. “ In case of the slaying by a
person or persons of one clan of the member of another clan in
time of peace, the fellow-clansmen of the murdered man will
send to the friends of the murderer and invite them to bring him
to trial before the united tendies. If, after full inquiry, he is
found to have committed the crime, he will be punished
according to the degree of guilt. If it were a case of murder,
with malice aforethought, he would be handed over to his own
clan to be put to death by spearing. If it should be what we
call manslaughter, he would receive a good thrashing, or be
banished from his clan, or compelled to go to his mother’s
^ Institutiones, iv, I. 5.
^ Laws of Alfred, ii. 7.
MOTIVES
^95
relations.” ^ In the Pelew Islands, if two natives are quarrelling,
and the one says to the other, ‘‘ Your wife is bad,” the insulted
party is entitled to chastise the provoker with a stone, and is not
held liable even if the latter should die in consequence.^ The
Eastern Central Africans ^^are aware of the difference between
murder and homicide,” even though the punishment of the two
crimes is often the same.^ Among the Kandhs only slight
compensation is awarded for wounds, however serious, given
under circumstances of extreme provocation.” ^ ‘‘ f^aldeyak^ or
manslaughter,” says Georgi, is not capital among the
Tungusians, when it has been occasioned by some antecedent
quarrel. The slayer is however whipped, and obliged to main-
tain the family of the deceased : he undergoes no reproaches on
account of the affair \ but on the contrary is considered as a
brave and courageous man for it.”^
Among the ancient Peruvians, “ when one killed another in
.a quarrel, the first thing enquired into was, who had been the
aggressor ; if the dead man, then the punishment was slight, at
the will of the Inga \ but if the surviver had given the provoca-
tion, his penalty was death, or at least perpetual banishment to
the Andes, there to work in the Inga’s fields of corn, which was
like sending him to the galeys. A murderer was immediately
publickly put to death, tho’ he were a man of quality,” ^
Among the Mayas of Yucatan and Nicaragua, in case of great
provocation or absence of malice, homicide was atoned by the
payment of a fine.^
From certain passages in the Mosaic law the conclusion has
been drawn that the ancient Hebrews did not consider it
obligatory to inflict death upon him who had killed his neighbour
in a fit of passion.® It is said that a man shall be put to death
if he “ come presumptuously upon his neighbour, to slay him
with guile,” ^ or if he hate his neighbour, and lie in wait for
him, and rise up against him, and smite him mortally that he
die.” On the other hand, he shall be allowed a resort to a city
^ Taplin, ^ Narrinyeri/ in Woods,
Native Tribes of South Australia,
P-34-y^.
^ Kubary, ‘ Die Palau-Inseln,’ in
Journal des Museum Godeffroy^ iv.
' * Macdonald, Africana^ i. 172.
^ Macpherson, op, cit. p. 82.
® Georgi, Russia, iii. 83. Cf also
Turner, ‘ Ethnology of the Ungava
District,’ in Ann. Rep. Bur. Ethn. xi.
186.
® Herrera, op. cit. iv. 337 sq.
^ Bancroft, Native Races of the
Pacific States, ii. 658.
® Goitein, Das Vergeltungsprincip
im biblischen and talmudischen Straf
rechty p. 33 sqq.
® Exodus, xxi. 14.
Deuteronomy, xix. 1 1 sq.
MOTIVES
of refuge if “ he lie not in wait,” ^ or if he thrust his neigiibour
“ suddenly without enmity.’' ^
Professor Leist suggests that in ancient Greece, at a time
when blood- revenge was a sacred duty in the case of premedi-
tated murder, homicide committed without premeditation could
be forgiven by the avenger of blood.^ Plato, in his ‘Laws,’
draws a distinction between him “ who treasures up his anger
and avenges himself, not immediately and at the moment, but
with insidious design, and after an interval,” and him “ who
does not treasure up his anger, and takes vengeance on the
instant, and without malice prepense.” The deed of the latter,
though not involuntary, “ approaches to the involuntary,” and
should therefore be punished less severely than the crime perpe-
trated by him who has stored up his anger.^ Aristotle, also,
whilst denying that “ acts done from anger or from desire are
involuntary,”® maintains that “assaults committed in anger are
rightly decided not to be of malice aforethought, for they do ilot
originate in the volition of the man who has been angered, but
rather in that of the man who so angered him.”^ And he adds
that “everyone will admit that he who does a disgraceful act,
being at the same time free from desire, or at any rate feeling
desire but slightly, is more to be blanied than is he who does
such an act under the influence of a strong desire ; and that he
who, when not in a passion, smites his neighbour, is more to be
blamed than is he who does so when in a passion.” ^ Cicero
likewise points out that “ in every species of injustice it is
a very material question whether it is committed through
some agitation of passion, which commonly is short-lived and
temporary, or from deliberate, prepense, malice ; for those
things which proceed from a short, sudden fit, are of slighter
moment than those which are inflicted by forethought and
preparation.” ^
Of ancient Russian law M. Kovalewsky observes, “ L’exist-
ence d'une excitation violente est prise en consideration, par
notre antique legislation, qui declare le crime accompli sous leur
influence non imputable.”^ According to ancient Irish law,
“ homicide was divisible into the two classes of simple man-
slaughter and murder, the difference between which lay in the
^ Exodus, xxi. 13. I. 21.
^ Numbers, xxxv. 22, 25. ® Ibid. v. 8. 9.
3 Leist, Grceco-italischc Rechisge- ^ Ibid. vii. 7. 3.
schickie, pp. 325, 352. 8 Cicero, De officiis, i. 8.
* Plato, Leges, ix. 867* ® Kovalewsky, Couiutne contempo*
Aristotle, Ethica Nicomackea, iii. ratne, p. 291.
MOTIVES
existence or absence of malice aforethought, the fine in the latter
being double what it was in the former case and for a wound
which was inflicted inadvertently in lawful anger, the payment
was made upon a diminislied scale.^ The ancient Teutons, also,
held a wrong committed in sudden anger and on provocation to
be less criminal than one committed with premeditation in cold
blood ; ^ this opinion seems partly to be at the bottom of the
distinction which they made between open and secret homicide.^
According to the law of the East Frisians, a man who kills
another without premeditation may buy off his neck with money,
not so he who commits a murder with malice aforethought/
It is curious that Bracton should take no notice of the different
grades of evil intention which may accompany voluntary
homicide, and that he should omit altogether the question of
provocation ; ^ Beaumanoir, the French jurist, who lived in the
same age, mentions in his ^ Coutumes du Beauvoisis ’ provocation
as an extenuating circumstance,^ and the same view was taken
by tJie Church/ Coke, in his Third Institute — which may be
regarded as the second source of the criminal law of England,
Bracton being the first — gives an account of malice aforethought,
and adds, ^^Some manslaughters be voluntary, and not of malice
forethought, upon some sudden falling out. Delinquens per tram
provocatus puniri debet mitinsr ^ Hume says that in Scotland
the manslayer on suddenty was to have the benefit of the girth
or sanctuary : he might flee to the church or other holy place \
from which he might indeed be taken for trial, but to be
returned thither, safe in life and limb, if his allegation of chaude
rnelle were proved.”^ All modern codes regard provocation
under certain circumstances as a mitigating circumstance.^^
According to the criminal law of Montenegro, great provocation
may even relieve a homicide of all guilt.^^
It has been said that a man who acts under the
influence of great passion has not, at the time, a full
knowledge of the nature and quality of his act, and that
^ Ancient Latvs of Ireland^ iii. pp.
xciii. cx.
Wilda, o/>, ciL p. 560 Sf/t/., 70 f.
Stemann, op, cit. p. 574. von Aniira,
in Paul’s Gritndriss der gerynanischen
Philologie, ii. pt. ii. 174.
Wilda, op, cit. p, 560. von Amira,
loc, cit. p, 173.
^ Das Ostfriesische Land- Dec Jit, iii.
17 sri.
® Cf, Stephen, op. cit. iii. 33.
^ Beaumanoir, Coutumes du Beau-
voisis,, XXX. loi, vol. i. 454 sq.
^ Gregory JII. Judicia congrua
panitentiims, 3 (Labbe- Mansi, op. cit.
xii. 289).
^ Coke, Third Institute^ p. 55.
^ 1 1 lime, Coniffixntaries on the Law
of Scotland y i. 365.
Gunther, op, cit. iii. 256 sqq.
Ibid, iii. 255 sq.
MOTIVES
298 ‘
the clemency of the law is “ a condescension to the frailty
of the human frame, to the furor brevis^ which, while the
frenzy lasteth, rendereth the man deaf to the voice of
reason.” ^ But the main cause for passion extenuating
his guilt is not the intellectual disability under which he
acts, but the fact that he is carried away by an impulse
which is too strong for his will to resist. This is implied
in the provision of the law, that “ provocation does not
extenuate the guilt of homicide unless the person provoked
is at the time when he does the act deprived of the power
of self-control by the provocation which he has received.” *
That anger has been so generally recognised as an ex-
tenuation of guilt is largely due to the fact that the person
who provokes it is himself blamable ; both morality and
law take into consideration the degree of provocation to
which the agent was exposed. But, at the same time, the
pressure of a non-volitional motive on the will may by
itself be a sufficient ground of extenuation. In certain
cases of mental disease a morbid impulse or idea may take
such a despotic possession of the patient as to drive him to
the infliction of an injury.. He is mad, and yet he may
be free from delusion and exhibit no marked derangement
of intelligence. He may be possessed with an idea or
impulse to kill somebody which he cannot resist. Or he
may yield to a morbid impulse to steal or to set fire to
houses or other property, without having any ill-feeling
against the owner or any purpose to serve by what he
does.® The deed to which the patient is driven is frequently
one which he abhors, as when a mother kills the child which
she loves most.^ In such cases the agent is of course
acquitted by the moral judge, and if he is condemned by
the law of his country and its guardians, the reason for this
can be nothing but ignorance. We must remember that
this form of madness was hardly known even to medical
^ Foster, Report of Crown Cases ^ Lehrbuch der gericht lichen Psychopatho-
p. 315. logic, p. 308 sqq.
® Stephen, Digest, art. 246, p. 188. ^ Gadelius, Ovi tvangstanhar, p.
® M.awdsley, Responsibility in Mental 16^ sq, Paulhan, Vactivite mentale.
Disease, p. 133 sqq^ von Krafft-Ebing, p. 374.
MOTIVES
*299
men till the end of the last century^ when Pinel, to his own
surprise, discovered that there were “ many madmen who
at no period gave evidence of any lesion of the under-
standing, but who were under the dominion of instinctive
and abstract fury, as if the affective faculties had alone
sustained injury.” ^ And there can be no doubt that the
fourteen English judges who formulated the law on the
criminal responsibility of the insane, made no reference to
this manie sans delire simply because they had not sufficient
knowledge of the subject with which they had to deal.®
That moral judgments are generally passed, in the first
instance, with reference to acts immediately intended, and
consider motives only in proportion as the judgment is in-
fluenced by reflection, holds good, not only of moral blame,
but of moral praise. Every religion presents innumer-
able examples of people who do “ good deeds ” only in
expectation of heavenly reward. This implies the assump-
tion that the Deity judges upon actions without much
regard to their motives ; for if motives were duly con-
sidered, a man could not be held rewardable for an act
which he performs solely for his own benefit. We are
told that the homage which the Chinese “ render the gods
and goddesses believed to be concerned in the manage-
ment of the affairs of this world is exceedingly formal,
mechanical, and heartless,” and that “ there seems to be no
special importance attached to purity of heart.” Accord-
ing to Caldwell, “ the Hindu religionist enjoins the act
alone, and affirms that motives have nothing to do with
merit.” ® The argument, “ Obey the law because it will
^ Maudsley, p. 141.
^ Pinel, TraiU mt^dico-philosophtque
sur r aliination mentale^ p. 156= “Je
ne fut pas peu surpris de voir plusieurs
alienes qui n’ofifroient a aucune epoque
aucune It^sion de ^ente^>dement, et qui
etoient dominos par une sorte d’instinct
de fureur, comme si les facult^s affec-
tives seules avoient et^ l^s^es.”
^ Sir James Stephen {Digest ^ art. 28,
p. 20 sq , ) thinks it possible that, accord-
ing to the present law of England, an
act is not criminal if the person who
does it is, at the time when it is done,
prevented by any disease affecting his
mind from controlling his own conduct,
unless the absence of the power of
control has been produced by his own
default.
* Doolittle, Social Life of the Chinese^
ii- 397.
® Caldwell, Tinnevelly Shanars^ p.
35 -
300 •
MOTIVES
profit you to do so,” constitutes the fundamental motive
of Deuteronomy, as appears from phrases like these :
“ That it may go well with thee,” “ That thy days may
be prolonged.” ^ Speaking of the modern Egyptians, Lane
observes that “ from their own profession it appears that
they are as much excited to the giving of alms by the
expectation of enjoying corresponding rewards in heaven
as by pity for the distresses of their fellow-creatures, or a
disinterested wish to do the will of God.”^ Something
similar may be said, not only of the “ good deeds ” of
Muhammedans, but of those of many Christians. Did
not Paley expressly define virtue as “ the doing good to
mankind, in obedience to the will of God, and for the
sake of everlasting happiness ” ? ®
Such views, however, cannot hold their ground against
the verdict of the scrutinising moral consciousness. They
have been repeatedly contradicted by the great teachers of
morality. Confucius required an inward sincerity in all
outward practice, and poured scorn on the pharisaism
which contented itself with the cleansing of the outside
of the cup and platter.^ He said that, “ in the rites of
mourning, exceeding grief with deficient rites is better than
little demonstration of grief with superabounding rites ; and
that in those of sacrifice, exceeding reverence with deficient
rites is better than an excess of rites with but little
reverence.” ® “ Sacrifice is not a thing coming to a man
from without ; it issues from within him, and has its birth
in his heart. When the heart is deeply moved, expression
is given to it by ceremonies.” “ The virtuous man offers
his sacrifices “ without seeking for anything to be gained
by them.”’’ “The Master said, ‘See what a man does.
Mark his motives.’ ” ® The popular Taouist work, called
‘ The Book of Secret Blessings,’ inculcates the necessity
^ Cf, Montefiore, Hibbert LecttireSy 261 sq, ; Girard de Rialle, Mythologie
p. 531. compar^e^ p. 214.
Lane, Modern Egyptians, p. 293. ® IJ Kt, ii. i. 2. 27. Cf. Lun Yu,
* Paley, Principles of Moral and iii. 4. 3.
Political Philosophy, i. 7 (Complete ® Lt Kt, xxii. i.
Works, ii. 38). ^ Ibid. xxii. 2.
^ Cf Legge, Religions of China, p. ® Lun Yii, ii. 10. i sq.
MOTIVES
- 301
of purifying the heart as a preparation for all right-doing.^
The religious legislator of Brahmanism, whilst assuming
in accordance with the popular view that the fulfilment of
religious duty will be always rewarded to some extent,
whatever may be the motive, maintains that the man who
fulfils his duties without regard to the rewards which
follow the fulfilment, will enjoy the highest happiness in
this life and eternal happiness hereafter.** According to the
Buddhistic Dhammapada, “ if a man speaks or acts with an
evil thought, pain follows him, as the wheel follows the
foot of the ox that draws the carriage. ... If a man
speaks or acts with a pure thought, happiness follows him,
like a shadow that never leaves him.”** In his description
of the Buddhists of Mongolia, the Rev. James Gilmour
observes ; — “ Mongol priests recognise the power of motive
in estimating actions .... The attitude of the mind
decides the nature of the act. He that offers a cup of
cold water only, in a proper spirit, has presented a gift
quite as acceptable as the most magnificent of donations.”'*
With reference to the Hebrews, Mr. Montefiore says : —
“ If it were true that the later Judaism of the law laid
exclusive stress in its moral teaching upon the mere out-
ward act and not upon the spirit — upon doing rather than
being, as we might nowadays express it — we should
scarcely find that constant harping upon the heart as the
source and seat of good and evil. What more legal book
than Chronicles ? Yet it is there that we find the earnest
supplication for a heart directed towards God. . . . The
eudasmonistic motive is strongest in Deuteronomy ; it
is weakest with the Rabbis.” ** Few sayings are quoted and
applied more frequently in the Rabbinical literature than
the adage which closes those tractates of the Mishna which
deal with the sacrificial law ; — “ He that brings few offer-
ings is as he that brings many ; let his heart be directed
’ Douglas, Confucianism and Taou- 239.
ism^ p. 272. ® Montefiore, op, ci(, pp. 483, 533.
^ Wheeler, History of India , ii. 478. i Chronicles, xxii. 19 ; xxviii. 9 ; xxix.
^ Dhammapada, \ sg. 18 sg, 2 Chronicles, xi. 16 ; xv. 12 ;
^ Gilmour, Among the Mongols^ p. xvi, 9.
MOTIVES
CH. XI
heavenward/’ ^ The same faults which Jesus chastises in
the hypocritical Rabbis of his day are also chastised in the
Talmud. It is said, Before a man prays let him purify
his heart,” ^ and, Sin committed with a good motive is
better than a precept fulfilled from a bad motive.” ® Rabbi
Elazar says, No charity is rewarded but according to the
degree of benevolence in it, for it is said, ‘ Sow (a reward)
for yourselves in giving alms as charity, you will reap
according to the benevolence.’”^ Nor is the doctrine
which requires disinterested motives for the performance
of good deeds foreign to Muhammedan moralists. What-
ever we give,” says the author of the Akhlalc-i-Jelali,
‘‘should be given in the fulness of zeal and good-will. . . .
We should spend it simply to please God, and not mix
the act with any meaner motive, lest thereby it be rendered
null and void.”’"'
^ Montefiore, op, cit. p, 484. Succah, fol. 49 B, ibid, p. ii.
^ Ibid. p. 174. Quoted by Ameer Ali, Ethics of
^ Nazir, fob 23 u, quoted by Hershon, Isidm^ p. 38 j-y.
Vreasures of the Talnmd,, p. 74.
Chapter XII
FORBEARANCES AND CARELESSNESS CHARACTER
The observation has often been made that in early
moral codes the so-called negative commandments, which
tell people what they ought not to do, are much more
prominent than the positive commandments, which tell
them what they ought to do. The main reason for this
is that negative commandments spring from the dis-
approval of acts, whereas positive commandments spring
from the disapproval of forbearances or omissions, and
that the indignation of men is much more easily aroused
by action than by the absence of it. A person who
commits a harmful deed is a more obvious cause of pain
than a person who causes harm by doing nothing, and
this naturally affects the question of guilt in the eyes
of the multitude. A scrutinising judge of course care-
fully distinguishes between wilfulness and negligence,
whereas, to his mind, a forbearance is morally equivalent
to an act. The unreflecting- judge, on the other hand,
is much less concerned with the question of wilfulness
than with the distinction between acting and not-acting.
Even the criminal laws of civilised nations take little
cognisance of forbearances and omissions and one reason
for this is that they evoke little public indignation.
Even if k be adrhitted that the rules of beneficence, so far
as details are concerned, must be left in a great measure to
^ Stephen, Hisioty of the C?'iMinat Zurechnung auf dem Gebiefe des Civil-
Law of England y ii, 113. Hepp, rechts, p. 115 (Roman law).
the jurisdiction of private ethics, the limits of the law on
this head, as Bentham remarks, seem “ to be capable of
being extended a good deal farther than they seem ever
to have been extended hitherto.” And he appropriately
asks, “ In cases where the person is in danger, why should
it not be made the duty of every man to save another
from mischief, when it can be done without prejudicing
himself, as well as to abstain from brinffine it on
him ^
The more scrutinising the moral, consciousness, the
greater the importance which it attaches to positive
commandments. This is well illustrated by a comparison
between Old and New Testament morality. As Pro-
fessor Seeley observes,^ “ the old legal formula began
‘ thou shalt not,’ the new begins with ‘ thou shalt.’ The
young man who had kept the whole law — that is, who
had refrained from a number of actions — is commanded
to do something, to sell his goods and feed the poor.
Condemnation was passed under the Mosaic law upon him
who had sinned, who had done something forbidden — the
soul that sinneth shall die ; — Christ’s condemnation is
pronounced upon those who had not done good — ‘ I
was. an hungered and ye gave' me no meat.’ The sinner
whom Christ habitually denounces is he who has done
nothing.” This characteristic is repeatedly manifested in
His parables — as in the case of the priest and Levite who
passed by on the other side ; in the case of Dives, of
whom no ill is recorded except that a beggar lay at his
^ FHnetpies of Morals and vol. ii. 280 j-t/.) that: he who could
Legislation, p. 322 sq. To a certain rescue a man from death and did not
extent, however, this ha.s been admitted do it, ought not to be exempt from
by legislators even in the Middle Ages. punishment. ' It was a principle of the
Frederick II. ’s Sicilian Code imposed Canon law that he who does not pre*
a penalty on per.sons who witnessed vent the infliction of an injury upon hi.s
conflagrations or shit)wucck.s without neighbour when it lies in his power
helping the victims, and a fine of four to do so, is to be regarded as an ac*
augustales on anyone who, hearing the complice in the offence (Geyer, Lehre
shrieks of an a.ssaulted woman, did p. 74.* Gregory IX.
not \n\xxy to Xmr r^CMc [ Constitntiojies Decretales, v. 12. 6. 2: “ Qui potiiit
Napolitanee stve Stcuhr, i. 28, 22 [Lin- liomincm liberare a morte, et non
denbrog. Codex legum antiquarunif pp. liberavit, eum occidit ”)* .
715, 712]). Bracton says \De Legtbus Seeley, Erec Homo, p. 176.
et Consucludimbus Anglia, fol. 121,
gate full of sores and yet no man gave unto him ; in the
case of the servant who hid in a napkin the talent
committed to him. However, to say that the new
morality involved the discovery of “ a new continent in
the moral globe,” ^ is obviously an exaggeration. The
customs of all nations contain not only prohibitions, but
positive injunctions as well. To be generous to friends,
charitable to the needy, hospitable to strangers, are rules
which, as will be seen, may be traced back to the lowest
s’tages of savagery known to us. The difference in
question is only one of degree. Of the Bangerang tribe
in Victoria Mr. Curr observes : — “ Aboriginal restraints
were, in the majority of cases, though not altogether, of
a negative character ; an individual might not do this,
and might not eat that, and might not say the other.
What he should do under any circumstances, or that he
should do anything, were matters with which custom
interfered less frequently.” ^
Whilst the unreflecting mind has a tendency to over-
look or underrate the guilt of a person who, whether
wilfully or by negligence, causes harm by doing nothing,
it is, on the other hand, apt to exaggerate the guilt of a
person who, not wilfully but out of heedlessness or rash-
ness, causes harm by a positive act. In reality the latter
person is blamable not for what he did, but for what he
omitted to do, for want of due attention, for not thinking
of the probable consequences of his act or for insufficient
advertence to them. But the superficial judge largely
measures the agent’s guilt by the actual harm done, and in
many cases even attributes to carelessness what was due to
sheer misfortune.
As Sir F. Pollock and Prof. Maitland rightly observe,
it is not true that barbarians will not trace the chain of
causation beyond its nearest link — that, for example, they
will not impute orte man’s death to another unless that
other has struck a blow which laid a corpse at his feet.®
^ Ibid, p. 179. ® Pollock and Maitland, History of
Curr, Recollections of Sqttaiting in English Law before the 7 'ime of Ed-
Victoria^ p. 264 sq. ward L ii. 470.
VOL, I
3o6 forbearances AND CARELESSNESS ch.
Among the Wanyoro, should a girl die in childbirth, the
seducer is also doomed to die, unless he ransom himself
by payment of some cows.^ Among the Wakamba, if a
man is the second time guilty of manslaughter in a state
of drunkenness, the elders may either sentence him to
death, “ or make the seller of drink pay compensation to
the family of the victim.”^ According to the native code
of Malacca, if vicious buffaloes or cattle “ be tied in the
highway, where people are in the habit of passing and
repassing, and gore or wound any person, the owner shall
be fined one tahil and one paha, and pay the expense
necessary for the cure of the wounded individual. Should
he be gored to death, then the owner shall be fined
according to the Diyat, because the owner is criminal in
having tied the animal in an improper place.” ® In the
Laws of Alfred it is said that, if a man have a spear over
his shoulder and anybody stake himself on it, the man
with the spear has to pay the zver.^ According to an
ancient custom, in vogue in England as late as the
thirteenth century, one who was accused of homicide was,
before going to the wager of battle, expected to swear that he
had done nothing through which the dead man had become
“ further from life and nearer to death ” ; ® and damages
which the modern English lawyer would without hesitation
describe as “ too remote,” were not too remote for the
author of the so-called ‘ Laws of Henry L’ ® “ At your
request I accompany you when you are about your own
affairs; my enemies fall upon and kill me; you must pay
for my death. ^ You take me to see a wild-beast show or
that interesting spectacle a madman ; beast or madman
kills me ; you must pay. You hang up your sword ; some
one else knocks it down so that it cuts me; you must pay.”®
In all these cases you did something that helped to bring
^ Emin Pasha in Central Africa^ p. ® Leges I/e uric i I. xc. il. Bracton,
83, op, cit. fol. 14 1 b, vol. ii. 440 sq.
Decle, Three Years in Savage ** Pollock and Maitland, op, cit, ii.
Africa, x>. . tg ]0 sq,
^ Newbold, British Settlements in ^ Leges LLenrici /. Ixxxviii. 9.
the Straits of Malacca, \\. sq. ^ Ibid, xc. II. Pollock and Mait-
^ Laws of Alfred, 36. land, of, cit, ii. 471,
about death or wound, and you are consequently held
responsible for the mishap.
But though early custom and law may be anxious
enough to trace an event to its source, they easily fail to
distinguish between external and internal causes, to dis-
cover where there is guilt or not, and, in case of
carelessness, to determine the magnitude of the offender’s
guilt. Ancient Teutonic law, as we have seen, distin-
guished between vi/i and. vadhi. It punished the
involuntary manslayer less heavily than the voluntary
one, but it punished him all the same; and whether the
unintended deed was combined with heedlessness or was
purely accidental was a question with which the law did not
at all concern itself.^ According to the Laws of Hammurabi,
‘‘ if the doctor has treated a gentleman for a severe wound
with a lancet of bronze, and has caused the gentleman to
die, or has opened an abscess of the eye for a gentleman
with the bronze lancet and has caused the loss of the
gentleman’s eye, one shall cut off his hands.”^ In the
Mosaic law distinction was made between presence and
absence of enmity in the manslayer, but the difference
between carelessness and misfortune was not considered,^
except when the instrument of death was a goring ox.^
However, in this, as in many other respects, great progress
was made by the later legislation of the Jews. The Rabbis
took considerable pains to distinguish between purely
accidental homicide and homicide due to carelessness; the
former they exempted from all punishment, whereas the
latter incurred the punishment of confinement to a city of
refuge."' They even distinguished between cases in which
the death was exclusively due to the carelessness of the
agent, and cases in which the deceased contributed to it
by some blamable act of his own. A father or a teacher
«
Wilda, Straf7'€cht der Germane7iy ^ Numbers^ xxxv. i6 sqq, DetUer-
p. 57 ^- Geyer, op. cit. p. 88. Brim- onomy^ xix. 4 sqq.
ner, ForscJmn^en ztir Geschichte des ^ Exodus^ xxi. 28-32, 35 sq. Cf
dent sc ken tmd fraftzosischeft Rechtes^ Laws of ILammurahiy 250 sqq.
p. 499. ® Rabbinowicz, Legislation criniL
^ Laws of Ifammurabi^ 218. nelle du Talmud^ p. 173 sqq.
X %
3o8 forbearances AND CARELESSNESS ch.
who in punishing his son or pupil unintentionally caused
his death, and a person who by order of the Sanhedrim
inflicted corporal punishment on a culprit and in doing
so happened by mistake to kill him — such persons were
not confined in a city of refuge, but escaped punishment
altogether.^ Whatever else may be said of these pro-
visions, .they certainly show remarkable discernment in a
point where legislators of a ruder type have been very
indiscriminate. In the oldest English records we see no
attempt to distinguish cases in which the dead man himself
was reprehensible from others in which no fault could be
imputed to him, and we find that many horses and boats
bore the guilt which should have been ascribed to beer.^
When a drunken carter was crushed beneath the wheel of
his cart, the cart, the cask of wine which was in it, and the
oxen that were drawing it, were all deodand.® According
to the customary law of the Ossetes, if a stolen gun went
off in the hands of the thief who was carrying it away,
and killed him, the thieP s kin had a just feud against the
owner of the gun."*
Modern laws generally hold a person liable for harm
caused by him through want of ordinary care and fore-
sight, and it depends on the nature of the case whether he
will have to pay damages or to suffer punishment. Yet,
as we have previously noticed, his punishment is determined
not only by the degree of carelessness of which he was
guilty, or the danger to which he exposed his fellow-men,
but, largely, by the harm resulting ; whereas, if nobody
happens to be hurt, little notice is taken of his fault. To
such an extent are men’s judgments in these matters *
influenced by external facts, that even nowadays many
among ourselves will hold a person answerable for all the
damage which directly ensues from an act of his, even
though no foresight could have reasonably been expected
^ p. ,.174. Benny, Criminal ^ Three Early Assize Tolls for the
Code oj the Jeivs according to the Tal- County of Northumberland^ p. 96 sq.
mud Massec'heth SynhedriHy X), sq, ** Kovalewsky, Coutume con tempo-
Pollock and Maitland, op, cit, ii. raincy p. 295.
474 > n. 4.
to look, out for it.^ Not long ago there were plausible, if
insufficient, grounds adduced for asserting that in English
courts a plea that there was neither negligence nor an
intent to do harm was no answer to an action which
charged the defendant with having hurt the plaintilF s
body.‘^ And of late years attacks have been made by con-
tinental jurists upon the Roman principle that there is no
liability where there is no fault ® — a principle which, more
or less modified, has been adopted by modern laws/
Although they take pains to point out the difference
between punishment and indemnification, the very language
they use indicates the quasi-ethical basis on which their
theory rests. It is, only just, they say, that he who has
caused the evil should compensate for it, since the injured
party “is still much more innocent than he.” And the
“ sense of justice ” is appealed to for compelling a man
who faints in the street and in the fall happens to break
some fragile articles to indemnify the owner for his loss.'"'
Thus, whilst loss from accident is generally allowed to lie
where it falls, an exception is made where the instrument
of misfortune is a human being. This is a nfost un-
reasonable exception, but one not difficult to explain.
People are ready to blame a person who commits a harm-
ful deed, whether he deserves blame or not ; at the same
time they are apt to overlook the indirect and more remote
cause of the harm which lies in the sufferer’s own conduct.
Hence the liability, if not the guilt, is laid on him who is
a cause of pain by doing something, even though it be by
merely spasmodic contractions of his muscles ; whereas the
other party, who only exposed himself to the risk of being
hurt, is regarded as the “ more innocent.”
Whilst culpability or quasi-culpability is thus imputed
to the innocent committer of a harmful deed, little or no
^ Holmes, Common Law, p. 80. op. cit. p. 106.
^ Stanley z'. Vo^^W, in Law Lepof'ts, ^ Forsman, Bidrag till Idran ont
Queen's Be?tch Dwision, Sf/q, shades tand i brottmal, 158 Pol-
Pollockand Maitland, op. cit. ii. Atl^sq. lock, Law of Torts, p. 129 sqq.
^ von Jhering, Schuldmoment im ® Thon, Rechtsnorm und suhjectives
romischen Privairecht, passim, espe- Recht, p. 106, n. 71.
cially pp. 20 sqq., 40 sqq, Ilepp,
CHARACTER
censure is passed on him whose want of foresight or want
of self-restraint is productive of suffering, if only the effect
is sufficiently remote. This is exemplified by the frivolous
leniency with which drunkenness, not long ago, was looked
upon in many civilised countries, and by the criminal in-
difference with which law and public opinion still regard
the production of offspring that are almost with certainty
doomed to misery on account of the vices, poverty, or
bodily infirmities of the parents. To interfere here, it is
argued, would be to intrude upon the individual’s right of
freedom, or to meddle with the affairs of Providence. But
men are not, generally, allowed to do mischief simply in
order to gratify their own appetites, and Providence might
equally well be called in to answer for any other kind of
human shortcoming. I presume the true explanation to
be that in this, as in many other kindred cases, the cause
and effect are so distant from each other that the near-
sighted eye does not distinctly perceive the connection
between them. Indeed, there is hardly any other point in
which the moral consciousness of civilised men still stands
in greater need of intellectual training than in its judg-
ments on cases which display want of care or foresight.
And there is no safer measure of the moral enlightenment
of a man than the scrupulosity with which he considers
the possible consequences of acts, and the number of
positive commandments which are contained in his catalogue
of duties.
That moral indignation and moral approval are from the
very beginning felt, not with reference to certain modes of
conduct per se, but with reference to persons on account of
their conduct, is obvious from the intrinsic nature of those
emotions. As we noticed before, they derive one of their
most essential characteristics from their being directed
against sensitive agents. Hence they may as naturally
give rise to judgments on human character as to judgments
on human conduct. And even when a moral judgment
immediately refers to a distinct act, it takes notice of the
CHARACTER
xir
31 ^
agent’s will as a whole. The forgiveness which follows
sincere repentance, and the distinction made between
injuries committed deliberately in cold blood and injuries
committed in the heat of passion, indicate that men, in
their moral judgments, are apt to consider something more
than a momentary volition. The same tendency is at the
bottom of the common practice of punishing a second and
third offence more severely than the first.
Among the Masai, if a man is convicted of a particular
crime several times, or constitutes himself a public nuisance, he
is proclaimed an outlaw, his property is confiscated, and he is
beaten away from any settlement or village he goes near. Un-
less an outlaw can find friends among non-Masai tribes, he dies
of starvation.” 1 Among the Wakamba “ a murder is judged
by the elders ; if it is a man’s first offence of that kind he is
punished by a fine. . . ♦ But a man convicted for the second
time of murder is killed at once, everyone setting on him the
moment judgment is delivered. . . . For rape a first offender
is flogged, and lias to pay a fine of one cow ; for the second
offence he is killed.” ^ Among the Wyandots of North
America, a woman guilty of adultery, for the first offence is
punished by having her hair cropped ; for repeated offences her
left ear is cut off.” ^ The laws of the Incas, also, were more
lenient to a first offence than to a second ; ^ and in the kingdom
of Mechoacan, whilst the first theft was not severely punished,
the thief who repeated his crime was thrown down a precipice
and his carcass was left to the birds of prey.^* Among the
Aleuts, for the first theft “corporal punishment was inflicted^
for the second offence of the kind some fingers of the right hand
were cut off ; for the third, the left hand and sometimes the lips
were amputated ; and for the fourth offence the punishment
was death.” Other crimes, again, “were punished at first by
reprimand by the chief before the community, and upon
repetition the offender was bound and kept in such a condition
for some time.”^ The Kamchadales “ burn the hands of people
who have been frequently caught in theft, but for the first
offence the thief must restore what he hath stolen, and live alone
^ Hinde, I'he Last of the Masai,
p. io8.
r Decle, op, cit. p. 487.
^ l^owell, ‘ Wyandot Government,*
in A fin. Hep. Bur. Ethn. i. 66.
^ Herrera, General History of the
West Indies, iv. 338 sqq.
^ Ibid. iii. 255.
® Veniaminof, quoted by Petroff,
‘ Report on Alaska,* in Tenth Census
of the United States, p. 152.
in solitude, without expecting any assistance from others.” ^
Among the Ainu, for breaking into the storehouse or dwelling
of another, a very sound beating was administered for the first
offence ; for the second, sometimes the nose was cut off, some-
times the ears, and in some cases both the nose and ears were
forfeited. . . . Persons who had committed such a crime
twice were driven bag and baggage out of the home and village
to which they belonged.”^ Among the Murray Islanders
repetition of an offence such as murder or robbery generally
incurred a penalty of death, whereas the first offence was
punished only by a fine.^ According to the Javanese Niti
Sastra, if a man violates the law, he may for the first trans-
gression be punished by a pecuniary fine, for the second by a
punishment affecting his person, but for the third he may be
punished with death.^ The Penal Code of the Chinese
prescribes that, for the first offence, individuals convicted of
being concerned in a theft shall be branded in the lower part of
the left arm with two words signifying thief, that for the second
offence they shall be branded again with the same words in the
lower part of the right arm, but that for the third offence they
shall suffer death by being strangled, after remaining the usual
period in confinement.® In Nepal, in the case of theft or petty
burglary, for the first offence one hand is cut off, for the second
the other hand, whilst the third offence is capital.® Herodotus
mentions with approval that in ancient Persia not even the king
was allowed to put any one to death for a single crime/
According to the Vendid^d, the gravity of a crime does not
depend only on the gravity of the deed, but on its frequency as
well.^ In ancient Rome the repetition of a crime aggravated
its punishment.® According to early English law, the punish-
ment upon a second conviction for nearly every offence was
death or mutilation.^® In modern European legislation, the
principle that the criminality of certain crimes is increased by
their repetition is generally recognised.
The more a moral judgment is influenced by reflection,
the more it scrutinises the character which manifests itself
^ Krasheninnikoff, History of K am- p. 285.
si'hatka, p. 179. ® Hodgson, Miscellaneous Essays^
’ Batchelor, Ainu and their Folk- ii. 235.
Lore, p. 285. . ^ Herodotus, i. 137.
Hunt, in Jour. Anthr. Inst. ® Vendi ddd, iw. sqq.
xxviii. 6. ^ Mommsen, Romisches Strafrecht^
^ Raffles, History of Java, i. 262. p. 1044.
^ Id Tsing Lcti Lee, sec. cclxix. Stephen, op, cit. i. 58.
CHARACTER
ji3
in that individual piece of conduct by which the judgment
is occasioned. But however superficial it be, it always
refers to a will conceived of as a continuous entity, to a
person regarded as a cause of pleasure or pain. This holds
good of savage and civilised men alike. Even tame
animals, in response to a hurt or a benefit, behave differently
towards different persons according to their previous
experience of the agent.
Chapter XIII
WHY MORAL JUDGMENTS ARE PASSED ON CONDUCT
AND CHARACTER MORAL VALUATION AND FREE-WILL
We have examined the general nature of the subjects
of moral judgments from an evolutionary point of view.
We have seen that such judgments are essentially passed
on conduct and character, and that allowance is made
for the various elements of which conduct and character
are composed in proportion as the moral judgment is
scrutinising and enlightened. But an important question
stills calls for an answer, the question, Why is this so We
cannot content ourselves with the bare fact that nothing
but the will is morally good or bad. We must try to
explain it.
After what has been said above the explanation is not
far to seek. Moral judgments are passed on conduct
and character, because such judgments spring from moral
emotions ; because the moral emotions are retributive
emotions ; because a retributive emotion is a reactive
attitude of mind, either kindly or hostile, towards a living
being (or something looked upon in the light of a living
being), regarded as a cause of pleasure or as a cause of
pain ; and because a living being is regarded as a true
cause of pleasure or pain only in so far as this feeling
is assumed to be caused by its will. The correctness of
this explanation I consider to be proved by the fact that
not only moral emotions, but non-moral retributive
emotions as well, are felt with reference to phenomena
EXPLANATORY
CH. XIII
exactly similar in nature to those on which moral judgments
are passed.
Like moral indignation, the emotion of revenge can be
felt only towards a sentient being, or towards something
which is believed to be sentient. We may be angry with
inanimate things for a moment, but such anger cannot last ;
it disappears as soon as we reflect that the thing in question
is incapable of feeling pain. Even a dog which, in play-
ing with another dog, hurts itself, for instance, by running
into a tree, changes its angry attitude immediately it
notices the real nature of that which caused it pain.^
Equivalent to injuries resulting from inanimate things
are injuries resulting accidentally from animate beings.
If my arm or my foot gives a push to my neighbour, and
he is convinced that the push was neither intended nor
foreseen nor due to any carelessness whatever on my part,
surely he cannot feel angry with me. Why not ? Professor
Bain answers this question as follows : — “ Aware that
absolute inviolability is impossible in this world, and that
we are all exposed by turns to accidental injuries from our
fellows, we have our minds disciplined to let unintended
evil go by without satisfaction of inflicting some counter
evil upon the offender.”^ Perhaps another answer would
be that an accidental injury in no way affects the “self-
feeling ” of the sufferer. But neither of these explanations
goes to the root of the question. Let us once more
remember that even a dog distinguishes between being
stumbled over and being kicked ; and this can neither be
the result of discipline, nor have anything to do with the
feeling of self-regarding pride.® I’he reason is that the dog
scents an enemy in the person who kicks him, but not in the
one who stumbles. My neighbour, more clearly still, makes
a distinction between a part of my body and myself as a
^ Hiram Stanley, Studies in the Africa^ i, 254), expect a similar clis-
Evolutionary Psychology of Feelings crimination from the elephant ; for “if
p. 154 sq. an elephant is killed . . . they seek
Bain, Emotions and the Willy p. to exculpate themselves towards the
185. dead animal, by declaring to him
^ The Koussa Kafirs, according to solemnly, that the thing happened
Lichtenstein ( '/ravels in Southej'n entirely by accident, not by design.
volitional being, and finds that / am no proper object of
resentment when the cause of the hurt was merely my arm
or my foot. An event is attributed to me as its cause only
in proportion as it is considered to have been brought about
by my will ; and /, regarded as a volitional, and sensitive
entity, can be a proper object of resentment only as a
cause of pain.
We can hardly feel disposed to resent injuries inflicted
upon us by animals, little children, or madmen, when we
recognise their inability to judge of the nature of their
acts. They are not the real causes of the mischief resulting
from their deeds, since they neither intended nor foresaw
nor could have foreseen it. “ Why,” says the Stoic, “ do
you bear with the delirium of a sick man, or the, ravings
of a madman, or the impudent blows of a child ? Because,
of course, they evidently do not know what they are
doing Would anyone think himself to be in his
perfect mind if he were to return kicks to a mule or bites
to a dog ? ” ^ Hartley observes, “ As we improve in
observation and experience, and in the faculty of analysing
the actions of animals, we perceive that brutes and children,
and even adults in certain circumstances, have little or no
share in the actions referred to them.’”'*
Deliberate resentment considers the motives of acts.
Suppose that a man tells us an untruth. Our feelings
towards him are not the same if he did it in order to save
our life as if he did it for his own benefit. Moreover, our
anger abates, or ceases altogether, if we find that he who
injured us acted under compulsion, or under the influence
of a non-volitional impulse, too strong for any ordinary
man to resist. Then, the main cause of the injury was not
his will, conceived as a continuous entity. It yielded to the
will of somebody else, reluctantly, as it were out of necessity,
or to a powerful conation which forms no part of his real
self. He was merely an instrument in another’s hand, or
he was “ beside himself,” “ beyond himself,” “ out of his
^ Seneca, De ira^ iii. 26 sq. ^ Hartley, Obscrvatiom on Man^ i.
493 -
mind.” When we are angry, says Montaigne, “ it is
passion that speaks, and not we.” ^ The religious psy-
chology of the ancient Greeks ascribed acts committed
upon sudden excitement of mind to the Ate which bewilders
the mind and betrays the man into deeds which, in his
sober senses, he is heartily sorry for. Hence the Ate has
in its train the the humble prayers of repentance,
which must make good, before gods and men, whatever
has been done amiss.^ The Vedic singer apologises, “ It is
not our own will, Varuna, that leads us astray, but some
seduction — wine, anger, dice, and our folly.” ® In the
Andaman Islands violent outbreaks of ill-temper or resent-
ment are looked upon as the result of a temporary
“ possession,” and the victim is, for the time being, con-
sidered unaccountable for his actions.^ Madness, as we
have seen, is frequently attributed to demoniacal possession.
In ancient Ireland, again, it was believed to be often
brought on by malignant magical agency, usually the work
of some druid, hence in the Glosses to the Senchus Mor
a madman is repeatedly described as one “upon whom the
magic wisp has been thrown.” What a person does in
madness is not an act committed by him.
“Was ’t Hamlet wrong’d Laertes ? Never Hamlet ;
If Hamlet from himself be ta’en away,
And when he’s not himself does wrong Laertes,
Then Hamlet does it not, Hamlet denies it.
Who does it, then ? His madness ; if ’t be so,
Hamlet is of the faction that is wrong’d ;
His madness is poor Hamlet’s enemy.” ®
We resent not only acts and volitions, but also omissions,
though generally less severely ; and when a hurt is
attributed to want of foresight, our resentment is, ceteris
paribus., proportionate to the degree of carelessness
' Montaigne, Essais.u. 31 ((Etivres, * Man, in Jour. Anthrop. Inst. xii.
P- '39^)* in.
^ Iliad, ix. 505 sqq. Miiller, Disser- » Joyce, Social Hisiory of Ancicftt
iations on the Etirnenides, io8. Ireland, \ 224.
* Veda^ vii. 86, 6, ® Shakespeare, Hamlet, v. 2,
which we lay to the offender’s charge. A person appears
to us as the cause of an injury which we think he could have
prevented by his will. But a hurt resulting from careless-
ness is not to the same extent as an intentional injury
caused by the will. And the less foresight could have been
expected in a given case, the smaller share has the will in
the production of the event.
Our resentment is increased by a repetition of the injury,
and reaches its height when we find that our adversary
nourishes habitual ill-will towards us. On the other hand,
as we have noticed in a previous chapter,' the injured party
is not deaf to the prayer for forgiveness which springs
from genuine repentance. Like moral indignation, non-
moral resentment takes into consideration the character of
the injurer.
Passing to the emotion of gratitude, we find a similar
resemblance between the phenomena which give rise to
this emotion and those which call forth moral approval.
We may feel some kind of retributive affection for in-
animate objects which have given us pleasure ; “ a man
grows fond of a snuff-box, of a pen-knife, of a staff which
he has long made use of, and conceives something like a
real love and affection for them.” But gratitude, involving
a desire to please the benefactor, can reasonably be felt
towards such objects only as are themselves capable of
feeling pleasure. Moreover, on due deliberation we do
not feel grateful to a person who benefits us by pure
accident. Since gratitude is directed towards the assumed
cause of pleasure, and since a person is regarded as a cause
only in his capacity of a volitional being, gratitude pre-
supposes that the pleasure shall be due to his will. For
the same reason motives are also taken into consideration
by the benefited party. As Hutcheson observes, “ bounty
from a donor apprehended as morally evil, or extorted by
force, or conferr’d with some view of self-interest, will not
procure real good-will ; nay, it may raise indignation.” ®
' Supra y ch. iii. ^ Hutcheson, Inquiry concerning
^ Adam Smith, Theory of , Moral Moral Good and Evil 157.
SenlimentSy p. 136.
Like moral approval, gratitude may be called forth not
only by acts and volitions, but by absence of volitions, in
so far as this absence is traceable to a good disposition of
will. And, like the moral judge, the grateful man is, in
his retributive feeling, influenced by the notion he forms
of the benefactor’s character.
The cognitions by which non-moral resentment and
gratitude are determined are thus, as regards their general
nature, precisely similar to those which determine moral
indignation and approval. Whether moral or non-moral,
a retributive emotion is essentially directed towards a sensi-
tive and volitional entity, or self, conceived of as the cause
of pleasure or the cause of pain. This solves a problem
which necessarily baffles solution in the hands of those who
fail to recognise the emotional origin of moral judgments,
and which, when considered at all, has, I think, never been
fully understood by those who have essayed it. It has
been argued, for instance, that moral praise and blame are not
applied to inanimate things and those who commit involun-
tary deeds, because they are administered only ‘‘where they
are capable of producing some effect'’;^ that moral judgment
is concerned with the question of compulsion, because
“ only when a man acts morally of his own free will is
society sure of him”;“ that we do not regard a lunatic as
responsible, because we know that “ his mind is so diseased
that it is impossible by moral reprobation alone to change
his character so that it may be subsequently relied upon.” ^
The bestowal of moral praise or blame on such or such an
object is thus attributed to utilitarian calculation;'^ whereas
in reality it is determined by the nature of the moral
emotion which lies at the bottom of the judgment. And,
as Stuart Mill observes (though he never seems to have
realised the full import of his objection), whilst we may
administer praise and blame with the express design of
influencing conduct, “ no anticipation of salutary effects
^ James Mill, Fragment on Mackin- Clifford, Lectures and Essays^ p.
toshy p. 370. 296.
^ Ziegler, Social Ethics ^ p. 56 sq. * See also James Mill, op, cit, pp.
;j6i, 262, 375.
from our feeling will ever avail to give us the feeling
itself.” 1
The nature of the moral emotions also gives us the key
to another important problem — a problem which has called
forth endless controversies — namely, the co-existence of
moral responsibility with the general law of cause and
effect. It has been argued that responsibility, and moral
judgments generally, are inconsistent with the notion that
the human will is determined by causes; that “either free-
will is a fact, or moral judgment a delusion.” The argu-
ment has been well summed up by Sir Leslie Stephen as
follows : — “ Moral responsibility, it is said, implies free-
dom. A man is only responsible for that which he causes.
Now the causa causce is also the causa causati. If I am
caused as well as cause, the cause of me is the cause of my
conduct ; I am only a passive link in the chain which
transmits the force. Thus, as each individual is the product
of something external to himself, his responsibility is really
shifted to that something. The universe or the first cause
is alone responsible, and since it is responsible to itself
alone, responsibility becomes a mere illusion.” We are told
that, if determinism were true, human beings would be no
more proper subjects of moral valuation than are inanimate
things ; that the application of moral praise and blame
would be “ in itself as absurd as to applaud the sunrise or
be angry at the rain”;® that the only admiration which
the virtuous man might deserve would be the kind of
admiration “ which we justly accord to a well-made
machine.”^ Nor are these inferences from the doctrine of
determinism only weapons forged by its opponents ; they
are shared by many of its own adherents. Richard Owen
and his followers maintained that, since a man’s character
is made for him, not by him, there is no justice in punishing
^ Stuart Mill, in a note to James ^ Martineau, Types of Ethical
Mill’s Analysis of the Phenomena of flieoryy ii. 41 sq.
the Human Mindy ii. 323. ** Balfour, Poundaiions of Belief p.
Leslie Stephen, S/ience of EthicSy 25.
p. 285. ,
XI n
AND FREE-WILL
him for’ what he cannot help,^ To Stuart Mill responsi-
bility simply means liability to punishment, inflicted for a
utilitarian purpose/^ So also Prof. Sidgwick — whose atti-
tude towards the free-will theory is that of a sceptic —
argues that the common retributive view of punishment,
and the ordinary notions of ‘‘ merit,” ‘‘ demerit,” and
responsibility,” involve the assumption that the will is
free, and that these terms, if used at all, have to be used
in new significations. ‘‘ If the wrong act,” he says, ‘‘and
the bad qualities of character manifested in it, are conceived
as the necessary effects of causes antecedent or external to
the existence of the agent, the moral responsibility — in the
ordinary sense — for the mischief caused by them can no
longer rest on him. At the same time, the Determinist
can give to the terms ‘ ill-desert ’ and ‘responsibility’ a
signification which is not only clear and definite, but, from
an utilitarian point of view, the only suitable meaning.
In this view, if I affirm that A is responsible for a harmful
act, I mean that it is right to punish him for it ; primarily,
in order that the fear of punishment may prevent him and
others from committing similar acts in future.” ^
If these conclusions are correct it is obvious that,
whether the infliction of punishment be justifiable or not,
the feeling moral indignation or moral approval is, from
the deterministic point of view, absurd. And yet, as a
matter of fact, these emotions are felt by determinists and
libertarians alike. Apparently, they are not in the least
affected by the notion that the human will is subject to
the general law of cause and effect. Emotions are always
determined by specific cognitions, and last only as long as
the influence of those cognitions lasts. It makes me sorry
to hear that some evil has befallen a friend ; but my
sorrow disappears at once when I find that the rumour was
false. I get angry with a person who hurts me ; but my
anger subsides as soon as I recognise that the hurt was
purely accidental. My indignation is aroused by an
^ Stuart Mill, Exanihiaiion of Sir ^ Ibid. p. 506 sqq.
William HafniHon's Philosophy/, p. ^ Sidgwick, Methods of Ethics, p.
506. 71 sq.
VOL. I y
MORAL VALUATION
atrocious crime ; but it ceases entirely when I hear that
the agent was mad. On the other hand, however convinced
I am that a person’s conduct and character are in every
detail a product of causes, that does not prevent me from
feeling towards him retributive emotions — either anger or
gratitude, or moral resentment or approval. Hence I
conclude that a retributive emotion is not essentially deter-
mined by the cognition of free-will. I hold that Spinoza
is mistaken in his assumption that men feel more love or
hatred towards one another than towards anything else,
because they think themselves to be free.^ And I attribute
the conception that moral valuation is inconsistent with
determinism either to a failure to recognise the emotional
origin of moral judgments or to insufficient insight into
the true nature of the moral emotions. At the same time
it seems easy to explain the fallacy which lies at the
bottom of that conception.
We have seen that the object of moral approval and
disapproval is the will, and that a person’s responsibility is
lessened in proportion as his will is exposed to the pressure
of non-volitional conations. Full responsibility thus pre-
supposes freedom from such pressure, and, particularly,
freedom from external compulsion. Hence the inference
that it also presupposes freedom from causation, and that
complete determination involves complete irresponsibility.
Compulsion is confounded with causation ; and this con-
fusion is due to the fact that the cause which determines
the will is actually looked upon in the light of a constrain-
ing power outside the will.
The popular mind has a strong belief in the law of
cause and effect. When reflecting on the matter, it admits
that everything which happens in this world has a cause ;
and if the natural cause is hidden, it readily calls in a
supernatural cause to account for the event. Now, in the
case of human volitions the chain of causation is often
particularly obscure ; as Spinoza said, whilst men are con-
scious of their volitions and desires, they “ never even
^ Spinoza, Etkica^ iii. 49, Note,
AND FREE-WILL
dream, in their ignorance, of the causes which have disposed
them so to wish and desire.” ^ Hence, when in a philo-
sophic mood, they are liable to attribute their acts to
the influence of an external power ruling over human
affairs, a god or an all-powerful fate. No doubt, Providence
and Fate may effect their purposes without the will of man
as their tool ; what happens ‘‘by chance,” being frequently
no less wonderful than any decree of a human will, may
likewise be traced to a supernatural cause. But, on the
other hand, the fact that the deeds of men are generally
preceded by volitions, is so obvious that it could not escape
even the simplest mind — indeed, so strongly are primitive
men impressed by this fact that they are apt to attribute
every event to a will. Acknowledging, then, the connec-
tion between volition and deed, the fatalist regards the
former only as an instrument in the hands of a force outside
the agent, which compels his will to execute its plans.
Sometimes it reaches its goal in a way quite unforeseen by
the agent himself. Muhammed said, “ When God hath
ordered a creature to die in any particular place. He causeth
his wants to direct him to that place ” ; and it is a popular
saying throughout Islam that “ whenas Destiny descends
she blindeth human sight.” ^ Sometimes the external
power causes its victim to will its decree, by exciting in
him some irresistible passion, as when Zeus urged Clytem-
nestra to the slaughter of Agamemnon ; or the volitions
of a person are themselves regarded as decreed by that
power. In Warend, in Sweden, when somebody has killed
another, as also when the manslayer himself suffers the
penalty of death, the women say, full of compassion,
“ Well, this was his destiny, to be sure,” or, “ Poor fellow,
it was a pitiful fate.” ^ In one of the Pahlavi texts the
following words are put into the mouth of the Spirit of
^ llnd, pt. i. Appendix. ^ I^ane, Arabian Society in the-
In a Pahlavi text fate is defined as Middle A^i^eSy ]). 6.
“that which is ordainoj from the lUirton, in his translation of the
h^^inning,” and divine providence as Arabian Nights^ i. 62, n 2.
that which the sacred heings “also Ilyltcn-Cavallius, Warend oek
grant otherwise ” [Dtnd-i Alai nog - 1 Wirdarne, i. 206.
Khirady xxiv. 6 sqS,
Y 2
MORAL VALUATION
Wisdom : — “ Even with the might and powerfulness of
wisdom and knowledge, even then it is not possible to
contend with destiny. Because, when predestination as to
virtue, or as to the reverse, comes forth, the wise becomes
wanting in duty, and the astute in evil becomes intelligent ;
the faint-hearted becomes braver, and the braver becomes
faint-hearted ; the diligent becomes lazy, and the lazy acts
diligently. Just as is predestined as to the matter, the
cause enters into it, and thrusts out everything else.” ^
Nor is it only the popular mind that, when human
volitions are concerned, interprets causation as compulsion.
Even such philosophers as Hamilton^ and Mansel® seemed
quite unable to distinguish between determinism and fatal-
ism. Professor Laurie likewise observes ; — “ Determinism
is the term adopted of late years to veil fatalism and
confound issues Freedom or fate, these are the
sole alternatives.”^ Surely, it is those who identify deter-
minism with fatalism that “ confound issues.” And a
similar confusion lurks behind the main argument which
has been adduced in support of free-will. It is said that
“ I ought ” implies “I can,” and that men are not account-
able for what they cannot avoid. This is perfectly true
if by “cannot” is meant compulsion, and by “can”
freedom from compulsion. But it is certainly not true if
“ I can ” is intended to mean that “ I ” am a first cause,
not determined by anything else.
When a person’s will is believed to be constrained by a
power outside him, he can obviously not be held responsible
for what he does under the influence of such constraint.
We are responsible only for that which is due to our will.
A licentious man who has grown up in a corrupt society
is less blamable than an equally licentious man who has
always lived under conditions favourable to virtue ; and
if we hear of a criminal that he was kidnapped as a child by
a band of pickpockets and trained to their profession, we
^ Dind-i Matndg-t Khirad^ xxiii. 3 . ^ Mansel, Prolegometia Logica^ p.
scjiu 329 sqq.
^ Yi^xm\iox\^ LecH(res on Metaphysics^ ^ Laurie, Ethica^ pp. 307, 319.
ii. 410 sqq.
AND FREE-WILL
no doubt look upon him with some indulgence. In these
cases, however, it may be said that, though the person’s
conduct is largely due to the influence of external circum-
stances upon his will, this influence was not irresistible,
that he might have saved himself with an effort of will,
and that consequently he is not wholly irresponsible. But
in the case of a restraining destiny no escape is possible ;
the compulsion is complete. Hence the logical outcome
of radical fatalism is a denial of all moral imputability,
and a repudiation of all moral judgment.^
Not so with determinism. Whilst fatalism presupposes
the existence of a person who is constrained by an outward
power, determinism regards the person himself as in every
respect a product of causes. It does not assume any part
of his will to have existed previous to his formation by
these causes ; his will is not constrained by them, it is made
by them. When we say of a person that he is influenced
by external circumstances or subdued by fate, we regard
him as existing independently of that which influences or
subdues him, we attribute to him an innate character which
is acted upon from the outside. He would have been
different if he had grown up under different conditions of
life, or if fate had left him alone. But it would be
absolutely meaningless to say that he would be different
if the causes to which he owes his existence had been
different ; for instance, if he were the offspring of dif-
ferent parents. This shows that we distinguish between
the original self of a person and the self which is
partly innate and partly' the product of external cir-
cumstances. His innate character belongs to his original
^ Of the inhabitants of North- i. 155, on the Bedouins. How-
Eastern Africa, Munzinger observes ever, men are not philosophers in the
{Ostafrikanische Studienj p. 66): — ordinary practice of life, hence the
“ Seien sie Christen, Heiden, oder fatalist is generally as ready as any-
Mohammedaner, schreiben sie Leben body else to judge on his neighbour’s
und Tod, Gltick und Ungllick, Tugend conduct. According to various ancient
und Verbrechen der unmittelbaren writers, the power of destiny is limited
Hand Gottes zu. Mit dieser blinder so as not to exclude personal respon-
Nothwendigkeit entschuldigt sich der sibility (see Schmidt, Ethik der alten
Missethater, trdstet sich der UnglUck- Griechen^ i. S 9
liche.” C/. also Doughty, Arabia
FREE-WILL
CH, XIII
self ; and, strictly speaking, it is on the innate char-
acter only that the scrutinising moral judge, so far
as possible, passes his judgment, carefully considering
the degree of pressure to which it has been exposed both
from the non-voluntary part of the individual himself and
from the outside world/ According to the fatalist, the
innate character is compelled ; hence personal responsibility
is out of the question. According to the determinist, the
innate character is ,* but this has nothing whatever
to do with the question of responsibility. The moral
emotions are no more concerned with the origin of the
innate character than the aesthetic emotions are concerned
with the origin of the beautiful object. In their capacity of
retributive emotions, the moral emotions are essentially
directed towards sensitive and volitional entities conceived,
not as uncaused themselves, but only as causes of pleasure
or pain.
^ That the proper subject of moral
judgment is the innate character was
emphasised by Schopenhauer in his
prize-essays on J)ie Freiheit des
Willem (SdfnnitlicheWerke^ vii. 83 jy</.)
and Die Grundlage der Moral {ibid. vii.
273 sijej. ). The innate character, he says,
that real core of the whole man, con-
tains the germ of all his virtues and
vices. And though Schopenhauer be
mistaken in his statement that a
person’s character always remains the
same, it seems to me indisputable that
the succeeding changes to which it
may be subject are imputable to hita
only in so far as they are caused by his
innate character.
Chapter XIV
PRELIMINARY REMARKS HOMICIDE IN GENERAL
We have discussed the general nature of those
phenomena which have a tendency to evoke moral blame
or moral praise. We have seen that moral judgments are
passed on conduct and character, and we have seen why
this is the case. It now remains for us to examine the
particular modes of conduct which are subject to moral
valuation, and to consider how these modes of conduct are
judged of by different peoples and in different ages.
If carried out in every detail such an investigation
could never come to an end. Among other things,
it would have to take into account all customs existing
among the various races of men, since every custom
constitutes a moral rule. And the impossibility of any such
undertaking becomes apparent when we consider the extent
to which the conduct of man, and especially of savage
man, is hampered by custom. Among the Wanika, for
instance, “ if a man dares to improve the style of his hut,
to make a larger doorway than is customary ; if he
should wear a finer or different style of dress to that of
his fellows, he is instantly fined.” ^ If, during the per-
formance of a ceremony, the ancestors of an Australian
native were in the habit of painting a white line across
the forehead, their descendant must do the same." Dr.
Nansen’s statement with reference to the Greenlanders,
^ New, Life^ Wanderings ^ and ^ Spencer and Gillen, Native Tribes
Labours in Eastern Africa ^ p, no, of Central Australia ^ p. ii.
PRELIMINARY REMARKS
that their communities had originally customs and fixed
rules for every possible circumstance/ is essentially true
of many, if not all, of the lower races.
It is necessary, then, that we should restrict ourselves to
the more important modes of conduct with which the
moral consciousness of mankind is concerned- These
modes of conduct may be conveniently divided into six
groups. The first group includes such acts, forbearances,
and omissions as directly concern the interests of other men,
their life or bodily integrity, their freedom, honour, property,
and so forth. The second includes such acts, forbearances,
and omissions as chiefly concern a man’s own welfare,
such as suicide, temperance, asceticism. The third group,
which partly coincides with, but partly differs from,
both the first and the second, refers to the sexual relations
of men. The fourth includes their conduct towards the
lower animals ; the fifth, their conduct towards dead
persons ; the sixth, their conduct towards beings, real or
imaginary, that they regard as supernatural. We shall
examine each of these groups separately, in the above
order. And, not being content with a mere description of
facts, we shall try to discover the principle which lies at
the bottom of the moral judgment in each particular case.
It is commonly maintained that the most sacred duty
which we owe our fellow-creatures is to respect their lives.
I venture to believe that this holds good not only among
civilised nations, but among the lower races as well ; and
that, if a savage recognises that he has any moral obliga-
tions at all to his neighbours, he. considers the taking of
their lives to be a greater wrong than any other kind of
injury inflicted upon them.
Among various uncivilised peoples, however, human life
is said to be held very cheap.
The Australian Dieyerie, we are told, would for a mere trifle
kill their dearest friend.‘^ In Fiji there is an utter disregard of
^ Nansen, Eskimo Life^ p. 104. the Dieyerie Tribe/ in Woods, Native
- Gason, ‘Manners and Customs of 'Jribes 0/ South Austra/ia, p. 258.
XlV
the value of human life/’ ^ A Masai \vill murder his friend
or neighbour "in a fight over a herd of captured cattle, atid
“ live not a whit the less merrily afterwards.”^ Among the
Bachapins, a Bechuana tribe, murder excites little sensation,
excepting in the family of the person who has been murdered ;
and brings, it is said, no disgrace upon him who has committed
it ; nor uneasiness, excepting the fear of their revenge.” ^ The
Orsons of Bengal are ready to take life on very slight
provocation,” and Colonel Dalton doubts whether they see
any moral guilt in it.^ Some of the Himalayan mountaineers
are reported to put men to death merely for the satisfaction of
seeing the blood flow and of marking the last struggles of the
victim.^ Among the Pathans, on the north-western frontier of
the Punjab, there is hardly a man whose hands are unstained,”
and each person “ counts up his murders.” ^
On the other hand; there are uncivilised peoples among
whom homicide or murder is said to be hardly known.
Among the Omahas, before liquor was introduced there
were no murders, even when men quarrelled.” Captain Lyon
could learn of no instances of manslaughter having ever
occurred among the Eskimo of Igloolik.® In 'Futuila, of the
Samoa group, according to Brenchley, there had been but one
case of assassination in the course of twenty years.^ The
Veddahs of Ceylon knowx)f manslaughter only as a punish-
^ Williams and Calvert, Fiji and the
Fijians^ p. 115.
Johnstun, Kilinia-njaro Expedition,
P-419-
^ Burchell, Travels in the Interior of
Southern Africa, ii. 554.
^ Dalton, Descriptive Ethnology of
Bengal, p. 256.
® Journal of a Tour throuji
the Hi mala Mountains , j). 267.
^ Temple, quoted by Spencer, Prin-
ciples of Ethics, i. 343. For other in-
stances of the indifference of savaj^es to
human life, see Fgcde, Description of
Gi'eenland, p. 123 ; Cranz, History of
Greenland, 177; Holm, ‘ Ethnolo-
gisk Skizze af Angmagsalikerne,’ in
Meddelelser orn Gronland, 87, 179
S(/^ ; Coxe. Russian Discoveries between
Asia and America, p. 257 (Aleuts of
Unalaska) ; Krasheninnikoff, History of
Kamschatka, p. 204 ; S teller, Beschrei-
bung von deni l.ande Kanitschatka, p.
294 ; Boyle, Adventures among the
Dyaks of Borneo, p. n6 (Malays);
Powell, IVanderings in a Wild Country,
p. 262 (aborigines of New Britain) ;
Scaramucci and Giglioli, ‘Notizie sui
Danakil,’ in Arch ivio per antropologia
e la etnologia, xiv. 26 ; Wilson and
Felkin, Uganda, ii. 310 (Gowane) ;
Schweinfurth, Heart of Africa, i. 286
(Bongo) ; Arnot, Garenganze, p. 71
(Barotse) ; Tuckey, Expedition to Ex-
plore the River Zaire, p. 383 (Congo
natives) ; Ward, Five Years with the
Congo Cannibals, p. 105 (Bolobo).
^ Dorsey, ‘ Omaha Sociology,’ in
Ann, Rep. Bur, Ethn. iii. 369.
® Lyon, IVivate Journal, p. 350.
^ Brenchley, Jottings during the
Cruise of HM,S. “ Cura^oa'^^ among
the South Sea Islands, p. 58.
HOMICIDE IN GENERAL
ment.^ The Bedouin of the Euphrates, says Mr. Blunt, is
essentially humane, and never takes life needlessly. If he has
killed a man in war he rather conceals the fact than proclaims
it aloud, while murder or even homicide is almost unknown
among the tribes.” ^ Among the Bakwiri, in Cameroon,
Zoller never heard of any person having killed a member of his
own community.^ Murders, says CailhY*, ‘‘are rare among
the Bambaras, and never committed by the Mandingoes.” ^
Among the Wanika “ wilful cold-blooded murders are almost
unknown.” ^ Among the Basutos perfect safety is enjoyed
“ on roads where the traveller might have been robbed a
hundred times over without the least hope of aid, and in houses
where the doors and windows have neither bolts nor bars,” and
cases of murder are very rare.^
In other instances homicide is expressly said to be
regarded as wrong.
The Greenlanders described by Dr. Nansen hold it atrocious
to kill a fellow-creature, except in some particular cases.”^ The
Dacotahs say that it is a great crime to take their fellow’s
life, unless in revenge, “ because all have a right to live.”®
In d'ierra del Kuego homicide rarely occurs, as Mr. Bridges
remarks, because of an inveterate custom according to which
human life is held sacred : “ Ic meurtricr est mis au ban de ses
compatriotes ; isolc de tous, il cst fatalement condamne a perir
de faim ou a tomber un jour sous les coups d’un groupe de
justiciers improvises.”^ The Andaman Islanders condemn
murder as yubda^ or sin."*^^ The natives of Botany Bay, New
^ Sarasin, Eri^ehnisse naturwisseii-
schaftlicher Eorschuiigxii attf Ceylon y iii.
539- ty* Teniient, Ceylon^ ii. 444 ;
Hartshorn e, in Indian .Intlqiiaryy viii,
320.
- Blunt, Bedouin Tribes of the Eti-
phrateSy ii. 203. Cf. ibid. ii. 207.
^ Zoller, JCamerim, i. 188.
^ Caillie, Travels through Central
Afrieay i. 353.
^ New, op. cit. p. 98.
^ Casalis, Basutos y 301. For
other instances, see Hall, Arctic Re-
searches y p. 571 (Eskimo) ; Dobriz-
hofifer, Account of the AbiponeSy ii. 148 ;
Turner, Sanioay p. 178 ; Ellis, Tour
through Hawaii y p. 429 ; Brooke, Ten
Years in Sarawak y i. 6 1 (Sea Dyaks) ;
Low, Sarawaky p. 133; Marsden,
History of Sumatra p. 471 (koggi
Islanders) ; Steller, De Sanpi-Af'chipely
p. 26 ; Riedel, De sluik- en kroesharige
r as sen tusschen Selebes tn Papuay p,
41 (Ambon and Uliase Islanders) ; von
Siebold, Aino auf der Inset YessOy
pp. II, 35 ; Munzinger, Ostafrikanische
Studieuy p. 532 (Barea and Kunama) ;
Holub, Seven Years in South AfricUy
ii. 319 (Marutse) ; Maclean, Compen-
dium of Kafr Lazvs and Customs y pp.
61, 143 sq. ; Shooter, Kafirs of AAtaf
p. 137.
^ Nansen, Eskimo Lifcy p. 162.
^ Prescott, in Schoolcraft, Indian
Tribes of the United States y ii. 195,
Hyades and Denilver, Alission
scientifique du Cap HorUy vii. 374, 243.
Man, in Jour. Anthr. Bist. xii. 1 12.
HOMICIDE IN GENERAL
South Wales, though a trivial offence in their ideas justifies the
murder of a man, highly reprobate the crime when committed
without what they esteem a just cause.” ^ According to Mr.
Curr’s experience, the Australian Black undoubtedly feels that
murder is wrong, and its committal brings remorse ; even after
the perpetration of infanticide or massacres, though both are
practised without disguise, those engaged in them are subject to
remorse and low spirits for some time.**^
It is of particular importance in this connection to note
that, in early civilisation, blood-revenge is regarded not as
a private matter only, but as a duty, and that, where this
custom does not prevail, the community punishes the
murderer, frequently with death. We may without
hesitation accept Professor Tylor’s statement that “ no
known tribe, however low and ferocious, has ever ad-
mitted that men may kill one another indiscriminately.”^
In every society — even where human life is, generally
speaking, held in low estimation — custom prohibits
homicide within a certain circle of men. But the
radius of the circle varies greatly.
Savages carefully distinguish between an act of homicide
committed within their own community and one where
the victim is a stranger. Whilst the former is under
ordinary circumstances disapproved of, the latter is in
most cases allowed, and often regarded as praiseworthy.
It is a very common notion in savage ethics that the
chief virtue of a man is to be successful in war and to slay
many enemies.
Among the Kdfirs of the Hindu-Kush killing strangers
might or might not be considered inexpedient, but it would
^ Barrington, Flisiory of New South p. 572 (Eskimo); Mariner, Natives of
Wales ^ p. 19. Cf, Liimholtz, Among the Tonga Islands^ ii. 162 ; Macdonald,
Cannibals^ p. 126 (natives of Northern Oceania^ p. 208 (Efatese) ; Yate, Ac-
Queensland). count of Neav 'Aealand^ p. 145 ; Ar-
“ Ciirr, The Australian Race^ i. lOO, bousset and Exploratory Tour
43 sq. For other instances, see Keat- to the North-East of the Colony of the
ing, Expedition to the Source of St. Cape of Good Plope, p. 322 (Bechu-
Peters River ^ i. 127 (Potifwatomis) ; anas) ; Fritsch, Die Eingeborenen Slid-
HaVmon, Journal of Voyages in the Afrikds^ p. 322 ( Mottenlots).
Interior of North America^ p. 348 Tylor, ‘ Primitive Society,’ in Con-
(Indians on the east side of tlie Rocky temporary Review ^ xxi. 714.
Mountains) ; Hall, Arctic Researches,
HOMICIDE IN GENERAL
hardly be considered a crime killing fellow-tribesmen, on the
other hand, is looked upon in a very different light.^ The
Koriaks do not regard murder as a great crime, unless it occur
within their own tribe.^ The early Aleuts considered the
killing of a companion a crime worthy of death, but to kill
an enemy was quite another thing.” ^ To an Aht Indian the
murder of a man is no more than the killing of a dog, provided
that the victim is not a member of his own tribe.^ According
to Humboldt, the natives of Guiana detest all who are not of
their family, or their tribe ; and hunt the Indians of a neigh-
bouring tribe, who live at war with their own, as we hunt
game.” ^ In the opinion of the Fuegians, ‘‘a strajiger and an
enemy are almost synonymous terms,” hence they dare not go
where they have no friends, and where they are unknown, as
they would most likely be destroyed.^ The Australian Black
nurtures an intense hatred of every male at least of his own
race who is a stranger to him, and would never neglect to
assassinate such a person at the earliest moment that he could
do so without risk to himself.^ In Melanesia, also, a stranger
as such was generally throughout the islands an enemy to be
killed.8
In Savage Island the slaying of a member of another tribe —
that is, a potejitial enemy — was a virtue rather than a crime.”^
To a young Samoan it was the realisation of his highest ambition
to be publicly thanked by the chiefs for killing a foe in mortal
combat. According to Fijian beliefs, men who have not slain
any enemy are, in the other world, compelled to beat dirt with
their clubs — the most degrading punishment the native mind
can conceive — because they used their club to so little purpose
and in Futuna it was deemed no less necessary to have poured
out blood on the field of battle in order to hold a part in the
happy future life.^“ In the Western islands of Torres Straits
“ it was a meritorious deed to kill foreigners either in fair fight
^ Scott Robertson, Kiifirs of the Curr, 'Ihe A usiralian Race^ i. 64,
Hindu- Kitsh^ p. 194, 85 sq, Mathew, in Jour, Proceed.
^ Krasheninnikoff, op. cit. p. 232. Roy. Soc. N. S. IVales, xxiii. 398.
^^Veniaminof, quoted by Petroff, ^ Codringlon, Melanesians., p. 345.
‘ Report on Alaska,’ in Tenth Census ^ Thomson, Saz>a^e Island., p. 104.
of the United States., p. 155, See also ibid. p. 94.
^ Sproat, Scenes and Studies of Pritchard, Poly Etesian Remini-
Savage Life., p. 152. sconces., p. 57.
® von Humboldt, Personal Narra- Seemann, Viti, p. 401. Cf,
five of Travels., v. 422. Williams and Calvert, op. cit. p. 97
® Stirling, in South American Mis- sq. ; Erskine, Islands of the Western
siona^y Magazine, iv. Ii. Bridges, Pacific, \y. 248.
in A Voice for South America, xiii. Smith, in Jour. Polynesian Society,
210. i. 39.
HOMICIDE IN GENERAL
or by treachery, and honour and glory were attached to the
bringing home of the skulls of the inhabitants of other islands
slain in battle.”^ In the Solomon Islands, ^ New Guinea,^
and various parts of the Malay Archipelago, he who has col-
lected the greatest number of human heads is honoured by his
tribe as the bravest man ; and some peoples do not allow a man
to marry until he has cut off at least one human head.^ Among
many of the North American Indians, again, he who can boast
of the greatest number of scalps is the person most, highly
esteemed,'" Among the Seri Indians the highest virtue is
the shedding of alien blood ; and their normal impulse on
meeting an alien is to kill, unless deterred by fear.”^^ Among
the Chukchi it is held criminal to thieve or murder in the
family or race to which a person belongs ; but these crimes
committed elsewhere are not only permitted, but held honour-
able and glorious.” ^ So, too, the Gallas consider it honourable
to kill an alien, though criminal to kill a countryman.^
At the same time there are, among the lower races,
various instances in which the rule, “ Thou shalt not kill,”
applies even to foreigners. Hospitality, as will be seen in
a subsequent chapter, is a stringent duty in the savage
world. Custom requires that the host should entertain
and protect a stranger who comes as his guest, and by
killing him the host would perpetrate an outrage hardly
possible. Moreover, even in the case of intertribal rela-
tions, we must not conclude that what is allowed in war
is also allowed in times of peace. The prohibition of
homicide may extend beyond the tribal border, to
^ Haddon, in Reports of the Cam- gon,’ in Contributions to N. American
bridge Anthropological Expedition to Ethnology y i. 192 ; Powers, Tribes of
Torres Straits ^ v. 277. Californiay p. 321).
Romilly, Western Pacific y p. 73, ® McGee, * Seri Indians," in Anit,
Penny, Ten Years in Mela 7 tesiay p. 46. Rep, Bur, Ethnol. xvii. 1 32.
Codrington, op, cit, p. 345. ^ Georgi, Russia, iii. 183.
^ Romilly, Weste 7 nt Pacific, p. 76. ® Macdonald, Af 7 dca 7 tay i. 229. JFor
^ Bock, Head-Hunters of Bo 7 neOy other instances, see Harmon, op, cit. p.
pp. 216, 221, &c. (Dyaks'. Bickmore, 301 (Taciillies) ; Burton, City of the
Travels hi the East lndia 7 t A 7 rhipelag 0 y Saints,^. 139 (Dacotahs) ; Maepher-
p. 205(Alfura of Ceram). Dalton, op. son, Memoidals of Service in India, p.
cit, p. 40 (Nagas of Upper Assam). 94(lCandhs) ; MacMahon, Far Cathay,
^ The well-known practice of scalp- p. 262 (Indo- Burmese border tribes) ;
ing, though very common, was not Macdonald, Africana, i, 194 sq.
universal among the North American (Eastern Central Africans) ; Johnston,
Indians (see Gibbs, ‘ Tribes of Western Kilitna-njaro Expedition, p. 419
Washington and Northwestern Ore- (Masai).
HOMICIDE IN GENERAL
members of different tribes who for some reason or
other are on friendly terms with each other. ^ We must
not suppose that a tribe of savages generally either lives
in a state of complete isolation, or is always at odds with
its neighbours. In Australia, for instance, one tribe of
rtatives, as a rule, entertains amicable relations with one,
two, or more other tribes/' Among the Central Australian
natives, say Messrs. Spencer and Gillen, “ there is no such
thing as one tribe being in a constant state of enmity with
another”; on the contrary, where two tribes come into
contact with one another on the border land of their
respective territories, friendly feelings are maintained
between the members of the two.^ Some uncivilised
peoples are even said to have no wars. The Veddahs of
Ceylon never make war upon each other.^ According
to the reports of the oldest inhabitants of Umnak and
Unalaska, the people there had never been engaged in
war either among themselves or with their neighbours,
except once with the natives of Alaska.'^ To the Green-
landers described by Dr. Nansen war is ‘‘incomprehen-
sible and repulsive, a thing for which their language has
no word.”
That savages to some extent recognise the existence of
intertribal rights in times of peace is obvious from certain
customs connected with their wars. Some South Sea
Islanders and North American Indians consider it neces-
sary for a party which is about to attack another to give
notice beforehand of their intention, in order that their
opponents may be prepared to meet them.' The cessation
of hostilities is often accompanied by the conclusion of a
special treaty and by ceremonies calculated to make it
binding. The Tahitians, for instance, wove a wreath of
* See, Scott Robertson, op. cit. Nansen, Eskimo LifOy p. 162.
p. 194 (Kafirs of the llindii-Kush). Hale, U.S. Exploring Expedition.
Curr, 'Ehe Anstraliayi RacCy i. 62 Vol. VI. Ethnography and Philologyf^
Si/. p. 72 (Micronesians). Gibbs, toe. cit.
Spencer and Ciillen, Native Tribes p. 190 (Indians of Western Washington
of Central Anstratiay p. 32. an<l North-Western Oregon).
Sarasin, of. cit. iii. 488. ^ See Farrer, Military Manners and
^ CoxG, op. cit. p. 244. Customs<y p. 162 sq.
HOMICIDE IN GENERAL
green boughs furnished by each side^ exchanged two young
dogs, and, having also made a band of cloth together,
offered the wreath and the band to the gods with
imprecations on the side which should first violate so
solemn a treaty of peace. ^ Nor does savage custom always
allow indiscriminate slaughter even in warfare. The
inviolability of heralds is not unfrequently recognised,^
Among the aborigines of New South Wales the tribal
messenger known to be a herald by the red net which he
wears round his forehead, passes in safety between and
through hostile tribes ; and among the North American
Omahas the bearer of a peace pipe was generally re-
spected by the enemy, just as the bearer of a flag of truce
is regarded by the laws of war among the so-called
civilised nations,”^ And many uncivilised races have
made it a rule in war to spare the weak and helpless.
The Samoans considered it cowardly to kill a Voman ; ^ and
even in Fiji the ‘^enlightened party” objected to the killing of
women, urging that it is “just as cowardly to kill a woman as
a baby.”^* 'The Abipones, in their wars, “generally spared the
iinwarlike, and carried away innocent boys and girls unhurt.”’^
An old Spanish writer tells us of the Guanches of Gran
Canaria that, “ in their wars, they held it as base and mean to
molest or injure the women and children of the enemy, con-
sidering them as weak and helpless, therefore improper objects
of their resentment ” ; ^ and similar views prevail among the
Berbers (Shluh) of Southern Morocco, as also among the
Algerian Kabyles ^ and the Touareg.^^ Though the Masai and
Wa-kikuyu “are eternally at war to the knife with each other,
there is a compact between them not to molest the womenfolk
of either party.” “The Masai,” says Mr. Hinde, “never
interfere with women in their raids, and the women cheer
^ Ellis, AV.'r<’(7;v//t’.v, i. 318. ^ Dobrizhoffer, r/V. ii. 14 T.
See Eaner, Military Manners and Abreu de Galindo, IJisfory of the
Cnstonis^ p. 161. Discovery and Conquest of the Canary
^ Fraser, Aborigines of New South Islands^ p. 66.
Wales y p* 4U ^ Ilanoteau and Letourneux, La
Dorsey, ‘ Omaha Sociology,’ in Kabylie^ ii. 76.
Ann. Rep. Bur. Ethn. iii. 368. ^ Hourst, Sur le Niger et au pays
^ Turner, Nineteen Years in Poly- des 7ouaregs, p. 223 sq.
nesia, p. 304. ” Tiioiiison, 'Eh rough Masai Landy
** Seemaiin, Vitiy p. 180. p. 177,
HOMICIDE IN GENERAL
loudly and encourage their relatives during the fight,” ^ Among
the Latukas, though women are employed as spies and thus
become exceedingly dangerous in war, there is nevertheless a
general understanding that no woman shall be killed. ^ The
Basutos maintain that respect should be paid during war to
women, children, and travellers, as also that those who surrender
should be spared and open to ransom 5 and, though these rules
are not invariably respected, the public voice always disapproves
of their violation.^
Sometimes custom even requires that the life of the
captive shall be spared.
It is against Masai tradition to kill prisoners of war.'^ Among
the Kabyles ‘HI faut que Texasp^ration des partis soit extreme
pour qu’un blcss(5 ou un prisonnier soit mis a mort.”^’ The
Touareg do not kill their prisoners after a fight.® Among the
Bedouins of the Euphrates the person of the enemy is sacred
when disarmed or dismounted ; and prisoners are neither
enslaved i^r held to other ransom than their mares.”
‘^Captives,” says Mr. Dorsey, ^‘were not slain by the Omahas
and Ponkas. When peace was declared the captives were sent
home, if they wished to go. If not they could remain where
they were, and were treated as if they were members of the
tribe.” ^ Among the Wyandots prisoners of war were
frequently adopted into the tribe. ^‘The warrior taking the
prisoner has the first right to adopt him. If no one claims the
prisoner for this purpose, he is caused to run the gauntlet as a
test of his courage. If at his trial he behaves manfully
claimants are not wanting, but if he behaves disgracefully he is
put to death.” ^
Thus we notice even among uncivilised races very ob-
vious traces of what is called ‘‘international law,” if not
as a rule, at least as an exception. On the other hand, the
^ Minde, The Last of the A/asai, p.
6, n.^
Baker, Albert APyanza^ i. 355.
^ Casalis, op, cit, p. 223 sq. For
regard paid to wonien, old people, and
children in war, see also Richardson,
Arctic Searching Expedition^ i. 367
(Western Eskimo) ; Gatlin, North
A merican Indians,, ii. 240 ; Azara,
Voyages, ii. 145 (Payaguas) ; Steinmetz,
Rechtsverhdllnisse, p. 292.
Hinde, op. cit, p. 64.
® Hanot eau and Letourneux, op. cit.
ii, 75-
® Hourst, op. cit. p. 207.
Blunt, op. cit. ii. 239.
^ Dorsey, ‘Omaha Sociology,’ in
Ann. Rep. Bur. Ethn. iii. 332.
^ Powell, ibid, i, 68, Cf. Morgan,
League of the Iroquois, p. ,344.
HOMICIDE IN GENERAL
readiness with which war is engaged in, not only in self-
defence or out of revenge, but for the sake of gain,
indicates how little regard is paid to human life outside
the tribe. The Kandhs, for instance, maintain “ that a state
of war may be lawfully presumed against all tribes and
nations with whom no express agreement to the contrary
exists.” ^ And if a few savage peoples live in perpetual
peace, it seems that the chief reason for this is not a
higher standard of morality, but the absence of all
inducements to war.
When we from the lower races pass to peoples more
advanced in culture, we find that the social unit has grown
larger, that the nation has taken the place of the tribe,
and that the circle within which homicide is prohibited as
a crime of the first order has been extended accordingly.
But the old distinction between injuries committed against
compatriots and harm done to foreigners remains. Even
when the subject is not touched upon in the laws referring
to homicide we may, from the general attitude of the
people towards members of other nations, infer that public
opinion is not very scrupulous as to the taking of their
lives. How the Chinese look upon the “ red-haired
barbarians,” the “ foreign devils,” is well known from
recent excesses. In former days, Japan’s attitude towards
her neighbours and the whole world was that of an enemy
and not of a friend.^ The Vedic hymns are full of im-
precations of misfortune upon men of another race.''* That
among the ancient Teutons the lot of a stranger was not
an enviable one is testified even by language ; the German
word elender has acquired its present meaning from the
connotation of the older word which meant an “ outland-
ish ” man.* The stranger as such — unless he belonged to a
friendly, neighbouring tribe — had originally no legal rights
at all ; for his protection he was dependent on individual
^ Hunter, Amials of Riir^al Bengal^ Veda,’ in Joiw. Avierican Oriental
iii., 75 - ' iii. 338,
“ Griffis, Religions ofjapan^ p. 129. ** Cf. Grimm, Deutsche Recktsnlter-
Roth, ‘ On the Morality of the thiimer^ p. 396 ; Gummere, Germanic
Origins^ p. 288.
VOL. I
Z
HOMICIDE IN GENERAL
hospitality, and hospitality was restricted by custom to
three days only.^ According to the Swedish Westgdta-
Lag, he who killed a foreigner had to pay no compensation
to the dead man’s relatives, nor was he outlawed, nor exiled.'^
The Laws of King Ine let us understand in what light a
stranger was looked upon : — “ If a far-coming man, or a
stranger, journey through a wood out of the highway, and
neither shout nor blow his horn, he is to be held for a
thief, either to be slain or redeemed.” ® However, as
commerce increased and the stranger was more often seen
in Teutonic lands, royal protection was extended to him ;
and a consequence of this was that thenceforth he who
killed the stranger had to pay a wergeld^ part, or the whole,
of which went to the king.'* In Greece, in early times,
the “ contemptible stranger ” ’’ had no legal rights, and was
protected only in case he was the guest of a citizen ; ® and
even later on, at Athens, whilst the intentional killing of
a citizen was punished with death and confiscation of the
murderer’s property, the intentional killing of a non-citizen
was punished only with exile." The Latin word hostis was
originally used to denote a foreigner ; and the saying of
Plautus, that a man is a wolf to a man whom he does not
know,® was probably an echo of an old Roman proverb.
Mommsen suggests that in ancient days the Romans did
not punish the killing of a foreigner, unless he belonged
to an allied nation ; but already in the prehistoric period
a change was introduced, the foreigner being placed under
the protection of the State.'®
How little regard is felt for the lives of strangers also
appears from the readiness with which war is waged on
^ Grimm, op. cit. p. 397 sqq. Brim- ** Hermann -Bliimner, Lehrbiuh der
ner, Deutsche Rechtsgeschichte^ i. 273. griechischen Privaialicrihuiner^ p. 492.
Westgbta' Lagen /. Af mandrapi, Schmidt, Elhifz der alien Griechen^ ii.
V. 4, p. 13. ^ 325.
^ Laws of Tnej 20. Cf. Laws of ^ Meier and Schdmann, Der aittsche
Wikt 7 'ied^ 28. Process y p. 379.
^ Brunner, op. cil, i. 273 sq. Gum- ^ Cicero, De officiis^ i. 12.
mere, op. cit. p. 28S. Pollock and ® Plautus, Asinaria, ii. 4. 88.
Maitland, I-Jisto 7 y of English Law be- Mommsen, Romisches Strafrecht ,
fore the Time of Edward /. i. 52. p. 622 sq.
® Iliady ix. 648.
HOMICIDE IN GENERAL
foreign nations, combined with the estimation in which
the successful warrior is held by his countrymen. The
ancient Mexicans were never at a loss for an excuse to pick
a quarrel with their neighbours, so as to be able to procure
victims for sacrifices to their gods.^ “ No profession was
held in more esteem amongst them than the profession of
arms. The deity of war was the most revered by them,
and regarded as the chief protector of the nation,” - The
Mayas not only wanted to increase their dominions by
encroachments upon their neighbours’ territory, but under-
took raids with no other object than that of obtaining
captives for sacrifice.'^ Speaking of the wars of the ancient
Egyptians, M. Amelineau observes,* Nous n’avons pas un
seul mot dans la litterature egyptienne, meme dans les-
ceuvres cigypto-chretiennes, qui nous fasse entendre le plus
leger cri de reprobation pour la guerre et ses horreurs.”
Among the Hebrews the most cruel wars of extermina-
tion were expressly sanctioned by their religion. That an
idolatrous people had no right to live was taken as a
matter of course ; but wars were also unscrupulously
waged from worldly motives, and in their moral code
there is no attempt to distinguish between just and unjust
war.'" Among the Mohammedans it is likewise the un-
believer, not the foreigner as such, that is regarded as the
most proper object of slaughter. Although there is no
precept in the Koran which, taken with the context, justi-
fies unprovoked war,^’’ the saying that Paradise is under
the shadow of swords ” ^ is popularly applied to all warfare
against infidels. Among the Celts '^ and Teutons a man’s
highest aspiration was to acquire military glory. The
Scandinavians considered it a disgrace for a man to die
^ Bancroft, Native Races of the Pa- sur rhistoire de V htimaniltU i. 384 sq.
cifc States, ii. 420. Clavi^ero, History ^ This was later on admitted by Lane
of ATexico, i. 371. (Moderu Ei^yptians, p. 574), who had
Clavigero, op. cit. i. 363. previously maintained that the duty of
^ Bancrfifl, op. cit. ii. 740, 745. waging holy war is strongly urged in
Amelineau, IJ tivolutioiu des idJes the Koran.
morales dans P Egypte aticienate, p. 344. ^ Bool, Studies in Mohammedanism,
Cf. Sclden, De Syncdriis et Pvte- p. 246.
fecturis Jnridicis veterum Ebr(Eoriitri, ^ Logan, 'J'lie Scottish Gael, i. loi.
hi. 12, p. 1179 sqq.\ Laurent, i&tudes de Valroger, Les Celtes, p. 186.
Z 2
HOMICIDE IN GENERAL
without having seen human blood flow ; ^ even the slaying
of a tribesman they often regarded lightly when it had
been done openly and bravely. In Greece, in ancient times
at least, war was the normal relation between different
states, and peace an exception, for which a special treaty
was required ; ^ while to conquer and enslave barbarians
was regarded as a right given to the Greeks by Nature.
The whole statecraft of the early Republic of Rome
was no doubt based upon similar principles;® and in
later days, also, the war policy of the Romans was certainly
not conducted with that conscientiousness which was
insisted upon by some of their writers.
However, the forei^er is not entirely, or under all
circumstances, devoid of rights. Among the nations of
archaic civilisation, as among the lower races, hospitality
is a duty, and the life of a guest is as sacred as the life of
any of the permanent members of the household. In
various cases the commencement of international hostili-
ties is preceded by special ceremonies, intended to justify
acts which are not considered proper in times of peace.
In ancient Mexico it was usual to send a formal challenge
or declaration of war to the enemy, as it was held dis-
creditable to attack a people unprepared for defence;^
and, according to the fecial law of the Romans, no war
was just unless it was undertaken to reclaim property, or
unless it was solemnly denounced and proclaimed before-
hand.'' In some cases warfare is condemned, or a distinc-
tion is made between just and unjust war with reference
to the purpose for which the war is waged. The Chinese
philosophers were great advocates of peace.'’ According
to Lao-Tsze, a superior man uses weapons “only on the
compulsion of necessity ” ; there is no calamity greater
^ Njdla^ ch. 40, vol. i. 167. Maurer, ^ Cf. Lecky, History of European
Bekehrung des Norwegischen StammeSy MoralSy ii. 257.
ii. 172. ^ Clavigero, i. 370. Bancroft,
2 Schmidt, Ethik der alien Griecheny op, cit. ii. 420, 421, 423.
ii. 280. Laurent, op. cit. i, 46. Plato, ® Cicero, De officiiSy i. ii.
Leges y i, 625. Livy, xxxi. 29 : Cum ® Cf. I^nessan, Morale des phih-
alienigenis, cum Imrbaris aeternum om- sophes chinoiSy pp. 54, 107.
nibus Graecis bellum est»” ^ Tdo Teh Kingy xxxi? 2.
HOMICIDE IN GENERAL
than lightly engaging in war/ and “ he who has killed
multitudes of men should weep for them with the bitterest
grief.” * In the Indian poem, Mahabharata, needless war-
fare is condemned ; it is said that the success which is
obtained by negotiations is the best, and that the success
which is secured by battle is the worst.®* Among the
Hebrews the sect of the Essenes went so far in their
reprobation of war that they would not manufacture
any martial instruments whatever.'* Roman historians,
even in the case of wars with barbarians, often discuss
the sufficiency or insufficiency of the motives “ with
a conscientious severity a modern historian could hardly
surpass.” ** According to Cicero, a war, to be just,
ought to be necessary, the sole object of war being to
enable us to live undisturbed in peace. There are two
modes of settling controversies, he says, one by discussion,
the other by a resort to force. The first is proper to
man, the second is proper to brutes, and ought never
to be adopted except where the first is unavailable.®
Seneca regards war as a “glorious crime,” comparable to
murder ; — “ What is forbidden in private life is com-
manded by public ordinance. Actions which, committed
by stealth, would meet with capital punishment, we praise
because committed by soldiers. Men, by nature the
mildest species of the animal race, are not ashamed to find
delight in mutual slaughter, to wage wars, and to transmit
them to be waged by their children, when even dumb
animals and wild beasts live at peace with one another.”'^
History attests that the Romans, in their intercourse with
other nations, did not act upon Cicero’s and Seneca’s lofty
theories of international morality ; as Plutarch observes,
the two names “ peace ” and “ war ” are mostly used only
as coins, to procure, not what is just, but what is
expedient.® Yet there seems to have been a general
} Ibid, Ixix. 2. Ibid. xxxi. 3. Lecky, History of European
' ^ Mahabharata^ Bhisma Parva, iii. Morals^ ii. 258.
81 (pt. xii. sq. p. 6). ® Cicero, De officiis, i. 11.
^ Philo, Quod liber sit quisquis vir- Seneca, Epistula, 95.
tuti studet, p, 877. ® Plutarch, Fita Pyrrh/jxil 3,p. 389.
HOMICIDE IN GENERAL
feeling in Rome that the waging of a war required some
justification. In declaring it, the Roman heralds called all
the gods to witness that the people against whom it was
declared had been unjust and neglectful of its obligations.^
Even in war the killing of an enemy is, under certain
circumstances, prohibited either by custom or by en-
lightened moral opinion. Among the ancient Nahuas,
who never accepted a ransom for a prisoner of war, the
person of an ambassador was at all events held sacred.'^
In the ‘ Book of Rewards and Punishments,’ which em-
bodies popular Taouism, it is said, “ Do not massacre the
enemies who yield themselves, nor kill those who offer
their submission.” ^ The Hebrews, whilst being com-
manded to “ save alive nothing that breatheth ” of the
cities which the Lord had given them for an inheritance,
were to deal differently with cities which were very far off
from them ; to kill only the men, and to take to them-
selves the women and the little ones."* The Laws of
Manu lay down very humane rules for a king who fights
with his foes in battle : — “ Let him not strike with
weapons concealed in wood, nor with such as are barbed,
poisoned, or the points of which are blazing with fire.
Let him not strike one who in flight has climbed on an
eminence, nor a eunuch, nor one who joins the palms of
his hands in supplication, nor one who flees with flying
hair, nor one who sits down, nor one who says * I am
thine ’ ; nor one who sleeps, nor one who has lost his coat
of mail, nor one who is naked, nor one who is disarmed,
nor one who looks on without taking part in the fight, nor
one who is fighting with another foe ; nor one whose
weapons are broken, nor one afflicted with sorrow, nor
one who has been grievously wounded, nor one who
is in fear, nor one who has turned to flight ; but in all
these cases let him remember the duty of honourable
warriors.” The Mahabharata contains expressions of
^ Livy, i. 32.
- Bancroft, op. cit. ii. 426, 412.
^ Douglas, Confucianism and Taou-
ism, p. 261,
^ Deuteronomy , xx. 13 S(jq.
® Laws of Manu, vii. 90 sqq.
HOMICIDE IN GENERAL
similar chivalrous sentiments in regard to enemies. A
car-warrior should fight only with a car-warrior, a horse-
man with a horse-man, a foot-soldier with a foot-soldier.
“ Always being led by consideration of fitness, willingness,
bravery, and strength, one should strike another after
having challenged him. None should strike another who
is confiding or who is panic-stricken. One fighting with
another, one seeking refuge, one retreating, one whose
weapon is broken, and one who is not clad in armour
should never be struck. Charioteers, animals, men engaged
in carrying weapons, those who play on drums and those
who blow conchs should never be smitten.” ^ Among the
Greeks, in the Homeric age, it was evidently regarded as a
matter of course that, on the fall of a city, all the men
were slain, and the women and children carried off as
slaves ; ^ but in historic times such a treatment of a
vanquished foe grew rarer, and seems, under ordinary
circumstances, to have been disapproved of.*^ The rulers
of this land, says the messenger in the ‘ Heraclida;,’ do not
approve of slaying enemies who have been taken alive in
battle."* In Rome the customs of war underwent a similar
change. In ancient days the normal fate of a captive was
death, in later times he was generally reduced to slavery ;
but many thousands of captives were condemned to the
gladiatorial shows, and the vanquished general was com-
monly slain in the Mamertine prison On the other hand,
nations or armies that voluntarily submitted to Rome
were habitually treated with great leniency. Cicero says :
— “ When we obtain the victory we must preserve those
enemies who behaved without cruelty or inhumanity
during the war ; for example, our forefathers received,
even as members of their state, the Tuscans, the Aequi,
the Volscians, the Sabines, and the Hernici, but utterly
destroyed Carthage and Numantia. . . . And, while we
^ Mahabharaiay Bhisma Parva, i. 27 ii. 281 sqq.
^sqq, (pt. xii. sq. p. 2). Euripides, Heraclidcc, 966.
Iliad, ix. 593 sq, ^ Laurent,^/, cit. iii. xo sq, Lecky,
^ Schmidt, Eihih der alien Griechen, History of Etty'opean Morals, ii. 257.
HOMICIDE IN GENERAL
CH. XIV
are bound to exercise consideration toward those whom we
have conquered by force, so those should be received into
our protection who throw themselves upon the honour of
our general, and lay down their arms, even though the
battering rams should have struck their walls.” ^
^ CicQTO y De ojicnsy i. ii.
Chapter XV
HOMICIDE IN GENERAL {con Hfl Ued)
Christianity introduced into Europe a higher regard
for human life than was felt anywhere in pagan society.
The early Christians condemned homicide of any kind as
a heinous sin. And in this^ as in all other questions of
moral concern, the distinction of nationality or race was
utterly ignored by them.
The sanctity which they attached to the life of every
human being led to a total condemnation of warfare,
sharply contrasting with the prevailing sentiment in the
Roman Empire. In accordance with the general spirit
of their religion, as also with special passages in the
Bible,^ they considered war unlawful under all circum-
stances. Justin Martyr quotes the prophesy of Isaiah,
that nation shall not lift up sword against nation,
neither shall they learn war any more,” and proceeds to say
that the instruction in the word of God which was given
by the twelve Apostles had so good effect that we, who
heretofore were continually devouring each other, will not
now so much as lift up our hand against our enemies.”^
Lactantius asserts that “ to engage in war cannot be lawful
for the righteous man, whose warfare is that of righteous-
ness itself.”^ Tertullian asks, ‘‘Can it be lawful to
^ St, Matthew, v. 9, 39, 44. Romans, Christianis, 39 (Migne, Patroiogice
xii. 17. Ephesians, vi. 12. cuf'stis, Ser. Graeca, vi. 387 sq,).
^ Isaiah, ii. 4. ^ Lactantius, Divittce institutiones,
* Justin Martyr, Apologia /. pro vi. (* De vero ciiltu’) 20 (Migne, op,
cit, vi. 708).
HOMICIDE IN GENERAL
handle the sword, when the Lord Himself has declared
that he who uses the sword shall perish by it ? ” And
in another passage he states that “ the Lord by his dis-
arming of Peter disarmed every soldier from that time
forward.” ^ Origen calls the Christians the children of
peace, who, for the sake of Jesus, never take up the sword
against any nation ; who fight for their monarch by
praying for him, but who take no part in his wars, even
though he urge them.^ It is true that, even irj early
times, Christian soldiers were not unknown ; Tertullian
alludes to Christians who were engaged in military pur-
suits together with their heathen countrymen."* But the
number of Christians enrolled in the army seems not to
have been very considerable before the era of Constantine,'*
and, though they were not cut off from the Church, their
profession was looked upon as hardly compatible with
their religion. St. Basil says that soldiers, after their term
of military service has expired, are to be excluded from
the sacrament of the communion for three whole years.®
And according to one of the canons of the Council of
Nice, those Christians who, having abandoned the pro-
fession of arms, afterwards returned to it, “ as dogs to
their vomit,” were for some years to occupy in the
Church the place of penitents."
A divine law which prohibited all resistance to enemies
could certainly not be accepted by the State, especially at
a time when the Empire was seriously threatened by
foreign invaders. Christianity could therefore never
become a State-religion unless it gave up its attitude
towards war. And it gave it up. Already in 314 a
Council condemned soldiers who, from religious motives.
^ Tertullian, De corona, ii (Migne,
op. cit. ii. 92).
* Tertullian, Deidolatria, 19 (Migne,
op. cit. i. 691).
3 Origen, Contra Cels uni, v. 33 ;
viii. 73 (Migne, op. cit. Ser. Graeca, xi.
1231 sq., 1627 sq.).
^ Tertullian, Apologeticus, 42 (Migne,
op. cit. i. 491).
® Le Blant, Inscriptions chrcHiennes
de la Gaule, i. 84 sqq.
« St. Basil, Epistola CLXXXVIIL,
ad Amphilochium, can. 13 (Migne, op.
cit. Ser. Graeca, xxxii. 681 sq,).
7 Conciliuni Niccenuni, A D. 2 , 2 ^, can.
12 (Labbe- Mansi, Sacrorurn Concilio-
rum col lectio, ii. 674).
HOMICIDE IN GENERAL
deserted their colours^ The Fathers of the fourth and
fifth centuries did not altogether disapprove of war.
Chrysostom arid Ambrose, though seeing the difficulty
of reconciling it with the theory of Christian life which
they found in the New Testament, perceived that the
use of the sword was necessary to preserve the State."
St. Augustine went much farther. He tried to prove
that the practice of war was quite compatible with the
teachings of Christ. The soldiers mentioned in the New
Testament, who were seeking for a knowledge of salva-
tion, were not directed by our Lord to throw aside their
arms and renounce their profession, but were advised by
him to be content with their wages.® St. Peter baptised
Cornelius, the centurion, in the name of Christ, without
exhorting him to give up the military life,^ and St. Paul
himself took care to have a strong guard of soldiers for
his defence.® And was not the history of David, the
“ man after God’s own heart,” an evidence of those being
wrong who say that “ no one who wages war can please
God” When Christ declared that “all they that take
the sword shall perish with the sword,” ^ He referred to
such persons only as arm themselves to shed the blood of
others without either command or permission of any
superior or lawful authority.® A great deal depends on
the causes for which men undertake war, and on the
authority they have for doing so. Those wars are just
which are waged with a view to obtaining redress for
wrongs, or to chastising the undue arrogance of another
State. The monarch has the power of making war when
he thinks it advisable, and, even if he be a sacrilegious
^ Concililun Arelatense 1 .^ ^ St. Augu.stine Epistola XLVII.^
can. 'i (Labbe-Mansi, op. cit. ii. 471). ad Piiblicolam, op. cit. xxxiii.
Cf. Le Hlant, op. cit. i. p. Ixxxii. 187).
Gibb, ‘ Christian Church and War,’ St. Au^nrstine, CLXXXIX..,
in British Quarterly Rezdaw., Ixxiii. 83. ad Bonifacium, 4(Migno, op. cit. xxxiii.
^ St. Augustine, CXXXVIII.^ 855).
ad Marcelliniim, 15 (Migne, op. cit. ^ St. Matthew, xxvi. 52.
xxxiii. 531 sq.). ® St. Augustine, Contra Faiututn
^ St. Augustine, A/A/. CLXXXJX., Alanichicum, xxii. (Migne, op. cit.
ad Bonifacium, 4 (Migne, ot>. cit. xxxiii. xlii, 444).
S55)-
king, a Christian may fight under him, provided that
what is enjoined upon the soldier personally is not
contrary to the precept of God.^ In short, though peace
is our final good, though in the City of God there is
peace in eternity,^ war may sometimes be a necessity in
this sinful world.
By the writings of St. Augustine the theoretical attitude
of the Church towards war was definitely settled, and
later theologians only reproduced or further elaborated his
views. Yet it was not with a perfectly safe conscience that
Christianity thus sanctioned the practice of war. There
was a feeling that a soldier scarcely could make a good
Christian. In the middle of the fifth century, Leo the
Pope declared it to be contrary to the rules of the Church
that persons after the action of penance — that is, persons
then considered to be pre-eminently bound to obey the law
of Christ — should revert to the profession of arms.®
Various Councils forbade the clergy to engage in warfare,**
and certain canons excluded from ordination all who had
served in an army after baptism.® Penance was prescribed
for those who had shed blood on the battle-field.® Thus
^ St. Augustine, Contra Faiisttim
Alanicluvttm^ xxii. 75 (Migne, op. cil.
xlii. 448).
- St. Augustine, Decivilate Dei^ xix.
11.
^ Leo Magnus, Epistoia XC.y ad
RtisHcnvi, inquis. 12 (Migne, op. cit.
liv. 1 206 sq . ).
One of the Apostolic Canons re-
quire.s that any bishop, priest, or deacon
who devotes himself to military service
shall l)e degraded from his ecclesiastical
rank { Canopies ecclesiastici qiii dicuntur
Apostolornnty 83 [74] [Bunsen, Analecta
Ante-Niccenay ii. 31]). The Councils
of Toulouse, in 633 (ch. 45, in Labbe-
Mansi, op. cit. x. 630), and of Meaux,
in 845 (can. 37, ibid. xiv. 827), con-
demned to a similar punishment those
of the clergy who ventured to take up
arms. Gratian says {Decretumy ii. 23.
8. 4) that the Church refuses to pray for
the soul of a priest who died on the
battle-field. Notwithstanding the canons
of Councils and the decrees of popes,
ecclesiastics frequently participated in
battles (Nicolaus I. Plpistoics et Decretay
83 [Migne, op. cit. cxix. 922]. Robert-
son, History of the Reign of Charles V.
i* 330 > 385* Ward, Fotindaiion and
History of the Law of Nations y i. 365 sq.
Buckle, History of Civilisation in E^ig-
landy i. 204 ; ii. 464. Bethune-Baker,
Influence of Christia 7 iity on iA'ar, p.
52. Dummler, Geschickte des Ost-
frdnkischen ReichSy ii. 637).
® Grotius, De jure belli et pads y i. 2.
10. 10. Bingham, Antiquities of the
Christian Churchy iv. 4. i ( WorkSy ii.
ss)-
® Pocmtentiale Bigotianumy iv. i. 4
(Wasserschleben, Bussordmingen der
abendllindischen R'irchey p. 453). Pcenit.
Vigilanum, 27 [ibid. p. 529). Pcenit.
Pseudo-Tkeodoriy xxi. 15 {ibid. p. 587
sq.). Cf. Mart de Garin le Loherainy
p, 213: “ Ainz se repent et se claime
cheti ; Ses pechies plore au soir et au
matin, De ce qu’il a tans homes mors et
pris.’*
HOMICIDE IN GENERAL
the ecclesiastical canons made in William the Conqueror’s
reign by the Norman prelates, and confirmed by the Pope,
directed that he who was aware that he had killed a man
in a. battle should do penance for one year, and that he who
had killed several should do a year’s penance for each3
Occasionally the Church seemed to wake up to the evils of
war in a more effective way ; there are several notorious
instances of wars being forbidden by popes. But in such
cases the prohibition was only too often due to the fact that
some particular war was disadvantageous to the interests
of the Church. And whilst doing comparatively little to
discourage wars which did not interfere with her own
interests, the Church did all the more to excite war against
those who were objects of her hatred.
It has been suggested that the transition from the
peaceful tenets of the primitive Church to the essentially
military Christianity of the crusades, was chiefly due to
the terrors and the example of Islam. “ The spirit of
Muhammedanism,” says Mr. Lecky, “slowly passed into
Christianity, and transformed it into its image.” Until
then, “ war was rather condoned than consecrated, and,
whatever might be the case with a few isolated prelates, the
Church did nothing to increase or encourage it.” ^ But
this view is hardly consistent with facts. Christianity had
entered on the war-path already before it came into
contact with Muhammedanism. Wars against Arian
peoples had been represented as holy wars, for which the
combatants would be rewarded by Heaven.® The war
which Chlodwig made upon the Visigoths was not only
undertaken with the approval of the clergy, but it was, as
Mr. Greenwood remarks, “ properly their war, and
Chlodwig undertook it in the capacity of a religious
champion in all things but the disinterestedness which
ought to distinguish that character.” Remigius of Reims
assisted him by his countenance and advice, and the
^ Wilkins, Concilia Magnet. Britan- ^ Lecky, History of European
nice et Hibernue^ i. 366. Morals^ ii. 251 sq,
^ Gibb, loc, cit. p, 86.
HOMICIDE IN GENERAL
Catholic priesthood set every engine of their craft in
motion to second and encourage him.^ In the Church
itself there were germs out of which a military spirit
would naturally develop itself. The famous dictum,
“ Nulla salus extra ecclesiam,” was promulgated as early as
the days of Cyprian. The general view of mediasval
orthodoxy was, that those beyond the pale of the Church,
heathen and heretics alike, were unalterably doomed to
hell, whereas those who would acknowledge her authority,
confess their sins, receive the sacrament of baptism, partake
of the eucharist, and obey the priest, would be infallibly
saved. If war was allowed by God, could there be a more
proper object for it than the salvation of souls otherwise
lost ? And for those who refused to accept the gift of
grace offered to them, could there be a juster punishment
than death ? Moreover, had not the Israelites fought
great battles “ for the laws and the sanctuary ” ? ^ Had
not the Lord Himself commissioned them to attack, sub-
due, and destroy his enemies ? Had He not commanded
them to root out the natives of Canaan, who, because of
their abominations, had fallen under God’s judgment, and
to kill man and beast in the Israelitish cities which had
given themselves to idolatry, and to burn all the spoil,
with the city itself, as a whole offering to Jehovah ? ®
There was no need, then, for the Christians to go to the
Muhammedans in order to learn the art of religious war.
The Old Testament, the revelation of God, gave better
lessons in it than the Koran, and was constantly cited in
justification of any cruelty committed in the name of
religion.'*
It was thus in perfect consistency with the general
teachings of the Church that she regarded an exploit
achieved against the infidels as a merit which might
obliterate the guilt of the most atrocious crimes. Such a
^ Greenwood, First Book oj the doctrine, that fighting may be directed
History of the Germans^ p. 518. to the preservation of divine worship.
I Maccabees^ xiii. 3. Thomas Deuteronoiny^ xiii. 15 sq.
Atjuinas [Sitnuna theolo^ica^ ii.-ii. 188. ■* Cf, Constant, De la reli^on^ ii.
3) quotc.s this passage in support of the 329 sq.
HOMICIDE IN GENERAL
deed was the instrument of pardon to Henry II. for the
murder of Becket,' and was supposed to be the means of
cure to St. Louis in a dangerous illness. Fighting against
infidels took rank with fastings, penitential discipline,
visits to shrines, and almsgivings, as meriting the divine
mercy." He who fell in the battle could be confident
that his soul was admitted directly into the joys of
Paradise.® And this held good not only of wars against
Muhammedans. The massacres of Jews and heretics
seemed no less meritorious than the slaughter of the
more remote enemies of the Gospel. Nay, even a slight
shade of difference from the liturgy of Rome became at
last a legitimate cause of war.
It is true that these views were not shared by all.
At the Council of Lyons, in 1274, the opinion was pro-
nounced, and of course eagerly attacked, that it was con-
trary to the examples of Christ and the Apostles to uphold
religion with the sword and to shed the blood of
unbelievers.^ In the following century, Bonet maintained
that, according to the Scriptures, a Saracen or any other
disbeliever could not be compelled by force to accept the
Christian faith.'’ Franciscus a Victoria declared that
“diversity of religion is not a cause of just war”C' and
a similar opinion was expressed by Soto,^ Covarruvias a
Leyva,® and Suarez.” According to Balthazar Ayala, the
most illustrious Spanish lawyer of the sixteenth century,
it does not belong to the Church to punish infidels who
^ Lyttelton, History of the Life of
King Henry the Second, iii. 96.
Cf, Mil mail, History of Latin
Christianity , iv. 209.
^ Cf. Laurent, Pjudes sur iLiistoire
de V humanity , vii. 257.
Bethune-Baker, op. cit. p. 73.
® Bonet, Varh'e des batailles, iv. 2,
p. 86: “ Selon la sainte E.scripture
nous ne pouvon.s et si ne deva^n.s con-
tredire ne cfforcer ung mescreant a
recepvoir ne le saint bapUme nc la
sainte foy ainsi les devons laisser en
leur franche volonte que Dieu leur a
donnee.”
^ Franciscus a Victoria, Relectiones
'Jlieologicie, vi. 10, p. 231 : “ Caussa
iusti belli non est diuersitas religionis.”
Yet infidels may be constrained to allow
the Gospel to be preached {ibid. v. 3.
12, p. 214 sq.).
^ Soto, De institia et jure, v. 3. 5,
fob 154.
8 Covarruvias a Leyva, Regiihe,
Peccatum, ii. JO. 2 (Of era on/nia, i.
496) : “ Infidelitas non priuat infideles
dominio, quod halient iure huniano, vel
habuerunt ante legem Eiiangelicam in
prouinciis et regnis, quae obtinent.”
Suarez, cited by Nys, Droit de la
guerre et les prlcurseurs de Grotius^
p. 98.
HOMICIDE IN GENERAL
CHAl>.
have never received the Christian faith, whereas those who,
having once received it, afterwards endeavour to prevent
the propagation of the Gospel, may, like other heretics,
be justly persecuted with the sword.* But the majority
of jurisconsults, as well as of canonists, were in favour of
the orthodox view that unbelief is a legitimate reason for
going to war.** And this principle was, professedly, acted
upon to an extent which made the history of Christianity
for many centuries a perpetual crusade, and transformed
the Christian Church into a military power even more
formidable than Rome under Cassar and Augustus. Very
often religious zeal was a mere pretext for wars which in
reality were caused by avarice or desire for power. The
aim of the Church was to be the master of the earth
rather than the servant of heaven. She preached crusades
not only against infidels and heretics, but against any dis-
obedient prince who opposed her boundless pretensions.
And she encouraged war when rich spoils were to be
expected from the victor, as a thankoffering to God for
the victory He had granted, or as an atonement for the
excesses which had been committed.
Out of this union between war and Christianity there
was born that curious bastard, Chivalry. The secular
germ of it existed already in the German forests. Accord-
ing to Tacitus, the young German who aspired to be a
warrior was brought into the midst of the assembly of
'the chiefs, where his father, or some other relative,
solemnly equipped him for his future vocation with
shield and javelin.^ Assuming arms was thus made a
social distinction, which subsequently derived its name
^ Ayala, De iure et officiis helHcis et held by infidels.
disciplina ?nilitan\ i. 2. 29 sq. ^ Tacitus, Germania., 13. According
2 Nys, op. cit. p 89. Idem, in his to Honor 4 de .Sainte Marie {Disserta-
Introduction to Bonet’s Ilarbre des tions historiques et critiques stir la
hatailles, p. xxiv. According to Con- Chevalerie, p. 30 sqq.). Chivalry is of
radus Brunus { De legationibns. iii. 8, Roman, according to some other writers,
p. 1 1 5), for instance, any war waged by of Arabic origin. M. Gautier {La Che-
Christians against the enemies of the valeric, pp. 14, 16) repudiates these
Christian faith is just, as being under- theories, and regards Chivalry as “un
taken for the defence of religion and usage germain idealise par I’liglise-”
the glory of God in order to recover See also Rambaud, Histoire de la civili-
the possession of dominions unjustly sation /ranfaisCj i. 178 Sjq,
HOMICIDE IN GENERAL
XV'
from one of its most essential characteristics, the riding a
war-horse. But Chivalry' became something quite different
from what the word indicates. The Church knew how
to lay hold of knighthood for her own purposes. The
investiture, which was originally of a purely civil nature,
became, even before the time of the crusades, as it were,
a sacrament.^ The priest delivered the sword into the
hand of the person who was to be made a knight, with
the following words, ‘‘ Serve Christi, sis miles in nomine
Patris, Filii, et Spiritus Sancti, Amen.”“ The sword was
said to be made in semblance of the cross so as to signify
how our Lord God vanquished in the cross the death of
human lying”; ^ and the word ‘‘Jesus” was sometimes
engraven on its hilt.^ God Himself had chosen the
knight to defeat with arms the miscreants who wished to
destroy his Holy Church, in the same way as He had
chosen the clergy to maintain the Catholic faith with
Scripture and reasons.^ The knight was to the body
politic what the arms are to the human body : the Church
was the head, Chivalry the arms, the citizens, merchants,
and labourers the inferior members ; and the arms were
placed in the middle to render them equally capable of
defending the inferior members and the head.*' “ The
greatest amity that should be in this world,” says the
author of the ‘ Ordre of Chyualry,’ “ ought to be between
the knights and clerks.”^ The several gradations of
knighthood were regarded as parallel to those of the
Church. And after the conquest of the Holy I.and the
union between the profession of arms and the religion of
Christ became still more intimate by the institution of the
two military orders of monks, the Knights Templars and
Knights of St. John of Jerusalem.
^ Scott, ‘ Essay on Chivalry/ in
MisceUaneoiis Prose IVorks^ vi. i6.
Mills, History of Chivalry j i. lo sq.
For a description of th5 various re-
l%ious ceremonies accompanying the
investiture, see The Book of the Ordre
of Chyualry or Knyghthode^ fol. 27 l>
sqq. Cf also F'avyn, Theater of Horwiir
and Kniy^ht- floods i. 52.
Favyn, op. cit. i. 52.
^ Ordre of Chyualry fol. 31 a jy.
** Mills, op. iit. i. 71.
Ordre of Chyualry, fol. 1 1 b.
Lc /oiiuencef fol. 94 sqq.
^ Ordre of Chyualry, fol, 1 2 a.
^ Scott, loc. cit. p. 15.
VOL. I
A A
HOMICIDE IN GENERAL
The duties which a knight took on himself by oath
were very extensive, but not very well defined. He should
defend the holy Catholic faith, he should defend justice,
he should defend women, widows, and orphans, and all
those of either sex that were powerless, ill at ease, and
groaning under oppression and injustice.' In the name of
religion and justice he could thus practically wage war
almost at will. Though much real oppression was
undoubtedly avenged by these soldiers of the Church, the
knight seems as a rule to have cared little for the cause or
necessity of his doing battle. La guerre est ma patrie,
Mon harnois ma maison ; Et en toute saison Combatre c’est
ma vie,” was a saying much in use in the sixteenth century.'^
The general impression which Froissart gives us in his
history is, that the age in which he lived was completely
given over to fighting, and cared about nothing else what-
ever.® The F'rench knights never spoke of war but as a
feast, a game, a pastime. “ Let them play their game,”
they said of the cross-bow men, who were showering down
arrows on them; and “to play a great game,” jouer gros
jeu, was their description of a battle.' Previous to the
institution of Chivalry there certainly existed much fight-
ing in Christian countries, but knighthood rendered war
“ a fashionable accomplishment.” ® And so all-absorbing
became the passion for it that, as real injuries were not
likely to occur every day, artificial grievances were created,
and tilts and tournaments were invented in order to keep
in action the sons of war when they had no other employ-
ments for their courage. Even in these images of war —
which were by no means so harmless as they have some-
times been represented to be'’ — the intimate connection
^ Ordre of Chyuahy^ foil. 1 1 b, 17 a.
Sainte-Palaye, M^tuoires sur I'ancienne
Chevalerie^ i. 75, 129.
^ De la Noue, Discolors poliiiques
et niilitaires^ p. 215.
See Sir James Stephen’s essay on
‘Froissart’s Chronicles,’ in his Hone
Sabbaticiey i. 22 sqq,
* Sainte-Palaye, of. cit. ii. 61.
* Millingen, History of DtieUing^ i.
70.
^ Sainte-Palaye, op. cit. i. 179 ; ii. 75.
Dll Cange, ‘ Di.ssertation.s sur I’histoirc
de S. Louys,’ in Petitot, Collection des
liHinoires re/ati/sc} P hisioire de France^
iii. 122 S(j. Honorc de Sainte Marie,
op. cit. p. 186.
HOMICIDE IN GENERAL
between Chivalry and religion displays itself in various
ways. Before the tournament began, the coats of arms,
helmets, and other objects were carried into a monastery,
and after the victory was gained the arms and the horses
which had been used in the fight were offered up at the
church.^ The proclamations at the tournaments were
generally in the name of God and the Virgin Mary.
Before battle the knights confessed, and heard mass ; and,
when they entered the lists, they held a sort of image
with which they made the sign of the cross/*^ Moreover,
“ as the feasts of the tournaments were accompanied by
these acts of devotion, so the feasts of the Church were
sometimes adorned with the images of the tournaments.”
It is true that the Church now and then made attempts
to stop these performances.^ But then she did so
avowedly because they prevented many knights from
joining the holy wars, or because they swallowed up
treasures which might otherwise with advantage have
been poured into the Holy Land."*
Closely connected with the feudal system was the prac-
tice of private war. Though tribunals had been instituted,
and even long after the kings’ courts had become well-
organised and powerful institutions, a nobleman had a
right to wage war upon another nobleman from whom he
had suffered some gross injury.^’^ On such occasions not
only the relatives, but the vassals, of the injured man
were bound to help him in his quarrel, and the same
obligation existed in the case of the aggressor.^ Only
greater crimes were regarded as legitimate causes of private
war,'"^ but this rule was not at all strictly observed.*' As
^ Sainte-Palaye, op. cit. i. 151.
“ Ibid. ii. 57.
^ Ibid. ii. 57 sq.
Du Cange, loc. cit. p. 124 sqq.
Honore de Sainte Marie, op. cit. p.
186. Sainte-Palaye, op. cit. ii. 75.
Du Cange, loc. cit. p. iz^sq.
The right of private war generally
supposed nobility of birth and equality
of rank in both the contending parties
{Beaumanoir, Omi times du Beativoisis,
lix. 5 sq. vol. ii. 355 sq. ; Robertson,
History of the Rcigti of Charles V. i.
329). But it was also granted to the
French communes^ and to the free towns
in Germany, Italy, and Spain (Du
Boys, Ilistoire dii droit crimind des
peiiples moderties, ii. 348).
^ Du Cange, loc. cit. pp. 450, 458.
® Ibid. p. 445 sq. Arnold, Deutsche
Urzeit, p. 341. von Wiichter, Beit rage
zur dent sc hen Geschichie^ p. 46.
We read of a nobleman who de-
clared war against the city of Frankfort,
A A 2
HOMICIDE IN GENERAL
a matter of fact, the barons fled to arms upon every
quarrel ; he who could raise a small force at once made
war upon him who had anything to lose. The nations
of Europe were subdivided into innumerable subordinate
states, which were almost independent, and declared war
and made treaties with all the vigour and all the cere-
monies of powerful monarchs. Contemporary historians
describe" the excesses committed in prosecution of these
intestine quarrels in such terms as excite astonishment and
horror ; and great parts of Europe were in consequence
reduced to the condition of a desert, which it ceased to be
worth while to cultivate.^
The Church made some feeble attempts to put an end
to this state of things. Thus, about the year 990, ordi-
nances were directed against the practice of private war
by several bishops in the south of France, who agreed to
exclude him who violated their ordinances from all
Christian privileges during his life, and to deny him
Christian burial after his death." A little later, men
engaged in warfare were exhorted, by sacred relics and by
the bodies of saints, to lay down their arms and to swear
that they would never again disturb the public peace by
their private hostilities.® But it is hardly likely that such
directions had much effect as long as the bishops and
abbots themselves were allowed to wage private war by
means of their vidames, and exercised this right scarcely
less frequently than the barons.^ Nor does it seem that
because a lady residing there had pro-
mised to dance with his cousin, but
danced with another ; and the city was
obliged to satisfy the wounded honour
of the gentleman (von Wachter, op. cit.
P- S7)-
1 Robertson, op. cit. i. 332.
^ ‘ Charta de Treuga et Pace per Ani-
ciensem Praesulem Widoneni in Con-
gregatione quamplurium Episcoporum,
Principium, et Nobilium hujus Terrae
•sancita,’ in Dumont, Corps iiniversel
diplomatique du droit des gens^ i.
41.
* Raoul Glaber, Historic^ stii tern-
ri<, iv. 5 (Bouquet, Rcru?n Galli-
carton et Francicavum Scriptores^ x.
49). Robertson, op. cit. i. 335,
Brussel, Nouvel examen de Pusage
gthidral des fiefs en France., i. 144. How
much the prelates were infected by the
general spirit of the age, appears from a
characteristic story of an archbishop of
Cologne who gave to one of his vassals
a castle situated on a sterile rock.
When the vassal objected that he could
not subsist on such a soil, the arch-
bishop answered, “ Why do you com-
plain? Four roads unite under the
walls of your castle ” (Du Boys, His-
toire dll droit crdminel de PEspagne, p.
504).
HOMICIDE IN GENERAL
the Church brought about any considerable change for the
better by establishing the Truce of God, involving obli-
gatory respite from hostilities during the great festivals of
the Church, as also from the evening of Wednesday in
each week to the morning of Monday in the week
ensuing.^ We are assured by good authorities that the
Truce was generally disregarded, though the violator was
threatened with the penalty of excommunication.' Most
barons could probably say with Bertram de Born : — “ La
paix ne me convient pas ; la guerre seule me plait, Je
n’ai (^gard ni aux lundis, ni aux mardis. Les semaines, les
mois, les annees, tout m’est ^gal. En tout temps, je veux
perdre quiconque me nuit.” * The ordinance enjoining the
treuga Dei was transgressed even by the popes. It was
too unpractical a direction to be obeyed, and was soon
given up even in theory by the authorities of the Church.
Thomas Aquinas says that, as physicians may lawfully
apply remedies to men on feast-days, so just wars may be
lawfully prosecuted on such days for the defence of the
commonwealth of the faithful, if necessity so requires ;
“ for it would be tempting God for a man to want to keep
his hands from war under stress of such necessity.” ^ And
in support of this opinion he quotes the First Book of
the Maccabees, where it is said, “ Whosoever shall come
to make battle with us on the sabbath day, we will fight
against him,”
It seems that the main cause of the abolition of private
war was not any measure taken by the Church, but the
increase of the authority of emperors or kings. In
France the right of waging private war was moderated
by Louis IX., checked by Philip IV., suppressed by
^ Raoul Glaber, op. cit. v. i [loc. cit. ^ Villemain, Co7irs de litt^raiin^e
p. 59). Dm C'Awgii, Glossarium ad scrip- fram^aise^ Littiraiiire du Moyen
tores viedue et hijimce Latmitatis, vi. i. 122 sq.
126'] sq. Nouvei abr^^d chro- ^ Belli, De re militari^ quoted by
nologique de Phistoire de* France ^ p. Nys, op, cit. p. 115.
I06. ® Thoma.s Aquinas, op. cit. ii.-ii.
Du Cange, Glossarinm^ vi. 1272. 40. 4.
Nys, Droit de la guerre et les prdcur- ^ Maccabees,^ ii. 41.
seurs de Grot ins y p. 114.
HOMICIDE IN GENERAL
35 ^
Charles VI.^ In England, after the Norman Conquest,
private wars seem to have occurred more rarely than
on the Continent, probably owing to the strength of the
royal authority, which made the execution of justice more
vigorous and the jurisdiction of the King’s court m6re
extensive than was the case in most other countries.^ In
Scotland the practice of private war received its final blow
only late in the eighteenth century, when the clans were
reduced to order after the rebellion of 1745.^ Whilst,
then, it is impossible to ascribe to the Church any con-
siderable part in the movement which ultimately led to
the entire abolition of private war, we have, on the other
hand, to take into account the encouragement which the
Church gave to the warlike spirit of the time by the
establishment of Chivalry ^ and by sanctioning war as a
divine institution. War came to be looked upon as a
judgment of God and the victory as a sign of his special
favour. Before a battle, the service of mass was usually
performed by both armies in the presence of each other,
and no warrior would fight without secretly breathing a
prayer.'* Pope Adrian IV. says that a war commenced
under the auspices of religion cannot but be fortunate ; ^
and it was commonly believed that God took no less
interest in the battle than did the fighting warriors.
Bonet, who wrote in the fourteenth century, puts to him-
self the question, why there are so many wars in the world,
and gives the answer, “ que toutes sont pour le pechii du
siecle dont nostre seigneur Dieu pour le pugnir permet les
guerres, car ainsi le mainticnt I’escripture.” *
Similar opinions have retained their place in the
orthodox creeds both of the Catholic and Protestant
^ Robertson, op, cit. -i. 55, 56, 338 Questions in Plodern I}iternatio 72 al
S(](j, Hallani, View of the State of Lara, p. 254 S(/.
Europe during the Middle Ages, i. 207. ■* I do not understand ]io\v M. Gau-
Brussel, op. cit. i. 142. tier can say {op. cit. p. 6) that Chivalry
Ibid. i. 343 si/. I’rof. Freeman was the most beautiful of those means
[Comparative rolitics, p. 328 men- by which the Church endeavoured to
tions as the last instance of private war check war.
in England one from the lime of ^ VlxW's,, Histoiy of Chivalry, i. 147.
Edward IV. ® Laurent, op. cit. vii. 245.
^ Essays on some Disputed 7 JJonet, op. cit. iv., 54, p. 150.
HOMICIDE IN GENERAL
Churches up to the present day. The attitude adopted
by the great Christian congregations towards war has
been, and is still, to a considerable degree, that of sym-
pathetic approval. The Catechism of the Council of
Trent brings home that there are on record instances of
slaughter executed by the special command of God
Himself, as when the sons of Levi, who put to death so
many thousands in one day, after the slaughter were
thus addressed by Moses, “ Ye have consecrated your
hands this day to the Lord.” ^ Even quite modern
Catholic writers refer to the canonists who held that a
State might lawfully make war upon a heretic people
which was spreading heresy, and upon a pagan people
which prevented the preaching of the Gospel.’’^ Again,
when the Protestant Churches became State-Churches,
their ministers, considering themselves as in the service
of the State, were ready to champion whatever war the
Government pleased to undertake. As Mr. Gibb ob-
serves, the Protestant minister was as ready with his
Thanksgiving Sermon for the victories of a profligate
war, as the Catholic priest was with his Te Deum ; “ in-
deed, the latter was probably the more independent of
the two, because of his allegiance to Rome.” ® The new
Confessions of Faith explicitly claimed for the State the
right of waging war, and the Anabaptists were condemned
because they considered war unlawful for a Christian.'* Even
the necessity of a just cause as a reason for taking part
in warfare, which was reasserted at the time of the Re-
formation, was subsequently allowed to drop out of sight.
Mr. Farrer calls attention to the fact that in the 37th
article of the English Church, which is to the effect that a
Christian at the command of the magistrate may wear
weapons and serve in the wars, the word justa in the Latin
form preceding the word bella has been omitted altogether.''
^ Catechism of the Coutfcil of Trent ^ ^ Augsburg Confession^ i. i6.
iii. 6. 5, Second Helvetic Confession^ xxx. 4.
Adds and Arnold, Catholic Die- Farrer, Military Manners and
tionary, p. 944. Customs, p. 208.
^ Gibb, loc. cit. p. 90.
HOMICIDE IN GENERAL
Nor did the old opinion that war is a providential
institution and a judgment of God die with the Middle
Ages. Lord Bacon looks upon wars as “ the highest
trials of right ; when princes and states that acknowledge
no superior upon earth shall put themselves upon the
justice of God, for the deciding of their controversies by
such success as it shall please Him to give on either side.”^
Real de Curban says that a war is seldom successful
unless it be just, hence the victor may presume that God
is on his side." According to Jeremy Taylor, “ kings
are in the place of God, who strikes whole nations, and
towns, and villages ; and war is the rod of God in the
hands of princes.” * And it is not only looked upon as
an instrument of divine justice, but it is also said, generally,
“ to work out the noble purposes of God.” ‘‘ Its tend-
ency, as a theological writer assures us, is “ to rectify and
exalt the popular conception of God,” there being
nothing among men “ like the smell of gunpowder for
making a nation perceive the fragrance of divinity in
truth.” By war the different countries “ have been
opened up to the advance of true religion.” '' “ No people
ever did, or ever could, feel the power of Christian
principle growing up like an inspiration through the
national manhood, until the worth of it had been thun-
dered on the battle-field.” " War is, “ when God sends
it, a means of grace and of national renovation” ; it is “ a
solemn duty in which usually only the best Christians and
most trustworthy men should be commissioned to hold
the sword.” ^ According to M. Proudhon, it is the
most sublime phenomenon of our moral life,'* a divine re-
velation more authoritative than the Gospel itself ’'* The
warlike people is the religious people ; war is the sign of
^ Bacon, Letters and Life, \. {JVor/cs, ^ Holland, lime of IVar, p, 14.
viii. ), 146. ^ Boston Review, iii. 257.
- Real de Curban, I.a science dn ^ ‘ Christianity and War,’ in C//r;V//<7;/
gouvernetneni , v. 394 sq. Revieiv, xxvi. 604.
® Taylor, Whole Works, xii. 164. ® Proudhon, La guerre et la paix, ii.
^ ‘ The Sword and Christianity,’ in 420.
Boston Review devoted to L'heologyf and Ibid, i. 62 ; ii. 435.
Literature, iii. 261. Ibid, i. 45.
^ Ibid, iii. 259, 257. '
HOMICIDE IN GENERA!
human grandeur, peace a thing for beavers and sheep.
“Philanthrope, vous parlez d’abolir la guerre; prenez
garde de degrader le genre humain.” '
In order to prove the consistency of war with Christi-
anity appeals are still, as in former days, made to the Bible ;
to the divinely-sanctioned exarhple of the ancient Israelites,
to the fact that Jesus never prohibited those around Him
from bearing arms, to the instances of the centurions
mentioned in the Gospel, to St. Paul’s predilection for
taking his spiritual metaphors from the profession of the
soldier, and so on.^ According to Canon Mozley, the
Christian recognition of the right of war was contained in
Christianity’s original recognition of nations.* “ By a
fortunate necessity,” a universal empire is impossible.^
Each nation is a centre by itself, and when questions of
right and justice arise between these independent centres,
they cannot be decided except by mutual agreement or
force. The aim of the nation going to war is exactly the
same as that of the individual in entering a court, and the
Church, which has no authority to decide which is the
right side, cannot but stand neutral and contemplate war
forensically, as a mode of settling national questions,
which is justified by the want of any other mode.‘^ A
natural justice. Canon Mozley adds, is inherent not only
in wars of self-defence : there is an instinctive reaching in
nations and masses of people after alteration and readjust-
ment, which has justice in it, and which arises from real
needs. The arrangement does not suit as it stands, there
is want of adaptation, there is confinement and pressure ;
there are people kept away from each other that are made
to be together, and parts separated that were made to join.
All this uneasiness in States naturally leads to war.
Moreover, there are wars of progress which, so far as they
are really necessary for the due advantage of mankind and
^ Ibid, i. 43. * Mozley, ‘On War,’ in Sermons
Sqg, e.g,^hrownQ, Ex/fosi/ionof (ke preached before the University of Ox-
'^'hirty-Nine Articles^ j'). 827 sq. ; ford^ p. 119.
Ckristiafi Rez)iew^ xxvi. 603 sq. ; Ec- ^ /bid, p. II2.
iectic Magazine^ xiii. 372. Ibid, p. 100 sqq.
HOMICIDE IN GENERAL
cwap.
growth of society, are approved of by Christianity,
though they do not strictly belong to the head of wars
undertaken in self-defence.^ A doctrine which thus, in
the name of religion, allows the waging of wars for recti-
fying the political distribution of nationalities and races,
and forwarding the so-called progress of the world,
naturally lends itself to the justification of almost any war
entered upon by a Christian State. As a matter of fact, it
would be impossible to find a single instance of a war
waged by a Protestant country, from any motive, to which
the bulk of its clergy have not given their sanction and
support. The opposition against war has generally come
from other quarters.
There have been, and still are, Christian sects which, on
religious grounds, condemn war of any kind. In the four-
teenth century the Lollards taught that homicide in war
is expressly contrary to the New Testament ; they were
persecuted partly on that account.*^ Of the same opinion
were the Anabaptists of the sixteenth century ; and they
could claim on their side the words of men like Colet and
Erasmus. From the pulpit of St. Paul’s Colet thundered
that ‘‘ an unjust peace is better than the justest war,” and
that, “ when men out of hatred and ambition fight with
and destroy one another, they fight under the banner,
not of Christ, but of the Devil.” According to Erasmus
“ nothing is more impious, more calamitous, more widely
perliicious, more inveterate, more base, or in sum more
unworthy of a man, not to say of a Christian,” than war.
It is worse than brutal ; to man no wild beast is more
destructive than his fellow-man. When brutes fight, they
fight with weapons which nature has given them, whereas
we arm ourselves for mutual slaughter with weapons which
nature never thought of. Neither do beasts break out
^ Ibid, 104 sq, of the three ^rcat Phiropean wars of the
On the principle of progress, Canon last d(^zen years.” This was said in
Mozley himself justifies {ibid. p. 1 10 i-y. ) 1871.
not only the wars undertaken against ^ Perry, History of the English
two Eastern empires which have shut Churchy First Period, pp. 455, 467.
themselves up and excluded themselves Green, History of the English
from the society of mankind, but “ two People, ii. 93.
in hostile rage for trifling causes, but either when
hunger drives them to madness, or when they find them-
selves attacked, or when they are alarmed for the safety
of their young. But we, on frivolous pretences, what
tragedies do we act on the theatre of war ! Under colour
of some obsolete and disputable claim to territory ; in a
childish passion for a mistress; for causes even more
ridiculous than these, we kindle the flame of war. Trans-
actions truly hellish, are called holy wars. Bishops and
grave divines, decrepit as they are in person, fight from
the pulpit the battles of the princes, promising remission
of sins to all who will take part in the war of the prince,
and exclaiming to the latter that God will fight for him,
if he only keeps his mind favourable to the cause of
religion. And yet, how could it ever enter into our
hearts, that a Christian should imbrue his hands in the
blood of a Christian ! What is war but murder and
theft committed by great numbers on great numbers !
Does not the Gospel declare, in decisive words, that we
must not revile again those who revile us, that we should
do good to those who use us ill, that we should give up
the whole of our possessions to those who take a part,
that we should pray for those who design to take away
our lives ? The world has so many learned bishops, so
many gray-headed grandees, so many councils and senates,
why is not recourse had to their authority, and the
childish quarrels of princes settled by their wise* and
decisive arbitration ? “ The man who engages in war by
choice, that man, whoever he is, is a wicked man ; he sins
against nature, against God, against man, and is guilty of
the most aggravated and complicated impiety.” ‘ I'hese
were the main arguments of reason, humanity, and
religion, which Erasmus adduced against war. They
could not leave the reformers entirely unaffected. Sir
Thomas More charged Luther himself and his disciples
with carrying the doctrines of peace to the extreme limits
^ Erasmibs, Adagia, iv. i, col. 893 sqq.
3^4
HOMICIDE m GENERAL
of non-resistance.^ But, as we have noticed, these peace-
ful tendencies only formed a passing phase in the history
of Reformation, and were left to the care of sectarians.
Among these the Quakers are the most important. By
virtue of various passages in the Old and the New
Testament,^ they contend that all warfare, whatever be
its peculiar features, circumstances, or pretexts, is wholly
at variance with the Christian religion. It is always the
duty of Christians to obey their Master’s high and
holy law — to suffer wrong, to return good for evil, to love
their enemies. War is also inconsistent with the Christian
principle that human life is sacred, and that death is
followed by infinite consequences. Since man is destined
for eternity, the future welfare of a single individual is of
greater importance than the merely temporal prosperity of
a whole nation. When cutting short the days of their
neighbour and transmitting him, prepared or unprepared,
to the awful realities of an everlasting state, Christians
take upon themselves a most unwarrantable responsibility,
unless such an action is expressly sanctioned by their
divine Master, as was the case among the Israelites. In
the New Testament there is no such sanction, hence it
must be concluded that, under the Christian dispensation,
it is utterly unlawful for one man to kill another, under
whatever circumstances of expediency or provocation the
deed may be committed. And a Christian who fights by
the command of his prince, and in behalf of his country,
not only commits sin in his own person, but aids and abets
the national transgression.’’
It must be added that views similar to these are also
found independently of any particular form of sectarianism.
According to Dr. Wayland, all wars, defensive as well as
offensive, are contrary to the revealed will of God, aggres-
sion from a foreign nation calling not for retaliation and
^ Farrer, Military Manners and 36. Homans ^ xii. 19 i Peter,
Customs, p. 185. iii. 9,
2 Isaiah, ch. ii. sqq. Micah, iv. I sqq, ^ Gurney, Views Cf Practices of the
St. Matthew, v. 38 sqq.\ .^-^\\. 52. Society of Friends, sqq.
St. Luke, vi, 27 sqq. St. John, xviii.
HOMICIDE IN GENERAL
injury, but rather for special kindness and good-willd
Theodore Parker, the Congregational minister, looks
upon war as a sin, a corrupter of public morals, a
practical denial of Christianity, a violation of God’s
eternal love.^ W. Stokes, the Baptist, observes that
Christianity cannot sanction war, whether offensive or
defensive, because war is an “ immeasurable evil, by hurl-
ing unnumbered myriads of our fellow-men to a prema-
ture judgment and endless despair.”® Moreover, those
who compare the state of opinion during the last years
with that of former periods, cannot fail to observe a
marked progress of a sentiment antagonistic to war in the
various sections of the Christian Church."* Yet, speaking
generally, the orthodox are still of the same opinion as
Sir James Turner, who declared that “those who condemn
the profession or art of soldiery, smell rank of Ana-
baptism and Quakery”;® and war is in our days, as it
was in those of Erasmus,'* so much sanctioned by authority
and custom, that it is deemed impious to bear testimony
against it. The duties which compulsory military service
imposes upon the male population of most Christian
countries presuppose that a Christian should have no
scruples about taking part in any war waged by the State,
and are recognised as binding by the clergy of those
countries. With reference to the Church of England,
Dr, Thomas Arnold asks, “ Did it become a Christian
Church to make no other official declaration of its
sentiments concerning war, than by saying that Christian
men might lawfully engage in it ? ” ’
The protest against war which exercised perhaps the
widest influence on public opinion came from a school of
moralists whose tendencies were not only anti-orthodox, but
distinctly hostile to the most essential dogmas of Christian
theology. Bayle, in his Dictionary, calls Erasmus’ essay
' Wayland, Elements “of Moral ^ Cf Gibb, loe. cit, p. 81.
Science, pp. 375, 379- ^ Turner, Pallas Armata, p. 369.
^ Parker, Sermon of War, p. 23. ^ Krasnnis, op. cit. iv. i. i, col. 894.
Stokes, All War inconsistent with ^ Arnold, On the Church, p. 136.
the Christian Religion, p. 41,
HOMICIDE IN GENERAL
against war one of the most beautiful dissertations ever
written.^ He observes that the more we consider the
inevitable consequences of war, the more we feel disposed
to detest those who are the causes of it." Its usual fruits
may, indeed, “ make those tremble who undertake or
advise it, to prevent evils which, perhaps, may never
happen and which, at the worst, would often be much less
than those which necessarily follow a rupture.” ^ To
Voltaire war is an “ infernal enterprise,” the strangest
feature of which is that “ every chief of the ruffians has
his colours consecrated, and solemnly prays to God before
he goes to destroy his neighbour.” '* He asks what the
Church has done to suppress this crime. Bourdaloue
preached against impurity, but what sermon did he ever
direct against the murder, rapine, brigandage, and universal
rage, which desolate the world “ Miserable physicians of
souls, you declaim for five quarters of an hour against the
mere pricks of a pin, and say no word on the curse which
tears us into a thousand pieces.” ^ Voltaire admits that
under certain circumstances war is an inevitable curse, but
rebukes Montesquieu for saying that natural defence some-
times involves the necessity of attack, when a nation
perceives that a longer peace would place another nation
in a position to destroy it.*' Such a war, he observes, is as
illegitimate as possible : — “ It is to go and kill your neigh-
bour for fear that your neighbour, who does not attack
you, should be in a condition to attack you ; that is to
say, you must run the risk of ruining your country, in
the hope of ruining without reason some other country ;
this is, to be sure, neither fair nor useful.” '' The chief
causes which induce men to massacre in all loyalty
thousands of their brothers and to expose their own
people to the most terrible misery, are the ambitions and
^ Bayle, Dictioiinairc historique et que^ art. Clucrre [CEuvres couiplites^
critique^ vi. 239, art. Erasme. xl. 5^2).
Ibid. ii. 463, art. Artaxata. ® Ibid. p. 564.
Ibid. i. 472, art. Alting (Menri). Montesquieu, De lesp)!! des loisy
Voltaire, Dictionnaire f hilosophi- x. 2 ( CEtivrcs complHeSy p. 256).
^ Voltaire, loc. cit, p. 565.
HOMICIDE IN GENERAL
jealousies of princes and their ministers^ Similar views
are expressed in the great Encyclopedic : — “ La guerre est
le plus terrible des fleaux qui dc^truisent I’espece humaine ;
elle n’^pargne pas meme les vainqueurs ; la plus heureuse
est funeste, . , . Ce ne sont plus aujourd’hui les peuples
qui declarent la guerre, c’est la cupidite des rois qui leur
fait prendre les armes ; c’est I’indigence qui les met aux
mains de leurs sujets.” ^
However vehemently Voltaire and the Encyclopedists
condemned war, they did not dream of a time when all
wars would cease. Other writers were more optimistic.
Already in 1713 Abbe Saint-Pierre — whose abbotship
involved only a nominal connection with the Church —
had published a project of perpetual peace, which was
based on the idea of a general confederation of European
nations.* This project was much laughed at ; Voltaire
himself calls its author “ un homme moitie philosophe,
moitie fou.” But once called into being, the idea of a
perpetual peace and of a European confederation did not
die. It was successively conceived by Rousseau,'' Bentham,®
and Kant.'' But on the other hand it met with a formid-
able enemy in the awakening spirit of nationalism.
The Napoleonic oppression called forth resistance.
Philosophers and poets sounded the war trumpet. The
dream of a universal monarchy was looked upon as absurd
and hateful, and the individuality of a nation as the only
possible security for its virtue." War was no longer
attributed to the pretended interests of princes or to the
caprices of their advisers. It was praised as a vehicle of
the highest right,* as a source of national renovation."
^ Ibid. pp. 466, 564. For Voltaire’s Pierre {Giuvres computes^ i. 606 sqq.).
condemnation of war, see Morlcy, Vol- ^ Bentham, A Plan for an universal
laire^ p. 311 sqq. I have availed my.self and perpetual Peare[lVorksf]. sqq.).
of Mr. Morley’s translation of .some of ^ Kant, Zuvi ewigen Prieden.
the passages quoted. " Fichte, Reden an die deutsche
Encyelopddie mdthodique^ Art mili- Nation. Cf. Idcrn^ iJeber den Begriff
taire, ii. 618 sq. ^ des wahrhaften Kriegcs.
^Aint- Pierre, Projet de Traitd pour ^ Arndt, quoted by Jiihns, ICrieg,
re.ndre la paix perpltuelle entre les B'ricden und Kultur, p. 302.
souverains Chrdtiens. ^ An.selin von Feuerl?ach, Unter^
Rousseau, Extrait dii Projet de driickung und IViederbcfreiung Euro^
paix perpdtuelle^ de, AI. V Abbd de Saint' pens.
By war, says Hegel, finite pursuits are rendered unstable,
and the ethical health of peoples is preserved. Just as the
movement of the ocean prevents the corruption which
would be the result of perpetual calm, so by war people
escape the corruption which would be occasioned by a
continuous or eternal peace.” ^ Similar views have been
expressed by later writers. War is glorified as a stimulus
to the elevated virtues of courage, disinterestedness, and
patriotism. “ It has done more great things in the world
than the love of man, says Nietzsche.*^ It is the mother
of art and of all civil virtues, says Mr. Ruskin.'^ Others
defend war, not as a positive good, but as a necessary
means of deciding the most serious international contro-
versies, denying that arbitration can be a substitute for all
kinds of war. Questions which are intimately connected
with national passions and national aspirations, and ques-
tions which are vital to a nation’s safety, will never, they
say, be left to arbitration. Each State must be the
guardian of its own security, and cannot allow its inde-
pendence to be calmly discussed and adjudicated upon by an
external tribunal,'" Moreover, arbitration would prove
effective only where the contradictory pretensions could be
juridically formulated, and these instances are by far the less
numerous and the less important.^" And would it not, in
many cases, be impossible to find impartial arbiters ?
Would not arbitration often be influenced by a calculation
of the forces which every power interested could bring
into the field, and would not war be resorted to where
arbitration failed to reconcile conflicting interests, or where
a decision was opposed to a high-spirited people’s sense of
justice ? These and similar arguments are constantly
adduced against the idea of a perpetual peace. But at the
same time the opponents of war are becoming more nume-
^ Hegel, Grttndlinien der Philosophie ^ Ruskin, C^'own of Wild Olive,
des Rechts, § 324, p. , 317 (English Lecture on War (Worlds, vi. 99, 105.).
translation, p. 331). ® Lawrence, op. cit. p. 275 sq. Sidg-
2 See, e.g.y Mabille, La Gtterre, p. wick, ‘Morality of Strife,’ in Inter-
139. national Journal of Mihics^ i. 13.
Also sprach /.arathnslra, ® Geffken, quoted by Jahns, op. cit,
i. 63. p. 352, n. 2, ^ .
HOMICIDE IN GENERAL
rous and more confident every day. Already after the
fall of Napoleon, when there was a universal longing for
peace in the civilised world, the first Peace Societies were
formed ; ^ and the idea of Saint-Pierre, from being the
dream of a philosopher, has become the object of a
popular movement which is rapidly increasing in import-
ance. There is every reason to believe that, when the
present high tide of nationalism has subsided, and the
subject of war and peace is no longer looked upon from
an exclusively national point of view, the objections
which are now raised against arbitration will at last appear
almost as futile as any arguments in favour of private war
or blood-revenge. There is an inveterate tendency in the
human mind to assume that existing conditions will remain
unchanged. But the history of civilisation shows how
unfounded any such assumption is with reference to
those conditions which determine social relationships and
the extent of moral rights and duties.
It is said that, though Christianity has not abolished
war, it has nevertheless, even in war, asserted the principle
that human life is sacred by prohibiting all needless
destruction. The Canon, ‘ De treuga et pace,^ laid down
the rule that non-resisting persons should be spared ;
and Franciscus a Victoria maintained not only that
between Christian enemies those who made no resistance
could not lawfully be slain, ^ but that even in war against
the Turks it was wrong to kill children and women.
However, this doctrine of mercy was far in advance of
the habits and general opinion of the time.' If the
simple peasant was often spared, that was largely from
motives of prudence,^’ or because the valiant knight con-
sidered him unworthy of the lance. ^ As late as the
seventeenth century, .Grotius was certainly not supported
by the spirit of the age when he argued that, if justice
^ Jiihps, op. cit, p, 307 sq. * ^ Cf. Hall, Treatise on International
Gregory IX. Decretales^ i. 34. 2. Lazo, p. 395, 11. i.
^ Franciscus a Victoria, op. cit. vi. ** d’Argenlrc, Ilhistoire de Bretagne
13, 35, 48 ; pp. 232, 24T, 246 sq. p. 391.
^ Ibid. vi. 36, p. 241. ” Mills, op. cit. p. 132.
VOt. 1 P B
HOMICIDE IN GENERAL
do not require, at least mercy does, that we should not,
except for weighty causes tending to the safety of many,
undertake anything which may involve innocent persons
in destruction ” ; ^ or when he recommended enemies
willing to surrender on fair conditions, or unconditionally,
to be spared.^ Afterwards, however, opinion changed
rapidly. Pufendorf, in echoing the doctrine of Grotius,®
spoke to a world which was already convinced ; and in
the eighteenth century Bynkershoek stands alone in giving
to a belligerent unlimited rights of violence.'' In reference
to the assumption that this change of opinion is due to
the influence of the Christian religion, it is instructive to
note that Grotius, in support of his doctrine, appealed
chiefly to pagan authorities, and that even savage peoples,
without the aid of Christianity, have arrived at the rule
which in war forbids the destruction of helpless persons
and captives.
The prevailing attitude towards war indicates the
survival, in modern civilisation, of the old feeling that
the life of a foreigner is not equally sacred with the life
of a countryman. In times of peace this feeling is
usually suppressed ; it appears in no existing law on
homicide, nor does it, generally, find expression in public
opinion. It dares to disclose itself only in the form of
national aggressiveness, under the flag of patriotism, or,
perhaps, in the treatment of the aborigines of some
distant country. The behaviour of European colonists
towards coloured races only too often reminds us of the
manner in which savages treat members of a foreign
tribe. It is said that the frontier peasants at the Cape
find nothing] morally wrong in the razzias which they
undertake against the Bushmans, without any provocation
whatsoever, though they would consider it a heinous sin
to do the same to their Christian fellow-men.® In Aus-
' Grotius, op. cit, iii. ii. 8. publici^ i. i, p. 3 : “ Oinnis enim vis in
Ibid. iii. sqq. hello justa est.” Hall, Treatise on
Pufendorf, De jure natune ei International Law^ p. 395, n. I.
gentium, viii. 6. 8, p. 885^ ^ Waitz, Introduction to Anthro-
^ van Bynkershoek, Ouestiones juris pology, p. 314.
HOMICIDE IN GENERAL
tralia there are instances reported of young Colonists
employing the Sunday in shooting blacks for the sake of
sport. ‘‘The life of a native,” says Mr. Lumholtz,
“ has but little value, particularly in the northern part of
Australia, and once or twice colonists offered to shoot
blacks for me so that I might get their skulls. On the
borders of civilisation men would think as little of shoot-
ing a black man as a dog. The law imposes death by
hanging as the penalty for murdering a black man, but
people live so far apart in these uncivilised regions that a
white man may in fact do what he pleases with the blacks.
. . . In the courts the blacks are defenceless, for their
testimony is not accepted. The jury is not likely to
declare a white man guilty of murdering a black man.
On the other hand, if a white man happens to be killed
by the blacks, a cry is heard throughout the whole
colony.” ‘
^ Lumholtz, Afnofii^ Canni/nx/Sy p. 390; Jilxci/rs ions in IVew South
346 See also Mathew, in Jour. IVales, p. 200 si/. ; Stokes, Discoveries
Proceed. Roy. Soc. N.S. IVaies, xxiii. i/i Austraiiiiy ii. 459 S(/(/.
i? 2
Chapter XVI
HOMICIDE IN GENERAL {concluded')
In the last two chapters we have only been concerned
with the statement of facts ; we shall now make an
attempt to explain those facts. What is the source of the
moral commandment, “Thou shalt not kill”? And
what is the cause of its original narrowness and of its
subsequent extension ?
Mr. Spencer suggests that the taking of life was
regarded as a wrong done to the family of the dead
man or to the society of which he was a member, before
it came to be conceived of as a wrong done to the
murdered man himself.' But considering the mutual
sympathy which prevails in small savage communities,
it seems extremely probable that sympathetic resentment
felt on account of the injury suffered by the victim has
from the beginning been a potent cause of thq^condemna-
tlon of homicide. Savages^ no less than civilised mankind,
practically regard a man’s life as his highest good. What-
ever opinions may be held about the existence after death,
whatever blessings may be supposed to await the dis-
embodied soul, nobody likes to be hurried into that
existence by another’s will. According to early beliefs,
the soul of a murdered man is furious with the person
who slew him, and finds no rest until his death has been
avenged.^ His friends and comrades pity his fate and
^ S25encer, Principles of 'KthicSy ii, - See infray on Blood^reven^e.
CH. XVI
HOMICIDE IN GENERAL
feel resentment on his behalf ; whereas, in a state of
culture where sympathy is restricted to a narrow group
of people, no such resentment will be felt if the victim is a
member of another group. On the contrary, when he is
regarded as an actual or potential enemy, or when the
slaying of him is taken for a test of courage, the man-^
slayer will be applauded by his own people, and his deed
will be styled good or meritorious. In some cases super-
stition, also, is an encouragement to extra-tribal homicide.
The Kukis believe that, in paradise, all the enemies whom
a man has killed will be in attendance on him as slaves.^
A similar belief partly lies at the bottom of the custom of
head-hunting ; ^ whilst, according to other notions, the
soul of the man whose head is procured is transformed
into a guardian spirit. * A Kayan chief said of the custom
in question, “ It brings us blessings, plentiful harvests,
and keeps off sickness and pains ; those who were once
our enemies, hereby become our guardians, our friends,
our benefactors.” Now, progress in civilisation is gener-
ally marked by an expansion of the altruistic sentiment ;
and this largely explains why the prohibition of homicide
has come to embrace more and more comprehensive circles
of men, and finally, in the most advanced cases, the whole
human race.
But whilst homicide is censured as a wrong done to the
person slain, it is at the same time viewed as an injury
inflicted upon the survivors. It deprived his friends of
his company, his family and community of a useful
member. In Arabia, when a man was killed, his tribes-
men, instead of mentioning his name, used to say, “ Our
blood has been spilt.”® According to Lafitau, the loss
of a single person seemed to the North American India'ns
a subject of great regret, because it weakened the family. “
^ Dalton, Descriptive Ethnology of * Furness, IIoyne-Life of Borneo
Bengal^ p. 46. Head-Himters, p. 59.
“ lAng KoXh-y Natives of Saraivahfu. ® Robertson Smith, Marriage a?id
141. liaddon, Head-Hunters^ p. 394. Kinship in Early Arabia^ p. 26.
^ Wilken, Het animisme bij de volken ^ Lafitau, Mcenrs des satwages ameri-
van deft Indischen Archipel^ p. 124. qnatns^ ii. 163.
Among the Basutos, again, ^ murder is condemned “ as a
violation of the sacred rights of a father, who is deprived
of the services of his son, or of a widow and orphans,
who are left without support.” * Especially when a person
is considered more or less the property of another, the
taking of his life is largely looked upon as an offence
against the owner. Mr. Warner states of the Kafirs,
“ All homicide must ... be atoned for ; the principle
assumed being, that the persons of individuals are the
property of the Chief, and that having been deprived of
the life of a subject, he must be compensated for it.” ^
We meet with a somewhat similar notion in the history of
English legislation. In his book on the Commonwealth
of England, Thomas Smith observes, “ Attempting to
impoison a man, or laying a waite to kill a man, though
hee wound him dangerously, yet if death follow not, it is
no fellony by the Law of England, for the Prince hath
lost no man, and life ought to be giuen we say for life
only.”® In the Middle Ages homicide was conceived as
a breach of the “ King’s peace ” ; and both before and
afterwards it has been stigmatised as a disturbance of
public tranquillity and an outrage on public safety. In
the Anglo-Saxon wer and wite we find a clear distinction
between the private and public aspects of homicide.^
A manslayer not only causes a loss to the group which
he deprives of a member, but he also may give trouble to
his own people, who, in consequence, disapprove of his
act. Among the Yahgans of Tierra del F'uego, says Mr.
Bridges, “ many things conspire to make the shedding of
blood a fearful thing. A murderer imperils all his friends
and connections more or less, and consequently estranges
them from himself. This state of things is the greatest
safeguard to human life we can conceive.” Among the
Kafirs of the Hindu-Kush, “the mere killing of an
^ Casalis, Basnlos^ p. 224 sq. ^ Cf. Pollock and Maitland, History
Warner, in Maclean, Cofnpendium of English Latv before the Time of
of Kafir LatuSy p. 60 sq. Edward I. i. 48.
* Thomas Smith, Cor?i mon-tv ealth of ® Bridges, in South 'Ameruati Mis-
Englamly p. 194 sq. sionary Magazine^ xiii. 153.
XVl
HOMICIDE IN GENERAL
individual is looked upon as a small affair, provided that
he does not belong to the tribe, or to another near tribe
with which it is at peace, for in the latter case it might
result in war.” ^
We have still to notice the common idea that a man-
slayer is unclean. The ghost of the victim persecutes
him, or actually cleaves to him like a miasma ; and he
must undergo rites of purification to get rid of the infec-
tion. Until this is done, he is among many peoples
regarded as a source of danger, and is consequently cut
off from free intercourse with his fellows.
Among the Ponka Indians Mr. Dorsey found the belief that
a murderer is surrounded by the ghosts, who keep up a constant
whistling ; that he can never satisfy his hunger, though he eat
much food ; and that he must not be allowed to roam at large
lest high winds arise.^ Of the warriors among certain North
American Indians Adair wrote that, “ as they reckon they are
become impure by sJiedding human blood,” they hasten to
observe a fast of three days.^ Among the Natchez, according
to Charlevoix, those who for the first time have made a
prisoner or taken off a scalp, must, for a month, abstain from
seeing their wives, and from eating flesh. They imagine, that
if they should fail in this, the souls of those whom they have
killed or burnt, would effect their death, or that the first wound
they should receive would be mortal ; or at least, that they
should never gain any advantage over their enemies.” ^
The Kafirs and Bechuanas practise various ceremonies of
purification after their fights.^ The Basutos say, Human
blood is heavy, it prevents him who has shed it from running
away.”^ They consider it necessary that, on return from
battle, the warriors should rid themselves, as soon as possible,
of the blood they have shed,, or the shades of their victims
would pursue them incessantly and disturb their slumbers”;
hence they go in full armour to the nearest stream, and, as a
rule, at the moment they enter the water a diviner, placed
^ Scott Robertson, Kafir's of the America^ ii. 203.
Hindu- Kush ^ p. 194. ® Arbousset and Daumas, Explora-
\ Dorsey, ‘ Siouan Cults,’ in Ann. tory Tour to the Colony of the Cape oj
Rep. Bur. Ethn. xi. 420. Good Hope., p. 394 sqq. Alberti, De
3 Adair, History of the American Kafers aan de Zuidkust van Afrika^
Indians., p. 388. p. 104.
** Charlevoix, Voyage to North ^ Casalis, op. cit. p. 309.
higher up, throws some purifying substances into the current.^
Among the Bantu Kavirondo, “ when a man has killed an
enemy in warfare he shaves his head on his return home, and
his friends rub ‘medicine’ (generally the dung of goats) over
his body to prevent the spirit of the deceased from worrying
the man by whom he has been slain/’ ^ Among the Ja-luo, a
warrior who has slain an enemy not only shaves his hair, but,
after entering the village, prepares a big feast to propitiate the
man he has killed so that his ghost may not give trouble.*^
Among the Wagogo of German East Africa, the father of a
young warrior who has shed blood gives to his son a goat “ to
clean his sword.” ^ After the slaughter of the Midianites, those
Israelites who had killed any one, or touched the slain, had to
remain outside the camp for seven days, purifying themselves
and everything in their possession either by water, or fire, or
both/'' So, also, if a person had been slain in the land of Israel,
and the perpetrator of the deed could not be detected, the elders
of the city which was next unto tlie slain had to undergo a
ceremony of purification in order to rid the city of “ the guilt of
innocent blood.” ^ According to the Laws of Mann, a person
who has unintentionally killed a Brahmana shall make a hut in
the forest and dwell in it during twelve years ; ^ in order to
remove the guilt he shall throw himself thrice headlong into a
blazing firc,"^ or walk against the stream along the whole course
of the river Sarasvati,^ or shave ofF all his hair.^^ The ancient
Greeks believed that one who had suffered a violent end, when
newly dead, was angry with the author of his death.^^ The
blood-guilty individual, as though infected with a miasma,
shunned all contact and conversation with other people, and
avoided entering their dwellings.^’ Even the involuntary man-
slayer had to leave the country for some time 5 according to
Plato’s ‘Laws,’ he “must go out of the way of iiis victim for
the entire period of a year, and not let himself be found in any
spot which was familiar to him throughout the country.”
^ Ibid, p. 258.
Johnston, Uganda Protectorate^ ii.
* Cole, ‘ Notes on the Wagogo of
Cierman East Africa,’ in Joitr. Anthr,
Inst, xxxii. 321.
® Numbers y xxxi. 19 sqq.
^ Deuteronomy y xxi. I sqq.
^ Lazvs of Manuy xi. 73.
^ Ibid. xi. 74.
^ Ibid. xi. 78.
Ibid. xi. 79.
Plato, Leges y ix. S65.
Muller, Dissertations on the
Eutnertides of AischyluSy p. 103.
Aeschylus says [EumenideSy 448 sqq.)
it is the custom that a murderer should
not speak anything until he has been
sprinkled with the spurted Wood of a
slain sucking-pig. Cf. Apollonius Rho-
diiis, Argonauticay iv. 700 sqq, ; Aris-
totle, Dc republic a Atkeniensi/rm, 57.
Plato, LegeSy ix. 865'
Nor must he return to his land until sacrifice had been offered
and ceremonies of purification performed.^
The state of uncleanness incurred by the shedding of
human blood does not intrinsically involve moral guilt.
As appears from many of the instances just referred to,
it results not only from the murder of a tribesman, but
from so meritorious a deed as the slaying of a foe. • In
Nukahiva, for instance, a man who has killed the highest
person, or one of the highest, among the enemy, is
tabooed for ten days, during which he is not allowed to
hold intercourse vyith his wife nor to meddle with fire ;
but, at the same time, he is treated with distinction, and
presents of pigs are brought to him.“ On the other
hand, there can be no doubt that in various cases the
polluting effect attributed to manslaughter has exercised
some influence upon the moral judgment of the act.
Whenever the commission of an act of homicide has any
tendency at all to call forth moral blame, the disapproval
of the deed will easily be enhanced by the spiritual danger
attending on it, as also by the inconvenient restrictions
laid on the tabooed manslayer and the ceremonies of
purification to which he is subject. I'he deprivations
which he has to undergo come to be looked upon in the
light of a punishment, and the rites of cleansing as a
means of removing guilt. The taboo rules which, among
the Omahas, a murderer whose life was spared had to
observe for a period varying from two to four years arc
spoken of by Mr. Dorsey as his punishment,” and this
seems also partly to have been the native point of view.
The murderer sometimes wandered at night, crying, and
lamenting his offence, until, at the end of the designated
period, the kindred of his victim heard his crying, and
said : — It is enough. Begone, and walk among the crowd.
Demosthenes, Contra Ai'isto-
cratem^ 71 sqq.y p. 643 sq, Muller,
Dissertations^ p. 106 sq. Frazer,
Golden Bough, i. 341- On the unclean-
ness of manslayers sec also Tylor,
Pfdmitive Culture, ii. 43^ sq. ; Frazer,
oD ad i. 331 sqq.
“ von 1 .angseiorf, Voyages and Travels,
133 -
Put on moccasins and wear a good robe.” ’ Moreover,
the notion of a persecuting ghost may be replaced by the
notion of an avenging god. Confusions are common in
the world of mystery ; doings or functions attributed to
one being are afterwards transferred to another — this is a
rule of which many important examples will be given in
following chapters. I'he Jbala of Northern Morocco
do not nowadays believe in ghosts, yet they regard a
person who has shed human blood to be in some degree
unclean for the rest of his life. Poison oozes out from
underneath his nails ; hence anybody who drinks the water
in which he has washed his hands will fall dangerously ill.
The meat of an animal which he has killed is difficult to
digest, and so is any food eaten* in his company. If he
comes to a place where people are digging a well, the
water wjll at once run away. He is said to be mejnun,
haunted by jtmn a race of beings entirely distinct
from men, living or dead. The Greenlanders believed
that an abortion or a child born under concealment was
transformed into an evil spirit called dngiacj, for the pur-
pose of avenging the crime. In Eastern Central Africa,
“ after killing a slave, the master is afraid of Chilope.
This means that he will become emaciated, lose his eye-
sight, and ultimately die a miserable death. He therefore
goes to his chief and gives him a certain fee (in cloth, or
slaves, or such legal tenders), and says, ‘ Get me a charm
{luasi)^ because I have slain a man.’ When he has used
this charm, which may be either drunk or administered in
a bath, the danger passes away.” ® Among the Omahas
the ghost of the murdered man was not lost sight of ; the
murderer “ was obliged to pitch his tent about a quarter
of a mile from the rest of the, tribe when they were
going on the hunt lest the ghost of his victim should
raise a high wind, which might cause damage.” But at
the same time his deed was considered offensive to
^ Dorsey, ‘ Omaha Sociology,’ in ^ Rink, Tales and Traditions of the
Ann, Rep, Bur. Ethn. iii. 369. Eskimo^ pp. 45, 439 sq, ''
* Macdonald, Africana, i, 168.
HOMICIDE IN GENERAL
Wakanda ; no one wished to eat with him, for they said,
“ If we eat with whom Wakanda hates, for his crime,
Wakanda will hate us.” ^ In the Chinese books there are
numerous instances of persons haunted by the souls of
their victims on their death-bed, and in most of these
cases the ghosts state expressly that they are avenging
themselves with the special authorisation of Heaven.*
The Greek belief in the Erinys of a murdered man no
doubt originated in the earlier notion of a persecuting
ghost, whose anger or curses in later times were personified
as an independent spirit.® And the transformation went
further still: the Erinyes were represented as the ministers
of Zeus, who by punishing the murderer carried out his
divine will. Zeus was considered the originator of the
rites of purification ; when visited with madness by the
Erinyes, Ixion appealed to Zeus Hikesios, and at the
altar of Zeus Meilichios Theseus underwent purification
for the shedding of kindred blood. Originally, as it
seems, only the murder of a kinsman was an offence
against Zeus and under the ban of the Erinyes, but later
on their sphere of action was expanded, and all bloodshed,
if the victim had any rights at all within the city, became
a sin which needed purification. Uncleanness was thus
transformed into spiritual impurity. When the pollution
with which a manslayer is tainted is regarded as merely
the work of a ghost or of some spirit-substitute who, like
the Moorish has nothing to do with the administra-
tion of justice, it may be devoid of all moral significance
in spite of the dread it inspires; but the case is different
when it comes to be conceived of as a divine punishment,
or as a sin-pollution in the eyes of the supreme god.
Such a transformation of ideas could hardly take place
1 Dorsey, ‘Omaha Sociology,’ in * Farnell, Cu/ls of the Greek States ^
Ann. Rep. Bur. Ethn. iii. 369. i. 66 sqq. Rohde, Psyche^ p. 249.
2 de Groot, Religious * System of Idem^ in Rheinisches Museum^ ^895,
China^ (vol. iv. bookjii. 441. p. 18. Stengel, Die griechischen Kul-
^ See Muller, Dissertations^ p. 155 tusalter turner^ p. 140.
sqq. ; Rohde, Psyche, p. 247 ; Idem^ Farnell, op, cit. i. 68, 71. Rohde,
‘ Paralipomena,* in Psyche^ i/gj.
fur Philologies 1895, P- ^ W*
38o homicide in general ctiAtK
unless the act, considered polluting, were by itself apt to
evoke moral disapproval. But it is obvious that the
gravity of the offence is increased by the religious aspect
it assumes.
In yet another way the defiling effect attributed to the
taking of human life has had an influence on religious and
moral ideas. Such defilement is shunned not only by men,
but, in a still higher degree, by gods. The shedding of
human blood is commonly prohibited in sacred places.
“ In almost every Indian nation,” says Adair, “ there are
several peaceable towns, which are called ‘ old-beloved,’
‘ancient, holy, or white towns’; they seem to have been
formerly ‘ towns of refuge,’ for it is not in the memory of
their oldest people, that ever human blood was shed in
them ; although they often force persons from thence,
and put them to death elsewhere.” ' The Aricaras of the
Missouri, according to Bradbury, have in the centre of the
largest village a sacred lodge called the “ medicine lodge,”
which “ in one particular corresponds with the sanctuary
of the Jews, as no blood is on any account whatsoever to
be spilled within it, not even that of an enemy.” At
Athens the prosecution for homicide began with debarring
the criminal from all sanctuaries and assemblies consecrated
by religious observances.® According to Greek ideas,
purification was an essential preliminary to an acceptable
sacrifice.'* Hector said, “ I shrink from offering a libation
of gleaming wine to Zeus with hands unwashed ; nor can
it be in any way wise that one should pray to the son of
Kronos, god of the storm-cloud, all defiled with blood
^ Adair, History of the American
Indians^ p. 159.
^ Bradlniry, Travels in the Interior
of America^ p. 165 sq. Our informer
adds, “ Nor i.s any one, having- taken
refuge there, to ])e forced from it”; but
with facts of this kind wc are not con-
cerned at present. They Vjelong to the
right of .sanctuary, in the strict sense of
the term, and, as will be seen, this right
is based on a different principle, which
prevents even the polluted manslayer,
tainted with newly shed blood, from
being dragged out of the sanctuary to
which he has fled in the capacity of a
•suj^pliant.
^ Aristotle, De republica Athenien-
sinm, 57. Muller, Disse.rtatio 7 ts^ p.
103.
^ Donaldson, ‘ Expiatory and Substi-
tutionary Sacrifices of the (wrecks,’ in
'Transactions Toy. Soc, Edinburgh^
xxvii. 433. Farnell, op. ciL i. 72.
and filth.” * In some parts of Morocco, a man who has
slain another person is never afterwards allowed to kill the
sacrificial sheep at the “ Great Feast.” " When David had
in his heart to build a temple, God said to him, “ Thou
shalt not build an house for my name, because thou hast
been a man of war, and hast shed blood.” ^ A decree of
the penitential discipline of the Christian Church, which
was enforced eveij against emperors and generals, forbade
anyone whose hands had been imbrued in blood to
approach the altar without a preparatory period of
penance.^
Whilst, from fear of contaminating anything holy,
casual restrictions have thus been imposed on ail kinds of
manslayers, whether murderers or those who have killed
an enemy in righteous warfare, more stringent rules have
been laid down for persons permanently connected with
the religious cult. Adair states that the “ holy men ” of
the North American Indians, like the Jewish priests, were
by their function absolutely forbidden to shed human
blood, “ notwithstanding their propensity thereto, even
for small injuries.” '^ Herodotus says of the Persian Magi
that they “kill animals of all kinds with their own hands,
excepting dogs and men.”'’ The Druids of Gaul never
went to war,’’ probably in order to keep themselves free
from blood-pollution ; * it is true, they sacrificed human
victims to their gods, but those they burnt." 'I'o the
same class of facts belong those decrees of the Christian
Church which forbade clergymen taking part in a battle.
Moreover, if a Christian priest passed a sentence of death
^ Iliads vi. 266 sqq, Cf Vergil,
ylineis^ ii. 717 sqq.
^ I found this custom prevalent among
the Shluh (Berbers) of Southern Mo-
rocco and among the Beni Ahsen, an
Arabic-speaking tribe in the neighbour-
liood of Rabat. I was told in Dukkala
t(iat it is a Berber custom. It occurs
neither there, nor among the Andjra, of
the Jbdla group.
^ I Chronicles^ xxviii. 2 sq,
\,tcV.y ^History of European Morals^
ii. 39.
^ Adair, op. cii. p. 152.
^ Herodotus, i. 40. The Shluh of
Southern Morocco consider that not
only homicide, but the killing of a dog
for ever after prevents a person from
performing sacrifice at the “ Great
Feast.”
" Cmsar, De hello gallico., vi. 14.
® dbVrbois de Jubainville, Civilisa-
tion des CelteSy p. 234.
^ Cwsar, Dc hello gal lico, vi. 16.
he was punished with degradation and imprisonment for
life ; ^ nor was he allowed to write or dictate anything
with a view to bringing about such a sentence/^ He must
not perform a surgical operation by help of fire or iron.^
And if he killed a robber in order to save his life, he had
to do penance till his death.^ The hands which had to
distribute the blood of the Lamb of God were not to be
polluted with the blood of those for whose salvation it was
shed.'^
It cannot be doubted that this horror of blood- pollu-
tion had a share In that regard for human life which from
the beginning, and especially in early times, was a charac-
teristic of Christianity. But in other respects also,
Christian feelings and beliefs had an inherent tendency to
evoke such a-sentiment. The cosmopolitan spirit of the
Christian religion could not allow, in theory at least, that
the life of a man was less sacred because he was a foreigner.
The extraordinary importance it attached to this earthly life
as a preparation for the life to come naturally increased
the guilt of any one who, by cutting It short, not only
killed the body, but probably to all eternity injured the
soul.*’ In a still higher degree than most other crimes, homi-
cide was regarded as an offence against God, because man
had been made in His image." Gratian says that even the
slayer of a Jew or a heathen has to undergo a severe
penance, “ quia imaginem Dei et spem futurae conversionis
exterminat.” ^
^ Gratian, Dec^'etiiui^ ii. 23. 8. 30.
^ Concilium Lat crane nse IV,, A.D.
1215, ch. 18 (Labbe- Mansi, Sacrorum
Conciliorum collectio, xxii. 1007).
3 Concilitt/n Lateranense IV,, A.D.
1215, ch. 18 (Labbe- Mansi, op. cit.
xxii. 1007).
^ Thoma.ssin, Diciionnaire dc disci-
pline eccUsiastitpic, ii. 1074,
^ Ibid. ii. 1069.
’’ Concilium Luc^dunense I., A.D.
1245, Additio, de Moinicidio (Labbe-
Mansi, op. cit. xxiii. 670).
^ von Eicken, Gesc/iichte tind System
der Mittelaltcr lichen Weltaiischauung,
p. 568.
^ Gratian, Dec return, i. 50. 40,
Chapter XVII
THE KILLING OF PARENTS, SICK PERSONS, CHILDREN
FETICIDE
We have found that among mankind at large there
is a moral rule which forbids people to kill members
of their own society. We shall now see that the
stringency of this rule is subject to variations, depending
on the special relationship in which persons stand to
one another or on their social status, and that there
are cases to which it does not apply at all.
Owing to the regard which children are expected to
feel for their parents, parricide is considered the most
aggravated form of murder. Nowhere have parents
been more venerated by their children than among the
nations* of archaic culture, and nowhere has parricide
been regarded with greater horror. In China it is
punished with the most ignorninious of all capital
punishments, the so-called “cutting into small pieces”;
and in some instances, when the crime has occurred in
a district, in addition to all punishments inflicted on
persons, the wall of the city where the deed was
committed is pulled down in parts, or modified in shape,
a round corner is substituted for a square one, or a
gate removed to a new situation, or even closed up
.altogether.^ In Corea the parricide is burned to death.'^
1 Social Life of the Chinese^ /twV/V.v, p. 229.
33 ^ Smith, Chinese Charac- Griffis, Corea^ p. 236.
THE KILLING OF PARENTS
Among the ancient Egyptians, we are told, he was
sentenced to be lacerated with sharpened reeds, and
after being thrown on thorns he was, burned.’^ In
Exodus we read of the “smiting ” of parents, but parricide
is not expressly mentioned, perhaps because the Hebrew
legislatdf, like Solon at Athens," did not think it possible
that any one could be guilty of so unnatural a barbarity.®
Herodotus states that the same notion was held by the
ancient Persians, who said that no one ever yet killed his
own father or nKjther, and that all cases of so-called
parricide, if carefully examined, would be found to have
been committed by supposititious children or those born
in adultery, it being beyond the bounds of probability
that a true father should be murdered by his own son.'*
Plato says in his ‘Laws’: — “If a man could be slain
more than once, most justly would he who in a fit of
passion has slain father or mother undergo many deaths.
How can he whom, alone of all men, even in defence
of his life, and when about to suffer death at the hands
of his parents, no law will allow to kill his father or
his mother who are the authors of his being, and whom
the legislator will command to endure any extremity
rather than do this — how can he, I say, lawfully receive
any other punishment ? ” At Athens parricides were the
only persons accused of murder who were not allowed
the chance of escaping before sentence was passed, but were
instantly arrested.® According to Roman law, a com-
mitter of parricidium was not subjected to any of the
regular modes of^pital punishment, but for “ the most
execrable of crin^ ” was provided “ the most strange of
punishments.” The criminal was sewn up in a leathern sack
with a cur, a cock, a viper, and an ape, and, when cooped
up in this fearful prison, was hurled into the sea, or into
^ Diodorus Siculus, Bibliotheca his- •* Herodotus, i. 137.
iorica^ i. 77. 8. ® Plato, Leges^ ix. 869. Cf. ibid. ix.
Diogenes Laertius, So/oHy 10. Ci- 873.
cero, Pro S. Roscio Aiuerino, 25. Oro- Muller, Dissertations on the En-
sius, I/istoricr, v. 16. inenides of ^Eschy/nSy p. 91. Cf.
^ ExodnSy yiyi\. Cf KeW, Manual Euripides, OresteSy 442 S(/(/,^
of Biblical Arclueology, ii. 376.
some neighbouring rivcr.^ But by the term parricidium
was not understood the murder of a parent only. According
to the ‘ Lex Pompeia de parricidiis,’ it included the mur-
der of any of the following persons : an ascendant or
descendant in any degree,^ a brother or sister, an uncle
or aunt, a cousin, a husband or wife, a bridegroom or
bride, a father- or mother-in-law, a son- or daughter-
in-law, a step-parent or step-child, a patron ; and
Mommsen suggests that in earlier times it had a still
wider significance, being applied to intentional homicide
in general.® But whilst the punishment just referred to
was in other cases of parricidium replaced by banishment, it
was, during the Empire at least, actually inflicted upon
him who murdered an ascendant.*
Whilst Christianity generally increased the sanctity
of human life, it could add nothing to the horror with
which parricide was regarded by the ancients. The
Church punished it more severely than ordinary murder,®
and so did, at least in Latin countries, the secular
authorities.® In France, even to this day, a person con-
victed of parricide is “conduit sur le lieu de I’execution
en chemise, nu-pieds, et la tete couverte dun voile
noir”; and whilst meurtre is excusable if provoked by
grave personal violence or by an attempt to break into a
dwelling-house by day, parricide is never excusable under
any circumstances.®
^ Insiitutiones, iv. 18. 6.
^ Unless the descendant was in the
potestas of him who committed the
deed.
3 Mommsen, Romisches Straft'echt,
pp. 644, 645, 612 sq.
Ibid. p. 645 sq.
* Gregory Ilf., Judicia congriia
pceniteutibus, ch. 3 (Labbe- Mansi,
Conciliomm collect to, xii. 289). Pccni-
tentiaU BigoHanumy iv. i (Wasser-
schleben, Btissordnungen d&r abend'
Idndischm Kirche^ p. 453)- Pcenitent.
Pseudo- Theodori, xxi. i 1 ^{ibid. p. 588).
^ Chauveau and I161ie, Thdorie du
Code Pdnal., iii. 394 (France). Salvioli,
Manuale di stoida del diritio italianoy
VOL. I
p. 570. In Scotland, also, parricide
formerly had a place in the list of ag-
gravated miird^ (Hume, Commen-
taries on the Scot land ^ i. 459 sq. ;
for a sentence passed in 1688, see Pit-
cairn, Cidminal Trials in Scotland^ iii.
198); though nowadays it is penalised
in the same way as other forms of mur-
der (Erskine, Principles of the Law of
Scotland^ p. 559)* There never was
any special punishment for parricide in
English law (Blackstone, Commentaries
on the Laws of England^ iv. 202.
Stephen, History of the Criminal T^aw
of England., iii. 95).
^ Code PMal, art. 13.
® Ibid. art. 321 sqq.
c c
THE KILLING OF PARENTS chap.
As regards the feelings with which ordinary parricide is
looked upon by uncivilised peoples, direct information
is almost entirely wanting. It is rarely mentioned at all,
no doubt because it is very unusual.^ Among the Kafirs
of Natal, though murder is generally punished by a fine,
death is inflicted on him who kills a parent.^ Among the
Ossetes a parricide draws upon himself a fearful punish-
ment : he is shut up in his house with all his possessions,
surrounded by the populace, and burned alive.® To judge
from the respect which, among the majority or un-
civilised peoples, children are considered to owe to their
parents, it seems very probable that the murder of a
father or a mother is generally condemned by them as a
particularly detestable form of homicide. But to this
rule there is an important exception. According to a
custom prevalent among various savages or barbarians, a
parent who is worn out with age or disease is abandoned
or killed.
Hearne states that, among the Northern Indians, one
half at least of the aged persons of both sexes, when no
longer capable of walking, arc left alone to starve and
perish of want."* Among the Californian Gallinomero,
when the father can no longer feebly creep to the forest to
gather his back-load of fuel or a basket of acorns, and is
only a burden to his sons, “ the poor old wretch is not
unfrequently thrown down on his back and securely held
while a stick is placed across his throat, and two of them*
seat themselves on the ends of it until he ceases to
breathe.” ® The custom of killing or abandoning old
parents has been noticed among several other North
^ Among the Omahas there have to step into his shoes ” (Emin Faska
been a few cases of parricide caused by in Central Africa^ p. 230). See also
drunkenness (Dorsey, ‘ Omaha Socio- Wilson and Felkin, Uganda^ i. 224.
logy,’ in Ann. Kep. Bur. Eth 7 t. iii. ^ Shooter, Kafirs ^ Natal p. 103.
369). A Chukchi killed his father for ^ von Haxthausen, Transcaucasia, p.
charging him with cowardice and 415.
awkwardness (Sarytschew, ‘Voyage of llQ^ccviQ, Joumtey to the Northern
Discovery,* in Collectiofi of Modern and Ocean, p. 346.
Co 7 ite 7 ?iporary Voyages, vi. 51). In ® Powers, Tribes of Calif 07 'nia, p.
Landa “it is no uncommon thing for 178,
a son to murder his father in order
THE KILLING OF PARENTS
American tribes,^ the natives of Brazil,^ various South Sea
Islanders,^ a few Australian tribes/ and some peoples in
Africa and Asia.® According to ancient writers, it
occurred formerly among many Asiatic and European
nations, including the Vedic people® and peoples of
Teutonic extraction.® As late as the fifth or sixth century
it was the custom among the Heruli for relatives to
kindle a funeral pile for their old folks, although a stranger
was employed to give the death wound. And there is an
old English tradition of “ the Holy Mawle, which they
fancy hung behind the church door, which when the
father was seaventie, the sonne might fetch to knock his
father in the head, as effete and of no more use.”
However cruel this custom may appear to be, some-
thing is certainly to be said in its favour. It is particularly
common among nomadic hunting tribes, owing to the
hardships of life and the inability of decrepit persons to
keep up in the march. Mr. Morgan observes that, whilst
^ Nansen, First Cross hi g of Green-
land^ ii. 331 (natives on the east coast
of Greenland). Sceniann, Voyage of
Herald f ii. 66 (Eastern Eskimo).
Gatlin, North American Indians y i. 217.
Lafitaii, Mcenrs des sauvages ameri-
qnainSy i. 488 sqq. Domcnech, Semen
Years' Residence in the Great Deserts
of North A m erica y ii. 325 ( north -
western tribes). Lewis and Clarke,
'J'ravels to the Source of the Missouri
River ^ p. 442 (Dacotahs, A.s.sinihoins,
the hunting tribes on the Missouri).
von IViartius, Beitrdge zur Ethno-
gi'aphie Aincrihalsy i. 126, 127, 393.
von Eschwege, Brasilien, i. 231 sq.
(Uerequenas). Among the Fuegians
the practice in question .seems to occur
only accidentally (Bridges, in A Voice
for South America, xiii. 206).
^ Codrington, Melanesiansy p. 347.
Romilly, VVestern Pacificy p. 70 (Solo-
mon Islanders). Brainne, Nouvelle-
Calddonicy p. 255. Turner, Samoay p.
335 (Efatese). Seemanft, Vili, p.
iqi sq. WiUia:ms and Calvert, Fiji, pp.
116, 157 sq. Angas, Polynesia, p. 342
(natives of Kunaie).
^ Eyre, Central Australia, ii. 382.
Dawson, Australian Aborigines , p. 62
(tribes in Western Victoria).
^ Arnot, Garenganze, p. 78 n. An-
der.sson, I.ake Ngami, p. 197 sq.
(Damaras). Kolben, Present State of
the Cape of Good Hope, i. 322, 334 ;
llahn, The Supreme Being of the
Khoi-Khoiy p. 86 (Hottentots). Lep-
siu.s, Letters from Egypt, p. 202 sq.
(Negro tribes to the south of Kordo-
fan). Post, Afrikanische jurisprudenz,
i. 298 sqq. Sartori, ‘ Die Sittc der
Alton- und Krankentotung,’ in Globus,
Ixvii. 108,
Hooper, Ten Months among the
7'ents of the luski, p. 188 sq. ; l)all,
Alaska, p. 3S3 sqq. (Chukdii). Rock-
hill, Land of the Lamas, p. 81 (Koko-
nor Tibetans).
Herodotus, i. 216 (Mas.sagetae).
Strabo, xi. 8. 6 (Massagetae) ; xi. ii.
3 (Baptrians) ; xi. ii. 8 (Caspians).
^ TAmm^x, Allindisches I.eben, p. 328.
^ Grimm, Deutsche Rechtsalter-
thiimer, p. 486 sqq.
Procopius, Dc bello gothico, ii. 14.
Cf Grimm, Kleincre Schriften, ii. 241.
Thoms, Anecdotes and Traditions,
p. 84.
c c 2
“ among the roving tribes of the wilderness the old and
helpless were frequently abandoned and, in some cases,
hurried out of existence as an act of greater kindness than
desertion,” this practice was unknown among the Iroquois,
who “ resided in permanent villages, which afforded a
refuge for the aged.” ^ With reference to certain tribes of
Western Victoria, Mr. Dawson remarks that the old people
are a burden to the tribe, and, should any sudden attack
be made by an enemy, the most liable to be captured, in
which case they would probably be tortured and put to a
lingering death.^ Moreover, in times when the food-
supply is insufficient to support all the members of a
community, it is more reasonable that the old and useless
should have to perish than the young and vigorous. Hahn
was told that, among the Hottentots, aged parents were
sometimes abandoned by very poor people who had not
food enough to support them.® And among peoples who
have reached a certain degree of wealth and comfort, the
practice of killing the old folks, though no longer justified
by necessity, may still go on, partly through survival of a
custom inherited from harder times, partly from the humane
intent of putting an end to lingering misery.^ What
appears to most of us as an atrocious practice may really
be an act of kindness, and is commonly approved of, or
even insisted upon, by the old people themselves. Speak-
ing of the ancient Hottentot custom of famishing super-
annuated parents in order to cause their death, Kolben
remarks : — “ If you represent to the Hottentots, as I have
done very often, the inhumanity of this custom, they are
astonished at the representation, as proceeding, in their
opinion, from an inhumanity of your own. The custom,
in their way of thinking, is supported by very pious and
very filial considerations. ‘ Is it not a cruelty,’ they ask you,
‘to suffer either man of woman to languish any consider-
^ Morgan, League of the Iroquois,
p. 171.
^ Dawson, of, cit. p. 62.
^ Hahn, of. cit, p. 86
^ Tylor, ‘ Primitive Society,’ in Con-
temporary Review, xxi. 705. Idem,
Anthropology, p. 410 sq.
THE KILLING OF PARENTS
able time under a heavy, motionless old age ? Can you see
a parent or a relative shaking and freezing under a cold,
dreary, heavy, useless old age, and not think, in pity to
them, of putting an end to their misery by putting, which
is the only means, an end to their days ? ’ ” 1 When Mr.
Hooper, hearing of an old Chukchi woman who was
stabbed by her son, made some remarks on the frightful
nature of the act, his native companions answered him ; —
“ Why should not the old woman die ? Aged and feeble,
weary of life, and a burden to herself and others, she no
longer desired to cumber the earth, and claimed of him
who owned nearest relationship the friendly stroke which
should let out her scanty remnant of existence.” Catlin
tells us that, among the North American tribes who roamed
about the prairies, the infirm old people themselves uni-
formly insisted upon being left behind, saying “ that they
are old and of no further use — that they left their fathers
in the same manner — that they wish to die, and their
children must not mourn for them.” ® In Melanesia, says
Dr. Codrington, when sick and aged people were buried
alive, it is certain that “ there was generally a kindness
intended”; they used themselves to beg their friends to
put them out of their misery, and it was even considered
a disgrace to the family of an aged chief if he was not
buried alive."* In Fiji, also, it was regarded as a sign of
filial affection to put an aged parent to death. In his de-
scription of the Fijians Dr. Seemann observes, “ In a
country where food is abundant, clothing scarcely required,
and property as a general rule in the possession of the
whole family rather than that of its head, children need
not wait for ‘ dead men’s shoes ’ in order to become well
off, and we may, therefore, quite believe them when de-
claring that it is with aching heart and at the repeated
entreaties of their parents that they are induced to commit
^ ^olben, op, cit, i. 322. ^ Catlin, North American IndianSy
^ Hooper, op, cit, p. 188 sq, Cf i. 217.
Sarytschew, loc, cit. vi. 50 ; Dali, * Codrington, op. cit. p. 347. Turner,
op. cit. p. 385 ; von Wrangell, Expe~ Samoa^ p. 335 sq. (Elatese).
dition to the Polar Sea, p. 1 22.
39 °
THE KILLING OF PARENTS chap.
what we justly consider a crime.” ^ The ceremony is not
without a touch of tragic grandeur : — “ The son will kiss
and weep over his aged father as he prepares him for the
grave, and will exchange loving farewells with him as he
heaps the earth lightly over him.” ^ One reason why the
old Fijian so eagerly desired to escape extreme infirmity
was perhaps “ the contempt which attaches to physical
weakness among a nation of warriors, and the wrongs and
insults which await those who are no longer able to protect
themselves”; but another, and as it seems more potent,
motive was the belief that persons enter upon the delights
of the future life with the same faculties, mental and
physical, as they possess at the hour of death, and that
the spiritual life thus co'mmences where the corporeal
existence terminates. “ With these views,” says Dr. Hale,
“ it is natural that they should desire to pass through this
change before their mental and bodily powers are so en-
feebled by age as to deprive them of their capacity for
enjoyment.” ^ Finally, we have to observe that in many
cases the old people are not only killed, but eaten, by the
nearest relatives, and that the motive, or at least the sole
motive, for this procedure is not hunger or desire for
human flesh.’^ It is described as “ an act of kindness ” or
as “ a pious ceremony,” as a method of preventing the
body from being eaten up by worms or injured by enemies.
Considering that many cannibals have an aversion to the
bodies of men who have died a natural death, it is not
unreasonable to suppose that, in some instances, the old
person is killed for the purpose of being eaten, and that
this is done with a view to benefiting him.® But, on the
other hand, the “ pious ceremony,” like so many other
funeral customs which are supposed to comfort the dead,
maybe the survival of a practice which was originally
intended to promote the selfish interests of the living.
^ Seemann, Vi/t't p. 193. p. 248.
2 Fison and Howitt, Kantilaroi and ** For instances, see SteinmeU, En-
Knrnai^ 1 75. dokannibalismuSy passim,
* Hale, op, cit, p. 65. William.s and ® Ibid. pp. 3, 5, 17.
Calvert, op. cit. p. 156. See also ® Cf. Herodotus’ staterhent regarding
Erskine, Islands of the Western Pacific^ the Massagetae, k 216.
Closely connected with the custom of doing away with
decrepit parents is the habit, prevalent among certain
peoples, of abandoning or killing persons suffering from
some illness.
^^The white man,” Mr. Ward observes, ^‘can never, as long
as he may live in Africa, conquer his repugnance to the callous
indifference to suffering that he meets with everywhere in
Arab and Negro. The dying are left by the wayside to die.
The weak drop on the caravan road, and the caravan passes
on.” ^ Among the Kafirs instances are not rare in which the
dying are carried to the bush and left to perish, and among
some of them epileptics are cast over a precipice, or tied to a
tree to be devoured by hyenas.^ The Hottentots abandon
patients suffering from small-pox.^ The southern Tandla in
Madagascar take a person who becomes insensible during an
illness, to the spot in the forest where they throw their dead,
and should the unfortunate creature so cast away revive and
return to the village, they stone him outright to death. ^ In
New Caledonia il est rare qu\m malade rend naturellement
le dernier soupir : quand il n’a plus sa connaissance, souvent
mSme avant son agonie, on lui ferine la bouche et les narines
pour r^touffer, ou bien on le tiraille de tons cotds par les jambes
et par les bras.” ^ In Kandavu, of the Fiji Group, sick
persons were often thrown into a cave, where the dead also
were deposited.^ In Efate, if a person in sickness showed signs
of delirium, his grave was dug, and he was buried forthwith, to
prevent the disease from spreading to other members of the
family."^ The Alfura kill their sick when they have no hope
of their recovery.” ^ Dobrizhoffer says of the Patagonians,
Actuated by an irrational kind of pity, they bury the dying
before they expire.” ^ In cases of cholera or small-pox
epidemics. North American Indians have been known to desert
their villages, leaving all their sick behind, of whatever age or
sex.^^ According to Dr. Nansen, it is not inconsistent with the
moral code of the Greenlanders to hasten the death of those
^ Ward, Years with (he Congo
Cannibals^ p, 262.
^ Shooter, Kafirs of Natal, p.
238 sq. Kidd, llie Essential Kafir, p.
247*
^ Lc Vaillant, Travels into the In-
terior Parts of A frica , i i . 1 1 2 .
■ ^ Sibree, The Great African Island,
p. 291.
® Crainne, op, cit. p 255.
® Williams and Calvert, op. cit, p.
159*
7 Turner, Samoa, p. 336.
^ Pfeiffer, A Ladfs Second Jotirney
round the World, i. 387.
** Dobrizhoffer, Account of the Abi-
pones, ii. 262.
Domenech, op, cit, ii. 326.
who are sick and in great suffering, or of those in delirium, of
which they have a great horror.”^ Lieutenant Holm states
that, in Eastern Greenland, when an individual is seriously ill,
he consents, if his relatives request if, to end his sufferings by
throwing himself into the sea ; whereas it is rare that a sick
person is put to death, except in cases of disordered intellect.^
At Igloolik “a sick woman is frequently built or blocked up in
a snow-hut, and not a soul goes near to look in and ascertain
whether she be alive or dead.” *
These and similar facts are largely explained by the
pitiful condition of the invalid, the hardships of a wander-
ing life, and the superstitious notions of ignorant men.
In some cases the practice of killing a dying person
seems to be connected with a belief that the death-blow
will save his soul.'* In 1 8 1 2 , a leper was burnt alive at
Katwa, near Calcutta, by his mother and sister, who
believed that by their doing so he would gain a pure body
in the next birth.® By carrying the patient away before
he dies, the survivors escape the supposed danger of
touching a corpse.® In the poorer provinces of the
kingdom of Kandy, when a sick person was despaired of,
the fear of becoming defiled, or of being obliged to change
their habitation, frequently induced those about him to
take him into a wood, in spite of his cries and groans,
and to leave him there, perhaps in the agonies of death. ^
But the most common motive for abandoning or destroying
sick people seems to be fear of infection or of demoniacal
possession, which is regarded as the cause of various
diseases.® Among the North American Indians, we are
told, “ the custom of abandoning the infirm or sick arose
^ Nansen, Eskimo Life^ p. 163.
^ ‘ East Greenland Eskimo,’ in
Science i vii. 172.
^ Lyon, Private Journal^ p. 357.
For other instances, see Sartori, in
Globtis^ Ixvii. nr. 7 sq. ; von Martins,
op. cit. i. 126, 127, 393 (Brazilian
tribes) ; Steller, Beschreibtmg von dem
Lande JCamischatkay p. 354; Dawson,
op. cit. p. 61, quoted supra ^ p. 27 1.
^ Sartori, loc. cit. p. 127.
* Crooke, Popular Religion and Folk-
Lore of Northern India., ii. 169.
® Shooter, op. cit. 239 (Kafirs of
Natal). Kidd, The Essential Kafir ^ p.
247.
^ Joinville, ‘ Religion and Manners
of the People of Ceylon,’ in Asiatick
Researches^ vii. 437 sq.
® See Sartori, loc. cit. p. Iio sq. ;
Lippert, Kulturgeschichte.der Mensck-
keit, i. no ; ii. 41 1.
THE KILLING OF CHILDREN
from a superstitious fear of the evil spirits which were
supposed to have taken possession of them.” * In Tahiti,
says Ellis, “ every disease was supposed to be the effect
of direct supernatural agency, and to be inflicted by the
gods for some crime against the tabu, of which the suf-
ferers had been guilty, or in consequence of some offering
made by an enemy to procure their destruction. Hence,
it is probable, in a great measure, resulted their neglect
and cruel treatment of their sick.” ^
Whilst the regard which children owe their parents
makes parricide an aggravated form of murder, the
paternal power sometimes implies that, under certain cir-
cumstances, the father is allowed to kill even his grown-
up child. Though the Chinese Penal Code provides a
slight punishment for parents who punish disobedient
children with death,^ the crime is practically ignored by
the authorities.'* Among the Hebrews, in early times, a
father might punish his incontinent daughter with death.®
The Roman house-father had jus vit^e necisque — the
power of life and death — over his children. However,
this power did not imply that he could kill them without
a just cause ; ® already in pagan times a father who killed
his son “ latronis magis quam patris jure,” was punished
as a murderer.'^ As Dean Milman observes, long before
Christianity entered into Roman legislation, “ the life of
a child was as sacred as that of the parent ; and Constan-
tine, when he branded the murder of a son with the
^ Dorman, Ori^n of Primitive ^ Douglas, Society in China^ p.
Superstitions^ p. 392. 78 sq.
Ellis, Polynesian Researches , i. 395. ^ Genesis^ xxxviii. 24.
^ 7 a Tsing Leu Lee^ sec. cccxix. p. ® Mittermaier, ‘ Beytrage zur Lehre
347. — <«if a father, mother, paternal vom Verbrechen des Kindesmordes,’
grandfather or grandmother, chastises a inNeues Archiv des Criminalrechts ^ vii.
di.sobedient child or grandchild in a 4. Walter, Geschichle des Romischen
severe and uncustomary manner, so that Rechis^ § 537, vol. ii. 147. vonjhering,
he or she dies, the party so offending Geist des romischen Rechts^ ii. 220.
shall be punished with 190 blows. — Mommsen, Romisckes Strafrechty p.
When any of the aforesaid relations are 619.
guilty of killing such disobedient child ^ DigestUy xlviii. 9. 5. Orosius,
or grandchild designedly, the punish- Historian v. 16. Mommsen, Rom-
ment shall be extended to 60 blows and isches Strafrechty p. 618.
one yearns banishment.”
THE KILLING OF CHILDREN chap.
name of parricide, hardly advanced upon the dominant
feeling.” ^ Nor is there any reason to suppose that,
among savages, the father possesses an absolute right of
life and death over his children. On the contrary, among
many of the lower races the existence of such a right is
expressly denied.^
But whilst a father only in rare cases, and then merely
as a measure of justice, is allowed to put to death his
grown-up child, he very frequently has the right of des-
troying a new-born infant. Nay, in many instances in-
fanticide is not only permitted, but enjoined by custom.
Among a great number of uncivilised peoples it is usual
to kill an infant if it is a bastard,® or if its mother dies,^
or if it is deformed or diseased,® or if there is anything
unusual or uncanny about it, or if it for some reason or
other is regarded as an unlucky child. In some parts of
^ Milman, History of Latin Christ'
ianity, ii. 25.
^ Lang, in Steinmetz, Rechtsver-
hciltnisse von eingeborenen Volkern in
Afrika unJ Ozeanien, p. 224 (Wash-
ambala). Desoignies, ibid. p. 271
(Msalala). Marx, ibid. p. 349 (Amah-
lubi). Kohler, ‘ Recht der Ilotlen-
totten,’ in Zeitschr. f. vergl. Rechts-
wiss. XV. 347. Po.st, Afrikanische
Jurispriidenz^ i. 52 ^<7.
^ Turner, Samoa ^ p. 304 (Savage
Islanders). Elton, in Jour. Anthr,
Inst. xvii. 93 (some Solomon Islanders).
Munzinger, Ostafrikanische Studie?i, p.
145 (Beduan). Dyveyrier, Exploration
du Sahara^ p. 428 (Touareg). Burton,
Sindh., p. 244 (Belochis). Haberland,
‘ Der Kindermord als Volkssitte,^ in
Globus., xxxvii. 58. The natives of
Australia often kill half-caste children
(Roth, Ethnological Studies among the
North- West- Central Queensland Abo-
rigines, p. 184. Curr, Recollections of
Squatting in Victoria, p. 252. Haber-
land, loc. cit. p. 58).
^ Collins, English Colony in New
South Wales, i. 607 sq. (aborigines .of
Port Jackson). Dale, ‘ Natives inhabit-
ing the Bondei Country,' in Jour.
Anthr. Inst. xxv. 182. Comte de
Cardi, ‘Ju-Ju Laws and Customs in
the Niger Delta,’ ibid. xxix. 58. Nan-
sen, First Crossing of Greenla^id, ii.
330; Holm, ‘ Ethnologisk Skizze af
Angrnagsalikerne,’ in Meddelelser om
Grimland, x. 91 (Cireenlanders). Haber-
land, loc. cit. p. 28 sq. Ploss, Das
Kind, ii. 252, 25^, 258 sq. Chamber-
lain, Child and Childhood in Folk-
Thought,^. wo sqq.
^ Daw.son, op, cit. p. 39 (tribes of
Western Victoria). Kicherer, quoted
by Moffat, Alissionary Labours and
Scenes in Southern Africa, p. 15 (Bush-
mans). Shooter, Kafirs of Natal, p.
89. Chapman, I'raveis in the Interior
of South Africa, ii. 285 (Banamjua).
Reade, Savage Africa, p. 244 (Equa-
torial Africans). New, Life, Wander-
ings, and Labours in Eastern Af ica,
p. 1 1 8 ; Krapf, Travels, p. 1 93 sq.
(Wanika). Georgi, Russia, iii. 134
(Kamchadales). Sarytschew, loc. cit.
vi. 50; von Wrangell, op. cit. p. 122
(Chukchi). Simp.son, quoted by Mur-
doch, ‘ Point Barrow Expedition,’ in
Ann. Rep. Bur. Ethn. ix. 417 (Es-
kimo). Powers, Tribes of California,
p. 382 (Yokuts). Guinnard, Three
Yeard Slavery among the Patagonians,
p. 144. Haberland, loc. cit, p. 58 sq.
Ploss, Das Kind, ii. 252, 254, 255,
258.
THE KILLING OF CHILDREN
Africa, for instance, a child who is born with teeth, ^ or
who cuts the upper front teeth before the under,^ or whose
teeth present some other kind of irregularity,® is put to
death. Among the natives of the Bondei country a child
who is born head first is considered an unlucky child, and
is strangled in consequence.^ The Kamchadales used to
destroy children who were born in very stormy weather ;
and in Madagascar infants born in March or April, or in
the last week of a month, or on a Wednesday or a Friday,
were exposed or drowned or buried alive.® Among various
savages it is the custom that, if a woman gives birth to
twins, one or both of them are destroyed.'^ They are
regarded sometimes as an indication of unfaithfulness on
the part of the mother — in accordance with the notion
that one man cannot be the father of two children
at the same time ® — sometimes as an evil portent or
as the result of the wrath of a fetish.® Miss Kingsley
observes, “ There is always the sense of there being some-
thing uncanny regarding twins in West Africa, and in
those tribes where they are not killed they are regarded
^ Ploss, Das Kind, ii. 257, 259.
Livingstone, Jllissicntary Tnw^ls^
p. 577. Kingsley, Traveds in West
Africa^ p. 472. Allen and Thomson,
Expedition to the RKer Niger ^ i. 245
sq, Mockler-Ferryman, British Ni-
geria, p. 286(Ibos).
^ Baumann, Usambara, pp. 131
(VVabondei), 237 (Waparc).
^ Dale, in Jonr. Anthr. Inst. xxv.
183-
''' Krasheninnikoff, History oj Katn-
sc hatha, p. 217.
Ploss, Das Kind, ii. 257. Cf.
Little, Madagascar, p. 60.
^ Dawson, op. cit. p. 39 (tribes of
Western Victoria). Spencer and Gillen,
Native Tribes of Central A usBalia, p.
52. lidern. Northern Tribes of Central
Anstralia, p. 609. Romilly, Western
Pacific, p. 70 (Solomon Islanders).
Kolben, op. cit. i. 144 (Jlottentots).
S'hooter, op. cit. p. 88 (Kafirs of Natal).
Livingstone, Missionary Travels, p.
577. Decle, Three Years in Savage
Africa, p. 160 (Matabele). Chapman,
op. cit. ii. 285 (Banamjua). Baumann,
Usambara, p. 131 (Wabondei). New,
op. cit. pp. 1 18 (Wanika, formerly),
458 (Wadshagga), Burton, Two Trips
to Gorilla Land, i. 84. Kingsley,
Travels in West Africa, p. 472 sqq.
Schoen and Crowther, p, 49
(Ibos on the Niger). Comte deCardi,
in Jour. Anthr. Inst. xxix. 57
(Negroes of the Niger Della). Nyen-
dael, (pioted by Ling Roth, Great
Benin, p. 35 (people of Arebo). Ploss,
Das Kind, ii. 26^ sq. (African peoples),
274 (some South American Indians).
Schneider, Die Natunjolher, i. 305 sq.
(some South American Indians).
Krasheninnikoff, op. cit. p. 217 (Kam-
chadales).
^ Wailz, Anthropologic der Natur-
vblher, iii. 394, 480 (South American
Indians). I.)apper says {Africa, p, 473)
that no twins are ever found in the
country of Benin, because the people
considered it a great dishonour to give
birth to twins.
Allen and Thomson, op. cit. i. 243.
Baumann, Usambara, p. 131 {Wa-
bondei).
as requiring great care to prevent them from dying on
their own account/^ ^ The Kafirs believe that ufiless the
father places a lump of earth in the mouth of one of the
babies he will lose his strength.^
In the instances just referred to, the infant is killed
either because, after the death of its mother, there is
nobody to nurse it, or on account of the fault of its
parents, especially the mother, or because it is held
desirable that the sickly or defective should die at once,
or out of superstitious fear. However, among many of
the lower races, infanticide is not restricted to similar
more or less exceptional cases, but is practised on a much
larger scale. Custom often decides how many children
are to be reared in each family, and not infrequently the
majority of infants are destroyed.
Infanticide is common among various tribes in North and
South America.^ Dobrizhoffer says that it was a rare exception
among the Abipones to find a woman who had brought up two
or three sons, whilst some mothers killed all the children they
bore, ‘‘no one either preventing or avenging these murders.’*^
According to Azara, the Guanas buried alive the majority ot
their female infants, and the Mbayas suffered only one boy or
one girl in a family to live ; ^ but the correctness of his state-
ments has been questioned.^ On the other hand there can be
no doubt as to the extreme prevalence of infanticide in the
islands of the South Seas. In some of the principal groups of
Polynesia it was practised publicly and systematically, without
compunction, to an extent almost incredible. During the
whole period of his residence in the Society Islands, Ellis does
^ Kingsley, Travels in West Africa,
p. 473. According to Nyendael, twin-
births are, on the contrary, esteemed
good omens in most parts of the Benin
territory (Ling Roth, Great Benin, p.
35 )*
2 Kidd, The Essential Kafir, p. 202.
^ Bessels, (quoted by Murdoch,
‘ Point Barrow Expedition,* in Ann.
Rep. Bur. Ethn. ix. 417 (Eskimo of
Smith Sound). Nelson, ‘Eskimo about
Bering Strait,* ibid, xviii. 289. Gibbs,
‘ Tribes of Western Washington and
Northwestern Oregon, ’ in Contributions
to North American Ethnology, \. 198.
Powers, op. cit. pp. 177, 184 (Cali-
fornian tribes). Yarrow, in Arm. Rep,
Bur, Ethn. \. 99 (Pimas of Arizona).
Hawtrey, in Jour, Ant hr, Inst, xxxi.
295 (Lengua Indians of the Paraguayan
Chaco).
^ Dobrizhoffer, op. cit, ii. 98. For
another account of the infanticides of
the Abipones, see infra, p. 400.
* Azaia, Voyages dans V Amirique
m&idionale, ii. 93, 115.
® Wied-Neuwied, Reise^ nach Bra-
silien, ii. 39.
THE KILLING OF CHILDREN
not recollect having met with a single pagan woman who had
not imbrued her hands in the blood of her offspring, and he
thinks that there, as also in the Sandwich Islands, two-thirds ot
the children were destroyed by their parents.^ No sense ot
irresolution or horror,” he says, ‘‘appeared to exist in the
bosoms of those parents who deliberately resolved on the deed
before the child was born. They often visited the dwellings of
the foreigners, and spoke with perfect complacency of their
cruel purpose”; and when the missionaries tried to dissuade
them from executing their intention, the only answer generally
received was that it was the custom of the country.^ The
Line Islanders allowed only four children of a family to get the
chance of life; the mother had a right to rear one child,
whereas it rested with the husband to decide whether any more
should live.^ In Radack every mother was permitted to bring
up three children, but the fourth and every succeeding one she
was obliged to bury alive herself, unless she was the wife of a
chief.^ In Vaitupu, of the Ellice Archipelago, also, “infanticide
was ordered by law,” and only two children were allowed to a
family.^ In New Zealand and the Marquesas infanticide,
though not so general, was yet of frequent occurrence and not
regarded as a crime.^ In most of the Melanesian groups it was
very common.'^ In the Solomon Islands there still seem to be
several places where it is the custom to kill nearly all children
soon after they are born, and to buy other cjiildren from foreign
tribes, good care being taken not to buy them too young.®
The practice of infanticide occurred at least occasionally in
Tasmania,® and, as it seems, almost universally in Australia.
Mr. Curr supposes that the Australian woman, as a rule, reared
only two boys and one girl, the rest of her children being
destroyed.^® “ In the laws known to her,” says Mr. Brough
Smyth, “ infanticide is a necessary practice, and one which, if
disregarded, would, under certain circumstances, be disapproved
^ Ellis, Polynesian Researches, i.
252. Idem, Tour through Hawaii, p.
325-
® Idem, Polynesian Researches, i.
250.
^ Tutuila, ‘ Line Islanders/ in Jour,
Polynesian Society, i. 267.
* von Kotzebue, Voyage of Discovery,
iii- 173- „ /
® Turner, Samoa, p. 284.
® Hale, U. S. Exploring Expedition,
VoL VL Ethnography and Philology,
P‘ 15-
^ Codrington, Melanesians, p. 229.
TMxviQt, Samoa,]}, 333 (Efatese). Gill,
Life in the Southern Isles, p. 213
(islands of Torres Straits). Atkinson,
in Folk-Lore, xiv. 248 (New Cale-
donians).
® Romilly, Western Pacific, p. 68 sq,
Cf Guppy, Solomon Islands, p. 42.
^ Ling Roth, AboHgines of Tas-
mania, p. 167 sq. Bon wick, Daily
Life and Origin of the Tasmanians , p.
85. Brough Smyth, Aborigines of
Victoria, ii. 386,
Curr, The Australian Race, i. 70.
THE KILLING OF CHILDREN chap.
of i and the disapproval would be marked by punishment/' i
Mr, Taplin was assured that, among the Narrinyeri, more than
one-half of the children born fell victims to this custom ; ^ and
in the Dieyerie tribe hardly an old woman, if questioned, but
will admit of having destroyed from two to four of her
offspring.^
Among the Todas of India, up to the period of Mr. Sullivan’s
visit to their hills, about the year 1820, only one female child
was allowed to live in each family/ With reference to the
Kandhs, or Khonds, Macpherson observes, ‘‘The practice of
female infanticide is, I believe, not wholly unknown amongst
any portion of the Khond people, while it exists in some of the
tribes of the sect of Eoora to such an extent, that no female
infant is spared, except when a woman’s first child is a female,
and that villages containing a hundred houses may be seen
without a female child.” ^
It is said that among the Guanches of the Canary Islands, in
ancient times, all children, except the first-born, were killed.®
The people of Madagascar frequently practised infanticide ; but
Ellis says that they were much less addicted to it than the
South Sea Islanders, a numerous offspring being generally a
source of much satisfaction.^ According to Kolben, infanticide
was common among the Hottentots;® whereas Sparrman only
states that “ the Hottentots are accustomed to inter, in case of
the mother’s death, children at the breast alive,” ^ and Le
Vaillant altogeth^ denies the existence of customary infanticide
among them/® Among the Swahili, according to Baumann,
infanticides are very common and hardly disapproved of.^^ But
the peoples of the African continent are not generally addicted
to infanticide, except in such special cases as have already come
under our notice.
The custom of infanticide, in its extensive form, has
been attributed to various motives. Among some peoples
mothers are said to kill their new-born infants on account
^ Brough Smyth, cii. i. p. xxi. ® Macpherson, Meuioriais of Service
Cf Obcrlander, ‘ Die Eingeborenen in India,, p. 132.
der Kolonic Victoria,’ in iv. 279. Floss, Das Kind, ii. 259
Taplin, ‘ Narrinyeri,’ in Woods, ^ Little, Madagascar, p, 60. Ellis,
Native IVibes of South Atfstratia, p. History of Madagascar, i. 1 55, 160.
13. » Kolben, op. cit. i. 333.
3 Gason, ‘ Manners and Customs of ® Sparrman, Voyage to the Cape of
the Dieyerie Tribe,’ ibid. p. 259. Good Plope, i. 358 sq.
^ Metz, 7 'ribes inhabiting the Neil- Le Vaillant, cil. ii. sqq.
gherry Hills, p. 16. Baumann, Usafubara, p. 42.
THE KILLING OF CHILDREN
of the trouble of rearing them/ or the consequent loss of
beauty/ Another cause is the long suckling time, generally
lasting, among savages, for two, three, four years, or even
more, owing to want of soft food and animal milk.® When,
as is very commonly the case, the husband must not
cohabit with his wife during the whole of this period,'* he
is naturally inclined to form other connections, and this
seems in some instances to induce the mother to destroy
her child.® In another respect, also, the long suckling-time
is an inducement to infanticide ; among certain Australian
tribes an infant is killed immediately on birth “when the
mother is, or thinks she is, unable to rear it owing to there
being a young child whom she is still feeding.” '' Among
the Pimas of Arizona, again, infanticide is said to be con-
nected with the custom of destroying all the property of
the husband when he dies. “ The women of the tribe, well
aware that they will be poor should their husbands die,
and that then they will have to provide for their children
by their own exertions, do not care to have many children,
and infanticide, both before and after birth, prevails to a
great extent. This is not considered a crime.” But
there can be little doubt that the wholesale Infanticide of
many of the lower races is in the main due to the hard-
ships of sava’ge life. The helpless infant may be a great
burden to the parents both in times of peace and in times
of war. It may prevent the mother from following her
husband about on his wanderings in search of food, or
otherwise encumber her in her work.® Mr. Curr states of
the Bangerang tribe of Victoria, with whom he was inti-
mate for ten years, that their habit of killing nearly half
^ Ellis, Polynesian Researches, i. 256
(Tahitians). Idem, Tour th 7 'ough Ha-
wait, p. 327. Polack, Manners and
Customs of the New Zealanders , ii.
92. Gason, loc. cit. p. 258 (Dieyerie
tribe).
Williams, Missionary Enterprises,
p. 565 (Tahitians). *
See Westermarck, History of Hu-
man Marriage, p. 484,
Ibid. p. 483.
® Schneider, Die Naturvolher, i, 297,
307-
® Spencer and Gillen, Native Tribes
of Central Australia, pp. 51, 264.
lidem, Northern I'rihes of Ce^ttral
Aicstralia, p. 608. Olierlander, loc. cit.
p. 279.
^ Yarrow, loc. cit. p. 99.
® Turner, Nineteen Years in Poly-
nesia, p. 394 (people of Vate, New
Hebrides). Polack, op. cit. ii. 93
(Maoris).
THE KILLING OE CHILDREN chap.
of the children born resulted “ principally from the diffi-
culty, if not the impossibility, of transporting several
children of tender age from place to place on their fre-
quent marches.” ^ Concerning the Abipones, Charlevoix
observes : — “ They seldom rear but one child of each sex,
murdering the rest as fast as they come into the world, till
the eldest are strong enough to walk alone. They think
to justify this cruelty by saying that, as they are almost
constantly travelling from one place to another, it is im-
possible for them to take care of more infants than two at
a time ; one to be carried by the father, and the other by
the mother.” ^ Among the Lenguas of the Paraguayan
Chaco an interval of seven or eight years is always ob-
servable between children of the same family, infants born
in this interval being immediately killed. The reasons for
this practice, says Mr. Hawtrey, are obvious. “ The
woman has the hard work of carrying food from garden
and field, and all the transport to do ; the Lenguas are a
nomadic race, and their frequent moves often entail
journeys of from ten to twenty miles a day. . . . Travel-
ling with natives under these circumstances, one is forced
to the conclusion that it would be impossible for a mother
to have more than one young child to carry and to care
for.”® Moreover, a little forethought tells the parents
that their child before long will become a consumer of
provisions perhaps already too scanty for the family.
Savages often suffer greatly from want of food, and may
have to choose between destroying their offspring or
famishing themselves. Hence they often have recourse to
infanticide as a means of saving their lives ; indeed, among
several tribes, in case of famine, children are not only
killed, but eaten. Urgent want is frequently represented
by our authorities as the main cause of infanticide ; ® and
^ Curr, Squatting in Victoria^ p. 252. ^ Hawtrey, in Jour^ Antkr^ Jnst,
Oberlancler, ioc. cit, p. 279. Cf. Fison xxxi. 295.
and Howitt, Kamilaroi and Kurnai^ ^ See Steinmetz, EndokannibalismuSy
p. 259; Fraser, Aborigines of New pp. 8, 13, 14, 17.
South IVales, P* 5 * ® Nansen, First Crossing of Green*
^ Charlevoix, History of Paraguay, land, ii. 330. Nelson, in A^in, Kep,
i. 405, Bur, Ethn, xviii. 289 (Eskimo about
THE KILLING OF CHILDREN
their statements are corroborated by the conspicuous pre-
valence of this custom among poor tribes and in islands
whose inhabitants are confined to a narrow territory with
limited resources.
In the chapter dealing with human sacrifice we shall
notice that infanticide is in some cases practised as a sacri-
ficial rite. In other cases infants are killed for medicinal
purposes, without being sacrificed to any divine being. ^
Thus in the Luritcha tribe, in Central Australia, ‘‘ it is
not an infrequent custom, when a child is in weak health,
to kill a younger and healthy one and then to feed the
weakling on its flesh, the idea being that this will give to
the weak child the strength of the stronger one.''^ A
curious motive for female infanticide is also worth men-
tioning. That the victims of this practice are most com-
monly, among several peoples almost exclusively, females,^
is generally due to the greater usefulness of the men both
as food-providers and in war. But the Hakka, a Mon-
golian tribe in China, often put their girls to a cruel death
with a view to inducing thereby the soul to appear the
next time in the shape of a boy.*^
Thus various considerations have Jed men to destroy
their own offspring. Under certain circumstances the
advantages, real or imaginary, assumed to result from the
deed have been sufficiently great to silence the voice of
parental love, which, as will be seen, is to be found even
in the bosom of a savage father. The resistance offered
by this instinct would be so much the less as the child is
killed immediately after its birth, at a period of its life
Behring Strait). Brough Smyth, op.
i* 53 ; ii- 3^^ (aboriginal tribes of
Australia and Tasmania). von Kotze-
bue, op. cii. iii. 173 (natives of Radack).
Tutuila, in Jour. Polynesian Soc. i. 263
(Line Islanders). Campbell, Wild
Tribes of Khondist an ^ p. 140 (Kandhs
otsjgporadah). Marshall, A P/u'vnologist
afmngsl the 'Jodas^ p. 194. Kolben,
op. cit. i. 144 (Hottentots). See also
ilaberland, loc. cit. p. 26 ; DimitroflT,
Die Geringschdtzung des vienschlichen
VOL. I
Pebens nnd Hire Ursachen bei den
Natnrudikern^ p. 162 sqq. ; Sutherland,
Origin and Growth of the Aloral
Instinct^ i. 115 S(j(j.
^ See infra^ p. 458 sq.
Spencer and (Bllen, Native Tribes
of Central Australia^ p. 475. Cf. ibid.
p. 52.
Cf. Haberland, loc. cit. p. S^sqq.
Hiibrig, quoted by Tloss, Das
Kind., ii. 263.
D D
THE KILLING OF CHILDREN chap.
when the father’s affection for it is as yet only dawning.
Even where, at first, infanticide w'as an exception, prac-
tised by a few members of the tribe, any interference from
the side of the community may have been prevented by
the notion that a person possesses proprietary rights over
his offspring ; and, once become habitual, infanticide easily
grew into a regular custom. In cases where it was found
useful to the tribe, it would be enforced as a public duty ;
and even where there no longer was any need for it, owing
to changed conditions of life, the force of habit might still
keep the old custom alive.
Though infanticide is thus regarded as allowable, or
even obligatory, among many of the lower races, we must
not suppose that they universally look upon it in this
light. Mr. McLennan grossly exaggerated its prevalence
when he asserted that female infanticide is “common among
savages everywhere.” ^ Among a great number of them it
is said to be unheard of or almost so,^ and to these belong
peoples of so low a type as the Andaman Islanders,® the
Botocudos,'* and certain Californian tribes.® The Veddahs
of Ceylon have never been known to practise it.® Among
the Yahgans of Tierra del Fuego, Mr. Bridges informs me,
it occurred only occasionally, and then it was almost
always the deed of the mother, who acted from “jealousy,
or hatred of her husband, or because of desertion and
wretchedness.” ’’ Mr. Fison, who has lived for a long time
among uncivilised races, thinks it will be found that
infanticide is far less common among the lower savages
than it is among the more advanced tribes.® Considering
^ McLennan, Studies hi Ancieut ^ Man, in Jour. Ant hr. Inst. xii.
History, p. 75. 329.
^ See Westermarck, History of ^ Wied-Neuwied, op. cit. ii. 39.
Human Marriage, p. 312 sq.\ and, be- Keane, in Jour. Anthr. Inst. xiii. 206.
sides the authorities there referred to, ® Powers, op. cit. pp. 192, 271, 382.
Dorsey, ‘Omaha Sociology,’ in Ann. ® Sarasin, Ergebnisse natunvissen-
Rep. Bur. Ethn. iii. 369 ; Kirke, schaftlicher Forschungen auf Ceylon,
Twenty Jive Years in British Guiana, iii. 469, 539.
p. 160; Chalmers, Pioneering in New ^ Bridges, in a letter dated Down-
Guinca, p. 163 ; Hodgson, Miscellane- east, Tierra del Fuego, August 28lh,
ous Essays, i. 123 (Bodo and Dhimdls) ; 1888.
Baumann, Durch Massailand zur ® Fison and Howitt, Kg^milaroi and
Nthjuelle, p. 16 1 (Masai). Knrnai, p. 134 sqq. Cf. Farrer,
THE KILLING OF CHILDREN
further that the custom of infanticide, being opposed to
the instinct of parental love, presupposes a certain amount
of reasoning or forethought, it seems probable that where
it occurs, it is not a survival of earliest savagery, but has
grown up under specific conditions in later stages of
development^ It is, for instance, very generally asserted
that certain Indians in California never committed infanti-
cide before the arrival of the whites;^ and Ellis thinks
there is every reason to suppose that this custom was
practised less extensively by the Polynesians during the
early periods of their history than it was afterwards.^
Where infanticide is not sanctioned by custom, the
occasional commission of it has a tendency to call forth
disapproval or excite horror. The Blackfeet are said to
believe that women who have been guilty of this crime
will never reach the happy mountain after death, but are
compelled to hover round the seats of their crimes, with
branches of trees tied to their legs.^ Speaking of another
North American tribe, the Potawatomis, Keating ob-
serves : — “ In a few instances, it is said that children born
deformed have been destroyed by their mothers, but these
instances are rare, and whenever discovered, uniformly
bring them into disrepute, and are not unfrequently
punished by some of the near relations. Independently of
these cases, which are but rare, a few instances of infanti-
cide, by single women, in order to conceal intrigue,
have been heard of ; but they are always treated with
abhorrence.” ® Among the Omahas “ parents had no
right to put their children to death.” ® The Aleuts
believed that a child-murder would bring misfortune
on the whole village.’^ The Brazilian Macusis** and
Botocudos” look upon the deed with horror. At Ulea,
Primitive Marmers arid Customs, p. Richardson, in Franklin, Joumey
224 ; Sutherland, op. cit. i. 114 sq. to the Shores of the Polar Sea, p. 77.
^ Cf. Darwin, Descent of Man, p. ® Keating, op. cit. i. 99.
594. ® Dorsey, in Ann. Pep. Bur. Ethn.
^ Powers, op. cit. p. 207. Cf. ibid. iii. 268.
p. 183. ^ Dali, op. cit. p. 399.
^ Polynesian Researches,\. ^ Waitz, (?/. cit. in. 391.
♦ * Wied-Neuwied, op. cit. ii. 39.
D D 2
THE KILLING OF CHILDREN chap.
of the Caroline Islands, “ the prince would have the un-
natural mother punished with death.” ^ So, too, Herr
Valdau tells us of a Bakundu woman who, accused of
infanticide, was condemned to death. In Ashanti a
man is punished for the murder of his child.® Among
the Gaika tribe, of the Kafirs, the killing of a child after
birth is punishable as murder, the fine going to the chief.'*
Nay, even peoples among whom infanticide is habitual
seem now and then to have a feeling that the act is not
quite correct. Mr. Brough Smyth asserts that the
Australian Black is himself ashamed of it ; and Mr. Curr
has no doubt that he feels, in the commencement of his
career at least, that infanticide is wrong, as also that its
committal brings remorse.*’
The custom of infanticide in most cases requires that
the child should be killed immediately or soon after its
birth. Among certain North American Indians “ the
right of destroying a child lasted only till it was a month
old,” after which time the feeling of the tribe was against
its death. Ellis says of the Society Islanders : — “ The
horrid act, if not committed at the time the infant
entered the world, was not perpetrated at any subsequent
period .... If the little stranger was, from irresolution,
the mingled emotions that struggled for mastery in its
mother’s bosom, or any other cause, suffered to live ten
minutes or half an hour, it was safe ; instead of a
monsler’s grasp, it received a mother’s caress and a
mother’s smile, and was afterwards nursed with solicitude
and tenderness.” * Almost the same is said of other
South Sea Islanders” and of tribes inhabiting the Australian
continent.*** That the custom of infanticide is generally
^ von Kotzebue, op. cit, iii. 21 1. ® Elli.s, Polynesian Researches, i. 255.
Valdau, in Ymer, v. 280. ^ Waitz-Gerland, op. cit, vi. 138,
^ Bowdich, Mission from Cape Coast 139, 638. Angas, Life and
Castle to Ashantee, p. .258. Scenes in Australia and New Zealand^
** Maclean, Compendium of Kafir i. 313.
Laws and Customs, p. in. Floss, Das Kind, ii. 255. Spencer
® Brough Smyth, op. cit. i. 54. and Gillen, Native Tribes of Central
® Carr, The Australian Race, i. lOO. Australia, p. 51. lidern, Northern
7 Schoolcraft, quoted by Sutherland, Tribes of Central Australia^ p. 608.
op. cit. i. 119.
THE KILLING OF CHILDREN
restricted to the destruction of new-born babies also
appears from various statements as to the parental love of
those peoples who are addicted to this practiced In Fiji
“ such children as are allowed to live are treated with a
foolish fondness.” ^ Among the Narrinyeri, “ only let it
be determined that an infant’s life shall be saved, and
there are no bounds to the fondness and indulgence with
which it is treated ” ; ® and with reference to other
Australian tribes we are told that it is brought up with
greater care than generally falls to the lot of children
belonging to the poorer classes in Europe.* Among the
Indians of the Pampas and other Indians of that
neighbourhood, who abandon deformed or sickly-looking
children to the wild dogs and birds of prey, an infant
becomes, from the moment it is considered worthy to
live, “ the object of the whole love of its parents, who, if
necessary, will submit themselves to the greatest priva-
tions to satisfy its least wants or exactions.” ® In
Madagascar, according to Ellis, “ nothing can exceed the
affection with which the infant is treated by its parents
and other members of the family ; the indulgence is more
frequently carried to excess than otherwise.” ** From
these and similar facts, as also from the general absence of
statements to the contrary, I conclude that murders of
children who have been allowed to survive their earliest
infancy are very rare, though not quite unknown,’ among
the lower races.
The custom of infanticide prevails, or has prevailed, not
only in the savage world, but among semi-civilised and
^ See p. 529 ; also, Haber- ® Ellis, History of Madagascar^ i.
land, loc. cit, p. 29, and Sulherland, 161.
op. cit. i. 1155^^. ^ Among the Sandwich Islanders
* Williams and Calvert, op. cit. p. “the infant, after living a week, a
142. month, ore\’cn a year, was still insecure,
^ Taplin, in Woods, Native Tribes as some were destroyed when nearly
of South Atistr alia, 15. able to walk” (Ellis, Tour through
^ Brough Smith, irf/. i 7 5i. Meyer, Hazaaii, p. 325). Among the Eskimo
‘Manners and Customs of the Abori- about Behring Strait, “girls were often
gines of the Encounter Bay Tribe,’ in killed w'hcn from 4 to 6 years of age”
Woods, Native Tribes of South Aus- (Nelson, in Aun. Kep. Bur. Ethn.
iralia. p. 186. xviii. 289).
® Gumnard, op. cit. p. 144.
4o6 the killing of CHILDREN chap.
civilised races. In the poorest districts of China female in-
fants are often destroyed by their parents immediately after
their birth, chiefly on account of poverty,* Though dis-
approved of by educated Chinese, the practice is treated
with forbearance or indifference by the mass of the people,
and is acquiesced in by the mandarins.^ “ When seriously
appealed to on the subject,” says the Rev. J. Doolittle,
“though all deprecate it as contrary to the dictates of
reason and the instincts of nature, many are ready boldly
to apologise for it, and declare it to be necessary,
especially in the families of the excessively poor.”®
However, infanticide is neither directly sanctioned by the
government, nor agreeable to the general spirit of the
laws and institutions of the Empire ; “* and it is prohibited
both by Buddhism and Taouism.® According to Dr. de
Groot, the belief that the spirits of the dead may, with
authorisation of Heaven, take vengeance on the living,
has a very salutary effect on female infanticide in China.
“ The fear that the souls of the murdered little ones
may bring misfortune, induces many a father or mother to
lay the girls they are unwilling to bring up in the street for
adoption into some family, or into a foundling-hospital.” “
In ancient times the Semites, or at least some of them,
not only practised infanticide, but, under certain circum-
stances, approved of it or regarded it as a duty. Accord-
ing to an ancient Arabic proverb, it was a generous deed'
to bury a female child ; * and we read of ‘ Osaim the
Fazarite ’ who did not dare to save alive his daughter
Lacita, without concealing her from the people, although
she was his only child. ® Considering that among the
^ Gutzlaff, Sketch of Chinese History^
i. 59. Wells Williams, Middle King-
dom^ ii. 240 sqq, Douglas, Society in
Chinay p. 354 sqq. Doolittle, Social
Life of the Chinese^ ii. 206.
Doolittle, op. cit. ii. 203, 208 sq.
Wells Williams, op. cit. i. 836 ; ii. 242.
Douglas, Society in China., p. 354.
IMoss, Das Kind., ii. 262.
^ Doolittle, op. cit. ii. 208.
^ Staunton, in his translation of Ta
Tsing Leu Lee, p. 347 n.*
^ Thdi Shang., 4. Giles, Strange
Stories from a Chinese Sttidio^ ii. 377.
Douglas, Confucianism and Taouisnif
p. 267. Indo-Chinese Gleaner j iii. 164.
^ de Groot, Religious System of China,
(vol. iv. book) ii. 457 sqq.
^ Frey tag, Arabum Droverbia, i. 229.
^ Robertson Smith, Kimlnp and
Marriage in Early Arabia, p. 293.
THE KILLING OF CHILDREN
nomads of Arabia, who suffer constantly from hunger
during a great part of the year, a daughter is a burden
to the poor, we may suppose, with Professor Robertson
Smith, that “ infanticide was as natural to them as to
other savage peoples in the hard struggle for life.” ^ It
was condemned, however, by the Prophet : — “ Slay not
your children for fear of poverty ; we will provide for
them ; beware ! for to slay them is ever a great sin.”^ In
the Mosaic law, on the other hand, infanticide is never
touched upon, and, in all probability, it hardly occurred
among the Hebrews in historic times. But we have
reason to believe that, at an earlier period, among them as
also among other branches of the Semitic race, child-
murder was frequently practised as a sacrificial rite.®
The murder of female infants, whether by the direct
employment of homicidal means, or by exposure to priva-
tion and neglect, has for ages been a common practice, or
even a genuine custom, among various Hindu castes.^
Yet they are well aware that it is prohibited by their
sacred books ; according to the Laws of Manu, the king
shall put to death “ those who slay women, infants, or
Brahmanas.”” Even the Rajputs, who — out of family pride
and owing to the expenses connected with the marriage
ceremony — were particularly addicted to infanticide, con-
sidered that a family in which such a deed had been per-
petrated was, in consequence, an object of divine dis-
pleasure. On the twelfth day, therefore, the family priest
was sent for, and, by suitable gratuities, absolution was
obtained. In the room where the infant was born and
destroyed, he also prepared and ate some food with which
the family provided him ; this was considered a horn, or
burnt offering, and, by eating it in that place, the priest
was supposed to take the whole hutteea, or sin, upon him-
self, and to cleanse the family from it.*'
^ Ibid, p, 294. • 431. Chevers, Manual of Medical
^ Koran^ xvii. 33 ; also, ibid. vi. 141, Ju 7 'isprudence for India^ p. 750 sqq.
152, and Ixxxi. 8 sq. " Laws of Manu^ ix. 232.
® See infra^ on Human Sacrifice. ® ‘ Oude as it was before the An-
Wilkins, Modern Hinduisntj p. nexation,’ in Chtirch Missionary Intel-
ligencer^ xi. 81 sq.
Exposure of new-born children was practised by the
people of the Vedic aged as also by other so-called Aryan
peoples in ancient timesd The Teutonic father had to
decide whether the new-comer, whilst still lying on the
ground, should be accepted as a member of the family, or
whether it should be exposed. If he lifted it up, and
some water was poured over it, or a drop of milk or honey
passed its lips, it was generally safe. But apart from
these restrictions, custom seems to have been in favour of
exposure only under certain circumstances, exactly similar
to those in which infanticide is practised among many
modern savages : if the child was born out of wedlock, or
if it was deformed or sickly, or if it was born on an
unlucky day, or in case of twins — one of whom was
always supposed to be illegitimate — or if the parents were
very poor. The exposed infant, however, was not neces-
sarily destined to die, but was, in many cases, adopted by.
somebody who could afford to rear it. ®
The exposure of deformed or sickly infants was
undoubtedly an ancient custom in Greece ; in Sparta, at
least, it was enjoined by law. It was also approved of by
the most enlightened among the Greek philosophers.
Plato condemns all those children who are imperfect in
limbs, as also those who are born from depraved citizens,
to be buried in some obscure and unknown place ; he
maintains, moreover, that when both sexes have passed
the age assigned for presenting children to the State, no
child is to be brought to light, and that any infant which
is by accident born alive, shall be done away with.^
Aristotle not only lays down the law with respect to the
exposing or bringing up of children, that “ nothing im-
perfect or maimed shall be brought up,” but proposes that
^ Rigveda, p. 1 6. Bekehrting des Norwegischen Slammes,
^ Strieker, ‘ EthnographischeNotizen ii. i8i. Weinhold, AUnordisches J.e-
iiber den Kindermord und die kiinst- ben, p. 261. Nordstrom, Bidrag till
liche Fruchtabtreibung,’ in Archtv fur, den svenska samhdllsfdrfattningens hi-
A ntkro^ologie, V, 4^1 {Celts an6 Slavs). storia, ii. 44. Stemann, Den danske
3 Grimm, Deutsche Rechtsalterthii- Retshistorie indtil Christian Vi^sLov,
mer, p. 455 sqq. Wilda, Strafrecht p. 359.
der Germanen, pp. 704, 725. Maurer, Plato, Respublica, v. 460
xvir
THE KILLING OF CHILDREN
the number of children allowed to each marriage shall be
regulated by the State, and that, if any woman be pregnant
after she has produced the prescribed number, an abortion
shall be procured before the fetus has life.^ These views
were in perfect harmony with the general tendency of the
Greeks to subordinate the feelings of the individual to the
interest of the State. Confined as they were to a very
limited territory, they were naturally afraid of being
burdened with the maintenance of persons whose lives
could be of no use. It is necessary, says Aristotle, to
take care that the increase of the people should not
exceed a certain number, in order to avoid poverty and its
concomitants, sedition and other evils.^ Yet the exposure
of healthy infants, which was frequently practised in
Greece, was hardly approved of by public opinion, although
tolerated,® except at Thebes, where it was a crime punish-
able with death.
In Rome custom or law enjoined the destruction of
deformed infants. According to a law of the Twelve
Tables, referred to by Cicero, monstrous abortions were
not suffered to live.® With reference to a much later period
Seneca writes, “ We destroy monstrous births, and we also
drown our children if they are born weakly or unnaturally
formed ” ; he adds that it is an act of reason thus to
separate what is useless from what is sound.® But there
was no tendency in Rome to encourage infanticide beyond
these limits. It has been observed that, whilst the Greek
policy was rather to restrain, the Roman policy was always
to encourage, population.’^ Being engaged in incessant wars
of conquest, Rome was never afraid of being over-popu-
lated, but, on the contrary, tried to increase the number of
its citizens by according special privileges to the fathers of
many children, and exempting poor parents from most
^ Aristotle, Politica^ vii. 16, p. 1335. ^ Aclian, Variir Historur^ ii. 7.
Jbid. ii. 6, p. 1265. Cicero, De le^ibusy iii. 8.
^ Schmidt, Ethik der alten G7'iecheity ^ Seneca, De ira, i, 15.
ii. 138, 463. Hermaiin-Bliimner, ^ Lecky, History of European
Lehrbuch der griechischen Privatalter- Morals, ii. 27.
thUnier, p. 77.
THE KILLING OF CHILDREN chap.
of the burden of taxation.* The power of life and death
which the Roman father possessed over his children un-
doubtedly involved the legal right of destroying or exposing
new-born infants ; but it is equally certain that the act was
frequently disapproved of.® An ancient “ law,” ascribed
to Romulus — which, as Mommsen suggests, could have
been merely a priestly direction ® — enjoined the father to
bring up all his sons and at least his eldest daughter, and
forbade him to destroy any well-formed child till it had
completed its third year, when the affections of the parent
might be supposed to be developed.* In later times we
find the exposure of children condemned by poets, his-
torians, philosophers, jurists. Among nefarious acts com-
mitted in sign of grief on the day when Germanicus died,
Suetonius mentions the exposure of new-born babes.''
Epictetus indignantly opposes the saying of Epicurus that
men should not rear their children : — “ Even a sheep
will not desert its young, nor a wolf ; and shall a man ?
‘ What ! will you have us to be silly creatures, like the
sheep ? ’ Yet they desert not their young. ‘ Or savage,
like wolves.^’ Yet even they desert them not. Come,
then, who would obey you if he saw his little child fall on
the ground and cry?”* Julius Paulus, the jurist, pro-
nounced him who refused nourishment to his child, or
exposed it in a public place, to be guilty of murder* — a
statement which is to be understood, not as a legal pro-
hibition of exposure, but only as the expression of a moral
opinion.® On the other hand, though the exposure of
healthy infants was disapproved of in Pagan Rome,
it was not generally regarded as an offence of very
great magnitude, especially if the parents were desti-
^ Montesquieu, De Vesprit des loisy ® Suetonius, Cali^ulay 5.
xxiii. 20 sq. {(Euv 7 ^eSy p. 398 sqq.). ^ Epictetus, DissertationeSy i. 23.
Lecky, Jlistory of European Mo 7 'alSy ^ Dioesta, xxv. 3. 4.
ii. 27. ® Noodt, ‘Julius Paulus, sive de
- Denis, Histoire des theories et des partus expositione et nece apud veteres,'
idhs morales dans r ant iqiiiti^y \\. no. . in Opera omnia, i. 465 5^^. Walter,
^ Mommsen, Romisches Strafrechty - Geschichtc des Komischen Rechts, § 538,
p. 619. vol. ii. 148 sq, Spangenberg, ‘ Ver-
^ Dionysius of Halicarnassus, A^iti- brechen des Kindermords und der
quitates Romancey ii. 15. Aussetzung der Kinder,’ in Neues
THE KILLING OF CHILDREN
tute.^ During the Empire it was practised on an extensive
scale, and in the literature of the time it is spoken of with
frigid indifference. Since the life of the victim was fre-
quently saved by some benevolent person or with a view
to profit,'^ it was not regarded in the same light as down-
right infanticide, which, in the case of a healthy infant,
seems to have been strictly prohibited by custom.®
As is generally the case in the savage world, so among
semi-civilised and civilised nations whose customs allow or
tolerate infanticide, the child, if not suffered to live, has
to be killed in its earliest infancy. Among the Chinese'*
and Rajputs it is destroyed immediately after its birth.
In the Scandinavian North the killing or exposure of an
infant who had already been sprinkled with water was
regarded as murder.*' At Athens parents were punished
for exposing children whom they had once begun to
rear.'^
The practice of exposing new-born infants, so common
in the Pagan Empire, was vehemently denounced by the
early Fathers of the Church.® They tried to convince
men that, if the abandoned infant died, the unnatural
parent was guilty of nothing less than murder, whilst the
sinful purposes for which foundlings were often used formed
another argument against exposure.** The enormity of the
crime of causing an infant’s death was enhanced by the
notion that children who had died un baptised were doomed
to eternal perdition. “ According to a decree of the Council
of Mentz in 852, the penance imposed on the mother was
heavier if she killed an unbaptised than if she killed a
Archiv des CriifiinalrechtSy iii. lo sqq.
Mommsen, Rouiischcs Strafrecht^ p.
620, n. I.
^ Quintilian, Declamationes, 306.
Plutarch, De a?nore prolis, 5.
Lecky, History of European
Morals, ii. 28. Lallemand, Histoire des
enfanis abandonn^s et d^Iaiss^s, ^ 59.
^ Mommsen, Rbmisches Strafrecht,
p. 619.
Gntzlaflf, op. cit. i, 59.
f Chureh Missionary Ifitelligencer,
81. Chevers, op. cit. p. 752.
® Grimm, Deutsche RechtsalterthU-
mer, p. 457.
7 Schoemann, Gricchische Alterihii-
mer, i. 503.
^ See Terme and Monfalcon, His-
toire des enfans trozivh, p. 67 sqq.
^ Justin Martyr, Apologia /. pro
Ckristia 7 iis, 29, 27 (Migne, Pat'ologice
cursiis, Ser. Graeca, vi. 373 sq,, 369
sqq . ).
Cf. Spangenberg, in Neues Archtv
des Cidmintilrechts, iii. 20 ; Lecky,
History of European A/ora/s, ii. 23.
THE KILLING OF CHILDREN
baptised childd In the year 1556, Henry II. o France
made a law which punished as a child-murderer any woman
who had concealed her pregnancy and delivery, and whose
child was found dead, “ priv6, tant du saint sacrement de
baptesme, que sepulture publique et accoustum^e.” ^ This
statute — to which there is a counterpart in England in the
statute 21 Jac. I. c. 27,® and in the Scotch law of 1690,
c. 21'' — thus went so far as to constitute a presumptive
murder, avowedly under the influence of that Christian
dogma to which Mr. Lecky attributes, in the first instance,
“the healthy sense of the value and sanctity of infant
life which so broadly distinguishes Christian from Pagan
societies.”
If the Pagans had been comparatively indifferent to the
sufferings of the exposed infant, the Christians became all
the more cruel to the unfortunate mother, who, perhaps
in a fit of despair, had put to death her new-born child.
The Christian emperor Valentinian I. made infanticide a
capital offence.® According to the Coutume de Loudunois,
a mother who killed her child was burned. In Germany
and Switzerland she was buried alive with a pale thrust
through her body ; ® this punishment was prescribed by
the criminal code of Charles V., side by side with
drowning.® Until the end of the eighteenth, or the
beginning of the nineteenth, century, infanticide was
a capital crime everywhere in Europe, except in Russia.’®
Then, under the influence of that rationalistic movement
which compelled men to rectify so many preconceived
opinions,” it became manifest that an unmarried woman
^ Canon Hhidowici regisy 9 (Pertz, ^ Tissot, Le droit phial y ii. 40,
Monttm. Germania historica yin, 41'^). ® Osenbriiggen, Das alamannische
2 T.sambert, Decrusy, and Armet, Sirafi'ccht im deufschen Mittelaltery p.
Recueil ghUral des a?iciennes I ois f ran- 22gsq. Ideniy Stndien zur deiitschennnd
faisesy xiii. 472 sq. schzveizerischen Kechtsgesckichtey p. 358.
^ Blackstone, Commentaries on the ^ Charles V.’.s Peinliche Gerichts
Laivs of Englandy 198, O rdnungy a,it. 131.
^ Erskine, Principles of the Law of de Feyfer, Verhandeling over den
Scotlandy p. 560. Kindermocrdy p. 225. von Fabrice,
® Lecky, History of European Die Lehr e von der Kind sab treibungund
Moi^alSy ii. 23. vom Kindsmordy p. 251.
® Codex TheodosianuSy ix. 14. I. In- Berner, Lekrbuch ''des Deutscken
stituiiomsy ix. 16. 7. Strafrechtesy p, 497.
FETICIDE
who destroyed her illegitimate child was not in the same
category as an ordinary murderess.* It was pointed out that
shame and fear, the excitement of mind, and the difficulty
in rearing the poor bastard, could induce the unfortunate
mother to commit a crime which she herself abhorred.
That no notice had been taken of all this, is explicable
from the extreme severity with which female unchastity
was looked upon by the Church. At present most
European lawbooks do not punish infanticide committed
by an unmarried woman even nominally with death.^ In
France the law which regards infanticide as an aggravated
form of meurtre ® has become a dead letter * ; and in
England no woman seems for a long time to have been
executed for killing her new-born child under the distress
of mind and fear of shame caused by child-birth.^
Hand in hand with the custom of infanticide goes
feticide, which prevails extensively in the savage world.*'
The same considerations as induce savages to kill their
new-born infants also induce them to destroy the fetus
before it has proceeded into the world from the mother’s
body. Besides, women procure abortion with a view to
avoiding the disagreeable incidents accompanying the state
of pregnancy ; or, very frequently, in order to conceal
illicit intercourse.’^ Considering that the same degree of
sympathy cannot be felt with regard to a child not yet
born as with regard to an infant, it is not surprising to
find that feticide is practised without objection even by
^ Benthain maintained ( Theory of
Legislation^ p. 264 sq. ) that infanticide
ought not to be punished as a principal
offence. “ The offence,” he says, “ is
what is improperly called the death of
an infant, who has ceased to be, before
knowing what existence is, — a result of
a nature not to give the slightest in-
quietude to the most timid imagination ;
and which can cause no regret^ but to
the very person who, through a senti-
ment of shame and pity, has refused to
prolong a life begun under the auspices
of misery.”
^ de Feyfer, op. cit. p. 228. For
modern legislation on infanticide, see
also S pangen berg, in Neues Archiv des
Cri/ninalrechts^ iii. 360 sqq. ; von
Fabricc, op. cit. p. 254 sqq.
» Code PinaL art 300, 302.
^ Garraud, T 7 ’aitii thJoretiqtte et
pratique du droit ptlnal ff'ancais^ iv.
251.
® Stephen, History of the Criininal
Law of Engl and y iii. 86.
^ Floss, Pas Weiby \. 842 sqq.
7 Ibid. i. 851 sq.
FETICIDE
some peoples who never commit infanticide. Thus in
Samoa, where the latter practice was perfectly unknown,
the destruction of unborn children prevailed to a melan-
choly extent, and the same was the case in the Mitchell
Group,^ Among the Dacotahs, who only occasionally
killed infants, abortion procured by artificial means was
not held objectionable.^ On the other hand there are
savages who consider it a crime. Some Indian tribes in
North America abhor the practice.® The natives of
Tenimber and Timor-laut punish it with heavy fines.^
Regarding the Kafirs, Mr. Warner states that “ the pro-
curing of abortion, although universally practised by all
classes of females in Kafir society, is nevertheless a crime
of considerable magnitude in the eye of the Law ; and
when brought to the notice of the Chief, a fine of four
or five head of cattle is inflicted. The accomplices are
equally guilty with the female herself.” ®
Passing to more civilised nations, we notice that, among
Hindus and Muhammedans, artificial abortion is extremely
common and is hardly reprobated by public opinion, what-
ever religion or law may have to say on the subject.® It
is especially resorted to by unmarried women as a means
of escaping punishment and shame. “ In a country like
India,” says Dr. Chevers, “where true morality is almost
unknown, but where the laws of society exercise the most
rigorous and vigilant control imaginable over the conduct
of females, and where six-sevenths of the widows, what-
ever their age or position in life may be, are absolutely
debarred from re-marriage, and are compelled to rely
upon the uncertain support of their relatives, it is scarcely
surprising that great crimes should be frequently practised
to conceal the results of immorality, and that the pro-
curing of criminal abortion should, especially, be an act of
^ Turner, Samm^ pp. 79, 280, 302.
^ Schoolcraft, Indian Tribes of the ® Warner, in Maclean, Compefjfiiuin
United Slates^ iii. 243. Keating, op. of Kafir Laws and Cnsioms^ p. 62. Cf.
cit. i. 394. Brownlee, ibid. p. iii ; Holden, Past
^ Ploss, Das Weib^ i. 848. and Futtrre of the Kaffir Paces, p. 334.
^ Riedel, De sluik- en kroesharige SQ^LawsofAfanUy^v. 90 ; Pish/iu
r assert tusschen Celebes en Papua, p. Purdna, p. no'j sq.
FETICIDE
almost daily commission, and should have become a trade
among certain of the lower midwives.” ^ In Persia every
illegitimate pregnancy ends with abortion ; the act is done
almost publicly, and no obstacle is put in its way.^ In
Turkey, both among the rich and poor, even married
women very commonly procure abortion after they have
given birth to two children, one of which is a boy ; and
the authorities regard the practice with indifference.® In
ancient Greece, as we have seen, feticide was under certain
circumstances recommended by Plato and Aristotle, in
preference to infanticide. In Rome it was prohibited by
Septimius Severus and Antoninus, but the prohibition
seems to have referred only to those married women
who, by procuring abortion, defrauded their husbands of
children.'* During the Pagan Empire, abortion was exten-
sively practised, either from poverty, or licentiousness, or
vanity; and, although severely disapproved of by some,®
“ it was probably regarded by the average Romans of the
later days of Paganism much as Englishmen in the last
century regarded convivial excesses, as certainly wrong,
but so venial as scarcely to deserve censure.” ® Seneca
thinks Helvia worthy of special praise because she had
never destroyed her expected child within her womb,
“after the fashion of many other women, whose attrac-
tions are to be found in their beauty alone.” ^ The
Romans drew a broad line between feticide and infanticide.
An unborn child was not regarded by them as a human
being ; it was a spes animantis, not an in fan s.^ It was said
to be merely a part of the mother, as the fruit is a part of
the tree till it becomes ripe and falls down.®
Very different opinions were held by the Christians. A
sanctity, previously unheard of, was attached to human
life from the very beginning. Feticide was regarded as a
^ Chevers, cit, p. 712. ® \^^cVy,Hisfo?y of European Morals ^
2 Polak, Persien, i. 217. , ii. 21
® Ploss, Das Weib, i. 846 sq. 7 Seneca, Ad Helviam, 16.
^ Digesta^ xlvii. ii. 4. Cf. 5 ^in, ® Spangenberg, ‘ Vcrbrechen tier
Criminalrecht der Rbnier^ p. 447. Abtreibung der Lcibesfrucht,’ in Neues
® Paulus, quoted in Digesta^ xxv. Archiv des Crimmalrechisfn. 22 ^.
3, 4, ® Ibid, ii. 22.
FETICIDE
form of murder. “Prevention of birth,” says Tertullian,
“ is a precipitation of murder ; nor does it matter whether
one take away a life when formed, or drive it away while
forming. He also is a man who is about to be or;e.
Even every fruit already exists in its seed,” ^ St.
Augustine, again, makes a distinction between an embryo
which has already been formed, and an embryo as yet
unformed. From the creation of Adam, he says, it
appears that the body is made before the soul. Before
the embryo has been endowed with a soul it is an embryo
informatus^ and its artificial abortion is to be punished
with a fine only ; but the embryo formatus is an animate
being, and to destroy it is nothing less than murder, a
crime punishable with death.^ This distinction between
an animate and inanimate fetus was embodied both in
Canon ® and Justinian law,^ and passed subsequently into
various lawbooks.'" And a woman who destroyed her
animate embryo was punished with death.
The criminality of artificial abortion was increased by
the belief that an embryo formatus^ being a person endowed
with an immortal soul, was in need of baptism for its
salvation. In his highly esteemed treatise De Fide,
written in the sixth century, St. Fulgentius says, “ It is to
be believed beyond doubt, that not only men who are come
to the use of reason, but infants, whether they die in their
mother’s womb, or after they are born, without baptism.
^ Tertullian, Apologeiicns, 9 (Migne,
r//. i. 319
St. Augustine, Questiones in Exo-
dum, 80 ; Idem, Questiones Veteris ct
Novi I'estamenii, 23 (Migne, op. cit.
xxxiv.-xxxv. 626, 2229).
^ Gratian, Decretum, ii. 32. 2. 8 sq,
* As regards the time from which the
fetus was considered to be animate a
curious distinction was drawn between
the male and the female fetus. The
former was regarded as animatus forty
days after its conception, the latter
eighty days. This theory, however —
which was derived, as it seems, either
from an absurd misinterpretation of
Leviticus, xii. 2-5, or from the views of
Ari.stotle [De animalibus historue, vii.
3 ; cf. Pliny, His tor ia naturalis, vii. 6)
— was not accepted by the glossarist of
the Justinian Code, who fixed the ani-
mation of the female, as well as of the
male, fetus at forty days after its con-
ception ; and this view was adopted by
later jurists (Spangenberg, in Neues
Archiv des Criminalrechts, ii. yj sqq.).
® von Fabrice, op. cit. p. 202 sq.
Perner, op. cit. p. 501. Wilda, op. cit.
p. 720 sqq.
^ Fleta, i. 23. 12 (England). Charles
V.’s Peinliche Gerichts Ordnung, art.
133. Spangenberg, in Neues Archiv
des Criminalrechts, ii. 16.
FETICIDE
in the name of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, are
punished with everlasting punishment in eternal fire,
because though they have no actual sin of their own, yet
they carry along with them the condemnation of original
sin from their first conception and birth.”* And in the
Lex Bajuwariorum this doctrine is expressly referred to
in a paragraph which prescribes a daily compensation for
children killed in the womb on account of the daily
suffering of those children in hell.“ Subsequently, how-
ever, St. Fulgentius’ dictum was called in question, and
no less a person than Thomas Aquinas suggested the
possibility of salvation for an infant who died before its
birth.“ Apart from this, the doctrine that the life of an
embryo is equally sacred with the life of an infant was so
much opposed to popular feelings, that the law concerning
feticide had to be altered. Modern legislation, though
treating the fetus as a distinct being from the moment of
its conception,"* punishes criminal abortion less severely
than infanticide.’' And the very frequent occurrence of
this crime is an evidence of the comparative indifference
with which it is practically looked upon by large numbers
of people in Christian countries.
^ St. Fulgentius, Dc fide, 27 (Mignc,
op. cit. Ixv. 701).
- Lex ILijiiwarioriini, viii. 21 (vii.
20).
^ Lecky, Histo ry of the Rise and
I)tflnence of the Spij if of Rationa/is/n
in Europe, i. 360, u. 2,
[lerike, Lehiburh der gcricJUlichen
Medic in, § 99, p. 75. Berner, op. cit.
P. 502.
^ von Fabrice, op. cit. p. 199. For
modern laws referring to criminal abor-
tion, .see ibid. p. 206 sqq., and Spangen-
lierg, in Neues clrc/nv des CrintinaL
r edits, ii. 178 sqq.
See Floss, Das IVcib, '\. 848 sqq. ;
Schmidt’s Jahrbiicher der in- iind aus-
Rindischen Gesannnten Medicin, xciii.
97 -
VOL. I
E E
Chapter XVIII
THE KILLING OF WOMEN, AND OF SLAVES
THE CRIMINALITY OF HOMICIDE INFLUENCED
BY DISTINCTIONS OF CLASS
Among many of the lower races a husband is said to
possess the power of life and death over his wife ; but
what this actually means is not always obvious. It is
quite probable that, in some cases, the husband may put
his wife to death whenever he pleases, without having to
fear any disagreeable consequences. In other instances he,
by doing so, at all events exposes himself to the vengeance
of her family. Among the Bangerang tribe of Victoria,
for instance, “ he might ill-treat her, give her away, do as
he liked with her, or kill her, and no one in the tribe
interfered ; though, had he proceeded to the last extremity^
her death would have been avenged by her brothers or
kindred.” ^ So, also, among the aborigines of North-West-
Central Queensland, “ a wife has always her ‘ brothers ’ to
look after her interests,” and if a man kills his wife he
has to deliver up one of his own sisters for his late wife’s
friends to put to death.^ We shall see in a subsequent
chapter that many statements in which absolute marital
power is ascribed to savage husbands are not to be inter-
preted too literally. ^I venture to believe that the
husband’s so-called power of life and death is generally
^ Recollections of Squatting in Aborigines ^ p. 141. Cf Fison and
Victoria^ p. 248. Hovvitt, Kamilaroi and Kurnaiy '^. 281
^ Roth, Ethnological Studies among (Geawe-gal tribe).
the North- West- Central Queenslanci
CH. xvrii THE KILLING OF WOMEN
restricted by custom to cases where the wife has committed
some offence, and, especially, where she has been guilty of
unfaithfulness.)
The right of punishing the wife capitally, however, is
by no means universally granted to the husband in
uncivilised communities. Among the Gaika tribe of the
Kafirs, “ if he puts her to death, he is punished as a
murderer.”^ Among the Bakwiri he has to suffer death
himself if he kills his wife ; if she is unfaithful to him he
is only permitted to beat her.^ From the information we
possess of the lower races it does not seem to be the
general rule that husbands punish their adulterous wives
with death ; but whether they have the right of doing so
is a question seldom touched upon by our authorities.® We
shall see that savage custom often gives to the husband
only very limited rights over his wife, and requires that he
should treat her with respect.
Among various peoples of a higher type the husband
has, under certain circumstances, had the right of punish-
ing his wife capitally ; but this seems to be nearly all that
is involved in that “ power of life and death ” which he is
said to have possessed over her.^ However, whilst custom
or law forbade him to kill his wife without sufficient
cause, such a deed was hardly looked upon with the same
horror, or treated with the same severity, as the murder
of a husband by his wife, owing to the former’s superior
position in the family. Among the Langobardi, according
to the laws of King Rothar, a husband who killed his wife
had to pay the same compensation as anybody else would
have had to pay -for taking her life, but if a wife killed her
husband, she was put to death, and her property forfeited
^ Brownlee, in Maclean, Compen-
dium of Kafir Laws and CustomSy
p. 1 17.
^ Schwarz, quoted by Post^ Afrtka-
nische furisprudens, i. 401. ^
^,See Steinmetz, EthnologiscJie Stu-
dien zur ersten Entwicklung der
Sirafey ii. 303.
** Rein, Japan^ p. 424. Hommel,
Die seniitischen Volker und Sprachen
i. 417 (Babylonians). Leist, Alt-
arisches Jus Civile y\, 196, 275 (“Aryan”
peoples). Wilda, Strafirecht der Ger-
7 ?ianeny p. 705 ; Nordstrom, Bidrag
till den svenska samhcillsforfattningens
historiay ii. 61 sq, ; Weinhold, Alt-
nordisches Lebe^iy p, 250 ; Keyser,
Efterladte Skriftery ii. pt. ii. 28 sq.
(Teutons).
E E 2
THE KILLING OF WOMEN
to the family of the dead.* In Russia, in the seven-
teenth century, whilst a husband who murdered his wife
was, according to law, obnoxious to corporal punishment,
a wife who murdered her husband was buried alive, with
the head above the ground, and left to perish by hunger.'^
According to English law, a woman who killed her
husband was guilty of “ petit* treason,” that is, murder in
its most odious degree.^
Among many peoples the life of a woman is held
cheaper than that of a man, independently of the relation-
ship between the slayer and his victim. In Burma, if a
woman was accidentally killed, less compensation had to
be paid than for a man. A Burman explained this in the
following words : — “A woman is worth less than a man
in that way. A maidservant can be hired for less than a
manservant, a daughter can claim less than a son. They
cannot do so much work ; they are not so strong. If they
had been worth more, the law would have been the other
way ; of course they are worth less.” Among Muham-
medans the price of blood for a woman is half the sum
which is the price of blood for a free man.'' In ancient
India the murder of a woman, unless she was with child, was
in the eye of the law on a par with the murder of a Sddra.'’
According to Cambrian ga Ian as, or blood-price, of
a woman was half galanas of her brother.* Among the
Teutons the wergeld of a woman varied : sometimes it was
the same as that for a man, sometimes only half as much,
but sometimes twice as much, or, if she was pregnant,
^ Edictus Rothari, 200 sqq.
^ Macieiowski, Slavische Rechtsge-
schichte^ iv. 292. For a Corsican law
concerning mariticide, see Cibrario,
Econoniia politica del medio eve^ i. 344 ;
and for the punishment inflicted for the
same crime on a woman in Nuremberg,
in 1487, see Du Boys, Histoh^e du droit
crimhiei des petiples modernes^ ii. 607.
3 Blackstone, Comnmttaries on the
Laws of Engl a 7 id^ iv. 203.
* Fielding, The Soul of a People p.
171.
^ Lane, Arabian Society in the
Middle AgeSy p. 18.
^ Batidhdyanay i. 10. 19. 3.
Leist, A It - arise he s Jus Gentium y p. 305
sqq,
7 Venedotzan Codoy ii. i. 16. Accord-
ing to the ‘ Laws of the Brets and
Scots/ the e.stimate of a married
woman is less by a third part than that
of her husband, whereas the estimate
of an unmarried woman is equal to that
of her brother Scotland in the
Middle Ages y p. 181).
THE KILLING OF WOMEN
even more.^ These variations depended upon the different
points of view from which the offence was looked upon.
By herself she was worth less than a man, as a mother
she was worth more and, quite apart from her value,
the natural helplessness of her sex tended to aggravate
the crime.® Among modern savages and barbarians, also,
the estimate of a woman’s life is in some instances lower
than that of a man’s,'* in some equal to it,’' and in some
higher.” Among the Gallas the killing of a free man
can be atoned for only by one thousand cattle, whereas
fifty are deemed sufficient for the killing of a woman."
On the other hand, among the Iroquois two hundred
yards of wampum were paid for the murder of a woman,
and only one hundred for that of a man.® Among the
Rejangs of Sumatra, whilst the compensation for murder
is eighty dollars if the victim was an ordinary man or
boy, it is one hundred and fifty dollars if the person mur-
dered was a woman or girl.” Among the Agar, a Dinka
tribe, the murder of a man must be atoned for by a
fine of thirty cows, that of a woman by forty cows.*”
Where wives are purchased, the killing of a woman
involves the destruction of valuable property, and is dealt
with accordingly.
As a husband often has “ the power of life and death ”
over his wife, so we may expect to find, even more often.
^ Grimm, Deutsche Dechtsa/ler-
thufner^ p. 404 sqq.
This point of view is very conspic-
uous in the Salic Law {Lex Salica
[Herold’s text], 28).
^ Wilda, op. cit. p. 571. Keyser,
op. cit. ii. pt. ii. 29. Brunner,
Deutsche Rechtsgeschichte^ ii. 614 sq.
Pardessus, Loi Saliqiie, p, 662.
^ Post, Anfdnge des Staats- und
Rechtsleben, p. 192. Idem, Studien
zur Entwicklungsgeschickte des Fami-
lienrechts, p. 1 19 sq. Gibbsf ‘ Tribes of
Western Washington and North-
western Oregon,’ in Contributions to
North American Eth^tology, i. 190.
Georgi, Russia, ii. 261 ; Vambery,
Tiirkenvolk, p. 305 (Kirghiz), Decle,
Three Years in Savage Africa, p. 487
(Wakamba).
® Schoolcraft, Indian Tribes of the
United States, i. 277 (Creeks). Dorsey,
‘ Omaha Sociology,’ in Ann. Rep. Bu^\
Ethn. iii. 370. Woodthorpe, in Jour.
Anthr. Inst. xxvi. 21 (Shans).
® Post, Studien zur Entzvicklungs-
geschichte des Familienrechts, p. 1 19 sq.
^ Paulitschke, Ethnographic Nordost-
Afrikas, p. 263.
® Loskiel, History of the Afission of
the United Brethren among the Indians
in North America, i. 16.
^ Marsden, History of Sumatra,
p. 222.
Emin Pasha in Central Africa,
p- 338-
that a master has the same power over his slave. The
latter, as a rule, can hardly count on the support of his
family, and when, as is frequently the case, he is a prisoner
of war, the right of killing an enemy easily passes into the
right of killing the slave. In the literature dealing with
the lower races we repeatedly meet with the statement
that the owner may kill his slave at pleasure, or that he
is not accountable for killing him.* Yet this seems to
mean rather that, if he does so, no complaint can be
brought against him, or no vengeance taken on him, than
that he has an unconditional moral right to put to death
a slave whom he no longer cares to keep ; we shall see
that savage custom very commonly requires that slaves
should be treated with kindness by their masters. In
many cases the master is expressly denied the right of
killing his slave at his own discretion.^ Among the
Bataks the owner, though allowed to punish his slave,
must take care that the latter does not succumb to the
punishment.^ Among the Rejangs, if a man kills his
slave, he pays half his price as compensation to the feudal
chief of the country.^ In Madagascar “ masters have
full power over their slaves, excepting as to life”;® and
the same is said of the Tshi-speaking peoples of the Gold
Coast.® The Mandingoes allow the owner to do what he
likes to a prisoner of war and to a person who has lost his
freedom through insolvency, but he is forbidden to kill a
house-slave.'* Among the Barea and Kundma, by putting
^ Monrad, Bidrag til en Skildring Steinmetz, Rechtsverhdltnisse vo 7 t
af Guinea-Kysten^ p. 42 (Negroes of eigeborenefi Volkern in Afrika und
Accra). Bowdich, Mission to Ashaniee^ Ozeanien^ p. 43 (Banaka and Bapuku).
p. 258 (people of Ashanti). Ward, Five Mademba, ibid. p. 83 (natives of the
Years with the Congo Cannibals, Sansanding States). Lang, ibid. p.
p. 105 (Bolobo). Macdonald, ^4^ (Washambala). Desoignies, ibid.
1. 168 (Eastern Central Africans). p. 278 (Msalala).
Burton, Zanzibar, ii, 95 (Wanika). ® Glimpses of the Eastern Archi-
Cooper, Mishmee Hills, p. 238. pelago, p. 114,
Glimpses of the Eastern Archipelago, * Marsden, op. cit. p. 222,
p. 106 (highlanders of Palembang). ® Ellis, History of Madagascar, i.
Hale, U.S. Exploring Expedition. 196.
Vol. VI. Ethnography and Philology, ® Ellis, Tshi-speaking Peoples of the
p. 33 (Maoris). Gibbs, loc. cit. p. 189 Gold Coast, p. 291,
(Thlinkets). Steinmetz, Studien, ii. ^ Post, Afrikanisck^ Jurisprudenz,
sqq. i. 95*
THE KILLING OF SLAVES
to death a slave who is a native of the country, the master
even exposes himself to the blood-revenge of the family of
the slain. ^
The murder of another person’s slave is of course
largely regarded as an offence against the property of the
owner, but, in many cases at least, it is not exclusively
looked upon in this light. Where the master himself is
not allowed to kill his slave, the slave possesses the right
of life in the full sense of the term. Sometimes there is
in this respect little difference between him and a free-
man. Among the Beni Amer, whilst the murder of a
slave who has been bought is merely compensated for by
the payment of the purchase sum, the murder of a slave
who belongs to his master by birth is avenged by his
relatives, or, if he has none, by the master himself ;
should the murderer be too high a person, the matter
drops, but there is no question of payment in any case.*
Where the system of blood-money prevails, the price paid
for the life of a slave is less than that paid for the life of
a freeman. Among the Kirghiz the former is only half
of the latter.® In Axim, on the Gold Coast, according to
Bosman, the murderer of a slave was usually fined thirty-
six crowns, whilst five hundred crowns were demanded for
the murder of a free-born negro.^
The rule that the life of a slave is held in less esti-
mation than the life of a freeman applies to the nations
of archaic culture ; yet not even the master is among them
in all circumstances allowed to put his slave to death. In
ancient Mexico the murder of a slave, though committed
by the master, was a capital offence.® In Corea a slave
may not be killed by his owner before the latter has
obtained the permission of the board of punishments, or
of the high provincial authorities.® According to the
^ Munzinger, Osiafrikamsche Stu-
dittiy p. 484.
Ibid. p. 309.
^ Geoi^i, op. cit. ii. 261.
^ Bosman, New Description of the
Coast of Guinea^ p. 141
* Bancroft, op. cit. ii. 223.
® Rockhill, ‘ Notes on some of the
Laws, Customs, and Superstitions of
Korea,’ in American Anthropologist ^ iv.
180. Cf Griffis, Corea y p. 239.
THE KILLING OF SLAVES
Chinese Penal Code, a master who, instead of complain-
ing to a magistrate privately, beats to death a slave who
has been guilty of theft, adultery, or any other similar
crime, shall be punished with one hundred blows. If he
beats to death, or intentionally kills, a slave who has com-
mitted no crime, he shall be punished with sixty blows
and one year’s banishment, and the wife or husband, as
also the children, of the deceased slave shall be entitled
to their freedom.^ Again, a freeman who kills another’s
slave shall be strangled.^
According to Hebrew law, a master who smites his
slave so that he dies under his hand, ‘‘ shall be surely
punished” ; but if the slave continues to live for a day or
two after the assault, the master goes free on the score
that the slave is ‘‘ his money.” ^ Muhammed strongly
enjoined the duty of kindness to slaves ; yet, according
to Muhammedan law, the master may even kill his own
slave with impunity for any offence, and incurs but a
slight punishment — as imprisonment for a period at the
discretion of the judge — if he kills him wantonly.^ The
price of blood for a slave is his or her value; but by the
Hanafee law a man is obnoxious to capital punishment
for the murder of another man’s slave.^‘
Among the ancient Teutons the master was irrespon-
sible in the eye of the law as to all dealings between him-
self and his slave ; legally the slave was on a par with the
horse and the ox, and to kill him was only to inflict a
certain loss upon the owner.*' In ancient Wales the
position of a slave seems to have been very similar ; there
was no galanas for a bondman, “ only payment of his
worth to his master, like the worth of a beast.” ' Among
the Greeks, in the Homeric age, the master evidently
^ Ta Tsing Leu Lee^ sec. ceexiv. p. ^ Ideniy Modern Egyfptians^ p. 119.
340. Idem^ Arabian Society^ P* sq.
2 Ibid, sec. cccxiii. p. 336. ^ Grimm, Deutsche Kechtsalterthii-
^ Exodus^ xxi. 20 sq. 7 ?ier, jd. 342 sqq. Brunner, Deutsche
^ Lane, Manners and Customs of the Recktsgeschichte^ i. 96. Kemble, Saxons
Modern Egyptians^ p. 1 1 5. ide 77 i^ m Engla 7 td/\. 20% sqq, Stemann,
A/'abiaft Society in the Middle Ages, cit. 281 sqq. Keyser, op. cit. ii. pt.
p. 251. i. 289.
7 Ditiietian Code, iii. 3. 8 .
XVUI
THE KILLING OF SLAVES
could punish his slaves with death ; ^ but in later times,
at least at Athens, he was obliged to hand over to the
magistrate any slave of his who deserved capital punish-
ment. What happened to a master who killed his own
slave we do not know exactly, but at any rate he had to
undergo a ceremony of purification.** Plato says in his
‘ Laws,’ that if a person kills the slave of another in
anger, he shall pay twice the amount of the loss to his
owner.'* ■ But he adds, “ If any one kills a slave who has
done no wrong, because he is afraid that he may inform of
some base and evil deeds of his own, or for any similar
reason, in such a case let him pay the penalty of murder,
as he would have done if he had slain a citizen.” **
In Rome, in ancient times, the master had by law the
absolute power of life and death over his slaves ; and he
who killed another man’s slave was not criminally prose-
cuted, but had merely to compensate the owner for the
destruction of his property.*’ Even during the Empire
a slave was counted a thing, not a person ; himself in-
capable of suffering an injuria^ he was viewed as a
mechanical medium only, through which an insult could
be transmitted to his master." Yet this doctrine was not
rigidly adhered to. After the publication of the Lex
Cornelia, the change was introduced that he who killed a
slave belonging to somebody else could be punished for
murder ; * and later on even the master’s power of life and
death was restricted by law. Claudius declared that sick
slaves who had been exposed by their owners in a lan-
guishing condition, and afterwards recovered, should be
perfectly free and never more return to their former
servitude ; moreover, “ if any one c'nose to kill at once,
rather than expose, a slave, he should be liable for murder.” ”
^ Odyssey^ iv. 743 ; xix. 489 sq, ® Ibid, ix. 872.
^ Schmidt, Ethik der alten Griechm^ ^ Mommsen, Romisches Strafrecht^
ii. 217. Hermann-Blumi^r, Lehrbuch p. 616.
aer griechischen Privatalterthumer, p. ^ histitutiones ^ iv. 4. 3.
88, n. 3. ^ Gains, Institutionuin juris civilis
^ Plato, Leges^ ix. 865, 868, Schmidt, commeuiariiy iii. 213. Cf. Mommsen,
op, cit, ii. 217 sq, Romisches Strafrecht^ p. 616.
^ Plato, LegeSi ix. 868. ^ Suetonius, Claudius, 25.
By a constitution of Antoninus Pius he who put his slave
to death without a sufficient cause (sine causa) was to be
punished equally with him who killed the slave of another.^
Hadrian even made an attempt to induce slave-owners to
hand over to the authorities slaves who had been guilty of
some capital crime, instead of themselves inflicting the
punishment on.the guilty.^
Faithful to her principle that human life is sacred, the
Church made efforts to secure the life of the slave against
the violence of the master ; but neither the ecclesiastical
nor the secular legislation gave him the same protection as
was bestowed upon the free member of the Church and
State. Various Councils punished the murder of a slave
with two years’ excommunication only, if the slave had
been killed “sine conscientia judicis”; ® and the same
punishment was adopted by some Penitentials.^ Edgar
made the penanpe last three years, whereas, if a freeman
was killed, the penance was of seven years’ duration.*
Facts do not justify Mr. Lecky’s statement that, “ in the
penal system of the Church, the distinction between wrongs
done to a freeman, and wrongs done to a slave, which lay
at the very root of the whole civil legislation, was
repudiated.” ®
Beyond a law of Constantine, to the effect that a master
^ Gaius, op. cic. i. 53. InstUuiiones^
i. 8. 2.
® Spartian, Vita Hadriani, 18. Cf.
Mommsen yJiomisches St rafreckty p. 617,
n. 2,
^ Concilium Agathensey A.D. 506,
canon 62 (Labbe- Mansi, Sacrorum
Conciliorum collection viii. 335). Con-
cilium E^aonensey A.D. 517, canon 34
{^ibid. viii. 563). Concilium Worma-
tiensey A.D. 868, canon 38 {ibid. xv.
876).
* Pc^mtenttale Cummeanty vi. 29
(Wasserschleben, Btissordnungen der
abendldndischen Kirchcy p. 480).
Pcenit. Pseudo- Theodoriy xxi. 12 {ibid.
p- 587)-
® Canons enacted under EdgaVy Mo-
dus imponendi poenitentiam, 4, ii
{Ancient Laws and Institutes of Eng-
land y p. 405 sq.).
® Lecky, History of European
Morals y ii. 66. Mr. Lecky states
{ibid. ii. 66 sq.) that the Council of
Illiberis excluded for ever from the
communion a master who killed his
slave. I have only been able to find
the following enactment made by a
Council held at Illiberis in the begin-
ning of the fourth century : — “ Si qua
domina furore zeli accensa flagris ver-
beraverit ancillam suam, ita ut in ter-
tium diem animam cum cruciatu eifun-
dat ; eo quod incertum sit, voluntate,
an casu occiderit ; si voluntate, post
septem annos ; si casu, post quin-
quennii tempora, acta legitima pceni-
tentia, ^ad communionem placuit ad-
mitti” {Concilium Eliberitanumy ch. 5
[Labbe-Mansi, op. cit. ii. 6]).
xvin
THE KILLING OF SLAVES
who put his slave to death in a non-judicial way, was to be
punished as a murderer,^ and a reiteration of some previous
enactments, the Christian emperors seem to have done
little to guard the life of the slave. Whilst it was
provided that any master who applied to his slave certain
atrocious tortures with the object of killing him should
be deemed a manslayer, it was emphatically said that no
charge whatever should be brought against him if the slave
died under moderate punishment, or under any punish-
ment not inflicted with the intention of killing him.*^
Arcadius and Honorius even passed a law refusing pro-
tection to a slave who should fly to a church for refuge
from his master ; ® but this law was, in the West, followed
by regulations of an opposite character.'* The barbarian
invasions certainly did not improve the condition of slaves,
and in Teutonic countries it was only by slow degrees that
the introduction and spread of a higher civilisation exer-
cised its humanising influence on the relation between
master and slave. The Visigothic Code prohibited a
person from killing any of his slaves who had committed
no offence.^ According to the Capitularia, the master had
to pay a penalty for causing the death of a guiltless slave,
provided that he died at once ; but if he survived the
injury only a day or two, the master was not punishable
for his deed, because the slave was his ■pecunia^ In a later
period any intentional killing of an innocent slave was
punished by law, but the law probably remained a dead
letter. In the thirteenth century Beaumanoir, the French
jurisconsult, could write: — “Plus cortoise est nostre
coustume envers les sers que en autre pais, car li segneur
poent penre de lor sers, et a mort et a vie, toutes les fois
^ Codex Theodosianus, ix. 12. i. Capitulariay vi. ir (Georgisch,
® Ibid. ix. 12. Lecky, History of Corpus Juris Germanici antiqui^ col.
European Morals ii. 62 sq. I 5 I 3 )« This law is borrowed from
* Codex TheodosianuSf ix. 45. 3. Exodus^ xxi. 20 sq.
^ Babington, TAe Influence of Chris- ^ Grimm, Deutsche Rechtsalterthii-
tianity in promoting the Abolition of mer^ p. 344 sq. Cf Potgiesser, Corn-
Slavery in Europe s p. 37. Biot, De muntarii juris Germanici de statu
V abolition de Vesclavage ancien en servorum veteri perinde atqve novo^ ii.
Occident, p. 239. 1. lo, 13, 24; iii. 6 (pp. 308, 309, 31 1,
^ Lex Wisigothorutn, vi. 5, 12. 312, 321, 633 sqq.).
qu’il lor plest, et tant qu’il lor plet.” ^ Nay, even in quite
modern times, in Christian countries, v/here negro slavery
prevailed as a recognised institution, the life of the slave
was only inadequately protected by their laws.
In most of the British colonies, it was only by force of
comparatively recent acts, made for the most part subse-
quent to the year 1797, that the same punishment was
prescribed for the murder of a slave as for the murder of
a free person. Prior to this period the former crime was
subject only to a small pecuniary penalty, in Barbados not
exceeding £iS-“ French colonies, according to the
Code Noir, a master who killed his slave should be punished
“ selon I’atrocit^ des circonstances.” ® In all the North
American Slave-States there was a time when the murder
of a slave, whether by his master or a third person, was
atoned for by a fine. In South Carolina this was the
case as late as 1821, and only since then the wilful,
malicious, and premeditated killing of a slave, by
whomsoever perpetrated, was a capital offence in all
the slave-holding States.'* But this does not mean that no
distinction was made between the killing of a slave and
the killing of a freeman. In South Carolina, according
to an enactment of 1821, he who killed a slave on a
sudden heat or passion was punished simply with a fine of
five hundred dollars and imprisonment not exceeding six
months.'* In the Statutes of Tennessee the law referring
to the wilful murder of a slave contained the provision
that it should not be extended to “ any person killing any
slave in the act of resistance to his lawful owner or master,
or any slave dying under moderate correction and a
very similar provision was made by the laws of Georgia.'^
In other words, a correction causing the death of the victim
^ Beaiimanoir, Les couttwies du Stroud, Laws relating to Slavery in the
Beauvoisis, xlv. 36, vol. ii. p. 237. United States of America ^ p. 5S ^.
^ Stephen, Slavery of the British ® Stroud, d?/. «/. p. 64.
West India Colonies delineated f\. if ® Caruthers and Nicholson, Corn'
^ Code Noir, fidit donne au mois de pilation of the Statutes of Tennessee,
Mars 1724, art. 39, p. 304. P- 677.
** Digest of the Public Statute Prince, Digest of the Laws of the
Laiv of South Carolina, ii. 240 sq. State of Georgia, p. 787.
THE KILLING OF SLAVES
was not necessarily immoderate in the eye of the law. In
a still higher degree the life of the slave was endangered
by another law, which prevailed universally both in the
Slave-States and in the British Colonies. Neither a slave,
nor a free Negro, nor any descendant of a native of Africa
whatever might be the shade of his complexion, could be
a witness against a white person, either in a civil or criminal
case.^ This law placed the slave, who was seldom within
the view of more than one white man at a time, entirely at
the mercy of this individual, and its consequences were
obvious. Speaking of slavery in the United States in
1853, Mr. Goodell remarks ; — “Upon the most diligent
inquiry and public challenge, for fifteen or twenty years
past, not one single case has yet been ascertained in which,
either during that time or previously, a master killing his
slave, or indeed any other white man, has suffered the
penalty of death for the murder of a slave.” Neverthe-
less, murders of slaves by white men had been notoriously
frequent.^
That the life of a slave is held in so little regard is due
to that want of sympathy with his fate which accounts also
for his unfree condition, and to the proprietary rights over
him which, in consequence, have been granted to his master.
For similar reasons the killing of a freeman by a slave,
especially if the victim be his owner, is commonly punished
more severely than if the same act were done by a free
person. The less the sympathy felt for an individual, the
more intense is the resentment which he excites by offensive
behaviour. According to the Chinese Penal Code, a slave
who designedly kills, or strikes so as to kill, his master,
shall suffer death “ by a slow and painful execution.” ®
Plato says that, if a slave voluntarily murders a freeman,
^ Brevard, op> clt. ii. 242. Stroud, flight throw light on the evidence of
of>. cit, p. 106 sq, Steplien, Slaifery of other witne.sses ( Code No/r, Edit du
the British I Vest India Cokmics, i. 166, mois de Mars 1685, art. 30, p. 44).
174. In the French Colonies, also, Coodell, American Stave Code in
slave.s could not be legal witnesses, but Theory and Practice^ p. 209 sq.
their testimony might be lieard by the ^ Ta 'J'sing Leu Lee^ sec. ceexiv. p.
judge, merely to serve as a suggestion, 338.
or unauthenticated information, which
THE INFLUENCE OF CLASS chap.
the public executioner shall lead him in the direction of
the sepulchre of the dead man, to a place whence he can see
the tomb, and after inflicting upon him as many stripes as
the complainant shall order, put the murderer, if he survives
the scourging, to death.^ Though the slave has committed
the act in a fit of passion, the relatives of the deceased
shall nevertheless be under an obligation to kill him, and
this may be done in any manner they please ; * nay, even
in self-defence a slave is not allowed to kill a freeman, any
more than a son is allowed to kill his father.® At Rome,
also, a slave was more heavily punished for the commission
of homicide than a freeman.^ Says the ancient jurist,
“ Maiores nostri in omni supplicio severius servos quam
liberos famosos quam integrae famae homines punierunt.” ®
In the estimate of life a distinction is made not only
between freemen and slaves, but between different classes
of freemen. Among certain peoples a person who kills a
chief is punished with death, though murder is not gene-
rally a capital offence.* Where the system of compensation
prevails, the blood-price very frequently varies according
to the station or rank of the victim.'^ Among the Rejangs
of Sumatra the compensation for the murder of a superior
chief is five hundred dollars, for that of an inferior chief
two hundred and fifty dollars ; for that of a common
person, man or boy, eighty dollars ; for that of a common
person, woman or girl, one hundred and fifty dollars ; for
the legitimate child or wife of a superior chief, two hun-
dred and fifty dollars.® The body of every Ossetian has
^ Plato, Leges^ ix. 872.
2 Ibid, ix. 868.
® Ibid. ix. 869.
^ Mommsen, Romisches Strafrechty
p. 631 sq.
* Digesta, xlviii. 19. 28. 16.
^ Woodthorpe, in Jour. Anthr. Inst.
XX vi. 21 (Shans). Shooter, Kajfirs of
Nataly p. 103.
^ Maclean, Compendium of Kafir
Laws and Customs y p. 144. Casalis,
BasutoSy p. 225. Ellis, TshLspeaking
Peoples of the Gold Coast, p. 301.
Munzinger, Ostafrikanische Studieny pp.
242 sq. (Marea), 314 (Beni Amer).
Forbes, A Naha-alisP s Wanderings in
the Eastern Archipelago y p. 145 (Lam-
pongers of Sumatra). Modigliani, Vi-
aggio a Niasy p. 494. Richardson, Arc^
tic Searching Expeditiony i. 386 ( Kut-
chin). Gibbs, loc cit. p. 190 (Indians
of' Western Washington and North-
western Oregon). Paget, Hungary and
Transylvaniay ii. 41 1 n. (Hungarians).
® Crawfurd, History of the Indian
ArchipelagOy \\\. 1 12.
THE INFLUENCE OF CLASS
a settled value in the eyes of the judges, which seems to
be fixed by public opinion ; thus the father of a family
bears a higher value than an unmarried man, and a noble
is rated at twice as much as an ordinary freemand In
Eastern Tibet the murderer of a man of the upper class
is fined 120 bricks of tea, the murderer of a middle-class
man only 80, and so on down through the social scale, the
life of a beggar being valued at a nominal amount only ;
but if the victim was a lama, the murderer has to pay a
much higher price, possibly 300 bricksd According to
the doctrine of modern Buddhism, “ when the life of a
man is taken, the demerit increases in proportion to the
merit of the person slain.” ® The Laws of the Brets and
Scots estimated the life of the king of Scots at a thousand
cows ; that of an earl’s son, or a thane, at a hundred
cows ; that of a villein, at sixteen cows.^ A similar
system prevailed among the Celtic peoples generally,® as
also among the Teutons. A man’s wergeld, or life-price,
varied according to his rank, birth, or office ; and so
minutely was it graduated, that a great part of many
Teutonic laws was taken up by provisions fixing its
amount in different cases.'' In English laws of the Norman
age the wer of a villanus is still only reckoned at j^4,
whilst that of the homo plene nobilis is ^^25.^
The magnitude of the crime, however, may depend not
only on the rank of the victim, but on the rank of the
manslayer as well.’' Among the Philippine Islanders,
“ murder committed by a slave was punished with death
— committed by a person of rank, was indemnified by
^ von Haxthaiisen, Transcaucasia^
p. 409. Kovalewsky, Couturne coitteni’
poraine, p. 355 sqq.
^ Rockhill, Land of the LamaSy p.
221.
^ Hardy, Mamial of Budhismy p.
478.
^ Innes, Scotland in the Middle AgeSy
p.'iSoj^.
^ Ancient Laws of Ireland y iii. 103,
&c. Skene, Celtic Scotlandy iii. 152.
de Valroger, Les CelteSy p. 471.
® Grimnj, Deutsche Rechtsalterthu-
mery pp. 272-275, 289. Brunner,
Deutsche RechisgeschichtCy i, 104, 105,
107, 108, 224, 247 sqq, Kemble,
Saxons in Englandy i. 276 sqq.
^ Leges Henrici I. Ixx. i ; Ixxvi. 4.
CfLaws of William the Conqueror y i. 8.
® These two principles do not always
go together. Among the Rejangs the
amount of the blood-money is not pro-
portioned to the rank and ability of the
murderer, but regulated only by the
quality of the person murdered (Mars-
den, op. cit. p. 246).
THE INFLUENCE OF CLASS
payments to the injured family.” ^ In Fijian estimation,
says Mr. Williams, offences “ are light or grave according
to the rank of the offender. Murder by a chief is less
heinous than a petty larceny committed by a man of low
rank.” ^ Among the Ewe-speaking peoples of the Slave
Coast, “ in cases of murder and manslaughter, if the homi-
cide be of rank superior to the person killed, he pays the
compensation demanded by the family of the latter, or, in
default of payment, forfeits his own life. If the homi-
cide be of equal rank with the person killed, the family
of the deceased have the right to demand his life, though
compensation is usually accepted ; but when he is lower
in rank his life is nearly always forfeited.” ^ Very similar
rules prevail among the Tshi-speaking peoples of the Gold
Coast."* Among the Marea, if a nobleman kills another
nobleman, the family of the deceased generally take re-
venge on him; whereas, if a commoner kills a nobleman, he
is not only executed himself, but his property is confiscated
and his nearest relatives become subject to the murdered
man’s family.’’ According to the religious law of Brah-
manism, the enormity of all crimes depends on the caste
of him who commits them, and on the caste of him
against whom they are committed.** • If a Brahmana
slays a jBrahmana, the king shall brand him on the
forehead with a heated iron and banish him from his
realm, but if a man of a lower caste murders a Brahmana,
he shall be punished with death and the confiscation of all
his property.*” If such a person slays a man of equal or
lower caste, other suitable punishments sliall be inflicted
upon him.** A fine of a thousand cows is the penalty for
slaying a Kshatriya, that of a hundred for slaying a
Vaisya, and that of ten cows only for slaying a Sfidra.*’
In Rome, also, at a certain period of its history, the
^ Bo wring, Visz^ to the Philippine dien^T^. 2^2 sq. Cf, ibid. p. 314 (Beni
Islands, p. 123. Amer).
2 Williams and Calvert, Pi/i, p.. 22. ' ® Hopkins, Peligums of India, p.
3 Ellis, Eive-spcakizig Peoples, p. 223. 263.
^ Idem, Tshi-speaking Peoples, p. ^ Baudhdyana, i. 10. 18. 18 sq.
301. ^ Ibid. i. 10. 18. 20.^
® Mtinzinger, Ostafrikanische Stu- ^ Ibid, i, 10. 19. I sq.
. XVIII
THE INFLUENCE OF CLASS
offence was magnified in proportion to the insignificance
of the offender. During the Republic there was no Jaw
sanctioning such a distinction, with reference to crimes
comjnitted by free citizens; but from the beginning of the
Empire, the citizens were divided into privileged classes
and commonalty - — uterque ordo and plebs — and, whilst a
commoner who was guilty of murder was punished with
death, a murderer belonging to the privileged classes was
generally punished with deportatio only.^ In the Middle
Ages a similar privilege was granted by Italian and
Spanish laws to manslayers of noble birtb.'^
In a society which is divided into different classes,
persons belonging to a higher class are naturally apt to
sympathise more with their equals than with their inferiors.
An injury inflicted on one of the former tends to arouse
in them a higher degree of sympathetic resentment than
a similar injury inflicted on one of the latter. So, also,
their resentment towards the criminal will, ceteris paribus,
be more intense if he is a person of low rank than if he
is one of themselves. Where the superior class, as was
originally the case everywhere, are the leaders of such a
society, their feelings will find expression in its customs
and laws, and thus moral distinctions will arise which are
readily recognised by the common people also, owing to
the admiration with which they look up to those above
them. But in a progressive society this state of things
will not last. The different classes gradually draw nearer
to each other. The once all-powerful class loses much of
its exclusi.veness, as well as of its importance and influence.
Sympathy expands. In consequence, distinctions which
were formerly sanctioned by custom and law come to be
regarded as unjust prerogatives, worthy only of abolition.
And it is at last admitted that each member of the society
is born with an equal claim to the most sacred of all
human rights, the right to live.
^ Mommsen, Romisekes Strafrecht^ des petiphs modernes^ ii. 402. Idefn^
FM’- 650, 1032 S(]q. Histoire dtc droit criniinel de PEspagne,
Da Boys, Histoire dii droit criminel pp- 357, 359. Cf. ibid. p. 635 sq.
VOB. I
F
Chapter XIX
HUMAN SACRIFICE
It Still remains for us to consider some particular cases
in which destruction of human life is sanctioned by custom
or law.
Men are killed with a view to gratifying the desires of
superhuman beings. We meet with human sacrifice in the
past history of every so-called Aryan race.^ It occurred,
at least occasionally, in ancient India, and several of the
modern Hindu sects practised it even in the last cen-
tury.^ There are numerous indications that it was known
among the early Greeks.® At certain times it prevailed in
the Hellenic cult of Zeus ; ■* indeed, in the second century
after Christ men seem still to have been sacrificed to
Zeus Lycaeus in Arcadia.® To the historic age likewise
belongs the sacrifice of the three Persian prisoners of
war whom Themistocles was compelled to slay before the
battle of Salamis.® In Rome, also, human sacrifices, though
^ See Mehn, JVan^erings of Plants Northern India, ii. 167 Chever.s,
and Animals from their First Home, Manual of Medical Jtirisp 7 'ndence for
p. sqq. '' India, p. 396 sqq.
2 Weber, Indisc he Streifen, i. 54 ® See Geusius, Viciima HnmancB,
sqq. Wilson, ‘Human Sacrifices in passim; von Lasaulx, Suhnofper der
the Ancient Religion of India,’ in Griechen tmd Romer, passim ; Farnell,
Works, ii. 247 sqq. Oldenberg, Re- Cults of the Greek States, i. 41 sq.;
ligion des Veda, p. 363 sqq. Barth, Stengel, Die griechischen Kultusalter-!
Religfons of htdia, p. 57 sqq. Monier tu?ner, p. 1145^^.
Williams, Brahmanism and Hinduism, ^ Cf Farnell, op. cit. i. 93 ; Stengel,
p. 24. Hopkins, Religions of India, op. cit. p. 116.
pp. 198, 363. Rajendralila Mitra, ® Pausanias, viii. 38. 7.
Indo- Aryans, ii. 69 sqq. Crooke, ** V\\\Xz.Ys\i, Themistocles, 13.
Popular Religion and Folk-Lore of
CH, XIX
HUMAN SACRIFICE
exceptional, were not unknown in historic times 3 Pliny
records that in the year 97 b.c. a decree forbidding such
sacrifices was passed by the Roman Senate,® and after-
wards the emperor Hadrian found it necessary to renew
this prohibition.® Porphyry asks, “Who does not know
that to this day, in the great city of Rome, at the festival of
Jupiter Latiaris, they cut the throat of a man?”^ And
Tertullian states that in North Africa, even to the procon-
sulship of Tiberius, infants were publicly sacrificed to
Saturn.® Human sacrifices were offered by Celts,® Teu-
tons,^ and Slavs ; ® by the ancient Semites ® and Egyp-
tians ; by the Japanese in early days ; “ and, in the New
World, by the Mayas and, to a frightful extent, by the
Aztecs. “ Scarcely any author,” says Prescott in his
‘ History of the Conquest of Mexico,’ “ pretends to estimate
the yearly sacrifices throughout the empire at less than
twenty thousand, and some carry the number as high
as fifty thousand.” The same practice is imputed by
Spanish writers to the Incas of Peru, and probably not
without good reason. Before their rule, at all events, it
^ Ideniy Quesiiones Romaiia;, 83. See
Landau, in Atn Ur^Qmll^ iii. 1892, p,
283 sqq,
Pliny, Historia naturalise xxx. 3.
3 Porphyry, De abstinentia ab esu
animaliume ii. 56.
^ Ibid. \\, 56.
^ Tertullian, ApologeticuSy 9 (Migne,
PatrologicB cursus^ i. 314).
® Caesar, De hello gallicoy vi. 16.
Tacitus, Afinalesy xiv. 30. Diodorus
Siculus, Bibliothecae v. 31, p. 354.
Pliny, Historia naturalis, xxx. 4.
Strabo, iv. 5, p. 198. Joyce, Social
History of Ancient Ireland y i. 281 sqq.
^ Tacitus, Germania y 9. Adam of
Bremen, Gesta Hammciburgensis ec-
clesicE pontificuuiy iv. 27 (Migne, op. cit,
cxlvi. 644). Grimm, Teutonic Myth-
ology, i. 44 sqq. Vigfusson and
Powell, Corpus Poeticum Boreale, i,
409 sq. Frey tag, ‘ Riesen jund Men-
sclienopfer in unsern Sagen und
Marchen,’ in Am Ur- Quell y i. 1890,
pp. 179-183. 197 m-
® Mone, Geschichte des nordtschen
HeidenthumSy i. 119, quoted by Frazer,
Golden Bough y ii. 52. Krauss, in Am
Ur-Quelly vi. 1896, p. 137 sqq.
(Servians).
® Ghillany, Die Menschenopfer der
alten Hebrdery passi?n. Robertson
Smith, Religion of the Se 7 niteSy p. 362
sqq. Wellhausen, Reste arabischen
Heidentumsy p. 115 sq. von Kremer,
Studien zur vergleichetiden Cultur-
geschichtey i. 42 sqq. Chwolsohn,
Die Ssabier tmd der Ssabismus, ii. 147
sqq.
Amelineau, V Evolution des idt*es
mof'ales dans VAg^pte AnciennCy p. 12.
Griflis, Religions of JapaUy p. 75.
Lippert, Seelencult, p. 79.
Bancroft, Native Races of the
Pcuific States y ii. 704, 725.
Prescott, History of the Conquest
of MexicOy p. 38. Cf, Clavigero,
History of Mexico y i. 281 ; Acosta,
Natural and Moral History of the
Indies y ii. 346.
Acosta, op. cit. ii. 344. de Molina,
‘Fables and Rites of the Yncas,’ in
Narratives of the Rites and Laws of the
Yncasy pp. 55, 56^ 59. According to
F F 2
was of frequent occurrence among the Peruvian Indians.^
It also prevailed, or still prevails, among the Caribs “ and
some North American tribes;^, in various South Sea
islands, especially Tahiti and Fiji ; * among certain tribes in
the Malay Archipelago ; among several of the aboriginal
tribes of India ; ® and very commonly in Africa.
LFrom this enumeration it appears that the practice of
human sacrifice cannot be regarded as a characteristic of
savage races. On the contrary, it is found much more
Cieza (le Leon {Segtuida parte de la
CrSnica del Peni^ p. lOo), the practice
of human sacrifice has been much ex-
aggerated hy Spanish writers, but he
does not deny its existence among the
Incas ; nay, he gives an account of
such sacrifices {djld, p. log syy,). Sir
Clements Markham seems to attach
undue importance to the statement of
Garcilasso de la Vega that human
victims were never sacrificed by the
Incas {First Part of the Royal Com-
mentaries of the Yncasy\. 130, 131, 139
n. t)- Cf Prescott, History of the
Conquest of Peru^ p. 50 sq. n. 3.
^ Garcilas.so de la Vega, of. cit. i. 50,
130.
^ Muller, Geschichte der Amerika-
nischen Urreligioneny p. 212 sq.
Ibid. p. ijgzsqq. Reville, Rclii^ions
des peuples non-ciz>ilisis, i. 249 sq.
Dorman, Origin of Primitive Sttper-
stitions^ p. 208 sqq.
■* Schneider, Nattimjblhery i. 191 sq,
Fornander, Account of the Polynesian
Race., i. 129. Ellis, Polynesian Re-
searches, i. 106, 346-348, 357 (Society
Islanders). Williams, Missionary
Enterprises in the South Sea Islazids,
p. 548 sq. (especially the Hervey
Islanders and Tahitians), von Kotzebue,
Voyac^e of Discovery, iii, 248 (Sandwich
Islanders). Lisiansky, Voyage round
the World, pp. 8 1 sq. (Nukahivans),
120 (Sandwich Islanders). Gill, Myths
and Songs from the South Pacific, p. 289
(Mangaians). Williamsand Calvert,
Fiji, pp. 188, 195 ; Wilkes, Narrative
of the U. S. Exploring Expedition, iii.
97 ; Hale, U. S. Exploring Expedition,
Vol. VI. Ethnography and Philology,
p. 57 (Fijians). Codrington, Mela-
nesians, p. 1 34 sqq.
^ Idng Roth, Natives of Sarawak
and British North Borneo, ii. 215 sqq.
Bock, Head-Hunters of Borneo, p. 218
sq. (Dyaks).
^ Woodthorpe, in Jour. Anthr. Inst.
xxvi. 24 (Shans, c^c.). Colqulioun,
Amongst the Shans, p. 152 (Steins
inhabiting the south-east of Indo*
China). Lewin, Wild Races of South-
Eastern India, 244 (J^inkhos and
Bunjogees). God win- Austen, m Jour.
Anthr. Inst. ii. 394 (Garo hill tril)cs).
Dalton, Descriptive Ethnology of
Bengpal, pp. 147 (Bhuiyas), 176
(Bhumij), 281 (Gonds), 285 sqij,
(Kandhs). Hislop, Aboriginal I'ribes
of the Central Provinces, p. 15 sq.
(Gonds). Maepherson, Memorials of
Sef'vice in India, p. 113 sqq. \ Camp-
bell, Wild Tribes of Khondistan,
passim (Kandhs).
^ Schneider, Religion der afrika-
nischen Natjcnjolker, p. 118. Reade,
Savage Africa, p. 52 (Dahomans, &c. ).
bang Roth, Great Benin, p. 63 sqq.
Ellis, Ezhe-speaking Peoples of the Slave
Coast, p. 1 17 sqq. Idem, Yoruba-
speaking Peoples of the Slave Coast,
p. 296. Idem, 'Ps hi- speaking Peoples
of the Gold Coast, p. 169 sqq. Cruick-
shank, Eighteen Years on the Gold
Coast, ii. 173. vSehoen and Crowther,
Expedition ztp the Niger, p. 48 sq.
(Ibos). Arnot, Garenganze, p. 75
(Barotse). Arbous.set and Daumas,
Exploratory Tour to the North-East of
the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope,
p. 97 (Marimos, a Bechuana tribe).
Macdonald, Africana, i. 963-^. (Eastern
Central Africans). ElHs, History of
Madagascar, i. 422 ; Sibree, The Great
African Island, p. 303 (Malagasy;.
HUMAN SACRIFICE
frequently among barbarians and semi- civilised peoples
than among genuine savages, and at the lowest stages of
culture known to us it is hardly heard of.^ Among some
peoples the practice has been noticed to become increasingly
prevalent in the course of time. In the Society Islands
“ human sacrifices, we are informed by the natives, are
comparatively of modern institution : they were not
admitted until a few generations antecedent to the dis-
covery of the Islands ” ; ^ and in ancient legends there
seem to be certain indications that they were once pro-
hibited in Polynesia.'^ /In India human sacrifices were
apparently much rarer among the Vedic people than
among the Brahmanists of a later age.® We are told that
such sacrifices were adopted by the Aztecs only in the
beginning of the fourteenth century, about two hundred
years before the conquest, and that, “ rare at first, they be-
canie more frequent with the wider extent of their empire ;
till, at length, almost every festival was closed with this
cruel abomination.” Of the Africans Mr. Winwood
Reade remarks, “ The more powerful the nation the
grander the sacrifice.”
Men offer up human victims to their gods because they
think that the gods are gratified by such offerings. In
many cases the gods are supposed to have an appetite for
human flesh or blood.'* The Fijian gods are described as
“delighting in human flesh.”" Among the Ooryahs of
India the priest, when offering a human sacrifice to the
war-god Manicksoro, said to the god, “ The sacrifice we
now offer you must eat.”® Among the Iroquois, when an
enemy was tortured at the stake, the savage executioners
leaped around him crying, “To thee, Arieskoi, great
spirit, we slay this victim, that thou mayest eat his flesh
and be moved thereby to give us henceforth luck and
^ ILWiSy Polynesian Researches P\. io6. Schneider, Naturvolker^ i. 190.
Fornander, op. cit. i. 129.* ^ Williams and Calvert, op. cit. p.
^ Wilson, IVorks, ii. 268 S(/. 195.
Prescott, History of the Conquest ** Campbell, IVild Tribes of Khan-
of Mexico., p. 36. distanf p. 21 1. Cf Maepherson,
Reade, Savage Africa., p. 52. Memorials of Sendee in India., p. 120
^ See Lippert, Seelencult, p. 77 sqq. ; (Kandhs).
victory over our foes.”* Among the ancient nations of
Central America the blood and heart of the human
victims offered in sacrifice were counted the peculiar
portion of the gods.* Thus, in Mexico, the high priest,
after cutting open the victim’s breast, tore forth the yet
palpitating heart, offered it first to the sun, threw it then
at the feet of the idol, and finally burned it ; sometimes
the heart was placed in the mouth of the idol with a
golden spoon, and its lips were anointed with the victim’s
blood.®
But the human victim is not always, as has been
erroneously supposed,* intended to serve the god as a food-
offering. The Tshi- speaking peoples of the Gold Coast,
as Major Ellis observes, maintain that their gods require
not only food, but attendants ; “ the ghosts of the human
victims sacrificed to them are believed to pass at once into a
condition of ghostly servitude to them, just as those sacri-
ficed at the funerals of chiefs are believed to pass into a
ghostly attendance.” Cieza de Leon mentions the pre-
valence of a similar belief among the ancient Peruvians.
At the hill of Guanacaure, “ on certain days they sacrificed
men and women, to whom, before they were put to death,
the priest addressed a discourse, explaining to them that
they were going to serve that god who was being
worshipped.” ®
Moreover, an angry god may be appeased simply by the
death of him or those who aroused his anger, or of some
representative of the offending community, or of some-
body belonging to the kin of the offender. Among the
E'^e-speaking peoples of the Slave Coast, “ in the case of
human victims the gods are not believed to devour the
^ Muller, Geschichte der Amerika-
nischen Urreligionen^ p. 142.
» Bancroft, cit. ii. 307, 310, 31 1,
707 m* , .
* Clavigero, op, ctf. 1. 279.
^ R^ville, Hibbert Lectures on the
Native Religions of Mexico and Peru,,
P* 75 J?* Idem,, Prolegomena of the
History of Religions^ p. 132. yrum-
bull, Blood Covenant i p. 189. Stein-
metz, Endokannibalismus ^ p. 60, n. i-
Schrader, Reallexikon der iftdogerma-
fiischen AUertumskunde^t p. 603.
® Ellis, Tshi-speakmg Peoples of the
Gold Coast y p. 169,
® Cieza de Leon, Segiinda parte de
la CrSnica del Per^^ '^p. 109.
HUMAN SACRIFICE
souls ; and as these souls are, by the majority of the
natives, believed to proceed to Dead-land like all others,
the object of human sacrifice seems to be to gratify or
satiate the malignancy of the gods at the expense of chosen
individuals, instead of leaving it to chance — the victims
are in fact slain for the benefit of the community at
large.” ^ One reason why the human victims are so
frequently criminals, is no doubt the intention of appeasing
the god by offering up to him an individual who is
hateful to him. The Sandwich Islanders “ sacrifice culprits
to their gods, as we sacrifice them in Europe to justice.”^
Among the Teutons the execution of a criminal was, in
many cases at least, a sacrifice to the god whose peculiar
cult had been offended by the crime.® Thus the Frisian
law describes as an immolation to the god the punishment
of one who violates his temple.^ In ancient Rome the
corn thief, if he was an adult, was hanged as an offering
to Ceres and Ovid tells us that a priestess of Vesta who
had been false to her vows of chastity was sacrificed by
being buried alive in the earth, Vesta and Tellus being the
same deity.** In consequence of the sacrilege of Menalip-
pus and Comaetho, who had polluted a temple of Artemis
by their amours, the Pythian priestess ordained that the
guilty pair should be sacrificed to the goddess, and that,
besides, the people should every year sacrifice to her a
youth and a maiden, the fairest of their sex." The
Hebrew cherem^ or ban, was originally applied to male-
factors and other enemies of Jahveh, and sometimes also
to their possessions. “ Cherem^' says Professor Kuenen, “ is
properly dedication to Jahveh, which in reality amounted
to destruction or annihilation. The persons who were
^ Ellis, Ewe-speaking Peoples of ihe
Slave Coast f p. 119.
2 von Kotzebue, op, cit, iii. 248. Cf,
Lisiansky, op. cit, 120.
^ von Amira, in Paul’s Grundriss der
germanischen Philologie^ ii. pt. ii. 1 77.
Brunner, Deutsche Rechtsgeschichte^ ii.
587, 684 sq, Vigfusson and Powell,
op. cit. i. 410. Gummere, Germanic
Origins f p. 463.
Lex Frisionum^ Additio sapien-
tium, 12.
® Granger^ Worship of the Ronians,
p. 260.
® Ovid, Fasti, vi. 457 sq, Cf. Momm-
sen, Romisches Strafrecht, p< 902.
^ Pausanias, vii. 19. 4.
HUMAN SACRIFICE
‘dedicated/ generally by a solemn vow, to Jahveh, were
put to death, frequently by fire, whereby the resemblance
to an ordinary burnt- offering was rendered still more
apparent ; their dwellings and ^property were also con-
sumed by fire ; their lands were left uncultivated for ever.
Such punishments were very common in the ancient world.
But in Israel, as elsewhere, they were at the same time
religious acts/’ ^ The sacrifice of offenders has, in fact,
survived in the Christian world, since every execution
performed for the purpose of appeasing an offended and
angry god may be justly called a sacrifice.
yt is impossible to discover in every special case in what
respect the worshippers believe the offering of a fellow-
creature to be gratifying to the deity. Probably they
have not always definite views on the subject themselves.
They know, or believe, that, on some certain occasion,
they are in danger of losing their lives ; they attribute
this to the designs of a supernatural being ; and, by
sacrificing a man, they hope to gratify that being's craving
for human life, and thereby avert the danger from them-
selves. That this principle mainly underlies the practice
of human sacrifice appears from the circumstances in
which such sacrifices generally occur. ^
Human victims are often offered in war, before a battle,
or during a siege.
Cxsar wrote of the Gauls, “ 'Fhey who are engaged in battles
and dangers either sacrifice men as victims, or vow that they
will sacrifice them . . . ; because they think that unless the
life of a man be offered for the life of a man, the mind of
the immortal gods cannot be rendered propitious.” ^ The
Lusitanians sacrificed a man and a horse at the commencement
of a military enterprise."^ Before going to war, or before the
beginning of a battle, or during a siege, the Greeks offered a
human victim to ensure victory.^ When hard-pressed in battle,
^ Kuenen, Religio 72 of Isf’ael, i. 29(0 ^ Csesar, De hello gallico^ vi. 16.
sq. K T.ivy, Zipitonic^ 49.
See siipra^ p. 197 sq. For various Pausanias, iv. 9. 4 sqq. ; ix. 17. i.
instances of expiatory human sacrifice, Plutarch, The/nlstoeles, 13. Idern^
involving vicarious atonement, see Arisiides, 9. Ideni^ Pefopidas, 21 sq,
supra, p. 66 sq. Lycurgiis, Oratio in Leocratem,{c\\. 24)
HUMAN SACRIFICE
the King of Moab sacrificed his eldest son as a burnt offering on
the wall.^ In times of great calamities, such as war, the
Phenicians sacrificed some of their dearest friends, who were
selected by votes for this purpose/^ During a battle with king
Gelo of Syracuse, the general Hamilcar sacrificed innumerable
human victims, from dawn to sunset ; ^ and when Carthage
was reduced to the last extremities, the noble families were
compelled to give up two hundred of their sons to be offered to
Haal.^ In Hindu scriptures and traditions success in war is
promised to him who offers a man in sacrifice.'’ In Jeypore
the blood-red god of battle ” is propitiated by human victims..
Thus, on the eve of a battle, or when a new fort, or even an
important village is to be built, or when danger of any kind is
to be averted, this sanguinary being must be propitiated with
human blood.” ^ In Great Benin human blood was shed in a
case of common danger when an enemy was at the gate of the
city.^ The Yorubas sacrifice men in times of national need.®
Among the Ewe-speaking peoples of the Slave Coast, such
sacrifices arc ordinarily only made in time of war, pestilence,
or great calamity,” The Tahitians offered human sacrifices
in seasons of war, or when war was in agitation.^^
After a victory, captured enemies are sacrificed to the god to
whose assistance the success is ascribed. I'his sacrifice has been
represented as a thank-offering but, in many cases at least, it
seems to be offered either to fulfil a vow previously made, or to
induce the god to continue his favours for the future. Among
the Kayans of Borneo it is the custom that, when captives are
brought to an enemy’s country, ‘‘one should suffer death, to bring
prosperity and abolish the curse of the enemy in their lands.
CHuman sacrifices are offered for the purpose of stopping
or preventing epidemics. ^
99. Apollodorus, BihliotheA'a^ iii. 15.
4. Porphyry, l)e abstiuenlia ob esii
aniuialhifn ^ ii. 56, Geusius, of>. cit. i.
ch. 16 sq. Stengel, op. cit. }>. 115
^ 2 Kiijgs^ iii. 27.
Porphyry, op. cit. ii. 56.
^ Herodotus, vii. 167.
Diodorus Siculus, xx. 14.
^ Chevers, op. cit. p. 39^.
Campbell, Wild Tribes of Khou-
distan^ p. 52.
^ Ling Roth, Great Benin, p. 72.
Ellis, Yornba-speaking J^eoples of
the Slave Coast, p. 296.
^ Idem, Eiue- speaking Peoples of the
Slave Coast, p. 117.
Ellis, Polynesian Researches , i. 276
346.
" Diodorus Siculus, xx. 65 (Cartha-
ginians), de Molina, loc. cit. p. 59
(Incas) ; &c.
Ellis, y'shi-speaking Peoples,^. 170.
Cruickshank, op. cit. ii. 173. Dubois,
Chaiacter, Planners, and Cnstoins of
the People of India, p. 488. Jordanes,
JM originc actibusque Getarinn, 5 (41).
Cf Jepl it hall’s vow {fudges, xi. 30 ).
Brooke, 7 'en Years in Sarawak,
ii. 304 IV/.
HUMAN SACRIFICE
The Phenicians sacrificed some of their dearest friends,’^
not only in war, but in times of pestilence.^ In similar circum-
stances the ancient Greeks had recourse to human sacrifices.^
In seasons of great peril, as when a pestilence was raging, the
ancient Italians made a vow that they would sacrifice every
living being that should be born in the following spring.^ In
West Gothland, in Sweden, the people decreed a human
sacrifice to stay the digerddd^ or Plague, hence two beggar
children, having just then come in, were buried alive.^ In Fur,
in Denmark, there is a tradition that, for the same purpose, a
child was interred alive in the burial ground.^ Among the
Chukchi, in 1814, when a sudden and violent disease had
broken out and carried off both men and reindeer, the Shamans,
after having had recourse in vain to their usual conjurations,
determined that one of the most respected chiefs must be sacri-
ficed to appease the irritated spirits.® In Great Benin, ‘‘when
the doctors declared a man had died owing to Ogiwo, if they
think an epidemic imminent, they can tell Overami [the king]
that Ogiwo vex. Then he can take a man and a woman, all
the town can fire guns and beat drums. I'he man and woman
are brought out, and the head Jujuman can make this prayer :
‘ Oh, Ogiwo, you are very big man > don’t let any sickness come
for Ado. Make all farm good, and every woman born man
son.’ ” ^ In the same country twelve men, besides various
animals, were offered yearly on the anniversary of the death
of Adolo, king Overami’s father. King Overami, calling
his father loudly by name, spoke as follows : “ Oh, Adolo,
our father, look after all Ado [that is. Great Benin], don’t
let any sickness come to us, look after me and my people,
our slaves, cows, goats, and fowls, and everything in the
farms.” 8
[The sacrifice of human victims is resorted to as a
method of putting an end to a devastating famine, i
^ Porphyry, (?/, cit, ii. 56.
2 Geusius, op, cit, i. ch. 13. Stengel,
op, cit. p. 1 1 6. Frazer, Golden Bough y
hi. 125 sq,
* Festus, De verborum signification ey
‘ Ver sacrum,’ Muller’s edition, p. 379.
Nonius Marcellus, De proprietaie ser-
monisy ‘ Versacruin,’ p. 522. Sefvius,
In Virgilii AineidoSy vii. 796.
Afzelius, Swenska Folkets Sago-
Hdpdery iv. 181.
® Nyrop, Romanske Mosaiker, p. 69,
n. I,
^ von Wrangell, Expedition to the
Polar Seay p. 1 22 sq,
^ Moor and Roupell, quoted by
Read and Dalton, Antiquities fro 7 H
the City of BemUy p. 7 ; also by Ling
Roth, Great Benin y p. 71
® Moor and Roupell, quoted by Ling
Roth, op, cit. p. 70 sq, ; also by Read
and Dalton, <?/. cit, p. 6.
HUMAN SACRIFICE
Instances of this practice are reported to have occurred among
the ancient Greeks ^ and Phenicians.^ In a grievous famine,
after other great sacrifices, of oxen and of men, had proved
unavailing, the Swedes offered up their own king Domaldi.^
Chinese annals tell us that there was a great drought and
famine for seven years after the accession of T^ang, the
noble and pious man who had overthrown the dynasty of Shang.
It was then suggested at last by some one that a human victim
should be offered in sacrifice to Heaven, and prayer be made for
rain, to which T^ang replied, If a man must be the victim, I
will be he.” ^ Up to quite recent times, the priests of Lower
Bengal have, in seasons of scarcity, offered up children to Siva ;
in the years 1865 and 1866, for instance, recourse was had to
such sacrifices in order to avert famine.^
For people subsisting on agriculture a failure of crops
means starvation and death, ^ and is, consequently, attri-
buted to the murderous designs of a superhuman being,
such as the earth-spirit, the morning star, the sun, or the
rain-god. { By sacrificing to that being a man, they hope
to appease its thirst for human blood ; and whilst some
resort to such a sacrifice only in case of actual famine,
others try to prevent famine by making the offering in
advance.^ \[This I take to be the true explanation of the
custom of securing good crops by means of human
sacrifice, of which many instances have been produced
by Dr. Frazer.^ There are obvious links between this custom
and that of the actual famine-sacrifice. Thus the ancient
Peruvians sacrificed children after harvest, when they pre-
pared to make ready the land for the next year, not every
year, however, but ‘‘only when the weather was not good,
and seasonable.” ® In Great Benin, “ if there is too much
^ Pausanias, vii. 19. 3 st/. Diodorus
Siculus, iv. 61. I Geusius, op,
cit, i. ch. 14.
2 Porphyry, op. cit. ii. 56.
^ Snorri Sturluson, * Ynglingasaga,’
15, in Heimskrmglay i. 30,
Legge, Religions of Ulhmay p. 54.
® Hunter, Annals of Rural Bengal ,
i. 128. ^
® Cf. Sleeman, Rambles anf Recollec-
tions ^ i. 204 sqq, : — In India, un-
favourable seasons produce much more
disastrous consequences than in Eufope.
. . . More than three-fourths of the
whole population are engaged in the
cultivation of the land, and depend
upon its annual returns for subsistence,
. . . Tens of thousands die here of
starvation, under calamities of season,
which in Europe would involve little of
suffering to any class.’*
7 PVazer, Golden Bought ii. 238 sqq.
^ Herrera, op. cit. ii. iii.
HUMAN SACRIFICE
rain, then all the people would come from farm and beg
Overami [the king] to make juju, and sacrifice to stop
the rain. Accordingly a woman was taken, a prayer made
over her, and a message saluting the rain god put in her
mouth, then she was clubbed to death and put up in the
execution tree so that the rain might see. . . . In the
same way if there is too much sun so that there is a
danger of the crops spoiling, Overami can sacrifice to the
Sun God.” ^ The principle of substitution admits of a
considerable latitude in regard to the stage of danger at
which the offering is made ; the danger may be more
imminent, or it may be more remote. This holds good
of various kinds of human sacrifice, not only of such
sacrifices as are intended to influence the crops. I am
unable to subscribe to the hypothesis set forth by Dr.
FVazer, that the human victim who is killed for the
purpose of ensuring good crops is regarded as a represent-
ative of the corn-spirit and is slain as such. So far as I
can see. Dr. Frazer has adduced no satisfactory evidence
in support of his hypothesis ; whereas a detailed examina-
tion of the various cases mentioned by him indicates that
they are closely related to human sacrifices offered on
other occasions, and explicable from the same principle,
that of substitution.
best known case of luunan sacrifices, systematically
offered to ensure good crops,” says Dr. Frazer, supplied by
the Khonds or Kandhs.” The victims, or Meriahs, are repre-
sented by our authorities*^ as being offered to propitiate the
Earth goddess, Tari Pennu or Hera Pennu, but from their treat-
ment both before and after death it appears to Dr. Frazer that
ithe custom cannot be explained as merely a propitiatory sacri-
fice. The flesh and the ashes of the Meriah, he observes, were
believed to possess a magic power of fertilising the land, quite
independent of the indirect efficacy which they might have as
an offering to secure the goodwill of the deity. For, though a
part of the flesh was offered to the Earth Goddess, the rest of it
^ Moor and Roupell, quoted by Campbell, IVi/d Tribes of Kkon-
Read and Dalton, op. c/A p, 7; also distan, Maepherson, .^Memorials of
by Ling Roth, Great Benin, p. 71. Service in India.
HUMAN SACRIFICE
4+5
was buried by eacli householder in his fields, and the ashes of
the other parts of the body were scattered over the fields, laid as
paste on the granaries, or mixed with the new corn. The same
intrinsic power was ascribed to the blood and tears of the
Meriah, his blood causing the redness of the turmeric and his
tears producing rain ; and magic power as an attribute of the
victim appears also in the sovereign virtue believed to reside in
anything that came from liis person, as his hair or spittle. Con-
sidering further that, according to our authorities, the Meriah
was regarded as something more than mortal,’' or that “ a
species of reverence, which it is not easy to distinguish from
adoration, is paid to him,” Dr. Frazer concludes that he may
originally have represented the Earth deity or perhaps a deity
of vegetation, and that he only in later times came to be
regarded rather as a victim offered to a deity than as himself
an incarnate deity. ^
The premise on whicli Dr. Frazer bases his argument appears
to me quite untenable. It is an arbitrary supposition that the
ascription of a magical power to the Meriah ‘indicates that he
was much more than a mere man sacrificed to propitiate a
deity.” ^ A sacrifice is very commonly believed to be endowed
with such a power, not as an original quality, but in conse-
quence of its contact or communion with the supernatural being
to which it is offered. Just as tlie Meriah of the Kandhs is
taken round the village, from door to door, and some pluck hair
from his head, while others beg for a drop of his spittle, so,
among the nomadic Arabs of Morocco, at the Muhammedan
‘‘Great Feast,” a man dressed in the bloody skin of the sheep
which has been sacrificed on that occasion, goes from tent to
tent, and beats each tent with his stick so as to confer blessings
on its inhabitants. For he is now endowed with l-haraka del-^id^
“ the benign virtue of the feast ” ; and the same power is
ascribed to various parts of the sacrificed sheep, which arc con-
sequently used for magical purposes. If Dr. Frazer’s way of
arguing were correct we should have to conclude that the
victim was originally the god himself, or a representative of the
god, to whom it is now offered in sacrifice. But the absurdity
of any such inference becomes apparent at once when we
consider that, in Morocco, every offering to a holy person,
for instance to a deceased saint, is considered to participate
Jn his sanctity. Wlien the saint has his feast, and animals and
other presents are brought to his tomb, it is customary for his
descendants — who have a right to the offerings — to distribute
^ Frazer, op. 245 sq. ^ lbid» ii. 246.
HUMAN SACRIFICE
some flesh of the slaughtered animals among their friends,
thereby conferring l-baraka of the saint upon those who eat it ;
and even candles which have been offered to the saint are given
away for the same purpose, being instinct with his baraka.
Of course, what holds good of the Arabs in Morocco does
not necessarily hold good of the Kandhs of Bengal ^ but it
should be remembered that Dr. Frazer’s argument is founded on
the notion that the ascription of a magic power to a victim
which is offered in sacrifice to a god indicates that the victim was
once regarded as a divine being or as the god himself ; and
the facts I have recorded certainly prove the arbitrariness of this
supposition.
This is by no means the only objection which may be raised
against Dr. Frazer’s hypothesis. In his description of the rite
in question he has emphasised its connection with agriculture to
a degree which is far from being justified by the accounts given
by our authorities. Mr. Maepherson states that the human
sacrifice to Tari Pennu was celebrated as a public oblation by
tribes, branches of tribes, or villages, both at social festivals held
periodically, and when special occasions demanded exceptional
propitiations. It was celebrated ‘^upon the occurrence of
an extraordinary number of deaths by disease ; or should very
many die in childbirth ; or should the flocks or herds suffer
largely from disease, or from wild beasts ; or should the greater
crops threaten to fail ” ; while the occurrence of any marked
calamity to the families of the chiefs, whose fortunes were regarded
as the principal indication of the disposition of Tari towards their
tribes, was held to be a token of wrath which could not be too
speedily averted.^ Moreover, besides these social offerings,
the rite was performed by individuals to avert the wrath of Tari
from themselves and their families, for instance, if a child,
when watching his father’s flock, was carried off by a tiger.^ So,
also, Mr. Campbell observes that the human blood was offered
to the Earth goddess, in the hope of thus obtaining abundant
crops, averting calamity, and insuring general prosperity ” ; ^ or
that it was supposed “ that good crops, and safety from all
disease and accidents, were ensured by this slaughter.^’ ^ Accord-
ing to another authority, Mr. Russell, the assembled multitude,
when dancing round the victim, addressed the earth in the
following words, O God, we offer this sacrifice to you ; give
us good crops, seasons, and health.”® Nor was the magic
^ Maepherson, op. cit. p, 113 sq. ^ Campbell,^/. aV. p. 51.
See, also, ibid. pp. 120, 128 sqq. ^ Ibid. p. 56. Cf. ibid. p» 73.
2 Ibid. p. 113 sq. ® Russell, quoted ibid. 54.
XIX .
HUMAN SACRIFICE
virtue of the Meriah utilised solely for the benefit of the crops.
According to one account, part of the flesh was buried near the
village idol as an olfering to the earth, and part on the bound-
aries of the village ; ^ whilst in the invocation made by the
priest, the goddess was represented as saying, Let each man
place a shred of the flesh in his fields, in his grain-store, and in
his yard.’* ^ ashes, again, were scattered over the fields, or
laid as paste over the houses and granaries.” ^ It is also worth
noticing that, among the Kandhs of Maji Deso, the offering
was not at all made for the special purpose of obtaining cereal
produce, “ but for general prosperity, and blessings for them-
selves and families ” ; ^ and that in the neighbouring principality,
Chinna Kimedy, inhabited for the most part by Ooryahs, the
sacrifice was not offered to the earth alone, ‘‘ but to a number of
deities, whose power is essential to life and happiness,” especially
to the god of war, the great god, and the sun god.® Now,
whilst all these facts are in perfect agreement with the theory
of substitution, they certainly do not justify the supposition that
the Meriah was the representative of a deity of vegetation.
The same may be said about other cases referred to by Dr.
Frazer, when more closely examined. The Indians of Guay-
aquil, in Ecuador,” he says, ‘^used to sacrifice human blood and
the hearts of men when they sowed their fields.”® But our
authority, Cieza de Leon, adds that those Indians also offered
human victims when their chiefs were sick, “ to appease the
wrath of their gods.” ^ The Pawnees,” Dr. Frazer writes,
annually sacrificed a human victim in spring when they sowed
their fields. The sacrifice was believed to have been enjoined
on them by the Morning Star, or by a certain bird which the
Morning Star had sent to them as its messenger .... They
thought that an omission of this sacrifice would be followed by
the total failure of the crops of maize, beans, and pumpkins.” ^
James, to whom Dr. Frazer refers, and other authorities say
that the human sacrifice was a propitiatory offering made /o that
star,^ a planet which especially with the Skidi — the only section
^ Russell, quoted idtd. p. 55,
^ Macpherson, o/>. cit, p. 122 sq,
3 Ibid. p. 128.
^ Campbell, op. cit. p. 181.
® Ibid. p. 120, Cf. ibid. p. 197; —
Among the Ooryahs humafh sacrifice is
“'performed on important occasions,
such as going to battle, building a fort
in an important village, and to avert
anv threatened danger.
® Frazer, op. cit. ii. 238.
^ Cieza de Leon, La CrStiica del Ferd
[parte primera], ch. 55 {Biblioteca de
autores espafioleSy xxvi. 409).
® Frazer, op. cit. ii. 238.
^ James, Expedition from Pittsburg
to the Rocky Mountains y i. 357. Grin-
nell, Pawnee Hero Stories and Folk-
7 ales y p. 357. Dunbar, ‘ Pawnee
Indians,’ in Magazine of American
History^ viii. 738.
HUMAN SACRIFICE
of the Pawnees who offered human sacrifices — was an object of
superstitious veneration.^ Sickness, misfortune, and personal
mishaps of various kinds were often spoken of as attributable to
the incurred ill-will of the heavenly bodies ; ^ and the object of
the sacrifice to the morning star is expressly said to have been
to avert the evil influences exerted by that planet.’’ Accord-
ing to Mr. J^unbar, whose important^ article dealing with the
subject has escaped Dr. Frazer’s notice, “ the design of the
bloody ordeal was to conciliate that being and secure a good
crop. Hence,” he continues, it has been supposed that the
morning star was regarded by them as presiding over agricul-
ture, but this was a mistake. They sacrificed to that star
because they feared it, imagining that it exerted malign influence
if not well disposed. It has also been stated that the sacri-
fice was made annually. This, too, was an error. It was
made only when special occurrences were interpreted as calling
for it.” ^ At the present day the Indians speak of the
sacrifice as having been made to Ti-ra’-wa, the Supreme Being
or the deity who is in and of everything.”^’’ In the detailed
account of the rite, whicli was given to Mr. Grinnell by an old
chief who had himself witnessed it several times, it is said : —
“ While the smoke of the blood and the buffalo meat, and of
the burning body, ascended to the sky, all the people prayed to
Ti-ra’-wa, and walked by the fire and grasped handfuls of the
smoke, and passed it over their bodies and over those of their
children, and prayed Ti-ra’-wa to take pity on tliem, and to
give them health, and success in war, and plenteous crops ....
This sacrifice always seemed acceptable to Ti-ra’-wa, and
when the Skidi made it they always seemed to have
good fortune in war, and good crops, and they were always
well.” ^ According to this description, then, the human
sacrifice of the Pawnees, like that of the Kandhs, was not an
exclusively agricultural rite, but was performed for the purpose
of averting dangers of various kinds. And this is also suggested
by Mr. Dunbar’s relation of the last instance of this sacrifice,
which occurred in April, 1838. In the previous winter the
Skidi, soon after starting on their hunt, had a successful fight
with a band of Oglala Dacotahs, and fearing that the Dacotahs
would retaliate by coming upon them in overwhelming force,
^ Dunbar, loc. cit. p. 738. quent visitor to the tribe in later years ”
Ibid. p. 736. (Gritinell, op. cit. p. 213).
^ Grinnell, op. cit. p. 357. ® Dunbar, loc. cit. p. sq.
Mr. Dunbar is “ born and ® Grinnell, op. cit. pp. 357, 358,
reared among the Pawnees, familiar xvii.
with them until early manhood, a fre- ^ Ibid. p. 367.
HUMAN SACRIFICE
they returned for safety to their village before taking a
sufficient number of buffaloes. With little to eat, they
lived miserably, lost many of their ponies from scarcity of
forage, and, worst of all, one of the captives proved to have
the small-pox, which rapidly spread through the band, and
in the spring was communicated to the rest of the tribe.
All these accumulated misfortunes the Ski’-di attributed to the
anger of the morning star ; and accordingly they resolved to
propitiate its favour by a repetition of the sacrifice, though in
direct violation of a stipulation made two years before that the
sacrifice should not occur again.” ^
Nor is there any reason whatever to suppose that the
Brahman boys whom the Gonds of India used to kidnap
and keep as victims to be sacrificed on various occasions,‘^
were regarded as representatives of the corn spirit. Tliey were
offered up to Bhimsen, the chief object of worship among the
Gonds, represented by a piece of iron fixed in a stone or in a
tree,^ now “ to sanctify a marriage, now to be wedded to the
soil, and again to be given away to the evil spirit of the
epidemic raging,” or on the eve of a struggle.” ^
Dr. Frazer writes : — At Lagos in Guinea it was the custom
annually to impale a young girl alive soon after the spring equinox
in order to secure good crops .... A similar sacrifice used to
be annually offered at Benin.” ^ But Dr. Frazer omits an
important fact — mentioned or alluded to by the two authorities
he quotes — which gives us the key to the custom, without
suggesting that it has anything to do with the corn-spirit.
Adams states that the young woman was impaled to
propitiate the favour of the goddess presiding over the rainy
season, that she may fill the horn of plenty.”^ And M. Bouche
observes, Au Benin, on a conserve jusqu’a present un usage qui
regnait jadis a Lagos et ailleurs : celui d’empaler une jeune
fille, au commencement de la saison des pluies, afin de rendre
les orichas propices aux recoltes.” ^ From these statements it
appears that the sacrifice was intended to influence the rain, on
which the crops essentially depend. That its immediate object
was to produce rain is expressly affirmed by Sir R. Burton.
At Benin he saw “a young woman lashed to a scaffolding upon
the summit of a tall blasted tree and being devoured by the
turkey-buzzards. The people declared it to be a ^ fetish,’ or
\ Dunbar, /o(\ cit. p. 740. ® Frazer, op. cit. ii. 239.
" Frazer, op. cit. ii. 241. ** Adams, Sketches taken diirhiir Ten
Panjab Notes and Queries, § 550, Voyages to Africa, p. 25.
vol. ii. 90. ^ Bouche, Sept ans en Afrique occi-
* Ibid. § 721, vol. ii. 127 sq. dentate, p. 132.
VOL. I
G G
HUMAN SACRIFICE
charm for bringing rain.” ^ We have previously noticed that
the people of Benin also have recourse to a human sacrifice if
there is too much rain, or too much sun, so that the crops are
in danger of being spoiled.^ The theory of substitution
accounts for all these cases.
The practice of offering human victims for the purpose of
preventing drought and famine by producing rain is appa-
rently not restricted to West Africa. In the beginning of
their year, the ancient Mexicans sacrificed many prisoners of
war and children who had been purchased for that purpose,
to the gods of water, so as to induce them to give the rain
necessary for the crops.^ The Pipiles of Guatemala celebrated
every year two festivals which were accompanied by human
sacrifices, the one in the beginning of the rainy season, the other
in the beginning of the dry season.^ In India, among the
aboriginal tribes to the south-west of Beerbhoom, Sir W. W,
Hunter heard vague reports of human sacrifices in the forests,
with a view to procuring the early arrival of the rains.” ^
Without venturing to express any definite opinion on a very
obscure subject which has already led to so many guesses,^ I
may perhaps be justified in here calling attention to the fact
that Zeus Lyc^us, in whose cult human sacrifices played a
prominent part, was conceived of as a god who sent the
rain.^ It appears from ancient traditions or legends that the
idea of procuring rainfall by means of such sacrifices was not
unfamiliar to the Greeks. A certain Molpis offered himself to
Zeus Ombrios, the rain-god, in time of drought.® Pausanias
tells us that once, when a drought had for some time afflicted
Greece, messengers were sent to Delphi to inquire the cause,
and to beg for a riddance of the evil. The Pythian priestess
told them to propitiate Zeus, and that Aeacus should be the
intercessor ; and then Aeacus, by sacrifices and prayers to
Panhellenian Zeus, procured rain for Greece.^ But Diodorus
adds that the drought and famine, whilst ceasing in all other
parts of the country, still continued in Attica, so that the
^ Burton, Abeoktday i. 19 n.*
^ Supruy p. 443 sq.
* Sahagun, Historia general de las
cosas de Nueva Espaflay i. 50. Tor-
quemada, Monarchia Indiana y ii. 251.
Clavigero, op. cit, i. 297.
* Stol), Ethnologie der Indiamr-
std?nme von GnalemalUy p. 46.
® Hunter, Annals of Rural Bengal^
i. 128.
^ See Immerwahr, Die KuUe uttd
Mythen ArkadienSy i. 16 sqq. Pro-
fessor Robertson Smith suggests
(‘Sacrifice,* in Encyclop(tdia Britan^
nica, XX i. 136) that the human
sacrifices offered to Zeus Lycoeus were
originally cannibal feasts of a wolf
tTil>e.
^ Pausanias, viii. 38. 4. Farnell,
op, cit, i. 41.
® Farnell, ^. rfr. i.^42. ,
® Pausanias, ii. 29. 7 sq.
HUMAN SACRIFICE
Athenians once more resorted to the Oracle. The answer was
now given them that* they had to expiate the murder of
Androgens, and that this should be done in any way his
father, Minos, required. The satisfaction demanded by the
latter was, that they every nine years should send seven boys and
as many girls to be devoured by the Minotaur, and that this
should be done as long as the monster lived. So the Athe-
nians did, and the calamity ceased.^
As an instance of the close relationship which exists
between human sacrifices offered for agricultural purposes and
other human sacrifices, the following case may also be
mentioned. According to Strachey, the Indians in some part
. of Virginia had a yearly sacrifice of cliildren. These sacrifices
they held so necessary that, if they should omit them, they
supposed their gods would let them no deare, turkies, come,
nor fish,” and, besides, “ would make a great slaughter amongst
them.” 2
Men require for their subsistence not only food, but
drink. Hence when the earth fails to supply them with
water, they are liable to regard it as an attempt against
their lives, which can be averted only by the sacrifice of a
human substitute.
In India, in former times, human victims were offered to
several minor gods whenever a newly excavated tank failed to
produce sufficient water.” ^ In KithiAwar, for instance, if a
pond had been dug and would not hold water, a man was
sacrificed ; and the Vadala lake in Bombay refused to hold
water till the local spirit was appeased by the sacrifice of the
daughter of the village headman.”** There is a legend that,
when the bed of the Saugor lake remained dry, the builder “ was
told, in a dream, or by a priest, that it would continue so till he
should consent to sacrifice his own daughter, then a girl, and
the young lad to whom she had been affianced, to the tutelary
god of the place. He accordingly built a little shrine in the centre
of the valley, which was to become the bed of the lake, put the
two children in, and built up the doorway. He had no sooner
doneso than the whole of the valley became filled with water.” ^
When Colonel Campbell was rescuing Merialis among the
^ Diodorus Siculus, op, cit. iv. 61. i ^ Rajendralala Mitra, op. cit. ii. in.
sqq. ^ Popular Religion of North-
StrsichGy.^ History 0/ Travaile into ern India^ ii. 174.
Vh'ginia Pritannia, p. 9$ sq, ® Sleeman, Rambles ^ i. 129^(7.
G G 2
HUMAN SACRIFICE
Kandhs, it was believed by some that he was collecting victims
for the purpose of sacrificing them on the plains to the water
deity, because the water had disappeared from a large tank which
he had constructed.^ According to a story related by Pausanias,
the district of Haliartus was originally parched and waterless,
hence one of the rulers went to Delphi and inquired how the
people should find water in the land. ^^The Pythian priestess
commanded him to slay the first person he should meet on his
return to Haliartus. On his arrival he was met by his son
Lophis, and, without hesitation, he struck the young man with
his sword. The youth had life enough left to run about, and
where the blood flowed water gushed from the ground. There-
fore the river is called Lophis.” ^
Human sacrifices are offered with a view to averting
perils arising from the sea or from rivers.
When the Greeks were afflicted by stress of weather at
Aulis, they were bidden to sacrifice Iphigenia, in order to lull
the winds,^ Menelaus was persecuted by the Egyptians for
sacrificing two children when he was desirous of sailing away
and contrary winds detained him.^ According to an Athenian
writer, the colonists who first went to Lesbos were directed by
an oracle to throw a virgin into the sea, as an offering to
Poseidon,^ Sextus Pompeius cast men into the sea as an offer-
ing to Neptune.^ Hamilcar, also, following a custom of his
country, threw a company of priests into the sea, as a sacrifice
to the sea-god,'^ The Saxons, when they were about to leave
the coast of Gaul and sail home, sacrificed the tenth part of
their captives.® The Vikings of Scrviidinavia, when launching
a new ship, seem to have bound a victim to the rollers on which
the vessel slipped into the sea, thus reddening the keel with
sacrificial blood. ^ In 1784, at the launching of one of the Bey
of Tripoli’s cruisers, a black slave was led forward and fastened
at the prow of the vessel. The Fijians launched their canoes
over the living bodies of slaves as rollers, or, according to
^ Campbell, Wild Tribes of Khon-
distan^ p. 129.
Pausanias, ix. 33. 4.
^ Aeschylus, Agamemnon^ 215 sq.
^ Herodotus, ii. 119.
® Athenteus, Deipnosophistee, xi. 15.
® Dio Cassius, Historia Romana^
xlviii. 48.
Diodorus Siculus, xiii. 86,
® Sidonius Apollinaris, Epistidte,
viii. 6. 15.
® Vigfusson and Powell, op, cit. i.
410 ; ii. 349.
Simpson, quoted by Grant Allen,
Evolution of tl^ Idea of God, p. 263.
Erskinc, Cruise among the Islands
of the Western Pacific y p. 249.
xrx
HUMAN SACRIFICE
another account, when a large canoe was launched, they laid
hold of the first person, man or woman, whom they en-
countered, and carried the victim home for a feast4 On the
deck of a new boat belonging to the most powerful chief in
the group, ten or more men were slaughtered, in order that
it might be washed with human blood.‘^
The Zuni Indians have a tradition that the waters of their
valley once rose in a flood and compelled the inhabitants to flee
to a table-land several hundred feet high for safety ; and when
the waters still rose, threatening to submerge the table-land
itself, the priest determined to sacrifice a youth and a maiden
to propitiate them/^ When Seleucus Nicator founded Antioch
on the Orontes, the high priest sacrificed a virgin at a place
between the town and the river,^ presumably in order to prevent
the town from being flooded by the river. When the converted
Franks marched to Italy under their king, Thcodebert, to fight
against the Goths under Vitigis, and were on the point of cross-
ing the Po, they sacrificed what children and wives of Goths they
found, and threw their corpses into the river, according to
Procopius, “as the first fruits of the war.” At Rome, every
year on the Ides of May, the Vestal Virgins threw from the
Sublician bridge into the Tiber thirty human effigies formed of
rushes ; the Romans themselves were of opinion that at an
earlier period living men had been hurled into the river, and
that it was Hercules who first substituted images of straw. ^
In West Africa human sacrifices arc often offered to rivers.
Major Ellis states that at each town or considerable village upon
the banks of the river Prah sacrifice is held on a day about
the middle of October, to Prah. “As loss of life frequently
occurs in this river, from persons attempting to cross it when
flooded, from a sudden rise, or from those hundred minor
accidents which must always occur in the neighbourhood of a
deep and strong stream, the gods of the Prah are considered
very malignant. The sacrifice is, in consequence, proportionate.
The usual sacrifice in former times was two human adults, one
male and one female. They. . . . were decapitated on the bank
of the river, and the stool and image of the god washed with their
^ Wilkes, U. S. Exploring Expedi-
tion, iii, 97. Cf, Williams and Calvert,
op, cit, p. 175. *
Wilkes, op, cit. iii. 97.
® Stevenson, ‘ A Chapter of Zufii
Mythology,’ in Memoirs of the Inter-
national Congress of Anth^opology^
Chicago, p. 316.
^ Malala, Chronographiay viii. 255
(200),
® Procopius, Belliim Gothictivi^ ii.
25-
® Ovid, Fasti,, 621 sq, Dionysius of
Halicarnassus, Antiquitates Romance, 1.
38. Hartland, Legend of I^ersens, iii.
78.
HUMAN SACRIFICE
blood. The bodies were then cut into a number of pieces,
which were distributed amongst the mangroves, or the sedge
bordering the river, for the crocodiles to eat ; crocodiles being
sacred in Prah.” ^ According to M. le Comte de Cardi, all the
river-side tribes of the Niger Delta used to propitiate the river
deity by the sacrifice of a copper-coloured girl^ procured from a
tribe of Ibos inhabiting a country away in the hinterland of New
Calabar, or in some places an Albino ; and it seems that this
custom is still practised in the British Protectorate. The Ibos
themselves were in the habit of throwing human beings into the
river to be eaten by alligators or fishes, or to fasten them to trees
or branches, close to the river, where they were left to perish
by hunger.-^ In Eastern Central Africa, also, human sacrifices
are offered to rivers.^ And in the East Indies there are various
traditions of such sacrifices being made to the divine crocodiles
of the sea.^'
In the cases which we have hitherto considered the
offering of human sacrifices is mostly a matter of public
concern, a method of ensuring the lives of many by the
death of one or a few. But human life is also sacrificed,
by way of substitution, for the purpose of preventing the
death of some particular individual, especially a chief or a
king, from sickness, old age, or other circumstances.
In Guatemala, in the case of a dangerous illness, human
sacrifice was resorted to when all other attempts to cure the
patient failed.^ Of the Indians of Guayaquil, Cieza de Leon
states : — When the chiefs were sick, to appease the wrath of
their gods, and pray for health, they made .... sacrifices
of a superstitious nature, killing men (as I was told), and
believing that human blood was a grateful offering,” Acosta
writes : — They vsed in Peru to sacrifice yong children of
foure or six yeares old vnto tenne ; and the greatest parte of
these sacrifices were for the affaires that did import the
Ynca, as in sickness for his health, and when he went to the
^ Ellis, Tshi-speaking Peoplesy p. 64 ^ Macdonald, Africana^ i. 96.
sq. Cf Ideni^ Land of 2 ^'etish, p. 122. ^ Tylor, ‘Anniversary Address,’ in
^ Comte de Cardi, ‘Ju-Ju Laws and Jour. Anthr. /wj-/. xxi. 408. J-Iartland,
Customs in the Niger Delta,’ in /<?«/', op, cit, iii. qo sq,
Anthr, Inst. xxix. 54. cy. Mockler- ^ Stoll, op, cit, p. 48.
Ferryman, British Nigeria., p. 235, ^ Cieza de Leon, La CrSnica del Peru
Schoen and Crowther, op. cit. p. [parte primera], ch. ^55 {Bibhoieca de
auiores espaHoles^ 409).
49.
HUMAN SACRIFICE
warres for victory, or Avhen they gave the 'wreathe to their new
Ynca, which is the marke of a King, as heere the Scepter
and the Crowne be. In this solemnitie they sacrificed the
number of two hundred children, from foure to ten yeares
of age .... If any Indian qualified or of the common sorte
were sicke, and that the Divine told him confidently that
he should die, they did then sacrifice his owne sonne to the
Sunne or to Virachoca, desiring them to be satisfied with
him, and that they would not deprive the father of life.” ^
According to Molina, “the Lord Ynca offered sacrifices [of
children] when he began to reign, that the huacas [or idols]
might give him health, and preserve his dominions in peace.”
Herrera tells us that the ancient Peruvians, when any person of
note was sick, and the priest predicted his death, sacrificed the
patient’s son, “ desiring the idol to be satisfic’d with him, and
not to take away his father’s life.”^ Garcilasso de la Vega,
again, denies the existence of any such custom in the kingdom
of the Incas, ^ but asserts that, before their reign, the Indians of
Peru offered up their own children on certain occasions.*'"
According to Jerez, some of the Peruvian Indians sacrificed
their own children each month, and anointed with the blood
the faces of their idols and the doors of their temples.® The
Tonga Islanders had a ceremony called nawgia^ or the cere-
mony of strangling children as sacrifices to the gods, for the
recovery of a sick relative. Our informant says : — “ All the
bystanders behold the innocent victim with feelings of the
greatest pity ; but it is proper, they think, to sacrifice a child
who is at present of no use to society, and perhaps may not
otherwise live to be, with the hope of recovering a sick chief,
whom all esteem and whom all, think it a most important
duty to respect, defend, and preserve, that his life may be of
advantage to the country.”'^ The Tahitians offered human
sacrifices during the illnesses of their rulers.^ In the Philip-
pines, if a prince was dangerously ill or dying, slaves were
slaughtered in order to satisfy the malignant ancestral soul
who was supposed to have caused the disease.^ Among the
Dyaks, when a raja “ falls sick, or goes on a journey, it is
^ Acosta, op. cit. ii. 344.
2 de Molina, loc. cit. p. 55.
® Herrera, General Hisiory of the
If'est Jndiesy iv. 347.
4 Garcilasso de la Vega, op. cit. i.
® Ibid. 1. 50.
® Jerez, ‘ Conquista del Peni,' in Bib-
Uoteca de autores espafiolesy xxvi. 327.
^ Mariner, Natives of the Tonga
Islands^ ii. 220.
** Ellis, Polynesian Researches^ 1 . 346.
® Blumentiitt, quoted by Wilken,
* Ueber das Haaropfer," in Revue
coloniale internationaky 1887, i. 364
sq.
common for him to vow a head to his tribe in case of
recovery or of safe return. Should he die, one or two heads
are usually offered by the tribe as a kind of sacrifice.” ^ Among
the Banjarilu of Southern India, who are great travelling
traders, it was formerly the custom “ before starting out on a
journey to procure a little child, and bury it in the ground up
to its shoulders, and then drive their loaded bullocks over the
unfortunate victim, and in proportion to the bullocks thoroughly
trampling the child to death, so their belief in a successful
journey increased.”*^ In India human sacrifices were also
offered to the goddess ChandikA to save the life of a king.'^
It is probable that the idea of substitution likewise accounts
for the sacrifice of a young girl which a certain raja
is reported to have offered in i86i, at the shrine of the
goddess Durga, in the town of Jaipur, when he installed
himself at his fathers decease,^ and for the sacrifice of a
Brahmin which a raja of Ratanpvir had offered up to Devi every
year.^ In Great Benin, once a year, at the end of the rainy
season, all the king’s beads were brought out by the boys in
whose care they were kept. They were put in a heap, and a
slave was compelled to kneel down over them. The king cut
or struck the head of the slave with a spear so that the blood
ran over the beads, and said to them, Oh beads, when I put
you on, give me wisdom and don’t let any juju or bad thing
come near me.” Then the slave was told, So you shall
tell the head juju when you see him.” The slave was led
out and beheaded, but his head was brought in again, and the
beads were touched with it.^ Among the ancient Gauls
persons who were troubled with unusually severe diseases
either sacrificed men or promised that they would make such
sacrifices.^ In the Ynglingasaga we are told that King Aun
sacrificed nine sons, one after the other, to Odin for the
purpose of obtaining a prolongation of his life.® According to
Macrobius, the ancient Romans immolated children to the
goddess Mania, the mother of the Lares, “ to promote the
health of the families.” ^ Suetonius states that Nero, frightened
by the sight of a comet, sacrificed a number of Roman noble-
^ Pfeiffer, A Lacies Second Journey ® Punjab Notes and Queries^ § 869,
round the World, i. 86. vol. ii. 162.
2 Cain, ‘ Bhadrachellam and Reka- ® Moor and Roupell, quoted by Read
palli Taluqas,’ in Indian Antiquary, and Dalton, i?/. cit. p. 7; also by Ling
viii. 219. Roth, Great Benin, 71.
* CxooVq, Popular Peli^'on in North- ^ Caesar, De bello galHco, vi. 16.
ern India, \\. 168. ® Snorri Sturluson, ‘Ynglingasaga,*
* North Indian Notes and Queries, 25, in Heimskringla, i.'45 sqq,
§310, vol. i. 40. ® Macrobias, Satur 7 zalia, i. 7.
HUMAN SACRIFICE
men in order to avert the disaster from himself.^ Antinous,
according to one account, sacrificed himself to prolong
the life of Hadrian/^ The notion that the death of one person
may serve as a substitute for the death of another still prevails
in the Vatican. When, during Leo XIII. ’s last illness, one
of the Cardinals died, it was said that his death had saved
the life of the Pope, Heaven being satisfied with one victim.
In Morocco, if a son or a daughter dies, it is customary to say
to the afflicted parents, Wliy are you sorry? Your child
took away your misfortune (bas),'"'* A similar custom prevails
in Syria and Palestine.^
(jMen are sacrificed not only to preserve the lives of
other men, but to help other men into existence. Barren-
ness is attributed to some god keeping back the children
which would otherwise be born in the due course of
nature. And in order to remove this obstacle a human
being, generally a child, is sacrificed to serve, as it were, as
a substitute. This I take to be the explanation of the
practice of offering a human sacrifice with a view to pro-
moting fecundity, a practice which has been particularly
common in India.
In the history of ancient Mexico we read of Nezahualcoyotl,
prince of tlie Tezcucans, who had been married some years
without being blest with issue. The priests represented that
it was owing to his neglect of the gods of his country, and that
his only remedy was to propitiate them by human sacrifice.” ^
In Hindu traditions and books a numerous offspring is promised
to him who offers a man in sacrifice."^ In Jainteapore, east of
Sylhet, human sacrifices were made to the goddess Kali, in
hopes of procuring progeny.^ Speaking of the Mahadeo sand-
stone hills which, in the Sathpore range, overlook the Nerbudda
to the south, Sir W. H. Sleeman states : — ‘‘When a woman is
without children she makes votive offerings to all the gods
who can, she thinks, assist her ; and promises of still greater
in case they should grant what she wants. Smaller promises
being found of no avail, she at last promises her first-born, if a
' ^ Suetonius, Nero, 36. To-day, p. 208.
^ Spartian, Vita Hadriani, 14. ^ Prescott, History of the Conquest
Aurelius Victor, De Ccssaribus, 14. of Mexico, p. 91.
Historia Romana,W\yi, ii. ® Chevers, op. cit. p. 399.
® Outiiss, Primitive Semitic Te/igion ® Macnaghten, quoted p. 397.
HUMAN SACRIFICE
male, to the god of destruction, Mahadeo. If she gets a son
she conceals from him her vows till he has attained the age of
puberty ; she then communicates it to him, and enjoins him
to fulfil it.” From that moment he regards himself as devoted
to the god, and, at the annual fair on the Mahadeo hills, throws
himself from a perpendicular height of four or five hundred
feet, and is dashed to pieces upon the rocks below. ^ In one of
the tales of Somadcva an ascetic tells a woman that, if she'
killed her young son and offered him to the divinity, another son
would certainly be born to her.^ We meet with a similar idea in
the story of king Somaka. For some time he did not succeed
in getting a single son from any of his one hundred wives.
Finally he got a single son ; but he wanted more, and asked the
family priest whether there was not a ceremony which could
help him to a hundred sons. The family priest answered : —
“O king! let me set on foot a sacrifice, and thou must
sacrifice thy son, Jantu, in it. Then on no distant date, a
century of handsome sons will be born to thee. When Jantu’s
fat will be put into the fire as an offering to the gods, the
mothers will take a smell of that smoke, and bring forth a
number of sons, valorous and strong. And Jantu also will
once more be born as a self-begotten son of thine, in that very
mother ; and on his back there will appear a mark of gold.”
The son was sacrificed ; the wives smelt the smell of the
burnt-ofFering ; all of them became with child ; and when ten
months had passed one hundred sons were born to Somaka, of
whom Jantu was the eldest, being born of his former mother.
But the family priest departed this life, and was grilled for a
certain period in a terrible hell as a punishment for what he had
done.^
Among certain peoples it is a regular custom to kill the
firstborn child, or the firstborn son.
Among some natives of Australia a mother used to kill and
eat her first child, as this was believed to strengthen her for
later births.^ In New South Wales the firstborn of every
lubra used to be eaten by the tribe as part of a religious cere-
mony.” ^ In the realm of Khai-muh, in China, according to
^ Sleeman, o/>. cit. i. 1325^. Peoples^ p. 17 n.* Cf. von Scherzer,
QxooVg, Popular Peligt on 0/ North- Reise der Oesterreichischen PYegatte
ern India^ ii. 173. Novara um die Erde^ iii. 32.
^ A/akabharala, Van a Farva, 127 ’ Brough Smyth, Aborigines of
(pt. vi. p. 188 Victoria, ii. 31 1.
^ Brinton, Religio?ts of Primitive
HUMAN SACRIFICE
a native account, it was customary to kill and devour the
eldest son alive. ^ Among certain tribes in British Columbia
the first child is often sacrificed to the sun.‘^ The Indians of
Florida, according to Le Moyne de Morgues, sacrificed the
firstborn son to the cliief,*^ We are told that, among the
people of Senjero in Eastern Africa, many families must offer
up their firstborn sons as sacrifices, because once upon a time,
when summer and winter were jumbled together in a bad
season, and the fruits of the field would not ripen, the sooth-
sayers enjoined it.” The heathen Russians often sacrificed
their firstborn to the god Perun.'* The rule laid down in
Exodus® and Numbers,’^ that all the firstborn of men and of
beasts belonged to the Lord, but that the former were to be
redeemed, seems to indicate the existence of an earlier custom
among the Hebrews of offer ing up as a sacrifice, not only the
firstling of an animal, but the firstborn child. As traces of such
a custom may probably be regarded the story of Abraham’s
surrender of his firstborn son to God and the tradition of
the origin of the Passover.^ Among the Hindus, until the
beginning of the last century, many parents sacrificed their
firstborn to the river Ganges.*^
In some instances the firstborn seems to be killed, not
in sacrifice to a god, but for the purpose of being eaten as
a kind of medicine. In other cases the act is a sacrifice
in the true sense of the word and, apparently, substitu-
tional in character. Considering that children are occa-
sionally sacrificed to save the lives of their parents, or for
the health of the families, or to promote fecundity, it
seems probable that the regular sacrifice of the firstborn
has similar objects in view. This supposition, indeed, is
strongly supported by some statements in which the
motive of the act is expressly mentioned. Among the
^ de Groot, Religions System of ^ Exodus^ xiii. 2, 15.
China, (vol. ii. book) i. 679. ^ Numbers, xviii, 15.
^ Boas, in Eifih Report on the ^ See Ghillany, op. cit. p. 494 sqq. ;
North-Western Tribes of Ca 7 iada, pp. Kuenen, Religion of Israel, ii, 92;
46, 52. Frazer, op. cit. ii. 47 sqq.
^ Bry, Narrative of Le Moyne, De- ^ Rajendraldla Mitra, op. cit. ii. 70,
scriptions of the Illustratfons, 34, p. 13. 76.
'Cf. Lafitau, Mccurs des sauvages arneri- Cf supra, p. 401.
quains, i. i8i ; Strachey, op. cit. p. 84. Cf. Micah, vi. 7 : “ Shall I give
* Krapf, Havels, p. 69 sq. my ftrslb<.)rii for my transgression, the
® Mone, quoted by Frazer, Golden fruit of iny body for the sin of my
Bough, ii, 52. soul ? ”
HUMAN SACRIFICE
Coast Salish of British Columbia the first child is sacrificed
to the sun “ to secure health and happiness to the whole
family.” ^ The same Is reported of a neighbouring people,
the Kutonaqa. The mother prays to the sun: — ‘‘ I am
with child. When it is born I shall offer it to you.
Have pity upon us.” “ Among some tribes of South-
Eastern Africa it Is a rule that, when a woman’s husband
has been killed in battle and she marries again, the first
child to which she gives birth after her second marriage
must be put to death, whether she has it by her first or
her second husband. Such a child is called “ the child
of the assegai,” and if It were not killed, death or
accident would be sure to befall the second spouse,
and the woman herself would be barren.^ Among some
peoples, including the ancient Hindus, we find the belief
that the son is in some sense identical with his father,
that he is a new birth, a new manifestation of the same
person/ The new birth might be supposed to endanger
the life of the father, just as, according to a notion preva-
lent among the ancient Teutons and in some parts of
Italy, a person would soon die if his name were given to
his son or grandson whilst he was still alive. Among
the Brazilian Tupis the father was accustomed to take a
new name after the birth of each new son ; ^ whilst, on
killing an enemy, a person used to take the enemy’s name
so as to annihilate not only his body but also his soul.^
Among the Kafirs, “ if a mother gives birth to twins, one
Is frequently killed by the father, for the natives think
that unless the father places a lump of earth in the rnouth
of one of the babies he will lose his strength.” In some
^ Boas, oj). Lit. p. 46. ^ Storm, quoted by Noreen, Spridda
^ Ibid. p. 52. Studier, Andra Samlingen, ]). 4.
^ Macdonald, Light in Africa, p. Placucci, Us I e pregindizj dei con-
156. Frazer, op. cit. ii. 51 s<]. tadini della Romagna, p. 23.
Ilartland, op. cit. i. 217 sq. von ^ von den Steinen, op. cit. p. 337.
den Steinen, Unter den Naiurvolkern ^ Staden, quoted by Andree,
Zcntral-Hrasiliens, p. 336 sq. T>eist, pophagie, p. 103.
Alt-arisches Jus Gentium, p. 98 sqq. Kidd, The Essential Kafir, p. 202.
Idem, Alt-arisches Jus Civile f\. l%C)sqq. I am indebted to Mr. N. W. Thomas
Imsvs of Alanu, ix. 8 : “ The husband, for drawing my attention to this state-
atter conception by his wife, becomes ment.
an embryo and is born again of her.”
HUMAN SACRIFICE
cases the practice of killing the firstborn son might
possibly be traced back to a similar belief. But I can quote
no fact directly supporting this suggestion.
(Human sacrifices are offered in connection with the
foundation of buildings. This is a wide-spread custom,
which not only occurs among various uncivilised and semi-
civilised peoples of the present day, but which is proved
to have existed among the so-called Aryan races. ‘ In
India we find traces of it in traditions and popular beliefs.'^
The Hindu rajas, we are told, used to lay the foundation
of public buildings in human blood.® a When Mr. Grierson
wanted to photograph a Bihar peasant house, the grand-
mother of the family refused to allow any of the children
to appear in the picture, her reason being that the Govern-
ment was building the bridge across the Gandak and
Vv^anted children to bury under the foundations.'* Among
the ancient Romans the old custom survived in the prac-
tice of placing statues or images under the foundations of
their buildings.® In the island of Zacynthus the peasants
to this day believe that in order to secure the durability
of important buildings, such as bridges and fortresses, it is
desirable to kill a man, especially a Muhammedan or a
Jew, and bury him on the spot.** South Slavonian folk-
tales speak of the immuration of a woman or a child as
a foundation sacrifice.^ In Servia no city was thought to
be secure unless a human being, or at least the shadow of
one, was built into its walls;® and the Bulgarians, when
^ Sartori, ‘ Ucbor das Bauopfer,’ in
Zeitschrift flir Ethnologic, xxx. 5 vy-/.
Tylor, PriniitLve Culture, i. 104 S(jq.
Baring* (joit Id, Strange Survivals, p. 4
Trumbull, Threshold Covenant,
p. 46 sqq. Giant Allen, Evolution of
the Idea of God, p. 249 sqq. Licbrecht,
Zur Volkskunde, p. 284 sqq. Andrce,
Ethnographische rarallelen, p. 18 sqq.
Nyrop, Romanske Mosaiker, p. 63 sqq.
Krauss, ‘ Das Bauopfer bei den Siid-
slavcn,’ in Alittheilungen der .Inthro-
pologischen Gesellschaft in IVien, xvii.
18 sqq. WuUke, Der deutsche Volks-
aberglaubc der Gegenwart, § 440,
p. 300 sq.
- Winternitz, ‘ Beincrkungen liber
das Bauopfer bei den Indern,’ in
Alittheil. Ant hr. Gcsellsch. in IVien,
xvii. [37] sqq.
^ Wheeler, History of l 7 idia, iv. 278.
^ Grierson, Bihar Peasant Life, p. 4.
Coote, ‘ A Building Superstition,’
in Folk-Lore fournal, i. 23.
Schniidl, VPlkslehen der Neu-Grie-
chen, p. 197.
^ Krau.ss, loc. cit. p. 19 sqq.
^ Kalston, Songs of the Russian
People, p, 127.
HUMAN SACRIFICE
going to build, are still said to take a thread and measure
the shadow of some casual passer-by, and then bury the
measure under the foundation-stone, expecting that the
man whose shadow has been thus treated will soon died
A similar custom prevails in Roumanian According to
Nennius, when Dinas Emris in Wales was founded by
Gortigern, all the materials collected for the fortress were
carried away in one night ; . and materials were thus
gathered thrice, and were thrice carried away. When he
then asked of his Druids, “ Whence this evil ? ” the Druids
told him that it was necessary to find a child whose father
was unknown, put him to death, and sprinkle with his
blood the ground on which the citadel was to be built.®
A Scotch legend tells that, when St. Columba first
attempted to build a cathedral on Iona, the walls fell
down as they were erected ; he then received supernatural
information that they would never stand unless a human
victim was buried alive, and, in consequence, his companion,
Oran, was interred at the foundation of the structure.^ It
is reported that, when not long ago the Bridge Gate of
Bremen city walls was demolished, the skeleton of a child
was found embedded in the groundwork ; ^ and when the
new bridge at Halle, finished in 1843, was building, “the
common people fancied a child was wanted to be walled
into the foundations.” ®
It seems highly probable that the building-sacrifice, like
other kinds of human sacrifice, is based on the idea of substi-
tution. A new house or dwelling-place is commonly regarded
as dangerous, a wall or a tower is liable to fall down and
cause destruction of life, a bridge may break, or the person
who crosses it may tumble into the water and be drowned.
In the Babar Islands, before entering a new house, offerings
are thrown inside, that the spirit, Orloo, may not make the
^ /did. p. 127. Krauss, loc. cit. p. in The Antiquajy^ iii. ii. Carmichael,
21. Carmina Gadtlica^ ii, 316.
Folk- Lore Record, iii. 283. ® Baring-Gould, Strange Survivals,
^ Nennius, /listoria Britonum, Irish p. 5.
Version, cli. 18, p. 93. ** Grimm, Teutonic Mythology, iii.
^ Gomme, ‘Some Traditions and 1142.
Superstitions connected with Building.s,’
HUMAN SACRIFICE
inmates ill.^ Before the Sandwich Islanders could occupy
their houses “ offerings were made to the gods, and pre-
sents to the priest, who entered the house, uttered prayers,
went through other ceremonies, and slept in it before the
owner took possession, in order to prevent evil spirits from
resorting to it, and to secure its inmates from the effects
of incantation.” Among the Kayans of Borneo, on the
occasion of the king or principal chief taking possession
of a newly-built house, a human victim was killed, and
the blood was sprinkled on the pillars and under the
house.® The Russian peasant believes that the building
of a new house “ is apt to be followed by the death of
the head of the family for which the new dwelling is con-
structed, or that the member of the family who is the
first to enter it will soon die ” ; and, in accordance with a
custom of great antiquity, the oldest member of a
migrating household enters the new house first. ^ In
German folk-tales “ the first to cross the bridge, the
first to enter the new building or the country, pays
with his life.” ® Even nowadays, in the North of Europe,
there is a wide-spread fear of being the first to enter
a new building or of going over a newly-built bridge ;
“ if to do this is not everywhere and in all cases
thought to entail death, it is considered supremely un-
lucky.” ® This superstition has been interpreted as a
survival of a previous sacrifice ; ^ but there can be no
doubt, I think, that the foundation sacrifice itself owes its
origin to similar notions and fears of supernatural dangers.
Uncultured people are commonly afraid of anything new,
or of doing an act for the first time ; ® and, apart from
this, the erecting of a new building is an intrusion upon
^ Riedel, De sluik- en kroesharige 21 sq. (Southern Slavs).
rassen tusschen Seiches cn Papua, p. ® Grimm, 7 'eutonic Mythology, i. 45,
343 * .
Ellis, Polynesian Researches, iv. ® Baring- Ciould, Strange Surnivah,
322. , p. 2. For various instances of similar
, ^ Burns, ‘ Kayans of the North- beliefs, see Sartori, in Zeitsekr. f.
West of Borneo,’ in Joui'nal of the Ethnol. xxx. 14 sqq. ; Crawley, Mystic
Indian Archipelago, iii. 145. Rose, p. 25.
^ Ralston, Songs of the Russian ^ Baring-Gould, op. cit. p. 4.
People, p. 126. Cf Krauss, loc. cit. p. ^ Crt^wley, op, cit. p. 25.
HUMAN SACRIFICE
the land of the local spirit, and therefore likely to arouse
its anger. There are houses which remain haunted by
spirits all their time.’^ It is natural, then, that attempts
should be made to avert the danger. And, human life
being at stake, no preventive could be more effective than
the offering up of a human victim.
On the other hand it is maintained that the foundation-
sacrifice is partly, if not exclusively, performed for the
purpose of converting the soul of the victim into a pro-
tecting demon.'* This opinion, no doubt, has the support
of beliefs actually held by some of the peoples who prac-
tise the rite. When the gate of the new city of Tavoy,
in Tenasserim, was built. Mason was told by an eye-
witness that a criminal was put in each post-hole tdl
become a guardian spirit.** The Burmese kings used to
have victims buried alive at the gates of their capitals,
“ so that their spirits might watch over the city.”
Formerly, in Siam, “ when a new city gate was being
erected, it was customary for a number of officers to lie in
wait near the spot, and seize the first four or eight persons
who happened to pass by, and who were then buried
alive under the gate-posts, to serve as guardian angels.”
But whatever be the present notions of certain peoples
concerning the object of the building-sacrifice, I do not
believe that its primary object could have been to procure
a spirit-guardian. According to early ideas, the ghost of
a murdered man is not a friendly being, and least of all is
he kindly disposed towards those who killed him. Several
instances are known in which later generations have put
upon human sacrifices an interpretation obviously foreign
to their original purpose.'’ Thus, according to a North
^ * Westermarck, ‘ Nature of the Arab tori, in Zeitschr. f EthnoL xxx. 32
illustrated by the i^resent Beliefs sejq.
of the People of Mt^rocco,’ in Jour. ' ^ Tylor, Primitive Culture, i. 107.
Ant/ir. Inst. xxix. 253, 260. ■* Woodthorpe, in Jour. Anthr. Inst.
Tylor, Primitive Culture, i. 106. xxvi. 24. See also vShway Yoc, I'hc
Grant Allen, op. cit. p. 248 sipj. I.ip- Burman, i. 286.
pert, Christenthum , I'olksirlauhe unci ^ Alal)aster, Wheel of the Law, p.
Volksbrauch, p. 456 .vy. Idem, Kullur- 212 sq. Cf. Gaidoz, loc. cit. p. sq.
geschichte der Menschheit, ii. 270. ^ See Nyrop, Romanske Alosaiker,
Gaidoz, in Mllusine, iv. 14 sqq. Sar- p. 73 sqq. ; also infra, p. 465 sq.
HUMAN SACRIFICE
German tradition, a master-builder was immured by a
certain knight in the tower which he had built, as a
punishment for boasting that he could have built a still
finer tower if he had liked to do so.^ An Indian raja,
we are told, was once building a bridge over the river
Jargoat Chunar, and when it fell down several times he
was advised to sacrifice a Brahman girl to the local deity ;
however, “ she has now become the Mari or ghost of the
place, and is regularly worshipped in time of trouble.”
Considering that the foundation-sacrifice was offered for the
purpose of protecting the living against the attacks of the
spirit of the place, it is quite intelligible that the ghost of
the victim came in time to be looked upon as a guardian
spirit ; and it was all the more natural to attribute to
the dead the function of a guard in cases where he was
buried at the gate. But he was buried there, I presume,
simply because that spot was thought to be the most
dangerous. The gate of a town corresponds to the
entrance of a house, and the threshold has almost univers-
ally been regarded as the proper haunt of what the Moors
call “the owners of the place.” ^
Whilst the man who is sacrificed is in some cases
described as a guardian, he is in other cases regarded as a
messenger. The Mayas of Yucatan maintained that the
human victims whom they offered in times of distress were
sent as messengers to the spirit-world to make known the
wants of the people/ The same idea prevailed in Great
Benin. When the head jujuman had said the prayer in
which he asked Ogiwo to let no sickness come for Benin,
he thus addressed the slaves who were going to be clubbed
to death and tied in the sacrifice-trees : — “ So you shall
tell Ogiwo. Salute him proper.”® A message was like-
wise sent to the head juju with the slave who was sacrificed
to it ; ® and a message saluting the rain-god was put in the
^ Nyrop, op. cit. p. 73. ^ Dorman, op, cit. p. 213.
Crooke, Popular Religion of North- ^ Moor and Roupell, quoted by Read
ern India,, ii. 174. and Dalton, op, cit. p. 7 ; also by Ling
See Triunbull, I^kt'es hold Covenant, Roth, Gi eat Benin, p. 72.
passitn. ® Supra, p. 456.
VOL. I
H H
HUMAN SACRIFICE
mouth of the woman who was sacrificed when there was
too much rain.^ Mr. Ling Roth suggests that the main
object of the human sacrifices which were offered in Benin
“ was the sending of prayers, by means of the special
messengers, for the welfare of the community, to the spirits
of the departed, or to other spirits, such as the spirits of
the beads, the Rain-God, Sun-God, the God Ogiwo '' ; and
he thinks that this explains ‘‘ a cult of world-wide pre-
valence. ^ But considering that in Yucatan and Benin,
as elsewhere, the human victim was sacrificed for the
avowed purpose of averting some mortal danger from the
community or the king, 1 conclude that there, also, the
primary object of the rite was to ofier a substitute, though
this substitute came to be used as a messenger.
I do not affirm that the practice of human sacrifice is in
every case based on the idea of substitution ; the notion
that a certain god has a desire for such sacrifices may no
doubt induce his worshippers to gratify this desire for a
variety of purposes. But 1 think there is sufficient
evidence to prove that, when men offer the lives of their
fellow-men in sacrifice to their gods, they do so as a rule
in the hopes of thereby saving their own. (^Human sacri-
fice is essentially a method of Jife-insurance — absurd, no
doubt, according to our ideas, but not an act of wanton
cruelty. N When practised for the benefit of the community
01 in a case of national distress, it is hardly more cruel
than to advocate the infliction of capital punishment on
the ground of social expediency, or to^compel thousands of
men to suffer death on the battle-field on behalf of their
country, n I he custom of human sacrifice admits that the
life of one is taken to save the lives of many, or that an
inferior ^ individual is put to death for the purpose of
preventing the death of somebody who has a higher right
to live. Sometimes the king or chief is sacrificed in times
of scarcity or pestilence, but then he is probably held
personally responsible for the calamity.^ Very frequently
^ Supray p. 444.
Ling Roth, op. cit. p. 72.
® Cf. P'razer, Golden Bought i. 15
sq.
HUMAN SACRIFICE
the victims are prisoners of war or other aliens, or slaves,
or criminals, that is, persons whose lives are held in little
regard. And in many cases these are the only victims
allowed by custom.
This was generally the case among the ancient Teutons,^
though they sometimes deemed a human sacrifice the more
^efficacious the more distinguished the victim, and the nearer his
relationship to him who offered the sacrifice.^ The Gauls, says
Ciesar, “ consider that the oblation of such as have been taken
in theft, or robbery, or any other offence, is more acceptable to
the immortal gods ; but when a supply of that class is wanting,
they have recourse to the oblation of even the innocent.” ^
Diodorus Siculus states that the Carthaginians in former times
used to sacrifice to Saturn the sons of the most eminent persons,
but that, of later times, they secretly bought and bred up child-
ren for that purpose.^ The chief aim of the wars of the
ancient Mexicans was to make prisoners for sacrificial purposes;
other victims were slaves who were purchased for this object,
and many criminals ‘^who were condemned to expiate their
crimes by the sacrifice of their lives.” ^ The Yucatans sacri-
ficed captives taken in war, and only if such victims were want-
ing they dedicated their children to the altar ‘‘ rather than let the
gods be deprived of their due.” ^ In Guatemala the victims were
slaves or captives or, among the Pipiles, illegitimate children from
six to twelve years old who belonged to the tribe. In bdorida
the human victim who was offered up at harvest time was
chosen from among the Spaniards wrecked on the coast.® Of the
Peruvian Indians before the time of the Incas, Garcilasso de la
Vega states that, besides ordinary things such as animals and
maize, they sacrificed men and women of all ages, being captives
taken in wars which they made against each other.” Among
the Tshi-speaking peoples of the Gold Coast, the persons
ordinarily sacrificed to the gods are prisoners of war or slaves.
When the latter, they are usually aliens, as a protecting god is
not so well satisfied with the sacrifice of his own people.” In
Great Benin, according to Captain Roupell, the people who
were kept for sacrifice were bad men, or men with bad sickness,
’ Grimm, '/'tuttonu ATytlwl&gy^ i. 45.
yioltzmaim, Deutsche Mythologies
. 232.
^ C?L\sar, De hello gaUicOs vi. 16.
* Diodorus Siculus, xx. 14.
® Clavigero, op. cit. i. 282.
** Bancroft, op. cit. ii. 704.
” Stoll, op. cit. p. 40.
” Bry, op. cit. p. 1 1 .
^ Garcilasso dc la Vega, op. cit. i.
50.
Ellis, 'rshi-speaking Peoples 170.
H H 2
HUMAN SACRIFICE
and they were all slaves.^ In Fiji the victims were generally
prisoners of war, but sometimes they were slaves procured
by purchase from other tribes.*^ In Nukahiva ‘‘the custom of
the country requires that the men destined for sacrifice should
belong to some neighbouring .nation, and accordingly they are
generally stolen.” ^ In Tahiti “ the unhappy wretches selected
were cither captives taken in war, or individuals who had
rendered themselves obnoxious to the chiefs or the priests.^
I'he Muruts of Borneo “ never sacrifice one of their own
people, but either capture an individual of a hostile tribe, or
send to a friendly tribe to purchase a slave for the purpose.”*''
It is said to be contrary to the Kayin custom to sell or sacrifice
one of their own nation. The Garo hill tribes “generally
select their victims out of the Bengali villages in the plains.”^
The Kandhs considered that the victim must be a stranger.
“ If we spill our own blood,” they said, “ we shall have no
descendants ” ; ^ and even the children of Meriahs, who were
reared for sacrificial purposes, were never offered up in the
village of their birth.^^
We find that various peoples who at a certain period
have been addicted to the practice of human sacrifice,
have afterwards, at a more advanced stage of civilisation,
voluntarily given it up. The cause of this is partly an in-
crease, or expansion, of the sympathetic sentiment, partly a
Change of ideas. With the growth of enlightenment men
would lose faith in this childish method of substitution, and
consequently find it not only useless, but objectionable ;
and any sentimental disinclination to the practice would
by itself, in the course of time, lead to the belief that the
deity no longer cares for it, or is averse to it. 'Brahmanism
gradually abolished the immolation of human victims,
incompatible as it was with the precept of ahimsd^ or
respect for everything that has life ; “ the liberation of
the victim, or the substitution in its stead and place of a
^ Lin^ Roth, Great Benirt^ p. 70. ® Burns, in Jour, of Indian Archi-
^ Hale, U.S. Exploring Expedition. pelago, iii. 145.
VoL VI. Ethnography and Philology^ Godwin- Austen, in Jour. Anthr . '
p. 57. Cf. Wilkes, op. cit. iii. 97. Inst. ii. 394.
^ Lisiansky, op. cit. p. %\ sq. ® Macpherson, Memorials of Seroice
Ellis, Polynesian Researches., i. 346. in India, p. I2I,
^ Denison, quoted l)y Ling Roth, * Campbell, Wild Tribes of Khon-
Natives of Sarawak, ii. 216. distan, p. 53.
HUMAN SACRIFICE
figure made of flour paste, both of which were at first
matter of sufferance, became at length matter of require-
ment.” ^ According to the Mahabharata, the priest who
performs a human sacrifice is cast into hell.^ In Greece,
in the historic age, the practice was held in horror at
least by all the better minds, though it was regarded
as necessary on certain occasions.* It was strongly con-
demned by enlightened Romans. Cicero speaks of it as a
“ monstrous and barbarous practice ” still disgracing Gaul
in .his day ; * and Pliny, referring to the steps taken by
Tiberius to stop it, declares it impossible to estimate the
debt of the world to the Romans for their efforts to put it
down.*
The growing reluctance to offer human sacrifice led to
various practices intended to replace it.® Speaking of the
Italian custom of dedicating as a sacrifice to the gods every
creature that should be born in the following spring,
Festus adds that, since it seemed cruel to kill innocent
boys and girls, they were kept till they had grown up,
then veiled and driven beyond the boundaries.’^ Among
various peoples human effigies or animals were offered
instead of men.
Among the Malays of the Malay Penitisula dough models
of human beings, actually called “the substitutes,” are offered up
to the spirits bn 'the sacrificial trays j and in the same sense
are the directions of magicians, that “ if the spirit craves a
human victim a cock may be substituted.”® We are told that,
in Egypt, King Amosis ordered three waxen images to be
burned in the temple of Heliopolis in lieu of the three men who
in earlier times used to be sacrificed there.” The Romans
offered dolls ; and in old Hindu families belonging to the sect
of the Vamacharis a practice still obtains of sacrificing an effigy
^ Barth, Religions of India^ p. 97.
^ ^ Siipra^ p. 458.
^ Stengel, op. cit. p. 117. Cf
DQnaldson, loc. cit. p. 464.
Cicero, Pro Fonteio., 10 (21).
® Pliny, llistoria fiaturalis^ xxx. 4
(I).
** Cf Krause, ‘ Die Abldsung der
Menschenopfer,’ in Abiwtn, 1878, iii.
76 sqq.
^ Festus, op. cit. ‘ Ver sacrum,’ p.
379 -
^ Skeat, Malay Magic ^ p. 72.
^ Porphyry, op. cit. ii. 55.
Leist, Gneco-italische Rechtsge-
schichte^ p. 272 sqq.
HUMAN SACRIFICE
instead of a living inan.^ In India, Greece, and Rome, animals,
also, were substituted for human victims.^ Of a similar
substitution tliere is probably a trace in the Biblical story of
Isaac being exchanged for a ram, and in the paschal sacrifice.^
On the Gold Coast the human victim who was formerly
sacrificed to the god of the Prah is nowadays replaced by
a bullock which is specially reserved and fattened for the
purpose.
In Other cases human sacrifices have been succeeded by
practices involving the effusion of human blood without
loss of life. We are told that, in Laconia, Lycurgus
established the scourging of lads at the altar of Artemis
Orthia, in place of the sacrifice of men, which had previously
been offered to her ; ® and Euripides represents Athena as
ordaining that, when the people celebrate the festival of
Artemis the Taurian goddess, the priest, to compensate
her for the sacrifice of Orestes, “ must hold his knife to a
human throat, and blood must flow to satisfy the sacred
claims of the goddess, that she may have her honours.” "
There are also many instances of bleeding or mutilation
practised for the same purpose as human sacrifice, prob-
ably according to the principle of /o/o, though it is
impossible to decide whether they really are survivals of
an earlier sacrifice.
Besides the ceremony of nawgia^ already described,*^ the Tonga
Islanders had another ceremony called tootoo-nbna^ or cutting off
a portion of the little finger, as a sacrifice to the gods, for the
recovery of a superior relation who was ill ; and so commonly
was this done that, in Mariner’s days, there was scarcely a
person living in the Tonga Islands who had not lost one or both
little fingers, or at least a considerable portion of them.^ In
Chinese literature there are frequently mentioned instances ot
persons cutting off flesh from their bodies to cure parents
or paternal grandparents dangerously ill. In most cases
^ Rajendralala Mitra, op, cit, ii. 109 of Northe)'n India,, ii. 175 sq,
sq, ^ See supra,, p. 458.
^ Leist, Grceco-italische Rechtsge- ^ Ellis, Tshi- speaking Peoples^ p. 66.
schichte^ p. 267 sqq. I'razer, Golden ^ Pausanias, iii. 16. 10.
Bough, ii. 38, n. 2. Pausanias, ix. 8. 2. ® Euripides, Iphigenia in Tauris^
For various modifications of human 1458 sqq.
sacrifice in India, see Wilson, Works, ^ Supra, p. 455
ii. 267 sq. ; Crooke, Popular Religion ^ Mariner, op. cit. ii. 222.
HUMAN SACRIFICE
it remains urimentioned how the flesh was prepared ; but it is
sometimes stated that porridge or broth was made of it, or that
it was mixed with medicine. Dr. de Groot maintains that
it was in the first place the ascription of therapeutic virtues
to parts of the human body that prompted such filial self-
mutilation. But he adds that “ often also we read of thigh-
cutters invoicing Heaven beforehand, solemnly asking this
highest power to accept their own bodies as a substitute for the
patients’ lives they wanted to save ; their mutilation thus assum-
ing the character of self-immolation.” ^ According to the
testimony of a native writer, there is scarcely a respectable
liouse in all Bengal, the mistress of which has not at one time
or other shed her blood, under the notion of satisfying
the goddess (.^handika by the operation. “Whenever her
husband or a son is dangerously ill, a vow is made that on the
recovery of the patient, the goddess would be regaled with
human blood. . . . Fhe lady performs certain ceremonies,
and then bares her breast in the presence of the goddess, and
with a nail-cutter {naruna) draws a few drops of blood from
between her breasts and offers them to the divinity.”- Garci-
lasso de la Vega states that, whilst some of the Peruvian Indians
before the time of the Incas sacrificed men, there were others
who, though they mixed human blood in their sacrifices, did
not obtain it by killing anyone, but by bleeding the arms and
legs, according to the importance of the sacrifice, and, in the
most solemn cases, by bleeding the root of the nose where it is
joined by the eyebrows.^
There is one form of human sacrifice which has out-
lived all others, namely, the penal sacrifice of offenders.
There can be no moral scruples in regard to a rite which
involves a punishment regarded as just. Indeed, this kind
of human sacrifice is even found where the offering of
animals or lifeless things has fallen out of use or become
a mere symbol. For this is the only sacrifice which is
intended to propitiate the deity by the mere death of the
victim ; and gods are believed to be capable of feeling
anger and revenge long after they have ceased to have
material needs. The last trace of human sacrifice has
^ de Groot, Relii^iom System of Rajendralala Mitra, op. ciiy i. iii
China^ (vol. iv. l)ook) ii. 386 3v/. sf
^ Garcilasso de la Vega, op. cii. i. 52.
HUMAN SACRIFICE
disappeared only when men no longer punish offenders '
capitally with a view to appeasing resentful gods.
Human beings are sacrificed not only to gods, but to
dead men, in order to serve them as companions or
servants, or to vivify their spirits, or to gratify their
craving for revenge.
From various quarters of the world we hear of the
immolation of men for the service of the dead, the victims
generally being slaves, wives, or captives of war, or, some-
times, friends.^ This rite occurs or has occurred, more or
less extensively, in Borneo" and the Philippine Islands,®
in Melanesia and Polynesia,^ in many different parts of
Africa,® and among some American tribes.® In America,
however, it was carried to its height by the more civilised
nations of Central America and Mexico^. Bogota and
Peru.’^ There is evidence to show that the funeral cere-
See Tylor, Primitive Ctilture, i.
458 sr/f/. ; Spencer, Principles of Socio-
logy, i. 203 ; Liebrecht, Zur
Volkskum/e, p. 380 sq. ; Schneider,
Naturvblker, i. 202 sqq. ; flehn, op, cit.
p. 416 sqq. ; Westermarck, History of
Human Marriage, p. 125 sq. ; Frazer,
Pausanias, iii. 199 sq.
Brooke, Ten Years in Sardwak,
i. 74. Hose and McDougall, ‘Rela-
tions between Men and Animals in
Sarawak,’ in four. Anthr. Inst. xxxi.
20T sq. Bock, Head-Hunters of Borneo,
pp. 210 n., 2ig sq.
Blumentritt, ‘ Der Ahnencultus und
die religidsen Anschauungen der
Malaieii des Philippinen-Archipeks,’ in
Miitkeilungen d. Geograpk. Gesellsch.
in Wien, xxv. 152 sq.
^ Westermarck, op. cit. p. 125 sq.
Brenchley, op, cit. p. 208 (natives of
Tana). Williams and Calvert, op. cit.
p. 161 sq. (Fijians). Lisiansky, op. cit.
p. 81 (Nukahivans). Mariner, op. cit. ii,
220 sq. (Tonga Islander.s). Taylor,
Te Ika a Maui,^ p. 218 (Maoris), von
Kotzebue, op, cit, iii. 247 (Sandwich
Islanders).
® Africa Unveiled, p. 127.
Idem, Religion of the Africans, p. 102
sq. Schneider, Religion der afrika-
nischenNatm'vdlker,'^, w^sqq, Wester-
marck, op. cit, p. 125. Ramseyer and
Klihne, Four Years in Ashantee, p. 50.
Mockler- Ferryman, British Nigeria,
PP* 235, 259 sqq. Barton, Mission to
Gelele, ii. 19 sqq. (Dahomans).
Idem, Abeokutas i. 220 sq. Idem,
Lake Regions of Central Africa, i. 124
(Wadoe) ; ii. 25 sq. (Wanyamwezi).
WiLson, Western Africa, pp. 203, 219.
Ellis, i's hi -speaking Peoples pf the Gold
Coast, p. 159 sqq. Idem, Ewe-speaking
Peoples of the Slave Coast, pp. 117,
1 18, 12 1 sqq. Nachtigal, Sahara tmd
Sudan, ii. 687 (Somrai and Njillem).
Baker, Ismailia, p. 317 sq. (Wanyoro).
Casati, Ten Years in Equatoria, i. 170
(Mambettu). Callaway, Religious Sys-
tem of the Arnazulu, p. 212 sq.
^ wSpencer, Principles of Sociology,
i. 204. Dorman, op. cit, p. 210 sqq.
Westermarck, op. cit. p. 125. Macfie,
Vancouver Island and British
Columbia, p. 448. Charlevoix, Voyage
to North. America, \\. igG sq. (Natchez).
R<^chefort, Histoire nature lie et morale
des lies Antilles, p. sq. (Caribs).
^ Tylor, Primitive Culture^ i. 461.
Spencer, Principles of Sociology, i. 205.
Dorman, op. cit. 212 sqq. Acosta, op.
cit. ii. 313, 314, 344 (Peruvians).
HUMAN SACRIFICE
monies of the ancient Egyptians occasionally included
human sacrifice at the gate of the tomb, although the
practice would seem to have been exceptional, at any rate
after Egypt had entered upon her period of greatness.'
It has been suggested that in China the burial of living
persons with the dead dates from the darkest mist of ages,
and that the cases on record in the native books are of
relatively modern date only because in high* antiquity the
custom was so common, that it did not occur to the
annalists and chroniclers to set down such everyday
matters as anything remarkable.*^ In the fourteenth cen-
tury of our era, the funeral sacrifice of men was abolished,
even for emperors and members of the imperial family,®
but it has assumed a modified shape under which it still
maintains itself in China. “ Daughters, daughters-in-law,
and widows especially imbued with the doctrine that they
are the property of their dead parents, parents-in-law, and
husbands, and accordingly owe them the highest degree of
submissive devotion, often take their lives, in order to
follow them into the next world.” And though it has
been enacted that no official distinctions shall be awarded
to such suttees, whereas honours are granted to widowed
wives, concubines, and brides who, instead of destroying
themselves, simply abjure matrimonial life for good,
sutfteism of widows and brides still meets with the same
applause as ever, and many a woman is no doubt prevailed
upon, or even compelled, by her own relations, to become
a suttee.' Professor Schrader observes that “ it is no
longer possible to doubt that ancient Indo-Germanic
custom ordained that the wife should die with her hus-
band.” ® v It has been argued, it is true, that the burning
of widows begins rather late in India ; " yet, though the
modern ordinance of suttee- burning be a corrupt depar-
^ Wiedemann, AtuierU Egyptian
Doctrine of the Inirnortality of the Soni^
p. 62 n.
^ de Groot, op, cit. (vol, ii. book) i.
721.
^ Ibid, (vol. ii. book) i. 724.
^ Ibid, (vol. li. ])Ook) 1. 735, 754,
748.
® Schrader, Prehistoric Antiquities
of the Aryan Peoples^ p. 391.
® Hopkins, op. cit, p, 274.
HUMAN SACRIFICE
ture from the early Brahmanic ritual, the practice seems
to be, not a new invention by the later Hindu priesthood,
but the revival of an ancient rite belonging originally to
a period even earlier than the Veda.^ In the Vedic
ritual there are ceremonies which obviously indicate
the previous existence of such a rite.^ From Greece we
have the instances of tivadne throwing herself into the
funeral pile of her husband,® and of the suicide of the
three Messenian widows mentioned by Pausanias.'* Sacri-
fice of widows occurred, as it seems as a regular custom,
among the Scandinavians,® Heruli,® and Slavonians.'
“ The fact,” says Mr. Ralston, “ that, in Slavonic lands, a
thousand years ago, widows used to destroy themselves in
order to accompany their dead husbands to the world of
spirits, seems to rest on incontestable evidence ” ; and if the
dead was a man of means and distinction, he was also
solaced by the sacrifice of his slaves.® Funeral ofFerings
of slaves occurred among the Teutons® and the Gauls of
Ciesar’s time;“ and in the Iliad we read of twelve captives
being laid on the funeral pile of Patroclus."
l^According to early notions, men require wives and
servants not only during their life-time, but after their
death. The surviving relatives want to satisfy their
needs, out of affection or from fear of withholding from
the dead what belongs to them — their wives and their
slaves. The destruction of innocent life seems justified
by the low social standing of the victims and their
subjection to their husbands or masters. » Flowever, with
advancing civilisation this sacrifice has a tendency to
^ Priinilive Culture ^\. Afi^sqq, ^ Dithmar of Merseburg, Chronicon^
X\mn\cx, Altindisches Leben, 1,^1. viii. 2 (Pertz, Monuwenta Germanue
- 2llg-Feda, x. i8. S sq. Macdonell, historical v. 86 1). Zimmer, op. cit. p.
Vedic Mythology., p. 165. Hille- 330.
l)randt, ‘ Eine Miscelle aus dem ® RaEton, Songs of the Russian
Vedarilual,’ in Zeitschr. d. Deutschen People, p. 327 sq.
Morgenldnd. Gesellsch. y\, ^\\. Olden- ^ Orimm, op. cit. p. 344.
berg, Religion des Veda, p. 587. CiTsar, De hello gallico, vi. 19.
^ Kuripide.s, Siipplices, 1000 sqq. In the ancient annals of the Irish there
Pausanias, iv. 2. 7, i.s one trace of human sacrifice being
^ Cirirnm, Deutsche Rechtsalter- offered as a funeral rite (Cusack, His-
thiimer, ji. 451. tory of the Irish Nation, p. 115 n.*).
® Procopius, op. cit. ii. 14. Iliad, xxiii. 175.
HUMAN SACRIFICE
disappear, partly, perhaps, oti account of a change of ideas ^
as regards the state after death, but chiefly, I presume,
because it becomes revolting to public feelings. It then
dwindles into a survival. As a probable instance of this may
be mentioned a custom prevalent among the Tacullies of
North America : the widow is compelled by the kinsfolk
of the deceased to lie on the funeral pile where the body
of her husband is placed, whilst the fire is lighting, until
the heat becomes intolerable/ In ancient Egypt little
images of clay, or wood, or stone, or bronze, made in
human likeness and inscribed with a certain formula, Vere
placed within the tomb, presumably in the hopes that they
would there attain to life and become the useful servants
of the dead.‘^ So also the Japanese'^ and Chinese, already
in early times, placed images in, or at, the tombs of their
dead as substitutes for human victims ; and these images
have always been considered to have no less virtual
existence in the next world than living servitors, wives, or
concubines. In China the original immolations were,
moreover, replaced by the custom of allowing the nearest
relatives and slaves of the deceased simply to settle on the
tomb, instead of entering it, there to sacrifice to the
manes, and by prohibiting widows from remarrying.'^ )
The practice of sacrificing human beings to the dead is
not exclusively based on the idea that they require servants
and companions. '-^It is extremely probable that the
funeral sacrifice of men and animals in many cases in-
volves an intention to vivify the spirits of the deceased
with the warm, red sap of life."'- This seems to be the
meaning of the Dahoman custom of pouring blood over
the graves of the ancestors of the king.*' So, also, in
Ashanti ‘‘ human sacrifices are frequent and ordinary, to
^ Wilkes, U, S. Exploring Expedi-
tion^ iv. 453.
^ Wiedemann, Ancient Egyptian
Doctrine of the I in mortality of the Sot cl,
P- ^3-
^ Tylor, Primitive Culture, i. 463.
^ de Groot, op. cit. (vol. ii. hook) i.
794 W*
® Cf. Principles of Sociology, /
i. 288 Sij. ; Rockholz, Deutscher Glattbe
und Branch, i 55 ; Sepp, Volkerbrauck
bei Hochzeit, Geburt und 7 od, p. 154 ;
Trumbull, Blood Covenant, p. no
SgiJ.
Reade, Savage Africa, p. 51
HUMAN SACRIFICE
CH. XIX
water the graves of the Kings.” ^ In the German folk-tale
known under the name of ‘ Faithful John,’ the statue said to
the King, ‘‘ If you, with your own hand, cut off the heads
of both your children, and sprinkle me with their blood, I
shall be brought to life again.” ^ According to primitive
ideas, blood is life ; to receive blood is to receive life ; the
soul of the dead wants to live, and consequently loves
blood. The shades in Hades are eager to drink the blood
of Odysseus’ sacrifice, that their life may be renewed for
a time.^ And it is all the more important that the soul
should get what it desires as it otherwise may come and
attack the living. The belief that the bloodless shades
leave their graves at night and seek renewed life by draw-
ing the blood of the living, is prevalent in many parts of
the world. As late as the eighteenth century this belief
caused an epidemic of fear in Hungary, resulting in a
general disinterment, and the burning or staking of the
suspected bodies.'' It is also possible that the mutilations
and self-bleedings which accompany funerals are partly
practised for the purpose of refreshing the departed soul.*'
The Samoans called it an offering of blood” for the
dead when the mourners beat their heads with stones till
the blood ran.^
Finally, as offenders are sacrificed to gods in order to
appease their wrath, so manslayers are in many cases killed
in order to satisfy their victims’ craving for revenge. In
the next chapter we shall see that the execution of blood-
revenge largely falls under the heading of ‘‘human
sacrifice for the dead.”
^ Bowdich, Mission from Cape Castle Farrer, Primitive Afanners and
to Ashatitce^ p. 289. Customs^ p. 23 sq.
^ Grimm, Kinder- und ITansmdr- ** Cf Spcncor, Princ iples of Soeio/o^yy
chetty p. 2g Sc/. i. 181 s/.
Odyssey, xi. 153. ^ d'urner, Nineteen Years in Poly-
Trumbull, Blood Covenant , p. 114 nesia, p. 227.
Chapter XX
BLOOD-REVENGE AND COMPENSATION THE PUNISH-
MENT OF DEATH
According to early custom, a person who takes the
life of another may himself be killed by the relatives of
his victim, or some other member of his family, clan, or
tribe may be killed in his stead.^ The custom of blood-
revenge is found among a host of existing savages and
barbarians, and has long survived among many peoples
who have reached a higher degree of culture.
We meet with blood-revenge in the midst of Japanese
civilisation, not as a mere fact, but as a legally permitted
custom. The avenger had only to observe certain pre-
scribed formalities and regulations : there was a regular
official to whom he must announce his resolve, and he
must fix the time within which he would carry it out.
The way in which the enemy was killed was of no
importance, except that, even in ancient times, the man
who had recourse to assassination was reprehensible.‘^
Among the Hebrews blood-revenge continued to exist
during the periods of the Judges and Kings, and even
later ; under the Old Kingdom, says Wellhausen, ‘‘ the
administration of justice was at best but a scanty supple-
ment to the practice of self-help.”^ It is a rule among
^ The collective responsibility usually Japan/ in Trans. Asiatic Soc. Japan,
involved in the blood -feud has been xiii. 84 sq,
discussed supra, p. 30 sqq, ^ Wellhausen, Prolegofnena to the
“ Rein, Japan, p. 326. Dautremer, History of Israel, p. 467.
‘ The Vendetta or Legal Revenge in
BLOOD-REVENGE
all the Arabs that whoever sheds the blood of a man owes
blood on that account to the family of the slain person.^
Says the Koran : — O ye who believe ! Retaliation is
prescribed for you for the slain.” ^ In ancient Eran
blood-revenge survived the establishment of tribunals.^
There is evidence left of its prevalence in early times
among the Aryan population of India, though no mention
is made in the Sutras of blood-revenge as an existing
custom.^ Among the Greeks it was only in the post-
Homeric age that it was given up as a fundamental
principle, the avenger being transformed into an accuser.^
In Gaul and Ireland, though justice was administered by
Druids or Brehons, their judgments seem to have been
merely awards founded upon a submission to arbitration,
the injured person being at liberty to take the law into
his own hands and redress himself.^' In the preface to
the Senchus Mor we read that retaliation prevailed in Erin
before Patrick, and that Patrick brought forgiveness with
him.” Among the clans of Scotland, as is well known,
the blood-feud has existed up to quite modern times ; in
the Catholic period even the Church recognised its power
by leaving the right hand of male children unchristened,
that it might deal the more unhallowed and deadly a blow
to the enemy.- In England it was at least theoretically
possible down to the middle of the tenth century for sC
manslayer to elect to bear the feud of the kindred of
the slain, instead of paying the wer;'^ and long after the
Conquest we still meet with a law against the system of
^ Biirckhardt, Azotes on the Bedouins prcsenled as objectionable (Mommsen,
a}id IVa/idhys^ p. 85. History of Ronie^ i. 190).
“ luirafiy ii. 173. Cf. ibid. xvii. 35. Maine, Early History of Institu-
^ (ieiger, Civilization of the Eastern lions., lect. ii. d’Arbois de Jubainville,
Iranians y ii. 31 sqq. ‘ Dcs attributions judiciaires de
** Leist, Alt-arisilies Jus Cenliuni^ I’autorite publicpie chez les Ccltes,’ in
p. 422. Revue Celtiijuc, vii. 5, Aneient Lazos
® Ideniy Griceo-italischc Rcektsge- of Ireland., iii. p. Ixxxix.
schiihte., § 50 sq.., especially pp. 375, ^ Skene, Celtic Scotland., iii. 1 52.
381. In Rome Idood-reven^e appears Mackintosh, History of Civilisa-
to have been very early suppressed. tion in Scotland, ii 279.
There is an echo of it in certain Pollock and Maitland, Histoiy of
legends, but even in them it is re- English Law before the Time of
^ Edward L i. 48.
BLOOD-REVENGE
private revenge.^ In Frisland, Lower Saxony, and parts
of Switzerland, the blood-feud was practised as late as the
sixteenth century.^ In Italy it prevailed extensively, even
among the upper classes, in the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries/ In Corsica/ Albania,'^ and Montenegro/" it
exists even to this day.
Blood-revenge is regarded not only as a right, but as a
duty. We are told that the holiest duty a West
Australian native is called on to perform is that of avenging
the death of his nearest relation. “ Until he has fulfilled
this task, he is constantly taunted by the old women ; his
wives, if he be married, would soon quit him ; if he is un-
m'arried, not a single young woman would speak to’ him ;
his mother would constantly cry, and lament she should
ever have given birth to so degenerate a son ; his father
would treat him with contempt, and reproaches would
constantly be sounded in his ear,”” Among the tribes of
Western Victoria a man would consider it his bounden
duty to kill his most intimate friend for the purpose of
avenging a brother’s death, and would do so without the
slightest hesitation.” ^ In his description of the Eskimo
about Behring Strait, Mr. Nelson states that blood-revenge
is considered a sacred duty among all the Eskimo, a duty
incumbent on the nearest male relative ; if the son of the
murdered man is an infant, it rests with him to seek
revenge as soon as he attains puberty.'^ Among the
Dacotahs ‘‘ no one can escape this Jaw of retaliation ;
public opinion would brand with disgrace whoever fled
under such circumstances.”^^ The Brazilian aborigines
^ Cherry, Growth of Critniiial Law
in Ancient Conunnnities, p. 85.
Gunther, Lice der IViedenjergcl-
timgy 'x. 207 Si], Krauensladt, Blutrache
und Todtschlagsiihne im Deutschen
Mittelaltery p. 21. Cf. Arnold,
Deutsche Urzeity p. 342.
^ Simonde de Sismondi, Histoire des
rdpublujues italiennes die ntoyen ligc,
xvi. 456.
^ Gregorovius, IVanderings in Cor-
sicay i. 176 s]].
^ Gopcevic, Obcralbanieft tend seine
LigUy p. 322 sqq.
® K(dil, Reise nach Istricuy i. 406
sqq. Popov id, Kecht und Gericht in
Montenegro y p. 69.
^ Grey, Journals of Expeditions of
Discovery in North- West and Western
Austral lay ii. 240.
® Dawson, Australian Aborigines y p.
7 ^-
Nelson, ‘ Eskimo about Bering
Strait,’ in Ann. Eep. Bur. Ethn. xviii.
p. 292 sq.
Domcnech, Seven Years'' Residence
in the Great Deserts of North Aniericay
ii. 338-
BLOOD-REVENGE
consider it a moral obligation, a matter of conscience, for
a son, a brother, or a nephew, to avenge the death of his
relative.^ Speaking of the Guiana Indians, Mr. Im
Thurn observes that, “ in all primitive societies where
there are no written laws and no n,upreme authority to
enforce justice, such vengeance has ^een held as a sacred
duty.” -^ Confucius affirmed, in the strongest and most
unrestricted terms, the duty of avenging the murder of a
father or a brother.'^ In Japan “ the man who was weak
enough not to try to put to death the murderer of his
father or his lord, was obliged to flee into hiding ; from that
day, he was despised by his own companions.” ^ The Lord
said to Moses : — “ The revenger of blood hiriiself shall
slay the murderer : when he meeteth him, he shall slay
him.” ° A similar rule, as we have seen, is laid down in
the Koran.'* The idea that blood-revenge is a sacred duty
incumbent on the kindred of the deceased was probably
held by all so-called Aryan peoples.’^ It still prevails in
Albania,^ Montenegro,''* and. Corsica. “ Not to take
revenge is considered by the genuine Corsicans as degrad-
ing. . . . Any one who shrinks from avenging himself
... is allowed no rest by his relations, and all his
acquaintances upbraid him with pusillanimity.” “
^ von Miirtiii.s, ziir Etluio- Christian K’j Lov^ ]). 574; Keyser,
graphic Anierika s^ i, 128. Efterladte Skrifter, ii. pt. ii. 95 ;
- Ini Thurn, Among the Indians of Ro.senl)erg, Nordhoernes AandsliVy
Guiana, p. 329 sq. i. 487 (Teutons). Miklosich, ‘ Die
^ Lcgge, Chinese Classics, i. ill. Blutrache bei den Slaven,’ in Denk-
Douglas, Confucianism and Taoiiism, schriften der kaiserl, Akadetnie d.
p. 145. Wissenseh. Philos, histor, Classe,
^ Dautremer, loc. cit. p. 83. Cf. Vienna, xxxvi. 127 sqq. Ewers, Das
Grififis, Corea, p. 227 (Coreans). dlteste Kecht der Russen, p, 50 sq,
^ Numbers, xxxv. 19. ^ Mahn, Albanesische Studien,
^ For modern Arabs, see Burckhardt, i. 176.
Notes on the Bedouins and Wahdbys, ^ Popovic, op, cit, p. 69. Kohl, op,
p. 313 sq, ; Blunt, Bedouin Tribes of cit, i, 409, 413 sqq, Miklosich, loc,
the Euphrates, ii. 207. cit, p. 145
^ Geiger, op. cit, ii. 32 (Avesta |>qo- Gregorovius, op. cit. i. 1 80 sq. For
pie). Leist, Alt-arisches Jus Genthim, other instances of blood-revenge as a
p. 422. Ide 7 n, Gneco-italische Kechts- duty, .see Boas, ‘ Central Eskimo,’ in
geschichte, p. 323 sqq. de Valroger, Ann. Rep. Bur. Ethn. vi. 582 ; Petroff,
op. cit. p. 472 (Celts). Nordstrom, ‘ Report on Alaska,’ in Tenth Census
Bidt'ag till den svenska samhcills- of the United States, p. 158 (Atkha
fdrfattningens historia, ii. 229 ; Ste- Aleuts) ; Kohler, in Zeitschr, f. vergl. ^
mann, Den Danske Retshistorie indtil Rechtswiss. vii. 376 (Papuans of New
BLOOD-REVENGE
The duty of blood-revenge is, in the first place, regarded
as a duty to the dead, not merely because he has been
deprived of his highest good, his life, but because his
spirit is believed to find no rest after death until the
injury has been aveng The disembodied soul carries
into its new existence an eager longing for revenge, and,
till the crime has been duly expiated, hovers about the
earth, molesting the manslayer or trying to compel its
own relatives to take vengeance on him.
According to Yakut beliefs, a person who is murdered be-
comes a yor^ that is, his ghost never comes to rest.^ The
Cheremises imagine that the spirits of persons who have died a
violent deatli cause illness, especially fever and ague.? The
Saoras of India seem to have most fear of the spirits of those
who have died violent deaths.^ The Burmese believe that per-
sons who meet a violent death become nats ” and haunt the place
where they were killed.® The Hudson Bay Eskimo regard the
island of Akpatok as tabooed since the murder of part of the
crew of a wrecked vessel, who camped on that island; ‘^not
a soul visits that locality lest the ghosts of the victims should
appear and supplicate relief from the natives, who have not the
proper offerings to make to appease them.’’*^ The Omahas
believe ^that the spirits of those who have been killed reappear
after death, their errand being to solicit vengeance on the
perpetrators of the deed.” ^ According to Genesis, the voice of
Cuinea) ; Modigliani, Viaggio a N/as, Archipelago).
Visit to the Philippine ^ See Kohler, Shakespea 7 'e 7 wr devi
Islands^ p. 177; Maepherson, Memo- Foru?n der Piirisp^'udenz^ p. 131 sq,\
rials of Service in India^ p. 82 Steinmetz, Ethnol. Studien znr ersten
(Kandhs) ; Radde, Die Chews"' uren, Entwicklung der Strafe, i. 291 sqq. ;
p. I15 ; von Haxthausen, 7 rans- Idem, Pec hts verbal tnisse,Yi.
caucasia, p. 406 sqq, (Ossetes); Mun- and Bapiiku) ; Nicole, ibid, p. 132
zinger, Die Sitten und das Recht der (Diakite-Sarrakolese) ; Lang, ibid, p.
Bogos, p. 87 ; Mungo Park, Ti'avels in 257 ( Washambala).
the Interior of Africa, p. 13 (Feloops ^ Sumner, in Jour. Atithr. Inst.
bordering on the Gambia) ; Leuschner, xxxi. loi.
in Steinmetz, Rechtsverhaltnisse von ^ Abercromby, Pre- and Proto-historic
eingeborenen Vblkern in Afrika und Finns, i. 168 sq.
Ozeafiien, p. 23 (Bakwiri) ; ibid. p. 49 ^ Fawcett, in four, Anthrop. Soc.
(Banaka and Bapuku) ; Nicole, ibid. p. Bombay, i, 59.
132 (Diakite-Sarrakolese) ; Lang, ibid. ® Schway Yoe, The Biu'man, i. 286.
p. 2^6 sq. (Washambala) ; Kraft, ibid. ® Turner, ‘ Ethnology of the Ungava
p. 292 (Wapokomo) ; Viehe, ibid. p. District,’ in A 777/. Rep. Bur. Etlm. xi.
31 1 (Ovaherero) ; Routanen, ibid. p. 186.
341 (Ondonga) ; Sorge, ibd. p. 418 Expeditio7t from Pittsburgh
(Nissan Islanders in the Bismarck to the Rocky Moimtains, i. 267.
VOL. I I I
BLOOD-REVENGE
blood shed cried for vengeance until the murderer was punished.^
A similar notion prevailed among the Bedouins, hence they
thought they might escape the taking of revenge by covering
up the blood with earth. ^ One of the most popular ghost stories
in folk-tales is that which treats of the ghost of a murdered person
flitting about the haunts of the living with no gratification but
to terrify them.^ According to Rohde, this belief was in full
force at Athens in the fifth and fourth centuries before Christ.^
Aeschylus attributes an Erinys to the heinous crime of a man’s
neglecting his duty as avenger of blood ^ — in other words, the
soul of the slain turned its anger against the neglectful relative.
Traces of the same belief still survive in various parts of
Europe.^ In Warend, in Sweden, the people maintain that the
unsatisfied ghost of a murdered man visits his relatives at night,
and disturbs their rest ; and it was an ancient custom among
them that, if the murderer was not known, the nearest relation
of the dead, before the knell began, went forward to the corpse
and asked the dead himself to avenge his murder. ^
From one point of view, blood-revenge is thus a form
of human sacrifice. Sometimes it even formally bears a
strong resemblance to certain other human sacrifices which
are offered to the dead. Among some Queensland tribes,
when the assassin has been caught red-handed, the slayer
and slain are buried together in the same grave ; ^ and
among the ancient Teutons the avenger by preference slew
the culprit at the feet of the murdered man, or at his
tomb.'^ Blood-revenge also resembles other kinds of
human sacrifice so far that it serves as a safeguard for
the sacrificer — in this case the avenger, who would other-
wise expose himself to the persecutions of the revengeful
spirit of the dead.
But the practice of blood-revenge is not exclusively
^ Genesis^ iv. lo.
]acob, Leben der vorishhnischen
Beduinen^ p. 146. Cf. Schwally, Leben
7 iach deni Tode, p. 52 sq.
3 See Dyer, The Ghost World,
p. 65 sqq. ; Anclree, Ethnographische
Parallelen, p. 80 sqq.
^ Rohde, Psyche, p. 240. Cf. Idem,
‘ Para]ipomena,’in Pheinisches Museum
fur Philologie, 1895, p. \<^sq.\ Schmidt,
Ethik der alien Griechen, ii. 125 sqq.
® Aeschylus, Choephori, 2 . 83 sqq, Cf.
ibid. 400 sqq.\ Plato, Leges, ix. 866.
® Dyer, op, cit, p. 68 sqq, Thorpe,
Northern Mythology, ii. 19 sq,
7 Ilylten-Cavallius, Warend och
Wirdarne, ii. 274 ; i. 473.
^ Roth, Ethnological Studies among
the North-West- Central Queens la7td
Aborigines, p. 165
® Wilda, Sh'afrecht der Germayien,
pp. 170, 692.
BLOOD-REVENGE
based on a desire to avenge the injury done to a fellow-
creature and to gratify the angry passion of his soul. The
act which caused his death is at the same time an injury
inflicted upon the survivors. Hence, in many cases, a
murder committed within the family or kin is left un-
avenged.^ Among the Iroquois, says Loskiel, any one
who has murdered his own relative escapes without much
difficulty, since the family, who alone have a right to take
revenge, do not choose to weaken their influence by
depriving themselves of another member, besides the one
whom they have already lost.*^ Again, when the murderer
belongs to an extraneous family, the injury inflicted on the
relatives of the murdered man suggests not only revenge,
but reparation.
The taking of life for life may itself, in a way, serve as
compensation. It seems that, in some cases, the blood of
the slain homicide is supposed to restore, as it were, to the
family of his victim the loss of life which he has caused
them.'^ Such an idea probably underlies a custom which
Burckhardt heard existed among the Hallenga, who draw
their origin from Abyssinia. When the slayer has been
seized by the relatives of the deceased, a family feast is
proclaimed, at which the murderer is brought into their
midst. While his throat is then slowly cut with a razor,
the blood is caught in a bowl and handed round amongst
the guests, ‘‘ every one of whom is bound to drink of it
at the moment the victim breathes his last.'’ ^ Among
various Arabic-speaking tribes in Morocco I have met with
a practice which also, possibly, involves a vague idea of
restoration. On the perpetration of his deed the avenger
^ Stcinmetz, Ethuol(\^ischc Studien Among the Jhdla of Northern Morocct)
zt/r ersicn Entwickltnig dcr Sh'afcy blood-revenge is taken for the killing of
ii., 159 sqq. Mauss, ‘La religion et a cousin, but not for the killing of a
les origines du droit penal,’ in Revue brother.
de Phistoire des religionSy xxxv. 44. Loskiel, History of the Mission of
Kovalewsky, ‘ Les origines du devoir,’ the United Brethren aniotig the Indians
in Revue internationale de Sociologie, ii. in North Ainericay i. 16.
86. Cf Seebohm, /VzAr/ Custom in Cf Trumbull, Blood Covenant,
Anglo-Saxon Law, pp. 30, 42 (Welsh) ; p. 126 sqq.
Robertson Smith, Religion of the Burckhardt, Travels in Nubia,
Semites, p. 420 ; Idem, Marriage and [>. 356.
Kinship in Early Arabia, p. 25.
J I 2
COMPENSATION
licks ofF the blood from the blade of the dagger with
which he killed his victim ; and in one instance related to
me, he bit off a piece of flesh from the dead body and
sucked its blood.^ Mr. Trumbull even goes so far as to
believe that, among the Hebrews, the primal idea of the
goeFs mission was not to wreak vengeance, but “to restore
life for life, or to secure the adjusted equivalent of a lost
life.” ^ But it is difficult to suppose that the exacting of
blood-revenge ever could have been looked upon as an
equivalent in the full sense of the term. If the loss of life
is to be compensated some other practice must take its
place.
Sometimes the manslayer, instead of being killed, is
adopted as a member of the family of his victim.® Among
the Kabyles of Algeria, for instance, a person who has
killed another unintentionally, goes to the parents of the
dead and says to them : — “ If you want to kill me, kill
me, here is my winding-sheet. If not, pardon me, and I
shall henceforth be one of your children.” And from this
day the manslayer is considered to belong to the kharouba,
or gens, of the deceased.^ Among the Jbala of Northern
Morocco, again, a homicide sometimes induces the avenger
to abstain from his persecutions by giving him his sister
or daughter in marriage ; and a similar custom has been
noticed among the Beni Amer ^’ and Bogos.^ In other
cases slaves are given to the relatives of the slain in order
to atone for the guilt ; ^ but most commonly the compen-
sation consists of cattle, money, or other property.
By giving presents to the relatives of his victim, the
offender not only repairs the loss which he has inflicted
^ C/. Golciziher, in Robertson Smith, p. 322.
Kinship and Marriage in Early 6 Sitten imd das Recht c(pr
Arabia, p. 296 n. 1. Bogos, p. 83. Cf, Kohler, Nachwort
Trumbull, Blood Covenani, pp. 260, zn Shakespeare vor defn Forum der
263. Jiirisprudenz, p. 15 sq.
See Steinraetz, Studieni. 410^^17., ^ Squier, ‘Archaeology and Ethno-
439 j Kovalewsky, in Revue logy of Nicaragua,’ in 'Frans, American
Inter nationale de Sociologie, n. sq. Ethh. Soc. iii. pt. i. 129. Idem,
^ Hanoteau and Letourneux, La Nicaragua, ii. 345 (ancient Nicara-
Kahylie, iii. 68 sq, guans), Macdonald, 'Africana, i. 171
^ M\xnz\T\\^QX,OstafrikanischeStudieHy (Eastern Central Africans).
COMPENSATION
upon them, but also appeases their wounded feelings.^
The pleasure of gain tends to suppress their passion, and
the loss and humiliation which the adversary suffers by
the gift exercise a healing influence on their resentment.®
Sometimes the present is chiefly intended to serve as an
apology. Among the Iroquois, according to Mr. Morgan,
the white wampum which the murderer sent to the family
of his victim and which, if accepted, for ever wiped out
the memory of his deed, “ was not in the nature of a com-
pensation for the life of the deceased, but of a regretful
confession of the crime, with a petition for forgiveness.” ®
Compensation, moreover, has the advantage of saving
the injured party the dangers involved in a blood-feud,
the uncertainty of the issue, and the serious consequences
which may result from the accomplished act of revenge
Whilst the carrying out of the principle of “ life for life ”
often leads to protracted hostilities between the parties,
compensation has a tendency to bring about a durable
peace. For this reason it is to the interest of society at
large to encourage the latter practice ; and this encour-
agement naturally adds to its attractions.
But in spite of its merits, the practice of composition
has, in comparison with blood-revenge, various disadvan-
tages. It is not equally calculated to satisfy a revengeful
mind. It has to contend with the conservatism of ancient
custom. It may be taken as a token of cowardice or
weakness, whereas the blood-feud gives to its perpetrator
an opportunity to display his courage and skill. It may be
considered offensive to the dead kinsman. Penally, if it is
to flourish, it presupposes a certain amount of wealth.
^ Rce, Enistehujig des Geivissefis, Studicn,, i. 427 sqq.^ and Lippcrt,
p. 57 sqq. Steinnietz, Studien^ i, 472 KuKurgeschichle der Mcnschheit^ ii.
sq. 591. Occasionally, however, composi-
Cf. Miklosich, lor. cit. p. 148; lion occurs even among such a poor
Kohl, <r?/. i. 426, 436 (Montenegriries people as ihe Vahgans of Tierra del
and Albanians). Fuego. “ Sometimes,” says Mr. Bridges
* Morgan, League of the Iroquois^ (in A Voire foi' South A;uerua, xiii.
PP« 33 ^ f 333 ' Turner, Saihoa, 207), “ the murderer is .suffered to live,
p. 326 (people of Aneiteum). but he is much beaten and hurt, and
** Fpr the influence of wealth on the has to make many pre.sents to the
practice of composition, see Steinnietz, relatives of the dead.”
COMPENSATION
The importance of these difficulties depends on the cir-
cumstances in each special case. Vindictiveness, conser-
vatism, the desire for fighting, and the estimation in which
courage and martial ability are held, are naturally subject
to variations, and so are people’s wealth and their willing-
ness to compensate. The ideas held concerning the spirits
of the departed are likewise variable. The readiness with
which blood-money was accepted among the Greeks of the
Homeric age has been explained by their belief in the
disembodied soul’s dreamlike existence in Hades, without
strong passions and without the power to molest the living ;
whilst the later custom of demanding life for life has been
interpreted as the result of a change of ideas which attri-
buted much greater activity to the dead.^ In other cases
the deceased is supposed to be appeased by a mere cere-
mony, or by a vicarious sacrifice. The Ossetes believe
that he often appears in a dream to some of his descendants,
“ tantot pour exiger de lui la vengeance, tantot pour lui
permettre, au contraire, dc la remplacer par un simple
office des morts .... Revetu d’habits de deuil, les cheveux
6pars, I’assassin Ossete vient sur la tombe de celui qu’il a
tu^, pour accomplir une ci^remonie dont Je but av6re est
de se consacrer lui-meme a sa victime. Cette ccr^monie
est connue sous le nom de kifaeldmn : le meurtrier se
livre spontanement au defunt, qui, en la personne de son
descendant, lui pardonne son offense.” ^ In Eastern Central
Africa, says Mr. Macdonald, “ if one man slay another,
the friends of the deceased are justified in killing the
murderer on the spot. But if they catch him alive they
put him in a slave-stick, till compensation be made by a
heavy fine of from four to twenty slaves. When the fine
is paid the life of the murderer is not demanded, but
several of the slaves obtained in compensation are killed,
to accompany the deceased.” ® In other instances the dead
is perhaps supposed to be appeased by the mere compensa-
^ Scbmich, Ethik der alten Griechen^ Kovalewsky, Coutume contenipo-
ii. Rohde, Psyche^ pp. % sqq.^ rainc et loi ancicnne^ p. 238.
238. ^ Macdonald, Africana^ i. 170 sq.
COMPENSATION
tion paid to his descendants, or his feelings are simply
disregarded when they collide with the interests of the
living.' Generally speaking, the question whether com-
pensation is to be accepted or not, must be settled by
a balancing of advantages and drawbacks.
We may expect, then, to find the customs regarding
blood-revenge and compensation to vary exceedingly
among different peoples. Among many the rule of
revenge is strictly followed, and compensation never, or
rarely, accepted, at least for intentional homicide. This
group includes not only tribes who are in a state of
savagery, but peoples like the Beni Amer," Marea,®
Kabyles of Jurjura,‘‘ and Jbala of Morocco. Burck-
hardt says of the Bedouins : — “ The stronger and the
more independent a tribe is, the more remote from culti-
vated provinces, and the wealthier its individuals, the less
frequently are the rights of the Thar commuted into a
fine. Great sheiks, all over the Desert, regard it as
a shameful transaction to compromise in any degree for
the blood of their relations.” ■’ Among the mountains of
Daghestan*’ and in parts of Albania^ it is likewise con-
sidered disgraceful to accept compensation for the murder
of a relative.
In some instances the acceptance of compensation does
not necessarily mean that the family of the slain altogether
renounce their right of revenge. Among the Ahts,
“ though it is usual to accept large presents as expiation
for murder, yet, practically, this expiation is not com-
plete, and blood alone effectually atones for blood. An
accepted present never quite cancels the obligation to
punish in the breast of the offended person or tribe.”**
Among the Somals, “after the equivalent is paid, the
^ Cf. Steinmetz, Siudien^ i. 452. Pilgriinage to Al-Madinah and A/eccah,
^ Mimzinger, Ostafrikanische Studien ^ ii. 103.
p. 321 sq, K()valewsky,in
^ Ibid, p. 242. ‘ de Sociologies ii. 87.
^ Hauoteau and Letourneux, op, cit, ^ Hahn, op, cU, i. 17^^-
iii, 61 sq, ^ Sproat, Scenes and Studies of
® Burckhardt, Notes on the Bedouins Savage Life ^ p. I 53 -
and WahdbySs p. 178. Cf. Burton,
COMPENSATION
murderer or one of his clan, contrary to the spirit of El
Islam, is generally killed by the kindred or tribe of the
slain.” ' Among the Berbers (Shluh) of the province of
SAs, in Southern Morocco, a person who commits homi-
cide immediately flees to another tribe, and places himself
under its protection. His relatives then pay ddit^ or
blood-money, to the family of the victim, but this only
prevents the offended party from taking revenge on any
of them, and does not entitle the murderer to return ; if
he appears outside the tribe to whom he has fled for
refuge, he is at any time liable to be killed. Among the
Ossetes, again, it was formerly “ a prevalent custom for a
murderer to pay a fixed price for a certain time to the
family of the murdered man, say for a year, during which
time the blood-revenge remained dormant.”^
In many instances, on the other hand, custom allows
the acceptance of compensation as a perfectly justifiable
alternative for blood-revenge, or even regards it as the
proper method of settling the case. Among the Indians
of Western Washington and North-Western Oregon the
principle of life for life, though fully recognised, is some-
times abrogated in favour of material damages.® Among
the Thlinkets “ the murder of a relative can be atoned
for by a certain number of blankets.” ^ Among the
Californian Karok the murder of a man’s nearest relative
may be compounded for by the payment of money.® The
Kutchin demand blood-money for a slain kinsman, but
avenge his death should such be denied.® Among the
Kandhs the custom of blood-revenge was modified by the
principle of money compensation, the acceptance of such
compensation being in no case considered disgraceful.^ In
the Malay Archipelago, whilst the more ferocious tribes
^ Burton, First Footsteps in East ^ Petroff, loc. cit. p. 165.
Africa^ p. 87 n.f. Cf, Paulitschke, Powers, Tribes of Californiay p.
Ethnog 7 ’aphie N(r>\iost-Afrikas^ p. 263. 21.
^ von Haxthausen, Transcaucasia y ® Richardson, Arctic Searching Ex^
p. 405. peditiony i. 386.
® Gibbs, * Tribes of.Western Wash- 7 Hunter, Annals of Rural Bengaly
ington and Northwestern Oregon,’ in ii. 76. Macpherson, Memorials oj
Contributions to North American Eth- Service m India y p. 82.
nologyy i. 189.
COMPENSATION
insist, in many situations, upon a literal compliance with
the law of retaliation, other tribes constantly accept a
pecuniary compensation.' Among the majority of the
Bedawee tribes of Egypt compensation is generally taken
in commutation for vengeance ; ® and the same is the case
among the Aenezes, though it would reflect shame on the
friends of the slain person if they were to make the first
overture.® Among the Wadshagga, again, the acceptance
of blood-money is obligatory.'* The Vendldad forbids the
followers of Zoroastrianism to refuse the compensation
offered for a deed of bloodshed.® Among the Irish the
public opinion of the village held that the quarrels be-
tween its members should be compromised in a certain
manner. However, if the guilty party did not pay the
amount awarded, the community did not compel him to
do so, and the injured party was then at liberty to avenge
his own wrongs l)y reprisals or levying of private war.®
Among the Teutons the kindred of the slain might, in
early times, choose between taking revenge or accepting
compensation, just as they liked ; but later on they were
expected by public opinion, and finally required by
public authority, not to pursue the feud if the proper
composition was forthcoming, except in a few extreme
cases.
Thus the exaction of life for life, from being a duty
incumbent on the family of the dead, becomes a mere
right of which they may or may not avail themselves, as
they please, and is at last publicly disapproved of or
actually prohibited. Among the circumstances by which
this process has been brought about there is still one
which calls for special attention, namely, the pressure of
some intervening authority, the elders of the tribe,® or
^ Crawfurd, History of the Indian ® Ancient Laws of J reland ^ iii. p.
Archipelago^ iii. iii. Ixxx.
- Lane, Alanners and Customs of ’’ Keyser, op. cii. ii. pt. ii. 95.
the Modern Egyptians ^ p. 120. Pollock and Maitland, op. cit. i. 46
^ Burckhardt, Notes on the Bedouins sq. Gotlands- Lagen , 13.
a 7 id IVahdhySy p. 87. ^ Cf. Vambery, Has Tilrkenvolky p.
^ Merker, quoted by Kohler, in 305 .sq. (Kir^^hiz) ; Munzinger, OsiafrL
Zeitschr. f vergl. Rechtswiss. xv. 56, kanische Studietiy p. 5cx:> (Barea and
^ Geiger, op. cit. ii. 34. Kunama).
COMPENSATION
the chief, inducing the avenger to lay down his weapon
and to accept money for blood. I do not say that the
practice of compensation has originated in such an inter-
vention ; we meet it among peoples who know nothing of
courts, judges, or regular arbitrators.^ But when we hear
of chiefs making efforts to check the blood-feud by
persuading the injured party to accept remuneration in
money or property, it is impossible to doubt that some
connection exists between the system of compensation and
the judicial power of the chief. Among the Indians of
Brazil, when blood is shed, either designedly or acci-
dentally, by one of the same tribe, the chief not seldom
insists upon the acceptance of compensation by the family
of the deceased.^ Of the people of Nias, amongst whom
the offender may suffer death at the hands of the avenger,
we read that even grave cases, when brought before the
chief, are often punished by fines only.® Among the
Dooraunees, in Western Afghanistan, “ if the offended
party complains to the Sirdar, or if he hears of a murder
committed, he first endeavours to bring about a compro-
mise, by offering the Khoon Behau, or price of blood.” ''
The Teutonic nations, as Kemble observes, in the course
of time made the State the arbitrator between the parties
“ by establishing a tariff at which injuries should be rated,
and committing to the State the duty of compelling the
injured person to receive, and the wrong-doer to pay, the
settled amount. It thus engaged to act as a mediator
between the conflicting interests, with a view to the main-
tenance of the general peace.” ®
We have previously discussed the important measure of
substituting punishment for revenge by transferring the
judicial and executive power of the avenger to a special
authority within the body politic, commissioned with
^ E.g.^ the Fiiegians (Bridges, in
South Avierican Missionary Magazine,
xiii. 152. Idtni^ in Voice for South
yltncrica, xiii. 207).
von Martins, Beitriige zur Ethno-
graphie Amerikds, i. 1 30. Idem, in
Jour. Roy. Geographical Soc. ii. 1 99.
^ Modigliani, Viaggio a Nias, p. 496.
^ Elphinstone, Kingdom of Caubul,
ii. 105 Sij.
® Kemble, Saxons in Engl<^nd, i.
270.
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
the administration of justice. The system of compensa-
tion was only one of the methods adopted by such an
authority for the settling of disputes ; and, on the whole,
it was a sign of weakness. Speaking of the Rejangs of
Sumatra, Marsden observes that the practice of expiating
murder by the payment of a certain sum of money “ had
doubtless its source in the imbecility of government,
which being unable to enforce the law of retaliation, the
most obvious rule of punishment, had recourse to a milder
scheme of retribution, as being preferable to absolute
indemnity.” * When the central power of jurisdiction is
firmly established, the rule of life for life regains its
sway.^ Thus, in the mature legislation of semi-civilised
and civilised peoples, up to quite recent times, murder has
almost invariably been treated as a capital offence — unless,
indeed, committed by some person belonging to a specially
privileged class, such as the Peruvian Incas,® the Brah-
manas of India,'’ or, in England, all who had the Benefit
of Clergy, that is, every man who knew how to read, with
the exception of those who were married to widows.’'
But among many of the lower races, also, manslayers are
subject to capital punishment, in the proper sense of the
term — to death inflicted, not by an individual avenger,
but by the community at large or by some special
authority.”
It is not only by the slaying of a fellow-creature that a
person may forfeit his right to live. Among various
peoples custom allows, or sometimes even compels, the
offended party to kill the offender in cases which involve
^ Marsden, History of Siwiaira^ p. simply exiled from Italy, whereas a slave
246. wasexccuted for a similar crime ( Momm-
Cf Brunner, Deutsche Rcchtsge- sen, Rouiisches Strafrecht, j). 631 sq.).
schichte^ ii. 599 -ry. (Teutonic peoples). ® Siipra^ pp. 171, 172, 189. Venia-
® R^ville, Hibbett Lectures on the minof, quoted by Pelroff, loc. cit, p.
Native Religions of Mexico and Pertly 152 (Aleuts). Adair, History of the
p. 151. American Indians^ p. 150. Morgan,
^ Laws of Manu, viii. 380 jy. League of the Iroquois^ p. 331. llar-
^ Stephen, Llistory of the Criminal mow. Journals of Voyages and Vyavels^
Law of England, i. 458 j-yy. According p. 348 (Indians on the east side of the
to the Cornelian law, a free Roman Rocky Mtnmtains). Turner, Samoa,
citizen could not be punished capitally pp. 178, 295, 334 (Samoans, natives of
for the commission of murder, but was Arorae, Khite.se). Thomson, in Jour.
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
no blood-guiltiness, especially adultery ; ^ and we hear of
capital punishment being inflicted not only for homicide,
but for treason,'-* incest,® adultery,* witchcraft,® sacrilege,®
theft,^ and other olfences.® We have seen that among
semi-civilised and civilised nations, particularly, the
punishment of death has been applied to a great variety
of offences, many of which appear to us almost venial.®
And we have discussed both the origin of the idea that
justice requires life for life, and the circumstances that
have led to the infliction of punishments the severity of
which, apparently at least, bears no proportion to the
magnitude of the crime.*®
But whilst, among peoples of culture, capital punish-
ment has been inflicted far beyond the limits of the lex
talionis^ we meet, on the other hand, among such peoples
with opinions to the effect that it should not be applied
even in the most atrocious cases. The old philosopher
Lao-tsze, the founder of Taouism, condemned it both as
useless and as irreverent. The people, he argued, do not fear
death ; to what purpose, then, is it to try to frighten them
with death ? There is only one who presides over the
infliction of it. “ He who would inflict death in the room
of him who presides over it may be described as hewing
wood instead of a great carpenter. Seldom is it that he
who undertakes the hewing, instead of the great carpenter,
does not cut his own hands.”*' Nor does Confucius seem
to have been in favour of capital punishment. When CM
AntJir. Inst. xxxi. 143 (Savage Morality. Studien zur Entwick-
Islanders). Hickson, A Nahtralisi in lungsgeschichte des Familierirechts^
North Celebes^ p. 198 (Sangire.se, in p. 134 S(j.
former days). Abreu de Galindo, Supra, p. 189.
History of the Discovery and Conquest ^ Infra, on vSexual Morality.
of the Canary Islands, p. 27 (aborigines * Supra, p. 189. Infra, on Sexual
of Ferro). Johnston, Uganda Frotec- Morality.
torate), ii, 882 (Miitei). Beltraine, II ® Sup?a, p, 189 sq.
Finnic Bianco e i Dhika, \). 77. In all ^ Supra, p. 197.
these ca.ses homicide or murder is said ^ Infra, on the Right of Pro[)erty.
to be pimi.shed with death ; but it may ® Supra, p. 195.
be that, in some of them, our authorities Supra, p. 186 sqq.
have not .sufficiently distinguished be- Supra, ch. vii.
tween punislnnent and bloori -revenge. Tiio Teh King, 74.
^ Silpra,^. sqq. /;//) rt, on Sexual
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
K’ang asked his opinion as to the killing of “ the un-
principled for the good of the principled,” Confucius
replied — “ Sir, in carrying on your government, why
should you use killing at all ? Let your evinced desires
be for what is good, and the people will be good.” ^ The
early Christians generally condemned the punishment of
death, as well as all other forms of shedding human
blood ; ^ but when the Church obtained an ascendency, the
condemnation of it was modified into the doctrine that no
priest or bishop must take any part in a capital charge.®
Later on, from the twelfth century at least, the priest
might assist at judicial proceedings resulting in a sentence
of death, if only he withdrew for the moment, when the
sentence was passed.^ And whilst ostentatiously sticking
to the principle, “ Ecclesia non sitit sanguinem,” the
Church had frequent recourse to the convenient method
of punishing heretics by relegating the execution of the
sentence to the civil power, with a prayer that the culprit
should be punished “ as mildly as possible and without the
effusion of blood,” that is, by the death of fire.'* In
modern times the views of the early Christians regarding
capital punishment have been revived by the Quakers ;
but the powerful movement in favour of its abolition
chiefly derives its origin from the writings of Beccaria and
the French Encyclopedists.
The great motive force of this movement has been
sympathy with human suffering and horror of the
destruction of human life — feelings which have been able
to operate the more freely, the less they have been
checked either by the belief in the social expediency of
^ Liin Yu^ xii. 19.
Hetzel, Die Todesstrafe^ p. 71 sqtj.
Gunther, Die Idee der Wieden)ergel
tungi Lactantius, Jnsli-
tutiones^ vi. (‘De vero cultu ’) 20
(Migne, PatrologUe airs us, vi. 708):
. occidere hominem sit semper
nefas, quern Deus .sanctum animal esse
voluit.”
3 Supra, p. 381 sq. Lecky, History of
European Morals^ ii. 39. Laurent,
Etudes sur t hi stoire de P Hu manitc,
iv. 223 ; vii. 233.
Cierhohus, De icdificio Dei, 35
(Migne, ^7/. cit. cxciv. 1282).
® Katz, Grtoidriss des kanonischen
Sirafrechts, p. 54.
® Lecky, History of European
Afar at s, ii. 41.
^ Gurney, Views Practices of the
Society of Pri ends, pp. 377 n. i, 389.
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
capital punishment, or by the notion of a vindictive god
who can be conciliated only by the death of the offender.
It has been argued that the punishment of death is no
more effective as a deterrent from crime than are certain
other punishments. According to Beccaria, it is not the
intensity of a pain which produces the greatest effect on
the mind of man, but its continuance ; hence the execution
of a culprit, occupying a short time only, must be a
less deterring example than perpetual slavery, which ought
to be the penalty for the greatest crimes.^ Moreover, the
circumstances which unavoidably attend the practical
application of the punishment of death are such as excite
the sympathy of the public in favour of the perpetrator of
the crime, and thereby seriously impair the efficacy of the
punishment as an example.*'* An execution is regarded as
less degrading than many other forms of punishment ;
when a man dies on the scaffold there is a counterpoise to
the disgrace in the admiration excited by his firmness,
whereas there is no such counterpoise when a man goes off
in the prison van to be immured in a cell.*’ Statistical data
prove, it is said, that, where capital punishment has been
abolished either for certain crimes or generally, crime has
not become more frequent after the abolition, whilst the
re-enactment of capital punishment, or greater strictness in
its execution, has nowhere diminished the number of
offences punishable with death.^ And the punishment of
death is no more required by the dictates of abstract justice
than it is requisite for the safety of the community. It is
quite an arbitrary assumption, based on the rude theory of
talion, that death must be inflicted on him who has caused
death ; such an assumption can be refuted simply by show-
ing that there are many degrees of homicide.'’ Nay, far
from being postulates of the highest justice, laws which
^ Beccaria, Dei delitti e dellc pene^ Mittermaier, Die Todesstrafe^ p.
§ 1 6. 1^0 s(jq. Olivecrona, Om dodsstraffet^
" Romilly, Punishment of Death, p. 130 S(j(j.
p. 56 sqq. ^ Mittermaier, op. cit. pp. 62, 133.
Ibid. p. 47 sq. Ilelzel, of,, cii, p. von Mehring, Frage von der 7 'odes-
454 jyy. strafe, 19 sqq.
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
prescribe capital punishment may lead to the highest
injustice. As Bentham observes, “ the punishment of
death is not remissible ” ; error is possible in all judgments,
but whilst in every other case of judicial error compensation
can be made, death alone admits of no compensation.^
And not only may the innocent have to suffer an
irreparable punishment, but the criminal easily escapes his
punishment altogether. Eixperience shows that the punish-
ment of death has the disadvantage of diminishing the
repressive power of the legal menace, because witnesses,
judges, and jurymen exert themselves to the utmost in
order to avoid arriving at a verdict of guilty in many cases
where an execution would be the consequence of such a
verdict.^ Finally, the punishment of death almost entirely
misses one of the most essential aims of every legitimate
punishment, the reformation of the criminal. Nay, by
putting him to a speedy death we actually prevent him
from morally reforming himself, and from manifesting the
fruits of sincere repentance ; and we perhaps deprive him
of the opportunity of making good his claim to mercy at
the hands of another and a higher Tribunal, on which we
are arrogantly encroaching in a matter of which we are
wholly unfit to judge.®
Under the influence of these and similar arguments, but
chiefly owing to an increasing reluctance to take human
life, the legislation of Europe has, from the end of the
eighteenth century, undergone a radical change with
reference to the punishment of death. In several
European and American States it has been formally
abolished, or is nowadays never inflicted,^ whilst in the
rest it is practically restricted to cases of wilful murder.
But it still has as strenuous advocates as ever, and receives
much support from popular feelings. It is said that the
abolition of capital punishment would remove one of the
^ Bentham, Rationale of Punish- ^ Komilly, op, cit. p. 3 sqq,
ment, p. 186 sqq. Cf Hetzel, op. cit. ^ Gunther, op. cit. iii. 347 sqq. von
p. 442 sqq. Liszt, Lehrbuch ties Deutschen Straf-
2 Bentham, cit. p. 1911^. Mittcr- reckts, p. 261.
maier, op. cit. pp. 98 sqq., 148.
best safeguards of society ; that it definitely prevents the
criminal from doing further mischief ; that it is a much
more effective means of deterring from crime than any
other penalty ; that its abolition would have the disadvan-
tage of crimes widely differing in their nature being placed
on the same footing ; that a person criminally disposed, if
he knew that he would only be punished with imprison-
ment for life, would, instead of merely perpetrating rob-
bery, commit murder at the same time, being aware that
no higher penalty on that account would be inflicted ; and
so forth. As usually, religion also is called in to give
strength to the argument. Several writers maintain that
the statements in the Bible which command capital
punishment have an obligatory power on all Christian
legislators ; * we even meet with the assertion that the
object of this punishment is not the protection of civil
society, but to carry out the justice of God, in whose
name “ the judge should sentence and the executioner
strike.” ^ But I venture to believe that the chief motive
for retaining the punishment of death in modern legisla-
tion is the strong hold which the principle of talion has
on the minds of legislators, as well as on the mind of the
public. This supposition derives much support from the
fact that capital punishment is popular only in the case of
murder. “ Blood, it is said, will have blood, and the
imagination is flattered with the notion of the similarity
of the suffering, produced by the punishment, with that
inflicted by the criminal.” '*
^ Mittermaier, op. cit. p. 128 sqq. Bentham, Rationale of Punish-
^ Clay, The Prisoi Ckaplamy\). 357, menty p. 191.
Chapter XXI
THE DUEL
When the system of revenge was replaced by the
system of punishment, the oifFended party generally lost
the right of killing the offender. But there are note-
worthy exceptions to this rule. In a previous chapter we
have seen that, among various peoples, in cases involving
unusually great provocation, an avenger who slays his
adversary is either entirely excused by custom or law, or
becomes subject to a comparatively lenient punishment.^
A few words still remain to be said about the most per-
sistent survival of the custom of exacting vengeance with
eventual destruction of life, the modern duel. But in
connection with this survival it seems appropriate to dis-
cuss the practice of duelling in general, in its capacity of a
recognised social institution.
Duelling, or the fighting in single combat on previous
challenge, is sometimes resorted to as a means of bringing
to an end hostilities between different groups of people.
Among the aborigines of New South Wales the war
often ends in a single combat between chosen champions.’* ^
In Western Victoria quarrels between tribes are sometimes
settled by duels between the chiefs, and the result is
accepted as final. At other times disputes are decided
by combat between equal numbers of warriors, painted
^ Su/>/a,p. 2.^0 sqq, Fraser, Aborigines New South
fVa/oSj p. 40.
VOL, I
K K
THE DUEL
with red clay and dressed in war costume ; but real fighting
seldom takes place, unless the women rouse the anger
of the men and urge them to come to blows. Even then
it rarely results in a general fight, but comes to single
combats between warriors of each side ; who step into the
arena, taunt one another, exchange blows with the liangle,
and wrestle together. The first wound ends the com-
bat.” ^ Among the Thlinkets feuds between clans or
families were commonly settled by duels between chosen
champions, one from each side.^ Ancient writers tell us
that among the Greeks, Romans, and Teutons, combats
were likewise agreed upon to take place between a definite
number of warriors, for the sake of ending a war.®
According to Tacitus, the Germans had the custom of
deciding the event of battle by a duel fought between
some captive of the enemy and a representative of the
home army.‘‘ In all these cases, as it seems, the duel
originates in a desire for a speedy peace.
In other instances daiels are fought for the purpose of
settling disputes between individuals, either by conferring
on the victor the right of possessing the object of the
strife, or by gratifying a craving for revenge and wiping
off the affront.
Thus, among the pagan Norsemen, any person who
confided in his strength and dexterity with his weapons
could acquire property by simply challenging its owner
to surrender his land or fight for it. The combat was
strictly regulated ; the person challenged was allowed to
strike first, he who retired or who lost his weapon was
regarded as vanquished, and he who received the first
wound, or who was most seriously wounded, had to pay a
fixed sum of money in order to save his life.® In the
^ Dawson, Atistralian Aborigifies^ p.
77 -
2 Holmberg, ^ Ethnographische Skiz-
zen liber die Volker des rus-sischen
Amerika,’ in Acta Societatis Scien-
tiarum Fennica^ iv. 322 sq,
^ See Grotius, De jure belli et pads,
iii. 20. 43. I ; Grimm, Deutsche Rechts-
altertkiimer, p. 928.
^ Tacitus, Germania, 10.
® I.,ea, Superstition and Force, p.
Ill sq. Keyser, Efterladte Skrifter,
ii. pt. i. 391. Weinhold, Altnordisches
Lcben, p. 297. von Amira, ‘Recht,’
in PauFs Grundriss der germanischen
Philologie, iii. 217 sq. Arnesen,
THE DUEL
islands outside Kamchatka, if a husband found that a rival
had been with his wife, he would admit that the rival had
at least an equal claim to her. ‘‘ Let us try, then,” he
would say, ‘‘ which of us has the greater right, and
shall have her.” After that they would take off their
clothes and begin to beat each other’s backs with sticks,
and he who first fell to the ground unable to bear any
more blows, lost his right to the woman. ^ Among the
Eskimo about Behring Strait Mr. Nelson was told by an
old man that in ancient times, when a husband and a lover
quarrelled about a woman, they were disarmed by the
neighbours and then settled the trouble with their fists
or by wrestling, the victor in the struggle taking the
woman. ^ Among the Chippewyans Richardson saw more
than once a stronger man assert his right to take the wife
of a weaker countryman in consequence of a successful
combat. ‘‘ Any one,” he says, ‘‘ may challenge another
to wrestle, and, if he overcomes, may carry off his wife
as the prize The bereaved husband meets his loss
with the resignation which custom prescribes in such a
case, and seeks his revenge by taking the wife of another
man weaker than himself.” ^ In the tribes of Western
Victoria, described by Mr. Dawson, a young chief who
cannot get a wife, and falls in love with one belonging
to a chief who has more than two, can, with her consent,
challenge the husband to single combat, and, if the hus-
band is defeated, the conqueror makes her his legal wife.^
In some points,” says Mr. Riedel, “the aboriginal law
of retaliation in Australia corresponds with the code of
honour, so called, which certain classes in Europe have
long maintained. When one blackfellow carries off the
Hisiorisk Indledning til den. gamle og
nye Islandske Raettergang, p. 158 sq.
Rosenberg, Traek af Livet paa Island
i Fristats- Tiden^ p. 98 n.
^ Steller, Bcschreibnng von deni
Lande Kanitschatka^ p. 348.
Nelson, ‘ Eskimo about Behring
Strait,’ in Ann. Rep, Bur. Ethn. xviii.
292.
3 Richardson, Arctic Searching Ex-
pedition, ii. 24 sq.
* Dawson, op. cit. p. 36. For other
instances of rights to women being
acquired by duels, see Westermarck,
History of Hnnian Marriage, p. 159
sqq. ; Post, Afrikanische Jurispriidenz,
ii. 23 sq. (people of Kordofan).
K K 2
THE DUEL
wife of another, the injured husband and the betrayer meet
in mortal combat ; and the spear that spills the life blood
repairs the wounded honour of the one, or justifies in the
eyes of society the crime of the other.” * Among the
aborigines of Western Australia “ duels are common be-
tween individuals who have private quarrels to settle, a
certain number of spears being thrown until honour is
satisfied.” ^ Among the Dieyerie tribe, should anybody
accuse another wrongfully, he is challenged to fight by
the person he has accused, and this settles the matter.® Of
the duels fought among the natives of North-West-Central
Queensland Dr. Roth gives us an interesting account. Sup-
posing an individual considers himself aggrieved, a duel
often takes place at a distance from camp. There is no in-
tention of killing. With two-handed swords, the combatants
would only aim at striking each other on the head ; with
spears, they would only make for the fleshy parts of the
thighs ; with stone-knives, they would only cut into the
shoulders, flanks, and buttocks, producing gashes an inch
or more deep, and up to seven or even eight inches long.
The lying upon the back on the ground — a posture in
which no lawful incisions with a stone-knife can be
made — is the sign of defeat, indicating that the combatant
has had enough, and gives in. But the matter has not
yet come to an end ; the duels of these savages are not so
defective in point of justice as the modern duels of
Europe. “ I'he fight between the two individuals being
at length brought to a termination, steps are taken by the
old men and elders to inquire into the rights or wrongs of
the dispute. If the victor turns out to be the aggrieved
party he has to show good cause, as for instance that the
man whom he had just taken upon himself to punish had
raped his gin, gave him the munguni [or death-bone], or
wrought him some similarly flagrant wrong ; under such
circumstances, no further action is taken by anyone. If,
^ Riedel, Aborigines of Australia^ ^ Gason, ‘ Manners and Customs of
p. 6. the Dieyerie Tribe,’ in Woods, Native
Calvert, Aborigines of Wester n Tribes of South Australia^ p. ^66.
Australia^ p. 22 .
THE DUEL
on the other hand, the victor happens to be the aggrieved
party only in his own opinion, and not in that of those
to whom he is answerable, and who do not believe the
grounds on which he commenced the fight to be sufficient,
he has to undergo exactly the same mutilations subse-
quently at the hands of the vanquished as he himself had
inflicted.” And should one of the combatants be killed
in the duel, which may sometimes happen, the survivor,
unless he can show that he had sufficient provocation or
cause, “ will be put to death in similar manner, at the
instance of the camp-council, and usually undergo the
extra degradation of digging his own as well as his
victim’s grave.” ^ Of the South American Charruas
Azara writes ; — “ Ce sont les parties elles-memes qui
arrangent leurs diffcrends particuliers : si elles ne sont pas
d’accord,eIles se chargent a coups de poing, jusqu’a ce qu’une
des deux tourne le dos et laisse I’autre, sans reparlcr de
I’affaire. Dans ces duels, ils ne font jamais usage des
armes ; et je n’ai jamais ouY dire qu’il y ait eu quelqu’un
detue.”^ If an Apache kills another, “ the next-of-kin
to the defunct individual may kill the murderer — if he
can. He has the right to challenge him to single combat,
which takes place before all assembled in the camp, and both
must abide the result of the conflict. There is no trial,
no set council, no regular examination into the crime or
its causes ; but the ordeal of battle settles the whole
matter.” ® Among the Central Eskimo, “ strange as it
may seem, a murderer will come to visit the relatives of
his victim (though he knows that they are allowed to kill
him in revenge) and will settle with them. He is kindly
welcomed, and sometimes lives quietly for weeks and
months. Then he is suddenly challenged to a wrestling
match, and if defeated is killed, or if victorious he may
kill one of the opposite party, or when hunting, he is
^ Roth, Ethnological Studies among
the North- West- Central Queensland
Aborigines^ p. 139
Azara, Coj'uges dans P Anuh ique
mJridionale, ii. l 6 .
^ Crciuony, Life among the Apachts^
P- 293-
THE DUEL
suddenly attacked by his companions and slain.” ^
Richardson heard that some of the Eskimo “ decided
their quarrels by alternate blows of the fist, each in turn
presenting his head to his opponent.”^ The Tunguses
formerly had a duel with arrows called koutschiguera^
which was fought “ only in the presence of the elders,
who marked out the spot, settled the distance of the com-
batants, and gave the signal for letting fly.” ® The Santals
have a tradition that years long since there was a custom
amongst them “ of deciding their disputes, when the
parties were males, by the ordeal of single combat. The
bow and arrow or hanger served in lieu of pistol and
sword for these rustic duels. Such affairs of honour were
always fatal to one party, but of late times, as equitable
remedies have been brought nearer to them, this remnant
of a barbarous age has disappeared.”"* Mr. Man also
heard that the Kols at one time preferred the duel to any
other mode of seeking redress for a wrong.® The ancient
Swedes were even compelled by law to fight duels to repair
their wounded honour. The so-called ‘ Hedna-lag,’ a
fragment of an old pagan law, prescribes that, if any man
says to another, “ You are not a man’s equal, you have
not the heart of a man,” and the other replies, “ I am a"
man as good as you,” they shall encounter in a place
where three roads meet. If he who has suffered the insult
does not appear, he shall be held to be what the other one
called him, and he shall henceforth be allowed neither to
swear nor to give evidence in any case. If, on the other
hand, they meet in single combat, and the offended party
kills the offender, he shall have to pay no compensation
for it ; but if the offender kills his opponent, he shall pay
half his price.'*
^ Boas, ‘ Central Eskimo,’ in Ann.
Rep. Bur. Ethn. vi. 582.
Richard.son, Arctic Searching Ex-
pedition^ i. 367 sq.
3 Georgi, Russia^ iii. 83.
** Man, Sonthalia and the SonthalSy
p. 90.
^ Ibid. p. 90.
^ Lo flier, On: den fornsnenska hed-
nalagcn, p. 40 sq. (in K. Vitterhets
Historic och Antiqvifets Akcuiemiens
Manadshlad^ 1879? P- I39 ^q>)- Bro-
fe.s.sor Leffler is inclined lo believe that
this fragment once formed a part of
the older Vestgotalag {op. cit. p. 35, in
the Aliiftadsbiady p. 134).
THE DUEL
These customs and rules are due to a variety of cir-
cumstances. To recognise the duel as a means of acquir-
ing a right to land or women, is a concession to superior
strength in a society where there is no government, or
where the government is weak ; whilst in the oppor-
tunity given to the challenged party to oppose the avenger
on equal terms we may trace the interfering influence of
public opinion. The duel is also in a higher degree
than downright violence calculated to bring about a
definite arrangement ; and in some cases, as we have seen,
it is a mere sham-fight, which may serve as a preventive
against the infliction of more serious injuries, by showing
which party is the weaker and, consequently, has to give
in. In other cases, again, the challenge is a method of
bringing forward an offender who otherwise might be out
of reach, and of limiting the fight to the parties them-
selves, so as to prevent whole families fronj making war
upon each other.^ Moreover, a duel may be preferable
to an ordinary act of revenge as a means of wiping off an
affront and of satisfying the claims of honour ; it displays
more courage, it commands more respect. In several of
the cases referred to it is obviously a mitigated form of
revenge, a method of settling a point of honour in a com-
paratively harmless way, and as such it has certain advan-
tages over the practice of compensation ; it requires no
wealth on the part of the offender, and allows of no doubt
as to the courage of the sufferer.^ The Queensland
aborigines are said to be very proud of the wounds they
receive in their single combats,'^ and the duelling Eskimo
“ consider it cowardly to evade a stroke.” * The duel
^ C/l Arnesen, op. cit. pp. 150, i66.\v/. rechlsprechenden centralen Regierungs-
^ According to Dr. Steinmctz, the gewiilt, uiid das nicht Erfiilltsein der
origin of the duel is “die Beschriin- Entwicklungsbedingungen der Com-
kung des Rachekampfes. , . . Die position, nainentlich der Mangel an
treibende Kraft, welche zu dieser duell- ukonomischen Giilern, welche die
artigen Beschriinkung fuhrte, war die materielle EiUschiidigung unmbglich
Exogamie, die vefwandtschaftlichen machte ” (Steinmetz, Shtdien zur ersien
Beziehiingen zwischen Gruppen, der jEntwicklmig der Slrafe, W.
Friedensverlangen erzeiigende, erwei- ^ Roth, op. cit. p. 140.
terte Verkehr derselben. Negative ^ Richardson, Arctic Searching Ex-
Bedingungen waren : das Eehleii einer pedition, i. 368.
THE DUEL
may, fina-lly, be regarded as the most equitable form of
settling disputes in cases where both parties claim to be
in the right. Sometimes it is even resorted to as a means
of ascertaining the truth, as an ordeal or “judgment of
God.”
The wager of battle is well known to every student of
mediaeval law. Outside Europe we meet with a similar
institution in the Malay Archipelago. In his ‘ History
of the Indian Archipelago,’ Mr. Crawfurd states : — “The
trial by combat or duel, and the appeal to the judgment
of God by various descriptions of ordeal, are not unknown.
The Malay laws direct that the combat or ordeal shall be
had recourse to in the absence of evidence, in the follow-
ing words : ‘ If one accuse and another deny, and there
be no witnesses on either side, the parties shall either fight
or submit to the ordeal of melted tin or boiling oil.’ ” '
The natives of the Barito River basin in Borneo have the
following ordeal, called the Hagalangang : — “ Both parties
are placed in boxes at a distance of seven fathoms opposite
one another, the boxes being made of nibong laths and
so high as to reach a man’s breast. Then both receive a
sharpened bamboo of a lance’s length to throw at each
other at a given signal. The wounded person is sup-
posed to be guilty.” '^ Among the Teutons the judicial
combat seems to have developed out of the ancient
practice of settling disputes by private duelling. In a
time when the community did its best to suppress acts of
revenge, it was no doubt a wise measure to adopt the duel
as a form of judicial procedure, investing it with the
character of an ordeal.^ It seems probable that the duel
assumed this character already among the pagan Teutons.^
Like other ordeals it was resorted to in cases where there
was some doubt as to the guilt of the accused.® To
' Crawfurd, History of the Indian hiilfe . . . war.” Cf Patetta, Le
Archipelaiio^ iii. 92. ordalie, p. 178.
^ Schwaner, Borneo^ i. 212. Patetta, op. cit. p. 179.
* Dahn observes { Bausteine, ii. 57) ^ See Unger, ‘ Der gerechtliche
that “der Kampf urspriinglich gar Zwcikampf bei den germanischen
kein Gottesiiitheil, sondern lediglich Volkern,' in Gotti nger Studien, 1847,
cine Verweisiing der ParleienaiifSelbst- Zweite Abtheilung, p. 358
THE DUEL
appeal to “the judgment of God” was an expedient
substitute for human evidence in a society where nothing
was more difficult than to procure reliable witnesses, and
where superstition reigned supreme. Speaking of the
Franks, M. Esmein observes : — “ En dehors du flagrant
delit ou de I’aveu de I’acciise, tout etait incertitude. . . .
Par solidarite forcee, jamais un homme ne temoignera
centre un autre homme du meme groupe ; il ne temoig-
nera pas non plus par crainte de la vengeance et des
represailles centre un homme appartenant a un autre
groupe.” ' I shall later on try to prove that the ordeal
is not, as it is often supposed to be, primordially based
on the belief in an all-knowing, all-powerful, and just
god, who protects the innocent and punishes the guilty,
but that it largely springs from the same notion as
underlies the belief in the efficacy of an oath. The
ordeal, then, intrinsically involves an imprecation with
reference to the guilt or innocence of a suspected person,
and its proper object is to give reality to this impre-
cation, for the purpose of establishing the validity or
invalidity of the suspicion. This also holds good of
the judicial combat. I'he issue of the fight decided
the question of guilt because of the imprecation involved
in the oath preceding the duel. Before the conflict
commenced each party asserted his good cause in the
most positive manner, confirmed his assertion by a solemn
oath on the Gospels or on a relic of approved sanctity,
and called upon God to grant victory to the right. Such
an oath was an indispensable preliminary to every combat,
and the defeat was thus not merely the loss of the suit,
but also a conviction of perjury, to be punished as such.^
That the real object of the judicial duel was to correct the
abuses of compurgation by oath appears from various
^ Esmein, Co itrs tHdment air e dii droit sqq, \ “ kSIc me Dcus adjuvet ik. haec
fran^ais^ \i. sq, sancta.” Lea, Superstition and Force^
Lex Bahnvarioriim,\\, Jourdan, p. 166 jr/. Brunner, Deutsche Rcchts-
Decrusy, and Isambert, Reciieil iRndral geschichteLG. 415* von Amira, ‘ Recht,*
des anciennes tois f?-ancaises^ n. sqq. in Paul’s Grundriss der gerfjf anise hen
Bracton, De Legihus et C' jisttetndinL Phihlogie^ iii. 218. Unger, loc. cit. p,
bus Ang/iee, fol. 141 b .ry., vol. ii. 438 386. Tuchmann, in MPlusim yiw. 130.
THE DUEL
facts. Gundebald, king of the Burgundians, says ex-
pressly, in the preamble to a law by which he authorises
the wager of battle, that his reason for doing so is, that
his subjects may no longer take oaths upon uncertain
matters, or forswear themselves upon certain.^ Charle-
magne urged the use of the duel as greatly preferable to
the shameless oaths which were taken with so much
facility, and Otho II. ordered its employment in various
forms of procedure for the same reason.^ Witnesses
might have to fight as well as principals. A Bavarian
law even directed the claimant of an estate to combat not
the defendant, but his witness ; * and in the later Middle
Ages, after enlightened legislators had been strenuously
and not unsuccessfully endeavouring to limit the abuse of
the judicial combat, the challenging of witnesses was still
the favourite mode of escaping legal condemnation.^
Some codes required the witnesses to come into court
armed, and to have their weapons blessed on the altar
before giving their testimony."' The practice of blessing
the arms before the duel took place ** was no doubt
intended to enable them the better to carry out the im-
precation by saturating them with sanctity, or by increas-
ing their natural sanctity ; weapons are commonly regarded
with superstitious veneration, hence oaths taken upon
them are held to be particularly binding.’^ But though
the judicial duel fundamentally derived its efficacy as a
means of ascertaining the truth from its connection with
an oath, it has, owing to the tendency of magic to fuse
into religion, readily come to be regarded as an appeal to
the justice of God, just as curses are transformed into
^ Leges Burgundionufn^ Leges
Gundebati, 45.
Lea, op. cit. p, 118.
^ Lex Bahavariortim^ xvii, 2 (xvi.
2 ).
^ Beaumanoir, Coutumes du Beau-
vozsiSj Ixi. 58, vol. ii. 398. Lea, op,
cit. p. 120 sq. Unger, ioc, cit, p. 379
“ Lea,,t?/. cit. p. 120.
^ Esniein, op. at. p. 95.
^ For the worship of, and swearing
by, weapons, see Du Cange, ‘ Juramen-
tum super arma,’ in Glossarittm ad
seriptores viedice et infinKB Latiniiatis ^
hi. 1616 sq. ; Grimm, Deutsche Rechts-
alter thiimer.^ pp. 165, 166,896; Pollock,
Oxford Lectures, 269 sq. n. i ; Joyce,
Social History of A u dent Ireland, i.
286 sq. In Morocco, also, an oath
taken on a weapon is considered a
particularly solemn form of swearing.
THE DUEL
prayers and perjury becomes an offence against the
Deity.
In most European countries the judicial duel survived
the close of the Middle Ages, but disappeared shortly
afterwards.* Various circumstances contributed to its
decline and final disappearance. From an early period
Councils and popes had declared against it," but with little
success ; many ecclesiastics, indeed, not only connived at
the practice, but authorised it, and questions concerning
the property of churches and monasteries were decided by
combat.^ There were other more powerful causes at
work — the growth of communes, devoted to the arts of
peace, seeking their interest in the pursuits of industry and
commerce, and enjoying the advantage of settled and
permanent tribunals ; the revival of Roman law, which
began to undermine all the institutions of feudalism ; * the
ascendency of the royal power in its struggle against the
nobles ; the increase of enlightenment, the decrease of
superstition. But though finally banished from the courts
of justice, the duel did not die. In the sixteenth century,
when the judicial combat faded away, the duel of honour
began to flourish.'* Buckle justly observes that, “ as the
trial by battle became disused, the people, clinging to
their old customs, became more addicted to duelling
hence the judicial duel may be regarded as the direct
parent of the modern duel.'* The Church and the State
naturally tried to suppress this sanguinary survival of
barbarism. The Council of Trent declared that “the
detestable custom of duelling, introduced by the contriv-
ance of the devil, that by the bloody death of the body
^ Lea, op. cit. p. 199 S(iq. In Eng-
land, however, it was formally abolished
by law as late as 1819 (Stephen, History
of the Criminal Law of England, i.
249 sq . ).
2 Du Boys, Histoire dn droit criminel
des petifles modernes, ii, 182. Lea, op,
cit, p. 206 sqq.
3 Robertson, History of the Reign
of the Emperor Charles V. i. 3 $7
‘Notitia gurpitionis,’ in Bouquet,
Recueil des hisloriens des Cattles ct de
la Frattce, ix. 729.
Lea, op. cit. pp. 200-205, 21 1 sq.
Unger, loc. cit. p. 392 sqq.
® Storr, ‘ Duel,’ in Encyclopcedia
Britannica^ vii. 512.
^ Buckle, Miscellaneous and Posthu-
mous IVorks, i. 386. Cf Bosquett,
'/’realise on Duelling, p. 79.
^ Storr, loc, cit. p. 5 1 1 .
THE DUEL
he may accomplish the ruin of the soul,” was to be utterly
exterminated from the Christian world, and that not only
principals and seconds, but anyone who had given counsel
in the case of a duel, or had in any other way persuaded a
person thereunto, as also the spectators thereof, should be
subjected to excommunication and perpetual malediction.^
In England, Cromwell’s Parliament made a determined
effort to check the practice.'^ A Scotch law of 1 600 rendered
the bare act of engaging in a duel, without license from
the king, a capital offence.'® About the same period the
Spanish Cortes passed a law which subjected all parties to
a duel to the penalties of treason."* In 1602, Henry IV. of
France issued an edict condemning to death whoever
should give or accept a challenge or act as second ; and
already several edicts against duelling had been promulgated
under Louis XIII.*' when, in 1626, there was published a
new one punishing with death any person who had killed
his adversary in a duel, or had been found guilty of send-
ing a challenge a second time.'' But all these enactments
had little or no effect. We are told that in the eight
years between 1601 and 1609, two thousand men of noble
birth fell in duels in France ; and, according to Lord
Herbert of Cherbury, who was ambassador at the court of
Louis XIII., there was scarce a Frenchman worth looking
on who had not killed his man in a duel.'* As Robertson
observes, in reference to duelling, “ no custom, how absurd
soever it may be, if it has subsisted long, or derives its
force from the manners and prejudices of the age in which
it prevails, was ever abolished by the bare promulgation
of laws and statutes.”'-’ In spite of laws which directly
prohibit duelling, or which punish with great severity
anyone who kills another in a duel, sometimes even sub-
^ Camm.s a 7 id Decrees of the Cotutcll ^ I.saml)ert, Taillandier, and Decnisy,
of 'f'rent^ Se-s.sion xxv. 19, p. 274 sq, Reeueil g<^ 77 dral dcs aiiciennes lots
- History of Crif?ie in Eupiand, Hancaises. xv. 31:1 sq,
ii. 192. ^ Hid. xvi. 21, 106, 146.
^ Hume, CoiJimentaries on the Lazv " Ibid. xvi. 176, 179.
of Scotland^ ii. 281. Erskine, Erin- Storr, he. cit. jx 512.
cifles of the T.atv of Scotland., p. 560. Rc)l)ert.son, op. cit. i. 66.
^ Truman, Field of Honor, p. 70.
THE DUEL
jecting him to punishment for murder/ the duel still pre-
vails in many European countries as a recognised custom,
so much supported by public opinion that the laws
referring to it are seldom or never applied.
This curious practice of taking the law into one’s own
hands, which we find existing in the midst of modern
civilisation, is explicable, partly from the indifference with
which legislators have treated offences against honour,**^
partly from the force of habit. The insulted person,
finding no adequate legal remedy for the affront he has
suffered, determines to be his own avenger, and challenges
the offender to fight. Nor is revenge his only motive.
He desires also to wash off the indignity by showing that
he respects his honour more than his life. The notion
that a challenge to mortal combat effaces the blot which
an insult has imprinted upon a man’s honour is a survival
from a period when the honourable man was above every-
thing a brave man.*^ By displaying courage the offended
party demonstrates that he is not worthy of contempt, by
showing timidity he condemns himself. So far as justice
is concerned, the duel, of course, became an absurdity as
soon as it ceased to be looked upon in the light of an
ordeal. It compels the insulted person to expose himself
to a fresh injury from the side of an impudent offender,
it allows the scoundrel to repay the most condign censure
with a mortal stroke. But when a man’s honour is at
stake the voice of justice is easily silenced, and the pres-
sure of ancient habit is greater than ever. As is usual in
similar cases, a variety of more or less futile arguments
are adduced to give their support to the survival. Lord
Karnes maintained that, if two persons agree to decide
their quarrel by single combat, the State has nothing to do
with it, since they need not make use of the protection
which the State offers them.^* But, as a matter of fact, the
^ Giinther, Die Idee der Wicdervcr- ^ That the modern duel is a special
iii. 225, n. 467. Stephen, development of Chivalry has been
History of the Criminal Law of Eng- pointed out by Buckle [History of
land^ iii. 99 sqq. Oelli, II duello^ p. 21. Civilization in England^ ii. 136 sq.).
Cf. Bentliam, Theory of Legisla- Karnes, Sketches of the History of
tiofty p. 299 sqq. MaUy i. 415 n.
THE DUEL
CH. XXI
duel is not a private affair between two individuals. As
•Moore observed, “ a refusal of the duel is attended with
such mortifying circumstances, with such an imputation
of meanness and cowardice . . . , with such a studied
contempt in public, and exclusion from the polite
circle in private, as renders the alternative both cruel and
inhuman ” ; ^ and it would seem that the State ought to
protect its members against such a compulsion. It is said-
that the duel “ grasps the sword of justice, which the laws
have dropped, punishing what no code can chastise —
contempt and insult.” '■* But we find that in countries
where it no longer prevails, laws against insults, courts
of honour, and especially more refined ideas as regards
honorary satisfaction, have made it as useless as it is
absurd, a matter of the past which nobody desires to
revive.
^ Moore, Full Inquiry into the Quoted by Millingcn, History of
Subject of Suicide, ii. 276. Duelling, i. 300.
Chapter XXII
BODILY INJURIES
Closely related to the right to life is the right to
bodily integrity. Indeed, homicide is, generally speaking,
the highest form of bodily injury which can, in the nature
of things, be inflicted, although there are some forms of
ill-treatment which are more terrible than death itself.
In the case of bodily injuries the magnitude of the
offence is, other things being equal, proportionate to the
harm inflicted. At the lower stages of civilisation we
meet with the principle of an eye for an eye and a tooth
for a tooth, or the offender has to pay an adequate
compensation for the injury.^ It is said in the Laws of
Manu that, if a blow is struck against men in order to
give them pain, the judge shall inflict a fine in proportion
to the amount of pain caused.® According to Muham-
medan law, retaliation for intentional wounds and mutila-
tions is allowed, but a fine may be accepted instead. The
fine for depriving a man of any of his five senses, or
dangerously wounding him, or grievously disfiguring him
for life, or cutting off a member that is single, as the
^ Cf Stephen, //istorj/o/thd Crimina/ Memorials of Set'vice in India ^ p. 82
Law of England f\\\. ii. (Kandhs). Earl, Papuans^ p. 83
2 Post, Afrikanische furisprudenz, (Papuans of Dory). Kubary, Die
ii. 61 sqq. Munzinger, Osiafrikanische soctalen Einrichtungen dcr Pelauery p.
Studien, pp. 208 (Takue), 502 (Barea 74 (Pelew Islanders), PetrofF, ‘ Report
and Kunama). Burton, Two Trips to on Alaska,’ in Tenth Census of the
Gorilla Land, *i. 105 (Mpongwe). United States, p. 105 (Thlinkets).
Maclean, Compendium of Kafir Laws ^ Laws of Manu, viii, 286.
and Customs, p. 6 1 sq. Maepherson,
BODILY INJURIES ^
nose, is the whole price of blood ; the fine for a
member of which there are two and not more, as
a hand or a foot, is half the price of blood ; the fine
for a member of which there are ten, as a finger or a
toe, is a tenth of the price of blood. ^ The scale of fines
for bodily injuries contained in many of the early Teutonic
law-books is minute to a degree.'^ According to various
texts of the Salic law, loo solidi — that is, a moiety of the
wergeld — must be paid for depriving a man of a hand,
foot, eye, or the nose ; the thumb and great toe were
valued at 50 solidi ; the second finger with which the
bow was drawn, at 35.* With respect to other acts of
violence, the fine varied according to several circumstances,
as, whether the blow was given with a stick or with closed
fist, whether the brain was laid bare, whether certain bones
were obtruded and how much, whether blood flowed from the
wound on the ground, and so forth.^* In the Anglo-Saxon
codes almost every part and particle of the body, every
tooth, toe, and nail, had its price. According to the Laws
of Aethelbirht, for instance, twenty shillings were paid for
striking off a thumb, three for a thumb nail, eight for the
forefinger, eleven for the little finger.'' In early Celtic
law different amounts of injury were taxed with a similar
affected precision.'' Nothing can better give us an idea of
the business-like manner in which the whole subject was
treated than the Irish law against castration. If the
injured persons be people to whom the organs extirpated
are of no use, “ such as a decrepit old man or a man in
orders, there is nothing due to them for the loss of them,
but body-fine according to the severity of the wound.” ^
^ Lane, Manners and Customs of the ^ Lex Sa/icat ediled by l Io.ssels, coll.
Modern Egyptians, p. 120. Sachaii, 163-167, 170, 172-177, 179.
Mtihantmedanisches Recht, p. 764. ^ Ibid, col. 100 sqij.
^ Wilda, Strafrccht der Gerfuanett, Lazos of uL'Ukelbirht, 54.
p. 729. Steinann, Den danshe Rets- ^ Aneient Lazvs of Ireland, iii. pp.
historic indtil Christian Vis Lov, p. ci.x., 349. Venedotian Code, iii. 23
658. Stephen, History of the Criminal {Ancient Lazvs and Institutes of Wales,
Lazv of England, i. 56. Lappenberg, p. 15 1 Dimeiian Code, ii. 17
dli story of England under the Anglo- {ibid. p. 246 .vyy.). Gwentian Code, ii.
Saxon Kings, ii. 422. (s sq. {ibid. 340 .i'y.).
^ Ancient Lazvs of Ireland, iii. 355.
xxir BODILY INJURIES
Alter this one is almost surprised to read in the ancient
laws of Ireland that, when a person had once been maimed,
and received part or all of his body-fine, no subsequent
wrong-doer could insist that the injured person should be
rated as a damaged articled
However, the degree of the offence depends not only
on the suffering inflicted, but on the station of the parties
concerned; and in some cases the infliction of pain is held
allowable or even a duty.
By using violence against their parents, children grossly
offend against the duty of filial regard and submissiveness.
It is said in the Laws of JJammurabi, that a man who has
struck his father shall lose his hands.'^ According to
Exodus, “ he that smiteth his father, or his mother, shall
be surely put to death.” ® In Corea the man who strikes his
father is beheaded.^ On the other hand, parents are
allowed to inflict corporal punishment on their children ;
but this is not the case everywhere — indeed, among many
of the lower races children are never, or hardly ever,
subject to such punishment.'^ Among the Australian
Dieyerie the children are never beaten, and should any
woman violate this law, she is in turn beaten by her
husband.'* The Efatese, says Mr. Macdonald, “ are
shocked to see Europeans correcting their children ; I
never saw an Efatese beating a child.” ^ The Eskimo
* Ibid. iii. pp. cix., cxi., 349, 351.
^ Laws of Hammurabi y 195.
^ ExoaiiSy xxi. 15.
* Griffis, CoreUy p. 236.
^ Curr, Recollections of Squatting in
Victoriay p. 252 (Bangerang tribe).
Angas, Savage Life and Scenes in
Austj'aliay i. 94 (tribes of the Lower
Murray). Calvert, Aborigines of West-
ern AustraUay p. 30 sq. Luniholtz,
Among CannibcilSy p. 192 sq. (Northern
Queensland aborigines). Kubary, ‘ Die
Palau-Inseln in der Siidsee,’ in four^ial
des Museum Godeffrogy iv. 56 (Pelew
Islanders). Man, Sonthalia and the
Sonthalsy p. 78. von Siebold, Die
Aim auf der Lnsel Vesso, p. ii.
Murdoch, * Ethnological Results of the
Point Barrow Expedition,’ in Ann.
VOL. I
Ref. Bur. Ethn. ix. 417 (Point Barrow
Eskimo). Boas, ‘ Central Eskimo,’
ibid. vi. 566. Richardson, in Franklin,
Joujmey to the Shores of the Polar SeUy
p. 68 (Crees). Lunihollz, Unknown
Mexico y p. 274 (I'arahumares). Rau-
tanen, in Steinmetz, Rechtsverhdltnissey
p. 329 (Ondonga). See also Steinmetz,
Ethnologische Studien zur ersten Ent-
wicklung der Strafey ii. ch. vi. § 2,
especially p. 203 ; Ideniy ‘ Das LVer-
hiiltnis zwi.schen Eltern und Kindern
bei den Naturvolkern,’ in Zeitschrift
fiir Sociahuissenschafty i. 610 sqq.
® Gason, ‘ Manners and Customs of
the Dieyerie Tribe,’ in Woods, Native
Tribes of South Ausiraliay p. 258.
^ Macdonald, Oceaniay p. 195.
L L
BODILY INJURIES
5H
visited by Mr. Hall never inflict physical chastisemen*’
upon the children ; “ if a child does wrong — for instance,
if it becomes enraged, the mother says nothing to it till
it becomes calm. Then she talks to it, and with good
effect.”* Among the Tehuelches of Patagonia “the
children are indulged in every way, ride the best horses,
and are not corrected for any misbehaviour.”^ Among
the Gaika tribe of the Kafirs, again, parents may inflict
corporal punishment on their children, but are fined for
causing permanent injuries to their persons, such as the
loss of an eye or a tooth.*
The power which the husband possesses over his wife
much more commonly implies the right of inflicting pain
on her than of punishing her capitally ; but even among
savages and barbarians the former right is not universally
granted to him. The Pelcw Islanders do not allow a
husband to beat his wife.'* Among various Eskimo tribes
the women are rarely, if ever, beaten.'* Among the
Central Eskimo the husband “ is not allowed to maltreat
or punish his wife ; if he does, she may leave him at any
time, and the wife’s mother can always command a
divorce.” ** Many, or most, of the North American
Indians consider it disgraceful for a husband to beat his
wife.’ Among the Kalmuks a man has no right to raise
his hand against a woman.* Among the Madis women
are never beaten.” Among the Ondonga a man is not
allowed to chastise his wife.*'* Among the Gaika tribe of
the Kafirs “ a husband may beat his wife for misconduct ;
but if he should strike out her eye or a tooth, or other-
wise maim her, he is fined at the discretion of the Chief.” ’*
^ Hall, Arctic Researches^ p. 568.
^ Muster.^, At Home 7 vith the Pata-
gonians^ P- ^ 97 *
^ Tirownlec, in yi'^e^Q-AW^Compendiiwi
of Kafir Laws and Customs y p. 1 1 8.
^ Kubary, ‘ Die Palau-In.scln,’ in
Jour, des Museum Godeffroy^ iv. 43.
^ King, in four. EtJin. Soc. i. 147.
Cf. Murdoch, loc. cit. p. 414.
^ Boas, in Ann. Rep. Bur. Ethn. vi.
579 -
" Wailz, Anthropologie dcr Natiir-
volkery iii. loi. Cf Powers, Tribes of
Californiay p. 178 (Oallinomero).
^ Liadov, in Jour. Ant hr. Inst. i.
405-
Ratzel, History of Mankind y iii.
40.
Raulanen, in Stcinmetz, Rcchts-
verhaltnissey p. 329.
Brownlee, in Maclean, op. cit. p.
1 17.
> According to the native code of Malacca, a man may
beat his wife, but not as he would chastise a slave, and not
till blood flows”; if he should do so, he is fined/
According to Muhammedan law, a husband may chastise
an obstinate wife, but he must not cause her great sulFering,
nor inflict on her a wound/ We read in the Laws of
Manu : — ‘‘A wife, a son, a slave, a pupil, and a younger
brother of the full blood, who have committed faults, may
be beaten with a rope or a split bamboo, but on the back
part of the body only, never on a noble part ; he who
strikes them otherwise will incur the same guilt as a
thief” In Europe the idea expressed by the ancient
Roman that ‘‘ he who beats his wife or children lays
hands on that which is most sacred and holy,” ^ was
shared neither by the ancient Teutons '^ nor by mediaeval
legislators. According to the Jydske Lov, a husband was
allowed to chastise his wife with a stick or rod, though
not with a weapon ; but he had to take care not to break
any limb of her body.*’ In the Coutumes du Beauvoisis
it is said that a man may beat his wife if she belies or
curses him, or disobeys his “reasonable” commands, or for
some other similar reason, though he must not kill or
maim her.' Among Russian and South Slavonian^
peasants public opinion still permits the husband to inflict
corporal punishment on his wife. In Russia “ the bride-
groom, while he is leading his bride to her future home,
gives her from time to time light blows from a whip,
saying at each stroke : ‘ Forget the manners of thine own
^ Newbold, British Setileinents in
the Straits of Malacca^ ii. 31 1 sq.
vSachau, Mnhainmedajiisches Becht,
pp. 10, 44, 849.
^ lunvs of Mann., viii. 299 sq.
^ Plutarch, Cato Major., xx. 3,
® Nordstrom, Bidrag till den svenska
samhallsforjattningens histcriay ii. 61
sq. Stemann, op. cit^ p. 323 sq.
® Jydske Lov, ii. 82.
^ Beaiimanoir, Coutumes du Beau-
voisis, Ivii. 6, vol. ii. p. 333 : “II loist
bien a roinme batre se feme, sans mort
et sans mehaing, quant ele le meffet ;
si comme quant ele est en voie de fere
folic de son cors, ou quant ele dement
son baron ou inaudist, on (plant ele ne
vent obeir a ses resnables commande-
mens (pie prode feme doit fere : en tel
cas et en sanllables est il bien mestiers
que li marls soit castierres de se feme
rcsnal)lement. ... Li man’s le doit
castier et repenre selonc toutes les
manieres qu’il verra que bon sera por li
oster de tel visse, exept(i mort ou
mehaing.”
^ Krauss, Sitte und Branch der
Sudslaven, p. 526.
L L 2
5i6 bodily injuries chap,
family, and learn those of mine.’ As soon as they hav^
entered their bedroom, the husband says to his wife,
‘Take off my boots.’ The wife imniediately obeys her
husband’s orders, and, taking them oflF, finds in one of
them a whip, symbol of his authority over her person.
This authority implies the right of the husband to control
the behaviour of his wife, and to correct her every time
he thinks fit, not only by words, but also by blows. The
opinion which a Russian writer of the sixteenth century
. . . expresses as to the propriety of personal chastisement,
and even as to its beneficial effects on the health, is still
shared by the country people. . . . The customary Court
seems to admit the use of such disciplinary proceedings
by not interfering in the personal relations of husband and
wife. ‘ Never judge the quarrel of husband and wife,’
is a common saying, scrupulously observed by the village
tribunals, which refuse to hear any complaint on the part
of the aggrieved woman, at least so long as the punishment
has not been of such a nature as to endanger life or limb.” ^
It seems that, wherever slavery exists, the master has a
right to inflict corporal punishment on his slave, even
though he be forbidden to deprive him of any of his limbs.
According to the Chinese Penal Code, the master, or
relations of the master of a guilty slave, may chastise
such slave in any degree short of occasioning his death,
without being liable to any punishment ; whereas “ all
slaves who are guilty of designedly striking their masters,
shall, without making any distinction between principals
and accessories, be beheaded.” ® Among the Hebrews, if
a man by blows destroyed an eye or a tooth, or any other
member belonging to his man-servant or maid-servant, he
was bound to let the injured person go free, though full
retribution was legally ordained for bodily injuries done to
free Israelites.^ In the North American Slave States and
^ Kovalewsky, Modern Customs and ^ Ta Tsing Leu Lec-y sec. cccxiv. p.
Ancietit Laws of Russiay p. 44 sq. Cf, 340.
Meiners, Vergleichung des iiltern und ® Ibid, see. cccxiv. p. 338.
7 teuern Russ tan des y ii. 167 sq. ; Ideniy ^ Exodus , xxi. 24 sqq.
History of the Female SeXy i. i6o.
.in the colonies of all European Powers the master could
inflict any number of blows upon his slave, but if he
mutilated him he was fined or subjected to a very moderate
term of imprisonment.'
The maltreatment of another person’s slave has, even
by civilised legislators, been regarded as an injury done to
the master rather than to the slave. According to Mu-
hammedan law, the fine imposed on a free person for in-
juring a slave varies according to the value of the slave.^
In the Institutes of Justinian it is said that, “if a man
were to flog another man’s slave in a cruel manner, an
action would, in this case, lie against him,” but that the
master has no right of action against a person who has
struck the slave with his fist.^ In the Negro Act of 1 740
it was prescribed that, if a slave was beaten by any person
who had not sufficient cause or lawful authority for so
doing, and if he was maimed or disabled by such beating
from performing his or her work, the olfender should pay
to the owner of the slave “ the sum of 15 shillings current
money per diem, for every day of his lost time, and also
the charge of the cure of such slave.” ' But if the beat-
ing of the slave caused no loss of service to his master, the
offender was not, as a rule, punished by law. A decision
of the Supreme Court of Maryland established expressly
the law to be, in that State, that trespass would not lie by
a master for an assault and battery on his slave, unless it
were attended with a loss of service.’' If, on the other
' ‘Negro Act’ of 1740, § 37, in
Brevard, Digest of the Public Statute
Law of South Carolina^ ii. 241. Ste-
phen, Slavery of the British IVest In-
dia Colonies^ i. 36 sq. Edwards, History
of the British West Indies^ ii. 192.
^ Lane, Manners and Customs of the
Modern Egyptians^ p. 120.
3 Institutiones^ iv. 4. 3.
^ Brevard, op. cit. ii. 231 sq.
® Harris and Johnson, Reports of Cases
argued and determined in the General
Court and Court of Appeals of the State of
Maryland., i. 4. Of all the Slave States,
so far as I know, Kentucky was the only
one where the owner of a .slave might
bring an action of trespass against any-
one who whipped, stroke, or otherwise
abused the slave without theowner’s con-
sent, notwithstanding the .slave was not
so injured that the master lost his
services thereby (Moreheadand Brown,
Digest of the Statute Laws of KottMchy,
ii. 1481). In Tennessee, according to
an act of 1813, a person was punished
if he “ wantonly and without sufficient
cause ” beat or abused the slave of ano-
ther (Caruthers and Nicholson, Compi-
lation of the Statutes of Tennessee., p.
678).
BODILY INJURIES
hand, the offender was a slave and his victim a white man,
the injury was regarded in a very different light. We read
in an act of Georgia passed in 1770 : — “If any slave shall
presume to strike any white person, such slave . . . shall
. . . for the second offence suffer death : But in case any
such slave shall grievously wound, maim, or bruise any
white person, though it shall be only the first offence, such
slave shall suffer death.” ^ And to offer violence, to strike,
attempt to strike, struggle with, or resist any white person,
was, even by the latest meliorating laws issued in the
British Colonies, declared to be a crime in a slave which, if
the white person had been wounded or hurt, and in some
islands even without that condition, should subject the
offender to death, dismemberment, or other, severe penal-
ties." We read in one of the codes of ancient Wales : —
“ If a freeman strike a bondman, let him pay him twelve
pence. ... If a bondman strike any freeman, it is just to
cut off his right hand, or his right foot.” ^ According to
Chinese law, a freeman striking a slave shall “ be punished
less severely by one degree than in the ordinary cases of
the same offence ” ; whereas “ a slave striking a freeman
shall, in proportion to the consequences, be punished one
degree more severely than is by law provided in similar
cases between equals.” ‘‘
Very frequently the penalties or fines for bodily injuries
are influenced by the class or rank of the parties even
when both of them are freemen. Among the Marea,
whilst a commoner who wounds another commoner simply
■pays him compensation for the hurt, a commoner who
wounds a nobleman must abandon to him all his property
and become his slave.'"' At Zimme the fines for assaults
“vary greatly, according to the rank of the party com-
^ Prince, Digest of the Laws of the p. 339). For ancient Swedish law on
State of Georgia, p. 781. this subject, .see Got lands - Lagen,
- Stephen, Slavery of the British i. 19. 37.
West India Colonies, i. 188. Kd wards, ^ Ta Tsing Len Lee, sec. cccxiii. p.
History of the British West Indies, ii. 336.
202 St], ^ Miinzinger, Ostafrikanische Stiidien,
2 Gweniian Code, ii. 5. 31 sq. {An- . p. 244.
cient Laws and Institutes of Wales,
plaining/’ ^ Among the Ossetes the limbs of a noble are
rated at twice as much as the limbs of an ordinary free-
man.^ The Laws of Hammurabi contain the following
provisions : — If a man has caused the loss of a gentle-
man’s eye, his eye one shall cause to be lost. If he has
shattered a gentleman’s limb, one shall shatter his limb. If
he has caused a poor man to lose his eye or shattered a
poor man’s limb, he shall pay one mina of silver. If a
man has made the tooth of a man that is his equal to fall
out, one shall make his tooth fdll out. If he has made the
tooth of a poor man to fall out, he shall pay one-third of
a mina of silver.”^ According to the Laws of Manu,
if a man of a low caste does hurt to a man of any of the
three highest castes, the offending member shall be cut
off ; and he who intentionally strikes a Brahmana in
anger, even if it were only with a blade of grass, “ will
be born during twenty-one existences in the wombs of such
beings where men are born in punishment of their sins.”
In early Teutonic and Celtic codes we meet with the prin-
ciple that the compensation by which a bodily injury is to
be atoned for varies according to the rank of the parties
concerned.''
We have noticed that men in their estimation of human
life, particularly at the earlier stages of culture, discrimi-
nate between fellow- tribesmen or compatriots and aliens.
A similar distinction is made with reference to other bodily
Injuries. It reaches its pitch in the sufferings inflicted on
vanquished enemies. The treatment to which the Kam-
chadales subjected their male prisoners of war included
‘‘ burning, hewing them to pieces, tearing their entrails out
when alive, and hanging them by the feet.” ‘ Some of the
Dacotahs, when they had taken a captive, secured him
^ Colquhoiin, the Shafts^ Aneient Laws of IrelatuL iii. p. cxi.
p, 132. DirnetianCodefn, ij, {Amiejit Laws
" von Ilaxthausen, Transcaucasia^ aJid Institutes of IVaies^ p. 2 ^S). (iwcn-
p. 409, tian. CodCy ii. 7- I3 {ibuL 342)-
^ Laws of IIa)nmurabi , 196-198,200 Valrogcr, Les Ccltes, p. 470. Innes,
sq. Cf. ibid. 202 sqq. Scotland in the Middle p. 180.
^ Laws of ManUy viii. 279. ” Krasheninnikof'f, History of Kant-
^ Ibid. iv. 166. Cf ibid, iv, 167. sc hatha p. 200.
Kemble, Saxons in England, i. 134.
$20
BODILY INJURIES chap.
to a stake and allowed their women to torture him by
mutilating him previous to killing him”; ^ and of many
other North American Indians it is said that they “ devote
their captives to death, with the most agonising tortures.”
The wars of the Society Islanders, Ellis observes, were
most merciless and destructive ; “ invention itself was
tortured to find out new modes of inflicting suffering.”®
On the other hand, there are not wanting instances of
savage warfare being conducted on more humane princi-
ples. Dobrizhoffer tells us that “ cruelty towards captives
and enemies is abhorred by the Abipones, who never tor-
ture the dying ” ; ■* and among the Somals no injury is done
to enemies who have been severely wounded in the battle.®
Civilised nations maintain that, in time of war, no greater
injuries should be inflicted upon the enemy than are neces-
sary to obtain the end of the war.
The right to bodily integrity is influenced by religious
differences as well as national. According to Muhamme-
dan law, the compensation for injuries inflicted on a Jew
or a Christian is a third, for those inflicted on a Parsee
only a fifteenth, of the sum to be paid for similar injuries
done to a Moslem.''’ A mediaeval Spanish law prescribes
that a Christian who beats a Jew shall pay four maravedis,
but that a Jew who beats a Christian shall pay ten.^
The right to bodily integrity may be forfeited by the
commission of a crime. As has been already noticed,
physical injuries are frequently resented according to the
law of like for like ; ® and in other cases, also, the inflic-
^ Dorsey, ‘Omaha Sociology,’ in
l\ep. Bur, Ethn. iii. 313.
2 Adair, History of the American In-
dians, p. 388.
Ellis, Polynesian Researches, i, 293.
Cf Williams, Narrative of Missionary
Enterprises, p. 533 (Samoans) ; Fore-
man, Philippine Islands, p. 185 ; Ellis,
Tshi-speaking Peoples of the Gold Coast,
p. 172 sq.
Dobrizhoffer, Account of the A bi-
hones, ii. 41 1.
^ raulitschkc, Ethnographie Nordost-
Afrikas, p. 255.
^ Sachau, op, cit, p. 764.
^ ‘Fucrode Sepulveda,’ art. M sq-t
quoted by Du Boys, Ilistoire du droit
criminel de lEspagne, p. 74.
^ Supra, p. 178. See also Laivs of
Hammurabi, 196, T97, 200 ; Exodus,
xxi. 24 sq, ; Leviticus, xxiv. 19 jy. ;
Deuteronomy, xix, 21 ; Koran, v. 49 ;
Sachau, op, cit, p. 762 (Muhamme-
dan law); Leist, Alt-arisches Jus Gen-
tium, p. 426 sq, (Greeks) ; Lex Duo-
decim Tabulartun, viii. 2 ; Gunther,
Idee der Wiederz>ergeitung, p, 186 sqq,
(Teutons).
xxn
BODILY INJURIES
tion of corporal suffering — by mutilation, scourging, and
so forth — is a common penalty. Amputation or mutila-
tion of the offending member has particularly been in vogue
among so-called peoples of culture.^ It is often men-
tioned in the Code of Hammurabi ^ and in the Laws of
Manu.* It occurred among the Greeks,^ Romans," and
Teutons.® Mediasval codes contain numerous instances of
it.’^ The Laws of Alfred prescribe that a male theow who
commits a rape upon a female theow shall be emasculated ; ®
and in a later age Bracton reserves the same punishment
for the deflowerer of a virgin, with the addition that the
offender shall also lose his eyes, “ on account of his look-
ing at the beauty, for which he coveted possession of the
virgin.”® According to a law of Cnut, an adulteress shall
have her nose and ears cut off.^® Aethelstan enjoined that
an illicit coiner should lose his right hand ; “ whereas in
later times this punishment was restricted to those who
struck anybody in the king’s presence or in his court. By
the statute law of Scotland the punishment of forgery, or
falsifying of writings, was at first the amputation of the
hand, afterwards dismembering of it, joined with other
pains.^® In some countries a perjurer lost the offending
fingers or his right hand,^^ in others he had his tongue cut
^ For its occurrence in modern Persia, Gunther, op. cit. i. 94 sqij.
see Polak, Persien, i. 256, 329 sq, ; in ^ Ibid. i. 155 sqq,
Fe^, sec Leo Africanus, History atid ^ Ibid. i. 195 sqq. Wilda op. cit. p.
Description of Africa, ii. 470. The 510. Grimm, Deutsche Rechtsaltcr-
Koran (v, 42) orders theft to be punished thiltner, p. 740.
by cutting off the hands of the thief, " Du }Joys, Histoirc du droit critnincl
but this punishment is now seldom des peuples 7 noderucs, ii. 699. Idem,
practised in Muhammedan countries. Histoire du droit criminei dc P Espagne,
Among the lower races I have met only p. 94, Cibrario, Economia politica del
with a few instances of punishing the medio eve, i. 346 sq.
offending member. In Ashanti in- ® Lazvs of Alfred, ii. 25,
trigue with the female slaves of the ^ Bracton, De Legibus et Consuctudi-
royal household is punished by emas- nibus Angluv, fob 147, vol. ii. 480 sq.
culation (Ellis, Tshi-speaking Peoples of Laws of Cnut, ii. 54.
the Gold Coast, p. 287) ; and the Kam- Laws of yEthelstan, 14.
chadales burn the hands of people who Strutt, View of the Manners, Cus-
have been frequently caught in theft toms, Psf^c. of the Ifihabitants of Eng-
(Krasheninnikoff, op. cit. p. 179). land, iii. 43.
Laws of Hammurabi, 192, 194, Erskine, Principles of the Law of
195, 218, 226, 253. Scotland, p. 571.
^ Laavs of Manu, viii. 270-272, 279- Stemann, op. cit. p, 645. Charles
283,322,334,374; xi. 105. V. ’s Peinliche Gerichts Ordmmg, art.
BODILY INJURIES
off or pierced with a hot iron ; ^ and in England, before
the Conquest, a man might lose his tongue by bringing a
false and scandalous accusation.^. In the seventeenth cen-
tury a person in Scotland was sentenced to have his tongue
bored because he had libelled the Lord Justice C^eneral.'*
In German and Austrian codes we find, even in the
eighteenth century, traces of the principle of punishing
the offending member ; * and in France the last survival
of it — the amputation of the right hand of a parri-
cide before his execution — disappeared only in 1832.“
Growing refinement of feeling has made people averse
from the use of surgery in the administration of
justice ; and in most European countries grown-up
offenders are no longer liable to corporal punishment of
any kind.'’'
Corporal punishment has generally been, by preference,
a punishment for poor and common people or slaves.’^
Blows and abusive language, says Plutarch, seem to be
more fitting for slaves than the freeborn.® According to
the religious law of the Flindus, a Brahmana shall not
suffer corporal punishment for any offence." Among the
Hebrews'" and Muhammedans," among the Romans'^ and
in the Middle Ages,'® the punishment of mutilation could
generally be commuted to a fine. For a long period, in
107, p. 235. Pollock and Maitland, Korpers'trafoi hei alien Volkeni^ passim.
History of English Lazv before the Time. ^ See, for in.stance, the Laws of
of Edivard 1 . ii. 453. Gihither, op. cit. Mann, viii. 267, 279.
ii. 57 * Plutarch, I)e cdueatione pnerorum^
^ Hisfoire dn droit o'imincl 12.
des peuples niodernes^ ii. 699. Idem., Baudhayana^ i. 10. 18* 17. Insii-
Histoire du droit criminel de I' Espagne^ tntes of VisJurn^ v. 2.
p. 599 sq. Pitcairn, Criminal Trials Giinthcr, op. cit. i. 5,5.
in Scotland, iii. 539. Ibid. i. 74 sq. Lane, Manners and
“ Pollock and Maitland, op. cit. ii. Customs of the Modcrfi E^^yptians, p.
539. 120. Sachau, op. cit. p. 764. According
^ Rogers, Social IJfe in Scotland, ii. to Muharnmedan law, it is not obliga-
35* tory for the injured party to accept com-
^ Giinther, op. cit, ii. 55-57, 65 ; iii. pensation in lieu of mutilation.
79 - Giinther, <r/A i. \ 2 C[sqq. Moinm-
® Chauveau and Helie, Thiorie du sen, Romisches Strafrecht, p. 981.
Code l^dnal, iii. 394. Du Boys, Ilistoire die droit criminel
^ See von Liszt, I.e droit criminel des des peuples modernes, ii. 557 sq. Strutt,
Bats europlens, passim ; Wrede, Die op. cit. ii. 8.
j^hristian Europe, as well as in Pagan Rome during the
Empire/ the punishment was more savage in proportion as
the delinquent was more helpless. “ En crimes,” says
Loysel, “ les villains sont plus grievement punis en leurs
corps que les nobles. ... Et ou le vilain perdroit la vie,
ou un membre de son corps, le noble perdra I’honneur, et
reponse en cour.” ^ Indeed, whilst the slave incurred the
penalty of mutilation for the most trifling offence, the
noble might be exempted from corporal punishment of any
kind.® In a similar manner the social status of a person
has influenced his right to bodily integrity with reference
to judicial torture. According to the Chinese Penal Code,
“ it shall not, in any tribunal of government, be permitted
to put the question by torture to those who belong to any
of the eight privileged classes, in consideration of the re-
spect due to their character.” ^ In Rome, under the Re-
public, torture was exclusively confined to the slaves.® In
mediaeval Christendom it was made use of to an extent and
with a cold-blooded ferocity unknown to any heathen nation,
and in cases of heresy and treason it was applied to every
class of the community.'’ But the tortures inflicted on the
nobles and the clergy were lighter than in the case of ordi-
nary laymen, and proof of a more decided character was
required to justify their being exposed to torment.'*’
“ Noble persons and persons of quality,” says Dumoulin,
“ cannot so easily be subjected to torture as persons
who are of mean and plebeian rank.” ® Guazzini, an
eminent Italian jurisconsult and a recognised expositor
of the law of torture in the days of its highest ascendency
and ripest maturity, observes that the torment inflicted
1 Cf. Mackenzie, Sltidies in Ko7?ian
Law, p. 414 sq,
^ Loy.sel, Institutes coutu??iih'cs, vi.
2. 31 sq., vol. ii. 219 sq.
3 Du Histoire, tin droit criininel
de PEspagne, p- 469.
4 Ta Tsing Leu Lee, sec. cccciv. p.
441-
® Momirsen, Roinisches Strafrecht,
p. 405-
® Suarez tie Paz, Praxis ecclesiasiica
et secular is, v. i. 3. 12, fol. 154 b. Cf.
Lcclcy, Pise at id Influence of the Spirit
of Pationalisni in Europe, i. 328.
^ Lea, Superstition and I'oire, p.
526 sq.
^ Dumoulin, tjuoled by Welling,
‘ Law of U'orture,’ in The American
Anthropologist, v, 210 sq.
BODILY INJURIES
on a person shall be proportionate to his age, his physical
constitution, his mental habits, and his social status ; ^
and he adds that bishops and others in high civil dignity
are exempt from torture even under strong presumptions
of guilt. ^
The moral notions regarding the infliction of bodily in-
juries require little comment. They are based on the
principle of sympathetic resentment, modified by the
ascription of particular rights to some and particular duties
to others, on account of the relation in which the parties
stand to each other ; and they follow the same rules as the
ideas concerning homicide, to tbe exclusion, of course, of
all such considerations as result from fear of the slain
man’s ghost or from the religious horror of taking life.
One point, however, calls for special attention. The for-
cible interference with another person’s body not only
causes physical pain but commonly entails disgrace upon
the sufferer. This largely accounts for the fact that a per-
son’s right to bodily integrity varies so much according to
his social standing.^ Even among the lower races we meet
with the notions that an act of bodily violence involves a
gross insult, and that corporal punishment disgraces the
criminal more than any other form of penalty. According
to the Malay Code, “ the persons who may be put to death
without the previous knowledge of the king or nobles, are
an adulterer, a person guilty of treason, a thief who cannot
otherwise be apprehended, and a person who offers another
a grievous affront, such as a blow over the face.” * Among
the Maoris a blow with the fist would lead to a combat
with arms.“ The Thlinkets consider corporal punishment to
^ Guazzini, Tractatus ad defensatn
inquisitorutti^ xxx. 4. 24, vol. ii. 86.
Ibid. xxx. 17, vol. ii. 102 sq.
^ Cf. Dintetian Code, ii. 17. 17 {Ait-
cient Laws and Institutes of IVales, p.
248) : “ The Law says that the limbs of
all per.sons are of equal worth ; if a
limb of the king be broken, that it is of
the same worth as the limb of the vil-
lain : yet, nevertheless, the worth of
saraad [or fine for insult] to the king, or
to a breyr, is more than the .saraad of a
villain, if a limb belonging to him be
cut.” See also Gwentian Code, ii. 7. 12
sq. {ibid. p. 342).
^ Crawfurd, History of the Indian
Archipelago, iii. 105 sq.
® Shortland, Traditions and Supe?'-
stitions of the New Zealanders, p. 227.
be the greatest indignity to which a freeman can be sub-
jected, hence they never inflict itd And civilised nations
who are ready to punish certain criminals with death,
hold whipping to be a punishment too infamous to be
employed.
' Holmberg, ‘ Ethnograph. Skizzen Ameiika,’ in Jaa Socictatis Scien-
uber die Volker des russischen tiaruni Feutiiccc^ iv. 321.
Chapter XXIII
CHARITY AND GENEROSITY
In previous chapters we have examined the regard for
the life and physical well-being of others as displayed in
moral ideas concerning homicide and the infliction of
bodily harm. We shall now consider the same subject
from another point of view, namely, the valuation of such
conduct as positively promotes the existence and material
comfort of a fellow-creature.
There is one duty so universal and obvious that it is
seldom mentioned : the mother’s duty to rear her child-
ren, provided that they are suffered to live. Another
duty — equally primitive, I believe, in the human race — is
incumbent on the married man : the protection and sup-
port of his family. We hear of this duty from all
quarters of the savage world.
Among the North American Indians it was considered
disgraceful for a man to have more wives than he was able to
maintain. 1 Mr. Powers says that among the Patwin, a Cali-
fornian tribe which he believes to rank among the lowest in
the world, ‘‘ the sentiment that the men are bound to support
the women — that is to furnish the supplies — is stronger even
than among us.” ^ Among the Iroquois it was the office of the
husband ‘‘ to make a mat, to repair the cabin of his wife, or to
construct a new one.” I'he product of his hunting expeditions,
^ Waitz, Anthropologie der Natur- p. 367.
vblker^\\\, 109. Carver, 'Travels through Powers, Tribes of California, p.
the Interior Parts of North Afnerica, 222.
CH. xxiii CHARITY AND GENEROSITY
(luring the first year of marriage, belonged of right to his wife,
and afterwards he shared it equally with her, whether she remained
in the village, or accompanied him to the chase.^ Among the
Botocudos, whose girls are married very young, remaining in
the house of the fatlier till the age of puberty, the husband is
even then obliged to maintain his wife, though living apart from
her.^ Among the Lengua Indians of the Paraguayan Chaco
the child of a woman whose husband deserts her is generally
killed at birth, the mother feeling that it is the man’s part of
married life to provide meat for his offspring,^ Azara states
that, among the Charruas/‘du moment ou un hommese marie,
il forme une famille a part, ct travaillc pour la nourrir.” ^ Of the
Fuegians it is said that, “as soon as a youth is able to maintain
a wife, by his exertions in fishing or bird-catching, he obtains
the consent of her relations.” The wretched Rock Veddahs
in Ceylon “ acknowledge the marital obligation and the duty
of supporting their own families.”^' Among the Maldivians,
“althougli a man is allowed four wives at one time, it is only on
condition of his being able to support them.” The Nairs,
we are told, consider it a husband’s duty to provide his wife
with food, clothing, and ornaments ; ^ and almost the same is
said by Dr. Schwaner with reference to the tribes of the
Barito district, in the south-east part of Borneo.'^ Among the
cannibals of New Britain the chiefs have to see that the families
of the warriors are properly maintained. Concerning the
Tonga Islanders Mariner states that “a married woman is one
who cohabits with a man, and lives under his roof and protect-
ion.” Among the Maoris “the mission of woman was to
increase and multiply, that of man to defend his home.”
With reference to the Kurnai in South Australia, Mr. Howitt
states that “the man has to provide for his family with the as-
sistance of his wife. His share is to hunt for their support, and
to fight for their protection.” In Lado, in Africa, the bride-
groom has to assure his fiither-in-law three times that he will
^ Heriot, Travels through the Cana- ^ Rosset, ‘ Maidive Islands/ in Joiti\
das, p. 338. Anthf\ Inst. xvi. 168 sq.
^ von Tschudi, Keisen diirch Siida- ® Stewart, ‘ Notes on Northern
merika, ii. 283. Cachar/ in Jour. Asiatic Soc. Bengal,
^ Ilawtrey, in [oiir. AntJir. Inst. xxiv. 614.
xxxi. 295. Schwaner, Borneo, i. 199.
Azara, Voyages dans V Anitlrique An<^as, Polynesia, p. 373.
mdridionale, ii. 22. Mariner, Natives of the Tonga
King and Fitzroy, Voyages of the Islands, ii. 167.
^V 4 dventure'' amV Beagle,^' ii. 182. Johnston, Alaoria, p. 2S sq.
^ Tennent, Ceylon, ii. 441. Fison and fiowitt, Kamilaroi and
Kurnai, p. 206.
CHARITY AND GENEROSITY chah.
protect his wife, calling the people present to witness.' Amo:
the Touareg a man who deserts his wife is Warned, as he ha!
taken upon himself the obligation of maintaining her.^
Among many of the lower races a man is not even per-
mitted to marry until he has given some proof of his
ability to support and protect his family.® Indeed, so
closely is the idea that a man is bound to maintain his
family connected with that of marriage and fatherhood,
that sometimes even repudiated wives with their children
are, at least to a certain extent, supported by their former
husbands.' And upon the death of a husband, the
obligation of maintaining his wife and her children
devolves on his heirs, the wide-spread custom of a man
marrying the widow of his deceased brother being not
only a privilege, but, among several peoples, even a
duty.'"’
Turning to peoples who have reached a higher stage of
culture : — Abd Shuga‘ says that, among Muhammedans,
parents are obliged to support their families, “ if the
children are both poor and under age, or both poor and
lastingly infirm, or both poor and insane.” ® But that
this duty chiefly devolves on the father is evident from
the fact that the mother is even entitled to claim wages
for nursing them.' Buddhistic law goes so far as to
prescribe that the parents shall provide their son with a
beautiful wife, and give him a share of the wealth belong-
ing to the family.® It has been observed that in the
Confucian books there is no mention of any real duties
incumbent upon the father towards his children ; ® nor
does the Decalogue contain anything on the subject ; nor
any law of ancient Greece or Rome.'® But, as has been justly
^ Wilson and Felkin, Uganda^ ii.
90.
^ Chavanne, Die Sahara^ p. 209.
Cf, Hanoteaii and Lctournciix, La
Kabylie^ ii. 167.
^ Westermarck, History of Human
Afarriage^ p. 18.
Ibid. p. 19.
Ibid. p. 511 S(j.
^ Sachau, Miihammedanisches Recht,
p. 18.
^ Ibid. p. 99 sq.
® Hardy, Manual of Budhism^ p.
495 -
^ Faber, Digest of the Doctrines of
Confucius^ p. 82.
Leist, GrcecO’italische Recktsge-
stchichie^ P* ^ 3 *
CHARITY AND GENEROSITY
l^rgued, if legal prescriptions are wanting, that is because
they are thought to be superfluous, nature itself having
sufficiently prepared men for the performance of their duties
towards their olTspring/ So, also, it is regarded as a matter
of course that the husband shall support his wife, however
great power he may possess over her. Among the Romans
manus implied not only the wife’s subordination to the hus-
band, but also the husband’s obligation to protect the wife.^
The parents’ duty of taking care of their offspring is,
in the first place, based on the sentiment of parental affec-
tion. That the maternal sentiment is universal in man-
kind is a fact too generally admitted to need demonstra-
tion ; not so the father’s love of his children. Savage
men are commonly supposed to be very indifferent towards
their offspring ; but a detailed study of facts leads us to
a different conclusion. It appears that, among the lower
races, the paternal sentiment is hardly less universal than
the maternal, although it is probably never so strong and
in many cases distinctly feeble. But more often it
displays itself with considerable intensity even among the
rudest savages. In the often-quoted case of the Pata-
gonian chief who, in a moment of passion, dashed his
little son with the utmost violence against the rocks
because he let a basket of eggs which the father handed to
him fall down, we have only an instance of savage
impetuosity. The same father “ would, at any other
time, have been the most daring, the most enduring, and
the most self-devoted ” in the support and defence of his
child,® Similarly the Central Australian natives, in fits of
sudden passion, when hardly knowing what they do, some-
times treat a child with great severity ; but as a rule, to
which there are very few exceptions, they are kind and
considerate to their children, the men as well as the
women carrying them when they get tired on the march,
^ Ibid. p. 13. Schmidt, Ethik der die rdniische Efie, p. 32. Cf. Laws of
alien Grieeken, ii. 141. Adam Smith, Mann, ix. 74, 75, 95.
Thcoiy of Moral Sentiments, p. 199 ^ Fitzroy, op. cit. ii. 155.
sq. Cf. ibid. ii. 154; Mu.sters, At Home
2 Kossbach, Untcrsuchungen liber with the Patagonians, p. 196 sq.
VOL. I MM
CHARITY AND GENEROSITY chap.
and always seeing that they get a good share of any
food.^ All authorities agree that the Australian Black is
affectionate to his children.^ “ From observation of
various tribes in far distant parts of Australia,” says Mr.
Howitt, “ I can assert confidently that love for their
children is a marked feature in the aboriginal character.
I cannot recollect having ever seen a parent beat or cruelly
use a child ; and a short road to the goodwill of the
parents is, as amongst us, by noticing and admiring their
children. No greater grief could be exhibited, by the
fondest parents in the most civilised community at the
death of some little child, than that which I have seen
exhibited in an Australian native camp, not only by the
immediate parents, but by the whole related group.” “
Other representatives of the lowest savagery, as the
Veddahs ^ and Fuegians,'^ are likewise described as tender
parents. Though few peoples have acquired a worse
reputation for cruelty than the Fijians, even the greatest
censurer of their character admits that the exhibition of
parental love among them “ Is sometimes such as to be
worthy of admiration”;*’ whilst, according to another
authority, “ it is truly touching to see how parents are
attached to their children.” ’’ The Bangala of the Upper
Congo, “ swayed one moment by a thirst for blood and
indulging in the most horrible orgies, . . . may yet the next
be found approaching their homes looking forward with
^ Spencer and Gillen, Wales, pp. 2, 4. Fraser, Aborigines
of Central Auslralia, p. 50 jv/. of New South I Cates, pp. 2, 44. Lum-
“ Curr, The Australian Race, i. 402 ; hoUz, A/no/ig Cannibals, p. 193.
iii. 155. Idem, Recollections of Squat- Fison and llovvitl, t?/. cit, p, 189.
ting in Victoria, p. 252. Anga.s, Savage Cf ibid. p. 259.
Life and Scenes in Australia, i. 94. .Bailey, ‘ Wild Tribes of the Ved*
33 rough Svnyth, Aborigines of Victoria, dabs of Ceylon,’ in 'Trans, Ethn. Soc.
i. 51 ; ii. 31 1. Bidley, Aborigines of N.S. ii. 291. Deschainps, Carnet cCun
Australia, p. 23. Ihyre, Journals of im’ageitr au pays des Veddas, p. 380.
Expeditions of Discovery into Central ® J^ing and Fltzroy, op. cit. i. 76 ;
Australia, ii. 214^7/. Expedition ii. 186. Weddell, Voyage towards the
into Central Australia, \\. \yj . Calvert, South Pole, p. 156. Pertuiset, Le
Aborigines of Western Australia, p. 30 Tresor des Incas ci la Terre de Feu,
sq. Taplin, ‘ Narrinyeri,’ in Woods, p. 217.
Native Tribes of South Australia, p. 15. ® Williams and Calvert, Fiji and the
Ga.son, ‘Manners and Customs of the Fijians, p. 116.
Dieyerie Tribe,’ ibid. p. 258. Hill and ^ Seemann* Viti, p. 193. Cf ibid.
Thornton, Aborigines of New South p. 194.
CHARITY AND GENEROSITY
the liveliest interest to the caresses of their wives and
children.” * Carver asserts that he never saw among any
other people greater proofs of parental or filial tenderness
than among the North American Naudowessies.^ Among
the Point Barrow Eskimo “ the affection of parents for
their children is extreme and the same seems to be the
case among the Eskimo in general."' Concerning the
Aleuts Veniaminof wrote long ago : — “The children are
often well fed and satisfied, while -the parents almost
perish with hunger. The daintiest morsel, the best dress,
is always kept for them.”® Mr. Hooper, again, found
parental love nowhere more strongly exemplified than
among the Chukchi ; “the natives absolutely doat upon
their children.” ® Innumerable facts might indeed be
quoted to prove that paternal affection is not a late
product of civilisation, but a normal feature of the savage
mind as it is known to us.’^
^ Ward, Five Years with the Congo MacCauley, ‘ Seminole Indians of
Catmibals^ p. 141. Cy'. ibid, jx 139. Florida,’ in A fin. Rep. Bur. Ethn. v.
^ Carver, op. cit. p. 240 sq. Cf ibid. 491. Dunbar, ^ Pawnee Indian.s,’ in
p. 378 sq. Magarnn of B/neriean Hi story ^ viii.
^ fvlurdoch, ‘ Kthnological Results of 745. (Z‘x\X\x\^ N’orth American Indians^
the Point Barrow Expedition,’ in Ann. ii. 242. Ten Kate, Reizen en onder-
Rep. Bur, Ethn. ix. 41 7. zoekingen in jVoord-A meriha, p. 364
^ Hall, Arctic Researches, p. 568. sq. Sproat, Scenes and Studies of
Parry, Second PPyage for the Eiscovery Savage dJfe, p. 160 (All ts). Franklin,
of a North-West Passage, p. 529. Boas, fouuiey to the Shores of the Polar Sea,
‘Central Kskinio,’ in Ann. Rep. Bur. p. 68 (Crees). Pdliott, ‘Report on the
Ethn. vi, 566. Turner, ‘ ICthnology Seal Islands,’ in Tenth Census of the
of the Ungava Di.strict,’ ibid. xi. 191. United States, p. 238. Krasheninni-
Seemann, Voyage of “ lleraldP'^ ii, 65, koff, History of Kamschatka, p. 232
Cranz, History of Greenland, i. 174. (Koriaks). Georgi, Russia, i. 25 (Eap-
® Veniaminof, <]uoted by Dal), landers); iii. 13 (Tunguses), 158 (Kain-
p. 397. Cf. ibid. p. 393 ; Petrofh, chadalcsj. Castren, iVordisha resor och
‘ Report on Alaska,’ in 'J'efiih Census forshningar, ii. 121 (Ostyaks). Pre-
of the United States, p. 158. jcvalsky, Alongoiia, i. ii. Scott
Hooper, Ten Months among the Robertson, Kafrs of the Hindu -Kush,
7 'ents of the Tuski, p. 201. p. 189. Ijlunt, Bedouin Tribes of the
't Dobrizhoffer, Account of the Abi- Euphrates, ii. 214. Dalton, Descrip-
pones, ii. 214 sq. Wied-Neuwied, tive Ethnology of Bengal, p. 6S (Garos).
Reise nach Brasilien, ii. 40 (Botocmlos). Marshall, A Phrenologist amongst the
Wallace, Travels on the Amazon, p. Todas, p. 200; Shortt, ‘Hill Tribes of
518 sq. (Amazon Indians* ]>ut on the the Neiigherries,’ in 7 'rans. Ethn. Sac.
Brazilian Indians generally, cf. von N.S. vii. 254 (Todas). Kloss, In the
Martins, in four. Roy. Geo. Soc. ii. 198, Andamans and Nicobars, p. 228(Nico-
and Idem, Beitrage zur Ethnographic barese). Man, Sonthalia and the
Ameriha^s, i. 125). Im Thurn, Among Sonthats, p. 78. Wallace, Malay
the Indians of Guiana, pp. 213,219. p. 450 (Malays). Schwaner,
MM2
CHARITY AND GENEROSITY chap.
When dealing with the origin of the altruistic sentiment
we shall find reason to believe that paternal affection not
only prevails among existing men, savage and civilised,
but that it belonged to the human race from the very
beginning, and that the same was the case with the germ
of marital affection, inducing the male to remain with the
female till after the birth of the offspring, and to defend
and support her during the periods of pregnancy and
motherhood. It is true that among several savage peoples
conjugal love is said to be unknown ; but what is meant
by this is, I think, typically expressed in Major Ellis’s
statement referring to some Gold Coast natives, that
among them “ love, as understood by the people of
Europe, has no existence.” ^ The love of a savage is cer-
tainly very different from the love of a civilised man ;
nevertheless we may discover in it traces of the same
ingredients. Even rude savages, such as the Bushmans,
Fuegians, Andaman Islanders, and Australian aborigines,
seem often to be lovingly attached to their wives.‘‘‘
Op. cit. i. 162 (Millays of the Barilo (Maoris. Dove, ‘Aborigines of Tas-
River Basin in l^ornco). Low, mania,’ in 7\i.s)nanian Journal of
p. 148 (Malays). Bock, If rad- Hunters Natural Science^ i. 252. Reade,
of Borneo, 2\o Ling Roth, Savage Africa, p. 245 (Equatorial
Natives of Sarawak and British North Africans). Casati, Ten Years in
Borneo, i. 68 (Land Dyaks). Forbes, Eijuatoria, i. 186 (Central African
A NatiiralisI s Wander in ;^s in the Negroes). Caillie, Travels through
Eastern Archipelago, p. 321 (natives of Central Africa, i. 352 (Mandingocs).
Timor-laut). Forljcs, Insulinde, p. I lolub, Seven Years in South Africa,
182 (natives of Ritcdjcl). Seligmann, ii. 296 (Marutse). Livingstone, Alis-
\i\ Reports of the Cambridge Ant hropo- sionary I ravels, p. 126 (Bechuanas).
logical Expedition to 'Torres Straits, Johnston, Uganda Protectorate, ii. 539
V. 199; riaddon, ibid. v. 229, 274 (Pigmies). Sparrman, Voyage to the
(Western Islands). Romilly, From my Cape of Good Hope, i. 219 (Hottentots).
Verandah in New Guinea, p. 51. Shaw, ‘ Betsileo Country and People,’
Chalmers, Pioneering in Neiv Guinea, \x\ Antananarivo Annual and A] adagas-
p. 163. Christian, Caroline Islands, car A/agazine, iii. 82. See also supra,
p. 72 ( Ponaiicans). Kiibary, ‘Die p. 405; Steinmetz, ‘ Verhaltnis zwi-
Bewohner der Mortlock Inseln,’ in .schen liltern und Kindern bei den
Alittheihingen der Geogr. Gesellsch. in Naturvdlkern,’ in Zeitschrift fur Social -
Hamburg, 1878-9, p. 261. Macdonald, wissenschaft , i. 610 sqq. ; Ide7fi, Eth-
Oceania, p. 195 (Efatese). Turner, nologische Studien zur ersten Entwick-
Samoa, p. 317 (natives of Tana), von lung der Strtife, ii. ch. vi. §2.
Kotzebue, Voyage of Discovery, iii. . ^ P^llis, 7'shi-speakhig Peoples of the
165 (Natives of Radackk Mariner, Gold Coast, p. 285. I have dealt with
op. cit. ii. 179 (Tongans). ]i)icffenl>ach, this subject in my History of Human
Havels in New Zealand, ii. 26, 107 ; Marriage, p. 356 sqq.
Crozet, Voyage to Tasmania, p. 66 Ibid. p. 358 sq.
xxni
CHARITY AND GENEROSITY
The prevalence of paternal and marital affection accounts
for the origin of the family (consisting of parents and child-
ren), and for the functions of the man as father and husband.
The growing intensity of these sentiments has naturally
increased the stability of the family tie ; and other factors,
of a selfish nature, have contributed towards the same
result. From various points of view it is desirable for a
man to have children. They are to him objects of pride ;
when grown-up, they add to his safety and power ; they
support him when he gets old ; they make offerings to his
spirit when he is dead. And no less useful is the possession
of a wife. When the generative power is no longer re-
stricted to a certain season of the year, she becomes a
lasting cause of sensual delight ; she is a mother of
children ; she manages the household ; she acts as a car-
rier, she works in the field.
Every social institution has a tendency to become a
matter of moral concern because of the persistence of
habit. But the simplest paternal and marital duties have
a deeper foundation than the mere force of the habitual. If a
man leaves his wife and children without protection and
support, the other members of the community will sympa-
thise with them, and feel resentment towards the neglect-
ful husband and father. He will be looked upon as the
cause of their sufferings, because he omitted to do what
other men in his position would have done. His conduct
will be repulsive to everyone who himself possesses those
sentiments of which he proves destitute. He will be held
guilty of a breach of contract, since by marrying he took
upon himself the burden of maintaining his wife and their
common offspring. To thoughtful minds his responsi-
bility towards his children is further increased by the fact
that he is the author of their being, and for that reason
the source of their misery. Finally, the community as a
whole will suffer by his negligence.
The parents’ duty of taking care of their offspring lasts
until the latter are able to shift for themselves. On the
other hand, when the parents, in their turn, get in need of
CHARITY AND GENEROSITY chap.
support, their care is to be reciprocated by the children.
The practice of killing or abandoning decrepit parents is
an exception even in the savage world, and, as we have
seen, restricted to extreme cases in which it may be
regarded as an act of kindness or of hard necessity.
There are also savage peoples among whom aged parents,
though suffered to live, are said to be grossly neglected by
their children. But, so far as I know, these peoples are
not numerous, and can hardly be regarded as representa-
tives of a custom common to any larger ethnic group.
Thus, according to Hearne, old age is the greatest calamity
that can befall a Northern Indian ; for when he is past labour, he
is neglected, aiid treated with great disrespect, even by his own
children. 'Fhcy not only serve him last at meals, but generally
give him the coarsest and worst of the victuals ; and such of the
skins as they do not chuse to wear, arc made up in the clumsiest
manner into clothing for their aged parents.’^ ^ Yet among the
same people Richardson witnessed ‘^several unquestionable
instances of tenderness and affection shown by children to their
parents, and of compliance with their whims, much to their own
personal inconvenience.” ^ In his work on the tribes of
California Mr. Powers observes : — Filial piety cannot be said
to be a distinguishing quality of the Wailakki, or, in fact, of any
Indians. No matter how high may be their station, the aged and
decrepit are counted a burden. 'Fhe old man, hero of a
hundred battles, sometime ‘ lord of the lion heart and eagle eye,’
when his fading eyesight no more can guide the winged arrow as
of yore, is ignominiously compelled to accompany his sons into the
forest, and bear home on his poor old shoulders the game they have
killed.”^ But concerning the Indians of Upper California
Beechey writes, When any of their relations are indisposed, the
greatest attention is paid to their wants, and it was remarked by
Padre Arroyo that filial affection is stronger in these tribes than in
any civilised nation on the globe with which he was acquainted.”^
Among the Indians on the east side of the Rocky Mountains,
the aged are commonly treated with much respect, which they
consider themselves as entitled to claim ” ; and they are
not suffered to want any thing which they need, and which
1 H earne, Journey io the Northern 3 l\)wers, op. cit. p. Ii8
Ocean ^ p. 345 sq. 4 Beechey, Voyage to the Pacific and
- Richardson, Arctic Searching Ex- Behrinjs Strait, if 402.
pedition, ii. 17.
CHARITY AND GENEROSITY
it is in the power of their relations to procure for them.” ^ The
religious teachers of the Iroquois inculcated the duty of protect-
ing aged parents, as divinely enjoined : — “ It is the will of the
Great Spirit that you reverence the aged, even though they be
as helpless as infants.”*^ The Aleuts described by Veniaminof
considered disregard of one’s parents to be the greatest and tnost
dishonourable of crimes ; we should sincerely love them,” they
said, do all we could toward their support, remain with them,
and care for them until their death.” The children of the
Central Eskimo are very dutiful, obeying the wishes of theii;
parents and taking care of them in their old age and state-
ments to the same effect are made with reference to other
Eskimo tribes.^ Cranz, who did not generally panegyrise the
moral qualities of the Greenlanders, wrote that the bonds of
filial and parental love seem stronger in them than amongst
other nations, and that ingratitude in up-grown children
towards their old decrepit parents, is scarcely exemplified among
them.” Among the Botocudos Prince Wied-Neuwied saw a
young man carrying about his blind father, not leaving him alone
for a single moment.'^ Among the Fviegians ‘‘grown-up
children are expected to support their parents when they become
aged ; the son generally makes his father, if he is past work, a
canoe every season, and if the aged man is a widower he lives
entirely under the charge of his eldest son.” ® The Australian
natives are much praised for the regard with which they treat
their parents and elders. With reference to the Western tribes,
Bishop Salvado observes: — “ Lcs fils adultes payent de retour
I’affection de leurs parents. S’ils sent vieux, ils reservent pour
eux les mcilleurs pieces de gihier, ou de tout autre mets, et se
chargent de venger leurs oftenses.”*^ Among the Kukis of
India, ‘‘when past work, the father and mother are supported by
their children.” Among the Bodo and Dhimals “ it is
^ Harmon, Voyages and 7 'ravels in
the Interior of North America^ p. 348.
^ Morgan, League of the Noqiwis^
p. 171.
Veniaminof, quoted by Petroft,
ioc. cU, p. 155*
^ Boas, ‘Central Eskimo,’ in Atm.
Rep. Bur. Ethn. vi. 566.
^ Murdoch, ‘ Point liarrow Expedi-
tion,’ in Ann, Rep. Bar. Ethn. ix. 417.
Turner, ‘ Ungava District,’ ib:d. xi. 191.
^ Cranz, op. cit. i. 1 74, 150. Cf.
Egede, Description of Greenland.^
p. 147 ; Holm, ‘ Ethnologisk .Skizze af
Angmagsalikerne,’ in Aleddelelser om
Grbnlattd x.
^ Wied-Ncuvvied, op. cit. ii. 40.
Bridges, ‘ Manners and Customs of
the Firclandcrs,’ in A Voice for South
America^ xiii. 206.
^ Salvado, lillinoires historiques stir
rAustralie, p. 277. Cf. Curr, The
Australian Race, iii. 155 5 Gason,
‘Dieyerie Tril)e,’ in Woods, Native
Trihes of South Australia, p. 258 ;
Mathew, ‘ Australian Aborigines,’ in
four. Cf' Proceed. Roy. Soc. N. S. Wales,
xxiii. 388.
Lew in, Wild Races of South-East-
ern India, p. 256,
deemed shameful to leave old parents entirely alone ; and the
last of the sons, who by his departure does so, is liable to fine
as well as disinheritance.” ^ Among the Betsileo of Madagascar
‘‘the old are never left destitute or to their own devices. . . .
It is by no means uncommon to see the son carrying the aged
parent on his back, when necessity or inclination demands
locomotion.”- Among the Mandingoes “the aged who are
unable to support themselves are always maintained and treated
with respect by their children.”*^ That uncivilised races
commonly regard it a stringent duty for children to maintain
their aged parents and to administer to their wants, is also obvious
from statements testifying their filial regard in general terms.^
On the otlier hand, the fact that some peoples are said to be
deficient in this sentiment, does not imply that they fail to
recognise the simple duty of supporting old and helpless parents.
At a higher stage of civilisation reverence for parents
reaches its pitch, and the duty of maintaining them in
their old age is taken for a matter of course. Among the
present Hindus “ it would certainly be regarded as a
most disgraceful thing were a rr^n who could do anything
for the support of an aged father or mother to allow the
burden of their maintenance to fall on strangers and
it is common for unmarried soldiers to stint themselves
almost to starvation point, that they may send home
money to their parents.’^ The priesthood of modern
Buddhism teach that children shall “respect their parents,
and perform all kinds of offices for them, even though
they should have servants whom they could command to
do all that they require.”^ At ancient Athens, before a
man could become a magistrate, evidence was to be pro-
duced that he had treated his parents properly ; and a
person who refused his parents food and dwelling lost his
right of speaking in the national assembly.’^ According to
^ Hodgson, Misi'ellaneons Essays^ i.
123.
Shaw, in Antattanm'ivo AnnnaL
iii. 82.
Caillic, op. fit. i. 352.
^ ^ See infra., on the Subjection of
Children.
® Wilkins, Modern Hinduism^ p.
418.
^ Monier Williams, Indian Wisdom,
p. 440, n. I.
^ Hardy, op. cit. p. 494. Cf. ibid.
p. 495-
^ Schmidt, Ethik der alien Griechen,
ii. 144.
the Icelandic Gragas, a man should maintain in the first
place his mother, in the second his father, in the third his
own children.^ The Talmud enjoins the duty of main-
taining parents ; ^ and so does Muhammedan law, “ if the
parents are both poor and lastingly infirm, or both poor
and insane.” ®
Christianity, as will be shown, in one essential point
changed the notions of antiquity regarding children’s
duties towards their parents : it made these duties sub-
ordinate to men’s duties towards God. “ Verily I say
unto you. There is no man that hath left house, or
brethren, or sisters, or father, or mother, or wife, or
children, or lands, for my sake, and the gospel’s, but he
shall receive an hundredfold now in this time, houses, and
brethren, and sisters, and mothers, and children, and
lands, with persecutions ; and in the world to come eternal
life.” * There are numerous legends and lives of saints in
which the desertion of the nearest relations is recorded as
one of the leading features of their sanctity, and as one of
their chief titles to honour.'* Some Catholic writers were
of opinion that a man might lawfully abandon his parents,
even though they could not be supported without him,
and enter religion, committing the care of them to God.
But Thomas Aquinas says that this would be tempting
God, adding however that he who has already professed
religion “ ought not, on any plea of supporting his parents,
to quit the cloister in which he is buried with Christ, and
entangle himself again in worldly business.” ® Yet our duties
towards our parents come next to our duties towards God.
We ought to aid them when in want, and to supplicate
God in their behalf that they may lead prosperous and
happy lives.^
The duty of supporting aged parents has its root in
^ Grdgds^ Omaga-balkr, I, vol. i. ^ Cf. P'arrer, Paganism and Christi-
232. anity, p. 196.
Katz, Der wahre Talmudjude, p. ** Thomas Aquinas, Sitmma Theo-
119. logicay ii.-ii. loi. 4.
Sachau, op, cit, p. 17 sq. ^ Caiechisvi of the CoKUcil of Trent ^
^ St, Marky X, 29 sq, iii. 5. 10 sq.
the sentiments of affection, gratitude, and regard, and, to
some extent, in superstitious fear. However feeble they
be, the parents have in their hands a powerful weapon —
the curse ; or, when they are dead, their ghosts may
avenge their wrongs on their neglectful children. All
these circumstances will be discussed in the chapter dealing
with the subjection of children.
We have further to consider the duty of assisting bro-
thers and sisters and more distant relatives. Among the
Aleuts, says Veniaminof, a brother “ must always aid his
brother in war as well as in the chase, and each protect
the other ; but if anybody, disregarding this natural law,
should go to live apart, caring only for himself, such a
one should be discarded by his relatives in case of attack
by enemies or animals, or in time of storms ; and such
dishonourable conduct would lead to general contempt.” ^
Among the Point Barrow Eskimo “ the older children
take very good care of the smaller ones ” ; ^ and of the
Sia Indians (Pueblos) we are told that “ a marked trait is
their loving kindness and care for younger brothers and
sisters.” ^ Dr. Schweinfurth writes : — “ Notwithstanding
. . . that certain instances may be alleged which seem to
demonstrate that the character of the Dinka is unfeeling,
these cases never refer to such as are bound by the ties of
kindred. Parents do not desert their children, nor are
brothers faithless to brothers, but are ever prompt to
render whatever aid is possible.” 1 presume that these
examples of fraternal relations may, on the whole, be
regarded as expressive of universal facts. According to
Confucius, the love which brother should bear to brother
is second only to that which is due from children to
parents.®
The duty of assisting more distant relatives is much
more variable. It may be said that, as a general rule, among
^ Veniaminof, quoted by Petroff, Bur. Eihn. xi. 22.
cit. p. 155. ^ Schweinfurth, Heart of Africa^
Amt. Rep. Bur. Ethn, i. 169.
ix. 417. ^ l'>ouglas, Confucianism and Taou-
^ Stevenson, ‘Sia/ in Ann. Rep, is/n, p. 123.
CHARITY AND GENEROSITY
savages and barbarians— with the exception, perhaps, of
those who live in small family-groups — as also among the
peoples of archaic culture, this duty is more prominent
and extends further than amongst ourselves. The blood-
tie has much greater strength, related families keep more
closely together for mutual protection and aid. The
Angmagsaliks of Eastern Greenland, says Lieutenant
Holm, consider that the tie of blood imposes mutual
assistance as a duty under all circumstances.^ The
Omahas maintain that “generosity cannot be exercised
toward kindred, who have a natural right to our assist-
ance.” ^ Among the natives of Madagascar “ the claims
of relationship are distinctly recognised by custom and
law. If one branch of a family becomes poor, the mem-
bers of the same family support him ; if he be sold into
slavery for debt, they often unite in furnishing the price
of his redemption. . . . The laws facilitate and encourage,
and sometimes even enforce, such acts of kindness.” ^ In
his description of the Australian Bangerang, Mr. Curr
observes, “ Though their ways were different from ours,
it always seemed to me that the bonds of friendship be-
tween blood relations were stronger, as a rule, with savages
than amongst ourselves.”^ Among the Philippine Is-
landers “ families are very united, and claims for help and
protection are admitted, however distant the relationship
may be.”® Of the Burmans it is said, “No people can.
be more careful in preserving and acknowledging the
bonds of family relationship to the remotest degrees, and
not merely as a matter of form, but as involving the duty
of mutual assistance.”” Among the ancient Hindus,
Persians, Greeks, and Romans, persons belonging to the
four generations of near relatives — the Sapindas, Syn-
geneis, Anchisteis, or Propinqui — were expected to assist
^ Holm, in Meddeleher om Gro/i-
/andy X. 87.
^ Dorsey, ‘ Omaha Sociology/ in
^nn. Rep. Bur. Ethn. iii. 274.
^ Ellis, History of Madagascar ^ i.
138. Cf. Sibree, The Great African
1 st and y p. 256 sq.
^ Curr, Recollections of Squatting in
Victoria, p. 274.
Foreman, Philippine Islands^ p.
186.
^ Forbes, British Burniay p. 59.
CHARITY AND GENEROSITY chap.
each other whenever it was needed.^ The Scandinavians
considered him to be a bad man who did not help his
kindred against strangers, even though there was enmity
between the relatives.*^
But the duty of helping the needy and protecting those
in danger goes beyond the limits of the family and the
gens. Uncivilised peoples are, as a rule, described as
kind towards members of their own community or tribe.
Between themselves charity is enjoined as a duty, and
generosity is praised as a virtue. Indeed, their customs
regarding mutual aid are often much more stringent than
our own. And this applies even to the lowest savages.^
La disposition a la gcnerosite,” says M. Hyades, est un trait
characteristique des Fucgiens. Ilsaiment a partager ce qu’ils ont
avcc tons ceux qui les entourent.’" Captain Weddell likewise
speaks of the philanthropic principle which these people exhibit
towards one another.’’ ^ Burchell tells us that the Bushmans,
between themselves, exercise the virtues of hospitality and
generosity, often in an extraordinary degree.”^ The Veddahsof
Ceylon are friendly towards each other, and ready to help a person
in distress.^ The Andamanese display much mutual affection in
their social relations, and frequently make presents of the best that
they possess. Every care and consideration,” says Mr. Man,
“ are paid by all classes to the very young, the weak, the aged, and
the helpless, and these, being made special objects of interest and
attention, invariably fare better in regard to the comforts and
necessaries of daily life than any of the otherwise more fortunate
members of the community,” ^ The Australian natives are almost
universally praised for their friendly behaviour towards persons
^ Lcist, AU-arisches Jus Civile^ i.
47 S(]q., 231 sqq.
^ Rosenberg, Nordboerues Aandsliv,
i. 488.
The prevalence of mutual aid in
uncivilised communities has been duly
emphasised by Prince Kropotkin,
Mutual A id, p. 76 sqq.
^ Hyades and Deniker, Mission
scientifique dit Cap Horn, vii. 243.
Weddell, op.rit.p. 168. According
to otheraiuhorities, thcFuegians, though
free from malevolence and cruelty, are
not distinguished for active benevolence
(Bridges, mA Voice for South America,
xiii. 208, 213. Bove, Patagonia, pp.
* 33 » 1 37 * Lovisato, ‘Appunti elno*
grafici sulla Terra del Fuoco,’ in Cos-
mos di Guida Cora, viii. 145, 15 1. Cf.
also Hyades and Deniker, op. cit, vii.
238, 240, 243 ^y.).
Burchell, Travels in the Interior of
Southern Africa, ii. 54.
^ Sarasin, Ergehnisse naturwissen-
schaftlicher Forschungen auf Ceylon,
hi- 545, 550- Schmidt, Ceylon, p. 276.
^ Man, in Jour. Ant hr, Inst, xii, 93
sq. Cf. Portman, ibid. xxv. 368,
belonging to their own people.^ Presents given to one of a group
are speedily divided as far as possible among the rest, and when a
black man has employment at a station he generally gives away
most of his earning to his comrades in the camp.‘^ Between
the males of a tribe,” says Mr. Curr, there always exists a strong
feeling of brotherhood, so that, come weal come woe, a man can
always calculate on the aid, in danger, of every member of his
tribe.” ^ Regarding the Central Australian natives, Messrs.
Spencer and Gillen observe that their treatment of one another
is marked on the whole by considerable kindness, that is, of
course, in the case of memlDers of friendly groups, with every
now and then the perpetration of acts of cruelty.” Collins
says that the aborigines about Botany Bay and Port Jackson
applauded acts of kindness and generosity, for of both these
they were capable.” ^
Passing to savages and barbarians who have reached a some-
what higher level of culture : — We are told by Mr. Catlin,
with reference to the North American Indians, that, to their
friends, . there are no people on earth that arc more kind.”
According to Adair, they are very kind and liberal to every
one of their own tribe, even to the last morsel of food they
enjoy ” ; Nature’s school teaches them the plain easy rule, ‘ do
to others, as you would be done by.’ ” ^ Harmon praises the
generosity of the Indians : — 7^hey arc more ready, in proportion
to their means, to assist a neighbour who may be in want, than
the inhabitants, generally, of civilised countries. An Indian rarely
kills an animal, without sending a part of it to a neighbour,
if he has one near liim.” Tlie Naudowessies ‘‘^supply the
deficiency of their friends with any superfluity of their own,”
and “ in dangers they readily give assistance to those of their band
^ Curr, The Australia 7 i Taee, i. 49.
Hodgson, Reminiscences of Australia^
p. 88. Oldfield, ‘ Aborigines of Aus-
tralia,’ in Trans. Ethn, Soc. N.S. iii.
226. Eyre, op cit. ii. 385 sq. Brough
Smyth, op. cit. ii. 279, Lnmholtz,
Among Cannibals, p. 176. Mathew,
in Jour, dr* Proceed. Roy. Soc. N.S.
IVales, xxiii. 387 sq. Breton, Excur-
sions in New South J Tales, p. 218.
Fison and Howitt, op. cit. p. 259.
Wyatt, ‘ Manners and Superstitions of
the Adelaide and Encounter Bay Ab-
original Tribes,’ in Woods, Native
Tribes of South Australia, p. 162.
Schuermann, ‘Aboriginal Tribes of
Port Lincoln,’ ibid. pp. 243, 244, 247.
Schuermann, loc. cit. p. 2^. Rid-
ley, Kdmilardi, p. 15S. Fison and
Howitt, op. cit. p. 256. Lumhollz,
Among Cannibals, pp. 199, 343* Stir-
ling, Report of the Ilorn Expeditioft to
Central Australia. PartJV, Anthro-
pology, p. 36.
Curr, ’The Australian Race, i. 62.
Spencer and Gillen, Native Tribes
of Central Australia, p. 50.
Collins, English Colony in Neiv
South Wales, i. 549.
Catlin, JR or III American Indians,
ii. 241.
” Adair, History of the American
Indians, pp. 431, 429.
^ Harmon, op. cit. p. 349.
CHARITY AND GENEROSITY chap.
who stand in need of it, without any expectation of return.”^
Among the Iroquois kindness to the orphan, hospitality to all,
and a common brotherhood, were among the doctrines held up
for acceptance by their religious instructors ” ; an Iroquois would
surrender his dinner to feed the hungry, vacate his bed to refresh
the weary, and give up his apparel to clothe the naked.” ^ Among
the Omahas grades of merit or bravery were of two sorts : to the
first class belonged such as had given to the poor on many occa-
sions, and had invited guests to many feasts. To the second class
belonged those who, besides having done these things many times,
had killed several of the foe, and had brought home many horses.
When a person sees a poor man or woman, they said, he should
make presents to the unfortunate being ; thus he can gain the
goodwill of Wakanda as well as that of his own people.^ The
Ahts of Vancouver Island succour any one in need of help,
without looking for any ulterior benefit. The Aleuts were
instructed to be kind to others and to refrain from selfishness ; it
was the custom for the successful hunter or fisher, particularly in
times of scarcity, to share his prize with all, not only taking no
larger share, but often less than the others.’"' Among the Eskimo
about Behring Strait, whenever a successful trader accumulates
property and food, and is known to work solely for his own wel-
fare, he becomes an object of enmity and hatred among his fellow-
villagers, which ends in one of two ways — the villagers may com-
pel him to make a feast and distribute his goods, or they may kill
him and divide his property among themselves.^' According to the
Greenland creed, all those who had striven and suffered for the
benefit of their fellow-men should find a happy existence after
death in the abodes of the supreme being, Tornarsuk.^ The
Greenlander,” says Dr. Nansen, is the most compassionate of
creatures witii regard to his neighbour. His first social law is to
help others.”® Captain Hall holds an equally favourable opinion
of those Eskimo with whom he came in contact. As between
themselves,” he says, there can be no people exceeding them in
this virtue — kindness of heart. Take, for instance, times of great
scarcity of food. If one family happens to have any provisions on
^ Carver, o/>. cit. p. 247.
“ Morgan, League of the Iroquois,
pp. 172, 329.
^ Dorsey, ‘ Onialia Sociology,’ in
Ann, Rep, Bur. Rthn, iii. 333, 274.
Cf, idetn, ‘ Sioiian Sociology,’ ibid. xv.
232 (Kansas).
^ Sproat, op. cit. p. 166.
® Veniamiiiof, quoted by Petroff, toe.
cit. p. 155, and Dali, Alaska, p. 392.
’’ Nelson, ‘ Eskimo about Bering
Strait,’ in Ann. Rep. Bur. Echn. xviii.
' Rink, Greenland, p. 141.
^ Nansen, First Crossing of Green-
land, ii. 304. Cf. ibid. ii. 334 ;
Nansen, hskirno Life, pp. 1 16, 177;
Egedc, op. cit. pp. 123, 126 sq.
XXIII CHARITY AND GENEROSITY
hand, these are shared with all their neighbours. If one man is
successful in capturing a seal, though his family may need it all to
save them from the pangs of hunger, yet the whole of his people
about, including the poor, the widow, the fatherless, are at once
invited to a seal-feast.”’ They believe that all Innuits who
have been good, that is, who have been kind to the poor and
hungry,” will after death go to Koodleparmiung, or heaven,
whereas those who have been bad, that is, unkind to one
another,” \)vill go to Adleparmeun, or hell.‘^ Many of the South
American peoples are praised for their kind disposition of mind ; ^
the Guiana Indians seemed to a Christian missionary to be
“generous to a fault.” ^ 'Fhe Caribs had all their interests in
common, lived in great harmony, and loved each other heartily.’'^
Among the Tonga Islanders the sentiment of humanity, or
a fellow-feeling for one another, is universally approved. U"hey
“are not only not selfish, but admire liberality, and are practic-
ally liberal.” When any one is about to eat, he always shares
what he has with those about him without any hesitation, and
not to do so would be considered exceedingly vile and selfish.
So, also, “if one chief secs something in the possession of
another, which he has a strong desire to have, he has only
to ask him for it, and in all probability it is readily and liberally
given.” ^ Not even the Fijians, who took great pains to instil
into the minds of their youth a contempt for compassionate
impulses and an admiration for relentless cruelty,'^ were destitute
of humanity and friendly feelings.^ In Aneiteum, of the New
Hebrides, the people believed that the sin which would be
visited with the severest punishment in the land of the dead
was stinginess or niggardliness in giving away food, and that the
virtue which received the highest reward was a generous
hospitality and a giving liberally at feasts.^^ In Tana, another
island belonging to the same group, one man has only to ask
anything from his neighbours, and he gets it.”’^ Of the New
Caledonians Mr. Atkinson states that, among themselves, they
are “ of a generosity that seems to arise mainly from aversion
to refuse any request.” The Dyaks arc described as hospitable,
^ Hall, Arctic Researches^ p. 567.
^ Ibid. p. 571 sq.
^ von Martius, Beitriige zur Etlmo-
graphic Amerika's., i. 217, 641 (Gua-
rayos, Macusis). Musters, op. cit. p. 195
(Patagonians).
^ Brett, Indian Tribes of Guiana.,
p. 276.
® de Poircy-Rochefort, Hisloire natiir-
elle et morale des lies Antilles, p. 460.
® Mariner, cit. ii. 153, 154? 165.
Erskine, Cruise among the Islands
of the IVestern Pacific, p. 247.
® Jbid. pp. 247, 273. Williams and
Calvert, op. cit. pp. 93, 115 sqq. See-
maiin, Vtti, p. 192.
Inglis, In the New Hebrides, p. 31.
Campbell, A Year in the New
Hebrides, p. 169.
Atkinson, in Folk-Lore, xiv. 248.
CHARITY AND GENEROSITY chap.
kindly, and humane, to a degree which well might shame our-
selves ” ; ^ whilst the practice of head-hunting is carried on by
every tribe at the expense of its neighbour, the members
of each community have strong feelings of sympathy for each
other.2 Among the Sea Dyaks, says Crossland, if any are
sick or unable to work, the rest help ; and there seems to me a
much stronger bond of union amongst them than I have ever
seen among the labouring classes in England.”^
The Santals arc gentle and very obliging, and sociable to a
fault among their own people."^ The Hos are charitable to
those deserving aid.” The Todas believe that, after death,
the souls of good people will have enjoyment in heaven,
whilst the souls of bad people will suffer punishment ; “ a good
man is, in the Toda estimation, one who is given to deeds of
charity, and a bad man one who is uncharitable (this in order
of precedence), quarrelsome, thieving, &c.”® Mr. Batchelor
states that a more kind, gentle, and sympathetic people than
the Ainos of Japan would be very difficult to find ” ; anything
given to them they always divide with their friends.^ The
Samoyedes are ready to share their last morsel with their com-
panions ^ and it is said that nobody can surpass the poor Ostyak
in benevolence and other virtues of the heart.'*^ ‘^The finest
trait in the character of a Bedouin (next to good faith),”
Burckhardt observes, is his kindness, benevolence, and charity.
. . . Among themselves, the Bedouins constitute a nation of
brothers , often quarrelling, it must be owned, with each other,
but ever ready, when at peace, to give mutual assistance.” ^
Generosity is a virtue which always commands particular
respect in the desert. The Arabs of the Soudan have a saying
that you must always put other people’s things on your head,
and your own under your arm. Tlien, if there be danger of
the things falling off your head, you must raise your arm, and
let fall your own things to save those of others.”
^ Boyle, Adventures among the
IJyahs of Borneo^ p. 215.
“ liock, Head-Hunters of Borneo, p.
210 jy. Brooke, Ten Years in Sardwak,
i- 57-
Crossland, quoted by Ling Roth,
Nath^es of Sarawak, i. 85.
Man, Sonthalia, p. 19 sq. Hunter,
Annals of Rural Beat gal, i . 215.
Tickell, ‘ Memoir on the Hode-
sum,’ in Jour, Asiatic Soc. Bengal, ix.
(pt. ii.)8o7.
® Thurston, ‘ Todas of the Nilgiris,’
in the Madras Government Museum’s
Bulletin, i. 166 sq,
Batchelor, A inu of Japan, p. 19.
Holland, ‘ Ainos,’ in Jour. Afithr, Inst.
hi. 235.
® Castr^n, op. cit, i. 238 ; ii. 55.
® Burckhardt, Notes on the Bedouins
and Wahdbys, p, 208.
Wallin, Reseanteckningar frht
Orienten, iii. 244. Blunt, Bedouin
Tribes of the Euphrates, ii. 224.
Richardson, Mission to Central
Africa, i. I17.
xxin
CHARITY AND G£:NEROSITY
The Barea are a benevolent people, kind even to strangers.^
Xhe Manganja, in the neighbourliood of Lake Nyassa, arc
generous in the distribution of food,” and even when starving
they share the last morsel with their friends.*^ Sir H. Johnston
says that he has never met with ‘‘a more kindly, sensible, con-
siderate set of beings ” than the Wa-taveita.^ The Eastern
Central Africans, the Rev. D. Macdonald observes, ‘•Lire not
mere animals composed of greed and selfishness. 4'hey often
shew great bravery and devotedness. I can point to one
man who saved my life on three separate occasions at the risk
of his own.” Among the Bechuanas a regard for the poor,
for widows, and for orphans, is everywhere considered to be
a sacred duty.^ Among all the virtues the Basutos appreci-
ate none more than kindness. They have a saying that one
link only sounds because of another ” — which implies that we
cannot do without the help of our fellow-creatures, — and
another saying that ‘S^ne does not skin one’s game without
showing it to one’s friends ” — that is, when we have been
successful in our undertakings, it becomes us to be geiierous.
If any food is brought to tiiem while they arc in each
other’s society, however small may be the quantity, every
one must have a tastc.‘" 'Lhe Kafirs are a kindly race ;
Lichtenstein says that whenever anyone kills an ox he must
invite all his neighbours to partake of it, and they remain his
guests till the whole is eaten.”’' Of the Hottentots Kolben
states : — “ They are certainly the most friendly, the most
liberal, and the most benevolent people to one another that ever
appear’d upon earth .... They are charmed with opportuni-
ties of obliging each other, and one of their greatest pleasures
lies in interchanging gifts and good offices.” ® A Hottentot,”
says Barrow, ‘‘ would share his last morsel with his companions.” ^
Drury wrote of the people of Madagascar: — -‘‘They certainly
treat one another with more humanity than we do. Here is no
one miserable, if it is in tlie power of his neighbours to help
him. Here is love, tenderness, and generosity which might
^ Munzinger, Oslafrikanische Stu-
dien, p. 534.
“ Rowley, Africa Unveiled^ p. 47.
Johnston, Kiliaia-iifaro Expedi-
tion, p. 436.
^ Macdonald, Africana, i. 270, 266.
' ® Arbousset and Daumas, Explor-
atory Tour to the North-East of the
Colony of the Cape of Good Hope, p,
402.
VOL. I
Casalis, Basutos, pp. 206, 207,
301, 306, 309 sqq,
‘ Leslie, A 7 no}i<e; the Zulus and
Auiatongas, p. 203. Lichtenslein,
Travels in Southern Africa, i. 272.
^ Kolljen, Present State of the Cafe
of Good Hope, i. 334 jy. Cf. ibid. i.
167.
^ Barrow, Travels into the Interior
of Southern Africa, i. 15 1.
N N
shame us ; and .... this is .... all over the island.” ^
Ellis likewise observes that, in Madagascar, assisting in distress,
and lending and borrowing property and money, are carried
on much more commonly and freely than amongst neighbours
or relatives in England, and that a kindness of heart in these
things is always esteemed excellent.^
Among many savages the old people, in particular,
have a claim to support and assistance, not only from
their own children or relatives, but from the younger
members of the community generally.
Among the Australian natives the old men get the best and
largest share of everything, and are allowed to monopolise the
youngesSt and best-looking women, whilst a young man must
consider himselt fortunate if he can get an old woman for wife."'
Among the Tonga Islanders ‘‘every aged man and woman enjoys
the attentions and services of the younger branches of society.'^
In the Kingsmill Islands “generosity, hospitality, and attention
to the aged and infirm are virtues highly esteemed and gener-
ally practised among all the natives.” Among the Kafirs, when
persons advanced in years become sick and helpless, “ everyone
is eager to aft'ord them assistance.” ^ In the opinion of the
Aleuts, “ feeble old men must be respected and attended when
they need aid, and the young and strong should give them a
share of their booty and help them through all their troubles,
endeavouring to obtain in exchange their good advice only,” ^
The sick, also, are often very carefully attended to.
Among the coast tribes of British Columbia Mr. Duncan
“always found one or two nurses to an invalid, if the case was
^ Drury, Adyefi/ures during Fifteen in Jour, ^ Proceed. Koy. Soc. N.S.
Years'^ Captivity on the Island of Mada- iVdleSy xxiii. 407. Luinholtz, Among
gascar,y.i^2 sq. ^ Cannibals, Cf OiGy, Journals
^ Ellis, History of Madagascar, i. of '/wo lixpeditions of Discovery in
139. For other African instances, see North-West and Western Australia, ii.
Mungo Park, Travels in the Interior of 248; Prough Smyth, of. cit. i, 138;
Africa, p. 17 (Mandingoes) ; Burton, Spencer and Q\\\ew, Native Tribes of
Abcohuta, i. ^03 (Voruba) ; Idem, I wo Central Australia, p. 51.
Trips to Gorilla Land, i. 106 (Mpong- ^ Mariner, op. cit. ii. 155.
we) ; Monrad, Guinea- Kysten og dens ^ llale, D.S. Exploring Expedition.
Indbyggere, p. 7 ; Johnston, Jxtver Vol. VI. Ethnography and Iliilology,
Congo, p. 423 (races of the Upper p, 95.
Congo) ; Wilson and Felkin, op. cit. ® Lichtenstein, op. cit. i. 265.
i. 225 (Waganda). 7 Veniaminof, quoted by Petroff,
3 Lyre, op. cit. ii. 385 sij. Mathew, loc. cit. p. 155.
CHARITY AND GENEROSITY
at all bad ; the sympathy of the nurses, too, seemed very
great.” ^ Beechey says of the wild Indians of Upper California
The very great care taken of all those who are affected with any
disease ought not to be allowed to escape a remark. When any
of their relations are indisposed, the greatest attention is paid to
their wants.” Keating noticed the kind and humane treat-
ment which the Potawatomis extended even to the idiots.^
The Koriaks ‘‘ carefully attend those who are sick.”^ The same
is said of the Ainos of Japan, ^ and the Tagbanuas of the Philip-
pine Islands.^ In Sarawak no relative is abandoned because an
injury or illness may have incapacitated him for work.^ When
a Dyak is ill at home, the women nurse the patient in turn.'^
In Samoa ^‘the treatment of the sick was invariably humane.” ^
In Tana,^^ Humphrey’s Island, Erromanga,^^ and Tasmania,^^
they were likewise kindly attended to ; and the same is the case
at least among many of the Australian tribes.^* Concerning the
aborigines of Herbert River, in Northern Queensland,
Lumholtz writes : — “ The natives arc very kind and sympathetic
towards those who are ill, and they carry them from camp to
camp. This is the only noble trait I discovered in the
Australian natives.” In various parts of Australia the blind,
and especially the aged blind, are carefully tended ;
travellers on the northern coast of the continent have noticed
that these are generally the fattest of the company, being
supplied with the best of everytliing.^^^ No trait in the char-
acter of the Malagasy,” says Ellis, is more creditable to their
liumanity, and more gratifying to our benevolent feelings, than
the kind, patient, and affectionate manner in which they
attend upon the sick.” A similar praise is bestowed upon the
^ Duncan, quoted by Mayne, /^'our
Years in British Columbia, p. 292 .vy,
Beechey, op. cit. ii. 402.
^ Keating, Expedition to the Source
of St. Peter's River, i. 100.
Krashenimi'ikoff, op. cit. ]). 233.
^ von Siebold, Die Aino auf dcr
Insel Vesso, p. 1 1 .
Worcester, Philippine Islands, p.
494.
^ St. John, Life in the Forests of the
Far East, ii. 323.
^ Bock, Head- limiters of Borneo, p.
211.
® Turner, Samoa, p. 141. Cp\ Prit-
chard, Polynesian Reminiscences, p.
146.
Turner, Samoa, p. 323.
/bid. p. 276,
Roljcrtson, Erromanga, p. 399.
Ting Roth, Aborigines of Tas-
mania, p. 47. Bon wick, Daily Life
and Origin of the I'asmanians, p. 10.
lirough Smyth, op. cit. ii. 284
(West Australian natives). Schuerniann,
‘Aboriginal 'bribes of I'ort Lincoln,’ in
W()ods, Native Tribes of South Aus-
tralia, p. 225.
Lumholtz, Among Cannibals, p.
183.
Ridley, Kamilaroi, ]x 169. Eyre,
op. cit. ii. 382. Barrington, History of
New South [Vales, p. 23. Stirling, op.
cit. p. 36.
Ellis, History of Madagascar, i.
231 sq.
N N 2
Mandingoes^ and Kafirs/^ Among the Zulus, says Mr. J.
Tyler, ‘‘work, however important, is at once suspended that
they may help their afflicted friends.” ^
Whilst the information which I have been able to
gather on the social customs of uncivilised races seems to
indicate that, in the majority of cases, mutual kindness
and goodwill prevail within their communities, there
are not wanting statements of a different character. But
these statements are, after all, exceptional, and some of
them are either ambiguous or obviously inexact. Only
too often travellers represent to us the savage, not as he is
in his daily life amidst his own people, but as he behaves
towards his enemy, or towards a stranger who enters his
country uninvited. As an experienced observer remarks,
“ the savage, passionate and furious with the feeling of
revenge, slaughtering and devouring his enemy and drink-
ing his blood, is no longer the same being as when
cultivating his fields in peace ; and it would be as unjust
to estimate his general character by his actions in these
moments of unrestrained passion, as to judge of Europeans
by the excesses of an excited soldiery or an infuriated
mob.” ^ Moreover, many accounts of savages date from
a period when they have already been affected by contact
with a ‘‘higher culture,” as we call it, a culture which
almost universally has proved to exercise a deteriorating
influence on the character of the lower races. Among the
North American Indians, for instance, “ there was more
good-will, hospitality, and charity, practised towards one
another ” before white people came and resided among
them ; whereas contact with civilisation has made them
“false, suspicious, avaricious, and hard-hearted.”^^ As has
been truly said, “ search modern history, and in the North
^ CailHe, op, cit, i. 354. •''' Warren, in Schoolcraft, Indian
^ Lichten.stein, op. cit, i. 266. Tribes of the United States., ii. 1 39.
Tyler, Forty Years among the ^ Donienecli, Seven Years'' Residence
Zulus, p. 195. in the Great Deserts of North America,
Dicffenbach, Travels in New Zea- ii. 69.
land, ii. 130 sq.
CHARITY AND GENEROSITY
XXIH
and South and East and West the story is ever the same —
we come, we civilise, and we corrupt or exterminate.” ^
Among the semi-civilised and civilised nations charity
has universally been regarded as a du^y, and has often
been strenuously enjoined by their religions. When Spain
and Peru first came into contact, the Americans surpassed
the Spaniards in brotherly love and systematic care for the
needy. They had a poor-law according to which the
blind, lame, aged, and infirm, who could not till their own
lands so as to clothe and feed themselves, should receive
sustenance from the public stores. The ancient Mexi-
cans, according to Clavigero, seemed to give without
reluctance what had cost them the utmost labour to
acquire.*"^ ‘‘ The great virtue of the Coreans is their
innate respect for and daily practice of the laws of human
brotherhood. Mutual assistance and generous hospitality
among themselves are distinctive national traits.” Accord-
ing to Chinese law, ^^all poor destitute widowers and
widows, the fatherless and childless, the helpless and the
infirm, shall receive sufficient maintenance and protection
from the magistrates of their native city or district, when-
ever they have neither relations nor connections upon
whom they can depend for support.” ‘‘Benevolence,”
said Confucius, “ is more to man than either water or
fire.” To assist the needy, to feed the hungry, to clothe
the naked, to succour the sick, to save men in danger —
these and similar acts of kindness are, according to
Chinese beliefs, merits which will be rewarded by the
unseen powers that watch human conduct, whereas the
uncharitable and parsimonious are threatened with divine
punishments.^ In a book of Buddhistic-Confucian flavour.
^ Boyle, op, cit. p. io8.
- Garcilasso de la W‘ga, Part
of the Royal Comfuentaries: of the
Vneas^ ii. 34.
^ Clavigero, History of Mexico,, i. 81.
^ Griffis, Coreay p. 288.
® Ta Tsing Leu Lee, sec, Ixxxix. p.
93. On the charitable institutions of
the Chinese, see Staunton, ibid. p. 93
n. * ; Smith, Chinese CharactcristicSy
p. 186 sq.
Douglas, Confttcianisni and 7 'aou-
isTtiy p. 109.
^ ‘ Merits and Errors Scrutinized,’ in
/ndo- Chinese Gleanery iii. 159, 161 sqq.
Thai Shangy 3. ‘ Divine Panorama,’
in Giles, Strange Stories from a Chinese
Studio, ii. 370, 371, 374, 379. Douglas,
as familiar to the youth of Japan as the Sermon on the
Mount is to us, it is said, “ Above all things, men must
practise charity; it is by almsgiving that wisdom is fed.” ^
According to the Dhammapada, “ the uncharitable do not
go to the world o^ the gods ; fools only do not praise
liberality ; a wise man rejoices in liberality, and through
it becomes blessed in the other world.” ^ Indeed, in the
didactic poetry of Buddhism the virtue of beneficence
occupies the most prominent place ; without any regard to
what is the measure of the real benefit thereby extended
to the recipient of the gift, the legends set before us as
a duty the most unbounded generosity, pushed even to
the extreme of self-destruction.® And in its conception
of charity and liberality, as in all other points of worldly
morality. Buddhism does not differ from the standard
recognised in India since ancient times.'* Already in the
Yedlc hymns praise is bestowed on those who from their
abundance willingly dispense to the needy, on those who
do not turn away from the hungry, on those who are kind
to the poor.'"' In the Hitopadesa it is said that the good
man shows pity even to the worthless, as the moon does
not withdraw its light even from a member of the lowest
caste." The sacred law-books of India are full of pre-
scriptions enjoining almsgiving as a duty on all twice-
born men.^ “A householder must give as much food as
he is able to spare to those who do not cook for them-
selves, and to all beings one must distribute food without
detriment to one’s own interest.” The student “ should
always without sloth give alms out of whatever he has
for food.”" The Bnihmana who has completed his
studentship should without tiring “ perform works of
Confucianism and Taouistn^ pp, 259,
272 sq. Davis, Chin i, ii. 48. Edkins,
Kelijjion in China, p. 89 sq.
^ Chamberlain, Things Japanese, p.
309-
- Dhammapada, 177.
Oldenbcrg, Buddha, 301.
^ Cf. Kern, Manual of Indian
Buddhism, p. 72,
^ Rig' Veda, x. 117. Kacgi, Rigveda,
p. 18.
^ Hitopadesa, Mitralal)ha, 63.
^ Gautama, v. 21 ; x. i sqq. Insti-
tutes of Vishnu, lix. 28. Baiidhdyaua,
i*- 7 - 13* 5 - Luaus of Mann, ix. 333;
X* 75 » 79 ; xi. I sqq. ^
^ Laws of Manu, iv. 32.
^ Anugitdf
XXI II
CHARITY AND GENEROSITY
charity with faith.” ' Almsgiving confers merit on the
giver, it frees him from guilt, it destroys sin ; ^ “ for
whatever purpose a man bestows any gift, for that pur-
pose he receives in his next birth with due honour its
reward.” ® On the other hand, he who cooks for himself
alone eats nothing but sin.'‘ Speaking of the modern
Hindus, Mr. Wilkins observes : — “ The charity of the
Hindus is great. . . . There is no poor-law in India, no
guardians of the poor, no workhouses, excepting for the
Europeans in the Presidency towns. The poor of a
family, the halt, the lame, the blind, the weak, the insane,
are provided for by their family, if it is at all able to do
it ; in cases where there are few or no relatives, then the
burden is taken up by others. It is a ‘ work of merit.’ ”
Of the ancient Persians Thucydides said that they
preferred giving to receiving.® To be charitable towards
the poor of their own faith was among them a religious
duty of the first order.’’ Zoroaster thus addressed
Vlshtaspa ; — “ Let no thought of Angra Mainyu ever
infect thee, so that thou shouldst indulge in evil lusts,
make derision and idolatry, and shut to the poor the door
of thy house.” ® The holySraosha is the protector of the
poor.'*' In the Shayast it is said that the clothing of the
soul in the next world is formed out of almsgiving.’®
It seems that among the ancient Egyptians charity was
considered no less meritorious.” “ The god,” M. Maspero
observes, ” does not confine his favour to the prosperous
and the powerful of this w'orld ; he bestows it also upon
^ Laws of Mann, iv. 226. Cf. ibid. Eastern Iranians, i. 164 S(j(/, ; Mills,
iv. 227. in Sacred Books of the East, xxxi. p.
Institutes of Vishmt, lix. 15, 30 ; xxii.
ch. xc. sqq. Gautama, xix. ri, 16. ® Vasts, xxiv. 37.
Vasishtha, xx. 47 ; xxii. 8. Lazos of Ibid, xi. 3.
Manu, iii. 95 ; iv. 229 sqq. ; xi. 228. Shayast Ld-Shayast, xii. 4. Cf,
^ Laws of Mann, iv. 234. Bundakis, xxx. 28.
^ Institutes of Vishim, Ixvii. 43. Brugseh, History of Egypt under
Laws of Manu, iii. 1 1 8 . Cf Rig- Veda, the Pharaohs, i. 29 sq. Tide, History
X. 117. 6. of the Egyptian Religion, p. 226 sq,
^ Wilkins, Modern Hinduism, p. Renouf, Ilibbert Lectures on the Reli-
416 sq. gion of Egypt, p. 72 sqq. Amelineau,
Thucydides, ii. 97. 4. L-t[volution des id/es morales dans
^ See Geiger, Civilization of the V Egypt Ancienne, pp. 145, 354.
CHARITY AND GENEROSITY
the poor. His will is that they be fed and clothed, and
exempted from tasks beyond their strength ; that they
be not oppressed, and that unnecessary tears be spared
them.” ^ In the memorial inscriptions, where the dead
plead their good deeds, charity is often referred to, “ I
harmed not a child,” says one Egyptian, “ I injured not a
widow ; there was neither beggar nor needy in my
time ; none were hungered, widows were cared for as
though their husbands were still alive.” ^ In the inscrip-
tion in honour of a lady who had been charitable to
persons of her own sex, whether girls, wives, or widows,
it is said, “ The god rewarded me for this, rejoicing me
with the happiness which he has granted me for walking
after his way.”
Charity was urgently insisted upon by the religious law
of the Hebrews.'^ “ Thou shalt open thine hand wide
unto thy brother, to thy poor, and to thy needy, in thy
land ” ; “ for this thing the Lord thy God shall bless thee in
all thy works, and in all that thou puttest thine hand unto.”
Even “ if thine enemy be hungry, give him bread to eat ;
and if he be thirsty, give him water to drink ; . . . the
Lord shall reward thee.” ** Especially in the Old
Testament Apocrypha and in Rabbinical literature alms-
giving assumed an excessive prominence — so much so that
the word which in the older writings means “ righteous-
ness ” in general, came to be used for almsgiving in
particular.'^ “Shut up alms in thy storehouses : and it
shall deliver thee from all affliction.” “As water will
quench a flaming fire, so alms maketh an atonement for
sins.”® “For alms doth deliver from death, and shall
purge away all sin. Those that exercise alms and
^ Ma.spero, Dawn of Civilizaiion^ p. xxv. 35.
1 91. Cf. Schiapparelli, Del sent imento ^ Deuteronomy^ xv. ii, 10.
retij^loso dcgli antic hi egizianf p. 18 ; Proverbs^ xxv. 21 sq.
Amclineau, op, cit. p. 268. ^ Addis, ‘Alms,’ in Encyclopa’dia
“ Wiedemann, Religion of the An- Biblica^ i. 118. Cf. Montefiore, Hihbo-t
dent Egyptians.^ p. 253. Lectures on the Religion of the Ancient
^ Renouf, op. cit. p. .75. /lebrezus, p. 484.9-/,
^ Deuteronomy., xiv. 29 ; xv. 7 sqq. ; ^ Ecctesiasticus, xxix. 12.
xvi. II, 14. T.eviticus., xix. 9 sq. ; ’’ Ibid. iii. 30.
CHARITY AND GENEROSITY
righteousness shall be filled with life.” ^ The charitable
man is rewarded with the birth of male issue. ^ Alms-
giving is equal in value to all other commandments.® He
who averts his eyes from charity commits a sin equal to
idolatry To such an extreme was almsgiving carried on
by the Jews, that some Rabbis at length decreed that no
man should give above a fifth part of his goods in
charity.®
Almsgiving, prayer, and fasting were the three cardinal
disciplines which the synagogue transmitted to both the
Christian Church and the Muhammedan mosque.®
According to Islam, the duty next in importance to
prayer is that of giving alms.'^ Muhammed repeatedly
announces that the path which leads to God is the
helping of the orphans and the relieving of the poor.®
“Ye cannot attain to righteousness until ye expend in
alms of what ye love.” ” “ Those who expend their
wealth by night and day, secretly and openly, they shall
have their hire with their Lord.” It is said that “ prayer
carries us half-way to God, fasting brings us to the door
of His palace, and alms procure us admission.” Certain
alms, called Zakat, are prescribed by law ; it is an
indispensable duty for every Muhammedan of full age to
bestow in charity about one-fortieth of all such property
as has been a year in his possession, provided that he has
sufficient for his subsistence and has an income equivalent
to about per annum.'" Other charitable gifts are
> voluntary, and confer merit upon the giver.
By Christianity charity of the religious type which we
^ 7 obit y xii. 9. Cf. ibid, i. 3, 16 ;
ii. 14 ; iv. 7 S(/q. ; xii. 8.
Bava Bathniy fol. 10 B, quoted by
llershon, I'reasures of the Valmuf
p. 24.
^ Rab Assi, quoted by Kohler, ^ Alms/
in Jewish Encydopediay i. 435.
^ Kethubothy fob 68 A, quoted by
Katz, Dcr wa/rre I'alniudjudCy p. 36.
® Katz, op, cit. p. 42.
® Cf. iVbity xii. 8 ; Kohler, in Jetv-
isJi Encyclopedia y i- 435-
7 Sec Sale’s ‘ Preliminary Di.scourse,’
in Wherry, Coninieutary on the Quj'dn,
i. 172 ; Lane, Manners and Customs of
the Alodern EgyptianSy p. 105.
Koran^ ii. 267, 269, 275 ; viii. 42 ;
ix. 60 ; xc. 12, 14 sq. ; xciii. 6 sqq. ;
&c.
« Ibid, iii. 86.
Ibid, ii. 275.
Sell, Eaith of fsldniy p. 284.
Ibid, p. 283. l^almer, ‘ Introduc-
tion ’ to his translation of Bhe QurWtiy
i. p. Ixxiii. x\ineer All, Life and
I'cac hi ngs of Mohammed, p. 268.
CHARITY AND GENEROSITY chap.
find in the East was introduced into Europe. We have
certainly no reason to blame the ancient Greeks and
Romans for neglecting their poor. Among them slavery
in a great measure replaced pauperism ; and what slavery
did for the very poor, the Roman system of clientage did
for those of a somewhat higher rank.’^ Moreover, the
relief of the indigent was an important function of the
State. ^ The Areopagus provided public works for the
poor.*^ At Rome gratuitous distribution of corn was the
rule for many centuries ; agrarian laws furnished free
homesteads to the landless, on conquered or public terri-
tory ; since the days of Nerva a systematic support of
poor children was enjoined in all the cities of Italy.® A
few examples of private charity, also, have descended to
us already from early times, such as Epaminondas collect-
ing dowers for poor girls,'' and Cimon feeding and clothing
the poor ; and from the days of the Pagan Empire there
are recorded several cases of individual beneficence.
Charitable bequests are alluded to in the burial inscrip-
tions ; when some great catastrophe happened, relief was
willingly given to the sufferers ; private infirmaries were
established for slaves.® The duty of charity was forcibly
enjoined by some of the moralists. The wise man, says
Seneca, “ will dry the tears of others, but will not mingle
his own with them ; he will stretch out his hand to the
shipwrecked mariner, will offer hospitality to the exile, and
alms to the needy.” But his alms are not thrown away by
chance ; his purse will open easily, but never leak. He
will choose out the worthiest with the utmost care, and
never give without sufficient reason; for unwise gifts must be
reckoned among foolish extravagances.” So also Cicero,
^ See Lecky, Hisloiy of European Aurelius Victor, Epito)}ie^ xii. 8.
Morals^ ii. 73. ^ Cornelius Nepos, Epaminondas ^ 3.
2 Boissier, Religion Romaine, ii. 206. ® Plutarch, Cimon^ 10.
^ Farrer, Paganisniand Chrislianity^ ^ ^Plistory of European Morals^
p. 183. ii. 77 sq. Boissier, op. cit. ii. 213 sq.
^ Naiulet, ‘ Des .secours publics chez p'arrcr, Paganism and Christianity ^
Ics Remains,’ in M&moires de PAca- ’•p. 182.
demie des inscriptions el belles-lettres^ Seneca, De clementia, ii. 6.
xiii. 43 sq. Idem. De vita beata. Z'l sq.
^ Ibid. p. 71 sq.
CHARITY AND GENEROSITY
whilst styling beneficence and liberality “ virtues that are
the most agreeable to the nature of man,” is anxious to
warn his readers against imprudence in practising them,
“ lest our kindness should hurt both those whom it is
meant to assist, and others.” *
In a very different light was charity viewed by the
Christians. Unlimited open-handedness became a cardinal
virtue. An ideal Christian was he who did what Jesus
commanded the young man to do ; who went and sold
what he had and gave it to the poor.^ Promiscuous alms-
giving was enjoined as a duty : — “ Give to him that
asketh thee, and from him that would borrow of thee turn
not thou away.” ® The discharge of this duty was even
more profitable to the giver than to the receiver. There
is perhaps no precept in the Gospel to which a promise of
recompense is so frequently annexed as to that concerning
charity. Eternal life is promised to those who feed the
hungry, give drink to the thirsty, take in the stranger, clothe
the naked, visit the sick.' Charity was regarded as an
atonement. “ God,” says St. Augustine, “ is to be pro-
pitiated through alms for sins past ” ; and countless times
is the thought expressed, that almsgiving is a safe invest-
ment of money at good interest with (iod in heaven."
Cyprian, who is the father of the Romish doctrine of good
works, establishes an arithmetical relation between the
number of alms-offerings and the blotting out of sins."
“ The food of the needy,” says Eeo the Great, “ is the
purchase-money of the kingdom of heaven.” “ As long
as the market lasts,” says St.' Chrysostom, “ let us buy
alms, or rather let us purchase salvation through alms.”"
The rich man is only a debtor ; all that he possesses beyond
^ Cicero, De officiis^ i. 14 sq. ^ Cyprian, De operc ct eleenio^ynis^
Cf Acts, ii. 45. 24 (Mi^ne, t?/. t //. iv. 620). C/MIarnack,
St. Matthew, v. 42. Cf. St. Liihe, llistoy of Dogvia, ii. 134, n. 2.
vi. 30. > Scr?}io X., de Collectis,
^ St. Matthew, xxv. 34 sqq, 5 (Mignc, op. cit. liv. 165 -sv/.)*
^ St, Augu.stine, Enchiridion, 70 St. Chry-so.stoni, Hoinilia VI L, de
(Migne, Patrologiie cursns, xl. 265). Panitentia (Mignc, op. cit. Ser. Graeca,
® See Uhlhorn, Die chrisiliche Lie- xlix. sq. 333).
hesthdtigkcit, i. 270,
CHARITY AND GENEROSITY
what is necessary, belongs to the poor, and ought to be
given away.^ The poor, no longer looked down upon,
became instruments of salvation. To them was given the
first place In the Church and in the Christian community.
St. Chrysostom says of them, As fountains flow near the
place of prayer that the hands that are about to be raised
to heaven may be washed, so were the poor placed by our
fiithers near to the door of the Church, that our hands
might be consecrated by benevolence before they are raised
to God.” Gregory the Great announces, and the Middle
Ages re-echo, “ The poor are not to be lightly esteemed
and despised, but to be honoured as patrons.’^ Thus it
happened that even in the darkest periods, when all other
Christian virtues were nearly extinct, charity survived un-
impaired.^ Later on Protestantism, by denyrng the
atoning effect of good deeds, deprived charity of a great
deal of Its religious attraction. And in modern times the
enlightened opinion on the subject, recognising the
demoralising influence of indiscrimiiiate almsgiving, rather
agrees with the principles laid down by Cicero and Seneca,
than with the literal interpretation of the injunctions of
Christ.
In the course of progressing civilisation the obligation
of assisting the needy has been extended to wider and wider
circles of men. The charity and generosity which savages
require as a duty or praise as a virtue have, broadly speak-
ing, reference only to members of the same community or
tribe. Kindness towards foreigners is looked upon in a
very different light. ‘‘ The virtues of the Negroes,”
Monrad observes, are entirely restricted to their own
tribe. The doing good to a stranger they would generally
find ridiculous.” To the Greenlander a foreigner,
especially if he be of another race, is an indifferent
object, whose welfare he has no interest in furthering.”
^ Uhlhorn, op. ciL p. 294 sq. ^ Quoted by Uhlhorn, op. cit. i. 315,
“ St. Dc verbis Apostoliy Cf. Milman, Ilisfory of Latin
TLahentes enuidein spiritirniy iii. il Christianity f\\. 33 .vy.
{Migne, op. cit. Ser. (jraeca, li. sq. ® Monrad, op. cit. p. 4.
300)* ® Nansen, Eskimo Life^ p. 159.
xxni
CHARITY AND GENEROSITY
The Bedouin, says Doughty, has two faces, this of gentle
kindness at home, the other of wild misanthropy and his
teeth set against the world besides.” ^ At higher stages
of civilisation the duty of charity embraces a wider group
of people, in proportion to the largeness of the social
unit or to the scope of the religion by which it is enjoined.
But it is still more or less restrained by national or religious
boundaries. M. Amelineau observes that the charity
referred to on ancient Egyptian papyri is “ la charlte
limitee a ceux de la meme nation.” According to
Zoroastrianism, charity should be restricted to the followers
of the true religion ; to succour an unbeliever would be
like a strengthening of the dominion of Evil.^^ The
Zakat, or legal alms of the Muhammedans, must not be
given to a non-Muslim, because it is regarded as a
fundamental pare of worship;^ similarly the Sadaqah, or
offering on the feast-day known as ‘ Idud-Fitr, is confined
to true believers.'’ Nor has Christian charity always been
free from religious narrowness. Eleury says that the early
Christians, in the care they took of the poor, always
preferred Christians before infidels, because their
principal regard was to their spiritual concerns, and to their
temporal welfare only in order to their spiritual.” '' The
principle of the Church was, Omnem hominem fidelem
judica tuum esse fratrem.” ‘ In the seventeenth century
the Scotch clergy taught that food or shelter must on no
occasion be given to a starving man unless his opinions
were orthodox. On the other hand, Christianity of a
higher type preaches charity towards all men ; and so does
advanced Judaism and Buddhism. It is said in the Talmud,
with reference to the treatment of the poor, that no dis-
tinction should be made between such as are Jews and
such as are not.'^ In modern times charity now and then
^ Doughly, Arabia Deserta, i. 36S ® Floury, IManners and Behaviour of
sq. the Christians^ p. 133 sq.
Aineliaoau, op. tit. p. 354. " L-iiiront, Etudes sur t hisloire de
^ Geiger, op. cit. i. 165. P liuniau it iv. 94.
^ Sell, cit. p. 284. Cf. Kora??., Buckle, Histo?y of Civilizatio?? in
ix. 60. E?io-ia?id, iii. 277.
^ Sell, op. cit. p. 318. * Gifin, fol. 6i A, quoted by Katz,
steps over the barriers of nationality even when the
sufferers belong to distant nations. Whilst our indigent
compatriots are generally recognised to have a greater
claim on our pity than needy strangers, a great calamity
in one country readily calls forth a charitable response in
other nations. Mr. Pike believes that the contribution of
one hundred thousand pounds sterlyig which England,
in the year 1755, when Lisbon was laid in ruins by
an earthquake, sent for the relief of the sufferers, in-
augurated this new era of international charitableness.
“Compassion,” he observes, “was at last shown by
Englishmen, not simply for Englishmen and Protes-
tants, but for foreigners professing a different religion ;
pity, for once, triumphed over intolerance and national
prejudice.”^ And in war, in the case of enemies rendered
harmless by wounds or disease, the growth of human feel-
ing has passed beyond the simple requirement that they
shall not be killed or ill-used, and has cast upon belliger-
ents the duty of tending them so far as is consistent with
the primary duty to their own wounded.^ However, it
must not be imagined that this humane principle, which
has only lately been recognised in Europe, is a unique
outcome of Christian civilisation at its height. It is said
in the Mahabharata that, when a quarrel arises among
good men, a wounded enemy is to be cured in the
conqueror’s own country, or to be conveyed to his
home.* Strangely enough, even from the savage world we
hear of something like an a?iticipation of the Geneva
Convention. Among certain tribes in New South Wales,
as soon as the fight is concluded, “ both parties seem
perfectly reconciled, and jointly assist in tending the
wounded men.” ''
Der wahre Talmiidjwie^ p. 38. Cf. the Law of Nations^ ii. Appendix no.
Apologic des Juifs^ \). 10. vi. Hall, Treatise on International
^ Pike, History of Crime in Eng- Law, p, 399, Ideffler, Das Euro-
land, ii. 346. pdische Volkerrecht der Gegernvart ,
‘Convention .signed at Geneva, § 126, p. 267, n. 5.
August 22, 1864, for the Amelioration of Mahabharata. xii. 3547, quoted by
the Condition of the Wounded in Annies Lorinier, op. cit. ii. 431.
in the Field,’ in Lorimer, Institutes of Brough Smyth, op. cit, i, 160.
CHARITY AND GENEROSITY
The gradual expansion of the duty of charity is due to
the fact that this duty, in the first place, is based on the
altruistic sentiment, and consequently follows the same
general law of development. Many cases referred to above
imply that savages are by no means strangers to affection,
and that in their communities there is not only mutual
assistance, but general kindness of heart. Numerous
instances to the same effect might easily be added.
When a Fuegian is very ill the near relatives show much
grief ; ^ and Darwin tells us that the Fuegian boy who
was taken on board the Beagle and brought to Europe,
used to go to the sea-sick and say, in a plaintive voice,
“ Poor, poor fellow ! ” " The Veddahs are praised not
only for their charitable behaviour towards each other,
but for their natural tenderness of heart.* The aborigines
of Victoria are said to “ have the greatest love for their
friends and relatives,” and to testify the liveliest joy
when a companion after a long absence returns to the
camp.^ Forster mentions an instance of affection among
the natives of Tana, which, as he says, “ strongly proves
that the passions and innate quality of human nature are
much the same in every climate.”* Melville declares that,
after passing a few weeks in the 'Fypee valley of the
Marquesas, he formed a higher estimate of human nature
than he ever before entertained.** It can hardly be doubted
that in every human society there is, normally, some degree
of social affection between its members ; ^ and it seems that
the evolution of this sentiment in mankind has been much
more in the direction of greater extensiveness than of
greater intensity.
Where the members of a group have affection for
each other, mutual aid will be regarded as a duty both
because it will be practised habitually, and because a
^ Bridges, in A Voice for South ■'* Korsler, Voyago round the Worlds
America^ xiii. 206, ii. 325.
2 Darwin, Journal of Researches^ Melv He, Typee^ p. 297,
p. 207. " See infra^ on the Origin and De-
^ Sara-^iin, op. cit. iii. 545, 550. velopmeiit of llie Altruistic Sentiment.
Brough Smyth, op. cit. i. 138.
56o charity and GENEROSITY chap.
failure to afford it will call forth sympathetic resentment
On behalf of the sufferer. But we need, here again, to
look below the surface. Men may be induced to do
good to their fellow-creatures not only by kindly feelings
towards them, but by egoistic motives ; and such motives,
through having a share in making beneficence a tribal
habit, at the same time influence the moral estimation in
which it is held. The Basutos say that “ the knife that
is lent does not return alone to its master ” — a kindness is
never thrown away.^ Of the Asiniboin, a Siouan tribe,
Mr. Dorsey states that “ nothing is given except with a
view to a gift in return.” When the Andaman Islanders
make presents of the best that they possess, they tacitly
understand that an equivalent should be rendered for
every gift.'^ Among the Makololo “the rich show kind-
ness to the poor, in expectation of services.” In his
description of the Greenlanders, Dr. Nansen observes that
all the small communities depend for their existence on
the law of mutual assistance, on the principle of common
suffering and common enjoyment. “A hard life has
taught the Eskimo that even if he is a skilful hunter and
can, as a rule, manage to hold his own well enough, there
may come times when, without the help of his fellows,
he would have to succumb. It is better, therefore, for
him to help in his turn.” ® That similar considerations
largely lie at the bottom of the custom of mutual aid and
charity both in uncivilised and more advanced communities,
we may assume from the experience of human nature
which we have acquired at home. And such motives
must be particularly active in a society the members of
which are so dependent on each other’s services and
return-services, as is generally the case with a horde of
savages.
Moreover, by niggardliness a person may expose him-
^ Ca.s:xli.s, op. cit. p. 310. p. 511.
- Dor.sey, ‘ Siouan StK'iology/ in ^ Nan.sen, P'irst Crossing of Green-
Ann. J\tp. Bur. Ethn. xv. 225 S(p land, ii. 304 sq. Cf Cranz, P/istory of
Man, \\\ four. Anthr. Inst, xii. 95. Greenland, i. 173 ; Parry, op. cit. p.
‘ l.ivingslunc. Missionary Travels, 525.
self to supernatural dangers, whereas liberality may entail
sup^ematural reward. In Morocco nobody would like to
eat in the presence of other people without sharing his
meal with them ; otherwise they might poison his food
by looking at it with an evil eye. So also, if anybody
shows a great liking for a thing belonging to you, wanting,
for instance, to buy your gun or your horse, it is best to
let him have it, since otherwise an accident is likely to
happen to the object of his desire.^ But baneful energy,
what the Moors call l-bas^ is transferable not only by the
eye, but by the voice. The poor and the needy have thus
in their hands a powerful weapon and means of retaliation,
the curse. The ancient Greeks believed that the beggar
had his Erinys,^ his avenging demon, which was obviously
only a personification of his curse.^ It is said in the
Proverbs, He that giveth unto the poor shall not Jack :
but he that hideth his eyes shall have many a curse.’'
The same idea is expressed in Ecclesiasticus : — ‘‘ Turn
not away thine eye from the needy, and give him none
occasion to curse thee : for if he curse thee in the bitter-
ness of his soul, his prayer shall be heard of him that
made him. ... A prayer out of a poor man’s mouth
reacheth to the ears of God, and his judgment cometh
speedily.” According to the Zoroastrian Yasts, the
poor man who follows the good law, when wronged and
deprived of his rights, invokes Mithra for help, with
hands uplifted.^’ Mr. Chapman states that, “ though
the Damaras are, generally speaking, great gluttons, they
would not think of eating in the presence of any of their
tribe without sharing their meal with all comers, for fear
of being visited by a curse from their ‘ Omu-kuru ' [or
deity], and becoming impoverished.” ' There is all reason
^ Similar beliefs prevail in modern
Egy})t (Klunzinger, Upper Egypt ^ j).
39J)-
“ Odyssey, xvii. 475.
Supra, p. 60.
Proverbs, xxviii. 27.
Ecclesinsticns, iv. 5 sq. ; xxi. 5.
Cf. JOeuierononiy, xv. 9. Rabbi Jo-
banan says lhat almsgiving “ saves man
from sudden, unnatural death” (Koh-
ler, \x\ Jewish Encyclopedia, i. 435). Cf.
Proverbs, x. 2.
« Vasts, X. 84.
^ Chapman, I'ravels in the Interior
of South Af rica, i. 341.
VOL. I
O O
CHARITY. AND GENEROSITY
to suppose that in this case the curse of the deity was
originally the curse, or evil wish, of an angry man.
A poor man is able not only to punish the uncharitable
by means of his curses, but to reward the generous giver
by means of his blessings. During my residence among
the Andjra tribe in the mountains of Northern Morocco,
our village was visited by a band of ambulant scribes who
went from house to house, receiving presents and invoking
blessings in return. When a goat w.as given them they
asked God to increase the flocks of the giver, when money
was given they asked God to increase his money, and so
forth. Some of the villagers told me that it was a pro-
fitable bargain, since they would be tenfold repaid for their
gifts through the blessings of the scribes. A town Moor
who starts for a journey to the country genei'ally likes to
give a coin to one of the beggars who are sitting near
the gate, so as to receive his blessings It is said in
Ecclesiasticus :■ — “ Stretch thine hand unto the poor, that
thy blessing may be perfected. A gift hath grace in the
sight of every man living.” ^ Whilst he that withholdeth
corn shall be cursed by the people, “ blessing shall be
upon the head of him that selleth it.” ^ Among the
early Christians those who brought gifts for the poor were
specially remembered in the prayers of the Church ^ Of
the Nayadis of Malabar Mr. Iyer says that the purport and
object of their prayers are, among other things, “ that all
the superior castes, who give them alms, may enjoy long life
and prosperity.” ** In various cases the nature of the
rewards promised for charitable acts suggests that they are
due to the blessings of the recipient. According to
Vasishtha, “through liberaiity man obtains all his
desires, even longevity.” ® In the Yasts it is said that the
children of a charitable man will thrive.® According to
Talmudic ideas, men acquire wealth for their children by
^ Eccksiasiicus^ vii. 32. Cf. Fro-
7Jerds\ xxii. 9.
Proverbs^ xi. 26.'
^ Uhlhorn, op. oil. i. 14 1,
^ Iyer, in the Madras Government
Museum’s Bulletin., iv. 72.
^ Vasishtha, xxix. l sq.
^ Vasts, xxiv. 36.
distributing alms among the poor.’ Considering how
widely spread is the belief in the efficacy of curses and
blessings, there can be little doubt that charity and
generosity are connected with this belief in many cases
where no such connection has been noticed by the
European visitor.
The curses and blessings of the poor partly account
for the fact that charity has come to be regarded as a
religious duty. Originally, it is true, they had not
the character of an appeal to a god, but were believed to
possess a purely magical power, independent of any super-
human will. This belief is rooted in the close association
between the wish, more particularly the spoken wish, and
the idea of its fulfilment. The wish is looked upon in
the light of energy which may be transferred — by material
contact, or by the eye, or by means of speech — to the
person concerned, and then becomes a fact. This process,
however, is not taken quite as a matter of course ; there
is always some mystery about it. Hence the words of a
holy man, a magician or priest, are considered more
efficacious than those of ordinary mortals. The
Australian natives believe that the curse of a potent
magician will kill at the distance of a hundred miles.
Among the Maoris ‘‘ the anathema of a priest is regarded
as a thunderbolt that an enemy cannot escape.” “ Among
the Gal las no man will under any circumstances slay either
a priest or a wizard, from a dread of his dying curse.
Some of the Rabbis maintained that a curse uttered by a
scholar is unfailing in its effect, even if undeserved.** In
Muhammedan countries the curses of saints or shereefs are
particularly feared. According to the Laws of Manu, a
Brahmana “ may punish his foes by his own power alone,”
speech being his weapon.^ But though a curse may
derive particular potency from the person who utters it,
^ Kohler, in Jewish Encyclopedia^ i. iii, 50.
436. Cf. Proverbs^ xxviii. 27. '* Makkotk^ fol. ii A. Beraichoth^
- Polack, Manners and Customs of fol. 56 A.
the New Zealanders^ i. 248 sq. Lazvs of Mann,, xi. 32 sq.
® Harris, Highlands of Hithiopiay
0 0 2
it is by no means inefFective even in the mouth of an
ordinary man.^ In the Old Testament children are
forbidden to curse their parents,^ subjects their rulers,^ men
their god;^ and according to Talmudic conceptions, a
curse should not be regarded lightly however ignorant be
the person who utters it."' All that is required is that the
words should possess that supernatural quality which alone
can bring about the result desired, and this quality may
be inherent in the curse quite independently of the
person who utters it. It is inherent in certain mystic
formulas or spells and in the invocations of some spirit or
god. The will of the invoked being is not considered
at all ; his name is simply brought in to give the curse
that mystic efficacy which the plain word lacks. Thus
both in the Old Testament^ and in the Talmud" there
are traces of the ancient idea that the name of the Lord
might be used with advantage in any curse however un-
deserved. But with the deepening of the religious senti-
ment this idea had to be given up. A righteous and
mighty god cannot agree to be a mere tool in the hand
of a wicked curser. Hence the curse comes to be looked
upon in the light of a prayer, which is not fulfilled if
undeserved ; as it is said in the Proverbs, ‘‘ the curse
causeless shall not come. ” And the same is the case with
the blessing. Whilst in ancient days Jacob could take
away his brother’s blessing by deceit,*’ the efficacy of a
blessing was later on limited by moral considerations.^^’ The
Psalmist declares that only the offspring of the righteous
can be blessed ; ’’ and according to the Apostolic Consti-
tutions, although a widow who eateth and is filled
from the wicked, pray for them, she shall not be heard.”
^ Taylor, Te Ika a Mattie ]). 204 ^ Makkolh, fol. ii A. Berakhoth,
(Maoris). Wellbauson, Resle arahischm foil. 19 A, 56 A.
Heidentums, p, 139. ® Proverbs, xxvi. 2.
- Exodus, xxi. 17. Leviiicns, xx. 9. Genesis, xxvii. 23 sqtj.
Proverbs, xx. 20; xxx. ii. Cheyne, ‘ Ble.ssings and Curses/
^ Exodus^ xxii. 28. Ecclesiastes, x. in Encyclopccdia Biblica, i. 592.
20. J^sal/ns, xxxvii. 26.
^ Exodus, xxii. 28. Constituiiones Apostoliae, iv. 6.
^ Meghilla, fol. 15 A. Cf, Jeremiah, vii. 16.
® Supra, p. 564.
On the other hand, curses and blessings, when well
deserved, continued to draw down calamity or prosperity
upon their objects, by inducing God to put them into
effect ; this idea prevails both in post-exilic Judaism
and in Muhammedanism,^ and underlies the Christian
oath and benediction. The final, but not the original,
view was that, as an uncharitable man deserves to be
punished and a charitable man merits reward, the
curses and blessings of the poor will naturally be heard
by a righteous God. ‘‘ The Lord will plead their cause.”
The chief cause, however, of the extraordinary stress
which the higher religions put on the duty of charity
seems to lie in the connection between almsgiving and
sacrifice. When food is offered as a tribute to a god,
the god is supposed to enjoy its spiritual part only, whilst
the substance of it is left behind and is eaten by the poor.
And when the offering is continued in ceremonial sur-
vival in spite of the growing conviction that, after all,
the deity does not need and cannot profit by it,^^ the poor
become the natural heirs of the god, and the almsgiver
inherits the merit of the sacrificer. The chief virtue of
the act, then, lies in the self-abnegation of the donor, and
its efficacy is measured by the sacrifice ” which it costs
him.
Many instances may be quoted of sacrificial food being
left for the poor or being distributed among them. At
Scillus, where Xenophon had built an altar and a temple
to Artemis and a sacrifice was afterwards made every year,
the goddess supplied the poor people living there in tents
with ‘‘ barley-meal, bread, wine, sweetmeats, and a share
of the victims offered from the sacred pastures, and of
those caught in hunting.”^ According to Yasna, sacri-
fices to Mazda were given to his poor.''" In ancient
Arabia the poor were allowed to partake of the meal-
^ Cf, Cheyne, in EncycIopcEdia ^ For such a survival, see Tylor,
Biblica^ i. 592 ; Goldziher, Ahhand- Fritnitive Culluj-e^ ii. 396 sqq,
lungen zur arabischen Philologie, i. ^ Xenophon, Anabasis^ v. 3. 9.
29 sqq. ^ Yasna, xxxiv. 5.
Proverbs, xxii. 23.
offering which was laid before the god Uqai^ir.* In
Zinder, in the Soudan, there are some trees, regarded
as divine, to which annual offerings of bullocks, sheep,
and so forth, are made, “ though the poor of the country
get the benefit of them.” ^ In Morocco even animals
which are killed as l-'-ar — a sacrifice embodying a con-
ditional curse — for departed saints or living people, with a
view to compelling them to grant a request, are commonly
eaten by the poor, though nobody else would dare to
partake of them.
In other cases we find that almsgiving is itself regarded
as a form of sacrifice, or takes the place of it. In the
sacred books of India the two things are repeatedly
mentioned side by side. “ The householder offers sacri-
fices, the householder practises austerities, the householder
distributes gifts.” “ Of a Bnihmana who has completed
his studentship it is said, “Let him always practise,
according to his ability, with a cheerful heart, the duty of
liberality, both by sacrifices and by charitable works, if he
finds a worthy recipient for his gifts.” * “ In the Krita
age the chief virtue is declared to be the performance of
austerities, in the Treta divine knowledge, in the Dvapara
the performance of sacrifices, in the Kali liberality alone.” "’
In the Egyptian ‘ Book of the Dead ’ the soul, on ap-
proaching to the gods who are in the Tuat, pleads ; — “ I
have done that which man prescribeth and that which
pleascth the gods. I have propitiated the god with that
which he loveth. I have given bread to the hungry,
water to the thirsty, clothes to the naked, a boat to the
shipwrecked. I have made oblations to the gods and
funeral offerings to the departed.” ° In the Zoroastrian
prayer Ahuna-Vairya, to which great efficacy is ascribed,
it is said, “ He who relieves the poor makes Ahura king.”^
1 Wellhiiusen, Restc arabischen IIei~ Laws of Mamt^ iv. 227. Cf ibid,
dentums^ p. 64. Robertson Smith, iv. 226.
Kelii^iofi of the Semites^ p. 223. ^ Ibid. i. 86.
“ Ricliardson, Mission lo Cenhal ^ Book of the Dead, 125, Renoufs
Africa, ii. 259. traii-slation, p. 217.
histitutes of Vishnu, lix. 28. ^ Vendiddd, xix. 2.
In the Koran almsgiving is often mentioned in connection
with prayer ; ‘ and the Zakat, or alms prescribed by law,
is regarded by the Muhammedans as a fundamental part
of their religion, hence infidels, who cannot perform
acceptable worship, have nothing to do with these alms.^
Among the Muhammedans of India it is common for
men and women to vow “ that when what they desire
shall come to pass, they will, in the name of God, the
Prophet, his companions, or some zvullee, present offerings
and oblations.” One of these offerings, called “an
offering unto God,” consists in preparing particular
victuals, and in “ distributing them among friends and
the poor, and giving any sort of grain, a sacrificed sheep,
clothes, or ready-money in alms to the indigent.” When
the destruction of the Temple with its altar filled the
Jews with alarm as they thought of their unatoned sins,
Johanan ben Zakkai comforted them by saying, “You
have another means of atonement as powerful as the
altar, and that is the work of charity, for it is said : ‘ I
desired mercy, and not sacrifice.’ ” ‘ Many other passages
show how closely the Jews associated almsgiving with
sacrifice. “ He that giveth alms sacrificeth praise.” ''
“As sin-offering makes atonement for Israel, so alms for
the Gentiles.” ** “Almsdeeds are more meritorious than
all sacrifices.”^ An orphan is called an “altar to God.”
And as a sacrificer should be a person of a godly character,
so it is better to perish by famine than to receive an
oblation from the ungodly.” Alms were systematically
collected in the synagogues, and officers were appointed to
make the collection.*” So, also, among the early Christians
the collection of alms for the relief of the poor was an
act of the Church life itself. Almsgiving took place in
public worship, nay formed itself a part of worship.
^ Koran^ ii. 40, 104 ; ix. 54. ^ Quoted by Levy, Neuhehniisches
Sell, op. cit. 284. tind Chaldaisches Worterbuch., iv, 173.
^ Jafifur Shurreef, Qanoo?i’e-Islam, ^ Quoted ibid. iv. 173.
p. 179. ^ Comtitiifiones Apos/o/iao, iv. 3.
Kohler, in Jewish Encyclopedia., i. ^ Ibid. iv. 8.
467. Hosea, vi. 6. Addis, in Encyclopiedia Bihlica,
® Ecclesiastic us., xxxv. 2. i. 1 19.
Gifts of natural produce, the so-called oblations, were
connected with the celebration of the Lord’s Supper.
They were offered to God as the . first-fruits of the
creatures {^rimitia creaturarurn)^ and a prayer was said ; —
“ O Lord, accept also the offerings of those who to-day
bring an offering, as Thou didst accept the offerings of
righteous Abel, the offering of our father Abraham, the
incense of Zachariah, the alms of Cornelius, and the two
mites of the widow.” These oblations were not only
used for the Lord’s Supper, but they formed the chief
means for the relief of the poor. They were regarded as
sacrifice in the most special sense ; and, as no unclean gift
might be laid upon the Lord’s altar, profit made from
sinful occupations was not accepted as an oblation, neither
were the oblations of impenitent sinners.^ The author of
the Epistle to the Hebrews speaks of almsgiving as a
sacrifice of thanksgiving which continues after the Jewish
altar has been done away with.'* Like sacrifice, alms-
giving is connected with prayer, as a means of making
the prayer efficacious and furnishing it with wings ; the
angel said to Cornelius, “ Thy prayers and thine alms are
come up for a memorial before God.”® When the
Christians were reproached for having no sacrifices, Justin
wrote, “We have been taught that the only honour that
is worthy of Him is not to consume by fire what He has
brought into being for our sustenance, but to use it for
ourselves and those who need.” '* So, also, Irenasus ob-
serves that sacrifices are not abolished in the New
Testament, though their form is indeed altered, because
they are no longer offered by slaves, but by freemen, of
which just the oblations are the proof.’’ And God has
enjoined on Christians this sacrifice of oblations, not
because He needs them, but “ in order that themselves
^ Uhlborn, op, cit. i. 135 sqq, liar- milia FI/., de Poeniteniia, 6 (Migne,
nack, History of Do^ma, i. 205. Patrologiacursiis^^Qt. Gr. xlix. sq. 332)!
Hebrews, xiii. 14 sqq. Cf. Addi.s, ^ Justin, Apologia I. pro Chrisiianis
\xi Encyclopa'dia Bihlica,\. 119. 13. ’
^ Acts, X. 4. Cyprian, De ope re et ^ Ircna*us, Adverstts Juercscs, iv.
e/eemosyais, 4. St. Chrysostom, Ho- 18. 82. ♦
might be neither unfruitful nor ungrateful.” ^ St.
Augustine says, The sacrifice of the Christians is the
alms bestowed upon the poof.” ^
The objection will perhaps be raised that I have here
tried to trace back the most beautiful of all religious
virtues to a magical and ritualistic origin without taking
into due account the benevolent feelings attributed to the
Deity. But in the present connection I have not had to
show why charity, like other human duties, has been
sanctioned by religious beliefs, but why, in the ethics of
the higher religions, it has attained the same supreme im-
portance as is otherwise attached only to devotional exer-
cises. And this is certainly a problem by itself, for which
the belief in a benevolent god affords no adequate explana-
tion. That the religious duty of charity is not merely an
outcome of the altruistic sentiment is well illustrated by
the fact that Zoroastrianism, whilst exalting almsgiving
to the rank of a cardinal virtue, at the same time excludes
the sick man from the community of the faithful until he
has been cured and cleansed according to prescribed rites.^
^ Ibid. iv. 17. 5. ^ Darmeslctor, ‘Introduction’ to the
" St. Augustine, Scniio XLII, i Zend-yVvesta, in Sacred Books of ike
(Migne, op. cit. xxxviii. 252). East^ iv. p. Ixxx.
Chapter XXIV
HOSPITALITY
We have seen that in early society regard for the life
and physical well-being of a fellow-creature is, generally
speaking, restricted to members of the social unit, whereas
foreigners are subject to a very different treatment. But
to this rule there are remarkable exceptions. Side by side
with gross indifference or positive hatred to strangers we
find, among the lower races, instances of great kindness
displayed even towards persons of a foreign race. The
Veddahs are ready to help any stranger in distress who
asks for their assistance, and Sinhalese fugitives who have
sought refuge in their wilds have always been kindly re-
ceived.^ Mr. Moffat was deeply affected by the sympathy
which some poor Bushmans showed to him during an
illness, although he was an utter stranger to them. Speak-
ing of the mutual affection which the Andaman Islanders
display in their social relations, Mr. Man adds that, in
their dealings with strangers, the same characteristic is
observable when once a good understanding has been
established.” ^ We have also to remember the friendly
manner in which the aborigines in various parts of the
savage world behaved to the earliest European visitors.
Nothing could be more courteous than the reception
which Cook and his party met with in New Caledonia,
where the natives guided and accompanied them on their
^ Sarasin, Ergehni sse nainrivissen- “ Man, ‘ Aboriginal Inhabitants of
schafi/ichcr Forschnngen auf Ceylo 7 i, the Andaman Islands, bin Jour. Anihr,
iii. 544. hist, xii 93.
CH. XXIV
HOSPITALITY
excursions. Forster says of the Society Islanders, ‘‘ We
should indeed be ungrateful if we did not acknowledge
the kindness with which they always treated us7’ ^ De
Clerque observes with reference to the Papuans on the
north coast of New Guinea : — The inhabitants seemed
always ready to help. . . . On our visit to the village
all the male and female inhabitants with their children
flocked around me, and offered me cocoanuts and sugar-
cane ; which, for the first contact with Europeans, is cer-
tainly remarkable.’' ^ On the arrival of white people in
various parts of Australia, the natives were not only in-
offensive, but disposed to meet them on terms of amity
and kindness.^ In a short intercourse,” says Eyre, “ they
are easily made friends. . . . On many occasions where I
have met these wanderers In the wild, far removed from
the abodes of civilisation, and when I have been accom-
panied only by a single native boy, I have been received
by them in the kindest and most friendly manner, had
presents made to me of fish, kangaroo, or fruit, had them
accompany me for miles to point out where water was to
be procured, and been assisted by them In getting at it.” ^
Nor must we forget the kind reception which Australian
Blacks have given to men cast upon their mercy, and
the tenderness with which the natives of Cooper’s Creek
wept for the death of Burke and Wills, and comforted
King, the survivor.^' Unfortunately, native races have
often received anything but favourable impressions from
their earliest interviews with liuropeans ; and both in
Australia and elsewhere prolonged Intercourse with white
people has, in many instances, induced them to change
^ Forster, Voyage round ihe fVor/dj Kyre, o/>. cil. ii. 2Ii.
ii. 157. Mathew, ‘ Australian Aborigines,’
De Clcrquc, in Glimpses of the in Jour. rroceed, Roy, Sac. N, S.
Eastern Archipelago^ p. 14, ll’ales, xxiii. 388. Mrough Smyth,
Breton, Excursions in New South Ahorietincs of Victoria, ii. 229. Ridley,
IVales, p. 218. Ciirr, 'Ehe Australian Aborigines of . iustralia, p. 22.
Race, i. 64. Salvado, Mlmoires his- Seelenleben der
foriques sur r Australie^ p. 340. Jvidley, Australicr,’ in Mitthcilungcndes Vereins
Aborigi/ies of Australia, p. 24. Eyre, fur Elrdknndc zu Leipzig, 1877, p.
fournals of Expeditions of Discaiwry i j sq.
into Central Australia, ii. 212, 382.
HOSPITALITY
their friendly behaviour into unkindness or hostility. The
Canadian traders, for instance, when they first appeared
among the Beaver and Rocky Mountain Indians, were
treated by these people with the utmost hospitality and
attention ; but by their subsequent conduct they taught
the natives to withdraw their respect, and sometimes to
treat them with indignity.^ Harmon writes, “ I have
always experienced the greatest hospitality and kindness
among those Indians who have had the least intercourse
with white people.” “ Many facts seem to verify the state-
ment made by a missionary who speaks from forty years’
experience among the natives of New Guinea and Poly-
nesia, that our conduct towards savages determines their
conduct towards us.''*
The friendly reception which white men have met with
in savage countries is closely connected with a custom
which, as it seems, prevails universally among the lower
races while in their native state,'* as also among the
^ Mackenzie, Voyage to the Frozen
and Pacific Ocean p. 149.
Harmon, Journal of l oyages and
y'raTJcis in the Interior of N'orfh America^
P..3I5-
Murray^ Forty Yeai-f Missioit Work
in Polynesia and New Guinea^ ]). 499.
For other instances of kindness tlis-
played by savages towards white men,
see von Kotzebue, Voyage of Discovery
into the South Sea, iii. 174 (people of
Radack) ; Yate, ylcconnt of New 'Zea-
land^ p. 102 Si].\ Dieffenbach, Travels
in New Zealand^ ii. 112 ; Keate,
Account of the Pelcau Islands, p. 329
sy.; Earl, Papuans, p. 79 (natives of
Port Dory, New Guinea) ; Saryt.schew,
‘ Voyage of Discovery to the Nortli-
East of Siberia,’ in Collection of Modern
ami Contemporary Voyages and Travels,
vi. 78 (Aleuts) ; Kingand kdtzroy, Voyages
of the Adventure'^ and Beagle f ii.
168, 174 (Patagonians) ; Wilson and
Eel kin, Uganda, i. 225.
A/ara, Voyages dans f Amlrique
miridionale, ii. 91 (Guanas). Southey,
History of Brazil, i. 247 (Tapis).
Davis, El Gringo, p. 421 (Pueblos).
Lafit-spt, Ala urs des saua.'ages amcri-
quai}il^\, 106 ; ii. 88. Heriot, Travels
through the Canadas, p. 318 sq. Ru-
chanan, North Amei'ican Indians, p. 6.
Perrot, Memoire sur les nuru)‘s, coiis-
t nines et iclligion des sauvages de
I A inerii/ue septentrionale, pp. 69, 202.
Ncighl'jors, in Schoolcraft, Indian
Tribes of the United States, ii. 132
(Comanches), James, Expedition from
Pittsburgh to the Rocky Mountains , i.
321 sq, (Omahas). Morgan, League of
the Iroquois, p. 327 sqq, ; Loskicl,
Ilistoiy of the Mission of the United
lirethren among the Indians in North
Aineriea, i. 15 ; Golden, in Schoolcraft,
op. eit. iii. 190 (Iroquois). Powers,
Tribes of California, p. 183. Sproat,
Scenes and Studies of Saziage Life, p.
56 sqq. (Ahts). Boas, ‘ Report on the
Indians of British Columbia,’ in the
Report read at the Meeting of the British
Association, 1S89, p. 36. Keating,
Expedition to the Source of St. Peter s
River, i. 10 1 ( Potawatomis) ; ii. 167
(Chippewas). Richardson, Arctic
Searching Expedition, ii. 18 (Crees and
Chippewas). Idem, in Franklin,
ney to the Shores of the Polar Sea, p.
66 ; Mackenzie, Voyages to the Fi'ozen
and Pacific Oceans, p, xevi. (Crees).
DaJl, Alaska, p. 397 ; Sarytschew, loc.
peoples of culture at the earlier stages of their civilisa-
cit. vi. 78 ; Sauer, Billing^ s Expedition
to the Northern Parts of Russia^ p. 274
(Aleuts). Lyon, Private Jom'nal^ p.
349 > Larry, Second Voyage for the
I)iscove 7 y of a North- IVest /\issage, p.
526 (Eskimo of Igloolik). Egcdc, De-
scription of Greenland^ p. 126 ; Cranz,
History of Grce 7 iia 7 td^ i. l*j 2 sq. ; Kane,
Af'ctic Explorations^ ii. 122 ; Holm,
‘ Ethnologisk Skizze af Angmagsali-
kerne,’ in Meddelelser 0771 G7V7i/a7id, x.
87, 175 (Greenlanders). Beechey,
Voyage to the Pacific a)id Behriiifs
Sti'aitf ii. 571 ; Richardson, Airtic
Sea 7 'chi 7 ig Expeditio 7 i, i. 367 ; Seernann,
Voyage of ^Hleraldf ii. 65 (Western
Eskimo). Hooper, I'cii Mo 7 iths among
the Tents of the Ttiskiy pj). 1 60, 193,
194, 208 ; Nordenskioid, Vegas fiuA
kring Asien och Europa^ ii. 145
(Chukchi). Dali, op. cif, pp. 381
(Tuski), 517 (Kamchadales), 526 (Ai-
nos). Sarytschew, loc, cit. v. 67 (Kam-
chadalcs), Dobell, Travels ioi Kamt-
schatkaa 7 id Siberia, i, 63, 82 sq. ( Kamcha-
dales) ; ii. 42 (jakuts). Sauer, op. cit.
p. 124 (Jakuts). Vambery, Das Tiir-
lumvolk, pp. 159 (Jakuts), 336 (natives
of Eastern Turkestan), 41 1 (Turko-
mans), 451 (Tshuvashes), 509 (baskirs),
&c. Ivrasheninnikoff', History of Kam-
schatka, p. 236 (Kurile islanders).
Georgi, Russia, i. 113 (Mordvins) ; iii.
m (Tunguses), 167 (Koriaks) ; iv. 22
( Kalmucks). Hergmann, Nof 7 iadische
Streifereie 7 i unler dc 7 i Kalmilkeii, ii.
281 sqq. Erejevalsky, Mo/igolia, i.
71 sq. Castren, Nordiska ivsor och
forshiingar, i. 41 (Laplanders), 319
(Ostyaks). .Scott Robertson, Kafirs of
the Hindu- Kush, p. 187 sq. Eraser,
Tour through the Hiiiidld AIoujitaBis,
pp. 264 (people of Kuna war), 335
(Hutias). Dalton, Descriptive Ethno-
logy of Beaigal, pp. 46 (Kukis), 68
(Garos). Hunter, A finals of Rural
Bengal, i. 215 (Santals). Tickell,
‘Memoir on the Htalcsum,’ in Jour.
Asiatic Soc. Bengal, ix. (pt. ii.) 807 sq.
(Hos). Lewin, Wild Races of South-
Eastern India, p. 217 (Tipperahs).
Colquhoun, Amongst the .Shans, pp. 160
sq. (Steins), 371 (Shans). E'oreman,
Philippi/te Islands, p. 187. de Cres-
pigny, ‘ Milano ws of Borneo,’ in Jour.
Ant hr. I fist. v. 34. Low, Sarawak,
pp. 243 (Hill Dyaks), 336 (Kayans).
Boyle, Advemtures among the Dyaks of
Borneo, p. 215. Ling Roth, Natives
of Sarazvak, i. 82 (Sea Dyaks). Mars-
den, History of Sumati'a, p. 208
(natives of the interior of Sumatra).
Raffles, History of Java, i. 249 ; Craw-
fiird, History of the Indian Archipelago,
i. 53 (Javanese). Riedel, .r ///'//(’- 6V/
kroesharige rassen tusschen Selebes en
Papua, p. 41 (natives of Ambon and
Uliase). vtm Kotzebue, op. cit. iii. 165
(natives of Radack), 215 (Pelew Is-
landers). Hale, U.S. Explorifig Ex-
peditioii. VoL VI. Ethnography aaid
Eliiloloqy, p. 95 (Kingsmill Islanders).
Macdonahl, Oceania, p. 195 (Efatese).
Erskine, Cruise amo 7 ig the Islands of
the. IVestern Pacife, ]3. 273 sq. ;
Williams and Calvert, lu/i and the
Eijians, p. no; Anderson, 1 ravel in
P'ijl a 7 id New Caledonia, p. 134 sq.
(Eijians). Edlis, Polynesian Pesea/rhes,
i. 95. Idem, Tour 'tluough Hawaii, p.
346 sq. h'orster, op. cit. ii. 158
(Taiulians), 364 (natives of Tana), 394
(South Sea Islanders generally). C<-)ok,
IPyage round the 11 ' oriel, p. 4.0
(Tahitians). I'regear, ‘ Niue,’ in Jour.
Polynesian Soc. ii. 13 (Savage Is-
landers). Turner, Samoa, ]). 114;
Bri tchard , Polynesian Rem ini sconces,
p. 132; Brencldey, duriiig the
Cruise of H.A/.S. Cura^oa among the
South Sea Islaiids, j). 76 (Samoans).
Mariner, Natives of the Tonga Islands,
ii. 154. Yatc, op. cit. p. 100; Diel-
fenbach, op. cit. ii. 107 sq. ; Polack,
Alanners and Customs of the Ncav
Zealanders, ii. 155 sq. ; Angas, Savage
Idfe a 7 id Scenes in A us 1 7 alia and jVe 7 .u
Zealand, ii. 22 (Maoris). Cason, ‘ Man-
ners and Customs of the Dieyerie Tribe,’
in Woods, Elative Tribes of South
Australia, p. 258 ; Brough Smyth, op.
cit. \. 25 ; Salvado, op. cit. p. 340
(Australian aborigines). Ellis, History
of iMadagascar, i. 198 ; Sil)ree, 'The
Great African Island, pp. 126, 1 29 ;
Rochon, Voyage to A/adagascar, p. 62 ;
Little, AJadagascar, p. 61 ; .Sliaw,
‘ Betsileo,’ in xlntananarivo Annual
and Aladagascar Aiagcvmaie, ii. 82.
Jiurchell, I'raveis in the Interior of
Soutluvn Africa, ii. 54 (Bushmansj/549
(Hottentot.s). Kolben, Ipescnt Slate of
HOSPITALITY
tion ^ — hospitality towards strangers. This custom pre-
sents several remarkable characteristics, which, to all
appearance, ill agree with their tribal or national exclusive-
ness generally. The stranger is often welcomed with
special marks of honour. The best seat is assigned to
him ; the best food at the host’s disposal is set before
the Cape of Good Hope^ i. r66, 337 ; Le
Vaillant, 'fravels from the Cape of Good
Hope, ii. 143 sq. ; vSrhinz, /heatseh-
Sadwest Afriha, p. 81 (1 loUentDl.s).
LichtenstL’in, Traiads i)i Southern
Africa, i. 272 ; Leslie, A?non^the Zulus
and Amatoigas, p. 203 ( Kafirs). Casalis,
Basuto^, pp. 209, 224. Andersson, Lithe
Ngami, p. 198 (Ovanilx)). Macdonald,
Africana, i. 27, 263 (Kastern Central
Africans). Wilson and Kells in, op. fit.
i. 21 1, 225 (Waganda). Rovvdey, Africa
Unveiled, p. 47 (natives of Maiv^anja,
in the neiglihourhood of Lake Kyassa).
Mew, Ldfc, I Panderings, and Labours
in East Africa, pp, 102 (Wanika), 361
(Taveta). Thomson, 7 'hrot/gh A/asai
Land, p. 64 (Wa-kwafi, of the Taveta).
Tuckey, Expedition to explore the River
'Zaire, p. 374 (Congo natives). Losman,
.Description of the Coast of Guitica, p.
108. ]3iirton, 7 \oo 7 rips to Go)-illa
/.and, i. 106 ( M])ongwe). Idem, Abco~
htifa, i. 303 (Voniha). (.'ail lie, Travels
through Centro/ A/ f ica, i. 165 (Hagos).
Chavanne, Die Sahara, p. 185 ( roii-
areg), ] fanoteau and 1 .etoiirneux, La
JPcihylie, ii. 45 sqq. Mun/.inger, Ost-
afrihatiischc Studicn, p. 534 fllarea).
Lol)o, Ihya^c to Abyssinia, p. 82 sq.
For the deteriorating inlluenee wliich
contact with a “higher culture” exer-
cises on savage hospitality, see Nansen,
Jnrst Crossing of Greenland, ii. 306 .<•</. ;
Fdlis, Tour thjough Hawaii, p. 346;
von Kotzebue, op. cit. iii. 25o(lIawaii-
ans) ; Mcadta Ride through the Dis~
iurbed Districts of H w Zealcutil, p. 164 ;
Dieffenbach, op. cit. ii. 107, 108, no.
^ According to a law of the Peruvian
Incas, strangers and travellers .sliould
lie treated as guests, and public housc.s
were provided for them (Garcilasso tie
la ^Tga, First Part of (he Royal Com-
mentaries of the Vneas, ii, 34). For
Yucatan, see Landa, Jlelacion de las
cosas de Yncalan, p. 134. Though
hospitality, according to Mr. Wells
Williams {A fiddle Khtgdom, i. 835), is
not a trait of the character of the
modern Chinese, kindness to strangers
and travellers is enjoined in their moral
and religious books {(Jhalmers,
‘ Chinese Natural Theology,’ in China
Revieav, v. 281. Douglas, Confucian-
ism atid 7 'aouism, p. 273. Indo-
Chinese Gleaner, iii. 160). In Corea it
would be a grave and .shameful thing to
reyfuse a portion of one’s meal with any
person. knt)wn or unknown, who pre-
sents himself at eating-time (Clriffis,
Corea, p. 288). ]''or the Hebrews, see
Gcjiesis, xviii. 2 sqq., xxiv. 31 sqq. ;
Lecd liens, xix. 9 sq., xxv. 35 ; Deute-
ronomy, xiv. 29, xvi. II, 14 ; Judges,
xix. 17 sqq. ; Job, xxxiv. 32 ; also
13ertholet, Die Stellung der Israeliten
und der Jude n zu. den IDemden, jk 22
sqq., and Nowack, Lehrbueh der
hebraisehen Archaologie,\). 186 jy. For
M uhainmedans, see Lane, Alanners and
Customs of the Alodcrn Egyptians, p.
296 sq. ; Purckhardt, Notes on the
Bedouins and JTahAbys, pp. 100-102,
192 sqq. ; Wood, four/iey to the Source
of the River Ox us, p. 148 ; Hamilton,
/Researches in Asia Alinor, ii. 379.
For ancient India, see Leist, Alt-
arisches fits Gentium, pp. 39, 40,
223 sqq. For (.Lecce, see Schmidt,
Ethik der aiten Griechen, ii. 325 sqq.
For Rome, see Leist, Alt-arisches Jus
Civile, i. 355 sqq. ; von ^ Jhering,
Geist des romischen Rechts, i. 227 sq.
For ancient Teutons, see Grimm,
Deutsche JRechfsaltcrthumer, p. 399 sq.
Gummere, Germanic Of'igins, p. 162
sqq. ; Keyser, Eftcrladte Skrifter, ii. pt.
ik 93 > Weinhold, Altnordisches Leben,
p. 441 sqq. ; Gudmimdsson and
K«^limd, ‘Sitte,’ in Paul’s Grundriss
der gernianisc hen Philologie, iii. 450 sq.
For Slavonians, see Schrader, Real-
Icxikon der indogermanischen Alter-
ttemskunde, i. 270 ; Krauss, Die
Siidslaven, p. 644 sqq.
HOSPITALITY
him ; he takes precedence over all the members of the
household ; he enjoys extraordinary privileges. M. Hyades
says of the Fuegians, ‘^Quelque encombree que soit une
hutte, et si rcduite que soit la quantite d’alimcnts dont on
dispose, le nouvel arrivant est toujours assure d’av^oir une
place pres du foyer ct une part de la nourriture.” ^ The
Mattoal of California, though they are sometimes heart-
lessly indifferent even to their parents, ‘‘will divide the
last shred of dried salmon with any casual comer who has
not a shadow of claim upon them, except the claim of
that exaggerated and supererogatory hospitality that
savages use.” ^ A Creek Indian would not only receive
into his house a traveller or sojourner of whatever nation
or colour, but would treat him as a brother or as his own
child, divide with him the last grain of corn or piece of
flesh, and offer him the most valuable things in his posses-
sion.^^ Among the Arawaks, “ when a stranger, and
particularly an Ituropcan, enters the house of an Indian,
every thing is at his command.” Notwithstanding the
Karen’s suspicious nature, says Mr. Smeatori, his hospi-
tality is unbounded. “Fie will entertain every stranger
that comes, without asking a question. Fie feels himself
disgraced if he docs not receive all comers, and give them
the very best cheer he has. The wildest Karen will
receive a guest with a grace and dignity and entertain
him with a lavish hospitality that would become a duke.
Hundreds of their old legends inculcate the duty of re-
ceiving strangers without regard to pecuniary circum-
stances either of host or guest.” Among many un-
civilised peoples it is customary for a man to offer even
his wife, or one of his wives, to the stranger for the time
he remains his guest. The Bedouins of Nejd have a
^ Hyades and Deniker, AHssioji ii. 230. Idcffi, IntUirn A'aficcs, p. 14.
scieiiiifiqtie du Cap vii. 243. Cf. von Marlius, Beit) a^c zur lithno-
Powers, op. cit. p. 112, graphie Antcrikd i. 692.
^ Bartrani, ^ Creek and Cherokee ® Loyal Karens of Bnr 7 }iay
Indians,’ in Trans. American Ethn. p. 144 sq.
Soc. iii. pt. i. 42. Westerniarck, J/is/ory of Pluman
^ Hilhouse, in Jonr. Roy. Geo. Soc. A/a^'riage, p. 73 sqq.
576 ' f CHAP.
A'-. . ^
saying thit “th6 guest wJIrfle in the house is its lord”^ *
.and in the Institutes of ’iTishnu we rfead that, as the
Brahmanas are lords over all other castes, and 'as a
husband is lord over his wives, so the guest is the lord of
his host.**
Custom may require that hospitality should be shown
even to an enemy. Captain Holm tells us of a Green-
lander of bad character who, though he had murdered his
step-father, was received, and for a long time entertained,
when he paid a visit to the nearest kindred of the murdered
man ; and this, as it seems, was agreeable to old custom.®
Among the Aeneze Bedouins, says Burckhardt, all means
are reckoned lawful to avenge the blood of a slain
relative, “provided the homicide be not killed while he
is a guest in the tent of a third person, or if he has taken
refuge even in the tent of his deadly foe.” ^ In Afghan-
istan “ a man’s bitterest enemy is safe while he is under
his roof.” ^ We read in the Hitopadesa : — “ On even an
enemy arrived at the house becoming hospitality should
be bestowed ; the tree does not withdraw its sheltering
shadow from the wood-cutter. . . . The guest is every-
one’s superior.”® The old Norsemen considered it a duty
to treat a guest hospitably even though it came out that
he had killed the brother of his host.’’ A mediaeval
^ Palgrave, Jotirney through Central
and Eastern Arabia^ i. 345,
^'Institutes of Vishnu^ Ixvii. 31.
For other instances of the precedence
granted to guests, see Man, in Jour,
Ant hr. Inst. xii. 94, i4cS (Andaman
[slanders) ; Buchanan, North American
Judians^ p, 324 (Indians of rennsyl-
vania) ; Lyon, Private Journal, p. 350
(Kskiino of Igloolik) ; Seemann, Poyage
of Herald f ii. 65 (Western Eskimo);
Krasheninnikoff, op. cit. p, 21 1 (Kam-
-chadales) ; Georgi, op. cit. iii. 153 sq.
(Kamtihadales), 183 sq. (Chukchi).
Ling Roth, Natives of Sarawak, i. 86
(Sea Dyaks) ; Mariner, op. cit. ii. 154
(Toiiga Islanders) ; New, op. cit. p. 102.
(Wanika) ; llanoteau and Letouriieux,
op, cit. ii. 45 (Kabyles) ; Wells Williams,
op, cit. i. 540 (Chinese) ; Krauss, oi>.
cit, p. 649 sq. (Southern Slavs). /
^ Nansen, First Crossing of Green-
land, ii. 305 sq.
^ B\\\'c\dv3ixd{.,Bcdotiinsa7id IVahiibys,
p. 87. Cf. Daunias, La vie A Labe , p.
317 (Algerian Arabs).
^ Elphinstone, Kingdom of Caubtit,
i. 296.
6 Ilitopculesa, Mitralabha, 60, 62.
^ Grimm, Deutsche Fcchtsalterthff
mer, p. 400. Weinhold, Altiiordisches
Leben, p. 441. For other instances of
hospitality towards enemies, see James,
Expedition to the Rocky Mount ains, \,
322 ( Omahas) ; Bartram, , fn . Trctnsl
American Ethn. Soc. iii. pt. i. 42(CreeKS
andCherokees); Lomonaco, ‘ Sidle razze
indigene del 16x2iS\\Qj\n ' Archivio per
r antropologia e la ctnologia,^-p\'iL, 57
(Tupis); Krauss, op. cit, pp, 656
( Mohtenet?rinesk
ki^ht granted safe conduct tiirough his terrftories tb
all who required it, including those who asserted pre-
tensions which, if established, would deprive him of his
possessions.^
To protect a guest is looked upon as a most stringent
duty under all circumstances. Le Kabyle qui accorde
son dndia doit, sous peine d’infamie, y faire honneur, dbt-il
s’exposer a tons les dangers. . . . La violation de leur
dndia est la plus grave injure que I’on puisse infliger a des
Kabyles. Un homme qui viole, ou, suivant Texpression
consacree, qui brise V dndia de son village ou de sa tribu,
est puni de mort et de la confiscation de tons ses biens ;
sa maison est d^molie.” ^ Among the Bedouins a breach
of the law of dakheel would be considered a disgrace
not only upon the individual but upon his family, and
even upon his tribe, which never could be wiped out.
No greater insult can be offered to a man, or to his clan,
than to say that he has broken the dakheel'^ ^ Among
the Aenezes, according to Burckhardt, a violation of
hospitality, by the betraying of a guest, has not occurred
within the memory of man.’’ In Egypt, most Bedawees
will suffer almost any injury to themselves or their families
rather than allow their guests to be ill-treated while under
their protection.”^ Among the Kandhs, ‘‘for the safety
of a guest life and honour are pledged ; he is to be con-
sidered before a child ” ; in order to save his guest a man
is even allowed to speak falsely, which is otherwise con-
demned by them as a heinous sin.^ Vambt^ry tells us of
cases in which the Kara-Kirghiz have preferred being
harassed with war by the Chinese to surrendering to them
such Chinese fugitives as have sought and received their
hospitality.'^ Among the Ossetes the host not only
considers himself responsible for the safety of his guest,'
^ Mills, History of Chivalry, p. 154. bys, p. 100. Cf. ibid. p. 192.
^ Hanoteau and Letourneux, op. ciL p Lane, Alodern Egyptians , p. 297,
ii. 61 sq. ^ Macpherson, Memorials of Service
^ Layardj f>iscoveries i?i the Rums itt India, pp. 65, 94.
of Nineveh and Babylon, p. 317. , > ^ Vambery, Das Turkenvolk, p. 268.
^ Burckhardt, Bedouins and Wakd^ Cf. ibid, p. 41 1 (Turkomans).
vol 7 I p p
HOSPITALITY
but revenges the murder or wounding of the latter as
he would that of a kinsman.” ^ In Albania it is considered
infamous to leave an injury inflicted on a guest unavenged.*^
Among the Takue, though a man would accept compensa-
tion for the murder of a relative, he would in all cases
exact blood-revenge for the murder of his guest. ^ On
the other hand, in Sierra Leone a guest is scarcely
accountable for any faults which he may commit, whether
through inadvertency or design, the host being considered
as responsible for the actions of ‘ his stranger.’ ”
Hospitality is not only regarded as a duty of the first
order, but has, in a remarkable degree, been associated
with religion. Among the doctrines held up for accept-
ance by the religious instructors of the Iroquois there was
the following precept : — If a stranger wander about
your abode, welcome him to your home, be hospitable
towards' him, speak to him with kind words, and forget
not always to mention the Great Spirit.” '' The natives
of Aneiteum, of the New Hebrides, maintained that
generous hospitality would receive the highest reward in
the Land of the Dead.^' The Kalmucks believe that want
of hospitality will be punished by angry gods.^ The
Kandhs say that the first duty which the gods ^have
imposed upon man is that of hospitality ; and “ persons
guilty of the neglect of established observances are
punished by the divine wrath, either during their current
lives, or when they afterwards return to animate other
bodies,” the penalties being death, poverty, disease, the
loss of children, or any other form of calamity. In the
sacred books of India hospitality is repeatedly spoken of
as a most important duty, the discharge of which will be
^ von Haxthausen, Transcaucasia, the Neighbourhood of Sierra Leone, i.
p. 412. 214.
Gopcevic, Oberalbanien 7 md seine ® Morgan, League of the Lroquo^,
p. 328. p. 172.
^ Mimzinger, Ostafrikanische Stu~ ^ In^Ws, L71 the Neiv Hebrides, \>,
diejt, p. 208. Among the Barea and Bergmann, op. cit. ii. 281 sq.
Kunama a man avenges the death of 8 Maepherson, ‘ Religious Opinions
his guest by killing the guest of the and Observances of the Khonds,’ in
murderer [ibid. p. 477). Jour. Toy. Asiatic Soc. vii. 196.
^ Winterbottom, Native Africans in
xxrv
HOSPITALITY
amply rewarded. “The inhospitable man,” the Vedic
singer tells us, “acquires food in vain. I speak the
truth — it verily is his death. . . . He who eats alone
is nothing but a sinner.” ^ “ He who does not feed
these five, the gods, his guests, those whom he is bound
to maintain, the manes, and himself, lives not, though he
breathes.” ^ According to the Vishnu Purana, a person
who neglects a poor and friendless stranger in want
of hospitality, goes to hell.^ On the other hand, by
honouring guests a householder obtains the highest
reward.^ “ He who entertains guests for one night
obtains earthly happiness, a second night gains the middle
air, a third heavenly bliss, a fourth the world of un-
surpassable bliss ; many nights procure endless worlds.
That has been declared in the Veda.” It is said
in the Mahabharata that “ he who gives food freely
to a fatigued wayfarer, whom he has never seen
before, obtains great virtuous merit.” According to
Hesiod, Zeus himself is wrath with him who does evil
to a suppliant or a guest, and at last, in requital for his
deed, lays on him a bitter penalty." Plato says ; — “ In
his relations to strangers, a man should consider that
a contract is a most holy thing, and that all concerns
and wrongs of strangers are more directly dependent
on the protection of God, than wrongs done to citizens.
. . . He who is most able is the genius and the god of
the stranger, who follows in the train of Zeus, the god of
strangers. And for this reason, he who has a spark of
caution in him, will do his best to pass through life
without sinning against the stranger. And of offences
committed, whether against strangers or fellow-country-
men, that against suppliants is the greatest.” ** Similar
opinions prevailed in ancient Rome. Jus hospitii, whilst
^ I^ig-Veda, x. 117. 6. ^ Mahabharata, Vana Parva, ii. 61,
2 Laws of Manu, iii. 72. Cf. In- pt. v. p. 5.
stitutes of Vishnu, \xviu 4^. ^ Hesiod, Opera et dies, 331 s^.
^ Vishnu Purdha, p. 305. (333 sq.),
* Institutes of Vishnu, Ixvii. 28, 32. Plato, I.eges, v. 729 sq.
® Apastamba, ii. 3. 7. 16.
P P 2
forming no part of the civil law, belonged to fas \ the
stranger, who enjoyed no legal protection, was, as a guest,
protected by custom and religion.^ The dit hospitales and
Jupiter were on guard over him;^ hence the duties
towards a guest were even more stringent than those
towards a relative.® Cassar* and Tacitus ® attest that the
Teutons considered it impious to injure a guest or to
exclude any human being from the shelter of their roof.
The God of Israel was a preserver of strangers.® In the
Talmud hospitality is described as “the most important
part of divine worship ,” '' as being equivalent to the duty
of honouring father and mother,® as even more meritorious
than frequenting the synagogue.® Mohammedanism like-
wise regards hospitality as a religious duty.*® “ Whoever,”
said the Prophet, “ believes in God and the day of resur-
rection, must respect his guest.” ** But the idea that a
guest enjoys divine protection prevailed among the Arabs
long before the tirnes of Muhammed.*® The Bedouins
say that the guests are “guests of God.”*® The Christian
Church, again, regarded hospitality as a duty imposed by
Christ.*^
That a stranger, who under other circumstances is
treated as an inferior being or a foe, liable to be robbed
and killed with impunity, should enjoy such extraordinary
privileges as a guest, is certainly one of the most curious
contrasts which present themselves to a student of the
moral ideas of mankind. It may be asked, why should
^ Servius, In Virgilii Alneidos^ iii. ® Psalms, cxlvi. 9.
55: ‘‘Fas omne ; et cognationis, et ^ T>Q\itiich, Literary Pemains, p. 57.
iuris hospitii.” von Jhering, Geisl des ^ Kiddushin, fol. 39 B, quoted by
rdntischen Reckts, i. 227. Leist, Alt- Ilershon, 'Preasures of the Talmud,
arise hes fits Civile, i. 103, 358 sq. p. 145*
- Servius, In Virgilii Aineidos, i. ^ Sabbath, fol. 127 A, quoted by
736. Livy, Historhe Romano:, xxxix. Katz, Per wahre Talmudjude, p. 103.
51. Tacitus, XV. 52. Plautus, Koran, sqq.
Peenuli, V. I. 25. "Lane, Arabian Society in the Afiddle
^ Gellius, Noctes Attica, v. 13. 5 : Ages, p. 142.
“ In officiis apud maiores ita observa- Wellhausen, Reste a 7 'abischen Hei-
tum est, primurn tutelae, deinde hospiti, dentnms, p. 223 sq.
deinde clienti, turn cognato, postea Doughty, Arabia Deserta, i. 228,
affini.” 504.
^ Caesar, De hello Gallico, vi. 23. Laurent, Etudes sur Vhistoire de
^ Tacitus, Ger 77 iania, 21. t HumanitS, vii. 346.
HOSPITALITY
he be received at all ? Of course, he stands in need of
protection and support, but why should those who do not
know him care for that ?
One answer is that his helpless condition may excite
pity ; facts seem to prove that even among savages the
altruistic feelings, however narrow, can be stirred by the
sight of a suffering and harmless stranger. Another
answer is that the host himself may expect to reap benefit
from his act. And there can be little doubt that the
rules of hospitality are in the main based on egoistic
considerations.
It has been justly observed that in uncivilised countries,
where there is no public accommodation for travellers,
“ hospitality is so necessary, and so much required by the
mutual convenience of all parties, as to detract greatly
from its merit as a moral quality.” ^ When the stranger
belongs to a community with which a reciprocity of inter-
course prevails, it is prudent to give him a hearty reception ;
he who is the host to-day may be the guest to-morrow. “ If
the Red Indians are hospitable,” says Domenech, “ they
also look for their hospitality being returned with the
same marks of respect and consideration.” Moreover,
the stranger is a bearer of news and tidings, and as such
may be a welcome guest where communication between
different places is slow and rare.^ During my wanderings
in the remote forests of Northern Finland I was con-
stantly welcomed with the phrase, “ What news ? ” But
the stranger may be supposed to bring with him some-
thing which is valued even
luck or blessings.
^ Winterbottom, op. cit. i. 214.
Domenech, Seven Years' Resilience
in the Great Deserts of North America.,
ii. 319. Cf Dunbar, ‘Pawnee In-
dians,’ in Magazine of Amerieaft His-
tory., viii. 745 ; Brett, Indian Tribes of
Guiana, p. 347 ; Bernau, Missionary
Labours in British Guiana, p. 51 ; von
den Steinen, Unter den Naturvolkem
Ze^itral-Brasiliens, p. 333 sq. (Bakairi);
Georgi, op. cit. hi. 154 (Kamchadales) ;
Smeaton, op. cit. p. 146 (Karens) ;
more highly, namely, good
Ellis, Polynesian Researches, i. 95
(Society Islanders) ; Pritchard, Poly-
nesian Reminiscences, p. 132, and
Brenchley, op. cit. p. 76 (Samoans) ;
Williams and Calvert, op. cit. p. no,
and Anderson, Notes of Travel in Fiji
and New Caledonia, p. 135 (Fijians) ;
Chavanne, Die Sahara, p. 393. (Arabs
of the Sahara).
3 Cf. Wright, Domestic Manners and
Sentiments in England during the
Middle Ages, p. 329.
HOSPITALITY
During the first days of my stay at Demnat, in the
Great Atlas, the natives in spite of their hostility towards
Europeans, said they were quite pleased with my coming
to see them, because I had brought with me rain and an
increase of the import of victuals, which just before my
arrival had been very scarce. So, too, whilst residing
among the Andjra mountaineers in the North of Morocco,
I was said to be a person with “ propitious ankles,”
because, since I settled down among them, the village
where I stayed was frequently visited by Shereefs — pre-
sumed descendants of the Prophet Muhammed — who are
always highly valued guests on account of the baraka, or
holiness, with which they are supposed in a smaller or
greater degree to be endowed. The stranger may be a
source of good fortune either involuntarily, as a bearer of
luck, or through his good wishes ; and there is every
reason to hope that he will, if treated hospitably, return
the kindness of his host with a blessing. According to
the old traveller d’Arvieux, strangers who come to an
Arab village are received by the Sheikh with some such
words as these; — “You are welcome; praised be God
that you are in good health ; your arrival draws down
the blessing of heaven upon us ; the house and all
that is in it is yours, you are masters of it.” * It is said
in one of the sacred books of India that through a
Brahmana guest the people obtain rain, and food through
rain, hence they know that “ the hospitable reception of a
guest is a ceremony averting evil.” ^ When we read in the
Laws of Manu that “ the hospitable reception of guests
procures wealth, fame, long life, and heavenly bliss,” ® it
is also reasonable to suppose that this supernatural reward
is a result of blessings invoked on the host. In the
‘ Suppliants ’ of Aeschylus the Chorus sings : — “ Let us
utter for the Argives blessings in requital of their bless-
ings. And may Zeus of Strangers watch to their fulfil-
ment the rewards that issue from a stranger’s tongue, that
^ d’Arvieux, Travels in Arabia the Vasishtha^ xi. 13.
Vesart, p. 131 sq, ® Laws of Manu^ iii. 106.
HOSPITALITY
they reach their perfect goal.” ' We can no'^ understand
the eagerness with which guests are sought for. When a
guest enters the hut of a Kalmuck, “ the host, the hostess,
and everybody in the hut, rejoice at the arrival of the
stranger as at an unexpected fortune.” ^ Among the
Arabs of Sinai, “ if a stranger be seen from afar coming
towards the camp, he is the guest for that night of the
first person who descries him, and who, whether a grown
man or a child, exclaims, ‘ There comes my guest.’
Such a person has a right to entertain the guest that night.
Serious quarrels happen on these occasions ; and the
Arabs often have recourse to their great oath — ‘ By the
divorce (from my wife) I swear that I shall entertain the
guest ; ’ upon which all opposition ceases.” * It is also
very usual in the East to eat before the gate of the house
where travellers pass, and every stranger of respectable
appearance is invariably requested to sit down and partake
of the repast.** Among the Maoris, “ no sooner does a
stranger appear in sight, than he is welcomed with the
usual cry of ‘ Come hither ! come hither ! ’ from
numerous voices, and is immediately invited to eat of
such provisions as the place affords.”
If efficacy is ascribed to the blessings of even an ordinary
man, the blessings of a stranger are naturally supposed to
be still more powerful. For the unknown stranger, like
everything unknown and everything strange, arouses a
feeling of mysterious awe in superstitious minds. The
Ainos say, “ Do not treat strangers slightingly, for you
never know whom you are entertaining.” ® According to
the Hitopadesa, “ a guest consists of all the deities.” ’’ It
is significant that in the writings of ancient India, Greece,
and Rome, guests are mentioned next after gods as due
objects of regard.® Thus Aeschylus speaks of a man’s
^ Aeschylus, SuppHces^ 632 sqq, ® Yate, op. cit. p. 100. Cj. Turner,
Bergniann, op. cit. ii. 282. Nineteen Vrars in Polynesia, p. 325
, 8 Bedouins and PPahdbys, (Samoans) ; Sproat, op. cit. p. 57 (Ahts).
p. 198. ^ Batchelor, Ainu and their Folk-
4 Idem, Arabic Proverbs, p. 218. Lore, p. 259.
Travels throtigh ^ Hitopadesa, Mitralabha, 65.
Syria and E^ypt, i. 413. ® Anugitd, 3, 31 {Sacred Books of the
“ imf^ous cd^duct to a god, or a stranger, or to his parents
dear.” ^ According to Homeric notions, “J:he gods, in
the likeness of strangers from far countries, put on all
manner of shapes, and wander through the cities,
beholding the violence and the righteousness of men.” ^
The author of the Epistle to the Hebrews writes, “ Be
not forgetful to entertain strangers : for thereby some
h^ve entertained angels unawares.” ®
The visiting stranger, however, is regarded not only as
a potential benefactor, but as a potential source of evil. He
may bring with him disease or ill-luck. He is commonly
believed to be versed in magic ; * and the evil wishes and
curses of a stranger are greatly feared, owing partly to his
quasi-supernatural character, partly to the close contact in
which he comes with the host and his belongings.
In the Mentawey Islands, in the Malay Archipelago, “ if
a stranger enters a house where there are children, the
father or some other member of the family who happens
to be present, takes the ornament with which the children
decorate their hair, and hands it to the stranger, who holds
it in his hands for a while, and then gives it back”; this
is supposed to protect the child from the evil effect which
the eye of a stranger might have on it.'* With reference
to the Californian Porno, Mr. Powers states, “ Let a
perfect stranger enter a wigwam and offer the lodge-father
a string of beads for any object that takes his fancy—
merely pointing to it, but uttering no word — and the
owner holds himself bound in savage honour to make
the exchange, whether it is a fair one or not.” When we
compare this idea of “ savage honour ” with certain cases
mentioned in the last chapter, we cannot doubt that it is
based on superstitious fear ; indeed, the next day the
former owner of the article “ may thrust the stranger
through with his spear, or crush his forehead with
a pebble from his sling, and the bystanders will look
jScts/f viii. 243, 361). Gellius, Nodes ® Heh 7 'ews^ xiii. 2.
Atticcc^ V. 13. 5. ^ Frazer, Golden Bought i. 298 sqq,
^ Ae.schylus, Eumenides^ 270 sq. ® Rosenberg, Der Malayische Areht-
- Odyssey y xvii. 485 sqq. pely p. 198.
upon it as only the rectification of a bad bargain.” ^
Among the African Herero “ no curse is regarded as
heavier than that which one who has been inhospitably
treated would hurl at those who have driven him from
the hearth.” ^ According to Greek ideas, guests and
suppliants had their Erinyes ® — personifications of their
curses ; and it would be difficult to attribute any other
meaning to “ the genius (Sai/icop) and the god of the
stranger, who follow in the train of Zeus,” spoken of by
Plato, and to the Roman Mi hospitales, in their capacity of
avengers of injuries done to guests. Aeschylus represents
Apollo as saying, “ I shall assist him (Orestes), and rescue
my own suppliant ; for terrible both among men and
gods is the wrath of a refugee, when one abandons him
with intent.” ^ It is no doubt the same idea that the
Chorus in the ‘Suppliants’ expresses, in a modified
form, when singing : — “ Grievous is the wrath of Zeus
Petitionary. ... I must needs hold in awe the wrath
of Zeus Petitionary, for that is the supremest on earth.”
Apastamba’s Aphorisms contain a sutra the object of
which is to show the absolute necessity of feeding a guest,
owing to the fact that, “ if offended, he might burn the
house with the flames of his anger ” ; ® for “ a guest comes
to the house resembling a burning fire,” “ a guest rules
over the world of Indra.” * According to the Institutes
of Vishnu, “ one who has arrived as a guest and is obliged
to turn home disappointed in his expectations, takes away
from the man to whose house he has come his religious
merit, and throws his own guilt upon him ”; ■' and the
^ Powers, cit. p. 153. The same
privilege as “the perfect stranger”
possesses among the Porno, was granted
by the tribes of the Niger Delta to the
Ibo girl who was destined to be offered
as a sacrifice. She “ w^as allowed to
claim any piece of cloth or any orna-
ment she set her eyes upon, and the
native to whom it belonged was obliged
to present it to her” (Comte de
Card), ‘Ju-Ju Laws and Customs,’ in
Joui\ Anthr. Inst, xxix. 54),
^ Ratzel, History of Mankind^ ii.
480.
^ Plato, Epistoh?^ viii. 357. Apollo-
nius Rhodiiis, Argonautica,^ iv. 1042 stj,
* Aeschylus, Eumenides, 232 sqij.
® Jdefu^ Suppiices, 349, 489.
® Sacred Books of the East^ ii. 114,
n. 3- .
" Apastamba, ii. 3. 6. 3.
® Laws of A/anu, iv. 182.
® Institutes of Vishnu^ Ixvii. 33.
HOSPITALITY
same idea is found in many other ancient books of
India.’ That a dissatisfied guest, or a Brahmana,^ thus
takes with him the spiritual merit of his churlish host,
allows of a quite literal interpretation. In Morocco, a
Shereef is generally unwilling to let a stranger kiss his
hand, for fear lest the stranger should extract from him
his baraka, or holiness ; and the Shereefs of Wazzan are
reputed to rob other Shereefs, who visit them, of their
holiness, should the latter leave behind any remainder of
their meals, even though it be only a bone.
The efficacy of a wish or a curse depends not only upon
the potency which it possesses from the beginning, owing
to certain qualities in the person from whom it originates,
but also on the vehicle by which it is conducted — just as
the strength of an electric shock depends both on the
original intensity of the current and on the condition of
the conductor. As particularly efficient conductors are
regarded blood, bodily contact, food, and drink. In
Morocco, the duties of a host are closely connected with
the institution of /-‘^r, one of the most sacred customs
of that country. If a person desires to compel another to
help him, or to forgive him, or, generally, to grant some
request, he makes l-'-ar for him. He kills a sheep or a
goat or only a chicken at the threshold of his house, or at
the entrance of his tent ; or he grasps with his hands
either the person whom he invokes, or that person’s child,
or the horse which he is riding ; or he touches him with
his turban or a fold of his dress. In short, he establishes
some kind of contact with the other person, to serve as a
conductor of his wishes and of his conditional curses. It
is universally believed that, if the person so appealed to does
not grant the request, his own welfare is at stake, and that
the danger is particularly great if an animal has been killed
at his door, and he steps over the blood or only catches a
glimpse of it. As appears from the expression, “ This is
l-'-ar for you if you do not do this or that,” the blood, or
^ V^asishtlm^ viii. 6. Laws of Mami, Vasishtha^ viii. 6, Laws of Manii^
ii. 100, Hitopadesa^ Mitralabha, 64. iii. loo.
HOSPITALITY
the direct bodily contact, is supposed to transfer to the
other person a conditional curse : — If you do not help
me, then you will die, or your children will die, or some
other evil will happen to you. So also the owner of a
house or a tent to which a person has fled for refuge must,
in his own interest, assist the fugitive, who is in his ’•ar ;
for, by being in his dwelling, the refugee is in close contact
with him and his belongings. Again, the restraint which
a common meal lays on those who partake of it is con-
spicuous in the usual practice of sealing a compact of
friendship by eating together at the tomb of some saint.
The true meaning of this is made perfectly clear by the
phrase that “ the food will repay ” him who breaks the
compact. The sacredness of the place adds to the efficacy
of the imprecation, but its vehicle, the real punisher, is
the eaten food, because it embodies a conditional curse.
Now the idea underlying these customs is certainly not
restricted to Morocco. As will be shown in subsequent
chapters, blood is very commonly used as a conductor of
conditional curses ; for instance, one object of the practice
of sacrifice is to transfer an imprecation to the god by
means of the blood of the victim. Bodily contact is
another common means of communicating curses ; and
this accounts for many remarkable cases of compulsory
hospitality and protection which have been noticed in
different quarters of the world. In Fiji “ the same native
who within a few yards of his house would murder a
coming or departing guest for sake of a knife or a hatchet,
will defend him at the risk of his own life as soon as he
has passed his threshold.”^ In the Pelew Islands “an
enemy may not be killed in a house, especially not in the
presence of the host.” If an Ossetian receives into his
house a stranger whom he afterwards discovers to be a man
to whom he owes blood-revenge, this makes no difference
in his hospitality; but when the guest takes his leave, the
^ Wilkes, l/.S. Exploring Expedu Stidsee,’ in Journal des Museum Godef-
Hon, iii. 77. froy, iv. 25.
2 Kubary, ‘ Die Palau- Inseln in der
HOSPITALITY
host accompanies him to the boundary of the village, and
on parting from him exclaims, “ Henceforth beware ! ” ^
Among the Kandhs, if a man can make his way by any
means into the house of his enemy he cannot be touched,
even though his life has been forfeited to his involuntary
host by the law of blood-revenge.^ In none of these cases
is an explanation given of the extraordinary privilege
granted to the stranger ; but it seems highly probable that
it has the same origin as the exactlysimilar custom prevalent
among the Moors. In other words, as soon as the stranger
has come in touch with a person by entering his house, he
is thought to be able to transmit to that person and his
family and his property any evil wishes he pleases. So,
also, in the East any stranger may place himself under the
protection of an Arab by merely touching his tent or his
tent-ropes,^ and after this is done “ it would be reckoned
a disgraceful meanness, an indelible shame, to satisfy even
a just vengeance at the expense of hospitality.” ■* “ Amongst
the Shammar,” says Layard, “ if a man can seize the end
of a string or thread, the other end of which is held by his
enemy, he immediately becomes his Dakheel [or protegf\.
If he touch the canvas of a tent, or can even throw
his mace towards it, he is the Dakheel of its owner. If
he can spit upon a man or touch any article belonging to
him with his teeth, he is Dakhal, unless of course, in case
of theft, it be the person who caught him The
Shammar never plunder a caravan within sight of their
encampment, for as long as a stranger can see their tents
they consider him their Dakheel .” '' But one of the
Bedouin tribes described by Lady Anne and Mr. Blunt,
whilst ready to rob the stranger who comes to their tents,
^ von Haxthausen, Transcaucasia^ 412.
p. 412. ® Layard, op, cit, p. 317 sq. Burck-
Macpherson, Memorials of Service hardt says {^Bedouins and Wahdbys^ p.
m India ^ p. 66. 72) that one of the most common oaths
^ Robertson Smith, Kinship and in the domestic life of the Bedouins is
Marriage in Early Arabia j p. 48. “to take hold with one hand of the
Bedouin Tribes of the Euphrates^ wasat, or middle tent-pole, and to
ii- 21 1, swear ‘ by the life of this tent and its
* Chasseboeiif de Volney, op, cit, i, owners.’”
HOSPITALITY
“ count their hospitality as beginning only from the
moment of his eating with them.” ^ All Bedouins regard
the eating of “ salt ” together as a bond of mutual friend-
ship, and there are tribes who — quite in accordance with
the Moorish principle, “ the food will repay you ” —
require to renew this bond every twenty-four hours, or
after two nights and the day between them, since other-
wise, as they say, “ the salt is not in their stomachs,” ^
and can therefore no longer punish the person who breaks
the contract. The “ salt ” which gives a claim to protec-
tion consists in eating even the smallest portion of food
belonging to the protector.® The Sultan Saladin did not
allow the crusader Renaud de Chatillon, when brought
before him as a prisoner, to quench his thirst in his tent,
for, had he drunk water there, the enemy would have been
justified in regarding his life as safe.* We find a similar
custom among the Omaha Indians : “ should an enemy
appear in the lodge and receive a mouthful of food or
wafer, or put the pipe in his mouth, he cannot be injured
by any member of the tribe, as he is bound for the time
being by the ties of hospitality, and they are compelled to
protect him and send him home in safety.” ® In these
and similar cases, where there is no common meal, the
guest may nevertheless transmit to his host a curse by
the exceedingly close contact established between him
and the food or drink or tobacco of the host, accord-
ing to the principle of pars pro toto. This is an idea
very familiar to the primitive mind. It lies, for instance,
at the bottom of the common belief that a person may
bewitch his enemy by getting hold of some of his spittle
or some leavings of his food — a belief which has led
to the custom of guests carrying away with them all they
are unable to eat of the food which is placed before them,
^ Blunt, op. cit. ii. 21 1 . MSmoires de P Institut de France^
^ Burton, Pilgrimage to Al-Madinah Acad^mie des Inscriptions et Belles’^
and Meccahf ii. 1 1 2, Doughty, op. cit. Lettres, xv. pt. ii. 346 jy.
i. 228, Quatrem^re, loc. cit. p. 346.
3 Burckhardt, Bedotdns and tVa- ® Dorsey, ‘Omaha Sociology,’ in
hdbys, p. 187. Quatremere, ‘ Memoire Ann. Rep. Bur. Ethn. iii. 271.
sur les asiies chez les Arabes,’ in
HOSPITALITY
out of dread lest the residue of their meal should be eaten
by somebody else.^ The magic wire may conduct impre-
cations in either direction. In Morocco, if a person gives
to another some food or drink, it is considered dangerous,
not only for the recipient to receive it without saying,
“In the name of God,” but also for the giver to give it
without uttering the same formula, by way of precaution.®
The stranger thus being looked upon as a more or less
dangerous individual, it is natural that those who are
exposed to the danger should do what they can to avert
it. With this end in view certain ceremonies are often
performed immediately on his arrival. Many such recep-
tion ceremonies have been described by Dr. Frazer,® but
I shall add a few others which for us are of particular
interest as fresh illustrations, it seems, of the principle
of transference in connection with hospitality. I am told
by a native that among some of the nomadic Arabs of
Morocco, as soon as a stranger appears in the village,
some water, or, if he be a person of distinction, some milk,
is presented to him. Should he refuse to partake of it, he is
not allowed to go freely about, but has to stay in the village
mosque. On asking for an explanation of this custom, I
was told that it is a precaution against the stranger ; should
he steal or otherwise misbehave himself, the drink would
cause his knees to swell so that he could not escape. In
other words, he has drunk a conditional curse.'* The
^ Shortlandj Traditions and Super-
stitions of the New Zea/anders^ pp. 86,
97. Cf. Ellis, Tojir through Hawaii,
p. 347 ; Harmon, op. cit. p. 361
(Indians on the east side of the Rocky
Mountain.s).
Isaac also blessed his son by eating
of his food {Genesis, xxvii. 4, 19,
24). The subject of hospitality has
been incidentally dealt with by Mr.
Crawley in his interesting book, The
Mystic Rose (p. 239 sijq. ; cf., also, p.
124 sqq.). I must leave the reader to
decide how far the theory I am here
advocating, which mainly rests upon
my researches in Morocco, coincides
with his. All through his book Mr.
Crawley lays much emphasis on the
principle of transference ; but, if 1
understand him rightly, he also regards
commeiLsality as involving a suppo.sed
“exchange of personality” between
the host and the guest, in consequence
of which “ injury done to R by A is
equivalent to injury done by A to him-
self” (p. 237). To this opinion I
cannot subscribe [cf. infra, on the
Origin and Development of the Altru-
istic Sentiment). So far as I can see,
the mutual obligations arising from eat-
ing together are fundamentally based
on the idea that the common meal
serves as a conductor of conditional
imprecations.
^ Frazer, Golden Bough, i. 299 sqq.
^ Cf, the “trial of jealousy” in
HOSPITALITY
Arabs of a tribe in Nejd “ welcome ” a guest by pouring
on his head a cup of melted butter,^ the South African
Herero greet him with a vessel of milk.^ Sir S. W.
Baker describes a reception custom practised by the Arabs
on the Abyssinian frontier, which is exactly similar to one
form of l-ar of the Moors : — “ The usual welcome upon
the arrival of a traveller, who is well received in an
Arab camp, is the sacrifice of a fat sheep, that should be
slaughtered at the door of his hut or tent, so that the
blood flows to the threshold.”'^ Reception sacrifices also
■‘occur among the Shulis,'* in Liberia,"' and in Afghanistan.'^
Among the Indians of North America, again, it is a
common rule that a dish of food should be placed before
the new-comer immediately on his arrival, that he should ^
taste of it even though he has just arisen from a feast,
and that no word should be spoken to him or no question
put to him until he has partaken of the food.^ Among
the Omahas “the master of the house is evidently ill at
ease, until the food is prepared for eating ; he will request
his squaws to expedite it, and will even stir the fire him-
self.” “ Among many peoples it is considered necessary
that the host should give food to his guest before he eats
himself. This is a rule on which much stress is laid
in the literature of ancient India.'' A Brahmana never
takes food “ without having offered it duly to gods and
guests.” “ He who eats before his guest consumes the
food, the prosperity, the issue, the cattle, the merit which
his family acquired by sacrifices and charitable works.
It is probable that this punishment has something to do
Numbers^ V. w sqq.^ particularly verse
22: “This water tliat caiiseth the
curse shall go into thy bowels, to make
thy belly to swell, and thy thigh to
rot.”
^ Burckhardt, Bedouins and Wakdbys^
p. 102.
Ratzel, op. cit. ii. 480.
3 Baker, Nile Tributaries oj Abys-
sinia^ p. 94.
^ Emin Pasha in Central Africa, p.
107.
TcmVihcPiX^Tlireshold Covenant
® Frazer, Golden Bought i. 303.
" Lafitau, op. cit. ii. 88. James,
Expedition to the Rocky Mountains,
i. 321 sq. Morgan, League of the
Iroquois, p. 328. Sproat, op, cit. p.
57 (Ahts).
^ James, op. cit, i. 322.
Gautama, v. 25.
Alahabharata, Shanti Parva,
clxxxix. 2. sq., pt. xxviii. sq. p. 281.
Apastamba, ii. 3. 7. 3.
with' the evil eye of the. neglected guest," for the idea
of eating' the evifrxi^sBes^^f others was evidently quite
faa^ilfer to the aUcient Hindus.. It is sdd in Apastamba^
Aphorisnfe ; — “ A guest who is at enmity with his host
^all ftdt eat his food, nor shall he eat the food of a host
who hates him or accuses him of a crime, or of one ‘•who’
is suspected of a crime. For it is declared in the Veda,
that he who eats the food of such a person eats' his
guilt.” ^ In Tonga Islands, “at meals strangers pf
foreigners are always shewn a preference, and females are
helped before men of the same rank ” — according tq ou|?
informant, “ because they are the weaker sex and, fe(iuire
attention.”* As to the correctness of this explanation,
» however, I have some doubts ; the Moors, also, at their
feasts, allow the women to eat first, and one reason
they give for this custom is that otherwise the hungry
women might injure the men with their evil eyes. In
Hawaii the host and his family do not at all partake of
the entertainment with which a passing visitor is geher-
ally provided on arriving among them ; ® and that their
abstinence is due to superstitious fear is all the more
probable as, among the same people, it is the custom for
the guest invariably to carry away with him all that
remains of the entertainment. '*
Amongthe precautions taken against the visiting stranger''
kind and respectful treatment is of particularly great im-
portance. No traveller among an Arabic-speaking people
can fail to notice the contrast between the lavish welcome
and the plain leave-taking. The profuse greetings mean
that the stranger will be treated as a friend and not as an
enemy ; and it is particularly desirable to secure his good-
will in the beginning, since the first glance of an evil eye
is always held to be the most dangerous. We can
now realise that the extreme regard shown to a guest, and
the preference given to him in every matter, must, in a
^ Ibid. ii. 3. 6. 19 sq. Cf Proverbs^ ^ Mariner, op. cit. ii. 154,
xxiii. 6: “Eat not the bread of him ^ Ellis, Tour through Hawaii^ p.
that hath an evil eye. ” 347, Ibid. p. 347.
' XXIV iffOSPITALITY
large measure^ be (iue tQ fear of hi^. anger^i aa^ as
to hope of l^s bte^sings. Evetl tifie pecijfcliat*^ ctistom
which requires a host to |end his wife to a guest beitfpThes
more inted when we consider the supposed danger of
the stranger’s evil eye or his curses, as also the benefit^,
^nieh may be supposed to result from his love.^ And
wheit the guest leaves, it is wise of the host to accept jio
rewatd ; for there may be misfortune in the stranger’s gift.
Thal^t^ should be free of cost is implied in
the very meaning of the word. Wherever the custom of
v^ntertaining guests has been preserved pure and genuine,
remuneration is neither asked nor expected ; indeed, to
>ofFef payment would give offence, and to accept it would
be disgraceful.^ Such a custom might no doubt result
from absence or scarcity of money, as it cannot be ex-
pected that the wandering stranger shall carry with him
heavy presents to all his future hosts ; and where the inter-
course is mutual, the hospitable man may hope one day to be
paid back in his own coin. But it seems likely that the
custom of not receiving payment from a guest is largely
due to that same dread of strangers which underlies many
other rules of hospitality. The acceptance of gifts is
frequently considered to be connected with some danger.
According to rules laid down in the sacred books of India,
he who is about to accept gifts, or he who has accepted gifts,
must repeatedly recite the four Vedic verses called Tarat-
samandis ; ^ or all gifts are to be preceded by pouring out
^ E^edc infonns us ((?/. p. 140) Veniaminof, quoted by Dali, aV.
that the native women of Cireenland p. 397 (Aleuts). Bartram, in I'rans.
thought themselves fortunate if an An- American Elhn, Soc. iii. pt. i. 42.
gekokk, or prophet,” honoured them Foreman, Philippuie Islands^ p. 187
with his caresses ; and some husbands (Tagalogs). Hunter, Annais of Rural
even paid him for having intercourse Bengal, i. 216. Bogle, Nariaiive of
with their wives, since they believed Mission to Tibet, p. 109 sq. Vambery,
that the child of such a holy man could Das Tilt kenvolk, p. 614 (Turks in Asia
not but be happier and better than Minor), i^tobinson, Biblical Researches
others. Some similar belief may be in Palesiine, ii. t8 sq.\ Burton, Pil-
held in regard to intercourse with a grimage to Al-Madinah iMeccah,
guest, though I can adduce no direct i. 36 ; Blunt, op. cit. ii. 212 ; Lane,
evidence for my supposition. Cf also Plodern Egyptians, p. 297 (Bedouins),
the /W prhnae nociis accorded to priests Krauss, Die Sudslavcn, p. 648.
(Westermarck, History of linifian ® Baudhdyaita, iv. 2. 4.
Marriage, p. 76 sq.; cf. ibid. p. 80).
VOL. I
Q Q
HOSPITALITY
water into the extended palm of the recipient’s right handd
evidently because the water is supposed to cleanse the gift
from the baneful energy with which it may be saturated. On
the other hand, “ without a full knowledge of the rules
prescribed by the sacred law for the acceptance of presents,
a wise man should not take anything, even though he may
pine with hunger. But an ignorant man who accepts
gold, land, a horse, a cow, food, a dress, sesamum-grains,
or clarified butter, is reduced to ashes like a piece of
wood. . . . Hence an ignorant man should be afraid of
accepting any presents ; for by reason of a very small gift
even a fool sinks into hell as a cow into a morass.”^
Moreover, a gift, to be accepted by a Brahmana, ought
to be given voluntarily, not to be asked for.® So, too,
Hebrew writers are anxious to inculcate the duty of giving
alms with an ungrudging eye, as also of not giving any-
thing before witnesses — the latter, perhaps, with a view to
preventing the evil influence which is likely to emanate
from an envious spectator.^ An Atlas Berber, who had
probably never before had anything to do with a
European, spat on the coin which I gave him for render-
ing me a service, and my native friends told me that he
did so for fear lest the coin, owing to some sorcery on my
part, should not only itself return to me, but at the same
time take with it all the money with which it had been in
contact in his bag. Of the Annamites it is said that “ for
fear of bringing ill-luck into the place the people even
decline presents.”
The duty of hospitality is probably always limited by
time, even though, among some peoples, a guest is said
to be entertained as long as he pleases to stay.® According
^ Apastamba^ ii. 4. 9. 8. Buhler, Mandieans were also forbidden to eat
in Sacred Books of the East^ ii. 122, food prepared by a stranger or to take
n.*. a meal in his company (Brandt, Afa;2-
^ Laws of Manila iv. 187, 188, 191. ddische Religion, p. 94).
3 Ibid. iv. 247 sq. Ratzel, op. cit. iii. 418.
^ Tobit, iv. 7. Kohler, in fewish ® Veniaminof, quoted by Dali, op. cit.
Encyclopedia, i. 436. Cf St. Mattheiv, p. 397 (Aleuts). Morgan, League of
vi. I sqq. ; Brandt, Mandaische Sck 7 df the Iroqtiois, p. 328. Bartram, in
te 7 t, pp. 28, 64: “If you give alms Trans. American Ethn. Soc. iii. pt. i.
do not do it before witnesses.” The 42 (Creeks and Cherokee Indians).
HOSPITALITY
to Teutonic custom, a guest might tarry only up to the
third day.^ The Anglo-Saxon rule was, ‘‘Two nights
a guest, the third night one of the household,'' that is, a ‘
slave.^ A German proverb says, “ Den ersten Tag eih
Gast, den zweiten eine Last, den dritten stinkt er fast." ^
So, also, the Southern Slavs declare that “ a guest and a
fish stpell on the third day." ^ Burckhardt states that,
among the Bedouins, if the stranger intends to prolong
his visit after a lapse of three days and four hours from
the time of his arrival, it is expected that he should assist
his host in domestic matters ; should he decline this, “ he
may remain, but will be censured by all the Arabs of the
camp."'* The Moors say that “the hospitality of the
Prophet lasts for three days"; the first night the guest is
entertained most lavishly, for then, but only then, he is
“the guest of God." The Prophet laid down the following
rule : “ Whoever believes in God and the day of resur-
rection, must respect his guest ; and the time of being
kind to him is one day and one night ; and the period of
entertaining him is three days ; and after that, if he does
it longer, he benefits him more ; but it is not right for a
guest to stay in the house of the host so long as to
incommode him." '' According to Javanese custom, it is
a point of honour to supply a stranger with food and
accommodation for a day and a night at least.' Among
the Kalmucks special honour is paid to a stranger for one
day only, whereas, if he remains longer, he is treated
without ceremonies,^ Growing familiarity with the
stranger naturally tends to dispel the superstitious dread
which he inspired at first, and this, combined with the
feeling that it is unfair of him to live at his host's expense
longer than necessity requires, seems to account for the
^ Grimm, Deutsche Rechtsalterthiim- VVeinhold, op, cit. p. 447.
p. 400. VVeinhold, A/lnordisches ^ Krauss, op. eit. p. 658.
Leben^ p. 447. ■ UmckhariUj/sedou/ustiudlfWMbj'S,
^ Quoted in Leges Edivardi Con- p. loi sq,
fessof'is, 23: “Tuua nicte geste pe ® Arabiafi Society ^ p. 142 sq.
|>irdde nicte agen hine.” Cf. Laws of ^ Crawfurd, op. cit. i. 53.
C 7 iut^ ii. 28 ; Laws of Hlothlui^'e and ^ Bergmann, op. cit. ii. 285.
EadriCy 15; Leges Henrici I. \\\\. 5.
HOSPITALITY
CH. XXIV
5^6
rapid decline of his extraordinary privileges and for the
short duration of his title to hospitable treatment.
Contrary to what is the case with other duties which
men owe to their fellow-creatures/ in every progressive
society we find hospitality on the wane. In the later days
of Greece and Rome it almost dwindled into a survival.^
In the Middle Ages hospitality was extensively practised
by high and low ; it was enjoined by the tenets of
Chivalry,^ and the poorer people, also, considered it
disgraceful to refuse to share their meals with a needy
stranger.^ However, in the reign of Henry IV., Thomas
Occlif complains of the decline of hospitality in England ;
and in the middle of the Elizabethan age, Archbishop
Sandys says that ‘‘ it is come to pass that hospitality itself
is waxen a stranger.”^ The reasons for this decline are
not difficult to find. Increasing intercourse between
different communities or different countries not only makes
hospitality an intolerable burden, but leads to the estab-
lishment of inns, and thus hospitality becomes super-
fluous. It habituates the people to the sight of strangers,
and, in consequence, deprives the stranger of that mystery
which surrounds the lonely wanderer in an isolated
district whose inhabitants have little communication with
the outside w^orld. And, finally, increase of intercourse
gives rise to laws which make an individual protector
needless, by placing the stranger under the protection
of the State.
^ 13ecker-(To]l, Chank/es, ii. 3 sqc/. Wright, Domestic Ma 7 iners and
Idern^ Cat/us, iii. 28 sqq. Sentiments in England during the
“ Sainte - Palaye, Afdfuoires sur Aliddle Ages, p. 329 sqq.
Pancienne chevalerie, i. 310. ^ Sandys, Sermons, p. 401.
Chapter XXV
THE SUBJECTION OF CHILDREN
From the modes of conduct which affect the life or
bodily welfare of a fellow-creature we shall pass to those
relating to personal freedom. In its absolute form the
right of liberty may be granted to a perfect being, but has
no existence on earth. Ever since the conduct of men
became subject to moral censure, the right of doing what
they pleased was eo ipso denied them ; and in resisting
wrong men have not only in various ways interfered with
the liberty of their fellow-creatures, but have considered
such interference to be their right or even their duty.
As to the question what conduct is wrong opinions have
differed, and so also as to the proper means of interference ;
but with neither of these questions are we concerned at
present. Nor shall I deal with the subject of political
liberty, nor with such restrictions as people lay on their
own freedom by contract. 1 shall only consider facts
bearing upon that state of subjection to which large classes
of individuals are doomed by custom or law, on account
of their birth or other circumstances beyond their own
control — the subjection of children, wives, and slaves to
their parents, husbands, or masters.
Among the lower races every family has its head, who
exercises more or less authority over its members. In
some instances where the maternal system of descent
prevails, a man’s children are in the power of the head of
their mother’s family or of their maternal uhcle ; ^ but
this is by no means the rule even among peoples who
reckon kinship through females only. The facts which
have been adduced as examples of the so-called “ mother-
right ” in most instances imply, chiefly, that children are
named after their mothers, not after their fathers, and that
property and rank descend exclusively in the female line ;
and this is certainly very different from a denial of paternal
rights.® Among those Australian tribes which have the
system of maternal descent, the father is distinctly said to
be the master of his children.^ In Melanesia, where the
clan of the children is determined by that of the mother,
she is, to quote Dr. Codrington, “ in no way the head of
the family. The house of the family is the father’s, the
garden is his, the rule and government are his.” ® As
regards the Iroquois — among whom, at the death of a
man, his property is divided between his brothers, sisters,
and mother’s brothers, whilst the property of a woman is
transmitted to her children and sisters ® — we are told that
the mother superintends the children, but that the word
of the father is law and must be obeyed by the whole
household.^ Among the Mpongwe, who reckon kinship
through the mother, the father has by law unrestricted
power over his children.® And in Madagascar, where
children generally follow the condition of the mother,'-* the
commands of a father or an ancestor are, among all
the tribes, “ held as most sacredly binding upon his
descendants.” Whatever might have been the case in
earlier times, it is a fact beyond dispute that among the
great bulk of existing savages children are in the power of
^ Westermarck, History of Human 6i, 69.
Marriage^ p. 40 sq, Grosse, Die » Codrington, Mela^iesiayis, p. 34.
Formen der Familie^ p. 183 sq. Post, ® Westermarck, op. cit. p. iio,
Afrika 7 iische JurisprtidenZy i. 51 sq. ^ Scaver, Narrative of the Life of
Marsden, History of Sumatra.^ p. 262 Mrs. Mary Jemison^ p. 165.
sq. ® lliibbe-Schleiden, Ethiopie^iy pp.
2 Westermarck, op. cit. p. 97. 1 51, 153.
^ See von Dargun, Mutterrecht und ^ Westermarck, op. cit. p. 103.
Vaterrecht^ p. 3 sqq. Sibree, The Great African Island^
* Curr, The Australian RacOy i. 60, p. 326.
their fatliC*, though he may to some extent have to share
his authoi^ty with the mother.
The extent of the father’s power, however, is subject
to great variations. Among some savage peoples, as we
have seen, he may destroy his new-born child ; among
others infanticide is prohibited by custom. Among some
he may sell his children,^ among others such a right is
expressly denied him.^ Frequently he gives away his
daughter in marriage without consulting her wishes ; but
in other cases her own consent is required, or she is
allowed to choose her husband herself.® Marriage by pur-
chase does not imply that “ a girl is sold by her father
in the same manner, and with the same authority, with
which he would dispose of a cow.” ^ It seems that the
paternal authority is always in some degree limited by
public opinion. Among the Kafirs of the Hindu-Kush,
for instance, though the head of the house is described as
an autocrat in his own family, the son, backed by public
opinion, may, and does, openly quarrel with and threaten
his father in cases when the father’s actions have been of
a particularly gross character.®
The essence of dependence lies in obedience and sub-
mission. To judge from what is said about children’s
behaviour towards their parents, the authority of the
father must among some savages be practically very slight.
The South American Charruas “ ne defendent rien a leurs
enfans, et ceux-ci n’ont aucun respect pour leurs peres.” ® Among
the Brazilian Indians, according to von Martius, respect and
obedience on the part of children towards their parents are un-
1 Schadenberg, ‘Negritos der Philip-
pinen,’ in Zeitschr. f. Ethnologic, xii.
137. Post , A frikanisch e Jurisprudenz ,
i. 31 sij. (Bogos, Fantis, Dahomans).
Paul i tschke , Eth nogyaph ie Nor dost -
Afrtkasy p. 189. Leuschuer, in Stein-
metz, Rechtsverhdltnisse, p. 16 sq.
(Bakwiri). Among the Banaka and
Bapuku, in the Cameroons, the father
may give his daughter in payment for a
(jebt, but not his son {ibid, p. 31).
Kraft, in Steinmetz, Rechtsverhdlt-
Ttissc, p. 285 (Wapokomo), Rautanen,
ibid. p. 329 (Ondonga).
^ Westermarck, op, cit, p. 215 sqq.
^ Leslie, Among the Zulus and
Amatongasy p. 194. Westermarck, op.
cit. ch. X.
® Scott Robertson, Kafirs of the
Hindu-Kiishy p. 474.
® Azara, Voyages dans V Ant^rique
fniridionaky ii. 23.
6oo THE SUBJECTION OF CHIL]^^||^ chap.
known. ^ Among the Tarahumares of Mexico |^1:^i^children
grow up entirely independent, and if angry a boy rn^^^n strike
his father. ’’ 2 We are told that among the Aleuts pare^l^ “scarcely
ever enjoy so much authority as to compel their own children
to shew them the least obedience, or to go a single step in their
service ^ but this does not seem to hold good of all of their
tribes.^ Of the Kamchadales Steller states that the children
insult their parents with all sorts of bad talk, stand in no fear
of them, obey them in nothing, and are consequently never
commanded to do anything, nor punished.^
Other savages, again, are by no means deficient in filial
piety. ^
Among various Eskimo^ and North American Indian tribes^
children are described as very obedient to their parents. Parry
says of the Eskimo of Winter Island and Igloolik that disobedi-
ence is scarcely ever known, and that “a word or even a look
from a parent is enough.”^ The Potawatomis hold the viola-
tion of the advice and directions of their parents one of the most
atrocious crimes.^^ In 'Fonga “filial duty is a most important
duty and appears to be universally felt.” One of the chief
duties which the Ainos taught their children was obedience to
parents.^‘^ Among the Central Asiatic I'urks a son, whilst
young, behaves as if he were his father’s slave.^^ Among the
^ von Martin.s, in Jour. Roy. Geo. Alii Emin Pascha ins Hcrz tmt Afrika^
Soc. ii. 199. Cf. Southey, History oj p. 801 (Latiika).
Brazil^ iii. 387 ((iuaycuru.s). ^ Hall, Arctic Researches^ p. 568.
^ Luniholtz, Unknown A/exico^ p. Boas, ‘ Central Eskimo,’ in Ann. Rep,
275. Bur. Ethn. vi. 566. Murdoch, ‘ Ethnol.
Georgi, iii. 212. Resultsof the Point Barrow Expedition,’
^ Veniaminof, quoted by Petroflf, ibid. ix. 417. Turner, ‘ PElinology of
‘ Report on Alaska,’ in 7 'enth Census the Ungava District,’ ibid. xi. 191
of ihl United States, pp. 155, 158. (Koksoagmyut).
® Steller, Beschreibung zwn dern ® Turner, in Ann, Rep. Bur. Ethn.
Eande Kamtschatka, p. 353. Cf. xi. 269 (Hudson Bay Indians). Meriot,
Georgi, op. cit. iii. 158. Travels through the Canadas, p. 530.
® Im Thurn, Among the Indians of Harmon, fournal of Coyages, p. 347
Guiana, p. 213. Schwaner, Borneo, i. (Indians on the cast side of the Rocky
162 (Malays of the Barito River in Mountains).
Borneo). V^oxq,(z’A.qx, Philippifie Islands, ^ Pnriy, Journal of a Second Voyage
p. 481. Lewin, Hill Tracts of Chit- for the Discovery of a North- West
tagong, p. 102 (Kukis). VambcTy, Passage, p. 530.
Tiirkettvolk, p. 268 (Kara- Kirghiz). Keating, Expedition to the Source
Maepherson, Alemorials of Service in of St. PetePs River, i. 127.
India, p. 67 ; Hunter, Annals of Rural Mariner, Natwes of the Tonga
Bengal, iii. 72 (Kandhs). Granville Islands, ii. 179.
and Roth, in Jour. Anthr. hist, xxviii. Batchelor, Ainu and their Folk-
109 (Jekris of the Warri District of the Lore, p. 254.
Niger Coast Protectorate). *Stuhhnann, Vamb?ry, op, cit, p. 226.
, SUBJECTION OF CHILDREN 6oi
Osset^^^l|ie authority of the head of the family, whether
gran(ife|lw, father, stepfather, uncle, or elder brother, is sub-
mitted I^Winconditionally ; the young men never sit in his
presence,^ nor speak with a loud voice, nor contradict him.’’ ^
Among the Barea and Kundma a father and a mother are
respected to the utmost degree. A son never dares to con-
tradict his parents nor oppose their commands, however unjust
they be. The mother particularly is much beloved and tenderly
cared for at her old age.” Among the Mandingoes children
have a great veneration for their parents,” and “ would feel
extreme reluctance to disobey their father.”^ Of the
Bachapins, a Bechuana tribe, it is said that “ filial obedience is
strenuously enforced.”'* Among the Kafirs ^‘’anyone who
should fail in respect for his father, or show any neglect of him,
would draw on himself the contempt of the whole horde ; there
have been even instances in which want of filial duty has been
punished with infamy and banishment.” ^
The period during which the paternal authority lasts
varies. The daughter is in her father’s power till she
marries, and as a rule no longer ; ^ but in some instances
his authority over her continues even after her marriage.^
This, we have reason to believe, is particularly the case
when the husband, on marrying, does not take his wife to
his own home, but goes himself to live with her in the
house or community of her father."^ A father’s authority
over his son frequently comes to an end as the young man
^ von liaxthausen, Transcaucasia ,
p. 414
Munzinger,Ostafrikaiuschc Stuclien,
p. 474.
^ Caillie, Travels through Cent 7 'al
Africa, i. 352 sq,
^ Burchell, Travels in the rjitcrior of
Souther)! Africa, ii. 557 *
® Lichtenstein, Travels in Southern
Africa, i. 265. Alberti, De Kaffers
aan de Zuidkust van Afriha, p. i r6
sqq. Shooter, Kafirs of Natal, p. 98.
^ See, e,g., Leiischner, in wSteinmelz,
Rechtsverhdlt nissc , p. 17 (Bakwiri) ;
Fama Mademba, ibid. p. 65 (natives of
the Sansanding States) ; Nicole, ibid,
p. 100 (Diakite) ; Lang, ibid. p. 224
(Washambala) ; Kraft, ibid. p. 286
(Wapokoino) ; Marx, ibid, p. 349
( Aniahlubi) ; Sorge, ibid, p. 404 (Nissan
Islanders of the Bismarck Archipelago).
^ See, c.g., Beverley, in Steinmetz,
Rechtsverhdltnisse, p. 206. What is
said, ibid. p. 31, concerning the Baiiaka
and Bapuku does not seem to agree
with the statement p. 30, that the
husband is the head of his household
and the possessor of his wives.
^ Cf. Mazzarella, La condizione
giuridica del niarito nella farniglia
/natriarcale, passim : infra, on the
Sul)jection of Wives. The point in
question, like the whole subject of the
father’s authority among the lower races,
requires much further investigation.
6o2 the subjection OF CHILDREN chap.
grows up. Among the Fuegians a son becoihes indepen-
dent of his parents at a very early age, being allowed to
leave their wigwam if he pleases.^ Among th6 Togiaga-
mutes, an Eskimo tribe, “ the youth, as soon as he is
able to build a kaiak and to support himself, no longer
observes any family ties but goes where his fancy takes
him.” ^ Of the Australian natives it is said that sons
become independent when they have gone through the
ceremonies by which they attain to the status of man-
hood ; ^ among the Bangerang tribe of Victoria “ after
his twelfth year or so the boy was very little subject to the
father, though parental affection always endured.” * Among
the Bedouins “ the young man, as soon as it is in his
power, emancipates himself from the father’s authority,
still paying him some deference as long as he continues in
his tent ; but whenever he can become master of a tent
himself (to obtain which is his constant endeavour), he
listens to no advice, nor obeys any earthly command but
that of his own will.” ^ That a son is emancipated from
the father’s power by getting full-grown or by leaving
the household is probably the rule among the great
majority of the lower races.® But here again instances
to the contrary are not wanting.^ In Flores the sons
even of rich families are dressed like slaves at public
feasts, so long as the father lives, as also at his funeral.
This, our authority adds, is apparently the external sign
of a strict f atria potestas, which remains in force till the
funeral ; until then the son is the father’s slave.®
^ Bove, Patagonia^ Terra del Fiioco^
P* 133 *
Petroff, loc. cit. p. 135.
3 Curr, The Australian Race^ i. 61.
^ Idem^ Recollections of Squatting in
Victoriay p. 248.
^ Burckhardt, Notes on the Bedouins
and WahdhySy p. 201.
® For other instances, see Munzinger,
Die Sitten tmd das Reckt der Bogos, p.
36; Post, Afrikanische JurisprtidenZy
i. 51 (Somals); Leuschner, in Stein-
metz, Rechtsve 7 'hdltniss€y p. 17 (Ba-
kwiri) ; Nicole, ibid. p. 100 (Diakite) ;
Beverley, ibid. p. 206 (Wagogo) ; Marx,
ibid. p. 349 (Amahlubi) ; Sorge, ibid.
jD. 404 (Nissan Islanders).
^ Sarbah, Fanti Customary Laws, p.
5. Stuhlmann, op. cit. p. 8oi (Latuka).
Steimnetz, Rechtsverhalhiissey p. 31
(Banakaand Bapuku). Fama Mademba,
ibid. p. 65 (natives of the Sansanding
States). Kraft, ibid. p. 286 (Wapo-
komo). Abercromby, Pre- and Proto-
historic P'uinSy i. i8i (Mordvins).
® von Martens, quoted by Nieboer,
Slavery as an Industrial System^ p. 26,
n. 2.
However, the expiration of the paternal power, in the
proper sense of the term, does not necessarily imply the
loss of all authority over the children. The father, at all
events, retains the rights incident to his superior age, and
among many uncivilised peoples these are great. Old age
commands respect and gives authority.
Among the Fuegians in each family the word of an old
man is accepted as law by the young people ; they never dispute
his authority.*' ^ The Patagonians ‘‘ pay respect to old people,
taking great care of them.” - The Caribs portent un grand
respect aus vieillards.’* ^ The same is the case among many of
the North American Indians.^ Among the Naudowessies,
whilst the advice of a father will seldom meet with any extra-
ordinary attention from the young Indians, they will tremble
before a grandfather, and submit to his injunctions with the
utmost alacrity. The words of the ancient part of their
community are esteemed by the young as oracles.” ^ Among
the Eskimo about Behring Strait the old men are listened to with
respect ; ^ and among the Point Barrow Eskimo respect for
the opinions of elders is so great that the people may be said to
be practically under what is called ^ simple elder rule.’ ’* ^ Among
the Veddahs of Ceylon the oldest man is regarded with a sort
of patriarchal respect when accident or occasion has brought
together any others than the members of one family.” ^ Among
the Jakuts an old man is implicitly obeyed as a father of a
family j “ a young man ever gives his opinion with the great-
est respect and caution ; and even when asked, he submits his
ideas to the judgment of the old.”^ Regard for the aged is
found among the Ainos,^® Kurilians,^^ Mongols, Ossetes,^^
^ King and Fitzroy, Voyages of the
“ Adventure ” and “ Beagle, \i. 1 79.
Ibid. ii. 172.
^ de Poircy-de Rochefort, Histoire
des Isles Antilles, p. 461.
^ Buchanan , North A merican Indians^
p. 7. Prescott, in Schoolcraft, Indian
Tribes of the United States, ii. 196.
® Carver, Travels through the Interior
Parts of North America, p. 243.
® Nelson, ‘ Eskimo about Bering
Strait,’ in Ann. Rep. Bur. Ethn. xviii.
304-
^ Murdoch, in Ann, Rep. Bur. Eth 7 i.
ix, 427.
® Hartshorne, ‘Weddas,’ in Indian
Antiquary, viii. 320. Cf. Deschamps,
Carnet d^un voyageur, p. 395.
^ Sauer, Billings' Expedition to the
Norlhern Parts of Russia, p. 124.
Batchelor, Ainu and their Folk-
Lore, p. 254. von Siebold, Ethnol.
Studien iiber die Aino auf der Insel
Vesso, p. 25.
Krasheninnikoff, History of Kam-
schatka, p. 236.
Prejevalsky, Mongolia, i. 71.
von Haxthausen, Transcaucasia,
p. 414. Strabo (xi. 4. 8) reports the
same of the Albanians of the Eastern
Caucasus.
6o4 the subjection OF CHILDREN chap.
Kiikis/ Nicobarese,^ Negritos of the Philippine Islands/^ Papuans
of New Guinea,’*' New Caledonians,^ Caroline Islanders,^-
Tonga Islanders/ and, in a remarkable degree, among the
Australian aborigines.® ‘‘Among the Kurnai,” says Mr.
Howitt, “age meets with great reverence. ... It may be
stated as a general rule that authority attaches to age. It follows
from this that there is no hereditary authority and no hereditary
chieftain. The authority which is inherent in age attaches not
alone to the man, but also to the woman.” And he justly
adds that this principle regulating authority seems to be, not
peculiar to the Kurnai, but general to the whole Australian
racc.^
Turning to African peoples : among the Danakil the aged of
both sexes, but especially the males, are held in great veneration,
and the old men are consulted on every occasion of any import-
ance.^^ “The real religion of the Barea and Kunama,” says
Munzinger, “consists in an extraordinary reverence for old age.
Among these peoples only the old, the weak, or the blind com-
mand respect.” The Ewe-speaking peoples on the Slave
Coast have a proverb, “Respect the elders, they are our fathers.”^*^
Winterbottom doubts whether the ancient Lacedaemonians paid
greater regard to old age than do the natives of Sierra Leone.^®
Mr. Leighton Wilson says of the Mpongwe : — “ I'here is no
part of the world where respect and veneration for age is carried
to a greater length than among this people. . . . All the younger
members of society are early trained to show the utmost defer-
ence to age. They must never come into the presence of aged
persons or pass by their dwellings without taking off their hats,
and assuming a crouching gait. When seated in their presence
^ Lewin, Hill Tracis of Chittagong,
p. 102.
- Kloss, In the Andamans and
Nicobar s, p. 243.
Scliadenberg, in Zeiischr.f. EthnoL
xii. 135. Earl, Papuans, p. 1 33.
Foreman, Philippine Islands, p. 209.
^ Earl, op, cit. p. 81.
° Atkinson, in Folk-Lore, xiv. 248,
® Christian, Caroline Islands, p. 72.
Angas, Polynesia, p. 382.
^ Mariner, op, cit, ii. 155.
8 Roth, North- West- Central Queens-
land Aborigines, p. 1 41. Fraser,
Aborigines of New South Wales, p. 5.
Schuermann, ‘ Aboriginal Tribes of Port
Lincoln,’ in 'Woods, Native Tribes of
South Australia, p. 226. Hale, U.S.
Exploring Expedition. Vol. VI. Efk-
7 iograpky and Philology, p. 113.
Mitchell, Expeditioois hi to the Interior
of Easiei'u Australia, ii. 346. Brough
Smyth, Aborigines of Victoria, i. 137
sq. See also Steinmetz, Ethnol.
Studien zur Entwicklungsgeschichie der
Strafe, ii. 26 sqq.
^ Fison and Howitt, Kaniilaroi and
Kurnai, p. 21 1 sq.
Scaramucci and Giglioli, ‘ Notizie
.sui Danakil,' in Archivio per lantropo-
logia e la etnologia, xiv. 36.
Munzi nger, Ostafrikanische Studien ,
P-474-.
Ellis, Ewe-speaking Peoples, p. 268.
Winterbottom, Native Africans in
the Neighbourhood of Sierra Leone, i,
211.
it must always be at a ^ respectful distance ’ — a distance propor-
tioned to the difference in their ages and position in society. If
they come near enough to hand an aged man a lighted pipe or a
glass of water, the bearer must always fall upon one knee. Aged
persons must always be addressed as ‘ father ’ {rera)^ or ^ mother ’
(ngwe). Any disrespectful deportment or reproachful language
toward such persons is regarded as a misdemeanour of no
ordinary aggravation. A youthful person carefully avoids com-
municating any disagreeable intelligence to such persons, and
almost always addresses them in terms of flattery and adulation.” ^
Among the P"or tribe of Central Africa great consideration is
shown towards women when they are old, as well as towards
aged men.” Regard for old age is, in fact, a very general trait of
the African character.*'^
Not only old age, but superiority of age, gives a certain
amount of power.
The Australian natives have a well-regulated order of pre-
cedence and authority. When the individual reaches the full
development of puberty, he or she undergoes a ceremony which
entitles him or her on its successful completion to a certain
social rank or status in the community. As life progresses,
other and higher ranks are progressively attainable for each sex,
until the highest and most honourable grade, that enjoyed by
an old man, or an old woman, is reached.'’ All North
American Indians hold that superior age gives authority ; and
every person is taught from childhood to obey his superiors and
to rule over his inferiors. The superiors are those of greater
age ; the inferiors, those who are younger,” The same
influence of age makes itself felt in the relations between elder
^ Wilson, IVes/ern Africa^ p. 392 sq.
“ Felkin, ‘ Notes on the For Tribe of
Central Africa,’ in Proceed. Koy. Soc.
Edinburgh^ xiii. 224 sq.
^ Mon rad, Bidrag til en Skildi'insr af
Guinea- Ay s/eu, p. 37 (Negroes of Accra).
Granville and Roth, in lour. Ant hr.
Inst, xxviii. 109 (Jekris). Kingsley,
Travels in West Africa^ p. 460 (Calabar
tribes). Caillie, op\ cit. i. 352 (Man-
dingoes). Stuhlmann, op. cit. pp. 789,
801 (Latuka). Casati, Ten Yea 7 's in
Equatoria, i. 1 86. Chanler, Thf'ough
Jungle arid Desert., p. 246 (Embe).
New, Life., Wanderings^ and Labours
in Eastern Aftica., p. lor (Wanika).
Johnston, Kilinia-njaro Expedition^
p. 419 (Masai). Arnot, Garenganse,
p. 78, note. Lichtenstein, op. cit. i.
265; Alberti, op. cit. p. 118; Shooter,
op. cit. p. 98 (Kafirs). Schinz, Deutsch-
Siidwest-Afrika., p. 82 (Hottentots).
** Roth, op. cit. p. 169. Cf. ibid. p.
65 sq . ; Eyre, Journals of Expeditions of
Discovery into Central Australia, ii.
Powell, ‘Sociology, in American
Anthropologist, N. S. i. 700, Cf.
Idem, in Ann. Rep. Bur. Ethn» iii. p.
Iviii.
6o6 THE SUBJECTION OP CHILDREN chap.
and younger brothers and sisters.^ Navaho myths indicate that
even among twins, the younger must defer to the elder.” 2
The eldest brother comes next to the father in authority, and,
in case of his death, succeeds him as the head of the family. The
Aleuts described by Father Veniaminof maintained that ^‘if
one had no father he should respect his oldest brother and serve
him as he would a father.”® Among the Kalmucks ‘^the elder
brother is the despot of the younger ones, and is even allowed
to punish them.” ^ In Madagascar so great respect is paid to
seniority ‘^that if two slaves who are brothers are going a journey,
any burden must be carried by the younger one, so far at least as
his strength will allow.” ^ In Tonga custom decrees that all
persons shall be in the service of their older and superior
relations, if those relations think proper to employ them ” ; and
every chief shows the greatest regard for his eldest sister.®
Among the Hottentots “ the highest oath a man could take and
still takes, was to swear by his eldest sister, and if he should
abuse this name, the sister will walk into his flock and take his
finest cows and sheep, and no law could prevent her from doing
so.” ^ Among the Point Barrow Eskimo, again, seniority
gives precedence when there are several women in one hut, and
the sway of the elder in the direction of everything connected
with her duties seems never disputed.”®
It must be added, however, that the reverence for old
age may cease when the grey-head gets so old as to be an
incumbrance to those around him;*’ and imbecility may
put an end to the father’s authority over his family. We
have previously noticed that parents worn out with age
^ Nachtigal, Sahara und Sudan, i.
450 (Teda). Chavanne, Die Sahara, p.
396 (Arabs of the Sahara). Paulitschke,
op. cit, p. i92(GaUas). von Haxthausen,
Transcaucasia, p. 415 (Ossetes). Buch,
‘ Die Wotjaken/ in Acta Societatis
Scientiarum Fenn{c(e,yA\.^S<) (Votyaks).
Sumner, in Jour. Anthr. Inst. xxxi. 75
(Jakuts). Batchelor, Aim/ and their
Folk-Lore, p. 254.
2 Matthews, ‘ Study of Ethics among
the Lower Races,’ in Journal of
America?/ Folk-Lore, xii. 9.
Veniaminof, quoted by Petroff, loc,
cit. p. 155.
^ Bergmann, No??iadische St?’eif€r€ie?t
unter den Kal??iuken, ii. 305.
® Sibrec, op. cit. p. 182.
^ Mariner, op. cit. i. 226; ii. 155.
^ Hahn, The Supreme Being of the
Khoi - Khoi, p. 21.
® Simpson, quoted by Murdoch, in
An??. Rep. Bur. Etlrn. ix. 427.
® Curr, Squatting i?t Victoria, pp.
245, 265 sqq.\ Eyre, op. cit. ii, 316
(Australian aborigines). Sumner, in
Jour. A?ithr. hist, xxxi. 76 (Jakuts).
Nansen, Eskimo Life, p. 177 sq.
(Greenlanders). Supra, p. 534.
Steinmetz, Rechtsverhditnisse , p.
31 (Banaka and Bapuku).
and disease are among some peoples killed or abandoned
by their own children/
When passing from the savage and barbarous races of
men to those next above them in civilisation, we find
paternal, or parental, authority and filial reverence at
their height. In ancient Mexico “ necessitous parents
were allowed to dispose of any one of their children, in
order to relieve their poverty,” whereas a master could not
sell a well-behaved slave without his consent/ A youth
was seldom permitted to choose a wife for himself, but
was expected to abide by the selection of his parents ; ®
and “ children were bred to stand so much in awe of their
parents, that even when grown up and married they
hardly durst speak before them.”'* So, too, in Nicaragua
a father might sell his children as slaves in cases of great
necessity,^ and matches were in the larger part of the
country arranged by the parents.® In ancient Peru dis-
obedient children were publicly chastised by their own
parents ; ^ and Inca Pachacutec confirmed the law that
sons should obey and serve their fathers until they reached
the age of twenty-five, and that none should marry with-
out the consent of the parents and of the parents of the girl.®
In China a house-father reigns almost supreme in his
family, and, according to ancient Chinese ideas, not even
marriage withdraws the son from his power.® The law,
it is true, prohibits him from killing or selling ** his
children ; but it is only in supreme cases that the State
interferes between the head of a household and his family
belongings, and the sale of children is practically allowed.*^
No person, of whatever age, can act for himself in matri-
^ Supra^ p. 386 sq.
Clavigero, History of Jl/exioo, i.
360.
^ Westermarck, op, cit. p. 226.
Clavigero, op. cit. i. 331.
^ Squier, Nicaragita., p. 345.
® Bancroft, Native Races of the
Pacific States^ ii. 667.
7 Herrera, General History of the
West iTtdies^ iv. 339.
^ Garcilasso de la Vega, First Part
of the Royal Cor/imentaries of the
VncaSf ii. 207,
^ de Groot, Religious Syste/u of
China, (vol. ii. book) i. 507.
Supra, p. 393.
'Pa Tsing Leu Ixe, sec. cclxxv. p.
292.
Douglas, Society in China, p. 78.
Staunton, in his translation of Ta Tsing
Leu Lee, p. 292, n.* Doolittle, Social
Life of the Chinese, ii. 209.
6o8 THE SUBJECTION OF CHILDREN cum.
monial matters during the lifetime or in the neighbour-
hood of his parents or near senior kinsfolk.^ The law
provides that disobedience to the instructions an^ com-
mands of parents or paternal grandparents shall be
punished with one hundred blows, ^ and that a still greater
punishment shall be inflicted on a son accusing hh father
or mother and on a grandson accusing his paternal grand-
parent, even though the accusation prove true.^ Indeed,
from earliest youth the Chinese lad is imbued with such
respect for his parents that it becomes at last a religious
sentiment, and forms, as he gets older, the basis of his
only creed — the worship of ancestors/ Confucianism
itself has been briefly described as an expansion of the
root idea of filial piety.” The Master said : — “ Filial
piety is the root of all virtue, and the stem out of which
grows all moral teaching. . . . Filial piety is the constant
method of Heaven, the righteousness of Earth, and the
practical duty of Man. . , . Of all the actions of man
there is none greater than filial piety. In filial piety there
is nothing greater than the reverential awe of one’s
father. In the reverential awe shown to one’s father there
is nothing greater than the making him the correlate of
Heaven.” ^ But the idea that filial piety is the funda-
mental duty of man was not originated by Confucitis, it
had obtained a firm hold of the national mind long before
his time.^ It also prevails in Corea ^ and Japan, where
the authority of a house-father is, or, in the case of Japan,
until lately has been/^ as great as in China. ‘‘ The Japanese
maiden, as pure as the purest Christian virgin, will at the
command of her father enter the brothel to-morrow, and
prostitute herself for life. Not a murmur escapes her lips
^ Medhurst, ‘ Marriage, Affinity, and
Inheritance in China,’ in Trans. Roy,
Asiatic Soc. China Branchy iv. ll.
Ta Tsing Leu Lee^ sec. cccxxxviii.
P. 374*
^ Ibid. sec. cccxxxvii. p. 371 sq.
^ Wells Williams, Middle Kingdomy
i. 646.
® Griffis, Corea y p. 32S sq.
® Hsiao Kingy i, 7, 9 (Sacred Books'
of the Tasty iii. 466, 473, 476).
^ Douglas, Confucianism and Taou-
isfiiy p. 1 18.
^ Griffis, CoreUy pp. 236, 259.
® Rein, Japatiy p. 427. Griffis,
Religions of fapaHy p. 122 sq.
Griffis, Religions offapariy p. 148.
as sl^ thus filially obeys.’* ^ In Corea, whilst the first thing
inculcated in a child’s mind is respect for his father, little
respect ds felt for the mother ; the child soon learns that
a mother’s authority is next to nothing.^
It is the general opinion of Assyriologists that in
ancient Chaldaea, at least in the early period of its history,
the father had absolute authority over all the members of
his household.^ Anything undertaken by them without
his consent was held invalid in the eyes of the law,^ and a
disobedient son might be sold as a slave.^ According to
the Laws of Jdammurabi, a man might give his son or
daughter as a hostage for debts ; ^ but he could not disown
his children at discretion. It is said that if he wishes to
cut off his son he must declare his intention to the judge,
whereupon the judge shall enquire into his reasons, and
if the son has not committed a heavy crime which cuts
off from sonship, the father shall not cut off his son from
sonship.” ^ Professor Hommel believes that the mother’s
authority over her children was as great as the father’s,^
whereas Meissner concludes that it was less, from the fact
that her children are not seldom found to be at law with
her in matters of succession.^ Among the Hebrews a father
might sell his child to relieve his own distress, or offer it to a
creditor as a pledge. He had not only unlimited power
to marry his daughters, but even to sell them as maids
into concubinage, though not to a foreign people. He
also chose wives for his sons ; and there is no indication
that the subjection of sons ceased after a certain age.^^
How important were the duties of the child to the
^ Idem, Mikadd s Empire, p. 555.
Cf. Kcin, /apau, p. 427.
- Griffis, Corea, p. 259.
^ Oppert, in Gdttin^sche gelehrte
Anzeigen, 1879, p. \6o^sq<]. Ilommel,
Die semiiischen Volker und Sprachen,
i. 416. Meissner, Beit rage zum aliba-
by Ionise hen P?'ivatrecht , p, 14 sq.
^ Maspero, Dawn of Civilization, p.
734.
® Hommel, op. cit. i. 416. Meissner,
op. cit. p. I .
VOL. I
^ Laws of Hanrmurabi, 117.
7 Ibid. 168.
® Hommel, op. cit. i. 416.
^ Meissner, op. cit. p. 15.
Ewald, Antiquities of Israel, p.
190. Wellhauseii, the
History of Israel, p. 465.
Exodus, xxi. 7 sq.
Genesis, xxiv. 4 ; xxviii. l sq.
Exodus, xxxiv. 16. Deuteronomy, vii. 3.
^ Cf. Michaelis, Conwientaries on the
Laws of Moses, i. 444.
X R
6io THE SUBJECTION OF CHILDREN chap.
parents is shown in the primitive typical relation of Isaac to
Abraham, and may be at once learned from the placing of
the law on the subject among the Ten Commandments,
and from its position there in the immediate proximity to
the commands relating to the duties of man towards God.^
Philo Judasus observes that it occupies this position
because parents are something between divine and human
nature, partaking of both — of human nature inasmuch as it
is plain that they have been born and that they will die,
and of divine nature because they have engendered other
beings, and have brought what did not exist into exist-
ence. What God is to the world, that parents are
to their children; they are “the visible gods.” ^ In
Muhammedan countries parents have practically great
authority over their children. Should a father exceed the
bounds of moderation or justice in chastising his son, the
idea of prosecuting him would hardly occur to anyone,
the injured party being prevented by public opinion, if
not by habit and feeling, from appealing against his own
father.^ Disobedience to parents is considered by Moslems
as one of the greatest of sins, and is put, in point of
heinousness, on a par with idolatry, murder, and deser-
tion in an expedition against infidels. “ An undutiful
child,” says Mr. Lane, “ is very seldom heard of among
the Egyptians or the Arabs in general. . . . Sons scarcely
sit or eat or smoke in the presence of the father, unless
bidden to do so.” * In Morocco it is curious to see big,
grown-up sons sneak away as soon as they hear their
father’s steps, or to notice their absolute reticence in his
presence. Children’s deference for their mothers is less
formal, but almost equally great.**
Among the ancient Romans, in relation to the house-
father, “all in the household were destitute of legal rights —
the wife and the child no less than the bullock or the
^ Cf. Ewald, o/). cit. p. i88 ; Cans, 440
Das Erbrecht in xveltgeschichtlicher ^ Lane, Manners and Customs of the
Entwickelung, i. 134. Moderji Egyptians^ p. 70. Cf Pool,
- Philo Judreus, Opera^ i. scjq. Studies in Mohammedanism^ p. 171.
3 Urquhart, Spirit of the East, ii. ® Cf Urquhart, op. cit. ii. 265 sq.
XXV THE SUBJECTION OF CHILDREN" 6ii
slave.” ^ The father not only had judicial authority over
his children — implying the right of inflicting capital
punishment on them,^ — but he could sell them at dis-
cretion.® Even the grown-up son and his children were
subject to the house-father’s authority/ and in marriage
without conventio in manum a daughter remained in the
power of her father or tutor even after marriage.^ Filial
piety, including reverence not only for the father but for
the mother also, was regarded as a most sacred duty.^ To
the ancient Roman the parents were hardly less sacred
beings than the gods/
It has been suggested by Sir Henry Maine and others
that the patria potestas of the Romans was a survival of
the paternal authority which existed among the primitive
Aryans.® But no clear evidence of the general prevalence
of such unlimited authority among other so-called Aryan
peoples has been adduced. The ancient jurist observed,
The power which we have over our children is peculiar
to Roman citizens ; for there are no other nations possess-
ing the same power over their children as we have over
ours.”® That among the Greeks and Teutons the father
had the right to expose his children in their infancy, to
sell them, in case of urgency, as long as they remained in
his power, and to give away his daughters in marriage,
does not imply the possession of a sovereignty like that
which the Roman house-father exercised over his descend-
ants of all ages. In Greece and among all the Teutonic
^ Mommsen, History of A^ome, i. 74. de Cuulanges, La citd antique^ p. 96
Stipra^ p. 393. sqq. Hearn, Aryan Household^ p. 92.
^ Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Anti- ^ Instiiutiones, i. 9. 2.
quitates Romanos, ii, 27. Leist, Grce.co-italische Rechtsge-
/nstitutiones^ i. 9. 3. schichte^ p. 60 sq. Grimm, Deutsche
® Westermarck, op. cit. p. 230. Rechtsalterihunier^ p. 461 sq. Brunner,
® Leist, Grceco-italische Rechtsge- Deutsche Rechtsgeschichie, i. 76. In
schichte^ ll sqq. Idem, Alt-arisches France the parents’ right of selliuj^^ their
Jus Gentium., p. 185. children gradually disappeared under
^ Valerius Maximus,!. l. 13: “Pari the kings of the third race (de Lauriere,
vindicta parentum ac deorum violatio in Luysel, Institutes cotitumieres, \. 82).
expianda est.” Serviu.s, In Virgi/ii Westermarck, op. cit. p. 232 sqq.
Geo?gico7t, ii. 473 : “ Sacra deorum I.eist, Grieco-italische Rechtsge-
sancta apud illos sunt, sancti etiam schichte., p. 62 sq. Can vet, ‘ De I’organi-
parentes.” sation de la famille k Ath^nes,’ in
® Maine, Ancient Law, p. 138. Fustel Revue de legislation., xxiv, 138.
R R 2
6i2 the subjection OF CHILDREN chap.
nations^ the father’s authority over his sons came to an
end when the son grew up and left his home. But here
again we must distinguish between the legal rights of
parents and the duties of children. There are numerous
passages in the Greek, writings which put filial piety on
a par with the duties towards the gods.^
Nor is there any evidence that the patria potestas of the
Roman type ever prevailed in full in India, great though
the father’s or parent’s authority has been, and still is,
among the Hindus.® Among the Vedic people the father
seems to have been the head of the family only as long as
he was able to be its protector and maintainer,^ decrepit
parents being even allowed to die of starvation.® Accord-
ing to some sacred books from a later age, the father and
the mother have power to give, to sell, and to abandon
their son, because “ man formed of uterine blood and
virile seed proceeds from his mother and his father as an
effect from its cause ” ; however, an only son may not be
given or received in adoption, nor is a woman allowed to
give or receive a son except with her husband’s permission.®
In other books it is said that “ the gift or acceptance of a
child and the right to sell or buy a child are not recog-
nised,” ^ and that he who casts off his son — unless the son
be guilty of a crime causing loss of caste — shall be fined
by the king six hundred panas? But whatever be the
legal rights of a parent, filial piety is a most stringent
duty in the child.® A man has three Atigurus, or specially
venerable superiors : his father, mother, and spiritual
teacher. To them he must always pay obedience. He
must do what is agreeable and serviceable to them. He
must never do anything without their leave.^® “ By honour-
ing these three all that ought to be done by man is ac-
^ Grimm, Deutsche Rechtsalter-
thiimer^ p. 462. Brunner, Deutsche
Rechtsgcschichte ^ i* 75
^ Schmidt, Ethik der alten Griechen^
ii. 141 sq.
Westermarck, op. cit. p. 231 sq,
^ Rig- VedUy i. 70. 5.
^ ZimmttyAliindtsches LebeUy p.328.
® Vasts kt ha y xv, i sqq, Baudhdyaua
Parisishtay vii. 5. 2 sqq.
^ Apastavihay ii. 6. 1 3. ii.
® Laws of Mamiy viii. 389. Cf ibid.
xi. 60.
® Apastamba, i. 4. 14. 6. Lazvs of
Mamiy ii. 225 sqq. ; iv. 162 ; &c.
Institutes of VishnUy ch. 31.
complished ; that is clearly the highest duty, every other
act is a subordinate duty.” ^ Similar feelings prevail
among the modern Hindus.* Sir W. H. Sleeman observes,
“ There is no part of the world, I believe, where parents
are so much reverenced by their sons as they are in India
in all cUsses of society.” The duty of daughters is from
the day of their marriage transferred entirely to their hus-
bands and their husbands’ parents, but between the son
and his parents the reciprocity of rights and duties which
have bound together the parent and child from infancy
follows them to the grave. The sons are often actually
tyrannised over by their mothers.*
According to ancient Russian laws, fathers had great
power over their children ; * but it is not probable that a
son could be sold as a slave.* Baron von Haxthausen,
who wrote before the Emancipation in 1861, says that
“ the patriarchal government, feelings, and organisation
are in full activity in the life, manners, and customs of the
Great Russians. The same unlimited authority which the
father exercises over all his children is possessed by the
mother over her daughters.” " It was a common custom
for a father to marry his young sons to full-grown
women ; and in Poland, also, according to Nestor, a
father used to select a bride for his son.^ According to
Professor Bogisic, the power of the father is not so great
among the Southern Slavs as among the Russians ; * but
a son is not permitted to make a proposal of marriage
to a girl against the will of his parents, whilst a daughter,
of course, enjoys still less freedom of disposing of her own
hand.® According to a Slavonian maxim, “a father is like
an earthly god to his son.”
^ Laws of Alanu, ii. 237. ® von Haxthau.sen, Russian Empire^
Nelson, View of the Hindu Law, ii. 229 sq.
p. 56 sq, Ghani, ‘ Social Life and ^ Westermarck, op. cit. p. 234.
Morality in India,’ in Internatiofial Macieiowski, op. cit. ii. 189.
fournal of Ethics, vii. 312. ^ Maine, Early Lazu amt Custom, p.
® Sleeman, Rambles and Recollec- 244, note.
tions of an Indian Official, i. 330 sqq- •• Krau.ss, Sitte und Branch der SiuL
* Accurse, quoted by de Lauri^re, in slazjtn, pp. 314, 320.
Loysel, op. cit. i. S2. Maine, Early Lazv and Custom, p.
® Macieiowski, Slavische Rechtsge- 243.
schickte, iv. 404.
6i4 the subjection OF CHILDREN chap.
Among this group of peoples, also, we meet with rever-
ence for the elder brother, for persons of a superior age
generally, and, especially, for. the aged.
Obedience on the part of the younger to the cider brother
is strongly inculcated by Confucianism and Taouismd In
ancient China the eldest son of the principal wife held so high
a position that even his own father had to mourn for him at his
death in the selfsame degree in which the son was bound to
mourn for his father ; and in some provinces of Japan the
elder brother or sister did not even go to the funeral of the
younger.**^ In Babylonia the elder brother occupied a privileged
position in the family in relation to the younger.^ In one of
the Mandnean writings it is said, Honour your father and your
mother and your elder brother as your father.” According to
the sacred books of the Hindus, the feet of elder brothers and
sisters must be embraced, according to the order of their
seniority ” ; ^ towards a sister of one’s father and of one’s
mother, and towards one’s own elder sister, one must behave as
towards one’s mother,” though the mother is more venerable
than they.'^
Again, in ancient Mexico respect was paid not only by
children to their parents but by the young to the old.® Among
the Yucatans ^‘the young reverenced much the aged.” ^ In
China persons of the lowest class who have attained to an unusual
age have not infrequently been distinguished by the Emperor,^®
and even criminals with grey hairs are treated with regard.^^
“ Respect for elders,” says Mencius, is the working of right-
eousness”;^'^ and it is said in Thai Shang that the good man
‘^will respect the old and cherish the young.” A Japanese
proverb runs, Regard an old man as thy father.” We read
in Leviticus, Thou shalt rise up before the hoary head, and
honour the face of the old man, and fear thy God.” Venera-
^ Douglas, Confucianism a 7 id Taou-
ism, pp. 123, 124, 259. Griffis, Jieli-
gions of fapan, p. 125 s^.
de Groot, op. cii. (vol. ii. book) i.
509.
^ Griffis, Religions of Japan, p. 127.
Ilommel, op. cit. i. 417 sq.
® Brandt, Mandaische Schriften, p.
64, ,
** Apastamha, i. 4. 14. 9. Cf thid.
i. 4. 14. 14 ; Laws of Manu, ii, 225.
^ Laws of Manu, ii. 133.
® Clavigero, op. cit. i. 81. Cf. ibid.
i- 332.
^ Landa, Relacmn de las cosas de
Yucatan, p. 178.
Davis, China, ii. 97.
Wells Williams, Middle. Empire, i.
805.
Mencius, vii. i. 15. 3.
Thdi Shang, 3.
Griffis, Mikadds Empire, p. 505.
Leviticus, xix. 32. Cf. Job, xxxii.
4 ; Proverbs, xvi. 31, and xx. 29.
tion for the aged is emphatically inculcated by Islam.^ In the
sacred books of India it is represented as a virtue.^ Herodotus
states that the Egyptians resembled the Lacedaemonians in the
reverence the young men paid to their elders.^ Plato says in
his ^ Laws ’ that everybody ought to consider that the elder has
the precedence of the younger in honour, both among the gods
as also among men who would live in security and happiness ;
wherefore it is a foolish thing and hateful to the gods to see an
elder man assaulted by a younger in the city. Everybody
ought to regard a person who is twenty years older than himself,
whether male or female, as his father or mother, and to abstain
from laying hands on any such person out of reverence to the
gods who preside over birth.'' ^ Regard for old age lies behind
such words as presbyter and the Anglo-Saxon ealdorinonn ; and
all travellers among the Southern Slavs have noticed their
extraordinary respect for old people/^
In Europe the paternal authority of the archaic type
which we have just considered has gradually yielded to a
system under which the father has been divested of the
most essential rights he formerly possessed over his
children — a system the inmost drift of which is expressed
in the words of the French Encyclopedist, Le pouvoir
paternel est plutot un devoir qu’un pouvoir.” ^ Already
in pagan times the Roman patria potestas became a
shadow of what it had been. Under the Republic the
abuses of paternal authority were checked by the censors,
and in later times the Emperors reduced the father's power
within comparatively narrow limits. Not only was the
life of the child practically as sacred as that of the parent
long before Christianity became the religion of Rome,^ but
Alexander Severus ordained that heavy punishments should
be inflicted on members of a family by the magistrate only.
Diocletian and Maximilian took away the power of selling
freeborn children as slaves. The father’s privilege of
^ Ameer Ali, Ethics of Istdm, p. 27 ® Maine, Early Law and Ctistoni^ p.
sq. 243.
Apastamba^ i. 5! 15. Laws of ** Encyclopildie 7ncHhodiqite^ Jurisprii-
Mamiy n. 121. Dka 7 ?unapaday loc). dence, vii. 77, art. J^iissance pater-
^ Herodotus, ii. 80. nclle.
^ Plato, Leges, ix. 879. Cf Idem, ^ Supra, p. 393 sq.
Respublica, v, 465.
6i6 THE SUBJECTION OF CHILDREN chap.
dictating marriage for his sons declined into a conditional
veto ; and it seems that the daughters also, at length,
gained a certain amount of freedom in the choice of a
husband.^
The new religion was anything but unfavourable to this
process of emancipation. The ethical precept of filial
piety was changed by Christ. His church was a militant
church. He had come not to send peace but a sword,
“ to set a man at variance against his father, and the
daughter against her mother.” ^ Being chiefly addressed to
the young, the new teaching naturally caused much dis-
order in families. Fathers disinherited their converted
sons,® and children thought that they owed no duty to
their parents where such a duty was opposed to the
interests of their souls. According to Gregory the Great,
we ought to ignore our parents, hating them and flying
from them when they are an obstacle to us in the way of
the Lord ; * and this became the accepted theory of the
Church.® Nay, it was not only in similar cases of conflict
that Christianity exercised a weakening influence on family
ties which had previously been regarded with religious
veneration. In all circumstances the relationship between
child and parent was put in the shade by the relationship
between man and God. “ Call no man your father upon
the earth : for one is your Father, which is in 'Heaven^’ “
“ If any man come to me, and hate not his father,' and
mother, and wife, and children, and brethren, and sisters,
yea, and his own life also, he cannot be my disciple.” ’ At
the same time the fifth commandment, though modified
by considerations which would never have occurred to
the mind of an orthodox Jew, was left formally intact.
Obedience to parents was, in fact, repeatedly enjoined Sy
St. f’aul as a Christian duty.® It was regarded as a pre-
^ ^ Westermarck, op, cit, p. 236. Ixxvi. 1275).
* St. Matthew^ x. 34 sq. St. Luke, ® Thomas Aquinas, Stinima tkeolo-
xii. 51 sqq. gica, ii.-ii. lOI. 4.
^ TGnu\\i3.n, LIpotoget 7 Cus, (Migne, ^ St. Mutthew, f ^
Patrohgice 2 %o sq.). St. Luke, 'idv .
St. Gregory the Great, Homilue in ® Ephesians, vi. i sqq,^ ColdUians,
Evangeiia^ xxxvii, 2 (Migne, cit, iii. 20. ^ ,
requisite for the veneration of God. “ If we do not
honour and reverence our parents, whom we ought to love
next to God, and whom we have almost continually before
our eyes, how can we honour or reverence God, the
supreme and best of parents, whom we cannot see ? ” ^
Ancient, deep-rooted ideas die slowly. Whilst among
Teutonic peoples the grown-up child is recognised both by
custom and law as independent of the parents, and. the
parental authority over minors is regarded merely in the
light of guardianship,^ the Roman notions of paternal
rights and filial duties have to some extent survived in
Latin countries, not only through the Middle Ages, but
up to the present time. “ Above the majesty of the feudal
■baron,” says M. Bernard, “ that of the paternal power was
held still more sacred and inviolable. However powerful
the son might be, he would not have dared to outrage his
father, whose authority was in his eyes always confounded
with the sovereignty of command.” ^ Du Vair remarks,
“ Nous devons tenir nos peres comme des dieux en
terre.” * Bodin wrote, in the later part of the sixteenth
century, that, though the monarch commands his subjects,
the master his disciples, the captain his soldiers, there is
none tO‘^whom nature has given any command except the
father, “ who is the true image of the great sovereign God,
uMversal father of all things.”® According to edicts of
Henry III., Louis XIII., and Louis XIV., sons could not
marry before the age of thirty, nor daughters before the
age of twenty-five, without the consent of the father and
mother, on pain of being disinherited.® And even now in
France considerable power is accorded to parents, not only
b^, custom and public sentiment, but by law. A child can-
®6t quit the paternal residence without the permission of
the father before the age of twenty-one, except for .enrol-
^ Catechism of the Council of Trent, ^ Du Vair, quoted by de Ribbe, Les
iii. 5. I. : families et la soci^t^ en France avant la
- Sttarekei jClessings and curses would for that reason also be
efficacious in an exceptional degree.^
However, the facts which we have hitherto considered
are hardly sufficient to account for the extraordinary
development of the paternal authority in the archaic State.
Great though it be, the influence which magic and religious
beliefs exercise upon the paternal authority is, as we have
just seen, largely of a reactive character. A father’s bless-
ings would not be so eagerly sought for, nor would his
curses be so greatly feared, if he were a less important
personage in the family. So, too, as Sir Henry Maine
aptly remarks, the father’s power is older than the practice
of worshipping him. “ Why should the dead father be
worshipped more than any other member of the household
unless he was the most prominent — it may be said, the
most awful — figure in it during his life ? ” ® We must
assume that there exists some connection between the
organisation of the family and the political constitution of
the society. At the lower stages of civilisation — though
hardly at the very lowest — we frequently find that the
clan has attained such an overwhelming importance that
only a very limited amount of authority could be claimed
by the head of each separate family. But, as will be shown
in a following chapter, this was changed when clans and
tribes were united into a State. The new State tended to
weaken and destroy the clan-system, whereas at the same
time the family-tie grew in strength. In early society
there seems to be an antagonism between the family and the
clan. Where the clan-bond is very strong it encroaches
upon the family feeling, and where it is loosened the
family gains. Hence Dr. Grosse is probably right in his
^ Mariner, op, cit, ii. 238. ^ Maine, Early Law and Custom, p.
^ C/. Nowack, in Jewish Encyclo- 76.
pediuy iii. 243 sq.
S S 2
assumption that the father became a patriarch, in the true
sense of the word, only as the inheritor of the authority
which formerly belonged to the eland
But whilst in its early days the State strengthened the
family by weakening the clan, its later development had
a different tendency. When national life grew more
intense, when members of separate families drew nearer to
one another in pursuit of a common goal, the family
again lost in importance. It has been observed that in
England and America, where political life is most highly
developed, children’s respect for their parents is at a par-
ticularly low ebb.^ Other factors also, inherent in pro-
gressive civilisation, contributed to the downfall of the
paternal power — the extinction of ancestor-worship, the
decay of certain superstitious beliefs, the declining influence
of religion, and last, but not least, the spread of a keener
mutual sympathy throughout the State, which could not
tolerate that the liberty of children should be sacrificed to
the despotic rule of their fathers.
^ Grosse, Die Formen der Familie, ^ Monier Williams, Indian Wisdom^
p. 219. p. 440, n. I.
SLAVERY
Slavery is essentially an industrial institution, which
implies compulsory labour beyond the limits of family
relations. The master has a right to avail himself of the
working power of his slave, without previous agreement
on the part of the latter. This I take to be the essence
of slavery ; but connected with such a right there are others
which hardly admit of a strict definition, or which belong
to the master in some cases though not in all. He is
entitled to claim obedience and to enforce this claim with
more or less severity, but his authority is not necessarily
absolute, and the restrictions imposed on it are not every-
where the same. According to a common definition of
slavery, the slave is the property of his master,^ but this
definition is hardly accurate. It is true that even in the
case of inanimate property the notion of ownership does
not involve that the owner of a thing is always entitled to
do with it whatever he likes ; a person may own a thing
and yet be prohibited by law from destroying it. But it
seems that the owner’s right over his property, even when
not absolute, is at all events exclusive, that is, that nobody
but the owner has a right to the disposal of it. Now the
master’s right of disposing of his slave is not necessarily
^ Nicbocr, Slavery as an Indiistrial one man is the property or possession
System^ p. 4 s(/(/. Dr. Nieboer him- of another beyond the limits of the
self defines slavery as “the fact, that family proper ” {zdzd. p. 29).
exclusive ; custom or law may grant the latter a certain
amount of liberty, and in such a case his condition differs
essentially from that of a piece of property. The chief
characteristic of slavery is the compulsory nature of the
slave’s relation to his master. Voluntary slavery, as when
a person sells himself as a slave, is only an imitation of
slavery true and proper ; the person who gives up his
liberty confers upon another, by contract, either for a
limited period or for ever, the same rights over himself as
a master possesses over his slave. If slavery proper could
be based upon a contract between the parties concerned,
I fail to see how to distinguish between a servant and a
slave.
Dr. Nieboer has recently with much minuteness ex-
amined the distribution of slavery and its causes among
savage races. It appears from his work that slavery is
unknown in Australia, and in Oceania is restricted to
certain islands. In the Malay Archipelago, on the other
hand, it prevails very extensively. Among the aboriginal
tribes of India and the Indo-Chinese Peninsula it is fairly
common, whereas no certain traces of it are found among
the lower races of Central Asia and Siberia, with the
exception of the Kamchadales. In North America it
exists along the Pacific Coast from Behring Strait to
the northern boundary of California, but beyond this
district it seems to be unknown. In Central and South
America there are at any rate several scattered cases of
it, and if our knowledge of the South American Indians
were less fragmentary, many other instances might perhaps
be added. In savage Africa there are only one or two
districts where no certain cases of slavery arc encountered,
whilst large agglomerations of slave-keeping tribes occur
on the Coast of Guinea and in the district formed by
Lower Guinea and the territories bordering the Congo.^
Slaves are kept only where there is employment for them,
and where the circumstances are otherwise favourable
to the growth of slavery. Its existence or non-existence
^ Nieboer, op, cit. p. 47 sqq.
SLAVERY
in a tribe largely depends on the manner in which that
tribe lives. Among hunters it hardly occurs at all. Mr.
Spencer justly observes that, “in the absence of industrial
activity, slaves are almost useless ; and, indeed, where
game is scarce, are not worth their food.” ^ Moreover,
they would have to be procured from foreign tribes, and
to prevent such slaves from running away would be almost
impossible for hunters who roam over vast tracts of land
in pursuit of game, especially if the slaves also were
engaged in hunting. For a small community of hunters
— and their communities generally are small ^ — it might
even be dangerous to keep foreign slaves in their midst.®
Among fishing tribes, on the other hand, slavery is much
more common, attaining a special importance among those
who live on or near the Pacific Coast of North-Western
America. These tribes have an abundance of food, they
have fixed habitations, they live in comparatively large
groups, and trade and industry, property and wealth, are
well developed among them. In consequence, they find
the services of slaves useful, and, at the same time, the
slaves have little chance of making their escape.^
Of the pastoral tribes referred to in Dr. Nieboer’s list
only one half keep slaves, and among some of these slave-
keeping is said to be a mere luxury. To pastoral peoples,
as such, slave labour is of little moment. Among them
subsistence depends much more on capital than on labour,
and for the small amount of work which is required free
labourers are easily procured. As Dr. Nieboer observes,
“ among people who live upon the produce of their cattle,
a man who owns no cattle, i.e. no capital, has no means
of subsistence. Accordingly, among pastoral tribes we
find rich and poor men ; and the poor often offer them-
selves as labourers to the rich.” ® Pastoral peoples have
thus no strong motives for making slaves, but at the same
^ Spencer, Principles of Sociology^ ^ Nieboer, op. cit. p. 191
iii. 459. ^ Ibid. p. 199 sqq.
Westermarck, History of Hurnan ° See also Hildebrand, op. cit.
Marriage., p. 43 sqq. Hildebrand, p. 38 sq,
Recht und Sitte., p. I sqq.
SLAVERY
time “ there are no causes preventing them from keeping
slaves. These tribes are, so to speak, in a state of equili-
brium ; a small additional cause on either side turns the
balance. One such additional cause is the slave-trade ;
another is the neighbourhood of inferior races.” All those
pastoral peoples who keep slaves live in districts where an
extensive slave-trade has for a long time been carried on.
The slaves are often purchased from slave-traders, and in
several cases they belong to an inferior race.^
Among agricultural peoples slavery prevails more exten-
sively ; further, it is more common among such tribes as
subsist chiefly by agriculture than among incipient agri-
culturists, who still depend on hunting or fishing for a
-large portion of their food. In primitive agricultural
communities nobody voluntarily serves another, because
subsistence is independent of capital and easy to procure.
All freemen in new countries,” says Mr. Bagehot,
must be pretty equal ; every one has labour, and every
one has land ; capital, at least in agricultural countries (for
pastoral countries are very different), is of little use ; it
cannot hire labour ; the labourers go and work for them-
selves.” “ Hence in such countries, if a man wants
another to work for him, he must compel him to do it —
that is, he must make him his slave. This holds true of
most savage countries, namely, of all those in which there is
much more fertile land than is required to be cultivated for
the support of the actual population ; but it does not hold
true of all. Where every piece of land fit for cultivation
has been appropriated, a man who owns no land cannot
earn his subsistence independently of a landlord ; hence
free labourers are available, slaves are not wanted, and
slavery is not likely to exist. And even where there are
no poor persons, but everybody has a share in the resources
of the country, the use of slaves cannot be great, since
a man who owns a limited capital, or a limited quantity
of land, can" only employ a limited number of labourers.
^ Niel)()er, op. cit. p. 261 sqq. Bagehot, Physics and Politics^
p. 72.
VOL^ I
X X
SLAVERY
For instance, the absence of slavery in many Oceanic
islands may be accounted for by the fact that all land had
been appropriated, which led to a state of things incon-
sistent with slavery as a social system.’
These are the main conclusions at which Dr. Nieboer
has arrived by means of much admirable and painstaking
research. Most of them, I think, are undoubtedly correct ;
yet it seems to me that the influence of economic condi-
tions upon the institution of slavery has perhaps been
emphasised too much at the cost of other factors. The
prevalence of slavery in a savage tribe and the extent to
which it is practised must also depend upon the ability of
the tribe to procure slaves from foreign communities and
upon its willingness to allow its own members to be kept as
slaves within the tribe. It may be very useful for a group
of savages to have a certain number of slaves, and yet they
may not have them, for the reason that no slaves are to
be had. It is only in extraordinary cases that a person
is allowed to enslave a member of his own community.
Intra-tribal slavery is a question not only of economic but
of moral concern, whilst extra-tribal slavery originally
depends upon success in war.
We have reason to believe that the earliest source of
slavery was war or conquest, and that slavery in many
cases was a substitution for putting prisoners of war to
death. ~ Savages, who have little mercy on their enemies,
naturally make no scruple in reducing them to slavery
whenever they find their advantage in doing so. Among
existing savages, in fact, prisoners of war are very fre-
quently enslaved.^ They and their descendants, together
^ Nieboer, r?/. r//. pp. 294-347, 420
- Cf. Millar, Origin of the Distinttion
of Ranks ^ p, 245 ; Jacob, Historical
Inquiry into the Production and Con-
sumption of the Precious Aletais, i.
136; Buckle, Miscellaneous and
Posthumous Works ^ iii. 413 ; Comte,
Conrs de philosophie positiue, v.
186 sqq. ; Cibrario, Della schiavitii e
del seri’aggio, i. 16.
Rink, Eskimo I'ribes^ p. 28
(Western Eskimo). Petroff, ‘ Report
on Alaska,’ in Tenth Census of the
United States, pp, 152 (Aleuts), 165
(Thlinkets). Richardson, Arctic
Searching Expedition , i. 412 (Kutchin).
Gil)bs, ‘ Tribes of Western Washington
and Northwestern Oregon,’ in Con-
tributions to JSkorth A rnerican Ethno-
logy, i. 18S. von Marlins, Bcitrdge
zur Ethnographie Amerikci s, i. 232
Giiaycurus), 298 (Carajas). Azara,
Voyages dans P Amlriqiie mdridionale,
with persons kidnapped or purchased from foreign tribes,
seem generally to form by far the majority of the slave
population In uncivilised countries.
Whilst little regard Is paid to the liberty of strangers,
custom everywhere, as a rule, forbids the enslaving of
tribesmen. Yet sometimes a father’s power over his
children,^ as also a husband’s power over his wife, “ involves
the right of selling them as slaves ; and among various
peoples a person may be reduced to slavery for committing
a crime, or for insolvency.^ Among the tribes of Western
ii. 109 sq. (Mbnyas). Lewin, Hill
Tracts of Chittagong^ p, 35. Jde/n^
l^Vild Tacos of South-Eastern. India.,
p. 194 (Toungtha). Modigliani,
Viaggio a Alias., p. 521. Kohler,
‘ Recht: der Papiias aiif Neu-Guinca,^
in Zeitschr. f. vergl. Rechtsiviss. vii.
370. Williams and Calvert, Fiji’,
p. 25. Polack, Maniiers and Customs
of the New Zealanders., ii. 52 ; Hale,
U.S. Exploring Expedition, Vol. VJ.
— Ethnoq^i'aphy and Philology, p. 33
(New Zealanders). I^llis, History of
Madagascar, i. 192. Andersson, J.ake
Nga/ni, p. 231 ; Kohler, in Zeitschr. f
vergl. Rechtswiss. xiv. 31 1 (Herero).
Vcllen, Sitten und Ccbranche der
Snaheli, p. 305. Baumann, Usanihara,
p. 141 (Wabondei). Felkin, ‘ Notes on
the VVaganda Tribe,’ in Proceed. Roy.
Soc. Edinburgh, xiii. 746. Mungo
Bark, 'Travels in the Interior of A fica,
p. 19 (Mandingoes). Rowley, Africa
Unveiled, p. 176, Tuckey, Expedition
to Explore the River Zaire, p. 367
(Negroes of Cong(j). Sarbah, luinli
Ciistofnary laws, p. 6. Burton,
Abcokula, i. 301. Ellis, 'Pshi-speaking
Peoples of the Gold Coast, p. 2S9.
Mun/dnger, Ostafrihanische Studicn,
p. 309 sq. (Beni Amer). Mademba,
in Steinmetz, Rechlsverhdltnisse von
eingeborenen Volkem in Afrika 7 /nd
Ozeanien, p. 83 (natives of the
Sansanding States). Nicole, ibid.
p. (Diakile-Sarracolese). Tel-
lier, ibid. pp. 168, 17 1 (Kreis Kita
of the French Soudan). Beverley,
ibid. p. 213 (Wagogo). Fang, ibid.
p. 241 (Washambala). Desoignies,
ibid. p. 278 (Msalala). Nieboer, op,
cit. pp. 49, 52, 73 " 7 < 3 , 78, 100.
^ Supra, p. 599.
2 Stipra, p. 629 sq.
2 Butler, 7 'rai^eh ana Adventures
in Assam, j). 94 (Kukis). Mason,
‘ Dwellings, Nc., of the Karens,' in
Jour. Asiatic Soc. Bengal, xxwii.
pt. ii. p. 146 jy. ; Smeaton, l-oyal
Karens of Bur/na, p. 86. Wilken,
‘ 1 let slrafrecht bij de volken van het
maleische ras,’ in Bijdragen tot de
laal- land- e/t volke/ihunde va/i Neder-
land sc h- Indie, 1883, Land- cn vol-
kenkunde, p. 108 sq. Junghuhn,
Die Bat laid fider auf Sumatra, ii.
145 .sv/. (Bataks). Rallies, History of
Java, ii. p. ccxxxv. (peojde ol Bali).
For DCS, A Naturalisf s IVai/dcrings in
the Eastern Archipelag'o, p. 320
(people of Timor-lavit). von Rosen-
l)erg, Per malayische .-Ire hi pel, p. 166
(Niase). Hickson, A Naturalist in
North Celebes, p. 194 (Sangirese).
Post, Afrikanische Jurisprudenz, ii.
87. Pa'ulitschkc, Ethnographic Nord-
ost-Afrihas, p. 261. Munzinger, Ost-
afrikanische .Sludien, p. 244 sq.
(Marea). Petherick, y'rti'r'tA' /// Cez/tral
Africa, ii. 3 (Shilluk of the White
Nile). Bowdich, Missio/i to Ashantee,
p. 238 n.* (Fantis). Hiiblre-Schleiden,
Ethiopien, p. 152 (M|K)ngwe). Burton,
Abeokuta, i. 301. Tuckey, op. cit.
p. 367 (Negroes of Congo). Mungo
J^ark, op. cit. p. 19 (Mandingoes).
Tellier, in Steinmetz, Rechtsverhdlt-
nisse, p. 171 (Kreis Kita of the krench
Soudan). Lang, ibid. p. 241 (Washam-
bala). Dale, ‘ Customs of the Natives
inhabiting the Bondei C'ountry,’ in
Jour. Anthr. Inst. xxv. 230. ^ P 211 is,
History of Madagascar, i. 193 Velten,
op. cit. p. 305 sq. (Waswahili).
^ Gibbs, loc. cit. p. 188 (Indians of
Western Washington and North-
western Oregon). Lewin, Hill Tracts
of Chittagong, p. 34. Idem Wild
X X 2
SLAVERY
Washington and North-Western Oregon, if an Indian has
wronged another and failed to make compensation, he
may be taken as a slave.^ The Papuans of Dorey had a
Jaw according to which an incendiary with his family
became the slave of the late proprietor of the burned
house. ^ Among the Line Islanders of Micronesia, if a man
of low class stole some food from a person belonging to
the “gentry,” he became the slave of the latter and lost
all his property.® Sometimes a man is induced by great
poverty to sell himself as a slave."* But most intra-tribal
slaves are born unfree, being the offspring of parents one
or both of whom are slaves.*'
In descriptions of slave-holding savages it is often said
that a master has absolute power over his slave. But even
in such instances, when details are scrutinised, it frequently
appears that custom or public opinion does not allow a
person to treat his slave just as he pleases. We have
noticed above that in many cases the master is expressly
denied the right of killing him at his own discretion.'*
More commonly than one would imagine the master has not
J^aces of SoiUJi-Easiern liidia^ [tp. 194
(Khyoun^lha), 235 (Mrus). Mason,
‘ Religion, of the Karens,’ in four,
Asiatic Soc, xwiv. pi. ii. 216.
l^lumentrill, ‘ Die Sitlen und Brauche
dcr alien Tagalen,’ in Ze it sc hr, f
ElhnoL XXV. 13 Lala, J'^hilipfine
Js/cuids^ p. Ill (iiatives of .Sulu). Low,
Sarenvah^ p. 301. Bock, Head- Hu filers
of Borneo,, ]). 210 (Dyak lriV>es).
Junghuhn, op. ciL ii. 15 1 sq. Kaflles,
op. cit. i. 353 n. {Javane.se ) ; ii.
p. ccxxxv. ([)eopIe of Bali). Nieboer,
op. lit. pp. no, III, 114, 1 19 sij.
(various peoples in Ihe Malay
Archipelago). .Munzinger, Ostafrikan-
ischc Siudien., pp. 207 (Takue), 245
(Marea). Kingsley, West African
Studies^ p. 370. Ifiibbe-Schleiden,
op. cit. p. 152 (Mpongwe). Burton,
Abcoknta^ i. 301. Mungo Park, op.
cit. p. 19 (Mandingoes). Dale, in
Jour. Ant/ir. lust. xxv. 230 (Wabondei).
Baskerville, in Sleinmelz, Rcchtsver-
haltnisse^ p. 193 sq. (Waganda). laing,
ibid. p. 240 (Washambala). Waller,
ibid. p. 381 (Natives of Nossi-Be and
Mayotte, Madagascar). Post, Afrikan-
ische JnrisprudenZy i. 90 sq. Jdeui.,
Grundriss der ethnologischcn Juris-
prudeuz, i. 363 sqq. ; ii, 564 sqq.
Kohler, Shakespeare vor deui P'orinn
der Jit risprudenz, p. 14 sq.
^ (dbbs, toe. (it. p. 188.
Karl, Papuans., p. 83.
Tiiluila, in Jour. Ihdynesian Soc.
i. 268 sq.
^ Azara, op. cit. ii. 109 (Mbayas).
Hale, op. cit. p. 96 (Kingsmill
Islanders). Burton, Abeokula, i. 301.
Anders.soii, Lake Hqanii, p. 231
(Herero). Ellis, History of Madagas-
car., i. 192 sq.
^ Cf. Post, Afrikanische Juris-
priidenz, i. 89 sq. ; Mademba, in
Steininetz, Rechtsvcrhiiltnisse, p. 83
(natives of the Sansanding States)*
Nicole, ibid. p. 119 ( Diakite-Sarra
colese). Baskerville, ibid. p. 194
(Waganda) ; Desoignies, ibid. p. 278
(Msalala) ; Dale, in four. Anthr.
Inst. xxv. 230 (Wabondei) ; Kllis, His-
tory of Aladagascar, i. 193.
^ Supra, p. 422 sq.
SLAVERY
even an unlimited right to sell his slave. Among some
peoples he may sell at will such slaves only as have been
captured 'in war or purchased, not such as have been born
in the house. ^ In several instances a slave, and especially
a domestic slave, cannot be sold unless he has been guilty
of some crime or misdemeanour.“ Among the Banaka
and Bapuku in the Cameroons the master may chastise
or send away a slave who has behaved badly, but is not
allowed to sell him.^ There are, moreover, instances in
which the master is entitled not to all the services of his
slave, but only to a limited portion of them. In some
parts of Africa the slave is obliged to work for his master
on certain days of the week or a certain number of hours,
but has the rest of his time free.‘^ In the highlands of
Palembang, Sumatra, a slave may carry on trade and hire
himself out as a day labourer on his own behalf, and when
he works in the field one-half of his harvesting belongs to
him and the other half to his master. Where the slave
is allowed to possess property of his own he may in some
cases,^' though not in all,^ buy his freedom ; and debtor
slaves are as a rule entitled to regain their liberty by
paying off the debt.'^ Many peoples even permit a dis-
satisfied slave to change his master. Among the Washam-
bala, if a person does not fulfil his duties towards any of
his slaves, the latter has a right to complain of him to the
chief, and should the accusation prove true the chief buys
the slave of his master for an ox and two cows, and keeps
^ Post, AfyikaiiiscJie J urisprudenz^
i. 05
/hid. i. 96 sq. lellicr, in Stcin-
inetz, IxCiditsiu-rJidl/iiisst:, p. 169 (Kicis
Kita). thid, p. 241 (Wasliani-
bala).
Stein met/, Rech/sverhaltnissr.,
p. 43-
Post, Afrikanische Jtirispriidenz.,
i. loi. Mademba, in Stcinmtaz,
Kechtsvcrhalinisse^ p. 83 (natives of
the Sansandin^ States). Nicole, ibid.
p. 1 18 (Diakile-Sarracolese). Tcllier,
ibid. p. 169 sqq. (Kreis Kita).
^ Glimpses of the Eastern Archi-
pelago., ]:). 106.
Post, Afrikanisidic furisprudenz^
i. Ill sq.
Ibid. i. Ill sq. Tcllier, in Stein-
metz, J\e<hts 7 h'rh(i//iiisse, p. 170 (Kreis
Kita). Senfft, ibid. ]). 442 (Marshall
Islanders).
Post, Gnrndriss dcr ethnologisehcn
Jnrispnideiiz.^ i. 366. Nieboer, op. rit.
PP- 3 ^? 432. Nicole, in Steinmetz,
/yeehtsverhal/nisse, p. 1 18 (Diakite-
Sarracolese). Ikaskerville, ibid. p. 194
(Wagantia). Lan^, ibid. p. 240 sqq.
(VVashambala).
SLAVERY
him for himself.’ Among other peoples a slave, in order
to get a new master, has only to cause a slight damage to
somebody’s property, or to commit some other trifling
offence, in which case he must be given up to the person
he ‘‘injured.”^’ It is astonishing to notice how readily,
in many African countries, slaves are allowed by custom to
rid themselves of tyrannical or neglectful masters.^ I'he
Barea and Bazes have a law according to which a slave
becomes free by simply leaving his lord.^ Among the
Manipuris, in Further India, if a slave flics from one master
and selects for himself another, it is presumed that he has
been badly treated by the first one, and the fugitive can
consequently not be reclaimed."’
A slave among the lower races can thus by no means
be described as a being destitute of all rights. As a rule,
it seems, he is treated kindly, very commonly as an
inferior member of the family.^' Among the Aleuts a
slave suffering want would bring dishonour upon his
master.’' The South American Mbayds, says Azara,
^ Oang, in Steinmetz, Rcchtsver’ Islanders), 293 (people of Teniml)cr
halinisse^ p. 242. and Timor-laut), 434 (people of
l\).st, Afrilcafiisrhc Jitrisp 7 'i{deuz^ Wetter). Earl, op. cif. p. 81
i. 102 sqg, IdcDi, Griuidriss der (I’apuan.s of Dorey). New, Life^
eth}toloq:[ischen Jurispritdoiz., i. 377. Wandcyi^tgs^ and Labours in Kastern
Steinmetz, Kcchtsvcrlnil/nisse., p. 168. A/r/ra, p. 128 (Wanika). Chanler,
rcchuel-Loesche, ‘ Aus dem Lcben I'hrough Jungle and Desert., p. 404
der Loango-Neger,’ in Globus, xxxii. (Ikistcrn Africans). Baumann, Usani-
238. bara, p. 141 (Wabondei). Felkin, in
See also Post, Afrikanische Juris- Proceed. Poy. Soc. Edinburgh, xiii.
prudenz, i. 102 sqq. ; Miinzinger, Ost- 746 ; Ikiskerville, in Steinmetz, Rechis-
afrikanische Studicui, p. 309 (Beni verhiiltnisse, p. 194 (Waganda).
Amer) ; Idefii, Die Siiten und das Ibid. p. 43 (Banaka and Bapuku).
Recht der Bogos, p. 43. Madeniba, ibid. p. 84 (natives of the
^ ^'V\m'Lm<ggx,OstaJrikanischeSiudien, San.sanding States). Nicole, ibid.
p. 484. p. 1 18 (Diakite-Sarracolese). Lang,
Dalton, Descriptive Ethnology oj ibid. p. 242 (Washambala). De-
Bcngal, p. 51. soignies, ibid. p. 278 (IMsalala). Kraft,
^ Ibid. pp. 51 (Manipuris), 58 ibid. p. 291 (VVapokomo). Reade,
(Garos). l^ewin, Hill Iracls of Smfage Africa, p. 582. Rowley,
Chittagong, p. 34 sq. Idem, IVild Africa Lltiveiled, p[). 174, 176.
Races of South-Eastern India, p. 90 Steinmetz, Eth/iologische Studien zur
(Chittagong Hill tribes), Colqiiboun, eo'sten Entivichlung der Strafe, i. 313.
Ajnongst the Shans, p. 267. Mouhot, Nicboer, op. cii. pp. 52, 78, 79, 81,
Travels in the Central Parts of Indo- 141-143, 305, 439 sq.
China, i. 250 (Stiens). Rieciel, De t Veniaminof, quoted by Petroff,
sluik- en kroesharige r as sen tusschen loc. cit. p. 152.
Sclebes en Papua, pp. 194 (Watubela
SLAVERY
‘‘ aiment extraordinairement tous leurs esclaves ; jamais
ils ne ]eur commandent d’un ton impcrieux ; jamais ils ne
les reprimandent, ni ne les chatient, ni ne Jes vendent,
quand meme ce seraient des prisonniers de guerre. . . .
^uel contraste avec le traitement que les europeens font
eprouVer aux africains ! ” ^ In West Africa the con-
dition of slavery is not regarded as degrading, and a slave
is not considered an inferior being.” “ On the Gold
Coast, with the exception of the unpleasant liability of
being sent at any moment to serve his master in the other
^ world, the lot of a slave is not generally one of hardship,
but is on the whole far better than that of the agricultural
labourer in England. The slave is generally considered
a member of the family, and if native-born succeeds in
some cases in default of an heir to the property of his
master.'^ In the Yoruba country it was quite common
for a slave to be named by his master in his last will to
be the factor or general manager of the estate, and to be
left to take care of the entire establishment." Among
the Kreis Kita, of the French Soudan, the master calls his
domestic slaves his sons, and they call him their father ;
nay, the natural guardian of an heir who is not yet of age
is not his mother, but the eldest domestic slave of the
household.'^ Speaking of the natives in the region of
Lake Nyassa, Mr. Macdonald remarks that most Africans
like to see their slaves become rich ; Are they not,”
they say, ‘‘ our own children ? ” Among the Wabondei,
if a man buys a slave, he calls his own children and
says, ‘Behold your brother.’ The slave is treated as a
son, and is neither beaten nor tied.” ^ In Madagascar
the slaves “ are kindly treated by their masters, they are
considered as a kind of inferior members of the family
to whom they belong, and many of the slaves have a
^ Azara, op. cit. ii. Iio. and Ihc Alakc,’ in Joii 7 \ African Soc.
“ lUlis, .Eioe-speaking Peoples of fhe 1904, p. 473.
Slave Coast., p. 219. See also Wilsrui, Tellicr, in Sleinmetz, Eecktsver-
Wester }i- Africa^ pp. 1 79, l8o, 27 1 sq. hatlnisse., p. 169.
laiis, Ts hi -speaking Peoples of i he ’’ Macdonald, in four. Antlir, Inst,
Gold Coasts p. 290- xxii. 102.
^ MacGregor, ‘ Lagos, Abeokuta, Dale, ibid. xxv. 230.
68o
SLAVERY
practical freedom of action to which the free population
are quite strangers.”^ The slavery prevalent among
the native races of the Malay Archipelago is generally
mild. In Borneo, says Mr. Boyle^ “ we always found a
difficulty in distinguishing the servile portion of a house-
hold from the freeborn population, and the honours and
distinctions open to the latter class are likewise accessible
to the former.” ^ The slave-debtors of the Dyaks are
“just as happy in this state — living in their creditors’
houses and working on their farms — as if perfectly free,
enjoying all the liberty of their masters.”*'^ Among
the Chittagong Hill tribes the debtor-slaves were treated'
as members of the creditor’s family, and were never
exposed to harsh usage.^ Among the Kafirs of the
Hindu-Kush slaves are sometimes chosen among the
annually elected magistracy, and Sir Scott Robertson
knew of a case in which a master and his slave went
through the ceremony of brotherhood together.
It appears that intra-tribal slaves, especially such as are
born in the house, are generally treated better than extra-
tribal or purchased slaves,” and that slaves are most
oppressed by their masters when they belong to a different
race.' We are told that among the South American
Guaycurus the two causes of slavery, captivity and birth,
imply a certain difference of caste, which is maintained
^ Sibree, I'he Great African Island^
p. I Si. Sec also l .iLlle, Aladai^ascar,
p. 77 ; Ellis, I di story of Afadayascar^
i. 196.
Eoyle, Advoit iires among the
Dyaks of Borneo^ p. 284.
^ Low, Sarawak^ p. 302. See als<;
SL John, Life in the Forests of the Far
East^ i. 83 ; Bock, Head- fj nut ers of
Borneo, p. 210 ; Kiikenthal, Ergetf-
nisse einer zoologischcn Forschmigs-
rcisc in den Alolukken ttnd Borneo,
i. 276 (Kyans); Crawfurd, History of
the Indian A > chipelago, i, 52 ; Raffles,
op. tit. i. 352 ; Marsden, History of
Sumatra, p. 2‘;3 ; [unirhuhn, op. cit.
ii. i5o{Bataks). .
^ I.e\vin, Hill Tracis of Chittagong,
P- 34 *
Scott Robertson, Hafirs of the
Hindu- Hush, p. 1 00 stj.
M u nzi n^er, Ostafrikanische Sludicn ,
p. 484 (Ikireaand Kunama). New,
op. cit. p. 56 ( Waswahiii). Hauniann,
Usamhara, p. 6 1 (natives of the Tanga
Coast). Sarbah, of. cit. p. 6 sq .
(Kantis). Nicole, in Sleinnielz, Rcchls-
verhaltnissc, p. 118 sq. (Diakite-
Sarracolese). Tellier, ihid. p. 169
(Kreis Kita). Beverley, ihid. p. 213
(Wagogo). Sibree, op. cit. p. 256 sq.
(natives of Madagascar). Post,
Afrikanische Jurisprndenz, i. 88 sq.
Mademba, in Steinmetz, Kechts-
verhaltnisse, p. 84 (natives of the
Sansanding States). Siliree, op. cit,
p. 1 81 (natives of Madagascar).
SLAVERY
68i
with great rigour.^ Mungo Park observes that in Africa
the domestic slaves or such as are born in their master’s
house are treated more leniently than those who are
purchased/^ I was told,” he says, ‘‘ that the Mandingo
master can neither deprive his slave of life, nor sell him
to a stranger, without first calling a palaver on his
conduct, or, in other words, bringing him to a public
trial ; but this degree of protection is extended only to
the native or domestic slave.” ^ Tuckey makes exactly
the same observation as regards the natives of Congo.^
On the Gold Coast slaves are of three kinds — ^native-born,
’imported, and prisoners of war; and “a distinction is
always made between the first and the two latter, who are
treated with far less consideration.”^ Speaking of the
Central African tribes generally, Mr. Rowley states that
slavery assumes a much severer character among the
pastoral than among the agricultural tribes, because the
slaves of the former are for the most part captives of
war, whereas those of the latter have rarely been acquired
by conquest but mostly by inheritance. Among the
agricultural tribes, he adds, persons who are in bondage
are not called slaves but children, and those to whom they
are in bondage are not called masters but fathers.'* Among
the Kafirs of the liindu-Kush all slaves ‘‘are not of the
same social position, for the house slave is said to be
much higher in grade than the artisan slave. . . . The
domestic slaves live with their masters.” ‘
Among the nations of archaic civilisation slavery
presents essentially the same characteristics as among the
lower races. In ancient Mexico there were various
classes of slaves — prisoners of war, criminals condemned
to lose their freedom, children sold by their parents, and
persons who had sold themselves. The relations between
master and slave are represented as friendly. '' “Slavery
' von Spix and von Martins, Travels Rowley, Africa Unveiled^ p.
in Brazil^ ii. 74. 174 sqq.
“ Mungo Park, op, cit. p. 262. Scott Robertson, vp. cit, p. 99 sq.
Ibid. p. 19. ^ Pancroft, Mative Races of the
Tuckey, op. cit. p. 367. Pacific States ^ ii. 217, 221,
^ Ellis, Ts hi- speaking Peoples y p. 2S9.
SLAVERY
In Mexico,” says Mr. Bancroft, was, according to all
accounts, a moderate subjection, consisting merely of an
obligation to render personal service, nor could that be
exacted without allowing the slave a certain amount of
time to labour for his own advantage.”^ Masters could
not sell their slaves without their consent, unless they
were slaves with a collar, that is, runaway, rebellious, or
vicious slaves, who In spite of two or three warnings did
not mend their behaviour.^ Their children were"* In-
variably born free ; ^ and when their masters died they
generally became free themselves.'*
In China the slave class is composed of prisoners of
war, of persons who sell themselves or are sold by others,
and of the children of slaves ; and in former days public
slavery was a punishment for crime.^' It is true that the
penal code forbids the sale of free persons ; according to
the letter of the text even the father of a family must not
sell his children,^ and persons who voluntarily submit
themselves to be sold are punished by law.'"^ But these
regulations arc frequently transgressed ; in times of dis-
tress children are often sold by their parents, and the
kidnapping of children is an even more common source
from which the supply of slaves is kept up.'- The
master's power over his slave Is not quite absolute, but
it seems to be fully as great as the father’s power over
his child. A master who falsely accuses his slave suffers
no punishment for it ; on the other hand, a slave cannot
complain in a court of justice of ill-treatment from his
master.*-^ Yet the condition of slaves In China is generally
easy enough.*'^ ‘‘In all Chinese families of ‘the upper ten
^ liancroft, A^alive Races of the Pacific
Stales^ ii. 220 j^v/.
“ Ckivigcro, History of Mexico^ 1. 360.
Pancroft, op. cii. ii. 221.
Clavjgcro, op. cii. i. 360
Plot, ‘ Memoiie sur la condition
dcs esc laves el de.s servi tears gages en
Chine/ in JoiiDial AsiatiquCy ser. iii.
vol. iii. 257 sqq.
Ibid. 249 sqq.
Supra, p. 607.
^ 7 a 7 "siny Ixu Lee, sec. cclxxv.
p. 291.
Biot, loc. cit. p. 260. Giles,
Strange Stories from a Chinese Studio,
p. 211, n. 8. Gray, China, i. 241,
242, 246.
Supra, p. 424.
Gray, op. cit. \. 243 sqq.
Plot, op. cit. p. 292. Ta Tsing
Leu I^cc, .sec. cccxxxvii. p. 373.
Piot, loc. cit, p. 296 sq. Giles,
op. cit. i. 21 1 sq. n. 8. Gray, op. cit.
i. 245. Wells Williams, Middle
Kingdom, i. 413. Douglas, Society in
China, p, 349.
SLAVERY
thousand/ an intimacy exists between masters and men-
servants on the one hand, and mistresses and female
servants on the other. Servants not unfrequently make
suggestions in reference to the well-being of the family,
and in many instances, domestic matters of a grave nature
are discussed before them/’ ^ In Chinese novels the servant
is the confidant of his master, and harsh behaviour towards
slaves is only attributed to vicious persons according to
the •Divine Panorama, he who beats or injures his slave
without estimating the punishment by the fault is tor-
mented in hell.’^ Many travellers have pointed out the
difference between the comparatively happy condition of
slaves in China and the degraded position of the former
negro slaves in European colonies and the United States
of America.^ ‘‘In China,’’ it is observed, “the identity
of blood, colour, race, and habits between master and
servant, operates as a restraint on the avarice, vices, and
cruelty of the former, which would not be the case if they
were of different races as in America.”^
It has been suggested that in ancient Egypt the
aboriginal inhabitants of the country were made slaves
by the conquering race. “Si nous consultons les monu-
ments,” says M. Amelineau, “ nous remarquons dans
les peinturcs equi ornent les parois des tombeaux de
Saqqarah une certaine race d’hommes sur laquelle Mariette
avait deja appele /attention. . . . Je crois que ce sont la
des csclaves, vieux restes des populations primitives sou-
mises par les conquerants nouvellement arrives dans la
vallee du Nil, descendants des premieres tribus humaines
qui s’etaient installeesen Egypt.”'' During the eighteenth
and nineteenth dynasties, which form the chief period of
Egypt’s foreign conquests, mention is frequently made of
the employment of prisoners of war as slaves. Every
Pharao of these dynasties recounts how he filled the god
Amon’s storehouses with male and female slaves from his
^ (iniy, op. cit. i. 247. Chiiiese Repository xviii. 3^2.
" Biot, loc. cit. p. 296. ^ Amelineau, Rssai sitr Ph'olution
3 Giles, op. l it. ii. 377. des idJ.es morales dcuis P Egypt Ancienne.^
Biot, loc. cit. p. 297 sq. p. 78,
SLAVERY
Spoil. These slaves are occasionally represented in tombs;
thus in the tomb of Rekhmere some slaves who are making
bricks and building a wall are designated as the spoil
which his Majesty brought for the construction of the
temple of Amon.” ^ M. Am61ineau believes that slavery
was in Egypt milder than in Greece and Rome.^ Ac-
cording to the Book of the Dead, the pity of the god
extends to slaves ; not only does he command that no
one should ill-treat them himself, but he forbids that their
masters should be led to ill-treat them."
In ancient Chaldasa, beneath the free Semite and
Sumerian population, there was a class of slaves largely
consisting of captives from foreign races and their de-
scendants, but continually reinforced by individuals of
the native race, such as foundlings, women sold by their
husbands, children sold by their fathers, and probably
debtors whom their creditors had deprived of their
liberty. Their position was evidently not one of ex-
cessive hardship.'* As a rule, they were permitted to
marry and bring up a family ; and it seems that masters,
when selling their slaves, as much as possible avoided
separating parents and children.^’ 'The master often
apprenticed the children of his slaves, and as soon as
they knew a trade he set them up in business in his own
name, allowing them a share in the profits.^ A slave
could hire himself out for wages, and could himself
acquire slaves to work for him.^ He was even entitled
to purchase his freedom.’^ “La loi babylonienne,” says
M. Oppert, “ laissait aux esclaves sur quelques points
' For thest? stalcmcMits T am indebted Mas])ero, op. cit. p. 743.
to my friend Mr. Alan Gardiner. Meissner, op. cit. p. 7. Oppert,
" Amelineau, op. cit. p. 349. loc. cit, p. 12I .svyy.
^ Book of the Btead, ch. 125. Cf, ^ ()})}xn-t, hoc. cit. )). 125 sqq.
Maspero, Dawn of Civilization.^ Koliler and beiser, Aus deni
p. 1 91. baby Ionise hen Bechts/eben ^ ii. 52 sqq.
^ Meissner, Bcitriige ztir altbabylon- ^ Oppert, loc. cit. pp. 122, 128.
ischen Privatreeht.^ p. 6. Oppert, ‘ Ixi ^ Meissner, op. cit. p. 7. Oppert,
condition des esclaves a liabylone,’ in loc. cit. p. 122. 0 ])pert and Menant,
Acadlniie des Inscriptions c.t Belles- Doc untent s jniidiqnes de I Assy rie cl de
J.etlres—Coniptes rendus des stances de la Chaldle, p. 14.
f annde 1888, ser, iv. vol. xvi, 122.
plus de prerogatives que le Code fran^ais n’en accorde
a nos Spouses.’’ ^
Among the Hebrews the slave class consisted of
captives taken in war ; ^ of persons bought with money
from neighbouring nations or from foreign residents in
the land ; ^ of children of slaves born in the house ;
of native Hebrews who had been sold by their fathers;"'
or who either alone or with their wives and children
had fallen into slavery in consequence of poverty,^ or
who had been sold by the authorities as slaves on account
of theft when unable to pay compensation for the stolen
property.^ To deprive an Israelite of his freedom for
any other reason, to steal him, use him as a slave, or sell
him, was a crime punishable with death/ And even the
Israelite who lost his liberty because he had become poor
on account of poverty was not to be treated in the same
way as the slave of foreign origin. He could not be
compelled to serve as a bondservant, only as a hired
servant.’^ He should not be ruled over with rigour.^^^ He
might not only be redeemed at any time by his relatives,
but if not redeemed he was bound to receive his freedom
without payment in the seventh year, and then the master
should not let him go away empty, but furnish him
liberally out of his flock, his floor, and his wine-pressd'
Slaves of foreign extraction, on the other hand, were not
to be emancipated, but should remain slaves for ever,
descending to children and children’s children. But in
no case had the master absolute power over his slave.
Whether the latter was an Israelite or a foreigner, his
life, and to some extent his body, were protected by
law ; and if a slave escaped from a hard master, he
^ Oppert, (it. p. I2l.
.Deuterononiyy xx. 14.
•' Le 7 '?tii iis, XXV. 44 S(j(j.
Gc 7 tcsis'^ xiv. 14.
Exodus', xxi, 7.
Ilnd. xxi. 2 sq. LeviticuSy xxv.
39 » 47 -
Exodus, xxii. 3.
^ Ibid. xxi. 16. Deuteronoiuyy
xxiv. 7.
^ Leviticus, xxv. 39, 40, 53.
Ibid. xxv. 43, 46, 53.
Exodus, xxi. 2. Leviticus, xxv.
40, 41, 48 sqq. Deuterotiomy, xv.
12 sqq.
Leviticus, xxv. 44 sqq.
Supra, pp. 424, 516.
SLAVERY
should not be given up, but be allowed to live unmolested
in the place which he should choose in one of the cities of
Israel.^ From everything that we read about slaves among
the Hebrews it appears that they were regarded as in-
ferior members of the family, and that the house-father
cared for their well-being hardly less than for that of his
own children.'-* In the Talmud masters are repeatedly
admonished to treat their slaves with kindness ; ’ traffic
in human beings is regarded as an occupation which
incapacitates the dealer to sit as judge ; and emancipa-
tioti of slaves is practically encouraged in various ways,'’
in spite of the dictum of certain rabbis that he who
emancipates his slave transgresses the positive precept
of I.eviticus XXV. 46, “ They shall be your bondmen for
ever. ^
According to Islam, a Muhammedan who is born free
can never become a slave. The slave,” says Mr. Lane,
“ is either a person taken captive in war or carried off* by
force from a foreign country, and being at the time of
capture an infidel; or the offspring of a female slave by
another slave, or by any man who is not her owner, or by
her owner if he do not acknowledge himself to be the
fiither.” ^ The slave should be treated with kindness; the
Prophet said, man who behaves ill to his slave will
not enter into Paradise.” ^ The master should give to his
slaves of the food which he eats himself, and of the
clothes with which he clothes himself.‘‘ Pie should not
^ Dc2itei'ono?}iy^ xxiii. 15 scj.
^ See Mielziner, Die Verhiilinisse
tier Sklaven hei den alien Hebrdern^
p. 61 sqq. ; Andre, IJ esc lavage ehez les
anciens Ht%renx^ p. 149 sqij. ; Benzin-
ger, ‘ Slavery,’ in Cheyne and Black,
Ji JicyclopeEdia Biblica^ iv. 4657 sq.
^ Katz, Der wahre 'Talniudjnde,
p. 59 sqq. See also Eeelesiasticusy
xxxiii. 31 : — “ If thou have a servant,
entreat him as a brother : for thou hast
need of him as of thine own soul.”
Benny, Criminal Code of the Jews
according to the Talmud Massecheth
Synhedrin, p. 36.
^ Winter, Die Stellung der Sklaven
bci dot Jude.} i , p. 41.
Berakhoth, fol. 47 B, (pioted by
llershon, I'reasnres of the Talmud^
p. 81. R. Sat/inel, qiuMed by Andre,
op. cit, p. 180 ry.
^ Lane, Alanners and Ct/sioms of
the Afodoni Egyptians^ p. 116. Cf.
Munzinger, Ostafrikanische Studieti,
p. 245 sq. ; Ameer Ali, Eife a>id
'Teachings of AIo hammed., p. y](i sq.
^ I.ane, Arabian Society in the
Aliddle Ages, p. 255, Lane-Boole,
Speeches and 'J 'able- 'Talk of the Prophet
Alohartimad., p. 163.
Lane, Arabiati Socie/y, 1:1. 254.
Lane -Poole, Speeches^ p. 163.
XXVfl
SLAVERY
order them to do anything beyond their power, and in the
hot season, during the hottest hours of the day, he should
let them rest/ He may marry them to whom he will, but
he may not separate them when married.^ He may,
generally, give them away or sell them as he pleases, but
he must not separate a mother from her child. The
Prophet said, Whoever is the cause of separation between
mother and child, by selling or giving, God will separate
him from his friends on the day of resurrection.’'^ Nor
is a* master allowed to alienate a female slave who has
borne to him a child which he recognises as his own ; and
at his death the mother is entitled to emancipation.^^ To
fiberate a slave is regarded as an act highly acceptable to
God, and as an expiation for certain sins."’ These rules, it
should be added, are not only recognised in theory, but
derive additional support from general usage. In the
Muhammedan world the slave generally lives on easy
terms with his master. He is often treated as a member
of the family, and occasionally exercises much influence
upon its affairs.^' In certain countries at least, it is held
disreputable or disgraceful for a person to sell his slave,
except perhaps in case of absolute necessity or in con-
sequence of intolerable behaviour on the part of the
slave. In Persia custom demands that on certain festive
occasions, such as the birth of a child or a wedding, one
^ Lane, Arabian Soriefy^ ]). 254.
Lane-Puole, Speeches, p. 163. Sachau,
Aluham?nedanisckcs Recht, pp. 18,
102.
" Lane, JModern Egyptians, p. 115.
^ Ibid. p. 1 1 5, I>ane, Arabian
Society, p. 255. Ameer Ali, Life of
Mohammed, ]:>. 374 sij.
Lane, Abodern Egyptia/is, p. 116.
® Koran, xxiv. 33. Amcor Ali,
Life of Mohammed, pp. 373, 377.
Bellrame, II Sennaar e lo Sciangallah,
i. 46. Lane, Alodcrn Egyptians,
p. 1 19.
^ Lane, Arabian Society, p. 253 sgt/.
Fulak, Fersien, i. 251, 255. Urqu-
harl, Spirit of the East, ii. 403,
Barton, Fi/grimage to A l-AIadinah PsF
Meccah, i. 61. Munzinger, Ostafrikan-
ischc Stndien, p. 1 55. Bellrame, //
Sennaar, i. 46 sejg. Loir, ‘ L’esclavage
en Timisie,’ in Reznie scientifique,
.scr. iv. vol. xii. 592 sq. Villot,
Air nr s, coutnmes et institutions des
indigenes de F AIgtrie, [). 250. Meakin,
Moors, p. 133. Chavanne, Die
Sahara, p. 389 (Arabs of the Salaira).
]k)mmerol. Among the IVomen of the
Sahara, p. 161 sqq. Dyveyrier,
Exploration du Sahara, p. 339.
Hoiirst, Snr le Niger et an pays des
Tonaregs, p. 206 (Tiniarcg). 1 lanoteau
and Letourneux, La Kabylie, ii. 143.
Reade, Saimge Africa, p. 582.
" Bolak, Fersien, i. 250. Bellrame,
II Sinnaar, i. 47, 248. Munzinger,
Ostafri ha nisc he Stndien, p. 155.
SLAVERY
or several of the slaves of the family should be set free ; ^
and both there and in other Muhammedan countries
testamentary manumissions are of frequent occurrence.''^
In Morocco a slave is sometimes allowed j||pertain amount
of liberty that he may earn enough to buy his freedom ; ®
whilst among the Bedouins of the Arabian Desert described
by Burckhardt, slaves are always emancipated after a
certain lapse of time.'* No stigma attaches to the
emancipated slave. It has been truly said that in Islam
slavery is regarded as an accident, not as a “ constitution
of nature,”"’ hence the freedman is socially on an equal
footing with a free-born citizen. He 'may without dis- ,
credit marry his former master’s daughter, and become the
head of the family. Eimancipated slaves have repeatedly
risen to the highest offices, they have ruled kingdoms and
founded dynasties.*'
According to the Laws of Manu, the mythical legislator
of ancient India, there are slaves of seven kinds, namely,
“ he who is made a capt've under a standard, he who
serves for his daily food, he who is born in the house, he
who is bought and he who is given, he who is inherited
from ancestors, and he who is enslaved by way of punish-
ment.” ^ The last mentioned class consists of persons
who have lost their freedom because they have been unable
to pay a debt or a fine, or because they have left a religious
order. “ The slave is not necessarily a Sfidra, or member
of the lowest of the four Indian castes, but Kshatriyas
may become the slaves of Brahmanas and Vaisyas of
Brahmanas and Kshatriyas.*’ On the other hand, the
Sfidras as such were not slaves, though it was their duty
to serve the other castes ; they chose the persons to whom
they would offer service, and claimed adequate compensa-
1 Polak, op. cit. i. 250. ^ Ibid. p. 375 sq. Bosworth Smith,
^ Ibid. i. 250. Mcakin, op. cit. Mohanuned and Alohammedanism,
p, 139. PP- 206, 21 1 sq.
Meakin, op. cit. p. 139. Laws of Manu, viii. 415.
^ Burckhardt, Notes on the Bedouins ® BUhlcr, in hi.s translation of the
and Wahdbys, p. 202. Laws of Mann, in Sacred Books of the
® Ameer Ali, Life of ALohawmedf Bast, xxv. 326, n. 415.
p. 375 - ^ P- 326, n. 415.
xxvri
SLAVERY
tion/ The power which a house-holder in India
possessed over his slaves is not exactly defined ; but he
is admonished not to have quarrels with them, and if
offended by any of them, to bear it without resen tment.“
In Apastamba’s Aphorisms it is said that a person may at
his pleasure stint himself, his wife, or his children, but
by no means a slave who does his work.’’ Elphinstone
wrote in 1839 ^History of India’ : — “Domestic
slayes are treated exactly like servants, except that they are
more regarded as belonging to the family. I doubt if they
are ever sold ; and they attract little observation, as there is
•nothing apparent^to distinguish them from freemen.”^
The priesthood of modern Buddhism teach that there are
five ways in which a master ought to assist his slave : —
“ He must not appoint the work of children to men, or
of men to children, but to each according to his strength ;
he must give each one his food and wages, according as
they are required ; when sick, he must free him from
work, and provide him with proper medicine ; when the
master has any agreeable and savoury food, he must
not consume the whole himself, but must impart a portion
to others, even to his slaves ; and if they work properly
for a long period, or for a given period, they must be set
free.”
In Greece, especially in earlier times, capture in war,
piracy, and kidnapping were common causes of slavery,^
and the condition washereditary. Other legitimate sources
were exposure of infants, except at Thebes,'^ and sale of
children by their parents.^ At Athens insolvent debtors
became the slaves of their creditors up to the time of
Solon ; and metics — that is, resident aliens — who did not
discharge the obligations imposed on them by the State,
’ Ingrai)!, Hii^ioiy of Slavery and VValion, Ilisfoire de P esclavage
Serfdo/n, p. 272. dans P anfii/uilt^, i. 161 sq^/, Richter,
- Trains of Manic y iv. iSo, 185. /die Sk/roerei ini grieeJiischen A Iter -
^ A/as/aw da, ii. 4. 9. 11. tn/ne, p. 39 sqq.
Elphinstone, History of India, Aelian, Ilisloria varia, ii. 7.
p. 203. ^ VValion, op. cii. i. 1 59 .sv/.
Hardy, Manual of /iudhisin, ^ IMutarcji, Pdta Sotonis, xiii. 4.
p. 500.
VOL. I
Y y
SLAVERY
were sold as slaves, as were also foreigners who had fraudu-
lently possessed themselves of the rights of citizens.^ At
least in a later age the majority of slaves seem to have
been of barbarian origin ; ^ indeed, after the Peloponnesian
war the principle that captives taken in wars between
Greek states should be ransomed and not enslaved was
commonly recognised, though not always followed in
practice/*^ As we have seen, the master had not the power
of life and death over his slave.** At sanctuaries the lifter
found a refuge from cruel oppression.^^ If maltreated he
could demand to be sold ; and he could purchase his
liberty with his peculium by agreement with his master.^'
But by manumission he only entered into an intermediate
condition between slavery and complete freedom ; thus, at
Athens the freedman was in relation to the State a metic
and in relation to his master a client.^ Domestic slaves
often lived on terms of intimacy with their masters,^ but
as a class slaves were regarded with contempt even by men
like Plato and Aristotle. The former, whilst warning his
hearers against insolent and unjust behaviour towards
slaves, observes that they should be treated with severity,
not admonished as if they were freemen, but punished,
and only addressed in words of command. Aristotle
compares the relation of the master to his slave with that
of the soul to the body and of the craftsman to his tool,
and adds that there can be friendship between them only
in so far as the slave is regarded not as a slave but as a
fellow human being. But whilst the state of slavery
always entailed disgrace, the question was raised whether
the master’s power over his slave was based on justice or
^ Wallon, op. cit. i. 160 $q. Richter, op. cif. p. 140 sq.
op. cit. p. 46. ^ Ingram, op. cit. p. 27 sq. Wallon,
Hermann- Uliimner, Lehrbuch dcr op. cit. i. 335 sq. Richter, op. cit.
gricchisckoi Privatalicrthiinicr., p. 86. p. 151.
Richter, op. cit. p. 48. ^ Richter, op. cit. p. 157. Wallon,
^ Schmidt, Eihik der alten Griechen, op. cit. i. 346 sqq.
ii. 204, 205, 283. Hermann- Blumner, ® Schmidt, op. cit. ii. 212. Richter,
op. cit. p. 86 sq. op. cit. p. 15 1.
Supra, p. 425. ^ Plato, Leges, vi. 777 sq.
Wallon, op. cit. i. 310 sq. Aristotle, Ethica Nicomachea, viii.
Schmidt, op. cit. ii. 218 .n/. Richter, 11. (> sq. Idem^ Politica, i. 5, p. 1254.
SLAVERY
on force, and in Greece, for the first time, we meet with
the opinion that the institution of slavery is contrary to
Nature, and that it is the law which, unjustly, makes one
man a slave and another free.^ However, Aristotle was
no doubt in general agreement with his age when he
declared that the barbarians, on account of their inferiority,
are intended by Nature to be the slaves of the Greeks.-
The Roman jurists held up slavery as a mitigation of
the ^horrors of war : the capture and preservation of
enemies, they said, was its sole and exclusive origin in the
past.^ But in Rome as elsewhere, when once established,
it contained in itself the germ of extension ; all the
children of a female slave followed the condition of the
mother, according to the principle applicable to the off-
spring of the lower animals- — ^^H^artus sequitur ventrem.’’
And sooner or later, when these sources proved insufficient
to maintain the supply, a regular commerce in slaves was
established, which was based on the systematically prose-
cuted hunting of men in foreign lands.^ To a much
smaller extent the slave class was recruited by Roman
citizens — by children sold by their fathers, by insolvent
debtors, or by criminals condemned to servitude as a
punishment for some heinous offence.'^ The idea of a
Roman becoming the slave of a fellow-citizen was never
quite agreeable to the Roman mind. According to an
ancient law the debtor, after being made over to the
creditor, should be sold abroad or traris Tiberim!' Sub-
sequently, in 326 B.C., the creditor’s lien was restricted to
the goods of his debtor, if the latter was a Roman
citizen ; ' and during the Pagan Empire the sale of free-
^ Idem., Poliika^ i. 3, p. 1253 b.
Ibid, i. 2, 6, pp. 1252 b, 1255 a.
See Euripides, Iphigcnia in d/dide,
1400 S(/.
^ M iiD ter, Exposition of Roman Iaiw^
p. 160 stj. Insti/ntiones, i. 3. 3: —
“Slaves are called se 7 'zn\ because
generals are wont to sell their captives,
and so to preserve {seo-tnif'c), and not
to destroy tlieni. They are also called
tnancipia^ because they are taken from
the enemy with the strong hand [manu
capinnim'], ”
■* Mommsen, History of Rome, iii,
305 S(j, Wall on, op, ciL ii. 46 sqq.
Ingram, op. cit. p. 38.
^ Wallon, op. lit. ii, l8 sqq. Ingram,
op. cit. ]). 39. Inst itntiones, i. 12. 3.
® Mackenzie, Stttdies in Roma?i
Law, p. 94.
" Livy, Ilistorice Ro 7 /ia 7 nv, viii. 28.
Wallon, op. cit. ii. 29, n. i.
Y Y 2
SLAVERY
born children by their fathers was prohibited.^ The
power^ originally unlimited, which the master had over
his slave was also, in the course of time, subjected to
limitations. We have seen that since the days of Claudius
and Antoninus Pius legal check was put on the master’s
right of killing his slave. The Lex Petronia, a.d. 61,
forbade masters to compel their slaves to fight with wild
beasts.'*^ In the time of Nero an official was appointed to
hear complaints of the wrongs done by masters to their
slaves.'^ Antoninus Pius directed that slaves treated with
excessive cruelty, who had taken refuge at an altar or
imperial image, should be sold ; and this provision was
extended to cases in which the master had employed a
slave in a way degrading to him or beneath his character.*'
In public auctions of slaves regard was paid to the claims
of relationship/' and in the interpretation of testaments it
was assumed that members of the same fiimily were not
to be separated by the division of the succession.' In
those days when Roman slavery had lost its original
patriarchal and, to speak with Mommsen,^ in some
measure innocent’’ character, when the victories of Rome
and the increasing slave trade had introduced into the city
innumerable slaves, when those simpler habits of life which
in early times somewhat mitigated the rigour of the law
had changed — the lot of the Roman slave was often
extremely hard, and numerous acts of shocking cruelty
were committed.'^ But we also hear, from the early days
of the Empire, that masters who had been cruel to their
slaves were pointed at with disgust in all parts of the city,
and were hated and loathed. And with a fervour which
can hardly be surpassed Seneca and other Stoics argued that
the slave is a being with human dignity and human rights,
borji of the same race as ourselves, living the same life,
^ Supra^ p. 615. p. 159.
- Supra., p. 425 Si/. ' VVallon, op. cit. iii. 53.
Diiirs'ta., xlviii. 8. il. 2. ^ Mommsen, Iftslory of Rorie^ iii.
^ Seneca, I)c hencficiis., iii. 22. 3. 305.
Wallem, op. cit. iii. 57 sq. Ingram, Sec Lecky, History of Piiiropean
p. 63. Morals., i, 302 sq.
^ WwwXrix, Exposition of Roman La%v^ Seneca, Do ctemoitia, i. 18. 3.
SLAVERY
and dying the same death — in short, that our slaves are
also men, and friends, and our fellow-servants.” ^ Epictetus
even went so far as to condemn altogether the keeping of
slaves, a radicalism explicable from the history of his own
life. ‘‘ What you avoid suffering yourself,” he says,
‘‘seek not to impose on others. You avoid slavery, for
instance ; take care not to enslave. P'or if you can bear
to exact slavery from others, you appear to have been
yourself a slave.” These teachings could not fail to
influence both legislation and public sentiment. Imbued
with the Stoic philosophy, the jurists of the classical period
declared that all men are originally free by the law of
Nature, and that slavery is only an institution of the
Law of Nations, by which one man is made the property
of another, in opposition to natural right.” ^
Considering that Christianity has commonly been
represented as almost the sole cause of the mitigation and
final abolishment of slavery in Europe, it deserves
special notice that the chief improvement in the condition
of slaves at Rome took place at so early a period that
Christianity could have absolutely no share in it. Nay,
for about two hundred years after it was made the official
religion of the Empire there was an almost complete
pause in the legislation on the subject.^ Under Justinian
certain reforms were introduced : — enfranchisement was
facilitated in various ways ; the rights of Roman citizens
were granted to emancipated slaves, who had previously
occupied an intermediate position between slavery and
perfect freedom ; *’ and though the law still refused to
recognise the marriages of slaves, Justinian gave them a
legal value after emancipation in establishing rights of
succession.^ But the inferior position of the slave was
asserted as sternly as ever. He belonged to the
^ Ideui^ Epislolcc^ 47. Ident, De Insfitiitioncs^ i. 3. 2.
bene/ifiis^ iii. 28. r/picletus, Diss^r/a- ^ Cf. Lecky, History of European
tiones^ i. 13. See also the collection Alorais^ ii. 64.
of statements referring to slavery made Justituiiones, i. 5 sqq.
by Holland, /uu'yn of the Stoics^ Ibid. i. 5 - 3 5 7 - 4 -
p. 186 sqij. Ibid. iii. 7 pr.
^ bvpictetus, Fragmenta^ 42.
SLAVERY
“corporeal” property of his master, he was reckoned
among things which are tangible by their nature, like
land, raiment, gold, and silverd The constitution of
Antoninus Pius restraining excessive severity on the part
of masters was enforced, but the motive for this was not
evangelic humanity.'-^ It is said in the Institutes of
Justinian, “This decision is a just one; for it greatly
concerns the public weal, that no one be permitted to
misuse even his own property.” •
It is curious to note that the inconsistency of slavery
with the tenet, “ Do to others as you would be done by,”
though emphasised by a pagan philosopher, never seems*
to have occurred to any of the early Christian writers.
Christianity recognised slavery from the beginning. The
principle that all men are spiritually equal in Christ does
not imply that they should be socially equal in the world.
Slavery does not prevent anybody from performing the
duties incumbent on a Christian, it does not bar the way
to heaven, it is an external affair only, nothing but a
name. He only is really a slave who commits sin.'^
Slavery is of course a burden, but a burden which has
been laid upon the back of transgression. Man when
created by God was free, and nobody was the slave of
another until that just man Noah cursed Ham, his
offending son ; slavery, then, is a punishment sent by
Him who best knows how to proportionate punishment
to offence.'' The slave himself ought not to desire to
become free,^ nay, if the master offers him freedom he
ought not to accept it.*^ Not one of the Fathers even
^ InstitKiiones^ ii. 2. I.
" Cf, Mil man, History of Latin
Christianity^ ii. 14.
^ [nsiitntio/tosy i. 8. 2.
Gregory Nazianzen, OrationeSy xiv.
25 (Migne, Patrolog^iu’ cursus, Ser.
Graeca, xxxv. 891 IdoHy Car-
})iinay i. 2. 26. 29 {ibid, xxxvii, 853) ;
i- 2. 33. \ZlS(iii. \ihid. xxxvii. 937^ .sv/.).
St. Chrysostom, In cap. IX. Genes.
Homilia XXIX. 7 {ibid. liii. 270).
Idem, In Epist. I. ad Cor. Hofnilia
XIX. 5 {ibid. Ixi. 158)- St. Ambrose,
In Epist olavi ad Cotossenses, 3 (Migne,
op. tit. Ser. Lat. xvii. 439).
® St. Augustine, De civitate Dei,
xix. 15 (Migne, op. cit. xli. 643 sq.).
St. Ignatius, Epistola ad Poly-
carpnm, 4 (Migne, op. cit. Ser. Graeca,
V. 723 sq.). St. Augustine, Ennaratio
in Psalmnm CXXIV. 7 (Migne, op.
cit. xxxvii. 1653).
Laurent, Etudes sur Ihistoire de
r hntnanitdy iv, 117.
xxvti
SLAVERY
hints that slavery is unlawful or improper.' In the early
age martyrs possessed slaves, and so did abbots, bishops,
popes, monasteries, and churches ; ^ Jews and pagans only
were prohibited from acquiring Christian slaves.® So
little was the abolition of slavery thought of that a
Council at Orleans, in the middle of the sixth century,
expressly decreed the perpetuity of servitude among the
descendants of slaves.' On the other hand, the Church
shojved a zeal to prevent accessions to slavery from
capture, but her exertions were restricted to Christian
prisoners of war.’’ As late as the nineteenth century the
•right of enslaving captives was defended by Bishop
Bouvier.''
The Apostles reminded slaves of their duties towards
their masters and masters of their duties towards their
slaves.’^ The same was done by Councils and Popes.
The Council of Gangra, about the year 324, pronounced
its anathema on anyone who should teach a slave to despise
his master on pretence of religion ; ® and so much
importance was attached to this decree that it was inserted
in the epitome of canons which Hadrian I. in 773 presented
to Charlemagne in Rome."
instances in which masters
humanity to their slaves.'®
^ Cf. IJabington, Influence of
Christianity in Promoting the AboJi-
iion of Slavery in Europe^ p. 29.
" Ibid. }i. 22. Potgic.sser, Com-
nientarii juris Gcrnianici dc statu
seroornm^ i. 4. 8, p. 176. Muratori,
Dissertazioni sopra le antic hita italiane,
i. 244.
^ Concilium Toletamtrn IV. a.d.
633, can. 66 (Labi.)e'Mansi, Sacrorum
Conciliorum collect io, \. 635). Elakey,
Temporal Benefits of Christianity.,
P- 397 * Mores Catholici, ii.
^*41. Cibrarin, Della schiavitu e del
senmyflo, i. 272. Jxivicrc, II Eglise et
I esc lavage, }). 350.
Concilium Aureliancnse IV. aiiout
A.D, 545, can. 32 (Labbe-Mansi, op.
cii. ix. 1 18 Si].).
^ Concilium Rhemense, al.)out a.d.
630, can. 22 (Labbe-Mansi, op. cit. x.
But there are also many
are recommended to show
According to Gregory IX.
597). (Iratian, Derretum, ii. 12. 2.
13 s]]. Baroniu.s, Annales Ecclesiastici,
A.D. 1263, ch. 74, vol. xxii. 124.
Le lilant, Inscriptions chrAiennes de la
Gaule, ii. 284 S]]. l>al;)ingti)n, op. cit.
pp. 51 s]]., 94 s]. Nys, le droit de
la guerre ct les prlcurseurs dc Grotius,
p. 1 1 4.
'• Eouvier, Instihitiones philosophic^,
p. 566.
' Ephesians, vi. 5 s]q. Coloss lans,
iii. 22 sqq.'y iv. I.
^ Concilium Gaugrense, about A.D.
324, can. 3 (Labl)c-Man.si, op. cit. ii.
1102, 1 106, n 10).
‘ l^pitoine caipjiuiin, (juain lla-
(.Irianus I. Carolo inagno obtulit,
A.D. I)C(E. XXIII. ’ in Labbe-Mansi,
op. cit. xii, 863.
liabington, op. cit. p. 58 sqq.
SLAVERY
‘‘ the slaves who were washed in the fountain of holy
baptism should be more liberally treated in consideration
of their having received sO great a benefit.’’ ^ Slaves who
had taken refuge from their masters in churches or
monasteries were not to be given up until the master had
sworn not to punish the fugitive ; or they were never
given up, but became slaves to the sanctuary.^ The
Church, as we have seen, protected the life of the slave by
excommunicating for a couple of years masters \^ho
killed their slaves.*^ She prohibited the sale of Christian
slaves to Jews and heathen nations. The Council
of Chalons, in the middle of the seventh century,
ordered that no Christians should be sold outside the
kingdom of Clovis, so that they might not get into
captivity or become the slaves of Jewish masters ; and
some Anglo-Saxon laws similarly forbade the sale of
Christians out of the country, and especially into bondage
to heathen, that those souls perish not that Christ
bought with his own life.” ^ The clergy sometimes
remonstrated against slave markets ; but their indignation
never reached the trade in heathen slaves,'^ nor was the
master’s right of selling any of his slaves whenever he
pleased called in question at all. The assertion made by
many writers that the Church exercised an extremely
favourable influence upon slavery surely involves a great
exaggeration. As late as the thirteenth century the
master practically had the power of life and death over
his slave. Throughout Christendom the purchase and
^ Baronins, Aiinales Ecc/esias/iri,
A.D. 1238, ch. 62, vo]. xxi, 204.
Mil man, oj). cil, ii. 51, Riviere,
op. cit. p. 306. Dll Boys, Ifistoire du
droit cr I mined dcs peiipics moder/ieSj ii.
246, n. I.
^ ‘Concilium Kin^esburiense sub
Bertulpho,’ in Wilkins, Concilia
Magtue Britan nice et JJihernnE., i. 18 1.
Snpra, p. 426.
^ Concilium Bhemense^ about A.J).
630, can. II (Labbe-Mansi, op. cit. x.
596). Concilium, /.iptinense., a.d.
743, can. 3 {ihid. xii. 371). Hefele,
Beitrdge zur Kirchengeschichte, i. 218.
Jde?n.^ History of the Councils of the
Church. V. 21 1.
Concilium Citin' lonense, about A.D.
650, can. 9 (Labbe-Mansi, op. cit. x.
1191).
" Julius of Ittheln:d.f v. 2 ; vi. 9.
Lazus of Cnut., ii. 3.
Ilullniann, Sticdtezvcsen des MitteB
allerSy i. 80 s//. Loring ]:lrace, Gesta
Cludsti, p. 229. Riviere, op. cit.
P* 325-
‘‘ \anoski, De Vahohtion de Pescla-
vage ancien an moycn a^e, p. 74 Sf/.
Allard, Bes eschwes chigHiois dipuis
les premiers temps de P Eglise, p. 487 ;
&c.
Supra i p. 427 sc/.
slav?:ry
the sale of men, as property transferred from vendor to
buyer, was recognised as a legal transaction of the same
validity with the sale of other merchandise, land or cattled
Slaves had a title to nothing but subsistence and clothes
from their masters, all the profits of their labour accruing
to the latter ; and if a master from indulgence gave his
slaves any or fixed allowance for their subsistence,
they had no right of property in what they saved out of
that, but all that they accumulated belonged to their
master/^ A slave or a freedman was not allowed to bring
a criminal charge against a free person, except in the case
of a crimen majestatis^ and slaves were incapable of
being received as witnesses against freemend The old
distinction between the marriage of the freeman and the
concubinage of the slave was long recognised by the
Church : slaves could not marry, but had only a right of
coniubernmm^ and their unions did not receive the nuptial
benediction of a priest/^ Subsequently, when conjunction
between slaves came to be considered a lawful marriage,
they were not permitted to marry without the consent of
their . master, and such as transgressed this rule were
punished very severely, sometimes even with death/*
The gradual disappearance of slavery in Europe during
the latter part of the Middle Ages has also commonly
been in the main attributed to the influence of the
Church/ But this opinion is hardly supported by facts.
It is true that the Church in some degree encouraged the
manumission of slaves. I’hough slavery was considered a
^ Potgiesscr, op. ci( . ii. 4. 5, p. 429.
Miliiian, op. cit. li. 16.
Potgiesser, op. cit. ii. 10, p. 528 .sv/i/.
Du Cange, Giossariu/ji ad scriptorcs
niedue et injinuc Latiiiitaiis, vi. 451*
RoberLson, History of the Keiyn of the
Emperor Charles V. i. 274.
Polgiessor, op. cit. iii. 3. 2, p. 612.
** Bcaunianoir, Coutumes dii Beait-
7Joisis, xxxix. 32, vol, ii. 103. Du
Cange, op. cit. vi. 452. Potgicsstrr,
op. cit. iii. 3. I, p. 611.
^ Potgiesser, op. cit. ii. 2. 10 S(/.,
P- 354 -'Y-
Jhid. ii. 2. 12, p. 355 sq.
Clarkson, Essay on Slavery
]). T9 s<]. P>iot, De raholition de
desc/ai'a^e ancien err Occident, p. xi.
'Pherou, l.e Christ ianisme ct I'cschis'ayc,
p. 147. Marlin, /■//.v/<7/;v; d'rcince jns-
quen 1789, iii. ii, n. 2. Palmes, Rt
Protest ant is mo corn par ado con cl Catoli-
cismo, i. 285. Plakey, op. cit. p. 170.
Vanoski, op. cit. p. 75. Cochin,
H abolition de P esclavage, ii. 349, 45S.
PilLre, Etudes snr tes Par'bares et le
A/oyen Age, p. 230 sq. Allard, op. cit.
p. 490. Tedeschi, La schiaviih, p. 68.
I.ecky, History of Rationalism in
Kiii'ope, ii. 216, 236 sqq. Maine,
Inlernational Laiu , p. 160. Kidd,
Social Evolution^ p. 168.
SIAVERY
perfectly lawful institution, the enfranchisement of a
fellow-Christian was deemed a meritorious act, and was
sometimes strongly recommended on Christian principles.
At the close of the sixth century it was affirmed that, as
Christ had come to break the chain of our servitude and
restore our primitive liberty, so it was well for us to
imitate Him by making free those whom the law of
nations had reduced to slavery ; ^ and the same doctrine
was again proclaimed at various times down to fhe
sixteenth century. “ In the Carlovingian period the abbot
Smaragdus expressed the opinion that among other good
and salutary works each one ought to let slaves go free,
considering that not nature but sin had subjected them to
their masters.^^ In the latter part of the twelfth century
the prelates of France, and in particular the Archbishop
of Sens, pretended that it was an obligation of conscience
to accord liberty to all Christians, relying on a decree of a
Council held at Rome by Pope Alexander III.^ And in
one of the later compilations of German mediaeval law
it was said that the Lord Jesus, by his injunction to
render unto Caesar the things which are Caesar’s and unto
God the things that are God’s, indicated that no man is
the property of another, but that every man belongs to
God/' Slaves were liberated for God’s love,” or ‘‘for
the remedy” or “ransom of the soul.” In the
formularies of manumission given by the monk Marcuifus
in the seventh century we read, for instance : — “ He that
releases his slave who is bound to him, may trust that
God will recompense him in the next world ” ; ‘ For the
remission of my sins, I absolve thee” “For the glory
^ St. Greg(^ry the Great, Episiohp^ ast, Col/ectio consiiehidhuifji et legum
vi. 12 (Migne, Patrologue cursus^ imperiaiiuni^ 158).
Ixxvii. 803 Gratian, op. cit. ii. Du Cange, op. cit. iv. 460 sqq.
12. 2. 68. l^jtgiesser, op. cit. iv. I. 3, Potgicsser, op. cit. iv. 12. 5, p. 751 sqq.
p. 666 sq. Murat{)ri, op. cit. i. 249. Robertson,
“ Rabington, op. cit. p. 180. op. cit. i. 323. Mibnan, op. cit. ii.
^ Smaragdus, Via Kegia., 30 51 sq,
(d’Achery, Spiciicgiiini , i. 253). Marcuifus, Forniida:^ ii. 32 (Migne,
fie Roulaiin-illiers, Ilistoirc de op. cit. Ixxxvii. 747)-
l\i)icicn gouvcnieinent de la France.^ i. ^ Ibid. ii. 33 (Migne, op. cit. Ixxxvii.
3 '?- ... , 748).
'' Sfcculum Saxonum, iii. 42 (Gold-
SLAVERY
of God's name and for my eternal retribution,” &cd
Too much Importance, however, has often been attached
to these phrases ; the most trivial occurrences, such as
giving a book to a monastery, are commonly accompanied
by similar expressions, and it appears from certain
formulas that slaves were not only liberated, but also
bought and sold, ‘Mn the name of God.”" Nor can we
suppose that It was from religious motives only that
manumissions were encouraged by the clergy. It has
been pointed out that, as dying persons were frequently
inclined to make considerable donations for pious uses, it
was more immediately tor the interest of churchmen,
that people of inferior condition should be rendered
capable of acquiring property, and should have the free
disposal of what they had acquired.” It also seems that
those who obtained their liberty by the influence of the
clergy had to reward their benefactors, and that the
manumission should for this reason be confirmed by the
Church.*^ And whilst the Church favoured liberation of
the slaves of laymen, she took care to prevent liberation
of her own slaves ; like a physician she did not herself
swallow the medicine which she prescribed to others.
She allowed alienation of such slaves only as showed a
disposition to run away.'^ The Council of Agatho, in
506, considered it unfair to enfranchise the slaves of
monasteries, seeing that the monks themselves were daily
compelled to labour ; and, as a matter of fact, the slaves
of monasteries were everywhere among the last who were
manumitted.' In the seventh century a Council at
Toledo threatened with damnation any bishop who should
liberate a slave belonging to the Church, without giving
^ IMarculfus, ii. 34 (Migne, /yanks, p. 274.^7/.
op. at. Ixxxvii. 748). ® Gratian, op, cit. ii. 12. 2. 54.
" Jiabini^ton, op. cii. p. 61, n. 6. ^ Conciliuin Agathoise, A.n. 506,
/^'ormake 2, ^ Vcndiiio cun. 56 (Lal^be-Mansi, op. cit. viii.
cle servo’ (lialiize, Capitularia regum 334).
ii. 497) Domino mag- ' liallam, Viczu of the State of’
nilico fiatri illi empturi, ego in Dei litirope dm/ng the Middle Ages (eel.
nomine ille vciulitor.” 1837), i. 221.
■* Millar, Origin of the Distinction of
SLAVERY
due compensation from his own property, as it was
thought impious to inflict a loss on the Church of
Christ ; ^ and according to several ecclesiastical regulations
no bishop or priest was allowed to manumit a slave in the
patrimony of the Church unless he put in his place two
slaves of equal value/^ Nay, the Church was anxious not
only to prevent a reduction of her slaves, but to increase
their number. She zealously encouraged people to give
up themselves and their posterity to be the slaves ^of
churches and monasteries, to enslave their bodies — as
some of the charters put it — in order to procure the
liberty of their sou Is. And in the middle of the seventh
century a Council decreed that the children of incontinent
priests should become the slaves of the churches where
their fathers officiated.'^
The disappearance of mediaeval slavery has further, to
some extent, been attributed to the efforts of kings to
weaken the power of the nobles.'" Thus Louis X. and
Philip the Long of France issued ordinances declaring
that, as all men were by nature free, and as their kingdom
was called the kingdom of the bVanks, they would have
the fact to correspond with the name, and emancipated all
persons in the royal domains upon paying a just com-
pensation, as an example for other lords to follow.*"
Muratori believes that in Italy the wars during the
twelfth and following centuries contributed more than
anything else to the decline of slavery, as there was a
need of soldiers and soldiers must be freemend Ac-
cording to others the disappearance of slavery was largely
effected by the great famines and epidemics with which
Europe was visited during the tenth, eleventh, and twelfth
^ Conciliuni Toletanuni IV. A.I>. 29).
633, can. 67 (Labbe-Mansi, op, cit. x. •’ Robertson, op. cif. i. 47 ,ry.
635). Millar, op. cit. p. 276 .^qq,
Gratian, op. cit. ii. 12. 2. 58. ^ Decrusy, IsainIx-rL, and Jourdan,
Pot^iesser, op. cit. iv. 2, 4, p. 673. Recticil c^tUnU-al. dcs ancioines lois
Du Canine, op. cit. iv. 1286. fj-aiicaiscs., iii. 102 sqq.
PotL^lesser, op. cit. i. i. , p. 5 sqq. " Aluratori, op. cit. i. 234x7. Idem.,
Rol)ei'lson, op. cit. x. 326. Kemim Ifalicariwi scriptores., xviii.
Concilium Toletanum IX. a.d. 268, 292.
655, can. lo (Labbe- Mansi, op. cit. xi.
XXVIt
SLAVERY
centuries.^ The number of slaves was also considerably
reduced by the ancient usage of enslaving prisoners of
war being replaced by the more humane practice of
accepting ransom for them, which became the general
rule In the later part of the Middle Ages, at least in
the case of Christian captives.'-^ But it seems that the
chief cause of the extinction of slavery in Europe was
its transformation into serfdom.
This transformation has been traced to the diminished
supply of slaves, which made it the interest of each family
to preserve indefinitely its own hereditary slaves, and to
• keep up their number by the method of propagation.
The existence and physical well-being of the slave became
consequently an object of greater value to his master, and
the latter found it most profitable to attach his slaves to
certain pieces of land.’^ Moreover, the cultivation of the
ground required that the slaves should have a fixed
residence in different parts of the master’s estate, and
when a slave had thus been for a long time engaged in
a particular farm, he was so much the better qualified
to continue in the management of it for the future. By
degrees he therefore came to be regarded as belonging to.
the stock upon the ground, and was disposed of as a
part of the estate which he had been accustomed to
cultivate.*^
But serfdom itself was merely a transitory condition
destined to lead up to a state of entire liberty. As
the proprietor of a large estate could not oversee the
behaviour of his villeins, scattered over a wide area of
land, the only means of exciting their industry would be
to offer them a reward for the work which they per-
formed. Thus, besides the ordinary maintenance allotted
^ Biot, op. rit. p. 318 .?////• S:ico, towns make mention of tlie sale of
Ilisioria de la esclavihid, iii. 241 sifij. slaves, who jnobahly were Turkish
Ward,* Rjiuiiiry into the Fouiida- eaj)tivos (Nys, l.e droit dc la yiierre et
tion and Hi story of the I.anv of N^at ions les preonrseurs dc Grot ins ^ p. I40).
in Europe.^ i. 298 sq. Ikilungton, op. Storch, Conrs dEcononiie politique,
cit. p. 147. Ayala, De jure ct ofjiciis iv. 260. Ingram, op. cit. p. 72.
bellicis, i. 5. 19. In the sixteenth ^ Millar, op. cit. p. 263 sqq.
century the statutes of some Italian
SLAVERY
to them, they frequently obtained a part of the profits,
and became capable of having separate property.’ In
many cases this no doubt enabled the serf to purchase
his liberty out of his earnings ; whilst in others the
master would have an interest in allowing him to pay
a fixed rent and to retain the surplus for himself The
landlord was then freed from the hazard of accidental
losses, and obtained not only a certain, but frequently
an additional, revenue from his land, owing to tjie
greater exertions of cultivators who worked for their
own benefit;^ and at the same time the personal sub-
jection of the peasants naturally came to an end, as it
was of no consequence to the landlord how they con-
ducted themselves provided that they punctually paid the
rents. Nor was there any reason to insist that they
should remain in the firm longer than they pleased ;
for the profits it afforded made them commonly not more
willing to leave it than the proprietor was to put them
away.'^ Another factor which led to the disappearance of
serfdom was the encouragement which sovereigns, always
jealous of the great lords, gave to the villeins to encroach
upon their authority.'' We have convincing proof that in
England, before the end of Edward IIl.’s reign, the
villeins found themselves sufficiently powerful to protect
one another, and to withhold their ancient and accustomed
services from their lord.’^ In Germany, again, the land-
lords sometimes furnished their villeins with arms to
defend the cause of their master, and this undoubtedly
tended to their enfranchisement, as persons who are taught
to use and allowed to possess weapons will soon make
^ ciV. p. 264. Simonde de ^ Adam Smith, Wealth of Nations^
Sismondi, Ilistoire des rtlpuhlhjues p. 173. Millar, op. rit. p. 267
italienries du nioyen Age., xvi. 365 sq. Mill, Prineiples of Political Pcoaomy,
Gueranl, Cartulaire de P Abbaye de i. 309, 31 1. Dunham, op. cit. i.
Saint- Pire de Chartres^ i. p. xli. 228 sq. On the inctliciency of slave
Dunham, History of the Germanic labour, see also Storch, op. cit. iv.
Empit'e., i. 230. 275 sqq.
Sec Vinogradolf, Villai?tage in ^ Millar, op. cit. p. 269 sq.
England., p, 87 ; Pollock and Mait- ® Adam Smith, Wealth of Nations.,
land, History of English Law before p. 1 73.
the Time of Edivard /. i. 36, 427. Eden, State of the Poor^ i. 30.
xxvn
SLAVERY
themselves respected.^ A great number of villeins also
shook ofF the fetters of their servitude by fleeing for
refuge to some chartered town,^ where they became free
at once,'^ or, more commonly, after a certain stipulated
period — a year and a day,'^ or more ; and it seems,
besides, that the rapid disappearance of serfdom in the
prospering free towns indirectly, by way of example,
promoted the enfranchisement of rural serfs. ^ There are,
further, instances of lords liberating their villeins at the
intercession of their spiritual confessors, the clergy avail-
ing themselves of every opportunity to lessen the formid-
able power of their great rivals, the temporal nobility.^
But the influence which the Church exercised in favour of
the enfranchisement of serfs was even less than her share
in the abolition of slavery proper.^ She represented
serfdom as a divine institution, as a school of humility,
as a road to future glory. She was herself the greatest
^ Dunhain, op. cit. i. 229.
Guil)erlns de Novi^ij^ento, ‘ De vila
sua,’ in ] 5 ouquet, Kt')‘ni}i Calli-
caritin ct Frauricanivi sor/ploros, xii.
257. Fra^tncnluin historicum vitain
Liidovici VfT. sumniatini cuniplcctens,’
ibid. xii. 286. Heaiunanoir, op. ci(. xiv.
36, vul. ii, 237. Eden, op. cU. i. 30.
Laurent, op. cit. vii. 531 sq. Saco, op.
cit. iii. 252
I.aurcnt, op. fit. vii. 532.
^ Gian vide, Tract at ns de Lepibits ct
Consuctitdinihus Rciqni v. 5.
Lracton, Dc Legibus ct Consueiudinihus
Jtfzg/ne, fol. 198 b, vol. iii. 292 sq.
lieaninanoir, op. cit. xlv. 36, vol. ii.
237, Pollock and Maitland, op. cit.
i. 429, 648 sq. Grimm, Deutsche
Rechtsaitcrthii/uer^'p. 337 . tv/. Laurent,
op. cit. vii. 532.
^ l.aurent, op. cit. vii. 532.
Ibid. vii. 533 sq.
Thomas Smith, Coiumon-zvcalth of
Enghvid^ ]). 250. Eden, op. cit. i. 10.
Sugenheim, Geschichtc dcr A iifhcbung
der Leibeigezi schaft tind Hdrigkcit in
Europa^ p. 109.
^ Cf. Riviere, op. cit. p. 51 1.
Babington says {op. cit. p. 148 sq.)
that in the live-hundred pages of
Wilkins’ CoucHia^ which com]")rise the
ecclesiastical documents of the British
churches in tlm tlnrtccnth century, we
only find the follf>wirig regulations
concerning the unfree po|nilation ; —
that neither freemen nor villeins are to
be impeded in making their wills when
death approaches ; that monks are not
to alienate their less useful skives
{famulos) ; that Jews aie not allo^ved
to ])ossess Christian slaves. — -It was
said that “he puts a disgrace on God
who raises a villein above his station ”
{ibid, jx 150).
Adalliero, Car/nen ad Rotbertunz
regeziz Frazzeorunz., 291, 292, 297 sqq.
(Bouquet, op. cit. x. 70): — “The-
saurus, vest is, cunctis sunt pascua servi.
Nam valet ingenuus sine servis vivere
nullus. , . . Trijvlex ergo Dei domus
est, qum credilur una. Nunc orant
alii ; pugnant ; aliique la bo rant : Quie
tria simt simul, et scissuram non
patiuntur.’' St. Bonaventura, ({noted
by I.aurent, op. cit. vii. 522: — “Non
solum sectmdum humanam institu-
tionem, sed etiam secundum divinam
dispensationem, inter Ciiristianos sunt
domini et servi.”
Laurent, op. cit. vii. 523.
SLAV^ERY
serf-holder;' and so strenuously did she persist in re-
taining her villeins, that after Voltaire had raised his
powerful outcry in favour of liberty and Louis XVI.
himself had been induced to abolish “ the right of
servitude ” in consideration of “ the love of humanity,”
the Church still refused to emancipate her serfs.'^ But
whilst the cause of freedom owes little to the Christian
Church, it owes so much the more to the feelings of
humanity and justice in some of her opponents. • ,
Not long after serfdom had begun to disappear in
the most advanced communities of Christendom a new
kind of slavery was established in the colonies of Eiuropean ‘
states. It grew up under circumstances particularly
favourable to the employment of slaves. Whether slave
labour or free labour is more profitable to the employer
depends on the wages of the free labourer, and these
again depend on the numbers of the labouring population
compared with the capital and the land. In the rich and
underpeopled soil of the West Indies and in the Southern
States of America the balance of the profits between free
and slave labour was on the side of slavery. Hence
slavery was introduced there, and flourished, and could be
abolished only with the greatest difficulty.^
From a moral point of view negro slavery is interesting
chiefly because it existed in the midst of a highly developed
Christian civilisation, and nevertheless, at least in the
British colonies and the United States, was the most
brutal form of slavery ever known. It may be worth
while to consider more closely some points of the legisla-
tion relating to it.
In America, as elsewhere, the state of slavery was here-
ditary. The child of a female slave was itself a slave and
belonged to the owner of its mother even if its father
was a freeman, whereas the child of a free woman was
^ Laurent, op. cit. vii. 524. Sugenheim, op. cit. p. 156 sqq.
' Hettncr, (ieschichto der jranzosischen Laurent, op, cit. vii. 537 sq.
Lileratiir itn achlzehnten Jahrhitndert^ Mill, Principles of Political
p. 169. Babington, op. cit. p. 108. Economy.^ i. 31 1.
SLAVERY
rXJtVII
free even if its father was a slave.' When the slave-trade
was prohibited, heredity remained the bnly legitimate
source of slavery ; but even then a freeborn negro was far
from safe. In the British colonies and in all the Slave
States except one, every negro was presumed to be a slave
until he could prove the reverse.^ A man who, within
the limits of a slave-holding State, could exhibit a person
of African extraction in his custody was exempted from
all necessity of making proof how he had obtained him or
by what authority he claimed him as a slave. Nay more,
through the direct action of Congress it became law that
^persons known to be free should be sold as slaves in
order to cover the costs of imprisonment which they had
suffered on account of the false suspicion that they were
runaway slaves. This law was repeatedly put into effect.
“ How many crowned despots,” says Professor von Hoist,
“ can be mentioned in the history of the old world who
have done things which compare in accursedness with this
law to which the democratic republic gave birth ? ” ^
Slaves were defined as “ chattels personal in the hands
of their respective owners or possessors, and their executors,
administrators, and assigns, to all intents and purposes
whatsoever.”' In the British colonies and the American
Slave States they were at all times liable to be sold or
otherwise alienated at the will of their masters, as abso-
lutely as cattle, or any other personal effects. They were
^ Stroud, Lows relating to Slave rj in
the Urzited States 0/ Anier/ai^ p. \(ysqq.
Cobb, Inquiry into the Law of Negro
Slavery in the United States of
America^ p. 68. Stephen, Slavery of
the British West India Colonics, i.
122; Code Noir, 6dit du inois de
Mars 1685, art. 13, p. 35 sq. ; Ii^dit
donne au mois de Mars 1724, art. 10,
p. 288 sq. In Maryland, according to
an early enactment, which obtained
till the year 1699 or 1700, all the
children born of a slave were slaves
“as their fathers were” (Stroud, op.
cit. p. 14 sqq , ). In Cuba the nobler par-
ent determined the rank of the offspring
(Newman, Aztglo- Saxon Abolition of
VOL. I
Negro Slavery, p. 17).
Stephen, op, cit, i, 369 sq.
Stroud, op, cit, pp. 125, 126, 130.
Cobb, op, cit. p. 67. Wheeler, 'J'reatise
071 the Law of Slavery, p. 5 -
von Holst, Const it utioiial azid
Political Histozy of the United States,
i. 305.
Ikevard, Digest of the Public
Statute Law of South- Carolina, p. 229.
IViuce, Digest of the Laws of Geo 7 -gia,
p.^ 777. In the French Code Noir
(l.Cdit du^ mois de Mars 1685, art. 44,
p. 49 ; Edit donne au niois de Mars
1724, art. 40, p. 305) slaves are
declared to be “ meubles.”
Z Z
SLAVERY
also liable to be sold by process of law for satisfaction of
the debts of a living, or the debts or bequests of a deceased
master, at the suit of creditors or legatees. They were
transmitted by inheritance or by will to heirs at law or to
legatees, and in the distribution of estates they were dis-
tributed like other property.^ No regard was paid to
family ties. Except in Louisiana, where children under
ten years of age could not be sold separately from their
mothers,'^ no law existed to prevent the violent separation
of parents from their children or from eacli other.^ And
what the law did not prevent, the slave-owners did not
omit doing ; thus Virginia was known as a breeding-place
out of which the members of one household were sold
into every part of the country.^ All this, however,
holds true of the British colonies and Slave States only.
In the Spanish, Portuguese, and French colonies plantation
slaves were real estate, attached to the soil they cultivated.
They partook therewith of all the restraints upon volun-
tary alienation to which the possessor of the land was
there liable, and they could not be seized or sold by credi-
tors, for satisfaction of the debts of the owner." As
regards the sale of members of the same family the Code
Noir expressly says, “ Ne pourront etre saisis et vendus
sdparement, le mari et la femme, et leurs enfans impu-
beres, s’ils sont tous sous la puissance du meme Maitre.” ''
A slave could make no contract ; he could not even
contract marriage, in the juridical sense of the. word. The
association which took place among slaves and was
called marriage was virtually the same as the Roman
contubernium, a relation which had no sanctity and to which
no civil rights were attached." The master could when-
^ Stephen, o/>, cii, i. 62. Stroud,
op. cit. p. 84. Goodell, A juerii an Slave
Code in Theojy and Practice^ p. 63 sqq.
Peirce, Taylor, and King, Con-
solidation arid Kcvision of the Statutes
of the State [Louis iarnt], pp. 523,
550 i-y.
^ Stephen, op. eit. i. 62 sq. Stroud,
op. cit. p. 82.
^ J *earson, National Life and Char-
acter^ p. 210.
^ Stephen, op. cit. i. 69.
® Code Noir, Kdit du pnois de Mars,
1685, art. 47, p. 51 ; Edit dtmne au
mois de Mars 1724, art. 43, p, 306.
Cobb, op. cit. |). 240 sqq. Stroud,
op. cit. p. 99. Goodell, American
Slave Code, p. 105 sqq, Wheeler, op.
SLAVERY
ever he liked separate the ‘‘husband” and “wife”;
he could, if he pleased, commit “ adultery ” with the
“wife,” and was the absolute owner of all the children born
by her. A slave had “ no more legal authority over his
child than a cow has over her calf.” On the other hand,
the common rules of sexual morality were not enforced on
the slaves. They were not admonished for incontinence,
nor punished for adultery, nor prosecuted for bigamy.
Incontinence was rather thought a matter of course in the
slave. We are told that even in Puritan New England
female slaves in ministers’ and magistrates’ families bore
^children, black or yellow, without marriage, that no one
inquired who their fathers were, and that nothing more
was thought of it than of the breeding of sheep or swine.
And concerning the “ slave-quarters ” connected with the
plantations the universal testimony was that the sexes were
there “ herded together promiscuously, like beasts.” ^
Yet though slaves were regarded as chattels, the master
could not do with his slave exactly what he pleased. We
have noticed that the life of the slave was in some degree,
though very insufficiently, protected by law,“ and that a
master who mutilated his slave was subject to a slight
penalty.^ The law also took care to prohibit the master
from doing things which were considered injurious to the
community or the State. There was a great fear of teach-
ing negroes to read and write. William Knox, in a
tract addressed to “ the venerable Society for propagation
cit. p. 199. Accordinn: to the Civil
Code of Louisiana, “slaves cannot
marry without the consent of their
masters, and their marriages do not
produce any of the civil effects which
result from such contract” (xMorgan,
Civil Code of Lotiisiana, art. 182, p. 29).
^ Goodell, Anierican Slave Code,
p. III. In 1835 the cpiery was pre-
sented to a -Baptist Association of
ministers, “ whether, in case of in-
voluntary separation of such a character
as to preclude all future intercourse,
the parties may be allowed to marry
again ?” The answer was, “ that .such
separation among persons situated as
our slaves are, is civilly a separatit)n
by death, and they believe that, in the
sight of (iod, it would Ije so viewed.
d\) forbid second marriages in such
cases would be to ex])ose the parties
not only to greater hardships and
stronger temptations, but to church
censure for acting in obedienee to their
masters f Incidentally here the fact
leaks out that slave cohabitation is
enforced by the authority of the
masters for the increase of their human
chattels (Goodell, Slavery ajtd Anti-
Slavery, p. 185).
Supra, p. 428 sq.
Supra, p. 517.
Z Z 2
7o8
SLAVERY
of the Gospel in foreign parts” in the year 1768, remarks
that “ instruction renders them Jess fit or less willing to
labour,” and that, if they were universally taught to read,
there would undoubtedly be a general insurrection of the
negroes leading to the massacre of their owners.^ A
similar fear underlies the laws on the subject which we
meet with in the codes of some of the Slave States.
According to the Negro Act of 1740 for South Carolina,
any person who instructed a slave in writing was subject to
a fine of one hundred pounds ; ' but this enactment was
later on considered too liberal. A law of 1834 placed
under the ban all efforts to teach the coloured race eithen.
reading or writing, and the punishment was no longer a
pecuniary fine only, but, besides, imprisonment for six
months or a shorter time or, if the offender was a free
person of colour, whipping not exceeding fifty lashes.® In
Georgia a law of 1770, which prohibited the instruction of
slaves in reading and writing, was in 1833 followed by an
act which extended the prohibition to free persons of
colour.^ In Louisiana the teaching of slaves was punished
with imprisonment for not less than one month nor more
than twelve months."' North Carolina allowed slaves to
be made acquainted with arithmetical calculations, but
sternly interdicted instruction in reading and writing;®
whilst Alabama warred with the rudiments of reading,
forbidding any coloured persons, bond or free, to be taught
not only reading and writing, but spelling.' In all these
States the prohibitions referred to the master of the slave
as well as to other persons. In Virginia, on the other hand,
the master might teach his slave whatever he liked, but
others might not.®
^ Knox, Three Iracts respecting the
Conversion and Instruction of the Free
Indians and Negroe Slaves iji the
Colonies^ p. 15 sq.
2 Brevard, op. cit. ii. 243.
McCord, Statutes at large of South
Carolina, vli. 468.
^ Prince, op. cit. pp. 785, 658.
^ Peirce, Taylor, and King, op. cit.
p. 552.
Revised Statutes of North Carolina
passed hy the General Assembly at the
Session of 1836-7, xxxiv. 74, cxi. 27, .
vol. i. 209, 57S.
Clay, Digest of the Laws of Ala-
bama, p, 543. ^
Cade of Virginia, cxcviii. 31 sq.,
vol. ii. 747 j-f/. Stroud, op. cit. p. 142.
SLAVERY
There is yet another point in which the master’s power
was restricted in a most unusual way : in many cases he
was not allowed to liberate his slave, or formidable
obstacles were put in the way of manumission. Thus, in
North Carolina a slave could formerly not be enfranchised
except for meritorious services ; ‘ but this enactment was
altered by the Revised Statutes of 1836- 1837, according
to which any emancipation granted to any slave shall be
upqji the express condition, that he, she or they will leave
the State, within ninety days from the granting thereof,
and never will return within the State afterwards.” “ The
-•Civil Code of Louisiana required that a slave, to be
emancipated, should have attained the age of thirty years
and behaved well at least for four years preceding the
emancipation, unless, indeed, the slave had saved the life
of his master or of one of his children, in which case he
might be set free at any age; and, according to a statute
of 1852, the emancipated slave should be sent out of the
United States within twelve months after his emancipation.
In several other States manumission was likewise hampered
by various regulations ; and throughout the British
West Indies there were restraints on manumission prior to
the Emancipation Act.*’ By an act passed in Saint Christ-
opher in the year 1802, a tax of £ 1^000 was imposed on
the manumission of any slave who was not a native of, or
had not resided for two years within, the island, whilst
natives or residents might be enfranchised at half that
price. But the authors of this act went further still.
They considered that a master, though unwilling to pay
^500 or ^1,000 for the legal enfranchisement of a slave,
might, during his own life, make him or her practically
free by not exercising his own rights as master. Hence
^ Stroud, cit, p. 233. Caroli/ui). Prince, op. a'l. j>, 787
“ Revised ^tatnies of North Caro/ifta, ((^'or^ia). Stroud, op. eit, ]>. 23 1
cxi. 58, vol. i. 583. (Alaliaiiia). Alduii aiul van IJocscii,
^ Morgan, Civil Code of Loiiisiano , Digest oj the Laivs of Ahssissippi,
art. 185 » P* 'ID P- 7 ^^^* Haywood and CobVjs,
Ibid. Stat. I Sill March, 1852, §1, Statute Laws of the State (f I'cnuessee,
p. 29. ^ i. 327 sf.
^ Brevard, of. eit. ii, 255 sq. (South ^ Cold), op. at. p. 282,
SLAVERY
they enacted “ that if any proprietor of a slave should, by
any contract in writing or otherwise, dispense with the slave’s
service, or should be proved before a justice of peace not
to have exercised any right of ownership over such slave,
and maintained him or her at his own expense, within a
month, the slave should be publicly sold at vendue by the
provost marshall; and should become the property of the
purchaser, and the purchase-money should be paid into
the colonial treasury.” ’ In St. Vincents one hundred
pounds sterling was required to be paid into the treasury
for each slave sought to be manumitted, whilst in
Barbados a person minded to manumit a slave should pay
^50 to the churchwarden of the parish in which he
resided. Very different were the Spanish laws on the
subject of manumission. According to a law of 1528 a
negro slave who had served a certain length of time was
entitled to his liberty upon the payment of a certain sum,
not less than twenty marks of gold, the exact amount to
be settled by the royal authorities.'^ In 1540 a law was
issued to the effect that ‘‘ if any negro, or negress, or any
other persons reputed slaves, should publicly demand their
liberty, they should be heard, and justice be done to them,
and care be taken that they should not on that account be
maltreated by their masters.” Nay, a slave who wished
to change his master and could prevail on any other
person to buy him by appraisement, could demand and
compel such a transfer,^’ and a master who treated his
slaves inhumanly could be by the judge deprived of
them.^ In most of the British colonies and American
Slave States, on the other hand, the slave had no
legal right to obtain a change of master when cruel treat-
ment made it necessary for his relief or preservation. ®
^ Stcplien, dp. cit. i. 401 sq.
“ Col.)b, op. lit. p. 282 sq.
^ Moore, Puhlic ^Uts passed by the
1 A'gislature of B a j-bados, p. 224 sq.
Helps, Spanish Conquest in
A/ne?'ica, iv. 373.
^ Recopilacioti dc Icyes de /os reiuQS do
las Indias, vii. 3. 8, vol. ii. 32 1.
1 Jarre Saint Venant, quoted by
Stephen, op. cit, i. 119 sq.
^ Edwards, History of the British
West Indies y iv. 451.
^ Stephen, op. cit. i. 106. Stroud,
op. cit. p. 93,
SLAVERY
xxvn
yri
The exceptions to this rule ' were few and of little practi-
cal value.
This system of slavery, which at least in the British
colonies and the Slave States surpassed in cruelty the
slavery of any pagan country ancient or modern, was not
only. recognised by Christian governments, but was sup-
ported by the large bulk of the clergy, Catholic " and
Protestant alike. In the beginning of the abolitionist
movement the Churches acknowledged slavery to be a
great evil, but with the making of this acknowledgment
they believed that they had done their share, and denied
that there was any obligation on them, or even that they
had any right, to proceed against the slave-holders. But
things did not stop here. The lamentations of resignation
were gradually changed into excuses, and the excuses into
justifications.® The Bible, it was said, contains no pro-
hibition of slavery ; on the contrary, slavery is recognised
both in the Old and New Testaments. Abraham, the
father of the faithful and the friend of God, had slaves ;
the Hebrews were directed to make slaves of the sur-
rounding nations ; St. Paul and St. Peter approved of the
^ Morgan, Civil Code of Louisiana^
art. 192, p. 33. Morelicad and Brown,
Digest of the Statute Laws of Kentucky^
ii. 1481. Edwards, of. eii. ii. 192
(Jamaica). Stephen, op. d(. \. 106
(some other British colonics). In the
French islands a negro who had been
cruelly treated, contrary to royal
ordinances, w'^as forfeited to the crown,
and acquired, if not freedom, at least
deliverance from a tyrannical master
{Code Noir^ Edit du moi.s dc Mars
1685, art. 42, p. 48 Si}. ; lulit donne
an mois de Mars 1724, art. 38,
p. 303 sq.')\ but the Court which
adjudged the offence might also decree
the sufferer to be manumitted (Stephen,
op. cit. i. 1 19).
2 The attempts to represent the
Roman Catholic clergy as ardent
abolitiohists (Cochin, /laholition de
Pesclasmge^ ii. 443 ; de Locqueneuille,
esclashige^ ses proniofeurs ct ses
adversaires^ p. 193) are certainly not
justified by facts. Among the Ca.tholics
of the Uniksl Stales there were some
advocates of emancipation, lait tlieir
number was not large (Coodell,
Slavery and A}iii-Slave)y^ [>. 195 sq. ;
Barker, Colleeled IVorhs, vi. 127 sq.).
Dr. Ihigland, the Catliolic bisliop of
Charleston, South Carolina, undertook
in public to |)rove that the Catholic
Cluirch had always been the uncom-
jiromising friend of slave-holding (Bar-
ker, op. eii. V. 57). In Brazil it was
common for clergymen not only to
pos.se.ss slaves, fait to buy and sell them
with as little scruple as other mer-
chandises (da Fonseca, A esra 7 ddao, 0
elcro c o aholicioiiis}iu\ pj). 28, 33).
Bishop B>ouvier wrote {op. cit. p, 568) :
— “ Servi autem dominis suis obedire,
sortem .siiam patienter tolerare et officia
sibi imposita fideliter exserjiii debent,
quoad usque libertas ijisis coneedatur.
Memincrint prmsentem vitam e.sse
momentaneam, futuram vero tTteinam.”
von Holst, ot). cit. ii. 231 sqq.
SLAVERY
7 I 2
relation of master and slave when they gave admonitions
to both as to their reciprocal behaviour ; the Saviour
himself said nothing in condemnation of slavery, although
it existed in great aggravation while was upon earth.
If slavery were sinful, would it have been too much to
expect that the Almighty had directed at least one little
word agaitist it in the last revelation of His will ? ^ Nay,
God not only permitted slavery, but absolutely provided
for its perpetuity;'^ it is the very legislation of Heaven
itself ; '* it is an institution which it is a religious duty to
maintain,* and which cannot be abolished, because “ God
is pledged to sustain it.” According to some, slavery
was founded on the judgment of God on a damned race,
the descendants of Ham ; according to others, it was only
in this way that the African could be raised to a parti-
cipation in the blessings of Christianity and civilisation.*^
With the name of “ abolitionist ” was thus associated the
idea of infidelity, and the emancipation movement was
branded as an attempt to spread the evils of scepticism
through the land.’^ According to Governor Macduffie, of
South Carolina, no human institution is more manifestly
consistent with the will of God than slavery, and every
community ought to punish the interference of aboli-
tionists with death, without the benefit of clergy, “ re-
garding the authors of it as enemies of the human race.” **
It is true that religious arguments were also adduced in
favour of abolition. I'o hold men in bondage was said to
be utterly inconsistent with the inalienable rights which
the Creator had granted mankind, and still more obviously
^ Barnes, The Church and Slavery' ^
p. 15. Birney, Letter to the Churches^
p. 3 sq. Bledsoe, Essay/ on Liberty
and Slavery^ pp. 138 sqq. Gerrit
Smith, Letter to Rez/. Ja/ties S/nylie,
p. 3. Cobb, op. cit. p. 54 sqq.
Goodell, Slavery and Anti-Slavery,
pp. 154 156, 167, 176, 181, 1S4, r86,
i^c. Barker, Collected li o/hs, v. 157.
" Thornton, quoted by Goodell,
Slavery and Anti-Slavery, p. 147.
Fisk, quoted ibid. p. 147.
^ Bledsoe, op. cit. p. 138.
^ Smylie, quoted by Gerrit Smith,
op.^cit. p. 3.
^ ()uoted by Goodell, Slavery and
Anti-Slavery/, f). 347.
Barnes, op. cit. p. 16.
/bid. p. 18. Newman, Anglo-
Saxon Abolition of Negro Slavery,
p. 56. i^ledsoe, op. cit. p. 223.
Newman, op. cit. p. 53. von
Holst, op. cit. ii, 118, n. i.
SLAVERY
at variance with the dictates of Christian loved Many
clergymen also joined the abolitionists. But it seems that
in the middle of the nineteenth century the Quakers and
the United Brethren were the only religious bodies that
regarded slave-holding and slave-dealing as ecclesiastical
offencesd The American Churches were justly said to be
‘Hhe bulwarks of American slavery.’’^
Nobody would suppose that this attitude towards slavery
.W4g due to religious zeal. It was one of those cases, only
too frequent in the history of morals, in which religion is
called in to lend its sanction to a social institution agreeable
to the leaders of religious opinion. Many clergymen and
missionaries were themselves slave-holders,^ the chapel
funds largely rested on slave property,'^ and the ministers
naturally desired to be on friendly terms with the more
important members of their respective congregations, who
were commonly owners of slaves. Adam Smith observes
that the resolution of the Quakers in Pennsylvania to set
at liberty all their slaves, was due to the fact that the
principal produce there was corn, the raising of which
cannot afford the expense of slave cultivation ; had the
slaves ‘‘ made any considerable part of their property, such
a resolution could never have been agreed to.”^
To explain the establishment of colonial slavery, the
difficulties in the way of its abolition, and the laws relating
to it, it is necessary to consider not only economic condi-
tions and the motive of self-interest, but, as a factor of
equal importance, the want of sympathy for, or positive
antipathy to, the coloured race. The negro was looked
upon almost as an animal, according to some he was a
being without a soul.' Even when free he was a pariah,
subject to special laws and regulations. In the Code of
^ Gurney, Views arid Prar/ las of t/ie Slavery and Anti- Slavery, pp. 151,
Society of Fric 7 ids, p. 390. ‘Anti- 186
Slavery Declaration of 1833,’ (luotcil ^ Newman, op. cit. p. 53.
\yy Ge>oC7.eW, Slavery and Anti-Slavery, ^ Adam Smith, Wealth of Nations,
p. 398. Birney, Second Letter, p. 1. p. 172.
‘ Barker, op. cit. v. 56. von Holst, op. cit. ’i. 279. Mal-
von Holst, c?/. Y/V. ii. 230, loch, ‘How the Church dealt with
4 Barnes, op. cit, p. 13. Goodell, Slavery,’ in 77 ^:^ xxvii. 454.
SLAVERY
71 +
Louisiana it is said : — “ Free people of colour ought never
to insult or strike white people, nor presume to conceive
themselves equal to the whites; but, on the contrary, they
ought to yield to them on every occasion, and never speak
or answer them but with respect> under the penalty of
imprisonment, according to the nature of the offence.” ^
The Code Noir prohibited white men and women from
marrying negroes, “ a peine de punition et d’amende
arbitraire ” ; ^ and in the Revised Statutes of North
Carolina we read ; — “ If any white man or woman, being
free, shall intermarry with an Indian, negro, mustee or
mulatto man or woman, or any person of mixed blood to
the third generation, bond or free, he shall, by judgment
of the county court, forfeit and pay the sum of one
hundred dollars to the use of the county.” ® In Mississippi
a free negro or mulatto was legally punished with thirty-
nine lashes if he exercised the functions of a minister of
the Gospel.* Coloured men in the North were excluded
from colleges and high schools, from theological seminaries
and from respectable churches, as also from the town
hall, the ballot, and the cemetery where white people
were interred."’ The Anglo-Saxon aversion to the black
race is thus expressed by an English writer : — “ We hate
slavery, but we hate the negroes still more.”® Among the
Spaniards and Portuguese racial antipathies were not so
strong, and their slaves were consequently better treated.’^
Thus we notice in the opinions regarding slavery
throughout the same distinction as in the judgments on
other matters of moral concern. A person is, as a rule,
allowed to enslave or to keep as slaves only persons belong-
ing to a different community or a different race from his
own, or their descendants. To deprive anybody of his
liberty is to inflict an injury on him, and is regarded as
^ Quoted by Stroud, op. cit. p. 157. ® Parker, op. cit. v. 58. Goodell,
^ Code Noir^ Edit donne au niois de Slavery and A^iti-Slavery., p. 200.
Mars 1724, art. 6, p. 286. ^ Seward, quoted by Newman,
^ Revised Statutes of Norih Carolina^ Abolition of Negro Slavery^ p. 54.
Ixxi. 5, vol. i. '386 sq. Gouty, V esclavage au Bntsily p. 8
Alden and van Iloescn, op, cit, sqq,
P* 771 -
SLAVERY
*715
wrong whenever the act gives rise to sympathetic resent-
ment, whereas nothing is thought of it where no sympathy
is felt for its victim. Thus, whilst slavery grows up only
under economic conditions favourable to slave labour, it is
always limited by feelings of an altruistic character, and
where these feelings are sufficiently broad and powerful it
is not tolerated at all. The same factor also influences
the condition of the slaves where slavery exists. We have
••seftn that native slaves are better treated than foreign ones,
and slaves born in the household better than those who
have been captured or purchased. The advancement
of a nation, again, is frequently attended with greater
severity in the treatment of the slaves, because, whilst
the simplicity of early ages admits of little distinction be-
tween the master and his servants in their employments
and manner of living, the introduction of wealth and
luxury gradually destroys the equality. Besides, the
number of slaves maintained in a wealthy nation makes
them formidable both to their owners and to the State,
hence it is necessary that they should be strictly watched
and kept in the utmost subjection.^
The condition of slaves is in various respects influenced
by the selfish considerations of their masters. Stuart Mill
observes : — “ When, as among the ancients, the slave-
market could only be supplied by captives either taken in
war, or kidnapped from thinly scattered tribes on the
remote confines of the human world, it was generally more
profitable to keep up the number by breeding, which
necessitates a far better treatment of them, and for this
reason, joined with several others, the condition of slaves
. . . was probably much less bad in the ancient world,
than in the colonies of modern nations.” Among the
Bedouins, says Burckhardt, “ the slaves are treated with
kindness^ and seldom beaten, as severity might induce
them to run away.” Superstition may also help to
1 Millar, op. cit. p. 256 sqq. " ^ Burckhardt, Bedouitfs and JVahd-
2 Mill, Principles of Political Econ- hys., p. 103.
omy, i. 307. Cf supra, p. 701.
7i6
SLAVERY
CH. XXVII
improve the lot of the slave. In West Africa “the
authority which a master exercises over a slave is very
much modified by his constitutional dread of witchcraft.
If he treats his slave unkindly, or inflicts unmerited
punishment upon him, he exposes himself to all the
machinations of witchcraft which that slave may be able to
command.”^ It is said in the Proverbs, “ Accuse not a
servant unto his master, lest he curse thee, and thou be
found guilty.” ^ The same danger threatens the cr'iel-’
master. We read in the Apostolic Constitutions, “ Thy
man-servant or thy maid-servant who trust in the same
God, thou shalt not command with bitterness of spirit ;
lest they groan against thee, and wrath be upon thee from
God.
> >
^ Wilson, Western Africa^ p. 271.
See also ibid, p. 179 ; Cruickshank,
Eighteen Years on the Gold Coasts ii.
180 sqq, ; Du Chaillu, Explorations
and Adventures in Equatorial Africa^
p. 331 ; Lancltman, Origin of Priest-
hood^ p. 198, n. 2.
^ Proverbs^ xxx. 10.
^ Constitutiones ApostoliaSy vii. 13.
Recapitulation of the theory of the moral consciousness set forth in vol. I., pp.
738-741.—This theory supported by the fact that not only moral emotions
but non-moral retributive emotions are felt with reference to phenomena
exactly similar in their general nature to those on which moral judgments
are passed, p. 741.—As also by the circumstance that the very acts, for-
bearances, and omissions which are condemned as wrong are also apt to call
forth anger and revenge, and that the acts and forbearances which are praised
as morally good are apt to call forth gratitude, p. 741 sg.—The variations of the
moral ideas partly due to different external conditions, p. 742.—But chiefly
to psychical causes, pp. 742-746.—The duties to neighbours have gradually
become more expansive owing to the expansion of the altruistic sentiment,
P- 743 sg-—The influence of reflection upon moral judgments has been
increasing, p. 744 sg.—The influence of sentimental antipathies and likings has
been decreasing, zé¢d.—The influence which the belief in supernatural
forces or beings or in a future state has exercised upon the moral ideas of
mankind, p. 745 sg.—Remarks as to the future development of the moral
ideas, p. 746.
AUTHORITIES QUOTED . pp. 747-824
SUBJECT INDEX . ; ; : . pp. 825-852
+ at
THE ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT
OF THE MORAL IDEAS
REGARD FOR OTHER PERSONS’ HAPPINESS IN GENERAL—
GRATITUDE—PATRIOTISM AND COSMOPOLITANISM
In previous chapters we have dealt with moral ideas
concerning various modes of conduct which have reference
to other men’s welfare—to their life or bodily comfort,
their liberty, property, knowledge of truth, or self-regard-
ing pride. But the list of duties which we owe to our
fellow-creatures is as yet by no means complete. Any act,
forbearance, or omission, which in some way or other
diminishes or increases their happiness may on that
account become a subject of moral blame or praise, being
apt to call forth sympathetic retributive emotions.
To do good to others is a rule which has been inculcated
by all the great teachers of morality. According to
Confucius, benevolence is the root of righteousness and a
leading characteristic of perfect virtue.’ In the Taouist
‘Book of Secret Blessings’ men are enjoined to be com-
passionate and loving, and to devote their wealth to the
good of their fellow-men.” The moralists of ancient India
teach that we should with our life, means, understanding,
and speech, seek to advance the welfare of other creatures
in this world; that we should do so without expecting
reciprocity ; and that we should enjoy the prosperity of
others even though ourselves unprosperous.* The writers
1 Zun Vii, xvii. 6. Douglas, Con- ments rendered from Sanskrit Writers,
fuctanism and Taouism, p. 108. p- 107 sg. Monier Williams, Zzdéan
2 Douglas, of. cit. p. 272 5g. Wisdom, p. 448.
3 Muir, Religious and Moral Sentz-
of classical antiquity repeatedly give expression to the idea
that man is not born for himself alone, but should assist his
fellow-men to the best of his ability. In the Old Testa-
ment we meet with the injunction, ‘“‘ Thou shalt love thy
neighbour as thyself” ;? and this was declared by Christ to
be of equal importance with the commandment, “Thou
shalt love the Lord thy God.” ® ;
To a reflecting mind it is obvious that the moral value
of beneficence exclusively lies in the benevolent motive, and
that there is nothing praiseworthy in promoting the happi-
ness of others from selfish considerations. Confucius taught
that self must be conquered before a man can be perfectly
virtuous.* According to Lao-Tsze, self-abnegation is the
cardinal rule for both the sovereign and the people.’ Self-
denial is the chief demand of the Gospel, and is emphasised
as a supreme duty by Islam.° Generally speaking, the
merit attached to a good action is proportionate to the
self-denial which it costs the agent. This follows from
the nature of moral approval in its capacity of a retributive
emotion, as is proved by the fact that the degree of
gratitude felt towards a benefactor is in a similar way
influenced by the deprivation to which he subjects himself.
On the other hand, there is considerable variety of opinion,
even among ourselves, as to the dictates of duty, in cases
where our own interests conflict with those of our fellow-
men. ‘To Professor Sidgwick it is a moral axiom that “ I
ought not to prefer my own lesser good to the greater
good of another.”" According to Hutcheson, we do not
condemn those as evil who will not sacrifice their private
interest to the advancement of the positive good of others,
‘“‘unless the private interest be very small, and the publick
good very great.” ®
The idea that it is bad to cause harm to others and
1 Schmidt, Dze thik der alten S Ameer Ali, Ethics of Islam
eee i. 275 geo Page ;
2 Leviticus, xix. 18. 7 Sidgwick, Je Y Tthics
3 St. Matthew, xxii. 39. p: ae aes oe Ne
4 Lun Vii, xii. 1. 1. 8 Hutcheson, Zssay cn the Nature
> Douglas, Confucianism and and Conduct of the Passions, &c.
Taoursit, p. 192. Damo:
a
——
XX XIII
good or obligatory to promote their happiness, is in different
ways influenced by the relationship between the parties ;
and to many cases it does not apply at all. We have
previously noticed that according to early ethics an enemy
is a proper object of hatred, not of love ;' and according
to more advanced ideas a person who treats us badly has
at all events little claim upon our kindness. The very
opposite is the case witha benefactor or friend. To requite
a benefit, or to be grateful to him who bestows it, is
probably everywhere, at least under certain circumstances,
regarded as a duty. This is a subject which in the
present connection calls for special consideration.
The duty of gratefulness presupposes a disposition for
gratitude.” According to travellers’ accounts, this feeling
is lacking in many uncivilised races.* Lyon writes of the
Eskimo of Igloolik :—‘ Gratitude is not only rare, but
absolutely unknown amongst them, either by action, word,
or look, beyond the first outcry of satisfaction. Nursing
their sick, burying the dead, clothing and feeding the
whole tribe, furnishing the men with weapons, and the
women and children with ornaments, are insufficient to
awaken a grateful feeling, and the very people who relieved
their distresses when starving are laughed at in time of
plenty for the quantity and quality of the food which
was bestowed in charity.”* Various other tribes‘ in
1 Supra, i. 73 Sq.
2 For the definition of gratitude, see
Supra, 1. 93.
3 Steller, Beschrecbung von Kamt-
schatha, p. 292. Bergmann, Momadische
Streifereten under den Kalmtiken, il.
310, 316. Foreman, /hzlippine
Islands, p. 183. Modigliani, Vzaggio
a Nias, p. 467. Selenka, Sonnzge
Welten, p. 286 (Malays). Marsden,
History of Sumatra, p. 207 (Malays of
Sumatra). Forbes, A Naturalists
Wanderings in the Eastern Archt-
pelago, p. 320 (natives of Timor-
laut). Mrs. Forbes, Zreselinde, p. 178
(natives of Ritabel). Hagen, Under
den Papuas, p. 266 (Papuans of
Bogadjim). Romilly, Western Pacific
and New Guinea, p. 239. La Pérouse,
Voyage round the World, ii. 109
(Samoans). Colenso, Maort Races of
New Zealand, p. 48; Dieffenbach,
Travels tin New Zealand, ii. 110.
Ling Roth, Adorigznes of Tasmania,
p-. 63. Gason, ‘ Manners and Customs
of the Dieyerie Tribe,’ in Woods,
Native Tribes of South Australia,
p- 258. Baker, Albert N’yanza, i. 242
(Latukas), 289 (Negroes). von
Francois, Vama und Damara, p. 191
(Herero).
4 Lyon, Private Journal during the
Voyage of Discovery under Captain
Parry, p. 348 sg. See also Parry,
Journal of a Second Voyage for the
Discovery of a North-West Passage,
p- 524 Sg.
™~ tS Pett
Pa
Ar
North America have been accused of ingratitude ;* and
of some South American savages we are told that they
evinced no thankfulness. for the presents which were given
them.2 The Fijians are described as utterly indifferent
to their benefactors. The Rev. Th. Williams writes :—
“If one of them, when sick, obtained medicine from me,
he thought me bound to give him food; the reception
of food he considered as giving him a claim on me for
covering ; and, that being secured, he deemed himself at
liberty to beg anything he wanted, and abuse me if I
refused his unreasonable request.” * Mr. Lumholtz had a
similar experience with regard to the natives of Herbert
River, Northern Queensland :—“ If you give one thing to
a black man, he finds ten other things to ask for, and he is
not ashamed to ask for all that you have, and more too.
He is never satisfied. Gratitude does not exist in his
breast.” * In several languages there is no word expressive
of what we term gratitude or no phrase corresponding to
our “thank you”’;° and on this fact much stress has been
1 Cranz, History of Greenland,
ih Gel Sarytschew, ‘Voyage of
Discovery to the North-East of Siberia,’
(Toungtha).
sg. (Bisayans).
WVias, p. 467.
Foreman, of. cz¢. p. 182
Modigliani, Vzagezo a
Ling Roth, Nazzves of’
in Collection of Modern Voyages, vi. Sarawak, i. 74 (Dyaks). Chalmers,
78 (Aleuts). Harmon, Voyages and Pioneering im New Gutnea, pp.
Travels in the Intertor of North 187; Romilly, Western Pacific
America, p. 291 (Tacullies). Heriot, and New Guinea, p. 239 sg.
Travels through the Canadas, p. 319.
Lafitau, AWZeurs des sauvages amert-
guaims, 1. 106. Burton, Czty of the
Saints, p. 125 (Sioux and prairie tribes
(However, Mr. Romilly’s statement
that ‘‘in all the known New Guinea
languages there is not even a word for
‘thank you,’”’ is not quite correct, as
generally).
2 von Spix and von Martius, Z7avels
tn Braztl, i. 228, 241 sg. (Coroados).
Stokes, quoted by King and Fitzroy,
Voyages of the ‘ Adventure’ and
‘ Beagle,’ i. 77 (Fuegians).
3 Williams and Calvert, 7272, p. 111.
See also Anderson, (Votes of Travel in
Fuji and New Caledonia, pp. 124,
131.
4 Lumholtz, Among Cannibals,
p- 100.
5 Southey, Mzstory of Braztl, iii.
399 (Abipones, Guaranies). Hearne,
Journey to the Northern Ocean, ~. 307
(Northern Indians). Lewin, Weld
Races of South-Eastern India, p. 192
appears from Chalmers, of. cz¢. p. 187.)
Wilson, Atsstonary Voyage to the
Southern Pacific Ocean, p. 365;
Waitz-Gerland, Anthropologie der Na-
turvolker, Vi. 116(Tahitians). Colenso,
op. cit. p. 48 (Maoris). New, Zz
and Labours in Eastern Africa, p. 100
(Wanika). von Francois, of. zt.
p- 191 (Herero). In the Vedic
language, also, there was no word for
‘‘thanks” (Oldenberg, Die Religion
des Veda, p. 305); and many Eastern
languages of the present day lack an
equivalent for ‘‘thank you” (Ward,
View of the History, &c. of the
Hindoos, ii. 81, n. a. 3 Pool, Studies in
Muhammedanism, yp. 176; Polak,
GRATITUDE
laid, the deficiency of language being regarded as an
indication of a corresponding deficiency in feelings.
Here again we must distinguish between a traveller’s
actual experience and the conclusions which he draws from
it; and it seems that in many cases our authorities have
been too ready to charge savages with a total lack ot
grateful feelings, because they have been wanting in
gratitude on certain occasions. It is too much to expect
that a savage should show himself thankful to any stranger
who gives him a present. _ Speaking of the Ahts of British
Columbia, Mr. Sproat remarks that the Indian’s suspicion
prevents a ready gratitude, as he is prone to see, in apparent
kindness extended to him, some under-current of selfish
motive. ‘He is accustomed, among his own people, to
gifts made for purposes of guile, and also to presents
made merely to show the greatness and richness of the
giver; but, I imagine,’ our author adds, “ when the Aht
ceases to suspect such motives—when he does not detect
pride, craft, or carelessness—he is grateful, and probably
grateful in proportion to the trouble taken to serve him.” ?
As for the ingratitude of the Northern Queensland natives,
Mr. Lumholtz himself admits that ‘they assume that the
gift is bestowed out of fear” ;* and of the New Zealanders
we are told that their total want of gratitude was particularly
due to the fact that “no New Zealander ever did any
kindness, or gave anything, to another, without mainly
having an eye to himself in the transaction.” * Moreover,
gratitude often requires not only the absence of a selfish
motive in the benefactor, but some degree of self-sacrifice.
‘A person,” says Mr. Sproat, “ may keep an Indian from
starving all the winter through, yet, when summer comes,
very likely he will not walk a yard for his preserver with-
out payment. The savage
Persien, i. 9). When one of the
missionaries in India was engaged in
the translation of the Scriptures into
Bengali, he found no common word in
that language suitable to express the
idea of gratitude (Wilkins, AZodern
does not, in this instance,
Hinduism, p. 397).
1 Sproat, Scenes and
Savage Life, p. 165 sg.
2 Lumholtz, Among
Studies of
Cannibals,
p- 159. : ‘
3 Colenso, of. czt. p. 48.
recognise any obligation ; but thinks that a person who
had so much more than he could himself consume might
well, and without any claim for after services, part with
some of it for the advantage of another in want.”* Mr.
Powers makes a similar observation with reference to the
aborigines of California :—‘“ White men,” he says, ‘ who
have had dealings with Indians, in conversation with me
have often bitterly accused them of ingratitude. ‘Do
everything in your power for an Indian,’ they say, ‘and
he will accept it all as a matter of course ; but for the
slightest service you require of him he will demand pay.’
These men do not enter into the Indian’s ideas. This
‘ingratitude’ is really an unconscious compliment to our
power. The savage feels, vaguely, the unapproachable
elevation on which the American stands above him. He
feels that we had much and he had little, and we took
away from him even his little. In his view giving does
not impoverish us, nor withholding enrich us. Gratitude
is a sentiment not in place between master and slave;
it isa sentiment for equals. The Indians are grateful to
one another.” ? Nor are men very apt to feel grateful
for benefits to which they consider themselves to have a.
right. Thus, according to Mr. Howitt, the want of
gratitude among the South Australian Kurnai for kind-
nesses shown them by the whites is due to the principle
of community, which is so strong a feature of the domestic
and social life of these aborigines. ‘ For a supply of food,
or for nursing when sick, the Kurnai would not feel grateful
to his family group. There would be a common obligation
upon all to share food, and to afford personal aid and
succour. This principle would also come into play as
regards the simple personal property they possess, and
would extend to the before-unknown articles procured
from the whites. The food, the clothes, the medical
attendance which the Kurnai receive from the whites, they
take in the accustomed manner ; and, in addition to this,
1 Sproat, of. cz. p. 165 sg. > Powers, Tribes of Caltfornia,
jen ati
we must remember that the donors are regarded as having
unlimited resources. They cannot be supposed by the
Kurnai. to be doing anything but giving out of their
abundance.” * Mr. Guppy found the same principle at
work among the Solomon Islanders :—‘ Often when during
my excursions | have come upon some man who was pre-
paring a meal for himself and his family, I have been
surprised at the open-handed way in which he dispensed the
food to my party of hungry natives. No gratitude was
shown towards the giver, who apparently expected none.” ”
It has also been observed that the want of gratitude with
which Arabs have often been charged by Europeans has
arisen ‘“ from the very common practice of hospitality and
generosity, and from the prevailing opinion that these
virtues are absolute duties which it would be disgraceful
and sinful to neglect.” ®
We should further remember that savages often take care
not to display their emotions. Among the Melanesians,
according to Dr. Codrington, “it is not the custom to say
anything by way of thanks ; it is rather improper to show
emotion when anything is given, or when friends meet
again ; silence with the eyes cast down is the sign of the
inward trembling or shyness which they feel, or think
they ought to feel, under these circumstances. There is
no lack of a word which may be fairly translated ‘ thank’;
and certainly no one who has given cause for it will say
that Melanesians have no gratitude; others probably are
ready enough to say it.’* Of the North American
Chippewas Major Strickland writes :—‘“If an Indian
makes a present, it is always expected that one equally
valuable should be given in return, No matter what you
give them, or how valuable or rich the present, they sel-
dom betray the least emotion or appearance of gratitude,
it being considered beneath the dignity of a red man to
betray his feelings. For all this seeming indifference,
1 Fison and Howitt, Aamdlarot and the Modern Egyplians, p. 298. See
Kurnat, p. 257. also Burton, P2/ertmage to Al-Madinah
2 Guppy, So/omon Islands, p. 127. and Meccah, i. 51.
* Lane, Manners and Customs of 4 Codrington, A/elaneszans, p. 354-
they are in reality as grateful, and, I believe, even more so
than our own peasantry.”’ ‘The Aleuts also, although
they are chary of expressions of thanks, “do not forget
kindness, and endeavour to express their thankfulness by
deeds. If anyone assists an Aleut, and afterwards offends
him, he does not forget the former favour, and in his mind
it often cancels the offence.”’? From the want of a word
for a feeling we must not conclude that the feeling itself
is wanting. Mr. Sproat observes :—‘‘ The Ahts have, it
is true, no word for gratitude, but a defect in language
does not absolutely imply defect in heart ; and the Indian
who, in return for a benefit received, says, with glistening
eyes, that ‘his heart is good’ towards his benefactor,
expresses his gratitude quite as well perhaps as the English-
man who says ‘ Thank you.’”’
It is not surprising, then, that in various cases a people
which to one traveller appears to be quite destitute of grati-
tude is by another described as being by no means lacking
in this feeling ; and sometimes contradictory statements are
made even by the same writer. Thus Mr. Lumholtz,
who gives such a gloomy picture of the character of the
Northern Queensland natives, nevertheless tells us of a
native who, though himself very hungry, threw the
animals which the traveller had shot for him to an old
man—his wife’s uncle—whom they met, in order to give
some proof of the gratitude he owed the person from
whom he had received his wife ;° and regarding the
Fijians Mr. Williams himself states that thanks for presents
“are always expressed aloud, and generally with a kind
wish for the giver.”° As we have noticed before, retri-
butive kindly emotions, of which gratitude is only the
most developed form, are commonly found among gre-
garious animals, social affection being not only a friendly
1 Strickland, Twenty-seven Vears in 4 E.g., the Fuegians, Sioux, Ahts,
Canada West, ii. 58. Aleuts, Kamchadales, Tasmanians,
2 Veniaminoff, quoted by Dall, Zulus (see sepra and zn/fra).
Alaska, p. 395. > Lumholtz, Among Cannibals,
3 Sproat, of. ct#. p. 165. See also pp. 221.
Ling Roth, Watives of Sarawak, i. 74 § Williams and Calvert, of. °cz¢.
(Dyaks). Deets z.
a
sentiment towards another individual, but towards an
individual who is conceived of as a friend.! And it is all
the more difficult to believe in the absolute want of grati-
tude in some savage races, as the majority of them—to
judge from my collection of facts—are expressly acquitted
of such a defect, and several are described as remarkably
grateful for benefits bestowed upon them.
The Fuegians use the word chapakouta, which means glad,
satisfied, affectionate, grateful, to express thanks.2 Jemmy
Button, the young Fuegian who was brought to England on
board the Beagle, gave proofs of sincere gratitude ;? and Admiral
Fitzroy also mentions a Patagonian boy who appeared thankful
for kindness shown to him.4 Of the Mapuchés of Chili Mr. E.
R. Smith observes :—“ Whatever present is made, or favour
conferred, is considered as something to be returned; and the
Indian never fails, though months and years may intervene, to
repay what he conscientiously thinks an exact equivalent for the
thing received.”° The Botocudos do not readily forget kind
treatment ;° and the Tupis “ were a grateful race, and remem-
bered that they had received gifts, after the giver had forgotten
it.’7 The Guiana Indians “are grateful for any kindness.” §
The Navahos of New Mexico have a word for thanks, and
employ it on all occasions which we would consider appro-
priate.? The Sioux ‘ evinced the warmest gratitude to any who
had ever displayed kind feelings towards them.”1° In _ his
‘Voyages from Montreal to the Frozen and Pacific Oceans,’
Mackenzie mentions the gratitude shown him by a young Indian
whom he had cured of a bad wound. When well enough to
engage in a hunting party, the young man brought to his
physician the tongue of an elk, and when they parted both he
and his relatives expressed the heartiest acknowledgment for the
care bestowed on him." If an Aleut receives a gift he accepts
it, saying 4&h ! which means “ thanks.” 12 Some of the Point
Barrow Eskimo visited by Mr. Murdoch “ seemed to feel truly
1 Supra, 1. 94. Guiana, p. 213.
2 Hyades and Deniker, Mission ® Matthews, ‘ Study of Ethics among
setentifique du Cap Horn, vil. 314. the Lower Races,’ in Journal of
3 King and Fitzroy, of. cz¢. li. 327. American Folk-Lore, xii. 9.
LANTERNS Se 10 Eastman, Dacotah, p. ix.
5 Smith, Araucanzans, p. 258. NU Mackenzie, Voyages from Montreal
8 Wied - Neuwied, Retse nach to the FHrozen and Pacific Oceans,
Brasilien, ii. 16. Daisy
7 Southey, of. czt. i. 247. 12 Veniaminof, quoted by Dall, of. cz?
8 Im Thurn, Among the Indians of p. 395.
VOL. II M
grateful for the benefits and gifts received, and endeavoured by»
their general behaviour, as well as in more substantial ways, to
CEA
make some adequate return ” ; whereas others appeared to think
only of what they might receive.?
Of the Tunguses it is said, “If you make them a present,
they hardly thank you; but though so unpolite, they are ex-:
ceedingly grateful.”2 The Jakuts never forget a benefit re-\
ceived ; “for they not only make restitution, but recommend
to their offspring the ties of friendship and gratitude to their
benefactors.” ®
grateful for attention or assistance. “ A little kindly sympathy
makes him an attached friend, and for his friend . . . . he will
readily give his life.’5 Mr. Bennett once had an interview
with two village Veddahs, and on that occasion gave them
presents. “[‘wo months after a couple of elephant’s tusks found
their way into his front verandah at night, but the Veddahs
who had brought them never gave him an opportunity to reward
them. “What a lesson in gratitude and delicacy,” he ex-
claims, “ even a Veddah may teach !”®
The Alfura of Halmahera,’ the Bataks of Sumatra,® and
the Dyaks of Borneo® are praised for their grateful disposi-
tion of mind. Of the Hill Dyaks Mr. Low observes that grati-
tude “eminently adorns the character of these simple people,
and the smallest beneft conferred upon them calls forth its
vigorous and continued exercise.” 1° ‘The Motu people of New
Guinea are “ capable of appreciating kindness,” 4! and have words
for expressing thanks.!’? Chamisso speaks highly of the gratitude
evinced by the natives of Ulea, Caroline Islands :—‘ Any
thing, a useful instrument, for example, which they have re-
ceived as a gift from a friend, retains and bears among them as
a lasting memorial the name of the friend who bestowed it.”
When Professor Moseley at Dentrecasteaux Island, of the
Admiralty Group, gave a hatchet as pay to his guide, according
1 Murdoch, ‘ Ethnol. Results of the
Point Barrow Expedition,’ in Azz.
Rep. Bur. Ethn. ix. 42. See also
Seemann, Voyage of ‘ Herald,’ ii. 67
(Western Eskimo).
2 Georgi, ARzzssia, ill. III.
° Sauer, Hapeditzon to the Northern
Parts of Russia, performed by Billings,
p. 124.
4 Tennent, Ceylon, ii. 445. Sarasin,
Forschungen auf Ceylon, ii. 546.
® Nevill, ‘ Vaeddas of Ceylon,’ in
Taprobanian, i. 192.
® Pridham, Account of Ceylon,
i. 460 sg.
* Kiikenthal, orschungsreise in den
Molukken und Borneo, i. 188.
8 Junghuhn, Dée Battalinder auf
Sumatra, i. 239.
® Ling Roth, Matcves of Sarawak,
1.74, 70.
1 Low, Sarawak, p. 246.
Stone, A Few Months in New
Guinea, p. 95.
2 Chalmers,
Guinea, p. 187.
8 von Kotzebue, Voyage of Discovery
into the South Sea, iii. 204.
Pioneering in New
S \
The Veddah of Ceylon is described as very. ~~
om
X XXIII
to promise, the guide seemed grateful, and presented him with
his own shell adze in return.t! Though the Tahitians never
return thanks nor seem to have a word in their language ex-
: pressive of gratitude, they are not devoid of the feeling itself.2
Backhouse tells us of a Tasmanian native who, having been
nursed through an illness, showed many demonstrations of
gratitude ; and he adds that this virtue was often exhibited
among these people—a statement which is corroborated by the
accounts of other travellers.* Of the Australian aborigines Mr.
Ridley writes :—‘I believe they are as a people remarkably
susceptible of impressions from kind treatment. ‘They recog-
nised me as one who sought their good, and were evidently
pleased and thankful to see that 1 thought them worth looking
after.” 4 “Che Adelaide and Encounter Bay blacks are said to
display attachment to persons who are kind to them.° Speaking
of the Central Australian tribes, Messrs. Spencer and Gillen
observe that, though they are not in the habit of showing
anything like excessive gratitude on receiving gifts from the
white man, they are in reality by no means incapable of that
feeling ;° and other writers report instances of gratitude dis-
played by natives of West Australia? and Queensland.®
Concerning the people of Madagascar the missionary Ellis
writes :—“ Whether the noble and generous feeling of gratitude
has much place amongst the Malagasy has been questioned.
Though often characterised by extreme apathy, they are cer-
tainly susceptible of tenderness of feeling, and their customs
furnish various modes of testifying their sense of any acts of
kindness shewn them, and their language contains many forms
of speech expressive of thankfulness. “The following are among
those in most general use: ‘May you live to grow old—may
you live long—may you live sacred—may you see, or obtain,
justice from the sovereign.’ ”” Moreover, with all their expressions
of thankfulness, considerable action is used : sometimes the two
hands are extended open as if to make a present; or the party
stoops down to the ground, and clasps the legs, or touches the
knee and the feet of the person he is thanking.® Ingratitude,
Bay Aboriginal Tribes,’ in Woods,
i Moseley, ‘Inhabitants of the
Native Tribes of South Australia,
Admiralty Islands,’ in Jour. Anthr.
Inst. vi. 416.
2 Waitz-Gerland, of. czt. vi. 116.
3 Ling Roth, Aborigines of Tas-
mania, pp. 47, 62, 64.
4 Ridley, Aborigines of Australia,
p- 24. See also zbzd. p. 20 sgg.
5 Wyatt, ‘Manners and Super-
stitions of the Adelaide and Encounter
Da lO?
6 Spencer and Gillen, Watzve Tribes
of Central Australia, p. 48 sgq.
7 Salvado, Alémotres historiques sur
? Australie, p. 146.
8 Fraser, Aborigines of New South
Wales, p. 44.
9 Ellis, A7zstory of
M 2
Madagascar,
GRATITUDE
again, is expressed by many strong metaphors, such as “son
of a thunderbolt,” or “‘ offspring of a wild boar.”! The Bush-
mans, according to Burchell, are not incapable of gratitude.’
The statement made by certain travellers or colonists that the
Zulus are devoid of this feeling, is contradicted by Mr. Tyler,
who asserts that “many instances might be related in which
a thankful spirit has been manifested, and gifts bestowed for
favours received.”® ‘The Basutos have words to express grati-
tude.¢ Among the Bakongo, says Mr. Ward, “ evidences of
gratitude are rare indeed, although occasionally one meets with
this sentiment in odd guises. Once, by a happy chance, I saved a
baby’s life. The child was brought to me by its mother in con-
vulsions, and I was fortunate enough to find in my medicine chest
a drug that effected an almost immediate cure. Yet the service I
rendered to this woman, instead of meeting with any apprecia-
tion, only procured for me the whispered reputation of being a
witch.” But twenty months afterwards, at midnight when all
the people were sleeping, the same woman came to Mr. Ward
and gave him some fowl’s eggs in payment. ‘I come,” she said,
“in the darkness that my people may not know, for they would
jeer at me if they knew of this gift.” A traveller tells us that
the inhabitants of Great Benin “if given any trifles expressed
their thanks.” ® Writing on the natives of Accra, Monrad
states that gratitude isamong the virtues of the Negroes, and in-
duces them even to give their lives in return for benefits conferred
onthem.’ The Feloops, bordering on the Gambia, “ display the
utmost gratitude and affection towards their benefactors.”& As
regards the Eastern Central Africans, Mr. Macdonald affirms
without any hesitation that they have gratitude, “‘ even though
we define gratitude as being much more than an ‘acute sense
of favours to come.’””® “The Masai and Wadshagea have “a
curious habit of spitting on things or people as a compliment or
sign of gratitude” !’—originally, I presume, with a view to
transferring to them a blessing. “The Barea are said to be
thankful for benefits." According to Palgrave, “ gratitude is no
i. 258. See also Rochon, Voyage to
Madagascar, p. 56.
1 Ellis, of. czt. i. 139 sg.
2 Burchell, Zravels in the Interior of
Southern Africa, ii. 68, 86, 447.
® Tyler, Forty Years among
Zulus, p. 194.
4 Casalis, Basztos, p. 306.
5 Ward, Frve Years with the Congo
Cannibals, p. 47 sqgq.
the
® Punch, quoted by Ling Roth,
Great Benin, p. 45.
™ Monrad, Skzldring af Guinea-
Kysten, p. 8.
8 Mungo Park, TZvavels in the
Intertor of Africa, p. 14.
® Macdonald, Africana, i. to.
10 Johnston, Kilima-njaro Ex-
pedition, p. 438.
1 Munzinger, Ostafrikanische Studien,
P- 533-
XXXIII GRATITUDE
less an Arab than a European virtue, whatever the ignorance or
the prejudices of some foreigners may have affirmed to the con-
trary” ;1 and Burckhardt says that an Aral never forgets the
generosity shown to him even by an enemy.?
In other statements gratitude is directly represented as
an object of praise, or its absence as an object of dis-
approval. Among the Atkha Aleuts, according to Father
Yakof, gratitude to benefactors was considered a virtue. ®
Among the Omahas, if a man receives a favour and does
not manifest his thankfulness, the people exclaim :—‘“ He
does not appreciate the gift ! He has no manners.”’* The
Kamchadales ‘are not only grateful for favours, but they
think it absolutely necessary to make some return for a
present.” ° The Chinese say that “‘ kindness is more bind-
ing than a loan.” °® According to the ‘ Divine Panorama,’
a well-known Taouist work, those who forget kindness and
are guilty of ingratitude shall be tormented after death and
‘shall not escape one jot of their punishments.””" In one
of the Pahlavi texts gratitude is represented as a means of
arriving at heaven, whilst ingratitude is stigmatised as a
heinous sin ;° and according to Ammian ungrateful persons
were even punished by law in ancient Persia.*° The same,
we are told, was the case in Macedonia. The duty of
gratitude was strongly inculcated by Greek and Roman
moralists. ’ Aristotle observes that we ought, as a general
rule, rather to return a kindness to our benefactor than to
confer a gratuitous favour upon a brother in arms, just as
we ought rather to repay a loan to acreditor than to spend
the same sum upon a present to a friend.” According to
7 Giles, Strange Stories
Chinese Studio, i. 374 sg.
That-Shang, 4
Jrom a
Palgrave, quoted in Spencer's
See also
Descriptive Sociology, ‘ Asiatic Races,’
Pp. 3I.
2 Burckhardt, Motes on the Bedouins
and Wahdbys, p. 155.
3 Yakof, quoted by Petroff, Report
on the Population, &c. of Alaska,
p. 158.
4 Dorsey, ‘Omaha Sociology,’ in
Ann. Rep. Bur. Ethn. iii. 270.
5 Dobell, Zravels in Kamtschatka,
lee 7i5
6 Davis, Chzna, ii. 123.
8 Dind-i Maindg-t Khirad, xxxvi.
25° °xXXXVils) 01>) XIU. QO:
® Ammianus Marcellinus,
6. 81.
10 Seneca, De beneficzzs, iii. 6. 2.
11 See Schmidt, Die Lthik der alten
Griechen, li. 305 sgq.
12 Aristotle, fhzca
Ibs Pay Be
Xxiil.
Nicomachea,
SGP OL the requital of benefits is enjoined by a divine
law.? ‘* There is no duty more indispensable than that of
returning a kindness,” says Cicero ; “all men detest one
forgetful of a benefit.” * Seneca calls ingratitude a most
odious vice, which it is difficult to punish by law, but
which we refer for judgment.to the gods.» The ancient
Scandinavians considered it dishonourable for a man to
kill even an enemy in blood-revenge if he had received a
benefit from him.?
We may assume that among beings capable of feeling
moral emotions the general disposition to be kind to a
benefactor will inevitably lead to the notion that ungrate-
ful behaviour is wrong. Such behaviour is offensive to
the benefactor ; as Spinoza observes, “he who has
conferred a benefit on anyone from motives of love or
honour will feel pain, if he sees that the benefit is
received without gratitude.’® This by itself tends to
evoke in the bystander sympathetic resentment towards
the offender ; but his resentment is much increased by the
retributive kindliness which he is apt to feel, sym-
pathetically, towards the benefactor. He wants to see
the latter’s kindness rewarded ; and he is shocked by the
absence of a similar desire in the very person who may
be naturally expected to feel it more strongly than any-
body else.
The moral ideas concerning conduct which affects other
persons’ welfare vary according as the parties are members
of the same or different families, or of the same or ee
communities. For reasons which have been stated i
previous chapters parents have in this respect ee
duties towards their children, and children towards their
parents; and a tribesman or a fellow-countryman has
claims which are not shared by a foreigner. But there
are duties not only to particular individuals, but also to
1 Xenophon, Memorabilia, iv. : 24. Norwegischen Stammies, ii. 174.
2NCiceros) ees opfic7s ale hG aa 7s 5 Spinoza, ¢hica, iii. 42. A
ii. 18 (63). Japanese proverb says that ‘‘ thankless
3 Seneca, De beneficits, iii. 6. 1 sg. labour brings fatigue” (Reed, /apan,
+ Maurer, Die Bekehrung des ii. 100).
whole social aggregates. Foremost among these is the
duty of patriotism.
The duty of patriotism is rooted in the patriotic senti-
ment, in a person’s love of the social body-of which he is
himself a member, and which is attached to the territory
he calls his country. It involves a desire to promote its
welfare, a wish that it may prosper for the time being and
for all future. This desire is the outcome of a variety of
sentiments: of men’s affection for the people among
whom they live, of attachment to the places where they
have grown up or spent part of their lives, of devotion to
their race and language, and to the traditions, customs,
laws, and institutions of the society in which they were
born and to which they belong.
Genuine patriotism presupposes a power of abstraction
which the lower savages can hardly be supposed to
possess. But it seems to be far from unknown among
uncultured peoples of a higher type. North American
Indians are praised for their truly patriotic spirit, for their
strong attachment to their tribe and their country.’
Carver says of the Naudowessies :—‘* The honour of
their tribe, and the welfare of their nation, is the first and
most predominant emotion of their hearts; and from
hence proceed in a great measure all their virtues and
their vices. Actuated by this, they brave every danger,
endure the most exquisite torments, and expire triumphing
in their fortitude, not asa personal qualification, but as a
national characteristic.” * Patriotism and public spirit
were often strongly manifested by the Tahitians.? The
Maori “loves his country and the rights of his ancestors,
and he will fight for his children’s land.”* Of the
Guanches of Teneriffe we are told that patriotism was
1 Adair, Héstory of the American pp. 412.
Indians, p. 378 sq. Heriot, Travels 3 Ellis, Polynesian Researches,
through the Canadas, p. 317. Loskiel, i. 128.
LTistory of the Mission of the United 4 Angas, Savage Life and Scenes in
Brethren among the Indians, i. 17 Australia and New Zealand, i. 338.
(Iroquois). See also Travers, ‘ Life and Times of
2 Carver, Travels through the Te Rauparaha,’ in 7razs. and Proceed.
Intertor Parts of North America, New Zealand Institute, v. 22,
their chief virtue. The same quality distinguishes the
Yorubas of West Africa; “no race of men,” says Mr.
MacGregor, “could be more devoted to their country.” ”
Burckhardt writes :—‘‘ As to the attachment which a
Bedouin entertains for his own tribe, the deep-felt
interest he takes in its power and fame, and the sacrifices
of every kind he is ready to make for its prosperity—
these are feelings rarely operating with equal force in any
other nation ; and it is with an exulting pride of conscious
patriotism, not inferior to any which ennobled the history
of Grecian or Helvetian republics, that an Aeneze, should
he be suddenly attacked, seizes his lance, and waving it
over his head exclaims, ‘I am an Aeneze.’”’ ?
Many of the elements out of which patriotism proper
has grown are clearly distinguishable among savages, even
the very lowest. We have previously noticed the savage’s
attachment to members of his own community or tribe.
Combined with this is his love of his native place, and of
the mode of life to which he is habituated. There is a
touching illustration of this feeling in the behaviour of
the wild boy who had been found in the woods near
Aveyron—where he had spent most part of his young life:
in perfect isolation from all human beings—when he,
after being removed to Paris, was once taken back to the
country, to the vale of Montmorence. Joy was painted
in his eyes, in all the motions and postures of his body, at
the view of the hills and the woods of the charming
valley ; he appeared more than ever restless and savage,
and ‘in spite of the most assiduous attention that was
paid to his wishes, and the most affectionate regard that
was expressed for him, he seemed to be occupied only
with an anxious desire of taking his flight.” * How much
greater must not the love of home be in him who has
there his relatives and friends! Mr. Howitt tells us of
1 Bory de St. Vincent, Assazs sar > Burckhardt, Votes on the Bedouins
les Isles Fortunées, p. 70. and Wahdbys, p. 205.
2 MacGregor, ‘ Lagos, Abeokuta, 4 Itard, Account of the Discovery
and the Alake,’ in Jour. African Soc. and Education of a Savage Man,
1904, p. 466. p: 70 sqq.
——-—_——
————
PATRIOTISM
>
an Australian native who, on leaving his camp with him
for a trip of about a week, burst into tears, saying to
himself once and again, ‘“‘ My country, my people, I shall
not see them.’”’* The Veddahs of Ceylon “would
exchange their wild forest life for none other, and it was
with the utmost difficulty that they could be induced to
quit even fora short time their favourite solitude.” ? The
Stiéns of Cambodia are so strongly attached to their
forests and mountains that to leave them seems almost
like death.2 Solomon Islanders not seldom die from
home-sickness on their way to the Fiji or Queensland
plantations.* The Hovas of Madagascar, when setting
out on a journey, often take with them a small portion of
their native earth, on which they gaze during their
absence, invoking their god that they may be permitted to
return to restore it to the place from which it was taken.’
Mr. Crawfurd observes that in the Malay Archipelago the
attachment to the native spot is strongest with the agri-
cultural tribes ;° but, though a settled life is naturally
most favourable to its development, this feeling is not
inconsistent with nomadism. The Nishinam, who are the
most nomadic of all the Californian tribes, have very
great attachment for the valley or flat which they count
their home.’
1 Brough Smyth,
Victoria, ii. 305.
2 Hartshorne, ‘ Weddas,’ in /zdian
Aino auf der Insel Yesso, p. 113
Aborigines of
Mallat, Les Phdlippines, ii. 95
Antiquary, vill. 317.
® Mouhot, Zyravels tn the Central
Parts of Indo-China, \. 243.
+ Guppy, of. ez¢. p. 167.
> Ellis, History of Madagascar, \.141.
® Crawfurd, Hzstory of the Indian
Archipelago, 1. 84.
7 Powers, of. cit. p. 318 sg. For
other instances of love of home among
uncivilised races see von Spix and von
Martius, of. c2t. ii. 242, note (Coroados);
von Kotzebue, of. cz¢. iii. 45 (Indians of
California) ; Gibbs, Zrzbes of Wes/ern
Washington and North- Western
Oregon, p. 187; Elliott, Report of the
Seal Islands of Alaska, p. 240;
Hooper, Zen Months among the Tents
of the Tuskt, p. 209; von Siebold,
(Negritos) ; von Brenner, Besuch bet
den Kannibalen Sumatras, p. 194
(Bataks); Earl, Papuwans, p. 126
(natives of Rotti, near Timor); Ling
Roth, Adorigines of Tasmania, p. 46 ;
Dieffenbach, 7ravels in New Zealand,
ii. 174; Cumming, Jz the Himalayas,
p- 404 (Paharis) ; Lane, AZanners and
Customs of the Modern Egyptians,
p- 302 (Bedawees); Tristram, Great
Sahara, p. 193 sg. (Beni M’zab) ;
Burton, Zanzzbar, ii. 96 (Wanika) ;
Emin Pasha in Central Africa, p. 315
(Monbuttu) ; Andersson, Lake ganz,
p- 198 (Ovambo); Rowley, Africa
Unveiled, p. 63 sg. (Kroos of the
Grain Coast below Liberia); Price,
‘Quissama Tribe,’ in /ouwr. Anthr,
,
Moreover, as we have noticed above, savages have | the
greatest regard for their native customs and institutions. * ‘
Many of them have displayed that love of national inde-\_
pendence which gives to patriotism its highest fervour.”
And among some uncivilised peoples, at least, the force of
racial and linguistic unity shows itself even outside the
social or political unit. Burckhardt observes that the
Bedouins are not only solicitous for the honour of their
own respective tribes, but consider the interests of all other
tribes as more or less attached to their own, and frequently
evince a general esprit de corps, lamenting “the losses of
any of their tribes occasioned by attacks from settlers or
foreign troops, even though at war with those tribes.” * A
Tongan “loves the island on which he was born, in par-
ticular, and all the Tonga islands generally, as being one
country, and speaking one language.’’* Travellers have
noticed how gratifying it is, when visiting an uncultured
people, to know a little of their language ; there is at once
a sympathetic link between the native and the stranger.°
Even the almost inaccessible Berber of the Great Atlas, in
spite of his excessive hatred of the European, will at once
give you a kindly glance as soon as you, to his astonish-
ment, utter to him a few words in his own tongue.
Like other species of the altruistic sentiment, patriotism
is apt to overestimate the qualities of the object for which
it is felt ; and it does so all the more readily as love of
one’s country is almost inseparably intermingled with love
of one’s self. ‘The ordinary, typical patriot has a strong
will to believe that his nation is the best. If, as many
1 See supra, i. 118 sq. Sarasin, of. cit. ili. 530 (Veddahs) ;
2 Cf. Dobrizhoffer, Account of the Casati, Ten Years in Equatoria, i. 188,
Abipones, ii. 95, 105; Lomonaco, 304 (Negroes of Central Africa) ;
‘Sulle razze indigene del Brasile,’ in Fritsch, Dze Eingeborenen Siid-
Archivio per Vantropologia e la Afrikes, p. 422 sg. (Bushmans).
etnologia, xix. 57 (Tupis); Brett, 3 Burckhardt, Bedouins and
Indian Tribes of Gutana, yp. 348 : Wahdbys, p. 205.
Schoolcraft, Jzdian Tribes of the * Mariner, .WVatives of the Tonea
United States, iii. 189 (Iroquois); Lslands, ii. 156. : -
Nansen, Eshzmo Life, p. 323 (Green- 5 See Stokes, Déscovertes in
landers); Macpherson, Memorials of Australia, ii. 25.
Service in India, p. 81 (Kandhs) ;
™~
es
CREL PATRIOTISM bey a
people nowadays seem to maintain, such a will to believe
is an essential characteristic of true patriotism, savages are
as good patriots as anybody. In their intercourse with white
men they have often with astonishment noticed the arro-
gant air of superiority adopted by the latter ; in their own
opinion they are themselves vastly superior to the whites.
According to Eskimo beliefs, the first man, though made
by the Great Being, was a failure, and was consequently
cast aside and called kod-/u-na, which means “white man”’;
but a second attempt of the Great Being resulted in the
formation of a perfect man, and he was called in-nu, the
name which the Eskimo give to themselves.' Australian
natives, on being asked to work, have often replied,
“White fellow works, not black fellow; black fellow
gentleman.”’* When anything foolish is done, the Chip-
pewas use an expression which means “as stupid as a white
man.” *® If a South Sea Islander sees a very awkward per-
son, he says, ‘‘ How stupid you are; perhaps you are an
Englishman.” * Mr. Williams tells us of a Fijian who,
having been to the United States, was ordered by his chiefs
to say whether the country of the white man was better
than Fiji, and in what respects. He had not, however,
gone far in telling the truth, when one cried out, “ He is
a prating fellow”; another, “ He is impudent” ; and
some said, ‘“* Kill him.” ° The Koriaks are more argumen-
tative ; in order to prove that the accounts they hear of
the advantages of other countries are so many lies, they
say to the stranger, “‘ If you could enjoy these advantages
at home, what made you take so much trouble to come to
us?’’® But the Koriaks, in their turn are looked down
upon by their neighbours, the Chukchi, who call the sur-
rounding peoples old women, only fit to guard their flocks,
and to be their attendants.’ The Ainu despise the Japanese
1 Hall, Arctic Researches, p. Boller, Among the Indians, p. 54 sq.
566 sg. 4 Williams, AZ¢sstonary Enterprises
2 Hale, U.S. Exploring Expedition. in the South Sea Islands, p. 514.
Vol. VI. Ethnography and Philology, 5 Williams and Calvert, #77, p. 105.
p- 109. 8 Krasheninnikoff, Hzstory of Kazm-
3 Keating, Axpedition to the Source schatha, p. 224.
of St. Peter’s River, ii. 168, See also 7 Sauer, op. cat. p. 255,
just as much as the Japanese despise them, and are con-
vinced of “the superiority of their own blood and descent
over that of all other peoples in the world.” * Even the
miserable Veddah of Ceylon has a very high opinion of
himself, and regards his civilised neighbours with con-
tempt.? As is often the case with civilised men, savages
attribute to their own people all kinds of virtue in perfec-
tion. The South American Mbayas, according to Azara,
“se croient la nation la plus noble du monde, la plus
généreuse, la plus exacte a tenir sa parole avec loyaute, et
la plus vaillante.”* The Eskimo of Norton Sound speak
of themselves as yu’-pik, meaning fine or complete people,
whereas an Indian is termed in-ki’-ltk, from a word which
means “a louse egg.’’* When a Greenlander saw a
foreigner of gentle and modest manners, his usual remark
was, ‘ He is almost as well-bred as we,” or, ‘““ He begins
to be a man,” that is, a Greenlander.? The savage regards
his people as ¢he people, as the root of all others, and as
occupying the middle of the earth. The Hottentots love
to call themselves ‘the men of men,.’’® The Indians of
the Ungava district, Hudson Bay, give themselves the
name zenenot, that is, true or ideal red men."
language of the Illinois Indians the word i//inois means
“men ”—‘‘as if they looked upon all other Indians as
beasts.”"° The Aborigines of Hayti believed that their
island was the first of all things, that the sun and moon
issued from one of its caverns, and men from another.®
Each Australian tribe, says Mr. Curr, regards its country
as the centre of the aah, which in most cases is believed
not to extend more than a couple of hundred miles or so
in any direction.”
1 Batchelor, ‘ Notes on the Ainu,’ in > Cranz, History of Greenland, i. 126.
In the’
Trans. Asiatic Soc. Japan, x. 211 sq.
Howard, Lzfe wth Trans-Siberian
Savages, p. 182.
2 Nevill, in Zafrobanian, 1. 192.
Sarasin, of. cét. lil. 530, 534, 553.
3 Azara, Voyages dans 1 Amérique
méridionale, ii. 107.
4 Nelson, ‘Eskimo about Bering
Strait,’ in dz, Rep. Bur. thn, xviii.
306 5g.
§ Kidd, The Essentéal Kafir, p. 92.
7 Turner, ‘ Ethnology of the Ungava
District,’ in Ann. Rep. Bur. Ethn. xi.
267.
8 Marquette, Recet des voyages, p. 47
Sq.
® Brett, Zdian Tribes of Gudana, p.
376.
1 Curr, The Australian Race, i. 50.
For other instances of national conceit
—_—
We meet with similar feelings and ideas among the
nations of archaic culture. The Chinese are taught to
think themselves superior to all other peoples. In their
writings, ancient and modern, the word “foreigner” is
regularly joined with some disrespectful epithet, implying or
expressing the ignorance, brutality, obstinacy, or meanness
of alien nations, and their obligations to or dependence
upon China.’ To Confugius himself China was ‘the
middle kingdom,” ‘the multitude of great states,” “all
under heaven,”’ beyond which were only rude and barbar-
ous tribes.” According to Japanese ideas, Nippon was the
first country created, and the centre of the world. The
ancient Egyptians considered themselves as the peculiar
people, specially loved by the gods. They alone were
termed “men” (romet); other nations were negroes,
Asiatics, or Libyans, but not men ; and according to the
myth these nations were descended from the enemies of
the gods.* The national pride of the Assyrians, so often
referred to by the Hebrew prophets,’ is conspicuous every-
where in their cuneiform inscriptions: they are the wise,
the brave, the powerful, who, like the deluge, carry away
all resistance ; their kings are the “* matchless, irresistible ”’;
and their gods are much exalted above the gods of all
other nations.°
exceeding good land,”
“the glory of all lands” ;7
or pride among savages see Darwin,
Journal of Researches, p. 207 (Fuegians);
von den Steinen, Unter den Natur-
volkern Lentral-Brasiliens, p. 332
(Bakairi) ; von Humboldt, /ersonal
Narrative of Travels to the Equinoctial
Regions of the New Continent, v. 423,
and press, op. cit. p. 128 (Guana
Indians); James, Hxfedztion to the
Rocky ee i. 320 (Omahas) ;
Murdoch, in Ann. Rep. Bur. Lthn. ix.
42 (Point Barrow Eskimo) ; Krashenin-
nikoff, of. ct. p. 180 (Kamchadales) ;
Brough Smyth, of. cz¢. ii. 284 (Austra-
lian natives) ; Macpherson, of. c?¢. p.
67 (Kandhs); Munzinger, Ueber ave
Sitten und das Recht der Bogos, p.
94; Andersson, Lake Ngamz, p. 198
To the Hebrews their own land was ‘‘an
“flowing with milk and honey,”
and its inhabitants were a holy
(Ovambo).
1 Philip, Zzfe and Opinions of the
kev. W. Milne, p. 257. Cf. Staunton,
in Narrative of the Chinese Embassy to
the Khan of the Tourgouth Tartars, p.
Vili.
* Legge, Chinese Classtcs,i. 107. See
also Giles, of. c7¢. li. 116, n. 2.
3 Griffis, Religions of Japan, jah ZOvye
4 Erman, Life im Ancient Egyft, p.
32.
5 Isaiah, x. 7 sgg. 3 xxxvii. 24 sgq.
Ezekiel, xxxi. 10 sg. Zephaniah, ii. 15.
6 Miirdter - Delitzsch, Geschichte
Babyloniens und Assyriens, p. 104.
” Numbers, xiii, 27 ; xiv.7. Ezekiel,
7S (Oy HGS
people ck the Lord had chosen “to be a special people
unto himself, above all people that are upon the face of
the earth.” + Concerning the ancient Persians, Herodotus
writes :— They look upon themselves as very greatly
superior in all respects to the rest of mankind, regarding
others as approaching to excellence in proportion as they
dwell nearer to them; whence it comes to pass that those
who are the factheses off must be the most degraded of
mankind.” ? To this day the monarch of Persia retains
the title of «‘the Centre of the Universe”; and it is not
easy to persuade a native of Isfahan that any European
capital can be superior to his native city. The Greeks
called Delphi—or rather the round stone in the Delphic
temple—* the navel” or “‘ middle point of the earth”’ ;*
and they considered the natural relation between them-
selves and barbarians to be that between master and
slave.°
In the archaic State the national feeling is in some cases
greatly strengthened by the religious feeling ; whilst in other
instances religion inspires devotion to the family, clan, or
caste rather than to the nation, or constitutes a tie not on
between compatriots but between members of different
political communities. The ancestor-worship of the
Chinese has hardly been conducive to genuine patriotism.
Whatever devotion to the common weal may have pre-
vailed among the Vedic Aryans, it has certainly passed
away beneath the influence of Brahmanism, or been
narrowed down to the caste, the village, or the famil
The Zoroastrian Ahura-Mazda was not anational god, but
“‘the god of the Aryans,” that is, of all the peoples who
inhabited ancient Iran ; and these were constantly at war
1 Deuteronomy, vii. 6. (iii, II5 sg.), and Rawlinson’s com-
= 4 eet) 3
~ Herodotus, i. 134. mentary, in his translation of Herodo-
3 Rawliison, in his translation of tus, i. 260 sg. n. 6.
Herodotus, 1. 260, n. 5. 5 Euripides, Jphigenta zt Aulide,
* Pindar, Pythia, vi. 3 sg. Idem, 1400 sg. Aristotle, Politica, i. 2, 6,
Nemea, Vii. 33 Sg. Aeschylus, Hu- pp. 1252 b, 1255 a.
mentdes, 40, 166. Sophocles, Gadzpus o Wheeler, Liistory of India, ii. 586
Tyrannus, 480, 898. Livy, xxxviii. 48. sg. See also Leist, Alt-arisches Jus
C/. Herodotus’ theory of ‘extremities’ Gerdzumr, p. 520.
PATRIOTISM
XXXII Lh
with one another.! Muhammedans, whilst animated with
a common hatred towards the Christians, show little public
spirit in relation to their respective countries,? composed
as they are of a variety of loosely connected, often very
heterogeneous elements, ruled over by a monarch whose
power is in many districts more nominal than real. In
ancient Greece and Rome patriotism no doubt contained a
religious element—each state and town had its tutelary
gods and heroes, who were considered its proper masters ;°
but in the first place it was free citizens’ love of their native
institutions, a civic virtue which grew up on the soil of
liberty. When the two Spartans who were sent to Xerxes
to be put to death were advised by one of his governors to
surrender themselves to the king, their answer was, ‘“ Had
you known what freedom is, you would have bidden us
fight for it, not with the spear only, but with the battle-
axe.’’* And of the Athenians who lived at the time of
the Persian wars, Demosthenes said that they were ready to
die for their country rather than to see it enslaved, and
that they considered the outrages and insults which befell
him who lived in a subjugated city to be more terrible
than death.? In classical antiquity ‘the influence of
patriotism thrilled through every fibre of moral and
intellectual life.”’° In some Greek cities emigration was
prohibited by law, at Argos even on penalty of death.’
Plato, in the Republic, sacrificed the family to the interests
of the State. Cicero placed our duty to our country next
after our duty to the immortal gods and before our duty
to our parents.* ‘Of all connections,” he says, ‘none is
more weighty, none is more dear, than that between every
individual and his country. Our parents are dear to us;
1 Meyer, Geschichte des Alterthums,
i. 540. Spiegel, Ardnische Alterthums-
4 Herodotus, vii. 134 sg.
> Demosthenes, De Corona, 205, p.
kunde, i. 687 sgq. 206.
2 Polak, Perszen, i. 12. Urquhart, 8 Lecky, History of Luropean Morals,
Spirit of the East, ii. 427, 439 (Turks). 1. 200.
Burckhardt, Bedouins and Wahdbys,
p- 204 sg. (Turks and Arab settlers).
3 Leist, A/t-arisches Jus Gentium, p.
529. Schmidt, Dze “thik der alten
Griechen, li, 221.
” Plutarch, Lycurgus, xxvii. 5. Ovid,
Metamorphoses, xv. 29.
8 Cicero, De offictts, i. 45 (160). Cf
zbzd, ill. 23 (90).
our children, our kinsmen, our friends, are dear to us;
but our country comprehends alone all the endearments
of us all. What good man would hesitate to die for her
if he could do her service ?””?
The duty of patriotism springs, in the first instance,
from the patriotic feeling ; when the love of country is
common in a nation public resentment is felt towards him
who does not act as that sentiment requires him to act.
Moreover, lack of patriotism in a person may also be
resented by his fellow-countrymen as an injury done to
themselves ; and, as we have seen before, anger, and
especially anger felt by a whole community, has a tendency
to lead to moral disapproval. For analogous reasons deeds
of patriotism are apt to evoke moral praise. However,
in benefiting his own people the patriot may cause harm
to other people ; and where the altruistic sentiment is
broad enough to extend beyond the limits of the State and
strong enough to make its voice heard even in competition
with the love of country and the love of self, his conduct
may consequently be an object of reproach. At the lower
stages of civilisation the interests of foreigners are not
regarded at all, except when sheltered by the rule of hospi-
tality ; but gradually, owing to circumstances which will
be discussed in the following chapter, altruism tends to
expand, and men are at last considered to have duties to
mankind at large. The Chinese moralists inculcated
benevolence to all men, without making any reference to
national distinctions. 7 Mih-tsze, who lived in the interval
between Confucius and Mencius, even taught that we
ought to love all men equally ; but this doctrine called
forth protests as abnegating the peculiar devotion due to
relatives.* In That-Shang it is said that a good man will
feel kindly towards every creature, and should not hurt
even the insect tribes, grass, and trees.* Buddhism
1 [bid. i. 17 (57). Cf. Cicero, De * Edkins, el¢gion in China, p. 119.
legibus, il. 2 (5). Legge, Chinese Classics, ii. 476, n. 45.
2 Lun Vii, xii. 22. Mencius, vii. 1. de Groot, Religious System of China
45. Douglas, Confuctandsm and Taou- (vol. ii. book) i. 684. ;
ism, Pp. 108, 205. + Thai-Shang, 3.
COSMOPOLITANISM
enjoins the duty of universal love :—“ As a mother, even
at the risk of her own life, protects her son, her only son,
so let a man cultivate goodwill without measure toward
all beings, . . . . unhindered loveand friendliness toward
the whole world, above, below, around.” According to
the Hindu work Panchatantra it is the thought of little-
minded persons to consider whether a man is one of our-
selves or an alien, the whole earth being of kin to him
who is generously disposed.» In Greece and Rome
philosophers arose who opposed national narrowness and
prejudice. Democritus of Abdera said that every country
is accessible to a wise man, and that a good soul’s father-
land is the whole earth.* The same view was expressed
by Theodorus, one of the later Cyrenaics, who denounced
devotion to country as ridiculous. The Cynics, in
particular, attached slight value to the citizenship of any
special state, declaring themselves to be citizens of the
world.’ But, as Zeller observes, in the mouth of the
Cynic this doctrine was meant to express not so much the
essential oneness of all mankind, as the philosopher’s
independence of country and home.® It was the Stoic
philosophy that first gave to the idea of a world-citizenship
a definite positive meaning, and raised it to historical
importance. The citizen of Alexander’s huge empire
had in a way become a citizen of the world; and
national dislikes were so much more readily overcome
as the various nationalities comprised in it were united
not only under a common government but also in a
common culture.’ Indeed, the founder of Stoicism was
himself only half a Greek. But there is also an obvious
connection between the cosmopolitan idea and the Stoic
1 Quoted by Rhys Davids, Azbdert
Lectures on the History of Buddhism,
mrt.
2 2 Muir, Religious and Moral Sentt-
ments rendered from Sanskrit Writers,
p. 109.
3 Stobzeus, /Vordlegium, xl. 7, vol. ii.
80. Cf. Natorp, Die Ethika des De-
mokretos, p. 117, n. 41.
VOL. Il
4 Diogenes Laertius, Vite phtlo-
sophorum, ii. 98 sg.
5 Jbid. vi. 12, 63, 72, 98. Epictetus,
Dissertationes, iii. 24. 66. Stobzeus,
Xv 29, VOL. 11 252.
6 Zeller, Socrates and the Socratic
Schools, p. 326 sg. Idem, Stotcs,
Epicureans, and Sceptics, p. 327.
7 Cf. Plutarch, De Alexandrt Magni
fortuna aut virtute, i. 6, p. 329.
N
system in general.'- According to the Stoics, human
society has for its basis the identity of reason in indivi-
duals ; hence we have no ground for limiting this society
to a single nation. We are all, says Seneca, members of
one great body, the universe; ‘we are all akin by
Nature, who has formed us of the same elements, and
placed us here together for the same end.”* “It our
reason is common,” says Marcus Aurelius, “there 1s a
common law, as reason commands us what to do and what
not to do; and if there is a common law we are fellow-
citizens ; if this is so, we are members of some political
community—the world is in a manner a state.” ® To
this great state, which includes all rational beings, the
individual states are related as the houses of a city are to
the city collectively ;* and the wise man will esteem it
far above any particular community in which the accident
of birth has placed him.’
But the Roman ideal of patriotism, with its utter dis-
regard for foreign nations,° was not opposed by philosophy
alone: it met with an even more formidable antagonist in
the new religion. The Christian and the Stoic rejected it
on different grounds: whilst the Stoic felt himself as a
citizen of the world, the Christian felt himself as a citizen
of heaven, to whom this planet was only a place of exile.
Christianity was not hostile to the State.’ At the very
time when Nero committed his worst atrocities, St. Paul
declared that there is no power but of God, and that who-
soever resists the power resists the ordinance of God and
shall be condemned ;*° and Tertullian says that all
Christians send up their prayers for the life of the emperors,
for their ministers, for magistrates, for the good of the
a ee
1 See Zeller, Stozcs, Sc. p. 327 sq.
2 Seneca, Apistule, xcv. 52.
3 Marcus Aurelius, Commentartt, iv.
4. Cf. 2bzd. vi. 44, and ix. 9; Cicero,
De legibus, i. 7 (23); Epictetus, Dzs-
sertationes, 1. 13. 3.
4 Marcus Aurelius, iil. II.
> Seneca, /2¢ of2o, iv. 1. der,
Epistule, \xvill. 2. Epictetus, Dzs-
sertationes, il. 22. 83 sqq.
® Cf. Lactantius, Divine Tnstitu-
tiones, Vi. (‘ De vero cultu’), 6 (Migne,
Patrologie cursus, vi. 655).
7 St. Matthew, xxii. 21.
ii. 13 5g,
8 Romans, xiii. 1 sg. See also Tztus,
lil. I.
1 Peter,
a
=>
XX XIII COSMOPOLITANISM
State and the peace of the Empire.’ But the emperor
should be obeyed only so long as his commands do not
conflict with the law of God—a Christian ought rather to
suffer like Daniel in the lions’ den than sin against his
religion ;° and nothing is more entirely foreign to him
than a Wiice of State.’ Indeed, in the whole Roman Empire
there were no men who so entirely lacked patriotism as the
early Christians. They had no affection for Judea, they soon
forgot Galilee, they cared nothing for the glory of Greece
and Rome.* When the judges asked them which was their
country they said in answer, ‘I am a Christian.”°® And
long after Christianity had become the religion of the
Empire, St. Augustine declared that it matters not, in
respect of this short and transitory life, under whose dom:
inion a mortal man lives, if os he be not compelled to
acts of impiety or injustice.° Later on, when the Church
grew into a political power independent of the State, she
became a positive enemy of national interests. i the
seventeenth century a Jesuit general called patriotism a
plague and the most certain death of Christian love.’’’
With the fall of the Roman Empire patriotism died out
in Europe, and remained extinct for centuries. It was a
feeling hardly compatible either with the migratory life of
the Teutonic tribes or with the feudal system, which grew up
wherever they fixed their residence. The knights, it is
true, were not destitute of the natural affection for home.
When Aliaumes is mortally wounded by Geri li Sors he
exclaims, “ Holy Virgin, I shall never more see Saint-
Quentin nor Neécle” ;* and the troubadour Bernard de
Ventadour touchingly sings, ¢ Quan la doussa aura venta—
Deves nostre pais,—M’es veiaire que senta—Odor de
1 Tertullian, Apologeticus, 39 (Migne,
op. cit. 1. 468). See also Ludwig,
Tertuliian’s Ethtk, p. 153 sqq.; Nielsen,
Tertullians Ethtk, p. 98 sq.
2 Tertullian, De <idololatria, 15
(Migne, of. cet. i. 684).
3 Tertullian, Afologeticus, 38 (Migne,
op. cit. i. 465) :—‘“‘ Nec ulla magis res
aliena, quam publica.”
4 See Renan, Hibbert Lectures on the
Influence of Rome on Christianity, p. 28.
5 Le Blant, /uscriplions chrétiennes,
ile, Weyer,
6 St. Augustine, De C2zvitate Dez, v.
17.
7 von Eicken, Geschichte und System
der mittelalterlichen Weltanschauung,
p. 809.
8 Lz Romans de Raoul de Cambraz,
210, p. 185.
Ne
Paradis.” But to a man of the Middle*Agesxhis
country’? meant little more than the neighbourhood in
which he lived.2 Kingdoms existed, but no nations. The
first duty of a vassal was to be loyal to his lord ;* but no
national spirit bound together the various barons of one
country. A man might be the vassal of the king of
France and of the king of England at the same time ; and
often, from caprice, passion, or sordid interest, the barons
sold their services to the enemies of the kingdom. The
character of his knighthood was also perpetually pressing
the knight to a course of conduct distinct from all national
objects.« The cause of a distressed lady was in many
instances preferable to that of the country to which he
belonged—as when the Captal de Bouche, though an Eng-
lish subject, did not hesitate to unite his troups with those
of the Compte de Foix to relieve the ladies in a French
town, where they were besieged and threatened with vio-
lence by the insurgent peasantry.” When a knight’s
duties towards his country are mentioned in the rules of
Chivalry they are spoken of as duties towards his lord:—
‘“*The wicked knight,” it is said, “that aids not his earthly
lord and natural country against another prince, isa knight
without office.” ° Far from being, as M. Gautier asserts,’
the object of an express command in the code of Chivalry,
true patriotism had there no place at all. It was not
known as an ideal, still less did it exist as a reality, among
either knights or commoners. As a duke of Orleans
could bind himself by a fraternity of arms and alliance to
a duke of Lancaster,* so English merchants were in the
habit of supplying nations at war against England with
provisions bought at English fairs, and weapons wrought
by English hands,’ If, as M. Gaston Paris maintains, a
} Quoted by Gautier, Za Chevalerie, 140 sq.
p. 64. > Scott, Essay on Chivalry, p. 31.
2 See Cibrario, Della economia polt- 8 Ordre of Chyualry, fol. 14 b.
teca del medio eve, i. 263; de Crozals, 7 Gautier, of. czt. p. 33.
ffistotre de la cevilization, ii. 287. 8 Sainte-Palaye, Mémozres sur Pan-
3 Ordre of Chyualry, foll. 13 b, ctenne Chevalerde, ii. 72.
32 b. ; 9 Pike, Azstory of Crime in England,
4 See Mills, Aéstory of Chivalry, i. i. 264 sq.
oie
deep feeling of national union had inspired the Chanson de
Roland,’ it is a strange, yet undeniable, fact that no
distinct trace of this feeling displayed itself in the medieval
history of France before the English wars.
Besides feudalism and the want of political cohesion,
there were other factors that contributed to hinder the
development of national personality and patriotic devotion.
This sentiment presupposes not only that the various
parts of which a country is composed shall have a vivid
feeling of their unity, but also that they, united, shall feel
_ themselves as a nation clearly distinct from other nations.
In the. Middle Ages national differences were largely
obscured by the preponderance of the Universal Church,
by the creation of the Holy Roman Empire, by the
prevalence of a common language as the sole vehicle of
mental culture, and by the undeveloped state of the
vernacular tongues. To make use of the native dialect
was a sign of ignorance, and to place worldly interests
above the claims of the Church was impious. When
Macchiavelli declared that he preferred his country to the
safety of his soul, people considered him guilty of
blasphemy ; and when the Venetians defied the Papal
thunders by averring that they were Venetians in the first
place, and only Christians in the second, the world heard
them with amazement.”
In England the national feeling developed earlier than
on the Continent, no doubt owing to her insular position
and freer institutions ; as Montesquieu observes, patriotism
thrives best in democracies.’ At the time of the English
Reformation the sense of corporate national life had
evidently gained considerable strength, and the love of
England has never been expressed in more exquisite form
than it was by Shakespeare. At the same time the sense
of patriotism was often grossly perverted by religious
1 Paris, La poésie du moyen age, jp. 2 *National Personality,’ in Zaiz-
107. M. Gautier says (of. czt. p. 61) burgh Review, cxciv. 133.
that Roland is ‘“‘la France faite 3 Montesquieu, De esprit des Lois,
homme.” iv. 5 (Guures, p. 206 sg.).
bigotry and party spirit.’ Even champions of liberty,
like Lord Russell and Algernon Sidney, accepted French
gold in the hope of embarrassing the King ; and Sidney
went so far as to try to instigate De Witt to invade
England. Loyalism, in particular, proved a much
stronger incentive than love of country. A loyalist like
Strafford would have employed half-savage Irish troops
against his own countrymen, and the Scotch Jacobites
invited a French invasion.
In France the development of the national feeling was
closely connected with the strengthening of the royal
power and its gradual victory over feudalism. ‘T-he word
patrie was for the first time used by Charles VII.’s
chronicler, Jean Chartier, and he also condemned as
renégats those Frenchmen who, at the end of the hundred
years’ war, fought on the side of the English.” But
patriotism was for a long time inseparably confounded
with loyalty to the sovereign. According to Bossuet
“tout |’Etat est en la personne du prince” ;* and Abbe
Coyer observes that Colbert believed royaume and patrie
to signify one and the same thing.* In the eighteenth
century the spirit of rebellion succeeded that of devotion '
to the king ; but the key-note of the great movement
which led to the Revolution was the liberty and equality
of the individual, not the glory or welfare of the nation.
Men were looked upon as members of the human race,
rather than as citizens of any particular country. To be
a citizen of every nation, and not to belong to one’s
native country alone, was the dream of French writers in
the eighteenth century.? “The true sage is a cosmo-
politan,” says a writer of comedy.® Diderot asks which is
the greater merit, to enlighten the human race, which
remains for ever, or to save one’s fatherland, which is
1 See Hdinburgh Review, exciv. 133, + Block, Déctzonnaire général de la
136 sg. ; Pearson, National Life and politique, ii. 518.
Character, p. 190. ° Texte, Jean-Jacques Rousseau and
2 Guibal, Histoire du sentiment the Cosmopolitan Spiret in Literature,
national en France pendant la guerre yp. 79.
de Cent ans, p 526 Sq: 6 Palissot de Montenoy, Les phdio-
» Legrand, L’zdée de patrie, p. 20. sophes, lil. 4, p. 75.
eee) Te hy ee ee
tne ttl
perishable." According to Voltaire patriotism is composed
of self-love and prejudice,’ and only too often makes us
the enemies of our fellow-men :—“ II est clair qu’un pays
ne peut gagner sans qu’un autre perde, et qu'il ne peut
vaincre sans faire des malheureux. Telle est donc la
condition humaine, que souhaiter la grandeur de son pays,
cest souhaiter du mal a ses voisins.”* In Germany
Lessing, Goethe, and Schiller felt themselves as citizens of
the world, not of the German Empire, still less as Saxons
or Suabians; and Klopstock, with his enthusiasm for
German nationality and language, almost appeared
eccentric.* Lessing writes point-blank :—* The praise of
being an ardent patriot is to my mind the very last thing
that I should covet; . . . I have no idea at all of love of
the Fatherland, and it seems to me at best but an heroical
weakness, which I can very readily dispense with.” °
The first French revolution marks the beginning of a
new era in the history of patriotism. It inspired the
masses with passion for the unity of the fatherland, the
Republic ‘one and indivisible.” At the same time it
declared all nations to be brothers, and when it made war
on foreign nations the object was only to deliver them
from their oppressors.° But gradually the interest in the
affairs of other countries grew more and more selfish, the
attempt to emancipate was absorbed in the desire to
subjugate ; and this awoke throughout Europe a feeling
which was destined to become the most powerful force in
the history of the nineteenth century, the feeling of
nationality. When Napoleon introduced French adminis-
tration in the countries whose sovereigns he had deposed
or degraded, the people resisted the change. ‘The resist-
ance was popular, as the rulers were absent or helpless,
and it was national, being directed against foreign institu-
1 Diderot, ZLssaz ser les regnes de Patrie vill.
art. (Quvres completes,
Claude et de Néron, ii. 75 (Quvres, vi.
244). ‘ A we
2 Voltaire, Pensdées sur Padministra-
tion publique, 14 (Guvres completes, v.
351)
3 Idem, Dictionnaire phelosophique,
IIS).
4 See Strauss, Der alte und der neue
Glaube, p. 259 sq.
5 Lessing, quoted by Ziegler, Soczal
Ethics, p. 121.
8 Block, of. ect. il. 376.
tions. It was stirred by the feeling of national rather
than political unity, it was a protest against the dominion
of race over race. The national element in this move-
ment had in a manner been anticipated by the French
revolution itself. The French people was regarded by it
as an ethnological, not as an historic, unit ; descent was
put in the place of tradition ; the idea of the sovereignty
of the people uncontrolled by the past gave birth to the
idea of nationality independent of the political influence of
history. But, as has been truly remarked, men were
made conscious of the national element of the revolution
by its conquests, not in its rise."
Ever since, the racial feeling has been the most
vigorous force in European patriotism, and has gradually
become a true danger to humanity. Beginning as a
protest against the dominion of one race over another,
this feeling led to a condemnation of every state which
included different races, and finally developed into the
complete doctrine that state and nationality should so far
as possible be coextensive.” According to this theory the
dominant nationality cannot admit the inferior nationalities
dwelling within the boundaries of the state to an equality |
with itself, because, if it did, the state would cease to be
national, and this would be contrary to the principle of its
existence ; or the weaker nationalities are compelled to
change their language, institutions, and individuality, so
as to be absorbed in the dominant race. And not only
does the leading nationality assert its superiority in relation
to all others within the body politic, but it also wants to
assert itself at the expense of foreign nations and races.
To the nationalist all this is true patriotism; love of
country often stands for a feeling which has been well
described as love of more country.* But at the same time
opposite ideals are at work. The fervour of nineteenth
century nationalism has not been able to quench the
aa See ‘ Nationality, in Home and 3 Robertson, Patriotism and Empire,
Foreign Review, \. 6 sqq. p. 138.
2 bt 9.13) 57
cosmopolitan spirit. In spite of loud appeals made to
racial instincts and the sense of national solidarity, the
idea is daily gaining ground that the aims of a nation
must not conflict with the interests of humanity at. large ;
that our love of country should be controlled by other
countries’ right to prosper and to develop their own
individuality ; and that the oppression of weaker nationali-
ties inside the state and aggressiveness towards foreign
nations, being mainly the outcome of vainglory and greed,
are inconsistent with the aspirations of a good patriot, as
well as of a good man.
Our long discussion of moral ideas regarding such modes
of conduct as directly concern other men’s welfare has at
last come to an end. We have seen that they may be
ultimately traced to a variety of sources: to the influence
of habit or education, to egoistic considerations of some kind
or other which have given rise to moral feelings, to notions
of social expediency, to disinterested likings or dislikes,
and, above all, to sympathetic resentment or sympathetic
approval springing from an altruistic disposition of mind.
But how to account for this disposition? Our explanation
of that group of moral ideas which we have been hitherto
investigating is not complete until we have found an
answer to this important question. I shall therefore in
the next chapter examine the origin and development
of the altruistic sentiment,
CLEANLINESS AND UNCLEANLINESS——ASCETICISM IN
GENERAL
Ir seems that man, like many other animals, is naturally
endowed with a certain tendency to cleanliness or aversion
to filth. Of Caspar Hauser—the boy who had been kept
in a dungeon separated from all communication with the
world from early childhood to about the age of seventeen—
Feuerbach tells us that “ uncleanliness, or whatever he con-
sidered as such, whether in his own person or in others, was
an abomination to him.”* And the savage boy of Aveyron,
though filthy at first, soon became so scrupulously clean
in his habits that ‘he constantly threw away, in a pet, the
contents of his plate, if any particle of dirt or dust had
fallen upon it; and, after he had broken his walnuts
under his feet, he took pains to clean them in the nicest
and most delicate manner.” ”
Many savages are praised for their cleanliness.2 The
Veddahs of Ceylon wash their bodies every few days, as
4
opportunity occurs.
1Feuerbach, Caspar
62.
2 Itard, Account of the Discovery
and Education of a Savage Man,
MSO:
3 Colquhoun, Amongst the Shans, p.
298sg. Man, Sonthalia and the Sonthals,
p. 84. Foreman, Phzlippine Islands,
p. 189 (domesticated natives). Boyle,
Dyaks of Borneo, p. 242. Erskine,
fTauser, )p.
Among the South Sea Islanders
Cruise among the Islands of the
Western Pacific, pp. 110 (Samoans ; cf.
Turner, Vineteen Years tn Polynesia,
p- 205), 262, 264 (Fijians). Percy
Smith, ‘Futuna,’ in Joe. Polynesian
Soc. i. 35. Markham, Crazse of the
“* Rosario,” p. 136 (Polynesians).
4 Nevill, ‘Vaeddas of Ceylon,’ in
Taprobanian, i. 187. °
Ck li et ill al kh hl ll hae ie
rere
ree
CLEANLINESS
bathing is a very common practice ; the Tahitians bathe in
fresh water once or twice a day,! and the natives of Ni-afu,
in the Tonga Islands, are said to spend half their life in
the water.” So, also, many Indian tribes both in North,
Central, and South America are very fond of bathing.’
The Omahas generally bathe every day in warm weather,
early in the morning and at night, and some of them also
at noon.* Among the Guiana Indians it is a custom for
men and women to troop down together to the nearest
water early in the morning and many times during the
day.” The Tehuelches of Patagonia not only make
morning ablutions and, when encamped near a river,
enjoy bathing for hours, but are also scrupulously careful
as to the cleanliness of their houses and utensils, and will,
if they can obtain soap, wash up everything they may be
possessed of.° The Moquis and Pueblos of New Mexico
are remarkable both for their personal cleanliness and the
neatness of their dwellings.’ Cleanliness is a common
characteristic of many natives of Africa.® The Negroes
of the Gold Coast wash their whole persons once, if not
oftener, during the day.° The Megeé, a people subject
to the Monbuttu, wash two or three times a day, and
when engaged in work constantly adjourn to a neigh-
bouring stream to cleanse themselves." The Marutse-
Mabundas, rather than lose their bath, are always ready
1 Ellis, Polynestan Researches (ed.
1829), ii. 113 5g.
2 Romilly, Western Pacific, p. 145.
3 Bancroft, Mative Races of the
Pacific States, 1, 83, 696, 722, 760.
Domenech, Seven Years’ Residence in
the Great Deserts of North America, ii.
337. von Humboldt, Personal Narrative
of Travels to the Equinoctial Regions
of the New Continent, ill. 237 (Chay-
mas). von Martius, SBedtriige zur
Ethnographie Amerika@s, i. 600
(Uaupés), 643 (Macusis). Molina,
History of Chil, ii. 118; Smith,
Araucanians, p. 184. Dobrizhoffer,
Account of the Abipones, ii. 53.
4 Dorsey, ‘Omaha Sociology,’ in
Ann. Rep. Bur. Ethn. iii. 269.
5 Im Thurn, Among the [Indians of
Guiana, p. 191.
6 Musters, At Home with the Pata-
gonians, p. 173.
7 Bancroft, of. cz¢. i. 540. See also
zbzd. i. 267 (some Inland Columbians).
8 Waitz, Anthropologie der Natur-
volker, i. 86 (Negroes of Accra, Krus),
464 (Western Fulahs). ‘Torday and
Joyce, ‘Ethnography of the Ba-
Huana,’ in Jour. Anthr. lnst. xxxvi.
292. Rowley, Africa Unveiled, p.
153. Ashe, Zwo Kings of Uganda, p.
305; Wilson and Felkin, Uganda, i.
184. Casati, Zen Years in EHquatoria,
i. 122 (Monbuttu). Holub, Sever
Years in South Africa, i. 208
(Manansas).
® Cruickshank, Zzghtcen Years on the
Gold Coast, ii. 283 sg.
1 Burrows, Land of the Pigiiies, p.
119.
to run the risk of being snapped up by crocodiles, and
they are in the habit of keeping their materials in well-
washed wooden or earthenware bowls or in suitable baskets
or calabashes.1 The cleanliness of the Dinka in every-
thing that concerns the preparation of food is said to be
absolutely exemplary.” Among the Bari tribes the dwell-
ings “are the perfection of cleanliness.” * So also the
Bachapins, a Bechuana tribe, are remarkable for the clean-
liness of their dwellings, showing the greatest carefulness
to remove all rubbish and everything unsightly ; but at
the same time they are lacking in personal cleanliness.*
We commonly find that savages who are clean in
certain respects are dirty in others. The Wanyoro bathe
frequently and always wash their hands before and after
eating, but their dwellings are very filthy and swarm with
vermin.” ‘The Nagas of India® and the natives of the
interior of Sumatra,’ though cleanly in their persons, are
very dirty in their apparel. The Mayas of Central
America make frequent use of cold water, but neither in
their persons nor in their dwellings do they present an
appearance of cleanliness.® So also the Californian Indians,
whilst exceedingly fond of bathing, are unclean about their
lodges and clothing.” The Aleuts, though they wash
daily, allow dirt to be piled up close to their dwellings,
prepare their food very carelessly, and never wash their
household utensils.°°. The New Zealander, again, whilst
not over-clean in his person, is very particular respecting
his food and also keeps his dwelling in as much order as
possible.“ On the other hand there are very many
uncivilised peoples who are described as generally filthy
in their habits—for instance, the Fuegians,’ many
1 Holub, of. ct. ii. 309, 8 Bancroft, of. czt. i. 654.
2 Casati, of. c2t. i. 44. 9 Powers, Tribes of California, p.
3 Baker, Albert N’yanza, i. 89. 403. Bancroft, of. cét. i. 377, 407.
4 Burchell, Zravels in the Interior of 0 Veniaminof, quoted by Dall,
Southern Africa, ii. 521, 553. Alaska, p. 398. See also Bancroft,
5 Wilson and Felkin, of. ct. ii. 46.
Baker, Albert N’yanza, ii. 58.
6 Stewart, ‘Northern Cachar,’ in
Jour. Asiatic Soc. Bengal, xxiv. 616.
7 Marsden, Aestory of Sumatra, p.
209.
op. cit. 1. 267 (Flatheads).
Dieffenbach, TZravels in New
Zealand, ii. 58.
} Snow, Zwo Years’ Cruise off Tierra
del Fuego, i. 345.
er awe i ee CS Le ee i
Indian tribes in the Pacific States,! several Eskimo tribes,”
various Siberian peoples,* the Ainu of Japan,‘ most hill
tribes in India,’® many Australian tribes,° the Bushmans,’
and, generally, the dwarf races of Africas But although
these peoples never or hardly ever wash their bodies, or do
not change their dress until it is worn to pieces, or eat out
of the same vessels as their dogs without cleaning them,
or feed on disgusting substances, or regard vermin as a
delicacy—we may assume that their toleration of filth is
not absolutely boundless.
The prevalence of cleanly or dirty habits among a
certain people may depend on a variety of circumstances :
the occupations of life, sufficiency or want of water,
climatic conditions, industry or laziness, wealth or poverty,
religious or superstitious beliefs. Castrén observes that
filthiness is a characteristic of fishing peoples ; among the
Ostyaks only those who live by fishing are conspicuous for
their uncleanliness, whereas the nomads and owners of
1 Bancroft, of. cét. i.
231, 492, 626.
2 Ibid. i. 51. Seemann, Voyage of
“ Herald,” ii. 61 sg. (Western Eskimo).
Kane, Arctic Explorations, ii. 116
(Eskimo of Etah). Cranz, Azstory of
Greenland, 1. 155.
3 Sarytschew, ‘ Voyage of Discovery
to the North-East of Siberia,’ in
Collection of Modern and Contemporary
Voyages, v. 67 (Kamchadales). Krash-
eninnikoff, /7story of Kamschatka,
pp. 176 (Kamchadales), 226 (Koriaks).
Sauer, Hxfpedition to the Northern
Parts ‘of Russia performed by Billings,
p. 125 (Jakuts). Georgi, zssza, ii.
398 (Jakuts) ; ili. 59 (Kotoftzes), 112
(Tunguses) ; iv. 37 (Kalmucks), 134
(Burats). Liadoy, in Jour. Anthr. Inst.
th C@IEP Bergmann, omadische
Stretfereien unter den Kalmiiken, ii.
102, 123 5g.; Pallas, quoted in Spencer’s
Descriptive Sociology, ‘ Asiatic Races,’
p- 29 (Kalmucks).
4 Batchelor, Azz of Japan, p.
24 sgg. Mac Ritchie, Aznos, p.
12 sq.
® Spencer, Descrzptive Sociology,
sAsiaties Races, pa 920-45) Grange;
‘Expedition into the Naga Hlills,’ in
83, 102, 184,
Jour. Asiatic Soc.
Bengal, ix. 962.
Stewart, zd¢d. xxiv. 637 (Kukis).
Mason, ‘ Physical Character of the
Karens,’ 2bzd. xxxv. pt. il. 25. Butler,
Travels in Assam, p. 98. Anderson,
Mandalay to Monten, p. 131 (Kak-
hyens). Moorcroft and Trebeck,
Travels in the Himalayan Provinces,
i. 321 (Ladakhis).
6 Breton, Axcursions tn New South
Wales, p. 197. Barrington, H2story of
New South Wales,p. 19 (natives of Botany
Bay). Angas, Savage Life in Australia,
i. 80 (South Australian aborigines).
Chauncy, in Brough Smyth, Adorzgznes
of Victoria, ii. 284 (West Australian
aborigines).
7 Moffat, A@ésstonary Labours im
Southern Africa, p. 15. Barrow,
Travels “into the Interior of Southern
Africa, i. 288.
8 Stuhlmann, At Emin Pascha
ins Herz von Afrika, p. 451. For
other instances of uncleanliness in
savages see Crawfurd, Azstory of the
Indian Archipelago, i. 39; St. John,
Life in the Forests of the kar East,
i. 147 (some of the Land Dyaks) ; An-
dersson, Lake Negamiz, pp. 50 (Herero),
470 (Bechuanas),
reindeer are not.! It has been observed that the inland
negro is clean when he dwells in the neighbourhood of
rivers.” In West Australia those tribes only which live
by large rivers or near the sea are said to have an idea of
cleanliness.’ Concerning the filthy habits of the Kukis
and other hill peoples in India, Major Butler remarks that
they may probably be accounted for by the scarcity
of water in the neighbourhood of the villages, as also by
the coldness of the climate.* Dr. Kane believes that
the indifference of many Eskimo to dirt or filth is largely
due to the extreme cold, which by rapid freezing resists
putrefaction and thus prevents the household, with its
numerous dogs, from being intolerable.° The Eskimo’s
habit of washing themselves with freshly passed urine
arises partly from scarcity of water and the difficulty of
heating it, but partly also from the fact that the ammonia
of the urine is an excellent substitute for soap in
removing the grease with which the skin necessarily
becomes soiled.° A cold climate, moreover, leads to
uncleanliness because it makes garments necessary ;‘ and
among some savages the practice of greasing their bodies
to protect the skin from the effects of a parching air
produces a similar result.° Lord Kames maintains that
the greatest promoter of cleanliness is industry, whereas
its greatest antagonist is indolence. In Holland, he
observes, the people were cleaner than all their neighbours
because they were more industrious, at a time when in
England industry was as great a stranger as cleanliness.”
Kolben says that the general laziness of the Hottentots
accounts for the fact that “they are in the matter of diet
1 Castrén, Lordiskha resdr ach
Jorskningar, 1. 319 sg.
> Kane, Arctic Explorations, ii. 116.
® Murdoch, ‘ Ethnol. Results of the
2 Bastian, Der Mensch in dex Point Barrow Expedition,’ in Az,
Geschichte, ui. 75. Mr. Torday, who
speaks from extensive experience, tells
me the same.
* Chauncy, quoted by Brough Smyth,
op. ctt, il. 284.
‘4 Butler, Zravels in Assam, p. 98
g. Cf. Stewart, in Jour. Astatic Soc.
Bengal, xxiv. 616.
Rep. Bur. Ethn. ix. 421. Dall, of.
cut, Pp. 20.
7 Cf. von Humboldt, of. ct. iii. 237.
8 Burchell, of. cé¢. ii. 553 (Bachapins
of Litakun).
® Kames, Sketches of the History of
Man, \. 323, 327 sqq.
ots ee?
the filthiest people in the world.”' Of the Siberian
Burats Georgi writes that “from their laziness they are
as dirty as swine” ;? and the Kamchadales are described
as a “dirty, lazy race.”* Poverty, also, is for obvious
reasons a cause of uncleanliness ;* “a starving vulture
neglects to polish his feathers, ae a famished dog has a
ragged coat.” ° Very commonly cleanliness is a class
distinction.° Thus among the Point- Barrow Eskimo the
poorer people are often careless about their clothes and
persons, whereas most of the wealthier individuals appear
to take pride in beirig well clad, and, except when actually
engaged in some dirty work, always have their faces and
hands scrupulously clean and their hair neatly combed."
Dr. Schweinfurth maintains that domestic cleanliness and
care in the preparation of food are everywhere signs of a
higher grade of external culture and answer to a certain
degree of intellectual superiority.* But already Lord
Kames pointed out the fact indicated above, that
‘cleanness is remarkable in several nations which have
made little progress in the arts of life.”’®
The factors which determine the cleanliness of a people
also naturally influence the moral valuation of it.
Aversion to dirt not only leads to cleanly habits, but
makes a filthy person an object of disgust and disapproba-
tion; indeed, this aversion is generally stronger with
reference to other individuals than with reference to one’s
own person. But where for some reason or other
dirtiness becomes habitual, it at the same time ceases to
be disgusting; and it is often astonishing how soon
people get used to filthy surroundings. Thus, when
1 Kolben, Present State of the Cape in Jour. Aszatic Soc. Bengal, ix. 808
of Good Hope, i. 47. (Hos). Rowlatt, ‘Expedition into
? Georgi, of. cit. iv. 134. the Mishmee Hills,’ zdzd. xiv. 489.
3 Jord. ili. 152. SeealsoSarytschew, Williams and Calvert, 772727, p. 117.
in Collection of Modern and Contem- Waitz, of. cit. ii. 86 (Ashantees).
porary Voyages, v. 67. Amot, Garenganze, p. 76 (Barotse).
4 See Marshall, A Phrenologist Lane, Modern Egyptians, p. 299.
amongst the Todas, p. 50; Veniaminof, 7 Murdoch, in Azz. Rep. Bur.
quoted by Dall, af. czt. p. 398 (Aleuts). thn. ix. 421.
5 St. John, Vellage Life in Egypt, 8 Schweinfurth, Heart of Africa,
187. i. 156.
6 Tickell, ‘ Memoir on the Hodésum,’ ® Kames, of. c2t. 1. 321.
cleanliness is insisted upon it is so in the first instance
because dirt is directly disagreeable to other persons, and
when uncleanness is tolerated it is so because it gives
no offence to the senses of the public. But at the higher
stages of civilisation, at least, cleanliness is besides in-
culcated on hygienic grounds.
In many cases cleanliness, either temporary or
habitual, is also practised and enjoined from religious or
superstitious motives. A Lappish oazde, or wizard, had
to wash all his body before he offered a sacrifice." The
Siberian shamans have compulsory water purifications
once a year, sometimes every month, as also on special
occasions when they feel themselves defiled by contact
with unclean things.” The Shinto priests in Japan bathed
and put on clean garments before making the sacred
offerings or chanting the liturgies.* Herodotus speaks of
the cleanliness observed by the Egyptian priests when
engaged in the service of the gods.* As a preliminary
to an act of worship the ancient Greeks washed their
hands or bathed and put on clean clothes.? One of the
legal maxims of the Romans required that men should
approach the deity in a state of purity.° According to—
Zoroastrianism it is the great business of life to avoid
impurity, and, when it is involuntarily contracted, to
remove it in the correct manner as quickly as possible ; :
and by impurity is then understood not an inward state
of the soul, but mainly a physical state of the body,
everything going out of the human body being considered
polluting.’ For a Brahmin bathing is the chief part of
the minute ceremonial of daily worship, whilst further
washings and aspersions enter into more solemn religious
acts ;° and not only Brahmins but most Hindus regard
1 Friis, Lappisk Mythologie, p. 145 xxiv. 302 sgg. Odyssey, ii. 261; iv.
sg. von Diiben, Lappland, p. 256. 750; xvii. 58. Keller, Homeric Society,
® Jour. Anthr. Inst. xxiv. 88. p. 141. .Stengel, Dze griechischen
® Griffis, Relzetons of Japan, p. 85. Kultusaltertiimer, p. 106.
eelerodouus, sil. G7.) Cys Wiede- ® Cicero, De legzbus, ii. 10.
mann, Herodots zweites Buch, p. 154. “ Darmesteter, in Sacred Books of the
® [had, i. 449; ili. 270; vi. 266; ~ Zast, iv. p. Ixxti. sgq.
ibe Hit, GAL SAUL, PA) MGs well, “li 8 Ward, View of the History, &c. of
it as a religious duty to bathe daily if this is at all
convenient.' Lamaism enjoins personal ablution as a
sacerdotal rite preparatory to worship, though the
ceremony seldom extends to more than dipping the tips
of the fingers in water.” Jewish Rabbis are compelled to
wash their hands before they begin to pray.* Tertullian
mentions that a similar ablution was practised by the
Christians before prayer.*. According to Islam, the
clothes and person of the worshipper should be clean, and
so also the ground, mat, carpet, or whatever else it be,
upon which he prays ; and every act of worship must be
preceded by an ablution, though, where water cannot be
got, sand may be used as a substitute.° But a polluting
influence is not ascribed to everything which we regard
as dirt. For instance, Muhammedans consider the
excrements of men and dogs defiling, but not the dung
of cows and sheep ; cow-dung is even used as a means
of purification.
These practices and rules spring from the idea that
the contact of a polluting substance with anything holy
is followed by injurious consequences—an idea which will
be more fully discussed in connection with sexual absti-
nences. Such contact is supposed to deprive a deity
or holy being of its holiness, or otherwise be detrimental
to it, and therefore to excite its anger against him who
causes the defilement. So also a sacred act is believed
to lose its sacredness by being performed by an unclean
individual. Moreover, as a polluting substance is itself
held to contain mysterious energy of a baneful kind, it is
looked upon as a direct danger even to persons who are
not engaged in religious worship. We have previously
noticed the rites of purification which a manslayer has to
undergo in order to get rid of the blood-pollution.? We
have also seen that ablutions and other purificatory cere-
the Hindoos, ii. 61 sg. Colebrooke, 3 Chwolsohn, Dze Ssadcer, ii. 71.
Miscellaneous Essays, ii. 142 sgq. 4 Tertullian, De Oratzone, 13 (Migne,
Dubois, People of India, p. 113 sq. Patrologia cursus, i. 1167 sq.).
1 Wilkins, Alodern Hinduism, p. 201. 5 Sell, Hazth of Isléim, p. 252 sgq.
2 Waddell, Buddhism of Tibet, p. Lane, Modern Egyptians, i. 84 sqq.
423. 6 Supra, i. 375 sqq-
VOLaa UE A A
monies are performed for the purpose of removing sins
and misfortunes.’ And bathing or sprinkling with water
is a common method of clearing mourners or persons
who have come in contact with a corpse from the con-
tagion of death.’
But whilst religious or superstitious beliefs have thus
led to ablutions and cleanliness, they have in other
instances had the very opposite effect. Among Arabs
young children are often left dirty and ill-dressed pur-
posely, to preserve them from the evil eye.» The Obbo
natives in Central Africa declare that if they do not wash
their hands with cow’s urine before milking, the cow will
lose her milk ; and with the same fluid they wash the
milk-bowl, and even mix some of it with the milk.*
The Jakuts ‘never wash any of their eating or drinking
utensils ; but, as soon as a dish is emptied, they clean
it with the fore and middle finger; for they think it a
great sin to wash away any part of their food, and appre-
hend that the consequence will be a scarcity.” ° A similar
custom prevails among the Kirghiz® and Kalmucks. The
latter “are forbidden by the laws of their faith” to wash
their vessels in river-water, and therefore “‘do no more
than wipe them with a piece of an old sheep-skin shube,
which they use also for cleaning their hands upon when
dirty.”* They, moreover, abstain from washing their
1 Supra, i. 54 Sqq.
2 Teit, ‘Thompson Indians of
British Columbia,’ in Aemozrs of the
American Museum of Natural History,
‘ Anthropology,’ 1. 331. Cruickshank,
op. cit, i. 218 (Negroes of the Gold
Coast). Ellis, Awe-speaking Peoples of
the Slave Coast, p. 160. Turner,
Samoa, p. 1453; zdem, Nineteen. Years
in. Polynesia, p. 228 (Samoans). Ellis,
Polynesian Researches, i. 403 (Society
Islanders). Kloss, /z the Andamans
and Nicobars, p. 305 (Kar Nicobarese).
Joinville, ‘ Religion and Manners of the
People of Ceylon,’ in Aszatick Re-
searches, vii. 437 (Sinhalese). Iyer,
‘Nayadis of Malabar,’ in the Madras
Government Museum’s Azdletin, iv. 71;
Thurston, zb7d. iv. 76 sg. (Nayadis).
Crooke, 7rzbes and Castes of the North-
Western Provinces and Oudh, i. 83
(Arakh, a tribe in Oudh). Ward,
View of the History, &c. of the
fTindoos, ii. 147, il. 275; Dubois,
Manners and Customs of the People of
India, p. 108 sg.; Bose, Aindoos as
they are, p. 257. Caland, Die Altin-
dischen Todten- und Sestattunesge-
brauche, p. 79 sq.
3 Blunt, Bedouzn
Euphrates, ii. 214.
Egypt, p. 391.
+ Baker, Albert Wyanza, i. 381.
Pe Daler, Op mcw pute Ge
6 Valikhanof, &c., Aesssdans in Cen-
tral Asia, p. 80.
” Georgi, of. cet. iv. 37.
op. crt. il. 123.
Tribes of the
Klunzinger, Upper
Bergmann,
aes le
clothes ; and so did the Huns and Mongols.’ The
ancient Turks never washed themselves, because they
believed that their gods punished ablutions with thunder
and lightning ; and the same belief still prevails among
kindred peoples in Central Asia.” Among the Bahima of
Enkole, in the Uganda Protectorate, a man may smear
his body with butter or clay as often as he wishes, but
“‘to wash with water is bad for him, and is a sure way of
bringing sickness into his family and amongst his cattle.’’®
The dread of water may be due partly to ill effects
experienced after using it, partly to superstition. The
Moors dare not wash their bodies with cold water in the
afternoon and evening after the ‘dsar, because all such water
is then supposed to be haunted by jzdn, or evil spirits.
In various religions the odour of sanctity is associated
with filth. Muhammedan dervishes are recognised by
their appearance of untidiness and uncleanness. Among
the rules laid down for Buddhist monks there is one
which prescribes that their dress shall be made of
rags taken from a dust or refuse heap.* In the early
days of Christian monasticism “the cleanliness of the
body was regarded as a pollution of the soul.” The
saints who were most admired were those who had
become one hideous mass of clotted filth. St. Atha-
nasius relates with enthusiasm how St. Antony, the
patriarch of monachism, had never, to extreme old age,
been guilty of washing his feet. A famous virgin,
though bodily sickness was a consequence of her habits,
resolutely refused, on religious principles, to wash any
part of her body except her fingers. And St. Simeon
Stylites, who was generally pronounced to be the highest
model of a Christian saint, bound a rope round himself
so that it became imbedded in his flesh and caused putre-
faction ; and it is said that “a horrible stench, intolerable
1 Neumann, Deze Volker des stidlichen 3 Roscoe, ‘ Bahima,’ in Jour. Anthr.
Russlands, p. 27. For the excessive /mst. xxxvil. III.
dirtiness of the present Mongols, see + Kern, Manual of Indian Buddhism,
Prejevalsky, Mongolia, 1. 51 sg. De WS
2 Castrén, of. cet. iv. 61.
to the bystanders, exhaled from his body, and worms
dropped from him whenever he moved, and they filled
his bed.”? In medizval Christianity abstinence from
every species of cleanliness was also enjoined as a penance,
the penitent being required to go with foul mouth, filthy
hands and neck, undressed hair and beard, unpared_ nails,
and clothes as dirty as his person. In these cases un-
cleanliness is a form of asceticism, a subject which we
have already touched upon in dealing with industry and
fasting, but the principles of which still call for our
consideration.
In various religions we meet with the idea that a
person appeases or gives pleasure to the deity by sub-
jecting himself to suffering or deprivation. This belief
finds expression in all sorts of ascetic practices. We read
of Christian ascetics who lived in deserted dens of wild
beasts, or in dried-up wells, or in tombs ; who disdained
all clothes, and crawled abroad like animals covered only
by their matted hair ; who ate nothing but corn which
had become rotten by remaining for a month in water 5
who spent forty days and nights in the middle of thorn-
bushes, and for forty years never lay down.’ Hindu
ascetics remain in immovable attitudes with their faces or
their arms raised to heaven, until the sinews shrink and the
posture assumed stiffens into rigidity ; or they expose
themselves to the inclemency of the weather in a state of
absolute nudity, or tear their bodies with knives, or feed
on carrion and excrement.’ Among the Muhammedans
of India there are fakirs who have been seen dragging
heavy chains or cannon balls, or crawling upon their
hands and knees for years; others have been found
lying upon iron spikes for a bed; and others, again, have
been swinging for months before a slow fire with a
'Lecky, Hestory of European sg. UHopkins, Religions of India,
Morals, \i. 109 sqq. p- 352. Monier-Williams, Ardhman-
2 bid. ii. 108 sq. asm and Hinditism, p. 395.
3 Barth, Relzgzons of India, p. 214
XX XIX ASCETICISM IN GENERAL om
tropical sun blazing overhead.'. Among modern Jews
some of the more sanctimonious members of the
synagogue have been known to undergo the penance of
voluntary flagellation before the commencement of the
fast of atonement, two persons successively inflicting
upon each other thirty-nine stripes or thirteen lashes with
a triple scourge.” According to the Zoroastrian Yasts,
thirty strokes with the Sraoshé-karana is an expiation
which purges people from their sins, and makes them fit
for offering a sacrifice. Herodotus tells us that the
ancient Egyptians beat themselves while the things offered
by them as sacrifices were being burned, and that the
Carian dwellers in Egypt on such occasions cut their
faces with knives.* Among the ancient Mexicans blood-
drawing was a favourite and most common mode of
expiating sin and showing devotion. ‘It makes one
shudder,” says Clavigero, “to read the austerities which
they exercised upon themselves, either in atonement of
their transgressions or in preparation for their festivals.
They mangled their flesh as if it had been insensible, and
let their blood run in such profusion, that it appeared to
be a superfluous fluid of the body.”® Self-mortification
also formed part of the religious cult in many uncivilised
tribes in North America.® “ The Indian,” Colonel Dodge
observes, ‘“ believes, with many Christians, that self-
torture is an act most acceptable to God, and the extent
of pleasure that he can give his god is exactly measured
by the amount of suffering that he can bear without
flinching.” *
The idea underlying religious asceticism has no doubt
1 Pool, Studies tn Mohammedanism,
p- 305. For similar practices among
the modern Egyptians, see Lane,
Modern Egyptians, p. 244.
2 Allen, Modern Judaism, p. 407.
2 Vasts, x. 122, Darmesteter, in
Sacred Books of the East, xxiil. 151,
ne 3.
4 Herodotus, il. 40, 61.
> Clavigero, History of Mexico, i.
284. See also Bancroft, of. czt. iii.
441 sg.; Réville, Arbbert Lectures on
the Native Religions of Mexico and
Peru, p. 100.
S Domenech, Seven Years Residence
in the Great Deserts of North America,
ii. 380. Catlin, orth American
Indians, ii. 243. James, Lxpedition
to the Rocky Mountains, i. 276 sqg.
(Omahas). McGee, ‘Siouan Indians,’
in Ann. Rep. Bur. Ethn. xv. 184.
7 Dodge, Our Wild Indians, p. 149.
been derived from several different sources. It should
first be noticed that certain ascetic practices have originally
been performed for another purpose, and only afterwards
come to be regarded as means of propitiating or pleasing
the deity through the suffering involved in them. This,
as we have seen, is the case with certain fasts, and also
with sexual asceticism.' When an act is supposed to be
connected with supernatural danger, the evil (real or
imaginary) resulting from it is readily interpreted as a
sign of divine anger and the act itself is regarded as
being forbidden by a god. If then the abstinence from it
implies suffering, as is in some degree the case with
fasting and sexual continence, the conclusion is drawn
that the god delights in such suffering. The same
inference is, moreover, made from the fact that such
abstinences are enjoined in connection with religious
worship, though the primary motive for this injunction
was fear of pollution. Beating or scourging, again, was
in certain cases originally a mode of purification, intended
to wipe off and drive away a dangerous contagion either
personified as demoniacal or otherwise of a magical
character. And although the pain inflicted on the person
beaten was at first not the object of the act but only
incidental to it, it became subsequently the chief purpose
of the ceremony, which was now regarded as a mortifica-
tion well pleasing to the god.? This change of ideas
seems likewise to be due both to the tendency of the
supernatural contagion to develop into a divine punish-
ment in case it is not removed by the painful rite, and
also to the circumstance that purification is held to be
a necessary accompaniment of acts of religious worship.
The Egyptian sacrifice described by Herodotus was com-
bined with purificatory fasting as well as beating. Among
the Jews, before the commencement of the fast of atone-
ment, whilst a few very religious persons undergo the
penance of flagellation, ‘““some purify themselves by
1 See zufra, p. 420 sg. ® Herodotus, ii. 40,
2. Frazer, Coen Bough, ii. 217 sg.
~
~
ablutions.”* And that the original object of the scourg-
ing mentioned in the Yasts was to purify the worshipper
is suggested by the fact that he on the same occasion had
to wash his body three days and three nights.? But it
should also be remembered that religious exaltation,
when it has reached its highest stage, may express itself
in self-laceration;* and the deity is naturally supposed to
be pleased with the outward expression of such an emotion
in his devotees. .
An ascetic practice may also be the survival of an
earlier sacrifice. We have seen that this is frequently
the case with fasting and almsgiving, and the same may
hold true of other forms of asceticism.‘ The essence of
the act then no longer lies in the benefit which the god
derives from it, but in the self-denial or self-mortification
which it costs the worshipper. In the sacred books of
India “austerity” is mentioned as a means of expiation
side by side with sacrifice, fasting, and giving gifts.”
When an ascetic practice develops out of a previous
custom of a different origin, it may be combined with an
idea which by itself has been a frequent source of self-
inflicted pain, to wit, the belief that such pain is an expia-
tion for sin, that it may serve as a substitute for a punish-
ment which would otherwise be inflicted by the offended
god ; and almost inseparably connected with this belief
there may be that desire to suffer which is so often,
vaguely or distinctly, involved in genuine repentance.°
The idea of expiation very largely underlies the peni-
tential discipline of the Christian Church and the
asceticism of its saints. From the days of Tertullian
and Cyprian the Latins were familiar with the notion that
the Christian has to propitiate God, that cries of pain,
sufferings, and deprivations are means of appeasing his
anger, that God takes strict account of the quantity of
1 Allen, of. cz¢. p. 407. 5 Gautama, xix. II. Vasishtha,
AE Vasts x22. xx. 47; xxil. 8. Baudhdyana, iil.
3 See Hirn, Origins of Art, p. 64. 10. 9.
4 Cf. Tertullian, De vresurrectione § See supra, 1. 105 sq.
carnts, 8 (Migne, of. czt. li. 806).
the atonement, and that, where there is no guilt to have
blotted out, those very means are regarded as merits.’
According to the doctrine of the Church, penance should
in all grave cases be preceded by sorrow for the sin and
also by confession, either public or private ; repentance,
as we have noticed above, is the only ground on which
pardon can be given by a scrupulous judge.” But the
notion was only too often adopted that the penitential
practice itself was a compensation for sin, that a man was
at liberty to do whatever he pleased provided he was
prepared to do penance afterwards, and that a person
who, conscious of his frailty, had laid in a large stock of
vicarious penance in anticipation of future necessity, had
a right “to-work it out,’’ and spend it in sins. The
idea that sins may be expiated by certain acts of self-
mortification is familiar both to Muhammedans* and
Jews.’ According to Zoroastrian beliefs, it is possible to
wipe out by peculiarly severe atonements not only the
special sin on account of which the atonement is per-
formed, but also other offences committed in former
times or unconsciously.° In the sacred books of the
Hindus we meet with a strong conviction that pain:
suffered in this life will redeem the sufferer from punish-
ment in a future existence. It is said that “men who
have committed crimes and have been punished by the
king go to heaven, being pure like those who performed
meritorious deeds”’ ;’ and the same idea is at the bottom
of their penitential system.* But in Brahmanism, as in
Catholicism, the effect of ascetic practices is supposed to
go beyond mere expiation. They are regarded as means
of accumulating religious merit or attaining superhuman
powers. Brahmanical poems tell of marvellous. self-
1 Tertullian, De jejunzzs, 7 (Migne, 4 ‘Supra, ii. 315, 317. Pool, op. cit.
op. ctt. 11. 962). dem, De resurrec- pp. 264.
tione carnis, 8 (Migne, 11. 806 sg.). 5 Supra, ii. 315 sgg. Allen, of. cit.
Harnack, Hestory of Dogiia, li. 110, p. 130.
I 2isediteeg dlls 6 Geiger, Czwilézation of the Eastern
2 Supra, i. 85. _ Lranians, i. 163. ;
%’ See Thrupp, Zhe Anglo-Saxon * Laws of Manu, viii. 318.
Home, p. 259. SOO 20st 2208
ers JL hhh r *
Pe yg ee eye ee TT
[en ae ee
i ay
mortifications by which sages of the past obtained
influence over the gods themselves ; nay, even the power
wielded by certain archdemons over men and gods is
supposed to have been acquired by the practice of
religious austerities.. How largely ascetic practices are
due to the idea of expiation is indicated by the fact that
they hardly occur among nations who have no vivid
sense of sin, like the Chinese before the introduction of
Taouism and Buddhism,’ and the ancient Greeks, Romans,
and Scandinavians. In Greece, however, people some-
times voluntarily sacrificed a part of their happiness in
order to avoid the envy of the gods, who would not allow
to man more than a moderate share of good fortune.?
Self-mortification is also sometimes resorted to not so
much to appease the anger of a god as rather to excite
his compassion. In some of the Jewish fasts, as we have
seen before, these two objects are closely interwoven.’
The Jewish custom of fasting in the case of a drought
is in a way parallel to the Moorish practice of tying
holy men and throwing them into a pond in order that
their pitiful condition may induce God to send rain. Mr.
Williams tells us of a Fijian priest who, “ after suppli-
cating his god for rain in the usual way without success,
slept for several successive nights exposed on the top of
a rock, without mat or pillow, hoping thus to move the
obdurate deity to send a shower.”’”
Not only is suffering voluntarily sought as a means of
wiping off sins committed, but it is also endured with a
view to preventing the commission of sin. ‘This is the
second or, in importance, the first great idea upon which
Christian asceticism rests. The gratification of every
worldly desire is sinful, the flesh should be the abject
slave of the spirit intent upon unearthly things. Man
was created for a life in spiritual communion with God,
1 Monier-Williams, Bra&himanism and 3 Aeschylus, Agamemnon, 1008 sgg.
Hindiiism, pp. 231, 427. Oldenberg, Schmidt, Die Athtk der alten Griechen,
Buddha, ~p. 302. 14 tee
2 Reville, La religion Chinoise, p. S Supra, il. 315s
221, 5 Williams and Calvert, 7272, p. 196.
but he yielded to the seduction of evil demons, who
availed themselves of the sensuous side of his nature to
draw him away from the contemplation of the divine and
lead him to the earthly. Moral goodness, therefore,
consists in renouncing all sensuous pleasures, in separating
from the world, in living solely after the spirit, in
imitating the perfection and purity of God. The contrast
between good and evil is the contrast between God and
the world, and the conception of the world includes not
only the objects of bodily appetites but all human institu-
tions, as well as science and art.! And still more than
any Byeoretical doctrine, the personal example of Christ
led to the olorification of spiritual joy and bodily
suffering.
The antithesis of spirit and body was not peculiar to
Christianity. It was an old Platonic conception, which
was regarded by the Fathers of the Church as the contrast
between that which was precious and that which was to be
mortified. The doctrine that bodily enjoyments are low
and degrading was taught by many pagan philosophers ;
even a man like Cicero says that all corporeal pleasure 1 1S
opposed to virtue and ought to be rejected.” And in the
Neo-Platonic and Neo-Pythagorean schools of Alexandria
an ascetic ideal of life was,the natural outcome of their
theory that God alone is pure and good, and matter impure
and evil. Renunciation of the world was taught and
practised by the Jewish sects of the Essenes and Thera-
peute. In India, Professor Kern observes, ‘‘ climate,
institutions, the contemplative bent of the native mind,
all tended to facilitate the growth of a persuasion that the
highest aims of human life and real felicity cannot be
obtained but by the seclusion from the busy world, by
undisturbed pious exercises, and by a certain amount of
mortification.””* We read in the Hitopadesa, ‘Subjec-
tion to the senses has been called the road to ruin, and
1 Harnack, of. ct. ii. 214 sgqg. 3; ill. * Cicero, De officizs, i. 30; ili. 33.
258 sgg. von Eicken, Geschechte der ® Kern, WZanual of Indian Buddhism,
mittelalterlichen Weltanschauung, p. pp. 73.
313 599.
their subjugation the path to fortune.”! The Jain regards
pleasure in itself as sinful :—‘* What is discontent, and
what is pleasure? One should live subject to neither.
Giving up all gaiety, circumspect, restrained, one should
lead a religious life.”* According to Buddhism, there
are two causes of the misery with which life is inseparably
bound up—lust and ignorance; and so there are two
cures—the suppression of lust and desire and the removal
of ignorance.* It is said in the Dhammapada, “ There is
no satisfying lusts, even by a shower of gold pieces ; he
who knows that lusts have a short taste and cause pain, he
is wise.” * Penances, as they were practised among the
ascetics of India, were discarded by Buddha as vexatious,
unworthy, unprofitable. ‘Not nakedness, not platted
hair, not dirt, not fasting, or lying on the earth, not
rubbing with dust, not sitting motionless, can purify a
mortal who has not overcome desires.”°> Where all con-
tact with the earthly ceases, there, and there only, are
deliverance and freedom.
The idea that man ought to liberate himself from the
bondage of earthly desires is the conclusion of a con-
templative mind reflecting upon the short duration and
emptiness of all bodily pleasures and the allurements by
which they lead men into misery and sin. And _ separa-
tion from the material world is the ideal of the religious
enthusiast whose highest aspiration is union with God
conceived as an immaterial being, as pure spirit.
1 Hitopadesa, quoted by Monier- Monier-Williams, Buddhism, p. 99.
Williams, Zrdian Wisdom, p. 538. + Dhammapada, 186 sq.
2 Hopkins, of. czt. p. 291. 5 Ibid. 141. See also Oldenberg,
3 Oldenberg, of. cet. p. 212 sg. op. ctt. p. 301 sg.
Chapter XL
MARRIAGE
Mawn’s sexual nature gives rise to various modes of
conduct on which moral judgments are passed. We shall
first consider such relations between the sexes as are com-
prised under the heading Marriage.
In a previous work I have endeavoured to show that in
all probability there has been no stage in the social history
of mankind where marriage has not existed, human marriage
apparently being an inheritance from some ape-like pro-
genitor.’ I then defined marriage as a more or less durable
connection between male and female, lasting beyond the
mere act of propagation till after the birth of the offspring.
This is marriage in the natural history sense of the term.
As a social institution, on the other hand, it has a some-
what different meaning: it is a union regulated by
custom or law.” Society lays down rules relating to the
selection of partners, to the mode of contracting marriage,
to its form, and to its duration. ‘These rules are essentially
expressions of moral feelings.
There is, first, a circle of persons within which marriage
is prohibited. It seems that the horror of incest is well-
nigh universal in the human race, and that the few cases in.
1 Westermarck, Lestory of Human
Marriage, ch, ii. sq.
2 The best definition of marriage as a
social institution which I have met with
is the following one given by Dr.
Friedrichs (‘ Einzeluntersuchungen zur
vergleichenden Rechtswissenschaft,’ in
Leitschr. f. vergl. Rechtswiss. x. 255) :—
*“ Fine von der Rechtsordnung aner-
kannte und privilegirte Vereinigung
geschlechtsdifferenter Personen, entwe-
der zur Fiihrung eines gemeinsamen
Hausstandes und zum Geschlechtsver-
kehr, oder zum ausschliesslichen Ge-
schlechtsverkehr.”
MARRIAGE
enrext. 365
which this feeling is said to be absent can only be regarded
as abnormalities. But the degrees of kinship within which
marriage is forbidden are by no means the same every-
where. It is most, and almost universally, abominated
between parents and children. It is also held in general
abhorrence between brothers and sisters who are children
of the same mother as well as of the same father. Most
of the exceptions to this rule refer_to royal persons, for
whom it is considered improper to contract marriage with
individuals of less exalted birth ; but among a few peoples
incestuous unions are practised on a larger scale on account
of extreme isolation or as a result of vitiated instincts.?
It seems, however, that habitual marriages between brothers
and sisters have been imputed to certain peoples without
sufficient reason.” This is obviously true of the Veddahs
of Ceylon, who have long been supposed to regard the
marriage Ol a man with his younger sister as he proper
marriage.® ‘Such incest,” says Mr. Nevill, ‘never was
allowed, and never could be, while the Vaedda customs
1 Westermarck, of. cz¢. ch. xiv. sq.
2 This is apparently the case with
various peoples mentioned by Dr.
Frazer (Pausanias’s Description of
Greece, ii. 84 sg.) as being addicted to
incestuous unions. Mr. Turner’s short
statement (Samoa, p. 341) that among
the New Caledonians no laws of con-
sanguinity were observed in_ their
marriages, and that even the nearest
relatives united, radically differs from
M. de Rochas’ description of the same
people. ‘* Les Néo-Calédoniens,” he
says (Mouvelle Calédonze, p. 232), ‘‘ne
se marient pas entre proches parents du
coté paternel ; mais du coté maternel,
ils se marient a tous les degrés de
cousinage.’’? Brothers and sisters, after
they have reached years of maturity,
are no longer permitted to entertain any
~ social intercourse with each other; they
are prohibited from keeping each other
company even in the presence of a
third person ; and if they casually meet
they must instantly go out of the way
or, if that is impossible, the sister must
throw herself on the ground with her
face downwards. ‘‘Cet éloignement,”
M. de Rochas adds (2é2¢. p. 239), ‘‘ qui
nest certes l’effet ni du mépris ni de
linimitié, me parait: né d’une exagéra-
tion déraisonnable dun _ sentiment
naturel, Vhorreur de Vinceste.” Dr.
Frazer says that, according to Mr.
Thomson, the marriage of brothers with
sisters has been practised among the
Masai; but a later and, as it seems,
better informed authority tells us that
**the Masai do not marry their near
relations” and that ‘‘ incest is unknown
among them” (Hinde, Zhe Last of the
Masai, p. 76). Again, the statement
that among the Obongos, a dwarf race
in West Africa, sisters marry with
brothers, is only based on information
derived from another people, the Ash-
angos, who have a strong antipathy
to them (Du Chaillu, /ourney to
Ashango-Land, p. 320). Liebich’s
assertion (Dze Zzgewner, p. 49) that the
Gypsies allow a brother to marry his
sister is certainly not true of the
Gypsies of Finland, who greatly abhor
incest (Thesleff, ‘Zigenarlif i Finland,’
in Mya Pressen, 1897, no. 331 B).
3 Bailey, ‘ Wild Tribes of the Ved-
dahs of Ceylon,’ in Zrans. Ethn. Soc.
N.S. ii. 294 sg.
lingered. Incest is regarded as worse than murder. So
positive is this feeling, that the Tamils have based a legend
upon the instant murder of his sister by a Vaedda to whom
she had made undue advances. The mistake arose from
gross ignorance of Vaedda usages. The title of a cousin
with whom marriage ought to be contracted, that 1s,
mother’s brother’s daughter, or father’s sister’s daughter, iS
naga or nangi. ‘This, in Sinhalese, is applied to a younger
sister. Hence if you ask a Vaedda, ‘Do you marry
your sisters ?’ the Sinhalese interpreter is apt to say, ‘ Do
you marry your naga?’ ‘The reply is (I have often tested
it), ‘ Yes—we always did formerly, but now it is not always
observed.’ You say then, ‘ What? marry your own-sister-
naga?’ and the reply i is an angry and insulted denial, the
very question appearing a gross insult.’’ The same writer
adds:—-‘‘In no case did a person marry one of the same
family, even though the relationship was lost in remote
antiquity. Such a marriage is incest. The penalty for
incest was death.” ?
As a rule, the prohibited degrees are more numerous
among peoples unaffected by modern civilisation than they
are in more advanced communities, the prohibitions in a
great many cases referring even to all the members of the
tribe or clan ; and the violation of these rules is regarded
as a most heinous crime.”
The Algonquins speak of cases where men have been put to
death by their nearest kinsfolk for marrying women of their own
clan.? Among the Asiniboin, a Siouan tribe, a chief can commit
murder with impunity if the murdered person be without
friends, but if he married within his gens he would be dismissed,
on account of the general disgust which such a union would
arouse. he Hottentots used to punish alliances between first
or second cousins with death.2 A Bantu of the coast region
considers similar unions to be “something horrible, something
unutterably disgraceful.”® The Busoga of the Uganda
1 Nevill, ‘Vaeddas of Ceylon,’ in <Avnn. Rep. Bur. Ethn. xv. 224.
Taprobantan, i. 178. > Kolben, Present State of the Cape
2 Westermarck, of. cet. p. 297 sgq. of Good Hope, 1. 155 sg.
3-Frazer, Totlemzsin, p. 59. 6 Theal, History of the Boers in
4 Dorsey, ‘Siouan Sociology,’ in South Africa, p. 16.
Protectorate held in great abhorrence anything like incest even
amongst domestic animals.1. Among the Kandhs of India
“intermarriage between persons of the same tribe, however large
or scattered, is considered incestuous and punishable with death.” 2
In the Malay Archipelago submersion is a common punishment
for incest,? but among certain tribes the guilty parties are killed
and eaten‘ or buried alive. In Efate, of the New Hebrides, it
would be a crime punishable with death for a man or woman to
marry a person belonging to his or her mother’s clan ; ® and the
Mortlock Islanders are said to inflict the same punishment upon
anybody who has sexual intercourse with a relative belonging to
his own “tribe.” * Nowhere has marriage been bound by more
severe laws than among the Australian aborigines. ‘Their tribes
are grouped in exogamous subdivisions, the number of which
varies ; and at least before the occupation of the country by the
whites the regular punishment for marriage or sexual inter-
course with a person belonging to a forbidden division was
death.®
Not less intense is the horror of incest among nations
that have passed beyond savagery and barbarism. Among
the Chinese incest with a grand-uncle, a father’s first
cousin, a brother, or a nephew, is punishable by death, and
a man who marries his mother’s sister is strangled ; nay,
punishment is inflicted even on him who marries a person
with the same surname as his own, sixty blows being the
penalty.’ So also incest was held in the utmost horror by
the so-called Aryan peoples in ancient times." In the
‘Institutes of Vishnu’ it is said that sexual intercourse with
1 Johnston, Uganda Protectorate, ii. lock Inseln,’
719. Gesellsch. im
2 Macpherson, quoted by Percival, pp. 251.
Land of the Veda, p. 345. Cf. Hunter, 8 Westermarck, of. cit. p. 299 sg.
Annals of Rural Bengal, iii. 81. See, besides the authorities quoted
3 Wilken, Huwelzzken tusschen bloed- there, Roth, Z¢hnol. Studies among
verwanten, p. 26 sg. Riedel, Deshuk- the North-West-Central Queensland
en kroesharige rassen tusschen Selebes Aborigines, p. 182; Spencer and Gil-
en Papua, p. 460. len, Mative Tribes of Central Australia,
4 Wilken, Over de verwantschap en
in Mittheil. d. Geogr.
Hamburg, 1878-9,
het huwelijks- en erfrecht by de volken
van het malersche ras, p. 18.
5 Ghmpses of the Eastern Archt-
pelago, p. 105.
6 Macdonald, Oceanza, p. 181 sg.
7 Kubary, ‘ Die Bewohner der Mort-
pals. zon
® Medhurst, ‘ Marriage, Affinity, and
Inheritance in China,’ in Z7vans. Roy.
Asiatic Soc. China Branch, iv. 21 sqq.
WoLeist, <Alt-arisches Jus Gentium,
P: 394 5¢.
one’s mother or daughter or daughter-in-law is a crime of
the highest degree, for which there is no other atonement
than to proceed into the flames."
Various theories have been set forth to account for the
prohibition of marriage between near kin. I criticised
some of them in my book on the ‘ History of Human
Marriage,’ and ventured at the same time on an explana-
tion of my own.’ I pointed out that there is an innate
aversion to sexual intercourse between persons living very
closely together from early youth, and that, as such
persons are in most cases related by blood, this feeling
would naturally display itself in custom and law as a horror
of intercourse between near kin. Indeed, an abundance of
ethnographical facts seem to indicate that it is not in the
first place by the degree of consanguinity, but by the
close living together, that prohibitory laws against inter-
marriage are determined. “Thus many peoples have a rule
of “exogamy ”’ which does not depend on kinship at all,
but on purely local considerations, all the members of
a horde or village, though not related by blood, being
forbidden to intermarry.* The prohibited degrees are
very differently defined in the customs or laws of different
nations, and it appears that the extent to which relatives
are prohibited from intermarrying is nearly connected
with their close living together. Very often the pro-
hibitions against incest are more or less one-sided,
applying more extensively either to the relatives on the
father’s side or to those on the mother’s, according as
descent is reckoned through men or women. Now, since
1 Institutes of Vishniw, xxxiv. 1 sq. zugleich auch fiir die Lokalgruppe Gel-
2 Westermarck, of. c2¢. p. 310 sqq. tung hat.” This, however, is only
3 Herr Cunow (Die Verwandtschafis- | Herr Cunow’s own inference. And it
Organisationen der Australneger, p. may be asked why it is more ‘* pecu-
187) finds this argument ‘‘rather pecu- _ liar” to suppose that the prohibition of
liar,” and offers himself a different marriage between near kin has sprung
explanation of the rule in question. from aversion to sexual intercourse
He writes:—‘‘In der Wirklichkeit between persons living closely together,
erklart sich das Verbot einfach daraus, than to assume chat. the rule which
dass sehr oft die Lokalgruppe mit dem forbids _ marriage between unrelated
Geschlechtsverband beziehungsweise persons living in the same community
dem Totemverband kongruirt, und has sprung from the prohibition of
demnach das was fiir die Gens gilt, marriage between kindred.
the line of descent is largely connected with local relation-
ships, we may reasonably infer that the same local relation-
ships exercise a considerable influence on the table of pro-
hibited degrees. However, in a large number of cases pro-
hibitions of intermarriage are only indirectly influenced by
the close living together.‘ Aversion to the intermarriage
of persons who live in intimate connection with one
another has called forth prohibitions of the intermarriage
of relations; and, as kinship is traced by means of a
system of names, the name comes to be considered iden-
tical with relationship. This system is necessarily one-
sided. Though it will keep up the record of descent
either on the male or female side, it cannot do both at
once ;* and the line which has not been kept up by such
means of record, even where it is recognised as a line of
relationship, is naturally more or less neglected and soon
forgotten. Hence the prohibited degrees frequently ex-
tend very far on the one side—to the whole clan—but
not on the other. It should also be remembered that,
according to primitive ideas, the name itself constitutes a
mystic link between those who have it in common. “In
Greenland, as everywhere else,’ says Dr. Nansen, “the
name is of great importance ; it is believed that there is a
spiritual affinity between two people of the same name.” ®
Generally speaking, the feeling that two persons are
intimately connected in some way or other may, through
an association of ideas, give rise to the notion that marriage
or sexual intercourse between them is incestuous. Hence
the prohibitions of marriage between relations by alliance
and by adoption. Hence, too, the prohibitions of the
Roman and Greek Churches on the ground of what is
called “spiritual relationship.”
1 T do not understand how any reader little more carefully what I have said,
of my book can, like Herr Cunow (0g. he might have saved himself the trouble
cit. p. 186 sgg.), attribute to me the he has taken to prove my great ignor-
statement that the group within which ance of early social organisations.
intermarriage is prohibited is identical 2 Cf. Tylor, Zarly History of Man-
with the group of people who live zzd, p. 285 sg. ;
closely together. If he had read a 3 Nansen, Hshzmo Life, p. 230.
VOL. Il B B
The question arises :—How has this instinctive aversion
to marriage and sexual intercourse in general between
persons living closely together from early youth origin-
ated? I have suggested that it may be the result of
natural selection. Darwin’s careful studies of the effects
of cross- and self-fertilisation in the vegetable kingdom,
the consensus of opinion among eminent breeders, and
experiments made with rats, rabbits, and other animals,
have proved that self-fertilisation of plants and close inter-
breeding of animals are more or less injurious to the
species ; and it seems highly probable that the evil chiefly
results from the fact that the uniting sexual elements were
not sufficiently differentiated. Now it is impossible to
believe that a physiological law which holds good of the
rest of the animal kingdom, as also of plants, would not
apply to man as well. But it is difficult to adduce direct
evidence for the evil effects of consanguineous marriages.
We cannot expect very conspicuous results from other
alliances than those between the nearest relatives—between
brothers and sisters, parents and children,—and the
injurious results even of such unions would not necessarily
appear at once. The closest kind of intermarriage which
we have opportunities of studying is that between first
cousins. Unfortunately, the observations hitherto made
on the subject are far from decisive. Yet it is noteworthy
that of all the writers who have discussed it the majority,
and certainly not the least able of them, have expressed
their belief in marriages between first cousins being more
or less unfavourable to the offspring; and no evidence
which can stand the test of scientific investigation has
hitherto been adduced against this view. Moreover, we
have reason to believe that consanguineous marriages are
much more injurious in savage regions, where the struggle
for existence is often very severe, than they have proved
to be in civilised societies, especially as it is among the well-
to-do classes that such marriages occur most frequently.
Taking all these facts into consideration, I am inclined
to think that consanguineous marriages are in some way or
other detrimental to the species. And here I find a quite
sufficient explanation of the horror of incest ; not because
man at an early stage recognised the 1 injurious influence of
close intermarriage, but because the law of natural selec-
tion must inevitably have operated. Among the ancestors
of man, as among other animals, there was no doubt a time
when blood-relationship was no bar to sexual intercourse.
But variations, here as elsewhere, would naturally present
themselves—we know how extremely liable to variations
the sexual instinct is; and those of our ancestors who
avoided in-and-in breeding would survive, while the others
would gradually decay and ultimately perish. Thus a
sentiment would be developed which would be powerful
enough, as a rule, to prevent injurious unions. Of course
it would display itself, not as an innate aversion to sexual
connections with near relatives as such, but as an aversion
on the part of individuals to union with others with whom
they lived; but these, as a matter of fact, would be blood-
relations, so that the result would be the survival of
the fittest. Whether man inherited this sentiment from
the predecessors from whom he sprang, or whether it was
developed after the evolution of distinctly human qualities,
we cannot know. It must have arisen at a stage when
family ties became comparatively strong, and children
remained with their parents until the age of puberty or
even longer. And exogamy, resulting from a natural
extension of this sentiment to a larger group, would arise
when single families united into hordes.
This attempt to explain the prohibition of marriage
between kindred and exogamy has not lacked sympathetic
support,’ but more commonly, I think, it has been rejected.
Yet after a careful consideration of the various objections
raised against it I find no reason to alter my opinion.
Some of my opponents have evidently failed to grasp the
1 A. R. Wallace, in his ‘Introduc- with regard to my theory that, at any
tory, Note’ to my Azstory of Human rate, I am ‘“‘ well on the track.” See
Marriage, p. vi. Giddings, Principles also Crooke, 7rzbes and Castes of the
of Soctology, p. 267. Howard, History North-Western Provinces and Oudh,
of Matrimonzal Institulions, i. 125sqg. 1. pp. clxxix, clxxx, ccil.
Prof. Tylor (in Academy, xl. 289) says
i)
B B
we MARRIAGE CHAP.
argument on which the theory 1 is based. Thus Professor
Robertson Smith argued that it begins by presupposing the
very custom which it professes to explain, the custom of
exogamy ; that ‘‘it postulates the existence of groups which
through many generations (for the survival of the fittest
implies this) avoided wiving ‘within the group.”' But
what my theory postulates is not the existence of exogamous
groups, but the spontaneous appearance of individual sen-
timents of aversion. And if, as Mr. Andrew Lang main-
tains, my whole argument is a “ vicious circle,’ * then the
theory of natural selection itself is a vicious circle, since
there never could be a selection of qualities that did not
exist before.
It has been argued that if close living together calls
forth aversion to sexual intercourse, such aversion ought
to display itself between husband and wife as well as be-
tween near relatives.* But these cases are certainly not
identical. The feeling of which I have spoken is aversion
associated with the idea of sexual intercourse between per-
sons who have lived in a long-continued intimate relation-
ship from a period of life when the action of sexual desire
is naturally out of the question.* On the other hand, when
a man marries a woman his feeling towards her is one very
different kind, and his love impulse may remain, nay in
crease, during the conjugal union ; though even in this
case long living together has undoubtedly a tendency to
lead to sexual indifference and sometimes to positive aver-
sion. ‘The opinion that the home is kept free from in-
cestuous intercourse only by law, custom, and education,’
1 Robertson Smith, in ature, xliv.
271.
2 Lang, Soczal Origins, p. 33.
3 Durkheim, ‘La _ prohibition de
Vinceste et ses origines,’? in L’année
soctologique, 1. 64. Professor Durkheim
refers in this connection to an article by
Dr. Simmel, ‘ Die Verwandtenehe,’ in
Vossische Zeitung, June 3rd and toth,
1894. But I cannot find that Dr.
Simmel is really opposed to my view.
He only says, ‘‘ Das intime Beisammen-
leben wirkt keineswegs nur abstumpf-
end, sondern in vielen Fallen gerade
anreizend, sonst wiirde die alte Erfahr-
ung nicht gelten, dass die Liebe, wo
sie beim Eingehen der Ehe fehlte, oft
im Laufe derselben entsteht.”
4 Cf. Bentham, Theory of Legisia-
Zion, p. 220:—‘‘ Individuals accus-
tomed to see each other and to know
each other, from an age which is
neither capable of conceiving the desire
nor of inspiring it, will see each other
with the same eyes to the end of life.”
° For advocates of such a view see
shows lack of discrimination. Law may forbid a son to
marry his mother, a brother to marry his sister, but it could
not prevent him from desiring such a union. Have the
most draconic codes ever been able to suppress, say, homo-
sexual love? As Plato observed, an unwritten law defends
as sufficiently as possible parents from incestuous inter-
course with their children, brothers from intercourse with
their sisters ; ‘nor does the thought of such a thing ever
enter at all into the minds of most of them.’’! Consider-
ing the extreme variability to which the sexual impulse is
subject, it is not astonishing that cases of what we consider
incestuous intercourse sometimes do occur. It seems to
me more remarkable that the abhorrence of incest should
be so general, and the exceptions to the rule so few.
Dr. Havelock Ellis, again, objects that my theory
assumes the existence of a kind of instinct which can with
difficulty be accepted. ‘An innate tendency,” he says,
‘“‘at once so specific and so merely negative, involving at
the same time deliberate intellectual processes, can only
with a certain force be introduced into the accepted class of
instincts. It is as awkward and artificial an instinct as
would be, let us say, an instinct to avoid eating the apples
that grew in one’s own orchard. The explanation of the
abhorrence of incest is really, however, exceedingly simple.
The normal failure of the pairing instinct to manifest
itself in the case of brothers and sisters, or of boys and
girls brought up together from infancy, is a merely nega-
tive phenomenon due to the inevitable absence under those
circumstances of the conditions which evoke the pairing
impulse. Between those who have been brought up
together fom childhood all the sensory stimuli of vision,
hearing, and touch have been dulled by use, trained to the
calm level of affection, and deprived of ahr potency to
Westermarck, of. cit. p. 310 sgg. toMr.Colenso(Maord Races, p. 47 59.),
More recently it has been expressed by
Krauss, in Amz U7-Quell, iv. 151, and
Finck, Przmztzve Love, p. 49.
1 Plato, Zeges, viii. 838. Among
the Maoris of New Zealand, according
adult brothers and sisters slept together,
as they had always done from their
birth, ‘‘not only without sin, but with-
out thought of it.”
arouse the erethistic excitement which. produces sexual
tumescence.”! | think that Dr. Ellis has considerably
exaggerated the difference between my theory and his own.
The “instinct ” of which I have spoken is simply aversion
to sexual intercourse with certain persons, and this is a no
more complicated mental phenomenon than, for instance,
an animal’s aversion to eating certain kinds of substances.
Indeed, Dr. Ellis himself, in his excellent ‘Studies in the
Psychology of Sex,’ gives us many instances not only of
sexual indifference, but of sexual aversion, quite instinctive
in character.” Thus the largest proportion of male inverts
described by him experience what is called horror femine,
that is to say, “‘ woman as an object of sexual desire is dis-
gusting” (not merely indifferent) to them.? And Dr.
Ellis also repeatedly speaks of the “ abhorrence ”’ of incest.
The objection has been raised that, if my explanation
of the prohibition of incest were correct, connections
between unrelated persons who have been brought up
together should be as repulsive as connections between
near kin ; whereas, as a matter of fact, the two cases are
regarded in a very different light, the latter, only, being
held incestuous.*. Much, of course, depends on the
closeness of the union, and Dr. Steinmetz’s argument that
‘“‘the very sensual Frenchmen often seem to marry the
lady friends of their earliest youth,”® is certainly not to
the point. I believe that sexual love between a man and
his foster-daughter is almost as great an abnormality
as. sexual love between a father and his daughter; and
among some peoples marriages between persons who have
been brought up together in the same family or who
' Havelock Ellis, Studies inthe stinct ‘has nothing in its content ex-
Psychology of Sex, ‘ Sexual Selection in
Man,’ p. 205 sg.
2 T have been blamed for making an
illegitimate use of the word “‘ instinct”
(Crawley, Zhe MZystic Rose, p. 446).
But if, as Dr. Ellis says, ‘‘ an instinct
is fundamentally a more or less com-
plicated series of reflexes set in action
by a definite stimulus,” or, as Mr.
Crawley puts it (of. czt. p. 446), in-
cept response of function to environ-
ment,” then the aversion I speak of
may certainly be called an instinct.
3 TIavelock Ellis, of. cz¢. p. 164.
+ Steinmetz, ‘Die neueren Forsch-
ungen zur Geschichte der menschlichen
Familie,’ in Zeztschr. f. Soctalwiss, ii.
818 sg.
5 Lbid. ii. 818.
belong to the same local group, without being related to
each other by blood, are held blamable or are actually
prohibited.’ Even Decreen. lads and girls who have been
educated in the same school there is a remarkable absence
of erotic feelings, as appears from an interesting com-
munication by a person who has for many years been the
head-mistress of such a school in Finland. One youth
assured her that neither he nor any of his friends would
ever think of marrying a girl who had been their school-
fellow ;° and I heard of alad who madea great distinction
between girls of his own school and other, “real,” girls, as
he called them. Yet however objectionable and nel
unions between foster-parents and foster-children or
between foster-brothers and foster-sisters may appear to
us, I do not deny that unions between the nearest
blood-relatives inspire a horror of their own ; and it seems
natural that they should do so considering that from earliest
times the aversion to sexual intercourse between persons
living closely together has been expressed in prohibitions
against unions between kindred. Such unions have been
stigmatised by custom, law, and religion, whilst much less
notice has been taken of intercourse between unrelated
persons who may occasionally have grown up in the same
household. The belief in the supernatural, especially, has
played. a very important part in the ideas referring to
incest, as in other points of sexual morality, owing to the
mystery which surrounds everything connected with the
function of reproduction.? The Aleuts in early times
believed that incest, which they considered the gravest
crime, was always followed by the birth of monsters with
walrus tusks, beards, and other disfigurations.* The Kafirs
1 Westermarck, op. czt. p. 321 sqq. 3 For the connection between reli-
Among the Western Islanders of Torres
Straits marriage was forbidden, ‘‘ with
a remarkable delicacy of feeling, to the
sister of a man’s particular friend”
(Haddon, ‘Ethnology of the Western
Tribe of Torres Straits,’ in /owr.
Anthr. Inst. xix. 315).
2 Lucina Hagman, ‘Fran sam-
skolan,’ in Humanitas, il. 188 sg.
gious feelings and the sexual impulse,
see Vallon and Marie, ‘ Des psychoses
religieuses,’ in Archives de Neurologie,
ser. li. vol. ili, 184 sg. 3 Gadelius, Om
tvangstankar, p. 120 sg.3; Starbuck,
Psychology of Religion, p. 401 sqq.
4 Veniaminof, quoted by [Petroff,
Report on Alaska, p. 155.
likewise maintain that the offspring of an incestuous union
will be a monster, as ‘“‘a punishment inflicted by the
ancestral spirit.” ’ The Bataks of Sumatra regard a long
drought as a decisive proof that two cousins have had
criminal intercourse with each other.? The Galelarese
think that incest calls forth alarming natural phenomena,
such as earthquakes, the eruption of a volcano, or torrents
of rain.* So also the higher religions have branded incest
as a heinous sin. As for Christianity’s views on the
subject, it is sufficient to notice that the prohibited degrees
were extended by the Church,* and that the jurisdiction
over incest, as over all sexual offences, was exercised by
the ecclesiastical courts.?
It has, finally, been argued that my theory utterly
fails to explain the fact that prohibitions of inter-
marriage frequently refer to all the members of a clan,
even those who live in different localities.° In addition to
what I have previously observed on this point, I desire to
emphasise that every hypothesis pretending to give a
full explanation of prohibitions of incest must assume
the operation of the very same mental law—that of
association—which in my
exogamy. Thus Professor Durkheim, while maintaining
that my theory as regards the horror of incest could not
apply to exogamy because the members of the same totem
do not live together, is himself quite ready to resort to
analogy to explain prohibitions extending outside the
totem clan. He tries to show that clan-exogamy is the
source of all other prohibitions against incest, and that
clan-exogamy itself springs from totemism.” According
opinion accounts for clan-—
1 Shooter, Ka/firs of Natal, p. 45.
2 von Brenner, Beszch bet den Kan-
nibalen Sumatras, p. 212.
3 van Baarda, ‘ Fabelen, verhalen en
overleveringen der Galelareezen,’ in
Bijdragen tot de taal-, land- en volken-
kunde van Nederlandsch-Indié, xlv.
(ser. vi. vol. i.) p. 514. See also
Frazer, Golden Bough, ii. 212 sg.
4 Westermarck, of. cz¢. p. 308. Katz,
Grundriss des kanontschen Strafrechts,
p- 116 sg.
5 Stephen, Hlistory of the Criminal
Law of England, ii. 411.
§ Cunow, of. cé#. p. 185. Durkheim,
in L’année soctologeque, i. 39, n. 2.
Steinmetz, in Zeztschr. f. Soctalwiss, ii.
? Prof. Durkheim says (L’année
Soctologigue, 1. 50):—‘* Le sang est
tabou dune maniere générale et il
taboue tout ce qui entre en rapports
rs
ae
XL MARRIAGE yer
to him the rule of clan-exogamy has been extended to near
relatives belonging to different clans, because they are in
no less intimate contact with each other than are the
members of the same clan. According to my own theory,
again, the prohibition of marriage between near relatives
living closely together has been extended to all the
members of the clan on account of the notion of intimacy
connected with the idea of a common descent and with a
common name. If I consider Professor Durkheim’s
hypothesis extremely unsatisfactory,’ it is certainly not
because he has called in the law of association to explain
the rules against incest. How could anybody deny the
operation of this law for instance in the Roman Catholic
prohibition of marriage between co-sponsors, or in the rule
prevalent in Eastern Europe according to which the
groomsman at the wedding is forbidden to intermarry with
the family of the bride,’ or in laws prohibiting marriage
between relatives by alliance? And why might not the
nombre des individus entre lesquels le
mariage est prohibé diminue. C'est
ainsi que, par une évolution graduelle,
elle en est arrivée a létat actuel ot
les mariages entre ascendants et de-
scendants, entre fréres et sceurs, sont
a peu pres les seuls qui soient radicale-
ment interdits.”
1 Professor Durkheim tries to ex-
plain a phenomenon of universal preva-
lence through an institution which has
been proved to exist among certain
peoples only. How does Professor
Durkheim know that totem clans once
prevailed among all peoples who now
prohibit the intermarriage of near
relatives? If the rules which prevent
parents from marrying their children
avec lui. ... La femme est, d'une
maniére chronique, le théatre de mani-
festations sanglantes. . . . La femme
est donc, elle aussi, et d’une manicre
également chronique, tabou pour les
autres membres du clan.” However,
the taboo is not restricted to the mem-
bers of the clan, but refers also to near
relatives belonging to different clans,
and this has to be explained. M.
Durkheim writes (z6zd. p. 19) :—
**Quand on a pris Vhabitude de
regarder comme incestueux et abomi-
nables les rapports conjugaux de sujets
qui sont nominalement du méme clan,
les rapports similaires d’individus qui,
tout en ressortissant verbalement a des
clans différents, sont pourtant en con-
tact aussi ou plus intime que les pré- and brothers from marrying _ their
cédents, ne peuvent manquer de __ sisters aresurvivals of ancient totemism,
prendre le méme caractére.” “And how shall we explain the normal
further (zdzd. p. 58):—‘‘Quand le aversion to such unions? Ancient
totémisme disparait, et avec lui la totemism can certainly not account for
parenté spéciale au clan, ’exogamie this. But then the coincidence between
devient solidaire des nouveaux types de these two facts—the legal prohibition
famille qui se constituent et qui re- of incest and the psychical aversion to it
posent sur d’autres bases, et comme
ces familles sont plus restreintes que
métait le clan, elle se circonscrit, elle
aussi, dans un cercle moins étendu; le
—is merely accidental ; and this seems
to me a preposterous supposition.
2 Maine, Dessertatcons on Early Law
and Custom, p. 257 Sq.
same law be applied to other relationships also, such as
those constituted by a common descent or a common
name?
There is not only an inner circle within which no
marriage is allowed, but also -an outer circle outside of
which marriage is either prohibited or at least disapproved
of. Like the inner circle, the outer one varies greatly in
extent.' Probably every people considers it a disgrace, if
not a crime, for its men, and even more so for its women,
to marry ane a race very different from its own,
especially if it be an inferior race. The Romans were
prohibited from marrying barbarians—the emperor
Valentinian inflicted the penalty of death for such unions ; ”
and a modern European girl who married an Australian
native would no doubt be regarded as an outcast by her
own society. Among many peoples marriage very seldom
or never takes place outside the limits of the tribe or
community. In India there are several .instances of this.
The Tipperahs and Abors view with abhorrence the idea
of their girls marrying out of their clan ;* and Colonel
Dalton was gravely assured that, “ when one of the
daughters of Padam so demeans herself, the sun and moon
refuse to shine, and there is such a-strife in the elements
that all labour is necessarily suspended, till by sacrifice and
oblation the stain is washed away.” * In ancient Peru it
was not lawful for the natives of one province or village to
intermarry with those of another.’ Marriage with foreign
women was unlawful at Sparta and Athens.° At Rome
any marriage of a citizen with a woman who was not
herself a Roman citizen, or did not belong to a community
possessing the privilege of connubium with Rome, was
invalid, and no legitimate children could be born of such a
union.’
1 Westermarck, of. cet. p. 363 sqq. of the Royal Commentaries of the
2 Rossbach, Rémische Lhe, p. 465. Yncas, i. 308.
3 Lewin, Wild kaces of South- 8 Miiller, History of the Doric Race,
Eastern India, ). 201. ii, 302. Hearn, Zhe Aryan House-
4 Dalton, Z¢hnology of Bengal, p. 28. hold, p. 156 sq.
° Garcilasso de la Vega, Fzrst Part 7 Gaius, Lnstetetiones, i. 56.
Prohibitions of intermarriage also very often relate to
persons belonging to different classes or castes of the same
community... To mention a few instances. The wild
tribes of Brazil consider alliances between slaves and free-
men highly disgraceful.? In Tahiti, if a woman of
condition chose an inferior person as her husband, the
children he had by her were killed? In the Malay
Archipelago marriages between persons of different rank
are, as arule, disapproved of, and in some places prohibited.’
In India intermarriage between different castes, though
formerly permissible, is now altogether prohibited.” In
Rome plebeians and patricians could not intermarry till
the year 445 B.c., nor were marriages allowed between
patricians and clients ; and Cicero himself disapproved of
intermarriages of ingenui and freedmen.° Among the
Teutonic peoples in ancient times any freeman who
married a slave became a slave himself.’ As late as the
thirteenth century a German woman who had intercourse
with a serf lost her liberty ;* and both in Germany and
Scandinavia, when the nobility emerged as a distinct order
from the class of freemen, marriages between persons of
noble birth and persons who, although free, were not noble
came to be considered misalliances.2 Even in modern
Europe there survive traces of the former class endogamy.
According to German Civil Law, the marriage of a man
belonging to the high nobility with a woman of inferior
birth is still regarded asa disparagium, and the woman is
not entitled to the rank of her husband, nor is the full
right of inheritance possessed by her or her children.”
Although in no way prevented by law, marriages out of
1 Westermarck, of. cét. p. 368 sgq. 6 Mommsen, fzstory of Romie, i. 371.
2 von Martius, Bectrige zur Ethno-
eraphie Amerika’s, i. 71. von Spix
and von Martius, 7vavels in Brazil,
il. 74.
3 Ellis, Polynesian Researches, i. 256.
Cook, Voyage to the Pacific Ocean, ii.
171 Sg.
4 Westermarck, of. cz¢. p. 371.
5 Monier-Williams, Mznzduzsm, p.
155:
Rossbach, of. c2¢z. pp. 249, 456 sg.
7 Winroth, Aktenskapshindren, pp.
227,
8 Jiid. p. 230 sg. Weinhold,
Deutsche Frauen in dem Mittelalter,
1. 349, 353 59. 3
» Weinhold, of. czt. 1. 349 sg.
10 Behrend, in von Holtzendorff,
Encyclopidie der Rechtswissenschafe,
i. 478.
the class are generally avoided by custom. As Sir Henry
Maine observes, “the outer or endogamous limit, within
which a man or woman must marry, has been mostly taken
under the shelter of fashion or prejudice. It is but
faintly traced in England, though not wholly obscured. It
is (or perhaps was) rather more distinctly marked in the
United States, through prejudices against the blending of
white and coloured blood. But in Germany certain
hereditary dignities are still forfeited by a marriage beyond
the forbidden limits ; and in France, in spite of all formal
institutions, marriages between a person belonging to the
noblesse and a person belonging to the dourgeoisie (distin-
guished roughly from one another by the particle ‘de’ )
are wonderfully rare, though they are not unknown.” ?
Religion, also, has formed a great bar to intermarriage.
Among Muhammedansa marriage between a Christian man
and a Muhammedan woman is not permitted under any
circumstances, whereas it is held lawful for a Muhammedan
to marry a Christian or a Jewish, but not a heathen,
woman, if induced to do so by excessive love of her, or if
he cannot obtain a wife of his own religion.” The Jewish
law Hs not recognise marriage with a person of another
belief ;? and during the Middle Ages marriage between
Jews and Christians was prohibited by the Christians also.‘
St. Paul indicates that a Christian was not allowed to marry
a heathen.® ‘Tertullian calls such an alliance fornication ; °
and in the fourth century the Council of Elvira forbade
Christian parents to give their daughters in marriage
to heathens.” Even the adherents of different Christian
confessions have been prohibited from intermarrying. In
' Maine, Zarly Law and Custom, Race-Types of the Jews,’ in /ozr.
p. 224 sg.
2 Lane, Manners and Customs of the
Modern Egyptians, i. 123. d’Escayrac
de Lauture, Dee afrikanische Waiste,
p. 68.
3 Frankel, Grwndlinzen des mosaisch-
talmudischen Lherechts, p. xx. Ritter,
Philo und die Halacha, p. 71.
+ Andree, Zur
Juden, p. 48. Neubauer, ‘ Notes on the
Volkskunde der
Anthr. Inst. xv. 19.
5 1 Corinthians, vii. 39.
® Tertullian, Ad wxorem, ii. 3
(Migne, Patrologie curstus, 1. 1292 sy.).
” Concilium Eliberitanum, cap. 15
sg. (Labbe-Mansi, Sacrorum Concile-
orum collectio, ii. 8). See also Miiller,
Das sexuelle Leben der christlichen
Kulturvolhker, p. 54.
the Roman Catholic Church the prohibition of marriage
with heathens and Jews was. soon followed by the pro-
hibition of ‘mixed marriages,” and Protestants likewise
forbade such unions.’ Mixed marriage§ are not now
contrary to the civil law either among Roman Catholic or
Protestant nations, but in countries belonging to the
Orthodox Greek Church ecclesiastical restrictions have
been adopted, and are still recognised, by the State.”
The endogamous rules are in the first place due to the
proud antipathy people feel to races, nations, classes, or
religions different from their own. He who breaks such a
rule is regarded as an offender against the circle to which
he belongs. He hurts its feelings, he disgraces it at the
same time as he disgraces himself. Irregular connections
outside the endogamous circle are often looked upon with
less intolerance than marriage, which places the parties on
a more equal footing. - A traveller relates that at Djidda,
where sexual morality is held in little respect, a Bedouin
woman may yield herself for money to a Turk or European,
but would think herself for ever dishonoured if she were
joined to him in lawful wedlock.’ In Rome contubernium,
but not marriage, could take place between freemen and
slaves.* And among ourselves public opinion regards it
as a much more lenient offence if a royal person keeps a
woman of inferior rank as his concubine than if he
marries her.
Modern civilisation tends more or less to pull down the
barriers which separate races, nations, the various classes of
society, and the adherents of different religions. he endo-
gamous rules have thus become less stringent and less
restricted. Whilst civilisation has narrowed the inner limit
within which a man or woman must not marry, it has
widened the outer limit within which a man or woman may
marry, and generally marries. The latter of these pro-
cesses has been one of vast importance in man’s history.
1 Winroth, of. czt. p. 213 sgg. Cf. d’Escayrac de Lauture, of. cet.
2 [bid. p. 220 sq. p» 155.
3 de Gobineau, Moral and Jntel- 4 Westermarck, of. cz¢. p. 372.
lectual Diversity of Races, p. 174, n. I.
Originating in race- or class- -pride, or in religious intoler-
ance, the endogamous rules have in their turn helped to
keep up and to strengthen these feelings. Frequent
intermarriages, ‘on the other hand, must have the very
opposite effect.
Like the rules referring to the choice of partners, so the
modes of contracting marriage and the ideas as to what in
this respect is right and proper have undergone successive
changes. The practice of capturing wives prevails in cer-
tain parts of the world, and traces of it are met with in the
marriage ceremonies of several peoples, indicating that it
occurred more frequently in past ages.’ This practice, as
it seems to me, has chiefly sprung from the aversion to close
intermarriage, together with the difficulty a savage man
may have in procuring a wife in a friendly manner, with-
out giving compensation for the loss he inflicts on her
family. We may imagine that it chiefly occurred ata stage
of social growth where family ties had become stronger, and
man lived in small groups of nearly related persons, but
where the idea of barter had scarcely presented itself to his
mind. Yet I do not think that capture was at any period
the exclusive form of contracting marriage ; its prevalence
seems to have been much exaggerated by McLennan and
his school.” It 1s impossible to believe that there ever was
a time when friendly negotiations between families who
could intermarry were altogether unknown. The custom
prevalent among many savage tribes of a husband taking
up his abode in his wife’s family seems to have arisen very
early in man’s history.
Among most uncivilised peoples now existing a man has,
in some way or other, to give compensation for his bride.®
The simplest way of purchasing a wife is to give a kins-
woman in exchange for her—a practice prevalent among
1 Westermarck, of, cit. ch, xvii. punishable act of violence, But, as Dr.
? Dr.Grosse (Die Formen der Familie, avelock Ellis justly observes (Stzdies
p- 105) goes so far as to believe that 7 the Psychology of Sex, ‘ Analysis of
marriage by capture has never beena the Sexual Impulse,’ p. 62, n. 2), this
form of marriage recognised by custom _ position is too extreme.
or law, but only an occasional and 3 Westermarck, of. ci¢. p. 390 sgq.
own
Australian tribes. Much more common is the custom of
obtaining a wife by services rendered to her father, the man
taking up his abode with the family of the girl for a certain
time, during which he works asa servant. But the ordinary
compensation for a girl is property paid to her father, or in
some cases to her uncle, or to some othef relatives as well
as to the father. Marriage by exchange or purchase is not
only general among existing lower races ; it occurs, or
formerly occurred, among semi-civilised nations of a higher
culture as well—in Central America and Peru, in China
and Japan, in the various branches of the Semitic race, in
the past history of all so-called Aryan peoples. We have
no evidence that it is a stage through which every race has
passed ; we notice its absence among some of the rudest
races with whom we are acquainted. Yet with more reason
than marriage by capture, purchase of wives may be said to
form a general stage in the social history of mankind.
Although the two practices may occur simultaneously, the
former seems more often to have succeeded the latter, as
barter in general has followed upon robbery. It has been
suggested that the transition from marriage by capture to
marriage by purchase was brought about in the following
way : abduction, in spite of parents, was the primary form ;
then there came the offering of compensation to escape
vengeance ; and this grew eventually into the making of
presents or paying a sum beforehand. The price was a
compensation for the loss sustained in the giving up of the
girl, and a remuneration for the expenses incurred in her
maintenance till the time of her marriage. The girl was
regarded more or less in the light of property, to take her
away from her owner without his consent was theft. To
claim a compensation for her was his right, or even his
duty. The Indians in Columbia consider it in the highest
degree disgraceful to the girl’s family if she is given away
without a price ;” and in certain tribes of California “ the
1 Koenigswarter, Etwaes historiques 2 Bancroft, MWative Races of the
sur le développement de la société Pacific States, i. 277. Cf. von Weber,
humaine, p. 53. Spencer, Principles Vier Jahre in Afrika, i. 215 Sy.
of Sociology, \. 625. (Kafirs).
children of a woman for whom no money was paid are
accounted no better than bastards, and the whole family are
condemned.” !
With progressing civilisation, however, the practice of
purchasing wives has been gradually abandoned, and come
to be looked upon asinfamous. ‘The wealthier classes took
the first step, and poorer and ruder. persons subsequently
followed their examples. Thus in India, in ancient times,
the Asura form, or marriage by purchase, was lawful for
all the four castes. Afterwards it fell into disrepute, and
was prohibited among the Brahmanas and Kshatriyas,
whereas it was still approved of in the case of a Vaisya and
a Sidra. But in the ‘Laws of Manu’ it is forbidden
altogether.” It is said there, “‘ No father who knows the
law must take even the smallest gratuity for his daugh-
r; fora man who, through avarice, takes a gratuity,
is a seller of his offspring.” ® The Greeks of the histo-
rical age had ceased to buy their wives. In Rome con-
farreatio, which suggested no idea of purchase, was in the
very earliest known time the form of marriage in force
among the patricians; and among clients and plebeians,
also, the purchase of wives came to an end in remote
antiquity, surviving as a mere symbol in their coémptio.*
Among the Germans marriage by purchase was abolished
only after their conversion to Christianity.° In the
Talmudic law the purchase of wives appears as merely
symbolical, the bride-price being fixed at a nominal
amount." In China, although marriage presents correspond
exactly to purchase-money in a contract of sale, the people
will not hear of their being called a “ price Se rewnich
shows that here, too, some feeling of shame is attached to
the idea, of selling a daughter.
We may discern two different ways in which this
' Powers, Tribes of California, 5 Grimm, Deztsche Rechtsalter-
pp- 22, 56. thitimer, p. 424.
2 Laws of Manz, iii. 23 sqq. 6 Gans, Erbrecht, i. 138.
J aittare ills Sign LO Nh abs, Oy, Ole 7 Jamieson, ‘ Marriage Laws,’ in
4 Rossbach, of. cz. pp. 92, 146, China Review, x. 78 n.*
248, 250, &c.
ys
Perey; ite leer
gradual disappearance of marriage by purchase has taken
place. On the one hand, the purchase became a symbol,
appearing as a sham sale in the marriage ceremonies or
as an exchange of presents; on the other hand, the
purchase sum was transformed into the morning gift and
the dotal portion, a part—afterwards the whole—being
given to the bride either directly by the bridegroom or by
her father. These transformations of marriage by purchase
have taken place not only in the history of the civilised
nations, but among several peoples who are still in a savage
or semi-civilised state; and of a few of them it is
expressly stated that they consider marriage by purchase a
disgraceful practice.’
From marriage by purchase we have thus come to the
practice of dower, which is apparently the very reverse of
it. But whilst the marriage portion partly derives its
origin from the purchase of wives, it does not do so in
every case. It serves different ends, often indissolubly
mixed up together. It may have the meaning of a return
gift. It may imply that the wife as well as the husband
is expected to contribute to the expenses of the joint
household. It is also very often intended to be a settle-
ment for the wife in case the marriage be dissolved through
the husband’s death or otherwise.” In the social history of
the civilised races the marriage portion has played so
prominent a part, that, as we have spoken of a stage of
marriage by purchase, we may speak of another and later
stage where fathers are bound by custom or law to portion
their daughters. The Jews® and Muhammedans* consider
it a religious duty for a man to give a dower to his
daughter. In Greece the dowry came to be thought
almost necessary to make the distinction between a wife
and a concubine.’ Isaeus says that no decent man would
give his legitimate daughter less than a tenth of his
1 Westermarck, of. czt. p. 405 sgq. a Athénes,’in Revue de législation et
2 [bid. p. 411 sgg. de jurisprudence, xxiv. 152. Potter,
3 Mayer, Rechte der Tsraeliten, Archeologia Greca, ii. 268. Cy.
li. 344. Meier and Schémann, Der attische
4 Koran, iv. 3. Process, p. 513 Sq.
5 Cauvet, ‘L’organisation de la famille
WONG, IO Gea
property 3" indeed, so great were the dowers given that in
the time of Aristotle nearly two fifths of the mole
territory of Sparta were supposed to belong to women.”
In Rome, even more than in Greece, the marriage a
became a mark of distinction for a legitimate wife ;*° and
though later on Justinian in several of his constitutions
declares that dos is obligatory for persons of high rank
only,‘ the old custom did not fall into desuetude.? The
Prussian ‘Landrecht’ still prescribes that the father, or
eventually the mother, shall arrange about the wedding
and fit up the house of the newly-married couple.° Accord-
ing to the ‘ Code Napoléon,’ on the other hand, parents are
not bound to give a dower to their daughters,’ and the
same principle is generally adopted by modern legislation.
It is true that especially in the so-called Latin countries
there is still a strong tendency to dotation,® but another
feeling, in some measure opposed to it, is gaining ground
everywhere. In a society where monogamy is prescribed
by law, where the adult women outnumber the adult men,
where many men never marry, and where married women
too often lead an indolent life—in such a society the
marriage portion in many cases becomes a purchase-sum
by means of which a father buys a husband for his daughter,
as formerly a man bought a wife from her father. But,
as Mr. Sutherland observes, “that pecuniary interests,
either on one side or on the other, should conspicuously
enter into the motives which lead to marriage becomes
repulsive to the increasing delicacy of feeling ; and so we
find that in cultured communities the dowry dies ‘out,
just as the purchase-money declined in the civilised
stages.” °
1 Tsaeus, Oratio de Pyrrhi hereditate,
51, P. 43.
2 Aristotle, Polztéca, li. 9, p. 1270 a.
3 Laboulaye, Recherches sur la con-
dition civile et politique des femmes,
p- 38 sg. Ginoulhiac, Azstotre du
régime dotal, p. 66. Meier and
Schomann, of. c2¢. p. 513 Sg.
4 Ginhoulhiac, of. cz¢. p. 103.
® For dos necessaria in Germany
during the Middle Ages, see Mitter-
maier, Grundsatze des gemeinen deut-
schen Privatrechts, ii. 3.
6 Eccius, in von Holtzendorff, Ency-
BAL der Rechiswissenschaft, ii. 414.
” Code Napoléon, art. 204.
8 See Maine, Zarly History of Insti-
tutions, Pp. 339.
iw Sutherland, Origin and Growth of
the Moral Instinct, i. 243.
Whilst most of the lower animal species are by instinct
either monogamous or polygynous, with man_ every
possible form of marriage occurs. There are marriages of
one man with one woman (monogamy), of one man with
many women (polygyny), of many men with one woman
(polyandry), and, a a few exceptional cases, of many men
with many women."
Among the causes by which the forms of marriage are
influenced the numerical proportion between the sexes
plays an important part. Polyandry seems to be due
chiefly to a surplus of men, though it prevails only where
the circumstances are otherwise in favour of it. It pre-
supposes an abnormally feeble disposition to jealousy, and
has probably at all times been exceptional in the human
race. ‘There is no solid evidence for the theory set forth
by McLennan that it was the rule in early times. On
the contrary, this form of marriage seems to require a
certain degree of civilisation; we have no trustworthy
account of its occurrence among the lowest savages. In
polyandrous families the husbands are most frequently
brothers, and the eldest brother, at least in many cases, has
the superiority. It seems a fair conclusion that in such
instances polyandry was originally an expression of fraternal
benevolence on the part of the eldest brother, or of urgent
demands on the part of the younger ones, who other-
wise, on account of the scarcity of women, would have to
live unmarried. If additional wives were afterwards
acquired, they would naturally be considered the common
property of all the brothers; and in this way the group
marriage of the Toda type seems to have evolved.*
Polygyny, also, is to some extent dependent upon the
proportion Bearcat the sexes. It has been observed in
India that polyandry occurs in those parts of the country
where the males outnumber the females, polygyny in those
1 Westermarck, of. czt. ch. xx. N.S. xxi. 703 sgg. Jdem, Studies in
2 Tbid. p. 482. Ancient History, p. 112 sq.
3 McLennan, ‘The Levirate and 4 Westermarck, of. czt. p. 510 sqg.
Polyandry,’ in Fortnightly Review, Seealso Rivers, Zodas, pp. 515, 519,
oie
2)
.@)
i)
where the reverse is the case.1 Indeed, in countries
unaffected by European civilisation polygyny is likely
to prevail wherever there is a majority of women. But
the proportion between the sexes is only one cause out of |
many to which polygyny is due.
There are several reasons why a man may desire to
possess more than one_wife.” Monogamy requires from
him periodical continence, not only for a certain time
every month, but among many peoples during the
pregnancy of his wife, and as long as she suckles her child.
One of the chief causes of polygyny is the attraction
which female youth and beauty exercise upon a man ; and
at the lower stages of civilisation women generally become
old much sooner than in more advanced communities.
The liking of men for variety is also a potent factor; the
Negroes of Angola asserted that they ‘‘ were not able to
eat always of the same dish.” * We must further take
into account men’s desire for offspring, wealth, and
authority. The barrenness of a wife is a very common
reason for the choice of a new partner ; the polygyny of
the ancient Hindus seems to have been due chiefly to the
fact that men dreaded the idea of dying childless, and
even now in the East the desire for offspring is one of the
principal causes of polygyny.* The more wives, the more
children ; and the more children, the greater power. In
early civilisation a man’s relations and connections are
often his only friends ; and where slavery does not prevail,
next to a man’s wives the real servant, the only to be
counted upon, is the child. Moreover, a man’s fortune is
increased by a multitude of wives not only through their
children, but through their work. Manual labour among
savages is undertaken largely by women ; and when neither
slaves nor persons who will work for hire can be procured,
1 Goehlert, ‘Die Geschlechtsver- Congo,’ in Pinkerton, Codlection of
schiedenheit der Kinder in den Ehen,’ Voyages, xvi. 299.
in Zettschr. f. Ethnologie, xiii. 127. * Wallin, eseanteckningar fran
2 Westermarck, of. czt. p. 483 sq. Oriente, iii. 267. Le Bon, La civi-
* Merolla da Sorrento, ‘ Voyage to J/ésation des Arabes, p. 424. Gray,
China, i. 184.
it becomes necessary for any man who requires many
servants to have many wives.
Nevertheless, however desirable polygyny may be from
-the man’s point of view, it is altogether prohibited among
many peoples, and in countries where it is an established
institution it is practised—as a rule to which there are few
exceptions—only by a comparatively small class. The
proportion between the sexes partly accounts for this, but
there are other causes of no less importance.? Where the
amount of female labour is limited and no accumulated
property exists, it may be very difficult for a man to keep
a plurality of wives. Again, where female labour is of
considerable value, the necessity of paying the purchase-
sum for a wife is a hindrance to polygyny which can be
overcome only by the wealthier men. There are, more-
over, certain factors of a psychical character which are
unfavourable to polygyny. When love depends on
external attractions only, it is necessarily fickle ; but when
it implies sympathy arising from mental qualities, there is
a tie between husband and wife which lasts long after
youth and beauty are gone. As another obstacle to
polygyny we have to note the true monogamous
sentiment, the absorbing passion for one, which is not
unknown even among savage races. Polygyny is finally
checked by the respect in which women are held by
men. Jealousy is not exclusively a masculine passion, and
it is the ambition of every wife to be the mistress of her
husband’s house. Hence where women have succeeded in
obtaining some power over their husbands, or where the
altruistic feelings of men have become refined enough to
lead them to respect the feelings of those weaker than
themselves, monogamy is frequently the result.
It is certain that polygyny has been less prevalent at the
lowest stages of civilisation—where wars do not seriously
disturb the proportion of the sexes, where life is chiefly
supported by hunting and female labour is consequently of
slight value, and where there is no accumulation of wealth
1 Westermarck, of. czt. p. 435 599. 2 bid. p. 493 599.
and no distinction of class—than it is at somewhat higher
stages.' The more advanced savages and barbarians seem
to indulge in this practice to a greater extent than the
lower ones, many, or most, of whom are either little
addicted to polygyny or strictly monogamous. Various
forest tribes in Brazil are monogamous,’ and so are
several of the Californian tribes—‘‘a humble and a
lowly race, . . . one of the lowest on earth.” Thus the
Karok do not allow bigamy even to a chief ; and though
a man may own as many women for slaves as he can
purchase, he brings obloquy on himself if he cohabits with
more than one.’ Among the Veddahs® and Andaman
Islanders ° monogamy is as rigidly insisted upon as any-
where in Europe. The natives of Kar Nicobar “ have
but one wife, and look upon unchastity as a very deadly
sin.’ * Among the Koch and Old Kukis polygyny and
concubinage are forbidden ;* whilst among some other
aboriginal tribes in India a man, though not expressly for-
bidden to have many wives, is blamed if he has more than
one.” Among the Karens of Burma” and certain tribes
of Indo-China, the Malay Peninsula, and the Indian
Archipelago, polygyny is said either to be prohibited or
unknown." The Hill Dyaks marry but one wife, and a
chief who once broke through this custom lost all his
influence.” In Australia there are said to be some truly
monogamous tribes;7* in the Birria ‘tribe, for instance;
‘“‘ the possession of more than one wife-is absolutely for-
bidden, or was so before the coming of the whites.” ™
' Westermarck, of. ctt. p. 505 sgq. 7 Distant, zézd. iii. 4.
2 von Martius, of. c2t. 1. 274, 2098. 8 Dalton, op. czt. p. 91. Stewart,
Wallace, Zravels on the Amazon, pp. “Notes on Northern Cachar,’ in /ewr.
509, 515 sgg. Waitz, Anthropologie As. Soc. Bengal, xxiv. 621.
der Naturvolker, iii. 472. 9 Dalton, of. czt. pp. 28, 54. Jelling-
® Powers, of. cit. pp. 5, 56, 406. haus,‘ Munda-Kolhs in Chota Nagpore,’
Wilkes, U. S. Exploring Expedition, in Zettschr. f. Ethnol. iii. 370.
v. 188. 10 Smeaton, Loyal Karens of Burma,
4\Powers, of. czt. p. 22. Damo.
5 Bailey, in Zrans. Ethn. Soc. N.S. 11 Westermarck, of. czt. p. 436 sg.
li. 291 sg. Hartshorne, in Jxdian 2 Low, Sarawak, p. 300.
Antiqguary, Vill. 320. 13 Curr, Australian Race, i. 402;
SeManweiiey oun. cathe. Test. Xie yin 37s
135. 14 Tbid. ii. 378.
'
;
;
a
q
‘vr
Monogamy is all the more likely to have been the general
rule among our earliest human ancestors as it seems to be
so among the man-like apes. Darwin certainly mentions
the gorilla as a polygamist ;' but the majority of state-
ments we have regarding this animal are to the opposite
effect. Relying on the most trustworthy authorities,
Professor Hartmann says, “ The gorilla lives in a society
consisting of male and female and their young of varying
Epes???
Whilst civilisation is thus up to a certain point favour-
able to polygyny, it leads in its higher forms to
monogamy. Owing to the decrease of wars, the death-rate
of the men becomes less, and the considerable dispropor-
tion between the sexes which among many warlike peoples
makes polygyny almost a law of nature no longer exists
among the most advanced nations. No superstitious belief
keeps the civilised man apart from his wife during her
pregnancy and while she suckles her child; and the
suckling time has become much shorter since the introduc-
tion of domesticated animals and the use of milk. To a
cultivated mind youth and beauty are by no means the
only attractions of a woman; and civilisation has made
female beauty more durable. The desire for offspring
becomes less intense. A large family, instead of being a
help in the struggle for existence, is often considered an
insufferable burden. A man’s kinsfolk are no longer his
only friends, and his wealth and power do not depend
upon the number of his wives and children. A wife
ceases to be a mere labourer, and manual labour is to a
large extent replaced by the work of domesticated animals
and the use of implements and machines. Moreover, the
sentiment of love becomes more refined, the passion for
one more absorbing. The feelings of the weaker sex are
frequently held in higher regard. And the better educa-
tion bestowed on women enables them to live comfortably
without the support of a husband.
1 Darwin, Descent of Man, pp. 217, 2 Hartmann, Deze menschendhnlichen
590 sq. Affen, p. 214.
As for the moral valuation of the various forms of
marriage, it should be noticed that even among polygynous
and polyandrous peoples monogamy is permitted by
custom or law, although in some instances it is associated
with poverty and considered mean, whereas polygyny, as
associated with greatness, is thought praiseworthy.’ Again,
the notion that monogamy is the only proper form of
marriage, and that any other form is immoral, is due
either to the mere force of habit; or, possibly, to the
notion that it is wrong of some men to appropriate a
plurality of wives when others in consequence can get
none; or to the feeling that polygyny is an offence
against the female sex; or to the condemnation of lust.
As regards the obligatory monogamy of Christian nations,
we have to remember that monogamy was the only recog-
nised form of marriage in the societies on which Christian-
ity was first engrafted, and that it was the only form that
could be tolerated by a religion which regarded every
gratification of the sexual impulse with suspicion and in-
continence as the gravest sin. In its early days the Church
showed little respect for women, but its horror of sensual-
ity was immense.
A few words still remain to be said of a form of marriage
which has of late been the subject of much discussion in
connection with Australian ethnology. Many years ago
attention was drawn to the fact that the Kamilaroi tribes
in South Australia are divided into four classes, in which
brothers and sisters are respectively Ipai and Ipatha, Ktbi
and Kubitha, Mtri and Matha, Kumbu and Biuitha; and
that the members of one class are forbidden to marry
among themselves, but bound to marry into a certain
other class. Thus Ipai may only marry Kubitha ; Kiubi,
Ipatha ; Kumbu, Matha; and Miri, Batha. Jn a certain
sense, we were told, every Ipai is regarded as married, not
by any individual contract, but by organic law, to every
Kubitha ; every Ktibi to every Ipatha, and so forth. If,
for instance, a Kiibi meet a stranger Ipatha, they address
1 Spencer, Principles of Sociology, i. 657.
each other as “ spouse’’; and “a Kitbi thus meeting an
Ipatha, though she were of another tribe, would treat her
as his wife, and his right ‘to do so would be recognised by
her tribe.”' The institution according to which the
men of one division have as wives the women of another
division, the Rev. L. Fison called “group marriage.”
He contends that among the natives of South Australia it
has given way in later times, in some measure, to indivi-
dual marriage. But theoretically, he says, marriage is still
communal: ‘it is based upon the marriage of all the
males in one division of a tribe to all the females of
the same generation in another division.” The chief
argument advanced by Mr. Fison in support of his theory
is grounded on the terms of relationship in use in the
tribes. These terms belong to the “ classificatory system”
of Mr. Morgan ;* but he admits that he is not aware of
any tribe in which the actual practice is to its full extent
what the terms of relationship imply. <“* Present usage,”
he says, ‘‘ is everywhere in advance of the system so implied,
and the terms are survivals of an ancient right, not precise
indications of custom as it is.”* The same is granted by
Mr. Howitt. Yet I have pointed out, in my criticism of
the classificatory system, to what absurd results we must be
led if, guided by such terms, we begin to speculate upon
early marriage.” Moreover, as I have said, “if a Kubi
and an Ipatha address each other as spouse, this does not
imply that in former times every Kttbi was married to
every Ipatha indiscriminately. On the contrary, the
application of such a familiar term might be explained
from the fact that the women who may be a man’s wives,
and those who cannot possibly be so, stand ina widely
different relation to him.”° ‘This suggestion derives
support from the following statement made by Dr.
Codrington with reference to the Melanesians :—‘“ Speak-
1 Ridley, Kdmlaréz, p. 161 sq. (edit. 4 Howitt, ‘Australian Group Rela-
1866, p- 35 sgg.). Fison and Howitt, tions,’ in Smzthsontan Report, 1883,
Kamiularot and Kurnat, pp. 36, 51, 53. p- 817.
2 Fison and Howitt, of. cz¢. p. 60. > Westermarck, of. ct. ch. v.
3 [bid. p. 159 sq. 6 Jbid. p. 56.
ing generally, it may be said that to a Melanesian _man all
women, of his own generation at least, are either sisters or
wives, to the Melanesian woman all men are either
brothers or husbands.... It must not be understood
that a Melanesian regards all women who are not of his
own division as, in fact, his wives, or conceives himself to
have rights which he may exercise. in regard to those
women of them who are unmarried ; but the women who
may be his wives by marriage and those who cannot
possibly be so, stand in a widely different relation to
hints24
More recently Messrs. Spencer and Gillen have shown
that a marriage system essentially similar to that of the
South Australian natives prevails in Central Australia ;
and they, also, regard it as a later modification of genuine
group marriage. Nowadays, they say, the system of indi-
vidual wives prevails—“ modified, however, by the prac-
tice of customs according to which, at certain times, much
wider marital relations are allowed.” But to this rule there
is one exception :—‘‘ In the Urabunna tribe group marriage
actually exists at the present day, agroup of men of a cer-
tain designation having, not merely nominally but in actual
reality, and under normal conditions, marital sates with
a group of women of another special designation” ; here
“individual marriage does not exist either in name o in
practice.” ” But, after all, it appears that even among the
Urabunna every woman is the special Nupa of one man,
and that certain other men, her Piraungaru, only have a
secondary right to her. Thus, if the Nupa man (the real,
or at all events the chief, husband) be present, the Piraun-
garu (accessory husbands) are allowed to have intercourse
with her only in case the Nupa man consents.? Is this
modification of the Urabunna group marriage a later de-
velopment from a previous system according to which all
the men of a certain group had an equal right to all the
Codrington, Melanestans, p. 22 sg. Lidem, Native Tribes of Central Aus-
cd Spencer and Gi lien, Northern tralia, p. 62 sq.
Tribes of Central Australia, p. 140, 3 Lidem, Native Tribes, p. 110.
—
women of another group? Here we are on dangerous
ground ; nothing is more difficult than to decide whether
certain customs are survivals or not. We find modifica-
tions resembling those connected with the group marriage
of the Urabunna both in polyandry and in polygyny ; the
first husband in a polyandrous family is usually the chief
husband, and the first wife in a polygynous family is very
frequently the chief wife. We must certainly not conclude
that these restrictions have been preceded by an earlier
custom which gave equal rights to all the husbands or all
the wives ; on the contrary, it is more likely that the
higher position granted to the first husband or to the first
wife is due to the fact that monogamy was the usual form
of marriage.’ Similarly the Urabunna custom may very
well have developed out of ordinary individual marriage,’
and the cause of it may perhaps be, as Mr. N. W. Thomas
has suggested,* the difficulties which an Australian native
often experiences in getting a wife.* As for other facts
which have been adduced as evidence of Australian group
marriage in the past, such as the jus prime noctis, &c., I
only desire to emphasise the circumstance that extra-
matrimonial intercourse is practised by the Australian
natives in a variety of cases the real meaning of which
seems obscure. In some instances at least, a magic
significance appears to be attributed to it ;° and that it is
a survival of group marriage, in the strict sense of the
term, is again only a conjecture.
I must admit, therefore, that the facts produced by
Messrs. Spencer and Gillen, and the severe criticism which
they have passed on my sceptical attitude towards Mr.
Fison’s group marriage theory have not been able to con-
vince me that among the Australian aborigines individual
marriage has evolved out of a previous system of marriage
between groups of men and women. Nor has Mr. Howitt,
1 Westermarck, of. cit. pp. 443-448, Cf Idem, Kinship and Marriage tn
457, 458, 508. Australia, p. 138.
2 Cf. Crawley, of. cit. p. 482 ; Lang, 4 See Westermarck, of. czt. p. 132 sg.3
Soctal Origins, p. 105 sg. infra, p. 460. :
3 Thomas, in a paper read before 5 See, e.g., Spencer and Gillen,
the Anthropological Institute in 1905. Northern Tribes, p. 137 59.
‘in his recent work on the ‘ Native Tribes of South-East
Australia,’ in my opinion, sufficiently proved that such an
evolution has taken place.1| He blames certain ‘“ ethnolo-
gists of the study” for not being willing “‘to take the
opinion of men who have first-hand knowledge of the
natives” ;? but I think we do well in distinguishing be-
tween statements based on direct observation and the
observer’s interpretation of the stated facts. Even suppose,
however, that group marriage really was once common in
Australia, would that prove that it was once common
among mankind at large? Mr. Howitt’s supposition that
the practice of group marriage “ will be ultimately accepted
as one of the primitive conditions of mankind ” ® is no doubt
shared by a host of anthropologists. The group marriage
theory will probably for some time to come remain the
residuary legatee of the old theory of promiscuity ; the
important works which have lately been published on the
Australian aborigines have made people inclined to view
the early history of mankind through Australian spectacles.
But even the most ardent advocate of Australian group
marriage should remember that the existence of kangurus
in Australia does not prove that there were once kangurus
in England.
The time during which -marriage lasts varies extremely
in the human race.* There are unions which, though
legally recognised as marriages, do not endure long enough
to deserve to be so called in the natural history sense of .
the term; there are others which are dissolved only by
1 Mr. Thomas has come to the same
result in his book on ‘ Kinship and
Marriage in Australia,’ which appeared
when the present chapter was already
in type. A detailed examination of the
relationship no argument of any sort
can be founded which assumes them
to refer to consanguinity, kinship, or
affinity. ‘‘It is therefore not rash to
say that the case for group marriage, so
facts which have been adduced as evi-
dence of Australian group marriage (p.
127 sgg.) has led him to the conclusion
(p. 147) that prevailing customs in
Australia, far from proving the present
or former existence of group marriage
in that continent, do not even render it
probable, and that on the terms of
far as Australia is concerned, falls to
the ground.”
2 Howitt,
East Australia,’
185.
° Idem, Native Tribes of South-East
Australia, p. 281.
+ Westermarck, of. cz¢. ch. xxiii.
‘Native Tribes of South-
in Folk-Lore, xvii.
death. As has already been pointed out, it is probable
that among primitive men the union of the sexes lasted till
after the birth of the offspring, and we have perhaps some
reason to believe that the connection lasted for years. On
the whole, progress in civilisation has tended to make
marriage more durable. It is evident that at the early stage
of development at which women first became valuable as
labourers, a wife was united with her husband by a new
bond more lasting than youth and beauty. The tie was
strengthened by the bride-price and the marriage portion.
And a higher development of the paternal feeling, better fore-
thought for the children’s welfare, in some instances greater
consideration for women, and a more refined love passion
have gradually made it stronger, until it has become in
many cases indissoluble. Yet we must not conclude that
divorcewill in the future be less frequent and more restricted
by law than it is now in European countries. It should
be remembered that the laws of divorce in Christian Europe
owe their origin to an idealistic religious commandment
which, interpreted in its literal sense, gave rise to legal
prescriptions far from harmonising with the mental and
social life of the mass of the people. The powerful authority
of the Roman Church was necessary to enforce the dogma
that marriage is indissoluble. The Reformation introduced
somewhat greater liberty in this respect, and modern legis-
lation has gone further in the same direction. In those
Christian states of Europe where absolute divorce is per-
mitted the grounds on which it may be sued for are nearly
the same for the man and the woman, except in England,
where the husband must be accused of one or other of
several offences besides adultery. In Italy, Spain, and
Portugal, a judicial separation may always be decreed on
the ground of the adultery of the wife, but, on the ground
of the adultery of the husband, only if it has been com-
mitted under certain aggravating circumstances," ‘These
laws imply that marriage is not yet a contract on the
footing of perfect equality between the sexes ; but there 1s
1 Glasson, Le mariage cévil et le divorce, pp. 291, 298, 304.
a growing opinion that, where it is not, it ought to be so.
Again, when both husband and wife desire to separate, it
seems to many enlightened minds that the State has no
right to prevent them from dissolving the marriage con-
tract, provided the children are properly cared for; and
that for the children, also, it is better to have the super-
vision of one parent only than of two who cannot agree.
REGARD FOR THE LOWER ANIMALS
Men’s conduct towards the lower animals is frequently
a subject of moral valuation.
Totem animals must be treated with deference by those
who bear their names, and animals generally regarded as
divine must be respected by all ; of this more will be said
in a subsequent chapter.' Among various peoples the
members of certain animal species must not be killed, be-
cause they are considered to be receptacles for the souls of
departed men,’ or because the species is believed to have
originated through a transformation of men into animals.”
The Dyaks of Borneo have a superstitious dread of killing
orang-utans, being of opinion that these apes are men who
went to live in the forest and abstain from speaking
merely in order to be exempt from paying taxes.* The
Moors consider it wrong to kill a monkey, because the
monkey was once a man whom God changed into his
present shape as a punishment for the sin he committed by
performing his ablutions with milk ; and they would never
do harm to a stork, because, as they say, the stork was
originally a judge, who passed unjust sentences upon his
fellow creatures and therefore became what he is. They
also account it a sin to kill a swallow or a pigeon, a white
spider or a bee, because they regard them as holy. Other
creatures, again, are spared by the Moors because they
! Infra, on Duties to Gods. $ See Meiners, Al/leemeine Geschichte
2 Infra, p. 516 sq. der Keligionen, i. 213 sgq.
* Selenka, Sonnige Welten, p. 57.
——,
appear uncanny or are suspected of being evil spirits in
disguise. It is believed that anybody who kills a raven
easily goes mad and that he who kills a toad will get fever
or die ; and no Moor would dare to hit a cat or a dog in
the dark, since it seems very doubtful what kind of being
it really is. Superstitions of this sort are world-wide.
It is a common belief among uncultured peoples that a
person who slays an animal is exposed to the vengeance
either of its disembodied spirit or of all the other creatures
belonging to the same species.’ Hence, as Dr. Frazer
has shown, the savage often makes it a rule to spare the
lives of those animals which he has no pressing motive for
killing, at least such fierce and dangerous ones as are
likely to exact a bloody revenge for the slaughter of any
of their kind ; and when, for some reason or other, he
overcomes his superstitious scruples and takes the life of
the beast, he is anxious to appease the victim and its
kindred by testifying his respect for them, or making
apologies, or trying to conceal his share in procuring the
death of the animal, or promising that its remains will be
honourably treated.” The Sti¢ns of Cambodia, for instance,
who believe that animals have souls which wander about
after death, ask pardon when they have killed one, lest its
soul should visit and torment them ; and they also offer it
sacrifices proportioned to the strength and size of the
animal.* When a party of Koriaks have killed a bear or
a wolf, they skin the beast, dress one of their family in
the skin, and dance round the skin-clad man, saying that
it was not they who killed the animal but someone else,
by preference a Russian.t The Eskimo about Behring
Strait maintain that the dead bodies of various animals
must be treated very carefully by the hunter who obtains
them, so that their shades may not be offended and bring
bad luck or even death upon him or his people.’
CR Szpra, i. 258. 4 Bastian, Der Mensch in der
2 Frazer, Golden Bough, ii. 389 sqq. Geschichle, iii. 26.
3 Mouhot, Zyavels in the Central > Nelson, ‘Eskimo about Bering
Parts of Indo-China, 1. 252. Strait,’ in Anz. Rep. Bur. Ethn, xvii,
438.
The savage, moreover, desires to keep on good terms
with animals which, without being feared, are either eaten
or valued for their skins. Hence, when he captures one,
he shows such deference for it as may be necessary for
inducing its fellows to come and be killed also.t. Alaskan
hunters preserve the bones of sables and beavers out of
reach of the dogs for a year and then bury them carefully,
lest the spirits which look after these species should con-
sider that “they are regarded with contempt, and hence
no more should be killed or trapped.” * The Thompson
River Indians of British Columbia said that when a deer
was killed its fellows would be well pleased if the hunters
butchered the animal nicely and cleanly.? The Hurons
refrained from throwing fish bones into the fire, lest the
souls of the fish should go and warn the other fish not to
let themselves be caught, since, if they were, their own
bones would also be burned.* Some savages respect the
bones of the animals which they eat because they believe
that the bones, if preserved, will, in the course of time,
be reclothed with flesh and the animal thus come to life
again.”
Besides the creatures which primitive man treats with
respect because he dreads their strength and ferocity or
on account of the benefits he expects from them, there is
yet a third class of animate beings which he sometimes
deems it necessary to conciliate, namely, vermin that
infest the crops.° Among the Saxons of Transylvania, in
order to keep sparrows from the corn, the sower begins
by throwing the first handful of seed backwards over his
head, saying, “‘ That is for you, sparrows.” " And of the
Dravidian tribes of Mirzapur we are told that, when
locusts threaten to eat up the fruits of the earth, the
people catch one, decorate its head with a spot of red
1 Frazer, op. czt. li. 403 sgq. * Sagard, Le grand voyage du pays
* Dall, Alaska, p. 89. des Hlurons, p. 255.
3 Teit, ‘Thompson Indians of British ° Frazer, op. ct. ii. 415 sqg.
Columbia,’ in Alemoirs of the American ® Lbtid, il. 422 sqq.
Museum of Natural Hestory, ‘ Anthro- 7 Heinrich, quoted zbzd. 11. 423.
pology,’ i. 346.
—"
ee.
ape
LOWER ANIMALS
XLIV 493 |
lead, salaam to it, and let it go; after which civilities the
whole flight immediately departs.'
Domestic animals are frequently objects of superstitious
reverence.” They are expected to reward masters who
treat them well, whereas those who harm them are
believed to expose themselves to their revenge. Among
the Eskimo about Behring Strait dogs are never beaten
for biting people, lest the zvua or shade of the dog should
become angry and prevent the wound from healing.’
Butchers are often regarded as unclean, and the original
reason for this was in all probability fhe idea that they
were haunted by the spirits of the animals they had slain.
Among the Guanches of the Canary Islands it was un-
lawful for anybody but professional butchers to kill
cattle, and a butcher was forbidden to enter other
persons’ houses, to touch their property, and to keep
company with any one not of his own trade? In
Morocco a butcher, like a manslayer, is thought to be
haunted by juin (jinn), and it seems that in this case also
the notion of haunting jnin has replaced an earlier belief
in troublesome ghosts.’ So, too, the ancient Troglodytes
of East Africa, who seriaed fice whole sustenance from
their flocks sae herds, are said to have looked upon
butchers as unclean.’ In the rural districts of Japan it
is believed that a butcher will have a cripple among his
descendants.’
How far ideas of this sort may account for the great
disinclination of many peoples to kill their cattle, it is
impossible to say; but they certainly do not constitute
the only motive. We have noticed above that pastoral
tribes are unwilling to reduce their herds and agricultural
peoples to kill the ploughing ox, because this would imply
Popular
of Northern
Religion and
India, i.
1 Crooke,
Folk-Lore
} See Robertson Smith, Relzgion of
the Semites, p. 296 sqq.
3 Nelson, in Anz. Rep. Bur. Ethn.
XVill. 435.
+ Abreu de ’Galindo, Héstory of the
Discovery and Conquest of the Canary
Lslands, p. 7159. Bory de St. Vincent,
Etssaes sur les Isles Fortunées, p.
103 sg.
SCF SUPTE, 1a) 370:
6 Robertson Smith, of, cz. p.
206 sq.
7 Griffis, MZkado’s Empire, p. 472.
loss of valuable property.! And apart from economic
considerations, we may assume that feelings of genuine
sympathy also induce them to treat their animals with
kindness. The altruistic sentiment has not necessarily
reference to members of the same species only ; of this
we find instances even among animals in confinement
and domesticated animals, which frequently become
attached to individuals of a different species with whom
they live together. And the savage feels himself much
more closely related to the animal world than does his
civilised fellow creature; indeed, as we have seen, he
habitually obliterates the boundaries between man and
beast and regards all animals as practically on a footing
of equality with himself.? Among the pastoral races of
Africa the men delight in attending their cattle, and spend
much time in ornamenting and adorning them; the
herdsman knows every beast in his herd, calls it by its
name, and affectionately observes all its peculiarities. Of
the Bahima, a cow tribe in Uganda, the Rev. J. Roscoe
tells us that the men form warm attachments for their
cattle ; some of them love the animals like children, pet
and coax them, talk to them, and weep over their
ailments, and should a favourite die their grief is so
extreme that it sometimes leads to suicide.” The mythical
founder of the kingdom of Uganda, Kintu, is said to have
been so humane and averse from the sight of blood, that
“even cattle killed for necessary food were slaughtered
at some distance from his dwelling.” ° But cattle are
not the only dumb creatures that excite tender feelings
in the bosom of a savage. The For tribe of Central
Africa regard it as a characteristic of a good man to be
kind to animals in general, and consider it wicked to be
otherwise.’ Concerning the Eastern Central Africans Mr.
IT SUPKa, Ue BBTe § Felkin, ‘Notes on the Waganda
2 See supra, i. 112. Tribe,’ in Proceed. Roy. Soc. Edin-
3 Supra, i. 258. burgh, xiii: 764.
4 Ratzel, Aestory of Mankind, ii. 7 Felkin, ‘Notes on the For Tribe,’
AIS. in Proceed. Roy. Soc. Edinburgh, xiii.
5 Roscoe, ‘ Bahima,’ in /oz7. Anthr. 232 Sy.
Inst. XXXVil. 94. Sy.
XLIV LOWER ANIMALS 4.95
Macdonald writes that if they appear destitute of pity,
say, for their fowls in their method of carrying them, it
is because they do not reflect that it gives them pain—“all
would admit that it was a cruel thing to pain the fowl”’ ;
and they have fables in their Janguage which show a desire
to enter minutely into the feelings of dumb creatures,
representing, for instance, fowls as reasoning on their
hard fate in being killed for their” master’s supper.’
Among the Indians of the province of Quito, according
to Juan and Ulloa, the women are so fond of their fowls
that they will not sell them, much less kill them with
their own hands ; “so that if a stranger, who is obliged
to pass the night in one of their cottages, offers ever so
much money for a fowl, they refuse to part with it, and
he finds himself under a necessity of killing the fowl
himself. At this his landlady shrieks, dissolves in tears,
and wrings her hands, as if it had been an only son; till
seeing the mischief past remedy she wipes her eyes, and
quietly takes what the traveller offers her.”? North
American Indians, again, are very fond of their hunting
dogs. Those on the west side of the Rocky Mountains
“appear to have the same affection for them that they
have for their children ; and they will discourse with
them, as if they were rational beings. They frequently
call them their sons or daughters ; and when describing
an Indian, they will speak of him as father of a particular
dog which belongs to him. When these dogs die, it is
not unusual to see their masters or mistresses place them
ona pile of wood, and burn them in the same manner as
they do the dead bodies of their relations ; and they
appear to lament their deaths, by crying and howling,
fully as much as if they were their kindred.” * So also
the natives of Australia often display much affection for
their dogs ; Mr. Gason has seen women crying over a
dog when bitten by a snake as if it had been one of their
own children, and if a puppy has lost its mother the
1 Macdonald, A/rzcana, 1. 10 sg. 3 Harmon, /ournal of Voyages zn
2 Juan and Ulloa, Voyage to South the Interior of North America, jp.
America, i. 420 sq. 335 Sg.
women suckle and nurse it.' Of the Maoris of New
Zealand we read that their extreme love of offspring “ was
also carried out to excess towards the young of brutes—
especially of their dogs, and, afterwards, of cats and pigs
introduced. Hence it was by no means an unusual sight
to see a woman carrying her child at her back, and a pet
dog, or pig, in her bosom. 22 The Geen of North-
Eastern Siberia believe that if a person is cruel to brutes
his soul will after his death migrate into some domestic
animal—a dog, a horse, or a reindeer.? Even the.
miserable Veddahs of Ceylon are said to be indignant at
the needless killing of a beast.*
On the other hand we also hear of savages who are
greatly lacking in sympathy for’ the brute creation.
Darwin says that humanity to the lower animals 1s appar-
ently unfelt by savages, except towards their pets.’
Mr. Atkinson charges the New Caledonians with great
cruelty to animals.° The Tasmanians appeared much to
enjoy the tortures of a wounded bird or beast.’ It is not
to be expected that people whose kindly feelings towards
men hardly extend beyond the borders of their own
communities should be compassionate to wild animals.
They may also appear wantonly cruel because they do not
realise the pain which they inflict. And, like children,
they may enjoy the agony of a suffering beast or bird
because it excites their curiosity.
It is obvious from what has been said above that
already at the savage stage men’s conduct towards the
lower animals must in some cases be a matter of moral
concern. For hand in hand with the altruistic sentiment
we always find the feeling of sympathetic resentment
whenever there is an occasion for its outburst. Moreover,
1 Gason, ‘ Dieyerie Tribe,’in Woods, 4 Sarasin, Ergebnisse naturwissen-
Native Tribes of South Australia, p. schaftlicher Forschungen auf Ceylon,
259. Fraser, Aborigines of New South iii. 539.
Wales, p. 5. Williams, ‘ Yircla > Darwin, Descent of Man, p.
Meening Tribe,’ in Curr, Zhe Austra- 123.
lian Race, i. 402. § Atkinson, ‘Natives of New
2 Colenso, AZaor? Races of New Caledonia,’ in Folk-Lore, xiv. 248.
Zealand, p. 43. 7 Davies, quoted by Ling Roth,
3 Ratzel, of. cet i. 231. Tasmanians, p. 66,
«cabal
GR dy LOWER ANIMALS
acts which are, or are believed to be, i injurious to the
agent, by exposing him to an animal’s revenge or other-
wise, are prohibited because they are imprudent ; and, as we
have often noticed, such prohibitions are apt to assume a
moral character. Finally, if a certain mode of conduct is
considered to be productive of public harm, as is the case
with any act or omission which reduces, or is supposed to
reduce, the supply of food or animal clothing, it is
naturally looked upon as a wrong against the community.
Similar facts have, among peoples of a higher culture,
‘led to moral rules inculcating regard for Be ys amar rit
which have often assumed a definite shape in their laws or
religious books.
According to Brahmanism tenderness towards all
creatures is a duty incumbent upon the four castes. It is
said that “‘ he who injures innoxious beings from a wish
to give himself ‘Pleasure, never finds happiness, neither
living nor dead.”* If a blow is struck against animals in
baer to give them pain, the judge shall inflict a fine in
proportion to the amount of pain caused, just as if the
blow had been struck against a man.” The killing of
various creatures, including fish and snakes, reduces the
offender to a mixed caste ;* and, according to ‘ Vishnu
Purana,’ fishermen go after death to the same hell as awaits
prisoners, incendiaries, and treacherous friends.* To kill a
cow is a great crime ;*° whereas he who unhesitatingly
abandons life for the sake of a cowis freed even from the
guilt of the murder of a Brahmana, and so is he who
saves the life of a cow.” Among many of the Hindus
the slaughter of a cow excites more horror than the
killing of a man, and is punished with great severity, even
with death.’
In Buddhism, Jainism, and Taouism the respect for
animal life is extreme. A disciple of Buddha may not
' Laws of Manu, v. 45. 1. Laws of Manu, xi. 109 sgq.
2 bid. viii. 286. 6 Laws of Manu, xi. 80.
® bid. xi. 69. 7 Barth, Relzgzons of India, p. 264.
4 Vishhu Purana, p. 208 sq.
° Tristitutes of Vishnu, ip
Gautama, xxii. 18.
VOL, Il
16 sgg.
Apastamba, i. 26.
Kipling, Beast and Man tn India, p.
118 sg. Crooke, Things Indian, p.
gl.
K K
knowingly deprive any creature of life, not even a worm
or an ant. He may not drink water in which animal life
of any kind whatever is contained, and must not even
pour it out on grass or clay.' And the doctrine which
forbids the killing of animate beings is not only professed,
but in a large measure followed, by the great majority of
people in- Buddhistic countries. In Siam the tameness of
many living creatures which in Europe fly from the
presence of man is very striking. Instances have been
known in which natives have quitted the service of
Europeans on account of their unwillingness to destroy
reptiles and vermin, and it is a not uncommon practice for
rich Siamese to buy live fish to have the merit of restoring
them to the sea.” In Burma, though fish is one of the
staple foods of the people, the fisherman is despised ; not
so much, perhaps, as if he killed other living things, but
he is still an outcast from decent society, and “will have
to suffer great and terrible punishment before he can be
cleansed from the sins that he daily commits.”* The
Buddhists of Ceylon are more forbearing : they excuse the
fisherman by saying that he does not kill the fish, but only
removes it from the water.* In Tibet all dumb
creatures are treated with humanity, and the taking of
animal life is rather strictly prohibited, except in the case
of yaks and sheep needed for food. Owing to the cold-
ness of the climate, flesh forms an essential staple of diet ;
but the butchers are regarded as professional sinners and
are therefore the most despised of all classes in Tibet.
Wild animals and even small birds and fish are seldom or
never killed, on account of the religious penalties attached
to this crime.°*
The Jain is stricter still in his regard for animal life.
He sweeps the ground before him as he goes, lest animate
things be destroyed ; he walks veiled, lest he inhale a living
organism ; he considers that the evening and night. are
1 Oldenberg, Buddha, pp. 290 n.,* People, p. 230.
351. 4 Schmidt, Ceylon, p. 316 sq.
2 Bowring, Svan, i. 107. > Waddell, Buddhism of Tibet, p.
3 Fielding Hall, Zhe Soul of a@ 567 sg.
of oes
not times for eating, since one might then swallow a live
thing by mistake ; and he rejects not only meat but even
honey, together with various fruits that are supposed to
contain worms, not because of his distaste for worms but
because of his regard for life.' Some towns in Western
India in which Jains are found have their beast hospitals,
where animals are kept and fed. At Surat there was
quite recently an establishment of this sort with a house
where a host of noxious and offensive vermin, dense as
the sands on the sea-shore, were bred and nurtured ; and at
Anjar, in Kutch, about five thousand rats were kept in a
certain temple and daily fed with flour, which was procured
by a tax on the inhabitants of the town.”
According to ‘Thai-Shang,’ one of the books of
Taouism, a good man will feel kindly towards all
creatures, and refrain from hurting even the insect tribes,
grass, and trees ; and he is a bad man who “shoots birds
and hunts beasts, unearths the burrowing insects and
frightens roosting birds, blocks up the dens of animals
and overturns nests, hurts the pregnant womb and breaks
eggs.” * In the book called ‘ Merits and Errors Scrutin-
ised,’ which enjoys great popularity in China, it is said to
be meritorious to save animals from death—even insects if
the number amounts to a hundred,—to relieve a brute
that is greatly wearied with work, to purchase and set at
liberty animals intended to be slaughtered. On the other
hand, to confine birds in a cage, to kill ten insects, to be
unsparing of the strength of tired animals, to disturb
insects in their holes, to destroy the nests of birds, without
great reason to kill and dress animals for food, are all
errors of various degrees. And “to be the foremost to
encourage the slaughter of animals, or to hinder persons
from setting them at liberty,” is regarded as an error of
the same magnitude as the crime of devising a person’s
death or of drowning or murdering a child.* Kindness
' Hopkins, elzgions of India, p. Hospital for Animals at Surat,’ in
288. Barth, of. cz¢. p. 145. Kipling, /owr. Roy. Aszatic Soc. i. 96 sq.
op. cit. p. 10 sg. 3 That-Shang, 3 sq. ha
2 Burnes, ‘Notice of a remarkable 4 Indo-Chinese Gleaner, ii). 164,
205 5g.
Km Ik 2
to animals is conspicuous in the writings of Confucius and
Mencius ;' the Master angled but did not use a net, he
shot but not at birds perching.”. Throughout Japan,
according to Sir Edward Reed, “the life of animals
has always been held more or ee sacred. . .,. neither
Shintoism nor Buddhism requiring or justifying the
taking of the life of any creature for sacrifice.” °
The ‘regard for the lower animals which is shown by
these Eastern religions and their adherents is to some
extent due to superstitious ideas, similar to those which we
found prevalent among many savages. Dr. de Groot
observes that in China the virtues of benevolence and
humanity are extended to animals because these, also, have
souls which may work vengeance or bring reward.* The
conduct of Orientals towards the brute creation has
further been explained by their belief in the transmigration
of souls. But it seems that the connection between their
theory of metempsychosis and their rules relating to the
treatment of animals is not exclusively, nor even chiefly,
one of cause and effect, but rather one of a common origin.
This theory itself may in some measure be regarded as a
result of that intimacy which prevails in the East between
animals and men. Buddhism recognises no fundamental
distinction between them, only an _ accidental or
phenomenal difference ;° and the step is not long from
this attitude to the doctrine of metempsychosis. Captain
Forbes maintains that the humanity with which the
Burmans treat dumb animals comes “more from the
innate good nature and easiness of their dispositions than
from any effect over them of this peculiar doctrine” ;° and
they laugh at the suggestion made by Europeans that
Buddhists abstain from taking life because they believe in
the transmigration of souls, having never heard of it
before. Their motive, + says Mr. Fielding Hall, is
compassion and noblesse oblige.’ But by its punishments
eeMlencius 1. 1. 7. ° Rhys Davids, Azhberd Lectures on
J bite VE ah, Ap Buddhism, p. 214.
3 Reed, Japan, 1. 61. ® Forbes, British Burma, jones
4 de Groot, Religious System of 7 Fielding Hall, of. czt. p. 237 sg.
China, (vol. iv. book) ii. 450.
ee a
— Oe. On
-and rewards, religion has greatly increased the natural
regard for animal life and welfare, and introduced a new
motive for conduct which originally sprang in the main
from kindly feeling.
In Zoroastrianism we meet with a different attitude
towards the lower animal world. A fundamental distinc-
tion is made between the animals of Ormuzd and those of
Ahriman. To kill one of the former is a heinous sin, to
kill one of the latter is a pious deed.! Sacred above all
other animals is the dog. The ill-feeding and maltreat-
ment of dogs are prosecuted as criminal, and extreme
penalties are inflicted on those who venture to kill them.”
Nay, if there be in the house of a worshipper of Mazda
a mad dog who has no scent, the worshippers of Mazda
“shall attend him to heal him, in the same manner as they
would do for one of the faithful.”* In the eyes of the
Parsis, animals are enlisted under the standards of either
Ormuzd or Ahriman according as they are useful or
hurtful to man; but M. Darmesteter is of opinion that
they originally belonged to the one or the other not on
account of any such qualities, but according as they
chanced to have lent their forms to either the god or the
fiend in the storm tales. “It was not animal psychology,”’
he says, ‘that disguised gods and fiends as dogs, otters,
hedge-hogs, and cocks, or as snakes, tortoises, frogs, and
ants, but the accidents of physical qualities and the caprice
of popular fancy, as both the god and the fiend might be
compared with, and transformed into, any object, the idea
of which was suggested by the uproar of the storm, the
blazing of the lightning, the streaming of the water, or the
hue and shape of the clouds.” * This hypothesis, however,
seems to attach undue importance to mythical fancies, and
it presupposes an almost unbounded and capricious
allegorism, for which there is apparently little foundation
1 Darmesteter, Ormazd et Ahriman,
p. 283.
2 Vendidéd, xiii. sq. Geiger,
Civilization of the Eastern Iranians,
il. 36.
3 Vendiddad, xiii. 35.
+ Darmesteter, in Sacred Books of
the East, iv. (ist edit.) p. Ixxi. sg.
See also zdem, Ormazd et Ahriman,
p. 283 sqq.
fia Js
in facts. The suggestion that the animals are referred to
either the one or the other category according as they are
useful or obnoxious to man, is at all events borne out by
a few salient features, although in many details the matter
remains obscure.
It appears that among the Zoroastrians, also, the respect
for the life of animals is partly due to superstitious ideas
about their souls and fear of their revenge. According to
the ‘ Yasts,’ “ the souls of the wild beasts and of the tame ”
are objects of worship ;' and in one of the Pahlavi texts
it is said that people should abstain from unlawfully
slaughtering any species of animals, since otherwise, in
punishment for such an act, each hair of the animal
killed becomes like a sharp dagger, and he who is unlaw-
fully a slaughterer is slain.” But here again we may
assume the co-operating influence of the feeling of sym-
pathy. Various passages in the Zoroastrian ‘ Gathas ’ which
enjoin kindness to domestic animals* suggest as their
motives not only considerations of utility but genuine
tenderness. In a later age Firdausi sang, “ Ah! spare
yon emmet rich in hoarded grain: He lives with pleasure,
and he dies with pain.’ * And of the modern Persian
Dr. Polak says that, ‘‘ naturally not cruel, he treats animals
with more consideration than men.” ’ His present religion,
too, enjoins kindness to animals as a duty.
According to Muhammedanism, beasts, birds, fish, in-
sects, are all, like man, the slaves of God, the tools of His
will. There is no intrinsic distinction between them and the
human species, except what accidental diversity God may
have been pleased to make.° Muhammed said to his
followers :—‘‘ There is not a beast upon the earth nor a
bird that flies with both its wings, but is a nation like to
you; . . . to their slord eshall® they sbeqoatmered: au
Muhammedan law prescribes that domestic animals shall
Pass, exis 54) Anniversary Discourse,’ in <Aszatich
2 Shidvast La-Shdyast, x. 8. Researches, iv. 12.
% Darmesteter, in Le Zend-Avesta. 5 Polak, Persdenm, i. 12.
1, Dacvile > Cf. Palgrave, Journey through
* Firdausi, quoted by Jones, ‘Tenth Central and Lastern Arabia, i. 368.
\ 7 Koran, vi. 38.
be treated with consideration and not be overworked ;!
and in various Muhammedan countries this law has also
been habitually put into practice. The Moslems of India
are kind to animals.’ _In his earlier intercourse with the
people of Egypt, Mr. Lane noticed much humanity to
beasts.° Montaigne said that the Turks gave alms to
brutes and had hospitals for them ;* and Mr. Bosworth
Smith is of opinion that beasts of burden and domestic
animals are nowhere in Christendom—with the one ex-
ception, perhaps, of Norway—treated with such unvarying
kindness and consideration as they are in Turkey. “In
the East,” he adds, “so far as it has not been hardened by
the West, there is a real sympathy between man and the
domestic animals ; they understand one another.” *
So also the ancient Greeks were on familiar terms with
the animal world. This appears from the frequency with
which their poets illustrate human qualities by metaphors
drawn from it. And as men were compared with animals,
so animals were believed to possess human peculiarities.
When a beast was going to be sacrificed it had to give its
consent to the act by a nod of the head before it was
killed. Animals were held in some measure responsible
for their deeds; they were tried for manslaughter,
sentenced, and executed.’ On the other hand, honours
were bestowed upon beasts which had rendered signal
services to their masters. The graves of Cimon’s mares
with which he three times conquered at the Olympic games
were still in the days of Plutarch to be seen near his own
tomb ;* anda certain Xanthippus honoured his dog by
burying it on a promontory, since then called ‘the dog’s
grave,” because when the Athenians were compelled to
abandon their city it swam by the side of his galley to
Salamis.’ According to Xenocrates, there were in existence
1 Sachau, JJuhammedanisches Recht, * Montaigne, “ssazs, ii. 11.
pp. 18, 103. 5 Bosworth Smith, Mohammed and
2 Pool, Studies in Mohammedanism, Mohammedanisn, pp. 180, 217.
pp. 176, 177; 247. Cf. Heber, Journey 8 Schmidt, Dze Ethtk der alten
through the Upper Provinces of India, Griechen, il. 96 sg.
ill, BGI 1 Supra,i. 254.
3 Lane, Aodern Egyptians, p. 8 Plutarch, Cato Major, v. 6.
2093. 9 Tbed. v. 7.
at Eleusis three laws which had been made by an ancient
legislator, namely :—‘‘ Honour your parents ; Sacrifice to
the gods from the fruits of the earth ; Injure not animals.” *
At Athens a man was punished for flaying a living ram.”
The Areopagites once condemned a boy to death because
he had picked out the eyes of some quails.* As we have
noticed before, the life of the ploughing ox was sacred ; *
and young animals in particular were believed to be under
the protection of the gods.° An ancient proverb says that
“there are Erinyes even for dogs.”® This seems to
indicate that the Greeks, also, were influenced by the
common notion that the soul of an animal may take
revenge upon him who killed it, the Erinys of the slain
animal being originally its persecuting ghost. Among the
Pythagoreans, again, the rule that animals which are not
obnoxious to the human race should be neither injured
nor killed was connected with their theory of metem-
psychosis ;* and in some cases the prohibition of slaying
useful animals may be traced to utilitarian motives.” But
both in Greece and Rome kindness to brutes was also
inculcated for their own sake, on purely humanitarian
grounds. Porphyry says that, as justice pertains to
rational beings and animals have been proved to be
possessed of reason, it is necessary that we should act
justly towards them.” He adds that “he who does not
restrict harmless conduct to man alone, but extends it to
other animals, most closely approaches to divinity ; and if
it were possible to extend it to plants, he would preserve
this image in a still greater degree.” According to
Plutarch kindness and beneficence to. creatures of every
species flow from the breast of a well-natured man as
1 Porphyry, De abstinentia ab esu 7 Jamblichus, De Pythagorica vita,
animaliui, 1V. 22. 21 (98).
2 Plutarch, De carniwm esu oratio 8 Diogenes Laertius, Vite pheloso-
ty Spill 2 phorum, viii. 2. 12 (77). Aristotle,
§ Quintilian, De tnstetateone oratoria, Rhetorica, i. 13. 2, p. 1373 b. Schmidt,
V.9- 13. op. ett. ii. 94.
SSE, “le, Be} iie ® Porphyry, of. cé?. iv. 22. Swpra,
_° Aeschylus, Agamemnon, 48 syg. ii. 331.
Xenophon, Cyegetzcaus, v. 14. 10 Porphyry, of. cz¢. iii. 18.
6 Schmidt, of. cé¢. ii. 96. NM Tbéd, iti. 28.
Ps ee
streams that issue from the living fountain. We ought
to take care of our dogs and horses not only when they
are young, but when they are old and past service. We
ought not to violate or kill anything whatsoever that has
life, unless it hurt us first.2 And if we cannot live
unblamably we should at least sin with discretion: when
we kill an animal in order to satisfy our hunger we should
do so with sorrow and. pity, without abusing and
tormenting it.° Cicero says it is a crime to injure an
animal.* And Marcus Aurelius enjoins man to make use
of brutes with a generous and liberal spirit, since he has
reason and they have not.?
In the Old Testament we meet with several instances of
kindly feeling towards animals.° God watches over and
controls the sustenance of their life. He sends springs
into the valleys which will give drink to every beast
of the field. He gives nests to the birds of the heaven,
which sing among the branches. He causes grass to
grow for the cattle; and the young lions, roaring after
their prey, seek their food from God.’ Whilst the Jews,
as Professor Toy observes, found it hard to conceive
of the God of Israel as thinking kindly of its enemies,
they had no such feeling of hostility towards beasts and
birds. But at the ‘same time man is the centre of the
creation, a being set apart from all other sentient
creatures as God’s special favourite, for whose sake
everything else was brought into existence. The sun,
the moon, and the stars were placed in the firmament of
the heaven to give light upon the estate of man.? For
his sustenance the fruits of the earth were made to grow,
and to him was given dominion over the fish of the sea,
often quoted as instances of tenderness
towards animals allow of another and
more natural interpretation. This is
especially the case with the sabbatarian
1 Plutarch, Cato Major, v. 3 sq.
2 Idem, Questiones Romane, 75.
3 Idem, De carniwm esu oratio LI,
thy 3 es]
4 Cicero, De republica, iil. II. injunctions referring to domestic
5 Marcus Aurelius, Commentariz, animals.
vi. 23.
6 See Bertholet, Dze Stellung der
Tsvaeliten 2 den Fremden, p. 14.
Various passages, however, which are
7 Psalms, civ. 10-12, 14, 17, 21.
5 Toy, Judaism and Christianity,
p. 81.
9 Genesis, i. 16 sq.
and over the fowl of the air, and over every living thing
that moves upon the earth.’ And when the earth is to be
replenished after the deluge, the same privileges are again
granted to him. ‘The fear of man and the dread of man
shall be upon all living creatures, into his hand are they
all delivered, they shall all be meat for him.’ And they are
given over to his supreme and. irresponsible control
without the slightest injunction of kindness or the
faintest suggestion of any duties towards them. They
are to be regarded by him simply as food.’
Among the Hebrews the harshness of this anthro-
pocentric doctrine was somewhat mitigated by the sympathy
which a simple pastoral and agricultural people naturally
feels for its domestic animals. In Christianity, on the
other hand, it was further strengthened by the exclusive
importance which was attached to the spiritual salvation
of man. He was now more than ever separated from
the rest of sentient beings. Even his own animal nature
was regarded with contempt, the immortality of his soul
being the only object of religious interest. ‘It would
seem,” says Dr. Arnold, “as if the primitive Christian, by
laying so much stress upon a future life in contradistinction
to this life, and placing the lower creatures out of the pale
of hope, placed them at the same time out of the pale of
sympathy, and thus laid the foundation for this utter dis-
regard of animals in the light of our fellow-creatures.” 4
St. Paul asks with scorn, ‘Doth God take care for oxen?’”’®
No creed in Christendom teaches kindness to animals as a
dogma of religion.® In the Middle Ages various councils
of the Church declared pe unlawful for the clergy”
but the obvious reason for this prohibition was its horror
of bloodshed,* not any consideration for the animals.
1 Genesis, i. 28. killmg of animals (Baur, Das AZanz-
ED icd aie. 25 chééische Religionssystem, p. 252 sqq.) 3
3 Cf. Evans, ‘Ethical Relations but Manichaeism did not originate on
between Man and Beast,’ in Popular Christian ground (Harnack, ‘ Manichze-
Science Monthly, x\v. 637 sq. ism,’ in Lxcyclopedia Britannica, xv.
4 Arnold, quoted by Evans, in 485 ; Supra, il. 312).
Popular Science Monthly, xv. 639. 7 Le Grand @Aussy, Héstocre de la
® 1 Corinthians, 1x. 9. vie privée des Frangots, i. 394 sq.
6 The Manicheeans prohibited all 8 Supra, i. 381 sg.
Mr. Mauleverer in Sir Arthur Helps’ ‘Talk about
Animals and their Masters,’ says, “Upon a moderate
calculation, I think I have heard, in my time, 1320
sermons ; and I do not recollect that i in any one of them
I ever heard the slightest allusion made to the conduct of
men towards animals.”’ Nor is there any such allusion
in most treatises on Ethics which base their teachings
upon distinctly Christian tenets. The kindest words,
I think, which from a Christian point of view have been
said about animals have generally come from Protestant
sectariang, Quakers and Methodists,? whereas Roman
Catholic writers—with a few exceptions *—, when they deal
with the subject at all, chiefly take pains to show that
animals are entirely destitute of rights. Brute beasts, says
Father Rickaby, cannot have any rights for the reason that
they have no understanding and therefore are not
persons. We have no duties of any kind to them, as
neither to stocks and stones ; we only have duties about
them. We must not harm them when they are our
neighbour’s property, we must not vex and annoy them
for spert, because it disposes him who does so to
inhumanity towards his own species. But there is no
shadow of evil resting on the practice of causing pain
to brutes im sport, where the pain is not the sport itself,
but an incidental concomitant of it. Much more in all
that conduces to the sustenance of man may we give pain
to animals, and we are not “ bound to any anxious care
to make this pain as little as may be. Brutes are as shings
in our regard: so far as they are useful to us, they
exist for us, not for themselves ; and we do right in
using them unsparingly for our need and convenience,
though not for our wantonness.”* According to Woother
.
1 Helps, Some Talk about Animals 490 syg.; Chalmers, ‘Cruelty to
and their Masters, p. 20. Cf. Mrs. Animals,’ in Methodist Magazine (New
Jameson, Common-Place Book of York), ix. 259 sqg.
Thoughts, p. 212. ®’ See de la Roche-Fontenelles,
2 See Gurney, Veews and Practices L’ Lglise et la pitié envers les animaux,
of the Society of Friends, p. 392 sg. n. passim. :
8; Richmond, ‘Sermon on the Sin of 4 Rickaby, Moral Philosophy, yp.
Cruelty to the Brute Creation,’ in 248 sgg. See also Addis and Arnold,
Methodist Magazine (London), xxx. Catholic Dictionary, p. 33; Clarke,
$10 REGARD FOR THE CHAP.
by those of a refined taste.' As late as 1824 Sir Robert
(then Mr.) Peel argued strongly against the legal prohibi-
tion of bull-baiting.’
About two years previously, however, humanity to
animals had, for the first time, become a subject of English
legislation by the Act which prevented cruel and improper
treatment of cattle. This Act was afterwards followed by
others which prohibited bear-baiting, cock-fighting, and
similar pastimes, as also cruelty to domestic animals in
general. In 1876 vivisection for medical or scientific
purposes was subjected to a variety of restrictions, and
since 1900 cases of ill-treatment of wild animals in
captivity may be dealt with under the Wild Animals in
Captivity Protection Act.* On the Continent cruelty to
animals was first prohibited by criminal law in Saxony, in
1838,’ and subsequently in most other European states.
But in the South of Europe there are still countries in
which the law is entirely silent on the subject.°
Whatever be the professed motives of legislators for
preventing cruelty to animals, there can be no doubt
that the laws against it are chiefly due toa keener and
more generally felt sympathy with their sufferings. The
actual feelings of men have commonly been somewhat
more tender than the theories-of law, philosophy, and
religion. The anthropocentric exclusiveness of Christianity
was from ancient times to some extent counterbalanced by
popular sentiments and beliefs. In the folk-tales of
Europe man is not placed in an isolated and unique
position in the universe. He lives in intimate and
friendly intercourse with the animals round him, attributes
to them human qualities, and regards them with mercy.’
Tender feelings towards the brute creation are also displayed
in many legends of saints.*
' Kames, Zssays on the Principles of
Morality, p. 7.
2 Hansard, Parliamentary Debates,
New Series, x. 491 sqq.
3 Statutes of Great
Treland, \xil. 403 sqq.
+ Stephen, Vew Commentaries on the
Britain and
St. Francis of Assisi talked
Laws of England, iv. 213 sqq.
> von Hippel, of. czt. p. 1.
8 Jbid. p. 90 sg.
" Supra, i. 259. Schwarz, Prahds-
torisch-anthropologische Studien, p. 203.
* Lecky, istory of European
Morals, ii. 168 sgg. Joyce, Social
XLIV LOWER ~ ANIMALS eia
with the birds and called them “ brother birds” or “ little
sister swallows,’ and was seen employed in removing
worms from the road that they might not be trampled
by travellers." John Moschus speaks of a certain abbot
who early in the morning not only used to give food to
all the dogs in the monastery, but would bring corn to the
ants and to the birds on the roof.? In the ‘ Revelations
of St. Bridget’ we read, “Let a man fear, above all, me,
his God, and so much the gentler will he become towards
my creatures and animals, on whom, on account of me,
their Creator, he ought to have compassion.” * Many
kind words about animals have come from poets and
thinkers. Montaigne says that he has never been able to
see without affliction an innocent beast, which is without
defence and from which we receive no offence, pursued
and killed. Shakespeare points out that “ the poor beetle
that we tread upon, in corporal sufferance finds a pang as
great as when a giant dies.’’® Mandeville thinks that if
it was not for that tyranny which custom usurps over us,
no men of any tolerable good-nature could ever be
reconciled to the killing of so many animals for their
daily food, as long as the bountiful earth so plentifully
provides them with varieties of vegetable dainties.”
Towards the end of the eighteenth century Bentham
wrote :—‘*‘ Men must be permitted to kill animals ; but
they should be forbidden to torment them. Artificial death
may be rendered less painful than natural death by simple
processes, well worth the trouble of being studied, and of
becoming an object of police. Why should the law
refuse its protection to any sensitive being? A time
will come when humanity will spread its mantle over
everything that breathes. The lot of slaves has begun to
History of Ancient Ireland, i. 2 St Bridget, “quoted by Helps;
Smsae op. cit. Pp. 124.
1 Sabatier, ZLzfe of St. Francis of 4 Montaigne, Zssazs, i. 11.
Assist, p. 176 sg. Digby, Mores ® Shakespeare, JZeasure for Measure,
Catholict, il. 291. mnt Ne
2 Moschus, Pratum speritwale, 184 6 Mandeville, Hable of the Bees, p.
(Migne, Patrologie cursus, Ser. Graeca, 187.
Ixxxvii. 3056).
1) REGARD FOR THE CHAP.
excite pity ; we shall end by. softening the lot of the
animals which labour for us and supply our wants.’’* Some
years later Thomas Young pronounced hunting, shooting,
and fishing for sport to be “ unlawful, cruel, and sinful.”’?
And in the course of the nineteenth century humanity to
animals, from being conspicuous in a few individuals
only, became the keynote of a movement gradually
increasing in strength. Humanitarians, says Mr. Salt,
“insist that the difference between human and non-human
is one of degree only and not of kind, and that we owe -
duties, the same in kind though not in degree, to all our
sentient fellow-beings.” ® Some people maintain that it
is wrong to kill animals for food or in sport; but the
most vigorous attacks concerning the treatment of the
brute creation are at present directed against the practice
of vivisection. The claim is made that this practice should
be, not merely restricted, but entirely prohibited by law.
And while the antivivisectionists generally endeavour to
deny or minimise the scientific importance of experiments
on living animals, their cry for the abolition of such
experiments is mainly based on the argument that
humanity at large has no right to purchase relief from its
own suffering by torturing helpless brutes.
This rapidly increasing- sympathy with animal suffering
is no doubt to a considerable extent due to the decline of
the anthropocentric doctrine and the influence of another
theory, which regards man, not as an image of the deity
separated from the lower animals by a special act of creation,
but as a being generally akin to them, and only representing
a higher stage in the scale of mental evolution. Through
this doctrine the orthodox contempt for dumb creatures
was succeeded by feelings of affinity and kindly interest.
But apart from any theory as regards human origins,
growing reflection has also taught men to be more
considerate in their treatment of animals by producing a
more vivid idea of their sufferings. Human thought-
1 Bentham, Theory of Levislation, 2 Young wop: cet. Pp. 75) S¢s
p-. 428 sg. 3 Salt, Animals’ Rights, p. v.
as ae 7
-
less has been responsible for much needless pain to
which they have been made subject. In spite of some
improvement it is so still; whilst, at the same time, the
movement advocating greater humanity to animals is
itself not altogether free from inconsistencies and a
certain lack of discrimination.
It has been observed that the Neapolitan would not
act so cruelly as he does to~almost all animals
except the cat if he could bring himself to conceive
their capacity for joy and pain.t So also we ourselves
should often behave differently if we realised the tortures
we thoughtlessly cause to creatures whose sufferings
escape our notice from want of obvious outward expres-
sion. While the practice of whipping young pigs to
death to make them tender, which occurred in England
not much more than a century ago,’ would nowadays be
regarded with general horror, cruelties inflicted for
gastronomic purposes upon creatures of a lower type are
little thought of. Cray-fish, oysters, and fish in general,
as Mandeville observed, excite hardly any compassion at all,
because “they express themselves unintelligibly to us ;
they are mute, and their inward formation, as well as
outward figure, vastly different from ours.”* On the
_ other hand, even passionate sportsmen describe the
hunting of monkeys as repulsive on account of their
resemblance to man; Rajah Brooke thought it almost
barbarous to kill an orang-utan, unless for the sake of
scientific research.* Buddhism itself declares that “ he
who takes away the life of a large animal will have greater de-
merit than he who takes away the life of a small one... . The
crime is not great when an ant is killed ; its magnitude in-
creases in this progression—a lizard, a guana, a hare, a deer,
a bull, a horse, and an elephant.” How little the feelings
which underlie men’s opinions concerning conduct towards
1 <Cruelty to Animals in Naples,’ i. 100. Cf Rengger, Waturgeschichte
in Saturday Review, lix. 854. der Stiugethtere von Paraguay, jp.
2 The World, 1756, nr. 190, p. 1142. 26.
Young, of. cz¢, p. 129. é 5 Hardy, Manual of Budhism, pp.
3 Mandeville, of. czt. p. 187. 478, 480.
4 Brooke, Zen Vears in Sarawak,
VOL. II Mb IE
‘et (ae
Ip
the lower animals are influenced by reflection is also
apparent in the present crusade against vivisection, when
compared with the public indifference to the sufferings
inflicted on wild animals in sport. The vivisector who in
cold blood torments his helpless victim in the interest of
science and for the benefit of mankind is called a coward,
and is a much more common object of hatred than ‘the
sportsman who causes agonies to the creature he pursues
for sheer amusement. ‘The pursued animal, it is argued,
has “free chances of escape.’”’? This*is an excellent
argument—provided we share the North American
Indian’s conviction that an animal can never be killed
without its own permission.
At present there is among ourselves no topic of moral
concern which presents a greater variety of opinion than
the question how far the happiness of the lower animals
may be justly sacrificed for the benefit of man. The
extreme views on this subject might, no doubt, be
somewhat modified, on the one.hand by a more vivid
representation of animal suffering, on the other hand by
the recognition of certain facts, often overlooked, which
make it unreasonable to regard conduct towards dumb
creatures in exactly the same light as conduct towards
men. It should especially be remembered that the
former have none of those long-protracted anticipations of
future misery or death which we have.’ If they are
destined to serve as meat they are not aware of it;
whereas many domestic animals would never have come
into existence, and been able to enjoy what appears a very
happy lite, but for the purpose of being used as food.
But though greater intellectual discrimination may
somewhat lessen the divergencies of moral opinion on the
subject, nothing like unanimity can be expected, for the
simple reason that moral judgments are ultimately based
upon emotions, and sympathy with the animal world is
a feeling which varies extremely in different individuals.
1 Cobbe, of. cz¢. p. 10. Prigciples of Morals and Legislation,
2 Cf. Bentham, Zntroduction to the p. 311, n.
emp eth Mgr
ee ee
sas indienne
THE BELIEF IN SUPERNATURAL BEINGS
WE now come to the last of those six groups of moral
ideas into which we have divided our subject—ideas con-
cerning conduct towards beings, real or imaginary, that
are regarded as supernatural. But before we enter upon
a discussion of human behaviour in relation to such beings,
it is necessary to say some words about man’s belief in
their existence and the general qualities attributed to
them.
Men distinguish between two classes of phenomena—
“ natural” and “ supernatural,” ' between phenomena which
they are familiar with and, in consequence, ascribe to
“natural causes,’ and other phenomena which seem to
them unfamiliar, mysterious, and are therefore supposed to
spring from causes of a “supernatural” character. We
meet with this distinction at the lowest stages of culture
known to us, as well as at higher stages. It may be that
in the mind of a savage the natural and supernatural are
often confused, and that no definite limit can be drawn
between the phenomena which he refers to the one class
and those which he refers to the other ; but he certainly
sees a difference between events of everyday occurrence
or ordinary objects of nature and other events or objects
which fill him with mysterious awe. The germ of sucha
' T do not share the objections raised to the word ‘superhuman,” when
by various writers to the term ‘‘super- applied to inanimate things or animals
natural.” It has the sanction of com-
which are objects of worship.
mon usage; and I consider it preferable
distinction is found even in the lower animal world. The
horse fears the whip but it does not make him shy ; on
the other hand, he may shy when he sees an umbrella
opened before him or a paper moving on the ground.
The whip is well known to the horse, whereas the moving
paper or umbrella is strange and uncanny. Dogs and
cats are alarmed by an unusual noise or appearance, and
remain uneasy till they have by examination satisfied
themselves of the nature of its cause.! Professor Romanes
frightened a dog by attaching a fine thread to a bone and
surreptitiously drawing it from the animal, giving to the
bone the appearance of self-movement; and the same
dog was frightened by soap-bubbles.*. Even a lion is
scared by an unexpected noise or the sight of an un-
familiar object; a horse, the lion’s favourite prey, has
been known to wander for days in the vicinity of a troop
of these animals and be left unmolested simply because it
was blanketed and knee-haltered.2 And we are told of a
tiger which stood trembling and roaring in an ecstasy of fear
when a mouse tied by a string toa stick had been inserted
into its cage.* Little children are apt to be terrified by
the strange and irregular behaviour of a feather as it
glides along the floor or lifts itself into the air.”
But the primitive mind not only distinguishes between
the natural and the supernatural, it makes, practically, yet
a further distinction. The supernatural, like the natural,
may be looked upon in the light of mechanical energy,
which discharges itself without the aid of any volitional
activity. This is, for instance, the case with the super-
natural force inherent in a tabooed object ; mere contact
with such an object communicates the taboo infection.
So also the baneful energy in a curse is originally con-
ceived as a kind of supernatural miasma, which injures
or destroys anybody to whom it cleaves; in fact, to
1 Morgan, Animal Life and Intelli- 4 Basil Hall, quoted zdzd. p. 81. See
gence, p. 339. also z6zd. p. 78 sgg. 3 Vignioli, AZyth
2 Romanes, Anzmal Intelligence, p. and Sctence, p. 58 sqq.
455 5g. > Sully, Stadies of Childhood, p. 205
3 Gillmore, quoted by King, Zhe — sq.
Supernatural, p. 80.
taboo a certain thing commonly consists in charging it
with a curse. On the other hand, supernatural qualities
may also be attributed to the mental constitution of
animate beings, especially to their will. Such an attribu-
tion makes them supernatural beings, as distinct from any
ordinary individuals who, without being endowed with
special miraculous gifts, may make use of supernatural
mechanical energy in magical practices. This distinction is
in many cases vague ; a wizard may be looked upon as a
god and a god as a wizard. But it is nevertheless essen-
tial, and lies at the bottom of the difference between
religion and magic. Religion may be defined as a belief
in and a regardful' attitude towards a supernatural being
on whom man feels himself dependent and to whose will
he makes an appeal in his worship. Supernatural me-
chanical power, on the other hand, is applied in magic.
He who performs a purely magical act utilises such power
without making any appeal at all to the will of a super-
natural being.
This, I think, 1s what we generally understand by
religion and magic. But in the Latin word religio there
seems to be no indication of such a distinction. KRe/igio
is probably related to re/igare, which means “to tie.” It
is commonly assumed that -the relationship between these
words implies that in religion man was supposed to be tied
by his god. But I venture to believe that the connection
between them allows of another and more natural interpre-
tation—that it was not the man who was tied by the god,
but the god who was tied by the man. This interpretation
was suggested to me by certain ideas and practices pre-
valent in Morocco. ‘The Moors are in the habit of tying
rags to objects belonging to a szyid, that is, a place where
a saint has, or is supposed to have, his tomb, or where
such a person is said to have sat or camped. In very
many cases, at least, this tying of rags is ‘ér upon the
1 Though somewhat indefinite, the call it religion when a savage flogs his
epithet ‘‘regardful” seems a necessary fetish to make it submissive,
attribute of a religiousact, We do not
ila agate aria dy rameaiadal
te
SUPERNATURAL BEINGS
saint, and /‘dr implies the transference of a conditional
curse.! Thus, in the Great Atlas Mountains I found a
large number of rags tied to a pole which was stuck in a
cairn dedicated to the great saint Mulai ‘Abd-til-Kader,
and when I asked for an explanation the answer was that
petitioners generally fasten a strip of their clothes to the
pole muttering some words like these :—‘“‘O saint, behold !
I promised thee an offering, and | will not release (literally
‘open’) thee until thou attendest to my business.” If
the petitioner’s wish is fulfilled he goes back to the place,
offers the sacrifice which he promised, and unties the knot
which he made. A Berber servant of mine from Aglu in
Stis told me that once when in prison he invoked Lalla
Rah’ma Yusf, a great female saint whose tomb is in a
neighbouring district, and tied his turban, saying, “1 am
tying thee, Lalla Rih’ma Yusf, and I am not going to
open the knot till thou hast helped me.” Or a person in
distress will go to her grave and knot the leaves of some
palmetto growing in its vicinity, with the words, “I tied
thee here, O saint, and I shall not release thee unless thou
releasest me from the toils in which I am at present.”
All this is what we should call magic, but the Romans
would probably have called it re/igio. They were much
more addicted to magic than to true religion ; they wanted
to compel the gods rather than to be compelled by them.
Their religio was probably nearly akin to the Greek
xatddecuos, Which meant not only an ordinary tie, but also
a magic tie or knot or a bewitching thereby.” Plato
speaks of persons who with magical arts and incantations
bound the gods, as they said, to execute their will. That
religio, however, from having originally a magical signifi-
cance, has come to be used in the sense which we attribute
1 See Westermarck, ‘ Z-‘dr, or the
Transference of Conditional Curses in
Morocco,’ in Azthropological Essays
presented to E. B. Tylor, p. 361 sgq.
2 TI am indebted to my friend Mr.
R. R. Marett for drawing my attention
to this meaning of the word karddecpos.
So also the verb karadém means not
only ‘‘to tie” but “‘ to bind by magic
knots” (Athenaeus, Detpnosophiste, xv.
9, p. 670; Dio Cassius, Mestoria
Romana, \. 5), and caradeots is used to
denote ‘‘a binding by magic knots ”
(Plato, Zeges, xi. 933). See Liddell-
Scott, Greek-English Lexicon, p. 7543
Harrison, Prolegomena to the Study of
Greek Religion, p. 138 sqq.
3 Plato, Respublica, ii. 364.
THE BELIEF IN
to the term “religion,” is not difficult to explain. Men
make use of magic not only in relation to their fellow
men, but in relation to their gods. Magical and religious
elements are often almost inseparably intermingled in one
and the same act ; and, as we shall soon see, the magical
means of constraining a god are often externally very
similar to the chief forms of religious worship, prayer
and sacrifice.
That mystery is the essential characteristic of super-
natural beings is proved by innumerable facts. It is
testified by language. The most prominent belief
in the religion of the North American Indians was
their theory of manitou, that is, of “a spiritual and
mysterious power thought to reside in some material
form.” ‘The word is Algonkin, but all the tribes had
some equivalent for it.' Thus the Dacotahs express the
essential attribute of their deities by the term wakan,
which signifies anything which they cannot comprehend,
“whatever is wonderful, mysterious, superhuman, or
supernatural.”* The Navaho word digi’n likewise means
“sacred, divine, mysterious, or holy” ;* and so does
the Hidatsa term mahopa.* In Fiji “the native word
expressive of divinity is ka/ou, which, while used to denote
the people’s highest notion of a god, is also constantly
heard as a qualification of anything great or marvellous.” ®
The Maoris of New Zealand applied the word atua,
which is generally translated as “ god,” not only to spirits
of every description, but to various phenomena not under-
stood, such as menstruation.and foreign marvels, a compass,
for instance, or a barometer.® The natives of Madagascar,
1 Dorman, Origin of Primitive 3 Matthews, Vavaho Legends, p. 37.
Superstitions, p. 226. Parkman, /eszz¢s 4 Idem, Hidatsa Indians, p. 47 sq.
in North America, p. \xxix. Brinton, > Williams and Calvert, /%72, p. 183.
Religions of Primitive Peoples, p. 102. 6 Best, ‘Lore of the Whare-Ko-
Hoffman, ‘ Menomini Indians,’ in 47272.
Rep. Bur. Hthn. xiv. 39, 0. 1.
hanga,’ in Jour. Polynesian Soc. xiv.
210. Dieffenbach, 7ravels tn New
2 Schooleraft, Archives of Aboriginal
Knowledge, iv. 642. Dorsey, ‘ Siouan
Cults,’ in Ann. Rep. Bur. Ethn. xi.
366. McGee, ‘Siouan Indians,’ zdzd.
xv. 182 sg.
Zealand, ii. 116, 118. The word tupua
(or 4¢2fwa) is used in a very similar way
(Tregear, Maort-Polynesian Compara-
tive Dictionary, p. 557).
says Ellis, designate by the term ndriamanitra, or god,
everything that exceeds the capacity of their under-
standing. ‘‘ Whatever is new and useful and extraordinary,
is called god. . Rice, money, thunder and lightning,
and earthquakes, are-alltcalledy pods ie) J aratasy, Or
book, they call god, from its “wonderfil capacity of
speaking by merely looking at it.” The Monbuttu use
the word kilima for anything ae do not understand—
the thunder, a shadow, the reflection in water, as well as the
supreme being in which they vaguely believe.? The Masai
conception of the deity (wgd7), says Dr. Thomson, ‘seems
to be marvellously vague. I was Ngai. My language
was Nedi. Ngai was in the steaming holes. . . . In fact,
whatever struck them as strange or incomprehensible,
that they at once assumed had some connection with
Negai.”* Mr. and Mrs. Hinde use “the Unknown”? as
their equivalent of the word ngdi.*
The testimony of language is corroborated by kindred
facts referring to the nature of those objects which are
most commonly worshipped.’ Among all the American
tribes, says Mr. Dorman, “any remarkable features in
natural scenery or dangerous places became objects of
superstitious dread and veneration, because they were
supposed to be abodes of gods.”°® A great cataract, a
difficult and dangerous ford in a river, a spring bubbling
up from the ground, a volcano, a high mountain, an
isolated rock, a curious or unusually large tree; the eens
of the raeodon or of some other immense animal_—all
were looked upon by the Indians with superstitious respect
1 Ellis, Aestory of Madagascar, i. between Siam and Annam). In Lord
390 sgq. Kames’s Essays on the Principles of
2 Burrows, Land of the Pigmies, p. Morality and Religion there is (p. 309
100. Sgq-) an interesting discussion on the
3 Thomson, 7hrough Masai Land,p. dread of unknown objects.
260. § Dorman, of. cit. p. 300. See also
4 Hinde, Last of the Masaz, p. 99. Miiller, Geschichte der Amerikant-
5 See, besides the instances referred schen Urreligionen, i. 52; Harmon,
to below, Karsten, Origzn of Worship, Voyages and Travels in the Interior of
p- 14 sgg.; von Brenner, Besuch bec North America, p. 363 sg.; Smith,
den Kannibaten Sumatras, p. 220 ‘Myths of the Iroquois,’ in Axx. Rep.
(Bataks); AZzttecl. d. Geog’ oraph. Ge- Bur. Hthn. ii. 51.
sellsch. zu Jena, iii. 14 (Bannavs,
or were propitiated by offerings.’ In Fiji “every object
that is specially fearful, or vicious, or injurious, or novel,”
is eligible for admission to the native Pantheon? It is
said that when the Aétas of the Philippines saw the first
locomotive passing through their country “ they all fell
upon their knees in abject terror, worshipping the strange
monster as some new and powerful deity.”* Of the
shamanistic peoples in Siberia Georgi writes, “ All the
celestial bodies, and all terrestrial objects of a considerable
magnitude, all the phenomena of nature that can do good
or harm, every appearance capable of conveying terror
into a weak and superstitious mind, are so many gods to
whom they direct a particular adoration.” * Among the
Samoyedes ‘a curiously twisted tree, a stone with an
uncommon shape would receive, and in some quarters
still receives, not only veneration but actual ceremonial
worship.” ° Castrén states that the Ostyaks worshipped no
other objects of nature but such as were very unusual and
peculiar either in shape or quality.” The Lapps made
offerings not only to large and strange-looking objects,
but to places which were difficult to pass, or where some
accident had occurred, or where they had been either
exceptionally unlucky or exceptionally lucky in fishing or
the chase." The Ainu of Japan deify all objects and
phenomena which seem to them extraordinary or dreadful.®
In China “a steep mountain, or any mountain at all
remarkable, is supposed to have a special local spirit, who
acts as guardian.”* The average middle-class Hindu,
according to Sir Alfred Lyall, worships stocks or stones
which are unusual or grotesque in size, shape, or position 3 or
— fli
i }
1 Dorman, of. czt. pp. 279, 290, 291,
302, 303, 308, 313-315, 319. Chamber-
lain, in Jour. Amerecan Folk-Lore, i.
157 (Mississagua Indians). Georgi,
Russia, iii. 237 sg. (Aleuts.)
2 Williams and Calvert, of. cet. p.
183.
3 Lala, Phzlippine Islands, p. 96.
4 Georgi, of. cet. ill. 256.
5 Jackson, in four. <Anthr. Inst.
xxiv. 398. Cf Castrén, Vordiska resor
och forskning ar, ili, 230.
6 Castrén, of. ct. ill. 227.
7 [bid. iii, 210. Hogstrém, Beskrif-
ning ofver de til Sveriges Krona
lydande Lapmarker, p. 182. Leem,
Beskrivelse over Finmarkens Lapper,
Pp. 442 sg. Friis, Lappesk AZythologe, p.
133 59.
8 Sugamata, quoted in ZL’ Anthro-
pologie, x. 98.
9 Edkins, Religion 7x China, p. 221.
of
¥
hap a See A
Prive tert
inanimate things which are gifted with mysterious motion ;
or animals which he fears ; or visible things, animate or
inanimate, which are directly or indirectly useful and
profitable or which possess any incomprehensible function
or property.’ From all parts of Africa we hear of similar
cults.” The Negroes of Sierra Leone dedicate to their
spirits places which “inspire the spectator with awe, or
are remarkable for their appearance, as immensely large
trees rendered venerable by age, rocks appearing in the
midst of rivers, and having something peculiar in their
form, in short, whatever appears to them strange or un-
common.” * When Tshi-speaking natives of the Gold
Coast take up their abode near any remarkable natural
feature or object, they worship and seek to propitiate its
indwelling spirit; whereas they do not worship any of
the heavenly bodies, the regularity of whose appearance
makes little impression upon their minds.* Through-
out East Africa the people seem to attach religious sanctity
to anything of extraordinary size; in the island of
Zanzibar, where the hills are low, they reverence the
baobab tree, which is the largest growing there, and in all
parts of the country where hills are not found they
worship some great stone or tall tree.” In Morocco places
of striking appearance are generally supposed to be haunted
by jun (jinn) or are associated with some dead saint. As
I have elsewhere tried to show, the Arabic jinn were
probably “ beings invented to explain what seems to fall
outside the ordinary pale of nature, the wonderful and
unexpected, the superstitious imaginations of men who
fear” ;° and the saint was in many cases only the
successor of the zzz. Indeed, the superstitious dread of
unusual objects is not altogether dead even among our-
1 Lyall, Astatic Studies, p. 7. 4 Ellis, Voruba-speaking Peoples of
2 Wilson, Western Africa, p. 388 the Slave Coast, p. 282. Ldem, Tshi-
(Mpongwe). Mockler-Ferryman, speaking Peoples of the Gold Coast, p.
British Nigerta, p. 255. Fritsch, 21.
Die LEingeborenen Siid-Afrika’s, p. > Chanler, Zhvrough Jungle and
340 (Hottentots). Desert, p. 188.
? Winterbottom, Watzve Africans in .° Westermarck, ‘ Nature of the Arab
the Neighbourhood of Sierra Leone,i. Ginn,’ in Jour. Anthr. Inst. xxix,
223 268.
selves. It survives in England to this day in the habit of
ascribing grotesque and striking landmarks or puzzling
antiquities to the Devil, who became the residuary legatee
of obsolete pagan superstitions in Christian countries.!
‘The common prevalence of animal worship is no doubt
due to the mysteriousness of the animal world ; the most
uncanny of all creatures, the serpent, is also the one most
generally worshipped. ‘Throughout India we meet with
the veneration of animals which by their appearance or
habits startle human beings.” In the Indian tribes of
North America animals of an unusual size were objects of
some kind of adoration.® In certain parts of Africa a cock
crowing in the evening or a crane alighting on a house-top
is regarded as supernatural.* White men have often
been taken for spirits by red, yellow, or black savages,
when seen by them for the free time.’ Religious venera-
tion is among various races bestowed on persons suffering
from some abnormality, such as deformity, albinoism, or
madness.° Some South American Indians “ regard as
divinities all phenomenal children, principally such as are
born with a larger number of fingers or toes than is
natural.” The Hindus venerate persons remarkable for
any extraordinary qualities—great valour, virtue, or even
vice.* By performing miracles men directly prove that
they are supernatural beings. [he Muhammedan saints,
like the Christian in olden days, are believed to perform all
kinds of wonders, such as flying in the air, passing unhurt
1 Lyall, of. cet. p. 9.
EN Crd pals:
3 Dorman, of. czt. p..258. Harmon,
op. ctt. p. 304.
+ Macdonald,
» 39:
> Avebury, Origin of Czvilisation,
pp: 272, 273, 375. Goblet d’Alviella,
Hibbert Lectures on the Origin and
Growth of the Conception of God, p. 67.
Schultze, /eteschismus, p. 224. In
Australia and elsewhere white people
were taken for ghosts by the natives
(Fison and Howitt, Aamdzlaro? and
Kurnat, p. 248 ; Brough Smyth, 4do77-
gines of Victoria, il. 269 sg.; Tylor,
Religion and Myth,
es emitive Culture, i. 5 SG. 5 Spencer,
Principles of Soctology, i. 170 sq.).
6 Schultze, of. ce#. p. 222. Supra,
1.270 sg. ‘‘ Among many savage or
barbarous peoples of the world albinos
have been reserved for the priestly
office ” (Bourke, ‘ Medicine-Men of the
Apache,’ in Anz. Rep. Bur. Ethn. ix.
460).
7 Guinnard, Three Years’
among the Patagonians, p. 144.
8 Monier - Williams, Srahmanism
and Hindiism, p. 350. For criminal-
worship in Sicily, see Peacock, ‘ Exe-
cuted Criminals and Folk-Medicine,’ in
folk-Lore, Vii. 275.
Slavery
through fire, walking upon water, transporting themselves
in a moment of time to immense distances, or supporting
themselves and others with food in desert places... When
Muhammed first claimed to bethe Prophet of Allah, he
was urged to give proof of his calling by working some
miracle ; and though he uniformly denied that he possessed
such power, it was nevertheless ascribed to him even by his
contemporaries.”
The dead are objects of worship much more
commonly than are the living. Whilst the human
individual consisting of body and soul is as a rule well-
known, the disembodied soul, seen only in dreams or
visions, is a mysterious being which inspires the survivors
withawe. Mr. Spencerand Mr.Grant Allen even regard the
worship of the dead as “ the root of every religion.”’* But
this is to carry the ghost theory to an extreme for which
there is no justification in facts. The spirits of the dead
are worshipped because they are held capable of influencing,
in a mysterious manner, the welfare of the living ; but
there is no reason to assume that they were originally con-
ceived as the only supernatural agents existing. We have
noticed that even the lower animals show signs of the
same feeling as underlies the belief in supernatural beings ;
and we can hardly suppose that they are believers in
chosts.
On account of their wonderful effects medicines,
intoxicants, and stimulants, are frequently objects of
veneration. Most of the plants for which the American
Indians had superstitious feelings were such as have
medical qualities ;* tobacco was generally held sacred by
them,° and so was cocoa in Peru.’ The Vedic deification
1 Lane, Arabian Society in the git. Grant Allen, Zhe Evolution of
Middle Ages, p. 49. Westermarck, ‘he /dea of God, pp. 91, 433, 438, &c.
‘Sul culto dei santi nel Marocco,’ 4 Dorman, of. c7t. p. 298 sg. Dorsey,
in Actes du XII. Congrés International ‘Siouan Cults,’ in Ann. Rep. Bur.
des Ortentalistes, il. 153 59g. Ethn, xi. 428.
2 Muir, Lzfe of Mahomet, i. p. Ixv. 5 Mooney, ‘ Myths of the Cherokee,’
sq. Bosworth Smith, Mohammed and in Ann, Rep. Bur. Ethn. xix. 439.
Mohammedanism, p. 19. Sell, Hazth Dorman, of. czz. p. 295.
of Islim, p. 218. ® Dorman, of. c7t. p. 295.
2 Spencer, Principles of Soctology, i.
592 TH Ee BERIT S IN CHAP,
of the drink soma was due to its exhilarating and invigor-
ating effects.’
Among all the phenomena of nature none is more
wonderful, impressive, awe- inspiring than thunder, and
none seems morexgenerally to have given rise to religious
veneration. But with growing reflection man finds a
mystery even in events of daily occurrence. The Vedic
poet, when he sees the sun moving freely through the
heavens, asks how it comes that it does not fall downward,
although “unpropped beneath, not fastened firm, and
downward turned ”’ ;? and it seems to him a miracle that
the sparkling Raters of all rivers flow into one ocean
without ever filling it.? ‘* Verily,” says the Koran, “in
the creation of the heavens and the earth, and in the
succession of night and day, are signs to those possessed
of minds.” *
The attribution of miraculous power to a certain object
or being may be due to direct experience of some effect
produced by it, as in the case of a medical plant, or a
poisonous sanices Olea miracle-working spring, or a
Christian or Muhammedan saint. Or it may be based on
the inference that objects with a strange and mysterious
appearance also possess strange and mysterious powers.
This inference, too, is in a way supported by facts. The
unusual appearance of the object makes an impression on
the person who sees it, and predisposes him to the belief
that the object is endowed with secret powers. If then
anything unusual actually happens in its neighbourhood
or shortly after it has been seen, the strange event is
attributed to the influence of the strange object. Thus=a
Siberian tribe came to regard the camel as the small-pox
demon because, just when the animal had appeared among
them for the first time with a passing caravan, the small
pox broke out.” Of the British Guiana itaskern we are
1 Whitney, ‘Vedic Researches in 3 Ibid. v. 85. 6.
Germany,’ in Jor. American Oriental 4 Koran, iii. 87.
SAR. Th, — ABV) Macdonell, Vedic > Tiele, Elements of the Sctence of
Mythology, p. 108. Religion, i. 70. i
2 Riz- Veda, iv. 13. 5.
aan
told by Mr. Im Thurn that if his eye falls upon a rock in
any way abnormal or curious, and if shortly after any evil
happens to him, he regards rock and evil as cause and
effect, and perceives a spirit inthe rock.!| With the lapse
of time the data of experience readily increase. Ifa certain
object has gained the reputation of being supernatural, it is
looked upon asthe cause of all kinds of unusual events which
may possibly be associated with it. When I visited the
large cave Imi-ntakkandut in the Great Atlas Mountains,
the interior of which is said to contain a whole spirit city,
my horse happened to stumble on my way back to my
camp, and fell upon one of my servants who was carrying
agun. The gun was broken and the man became lame
for some days. I was told that the accident was caused
by the cave-spirits, because they were displeased at my
visit. When the following day I again passed the cave
with my little caravan, heavy rain began to fall ; and now
the rain was attributed to the ill-temper of the spirits.
Startling events are ascribed to the activity not only of
visible, but of invisible supernatural agents. Thus
sudden or strange diseases are, at the lower stages of
civilisation, commonly supposed to be occasioned by a
supernatural being, which has taken up its abode in the
sick person’s body, or otherwise sent the disease.”
Among the Maoris, for instance, ‘“‘each disease was
supposed to be occasioned by a different god, who resided
in the part affected.”* The Australian Kurnai maintain
that phthisis, pneumonia, bowel complaints, and insanity
are produced by an evil spirit, ‘‘ who is like the wind.” *
According to Moorish beliefs convulsions, epileptic or
paralytic fits, rheumatic or neuralgic pains, and certain
rare and violent epidemics, like the cholera, are caused by
spirits, which either strike their victim, or enter his body,
or sometimes, in the case of an epidemic, shoot at the
1 Im Thurn, /déans of Guzana, p. heits-Damonen,’ in Archiv fiir Re-
354- ¥ ligionswissenschaft, ii. 86 sgg. Karsten,
2 Tylor, Primdtive Culture, ii. 146 op. cét. p. 27 599. :
sgg. Schneider, De Naturvilher, i. * Taylor, 7e cha a Maut, p. 137.
217, Bartels, Dze Medzcin der Natur- 4 Fison and Howitt, of. cz¢. p. 250.
volker, p. 27 sgg. Hofler, ‘Krank-
WO, wil Q Q
THE BELIEF IN
people with poisonous arrows. Indeed, unexpected
events of every kind are readily pacriees to super-
natural influence, in Morocco and elsewhere. Among
the North American Indians “the storms and tempests
were generally thought to be produced by aérial spirits
from hostile lands.”’? Among the Hudson Bay Indians
“ everything not understood is attributed to the working
of one of the numerous spirits.” ‘Dans toute
Afrique,” says M. Duveyrier in his description of the
Touareg, “il n’y a pas un individu, éclaire ou ignare,
instruit ou illettre, qui n’attribue aux. génies tout ce qul
arrive Be eordinace sur la terre’’® Of the South
African natives Livingstone writes, ‘‘ Everything not to
be accounted for by common causes, whether of good or
evil; as ascribed to theeDeity. = With the progress of
science the chain of natural causes is extended, and, as
Livy puts it, it is left to superstition alone to see the
interference of the deity in trifling’ matters. Among
ourselves the ordinary truths of science are so generally
recognised that in this domain God is seldom supposed
to interfere. On the other hand, with regard to social
events, the causes of which are often hidden, the idea
of Providence is still constantly needed to fill up the gap
of human ignorance.
Man’s belief in supernatural agents, then, is an attempt
to explain strange and mysterious phenomena which
suggest a volitional cause.? The assumed cause is the
will of a supernatural being. Such beings are thus, in
the first place, conceived as volitional. But a being
which has a will must have a mind, with emotions,
desires, and a certain amount of intelligence. Neither
the savage nor ourselves can imagine a volitional being
$94 CHAP.
1 Dorman, of. cz. p. 350. Zambest, p. 521 Sq:
2 Turner, ‘ Ethnology of the Ungava
District,’ in Ann. Rep. Bur. Ethn.
al, Oy
3 Duveyrier, Exploration du Sahara,
p- 418. See also Schneider, Religion
a afrikanischen Naturvolker, p. 103.
4 Livingstone, xfedition to the
5 Already Hobbes (Zevdathan, i. 12,
p. 79) traced, in part, the origin of
religion to the fact that when man can-
not assure himself of the true causes of
things, he supposes causes of them.
See also Meiners, Geschichte der Re-
figtonen, i. 16.
which has nothing but a will. If an object of nature,
therefore, is looked upon as a_ supernatural agent,
mentality and life are at the same time attributed to it as
a matter of course. This I take to be the real origin of
animism. It is not correct to say that “as the objects of
the visible world are conceived as animated, volitional,
and emotional, they may be deemed the originators of
those misfortunes of which the true cause is unknown.” !
This is to reverse the actual order of ideas. Inanimate
things are conceived as volitional, emotional, and animate,
because they are deemed the originators of startling events.
The savage does not speculate upon the nature of things
unless he has an interest in doing so. He is not generally
inquisitive as to causes.” The natives of West Australia,
says Eyre, “are not naturally a reasoning people, and by
no means given to the investigation of causes or their
effects.” * In matters not concerning the common wants of
life the mind of the Brazilian Indian is a blank.t When
Mungo Park asked some negroes, what became of the
sun during the night ? they considered his question a very
childish one ; “ they had never indulged a conjecture, nor
formed any hypothesis, about the matter.”’ I often
found the Beduins of Morocco extremely curious, but
their curiosity consisted in the question, What? rather
than in the question, Why?
Whilst belief in supernatural agents endowed with a will
made the savage an animist, the idea that a mind presup-
poses a body, when thought out, led to anthropomorphism.
Impossible as it is to imagine a will without a mind, it is
hardly less impossible to imagine a mind without a body.
The immaterial soul is an abstraction to which has been
attributed a metaphysical reality, but of which no clear
conception can be formed. As Hobbes observed, the
opinion that spirits are incorporeal or immaterial, ‘could
1 Peschel, Races of Man, p. 245. 4 Bates, Zhe Naturalist on the Rrver
2 Cf. Spencer, Principles of Sociology, Amazons, ii. 163.
i. 86 sg. ; Karsten, of. cit. p. 43 5g. 5 Mungo Park, Z7avels in the In-
3 Eyre, Lxfeditions of Discovery terior of Africa, i. 413.
into Central Australia, il. 355.
Or Op
never enter into the mind of any man by nature ;_ because,
though men may put together words. . . . as Spirit and
Incorporeall ; yet they can never have the imagination of
anything answering to them.” ' Descartes himself frankly
confessed, ‘‘ What the soul itself was I either did not
stay to consider, or, if I did, I imagined that it was some-
thing extremely rare and subtile, like wind, or flame, or
ether, spread through my grosser parts.’’? The super-
natural agents were consequently of necessity considered
to possess a more or less material constitution. The dis-
embodied human soul which the savage saw in dreams or
visions, in the shadow or the reflection, was only the
least material being which he could imagine ; and when
raised to the dignity of an ancestor-god, it by no means
lost its materiality, but, on the contrary, tended to acquire
a more substantial body.
Of a grosser substantiality and very unlike the human
shape are the inanimate objects of nature which
receive divine veneration. It has been said of savages
that they do not worship the thing itself, only the
spirit dwelling in it. But such a distinction cannot be
primitive. The natural object is worshipped because it 1s
believed to possess supernatural power, but it is neverthe-
less the object itself that is worshipped.’ Castrén, who
combined great personal experience with unusual acuteness
of judgment, states that the Samoyedes do not know of
any spirits attached to objects of nature, but worship the
objects as such; “in other words, they do not separate
the spirit from the matter, but adore the thing in its
totality as a divine being.” * Of the deification of the
Nerbudda river Sir W. H. Sleeman likewise observes,
“As in the case of the Ganges, it is the river itself to
whom they address themselves, and not to any deity
residing in it, or presiding over it—the stream itself is
the deity which fills their imaginations, and receives their
1 Hobbes, of. cz¢. i. 12, p. 80. wessenschaft, p. 35; Parkman, of. ci.
z Descartes, Meditationes, 2, p. 10. p. Ixvii. (North American Indians).
3 Cf. Tiele, Max Miiller und Fritz 4 Castrén, of. c#t. ili. 192. Cf. zbzd.
Schultze tiber ein Problem der Religions- iii. 161, 200 sg.
a
ran sineetiicsiie santana
homage.” ' The animist who endows an inanimate object
with a soul regards the visible thing itself as its body.’
How a being with such a body, like a tree or a stone,
can hear the words of men, can see their doings, and can
partake of the food they offer, might be difficult to
explain—if it had to be explained. But, as I have said,
the inquisitiveness of savage curiosity does not go to the
roots of things, and religion is in its essence mystery.
However, in proportion as a supernatural being comes
more and more to occupy the thoughts of its worshippers
and to stir their imagination, a more distinct personality
is attributed to it ; and at length neither the ethereal or
vaporous materiality of a departed human soul, nor the
crude substantiality of an inanimate object is considered a
satisfactory body for such a being. It is humanised also
with regard to its essential shape. The Koriaks of
Siberia believe “that objects and phenomena of nature
conceal an anthropomorphic substance underneath their
outer forms”’ ; but they also show the first signs of a belief
in spiritual owners or masters ruling over certain classes
of things or over large objects. The supernatural being
which is originally embodied in a natural phenomenon is
gradually placed behind it. In the Vedic hymns we may
study this anthropomorphism as a process in growth.
The true gods of the Veda are almost without exception
the deified representatives of the phenomena or forces of
nature,’ which are personified, though in varying degrees.
When the name of the god is the same as that of his natural
basis, the personification has not yet advanced beyond the
rudimentary stage ; names like Dyaus (“ heaven’), Prthivi
(“earth”), Surya (‘“‘sun’’), Usas (“dawn”), represent
the double character of natural phenomena and of the
personalities presiding over them. Speaking of the
nature of the gods, the ancient Vedic interpreter Yaska
remarks that “what is seen of the gods is certainly not
1 Sleeman, Rambles and Recollections Myth,’ in Jesup Nor Pacthc Expedt-
of an Indian Offictal, i. 20. tion, Vi. 115, 118.
2 Castrén, of. cet. iii. 164 sg. 4 Oldenberg, Religion des Veda, p.
3 Jochelson, ‘Koryak Religion and 591 sgq.
THE BELIEF IN
anthropomorphic, for example the sun, the earth, and so
forth.” + Again, when the name of the god is different
from that of the physical substance he is supposed to
inhabit, the anthropomorphism is more developed, though
never very distinct. The Vedic people always recognised
behind its gods the natural forces of which they were the
expression, and their physical appearance often only repre-
sents aspects of their natural bases figuratively described
to illustrate their activities. The sun is spoken of as
the eye with which Varuna observes mankind ;* or it is
said that the all-seeing sun, rising from his abode, goes
to the dwellings of Mitra and Varuna to report the deeds
of men.’ Even to this day the Hindu, to whatever sect
he may belong, does homage to the rising sun every
morning of his life by repeating a text of the Veda.* The
god does not very readily change his old solid body for
another which, though more respectable, has the dis-
advantage of being invisible. The simple unreflecting
mind finds it easier to worship a material thing which
may be seen, than a hidden god, however perfect in
shape. To the common Japanese the sun is still the
god to whom he prays morning and evening.® Whilst
Chinese scholars declare that the sacrifice offered to
Heaven “ is assuredly not addressed to the material and
sensible heaven, which our eyes see, but to the Master
of heaven, earth, and all things,” ° the people are less
metaphysical ; and the Russian peasant to this day makes
an appeal to the Svarog of the old religion when crying,
“Dost thou hear, O Sky? dost thou see, O Sky?”’
That the worship of animals survives at comparatively
late stages of civilisation is probably due to the double
advantage of their bodies being both visible and animate.
1 Mirukta, vil. 4, quoted by Hop-
kins, Religions of India, p. 209.
2 Rig-Veda, 1. 50.6. Hopkins, of.
cul. p. 67. Cf. ‘Rég-Veda, 1. 25. 10
Gip.B ‘ily tigloy 2
3 Rig- Veda, vii. 60. 1 sg. See Mac-
donell, of. czt. pp. 2, 15, 17, 233 Muir,
Original Sanskrit Texts, v. 6; Barth,
Relisions of India, p. 178 ; Oldenberg,
Religion des Veda, p. 591 sqq.
4 Monier-Williams, rahmanism and
fTinditism, p. 342.
> Griffis, Religions of Japan, p. 87.
6 Legge, Motions of the Chinese
concerning God and Spirits, p. 38.
* Ralston, Songs of the Russian
People, p. 362.
spate ical ial
But though man created his gods in his own image
and likeness, endowing them with a mind and a_ body
modelled after his own, he never lost sight of the
difference between him and them. He always ascribed
to them a superior power of action ; otherwise they
would have been no gods at all. In many cases, at least,
he also attributed to them a superior knowledge. The
Bechuanas maintain that their gods are much wiser than
they are themselves.‘ In the admonitions of an Aztek
mother to her daughter reference is made to a god who
‘sees every secret fault.”* The gods “of the Greeks
and Romans were possessed of superhuman wisdom,’
and so was Yahveh. It is true that the anthropomorphic
god acquires knowledge of the affairs of men through his
senses. When hearing the cry of Sodom and Gomorrah,
Yahveh said, “I will go down now, and see whether they
have done altogether according to the cry of it, which
is come unto me; and if not, I will know.’ * But
the senses of a god are generally superior to those of
a man. ‘‘A god,’ says Orestes, “can hear even from
a distance.’° Varuna has an all-seeing eye, and the
Zoroastrian Mithra has a thousand ears and ten thousand
eyes.° In other respects, also, the bodies of gods excel
the bodies of men. Sometimes they are more beautiful,
sometimes they have a gigantic shape. When Ares is
felled to the ground by the stone flung by Athene, his
body covers seven roods of land.’ When Here takes a
solemn oath, she grasps the earth with one hand and
the sea with the other.* In three steps Poseidon goes
an immense distance ;° in three paces Vishnu traverses
earth, air, and sky.”
However, the tendency to make gods more and more
1 Arbousset and Daumas, 2wxplora- 4 Genesis, xviil. 20 sg.
tory Tour to the North-East of the 5 Aeschylus, Hzmentdes, 297.
Colony of the Cape of Good Hope, p. SMG in Se 7
eV Gles oe 7 Thad, xxi. 407.
2 Sahagun, Héstoria general de las 8 Jbid. xiv. 272 sq.
cosas de Nueva Espafia, vi. 19, vol, ii. 9 bid. xiii. 20.
Veils 10 Grimm, TZeztontc Mythology, i.
3 Cf. Westcott, Assays inthe History 325.
of Religious Thought, p. 101.
perfect—of which I shall say more in a following chapter
—gradually led to the notion that materiality is a quality
which is not becoming to a god ; hence men endeavoured,
to the best of their ability, to grasp the idea of a
purely spiritual being, endowed with a will and even
with human emotions, but. without a material body.
Like Xenophanes in Greece, the Inca Yupangut in Peru
protested against the prevailing anthropomorphism,
declaring that purely spiritual service was befitting the
almighty creator, not tributes or sacrifices." In the
Bible we notice a successive transformation of the nature
of the deity, from crude sensuousness to pure spirituality.
According to the oldest traditions, Yahveh works and
rests, he plants the garden of Eden, he walks in it in
the cool of the day, and Adam and Eve hear his
voice. In a great part of the Old Testament he is
expressly bound by conditions of time and space. He
is attached in an especial manner to the Jerusalem
temple or some other shrine, and his favour is gained
by definite modes of sacrifice. At the time of the
Prophets the cruder anthropomorphisms of the earlier
religion have been overcome ; Yahveh is no longer seen
in person, and by a prophet like Isaiah his residence
in Zion is almost wholly dematerialised. Yet, as
Professor Robertson Smith observes, not even Isaiah
has risen to the full height of the New Testament
conception that God, who is spirit and who is to be
worshipped spiritually, makes no distinction of spot
with regard to worship, and is equally near to receive
men’s prayers in every place.” Moslem theologians take
pains to point out that God neither is begotten nor
begets, and that he is without figure, form, colour, and
parts. He hears all sounds, whether low or loud ; but
he hears without an ear. He sees all things, even the
steps of a black ant on a black stone in a dark night ;
but he has no eyes, as men have. He speaks; but not
1 Brinton, American Hero-Myths, p. Toy, Judaism and Christianity, p. 87.
236. er Montefiore, op. cit. p. 424. Robertson
2 Goblet d’Alviella, of. czt. p. 216. Smith, Religzon of the Semites, jek, WY
as ahi ll le
with a tongue, as men do.' He is endowed with know-
ledge, feelings, and a will.” Thus the dematerialised god
still retains a mental constitution modelled upon the
human soul, with all its bodily desires and imperfections
removed, with its higher qualities indefinitely increased,
and, above all, endowed with a supernatural power of
action.
In following chapters we shallsee how the moral
ideas of men have been influenced by the attributes they
ascribe to supernatural beings.
1 Risalah-i-Berkevi, quoted by Sell, 2 Sell, op. czé. p. 185.
op. cit. p. 166 sg.
GODS AS GUARDIANS OF MORALITY (concluded)
We have seen that the gods of uncivilised races are to
a very large extent of a malevolent character, that they
as a rule take little interest in any kind of human conduct
which does not affect their own welfare, and that, if they
show any signs of moral feelings, they may be guardians
either of tribal customs in general or only of. some special
branch of morality. Among peoples of a higher culture,
again, the gods are on the whole benevolent to mankind,
when duly propitiated. They by preference resent offences
committed against themselves personally ; but they also
avenge social wrongs of various kinds, they are superin-
tendents of human justice, and are even represented as
the originators and sustainers of the whole moral order
of the world. ‘The gods have thus experienced a gradual
change for the better ; until at last they are described as
ideals of moral perfection, even though, when more closely
scrutinised, their goodness and notions of justice are found
to differ materially from what is deemed good and just in
the case of men.
The malevolence of savage gods is in accordance with
the theory that religion is born of fear. The assumed
originators of misfortunes were naturally regarded as
enemies to be propitiated, whilst fortunate events, if
attracting sufficient attention and appearing sufficiently
marvellous to suggest a supernatural cause, were. com-
monly ascribed to beings who were too good to require
hie -
worship. But growing reflection has a tendency to attri-
bute more amiable qualities to the gods. The religious
consciousness of men becomes less exclusively occupied
with the hurts they suffer, and comes more and more to
reflect upon the benefits they enjoy. The activity of a
god which displays itself in a certain phenomenon, or
group of phenomena, appears to them on some occasions
as a source of evil, but on other occasions as a source of
good ; hence the god is regarded as partly malevolent,
partly benevolent, and in all circumstances as a being
who must not be neglected. Moreover, a god who is by
nature harmless or good may by proper worship be
induced to assist man in his struggle against evil spirits.’
This protective function of gods becomes particularly
important when the god is more or less disassociated from
the natural phenomenon in which he originally manifested
himself. Nothing, indeed, seems to have contributed
more towards the improvement of nature gods than the
expansion of their sphere of activity. When supernatural
beings can exert their power in the various departments of
life, men naturally choose for their gods those among them
who with great power combine the greatest benevolence.
Men have selected their gods according to their usefulness.
Among the Maoris “a mere trifle, or natural casualty,
will induce a native (or a whole tribe) to change his
Atua.”* The negro, when disappointed in some of his
speculations, or overtaken by some sad calamity, throws
away his fetish, and selects a new one.’ When hard-
pressed, the Samoyede, after having invoked his own
deities in vain, addresses himself to the Russian god,
promising to become his worshipper if he relieves him
from his distress; and in most cases he is said to be
faithful to his promise, though he may still try to keep
on good terms with his former gods by occasionally
1 yon Rosenberg, Der malayische Buch, ‘Die Wotjiken,’ in Acta Soc.
Archipfel, p. 162 (Niase). Howard, Scient. Fennica, xii. 633. Supra, ii.
Life with Trans-Siberian Savages, 701, 702, 704 sq.
p- 192 (Ainu). Georgi, Russéa, ii. ? Polack, Manners and Customs of
273 sg. (shamanistic peoples of Siberia). the New Zealanders, i. 233.
3 Wilson, Western Africa, p. 212.
offering them a sacrifice in secret.' North American
Indians attribute all their good or bad luck to their
Manitou, and “if the Manitou has not been favourable
to them, they quit him without any ceremony, and take
another.”? Among many.of the ancient Indians of
Central America there was a regular and systematical
selection of gods. Father Blas Valera says that their
gods had annual rotations and were changed each year
in accordance with the superstitions of the people. ‘The
old gods were forsaken as infamous, or because they had
been of no use, and other gods and eae were elected.
. Sons when they inherited, either accepted or re-
pudiated the gods of their fathers, for they were not
allowed to hold their pre-eminence against the: will of
the heir. Old men worshipped other greater deities, but
they likewise dethroned them, and set up others in their
places when the year was over, or the age of the world,
as the Indians had it. Such were the gods which all the
nations of Mexico, Chiapa, and Guatemala worshipped, as
well as those of Vera Paz, and many other Indians. They
thought that the gods selected by themselves were the
greatest and most powerful of all the gods.”* These are
crude instances of a process which in some form or other
must have been an important motive force in religious
evolution by making the gods better suited to meet the
wants of their believers.
But men not only select as their gods such supernatural
beings as may be most useful to them in their struggle for
life, they also magnify their good qualities in wor-
shipping them. Praise and exaggerating eulogy are common
in the mouth of a devout worshipper. In ancient
Egypt the god of each petty state was within it held to be
the ruler of the gods, the creator of the world, and the
giver of all good things.* So also in Chaldea the god of
1 Ahlqvist, ‘Unter Wogulen und 3 Blas Valera, quoted by Garcilasso
Ostjaken,’ in Acta Soc. Scient. Hennice, de la Vega, first Part of the Royal
xiv. 240. Commentaries of the Yncas, i. 124 sq.
2 Bossu, Zravels through Loudsiana, + Wiedemann, Religion of the
p- 103. Frazer, Totemzsm, p. 55. Ancient Egyptians, p. 11.
LII MORALITY aT
a town was addressed by its inhabitants with the most ex-
alted epithets, as the master or king of all the gods.'_ The
Vedic poets were engrossed in the praise of the particular
deity they happened to be invoking, exaggerating his attri-
butes to the point of inconsistency.? ‘Every virtue,
every excellence,” says Hume, “must be ascribed to the
divinity, and no exaggeration will be deemed sufficient
to reach those perfections with which he is endowed.” ®
The tendency of the worshipper to extol his god beyond
all measure is largely due to the idea that the god is fond
of praise,* but it may also be rooted in a sincere will to
believe or in genuine admiration. That nations of a
higher culture have especially a strong faith in the power
and benevolence of their gods is easy to understand when
we consider that these are exactly the peoples who have
been most successful in their national endeavours.’ As the
Greeks attributed their victory over the Persians to the assist-
ance of Zeus,°so the Romans maintained that the grandeur
of their city was the work of the gods whom they had
propitiated by sacrifices.’
The benevolence of a god, however, does not imply
that he acts asa moral judge. A friendly god is not gene-
rally supposed to bestow his favours gratuitously ; it is
hardly probable, then, that he should meddle with matters of
social morality out of sheer kindliness and of his own accord.
But by an invocation he may be induced to reward virtue
and punish vice. We have often noticed how closely the
retributive activity of gods is connected with the
blessings and curses of men. In order to give efficacy to
their good or evil wishes men appeal to some god, or simply
bring in his name when they pronounce a blessing or a
curse ; and if this is regularly done in connection with
some particular kind of conduct, the idea may grow up
that the god rewards or punishes it even independently of
1 Miirdter-Delitzsch, Geschichte Baby- 4 See supra, il. 653 sq.
loniens und Assyriens, p. 24. 5 Cf. Oldenberg, Die Religion des
2 Macdonell, Vedic Mythology, p. 16 Veda, p. 281; Macdonell, of. cz¢. p.
sq. Barth, Religions of India, p. 26. 18. ¥
Hopkins, Religions of [ndia, p. 139. ° Supra, il. 713. ie
3 Hume, Philosophical Works, iv. 353. 7 Cicero, De natura deorum, ili. 2,
ee GODS AS GUARDIANS OF CHAP.
any human invocation. Moreover, powerful curses, as
those uttered by parents or strangers, may be personified as
supernatural beings, like the Greek Erinyes ; or the magic
energy inherent in a blessing or a curse may become an
attribute of the chief god, owing to the tendency of such
a god to attract supernatural forces which are in harmony
with his general nature.’ So also, the notion ofa perse-
cuting ghost may be changed into the notion of an aveng-
ing god.? Various departments of social morality have
thus come to be placed under the supervision of gods :—
the rights of life*® and property,* charity ° and hospitality,°
the submissiveness of children,’ truthspeaking and fidelity
to a given promise.* That gods are so frequently looked
upon as guardians of truth and good faith is, as we have
seen, mainly a result of the common practice of confirming a
statement or promise by an oath ; and where the oath is an
essential element in the judicial proceedings, as was the
case in the archaic State,” the-consequence is that the
guardianship of gods is extended to the whole sphere of
justice. Truth and justice are repeatedly mentioned hand
in hand as matters of divine concern. We have seen how
frequently the same gods as are appealed to in oaths or
ordeals are described as judges-of human conduct." “ En
Egypte,” says M. Amélineau, “la vérité et la justice
n’avaient qu’un seul et méme nom, M4éy, qui veut aussi bien
dire vérite que justice, et justice que vérité.” " Zeus presided
over assemblies and trials ; ” according to a law of Solon,
the judges of Athens had to swear by him.” And the Erin-
yes, the personifications of oaths and curses, are sometimes
represented by poets and philosophers as guardians of right
in general.” .
1 See supra, ii. 68. 10" ‘Supra, Ui. 125, 116, 121, 122, 686,
2 Supra, i. 378 sq. 687, 699.
3 Supra, i. 379 59g. 1 Amélineau, L’évolution des idées
4 Supra, ii. 59 Sgq. morales dans [ Egypte ancienne, p. 187.
> Supra, i. 561 sgg. See also supra, ii. 115, 699.
8 Supra, i. 578 sqq. 12 Farnell, Cults of the Greek States,
7 Supra, i. 621 sqq. i. 58. :
8 Supra, il. 114 Sgq. 13 Pollux, Onxomasticumt, Vili. 12. 142.
9 Leist, Greco-ztalische Rechtsge- 14 Rohde, Psyche, p. 246.
schichte, p. 228.
é
LII MORALITY me
It has been said that when men ascribe to their gods a
mental constitution similar to their own they also eo ipso
consider them to approve of virtue and disapprove of
vice.’ But this conclusion is certainly not true in general.
Malevolent gods cannot be supposed to feel emotions
which essentially presuppose altruistic sentiments ; and, as
we have just noticed, an invocation is frequently required
to induce benevolent gods to interfere -with the worldly
affairs of men. | Moreover, where the system of private
retaliation prevails, not even the extension of human
analogies to the world of supernatural beings would lead
to the idea of a god who of his own accord punishes social
wrongs. But it is quite probable that such analogies have
in some cases made gods guardians of morality at large,
especially ancestor gods who may readily be supposed not
only to preserve their old feelings with regard to virtue
and vice but also to take a more active interest in the
morals of the living, and who are notoriously opposed to
any deviation from ancient custom.’ I also admit that the
conception of a great or supreme god may perhaps, inde-
pendently of his origin, involve retributive justice as a
natural consequence of his power and benevolence towards
his people. Yet it is obvious that even a god like Zeus
was more influenced by the invocation of a suppliant than
by his sense of justice. Dr. Farnell points out that the
epithets which designate him as the god to whom those
stricken with guilt can appeal are far more in vogue in
actual Greek cult than those which attribute to him the
function of vengeance and retribution. Hermes was
addressed by thieves as their patron.* According to the
Talmud “the thief invokes God while he breaks into the
house.” ° And the Italian bandit begs the Virgin herself
to bless his endeavours,
At the same time we must again remember that men
1 Adam Smith, Theory of Moral Anthropology, p. 369; Macdonald,
Sentiments, p. 2325g. Darwin, Descent LKeligion and Myth, p. 2209.
of Man, p. 95. Tiele, Hlements of the 3 Farnell, of. cat. 1. 66 sq.
Sctence of Religion, 1. 92 sq. 4 Schmidt, Die Lthik der alten
2 See supra, i. 519 sg. Cf. Tylor, Gyrzechen, i. 136.
5 Deutsch, Lzterary Remains, p. 57.
*
ascribe to their gods not only ordinary human qualities
but excellences of various kinds, and among these may
also be a strong desire to punish wickedness and to reward
virtue. The gods of monotheistic religions in particular
have such a multitude of the most elevated attributes that
it would be highly astonishing if they had remained
unconcerned about the morals of mankind. If flattery
and admiration make the deity all-wise, all-powerful, all-
good, they also make him the supreme judge of human
conduct. And there is yet another reason for investing
him with the moral government of the world. The claims
of justice are not fully satisfied on this earth, where it
only too often happens that virtue is left unrewarded and
vice escapes unpunished, that right succumbs and wrong
triumphs ; hence persons with deep moral feelings and a
religious or philosophical bent of mind are apt to look for
a future adjustment through the intervention of the deity,
who alone can repair the evils and injustices of the present.
This demand of final retribution is sometimes so strongly
developed that it even leads to the belief in a deity when
no other proof of his existence is found convincing.
Kant maintained that we must postulate a future life in
which everybody’s happiness is proportionate to his virtue,
and that such a postulate involves the belief in a God of
infinite power, wisdom, and goodness who governs the
moral as well as the physical world. Not even Voltaire
could rid himself of the notion of a rewarding and avenging
deity, whom, if he did not exist, “it would be necessary to
invent.”’
The belief in a god who acts as .a guardian of worldly
morality undoubtedly gives emphasis to its rules. To the
social and legal sanctions a new one is added, which
derives particular strength from the supernatural power
and knowledge of the deity. The divine avenger can
punish those who are beyond the reach of human justice and
those whose secret wrongs even escape the censure of their
fellow men. But on the other hand there are also certain
circumstances which considerably detract from the influence
=
Lil MORALITY a8
of the religious sanction when compared with other sanctions
of morality. The supposed punishments and rewards of
the future life have the disadvantage of being conceived as
very remote ; and fear and hope decrease in inverse ratio to
the distance of their objects. Men commonly live in the
happy illusion that death is far off, even though it in
reality is very near, hence also the retribution after death
appears distant and unreal and is comparatively little
thought of by the majority of people who believe in it.
Moreover, there seems always to be time left for penance
and repentance. Manzoni himself admitted, in his defence
of Roman Catholicism, that many people think it an easy
matter to procure that feeling of contrition by which,
according to the doctrine of the Church, sins may be
cancelled, and therefore encourage themselves in the
commission of crime through the facility of pardon. The
frequent assumption that the moral law would hardly
command obedience without the belief in retribution
beyond the grave is contradicted by an overwhelming
array of facts. We hear from trustworthy witnesses that
unadulterated savages follow their own rules of morality
no less strictly, or perhaps more strictly, than civilised
people follow theirs. Nay, it is a common experience
that contact with a higher civilisation exercises a deterior-
ating influence upon the conduct of uncultered races,
although we may be sure that Christian missionaries do not
fail to impart the doctrine of hell to their savage converts.
It has also been noticed that a high degree of religious
devotion is frequently accompanied by great laxity of
morals. Of the Bedouins Mr. Blunt writes that, with
one or two exceptions, “the practice of religion may be
taken as the sure index of low morality in a tribe,’
Wallin, who had an intimate and extensive knowledge of
Muhammedan peoples, often found that those Muslims
who attended to their prayers most regularly were the
greatest scoundrels.” ‘One of the most remarkable traits
1 Mr. Blunt, in Lady Anne Blunt’s 2 Wallin, Reseanteckningar fran
Bedouin Tribes of the Huphrates,ii.217. Ortenten, i. 166.
in the character of the Copts,” says Lane, “is their
bigotry ” ; and at the same time they are represented as
“deceitful, faithless, and abandoned to the pursuit of
worldly gain, and to indulgence in sensual pleasure.” '
Among two hundred Italian murderers Ferri did not find
one who was irreligious ; and Naples, which has the worst
record of any European city for crimes against the person,
is also the most religious city in Europe.” On the other
hand, according to Dr. Havelock Ellis, “it seems extremely
rare to find intelligently irreligious men in prison” ;°*
and Laing, who himself was anything but sceptical,
observed that there was no country in Europe where there
was so much morality and so little religion as Switzer-
land.* Most religions contain an element which consti-
tutes a real peril to the morality of their votaries. They
have introduced a new kind of duties—duties towards
gods ;—and, as we have noticed above, even where religion
has entered into close union with worldly morality, much
greater importance has been attached to ceremonies or wor-
ship or the niceties of belief than to good behaviour
towards fellow men. People think that they may
make up for lack of the latter by orthodoxy or pious
performances. A Christian bishop of the seventh
century, who. was canonised by the Church of Rome,
described a good Christian as a man “who comes
frequently to church ; who presents the oblation which is
offered to God upon the altar ; who doth not taste of the
fruits of his own industry until he has consecrated a part
of them to God ; who, when the holy festivals approach,
lives chastely even with his own wife during several days,
that with a safe conscience he may draw near the altar of
God 3 and who, in the last place, can repeat the Creed and
the Lord’s Prayer.’’® A scrupulous observance of external
ceremonies—that is all which in this description is required
1 Lane, Manners and Customs of the 4 Laing, Motes of a Traveller, pp.
Modern Egyptians, p. 551. 323, 324, 333.
2 Havelock Ellis, Zhe Criminal, ° Robertson, Héstory of the Reign of
p. 156. the Emperor Charles V. i, 282 sq.
3 Jbid. p. 159.
*
By
Lil MORALITY a3
of a good Christian. And since then popular ideas on
the subject have undergone but little change. Smollett
observes in his * Travels into Italy’ that it is held more
infamous to transgress the slightest ceremonial institution
of the Church of Rome than to transgress any moral duty ;
that a murderer or adulterer will be easily absolved by the
Church, and even maintain his character in society ; but
that a man who eats a pigeon on a Saturday is abhorred as
a monster of reprobation.' In the nineteenth century
Simonde de Sismondi could write :—‘Plus chaque homme
vicieux a été régulier a observer les commandemens
de I’Fglise, plus il se sent dans son cceur dispensé de
Vobservation de cette morale céleste, a laquelle il faudroit
sacrifier ses penchans dépravés.’”” And how many a
Protestant does not imagine that by going to church on
Sundays he can sin more freely on the six days between.
It should also be remembered that the religious sanc-
tion of moral rules only too often leads to an external
observance of these rules from purely selfish motives.
Christianity itself has, essentially, been regarded as a means
of gaining a blessed hereafter. As for its influence upon
the moral life of its adherents I agree with Professor
Hobhouse that its chief strength lies not in its abstract
doctrines but in the simple personal following of Christ.’
In moral education example plays a more important part
than precept. But even in this respect Christianity has
unfortunately little reason to boast of its achievements.
1 Smollett, quoted by Kames, Sketches républiques ttalrennes du moyen-dge,
of the History of Man, wv. 380. Xvi. 419. ,
2 Simonde de Sismondi, Hestozre des 3 Hobhouse, Morals in Evolution, ii.
WiC leeme lil sy 18
Chapter LIII
CONCLUSION
We have completed our task. Only a few words
will be added to emphasise the leading features of our
theory of the moral consciousness and to point out some
general conclusions which may be drawn as regards
its evolution.
Our study of the origin and development of the moral
ideas was divided into three main sections. As moral
ideas are expressed in moral judgments, we had to
examine the general nature of both the predicates and
the subjects of such judgments, as well as the moral
valuation of the chief branches of conduct with which
the moral consciousness of mankind concerns itself.
And in each case our aim was not only to describe or
analyse but also to explain the phenomena which came
under our observation.
The theory was laid down that the moral concepts,
which form the predicates of moral judgments, are ulti-
mately based on moral emotions, that they are essentially
generalisations of tendencies in certain phenomena to call
forth either indignation or approval. It was therefore
necessary for us to investigate the nature and origin of
these emotions, and subsequently to consider their rela-
tions to the various moral concepts.
We found that the moral emotions belong to a wider
class of emotions, which may be described as fetributues
that moral disapproval is a kind of resentment, akin to
Lhe MG Lae thee
anger and revenge, and that moral approval is a kind of
retributive kindly emotion, akin to gratitude. At the
same time they differ from kindred non-moral emotions
by their disinterestedness, apparent impartiality, and
flavour of generality. As for the origin of the retributive
emotions, we may assume that they have been acquired
by means of natural selection in the struggle for exist-
ence ; both resentment and retributive kindly emotion
are states of mind which have a tendency to promote the
interests of the individuals who feel them. This explan-
ation also applies to the moral emotions in so far as they
are retributive: it accounts for the hostile attitude of
moral disapproval towards the cause of pain, and for the
friendly attitude of moral approval towards the cause of
pleasure. Our retributive emotions are always reactions
against pain or pleasure felt by ourselves ; this holds
true of the moral emotions as well as of revenge and
gratitude. But how shall we explain those elements
in the moral emotions by which they are distinguished
from other, non-moral retributrve emotions? First, why
should we, quite disinterestedly, feel pain evoking indig-
nation because our neighbour is hurt, and pleasure
calling forth approval because he is benefited ?
We noticed that sympathy aided by the altruistic
sentiment—sympathy in the common sense of the word
—tends to produce disinterested retributive emotions.
In all animal species which possess the altruistic senti-
ment in some form or other we may be sure to find
sympathetic resentment as its accompaniment. And this
sentiment may also give rise to disinterested retributive
kindly emotion, even though it is more readily moved by
the sight of pain than by the sight of pleasure and
though sympathetic retributive kindliness has a powerful
rival in the feeling of envy. Moreover, sympathetic
retributive emotions may not only be reactions against
sympathetic pain or pleasure, but may also be directly
produced by the cognition of the signs of resentment or
of the signs of retributive kindliness. Punishments and
Re ae?
rewards tend to reproduce the emotions from which they
sprang, and language communicates retributive emotions
by terms of condemnation and by terms of praise.
Finally, there are cases of disinterested retributive emo-
tions into which sympathy does not enter at all—
sentimental antipathies and paigee quite disinterested
in character.
There are thus various ways in which disinterested
retributive emotions may originate. But how shall we
explain the fact that disinterestedness together with
apparent impartiality and the flavour of generality have
become characteristics by which the so-called moral
emotions are distinguished from other retributive emo-
tions? To this question the following answer was
given :—Society is the birthplace of the moral con-
sciousness. ‘The first moral judgments expressed not
the private emotions of isolated individuals but emotions
which were felt by the community at large. Public
indignation is the prototype of moral disapproval and
public approval the prototype of moral approbation. And
these public emotions are characterised by generality,
individual disinterestedness, and apparent impartiality.
The moral emotions give rise to a variety of moral
concepts, which are in different ways connected with the
emotions from which they were derived. Thus moral
disapproval is at the bottom of the concepts bad, vice,
and wrong, ought and duty, right and rights, justice Ai
injustice ; whilst moral approval has led to the concepts
good, virtue, and merit. It has, in particular, been of
fundamental importance for the whole of our investiga-
tion to recognise the true contents of the notions of
ought and duty. If these concepts were unanalysable, as
they have often been represented to be, any attempt to
explain the origin and development of the moral ideas
would, in my opinion, be a hopeless failure.
From the predicates of moral judgments we proceeded
to consider their subjects. Generally speaking, such
judgments are passed on conduct or character, and
allowance is made for the various elements of which
conduct and character are composed in proportion as the
moral judgment is scrutinising and enlightened. It is
only owing to ignorance or lack of due reflection if, as is
often the case, moral estimates are influenced by external
events which are entirely independent of the agent’s will ;
if individuals who are incapable of recognising any act x
theirs as right or wrong are treated-as responsible beings ;
if motives are completely or partially disregarded ; if little
cognisance is taken of forbearances in comparison with
acts; if want of foresight or want of self-restraint is
overlooked when the effect produced by it is sufficiently
remote. We were also able to explain why moral judg-
ments are passed on conduct and character. ‘This is due
to the facts that moral judgments spring from moral
emotions ; that the moral emotions are retributive emo-
tions ; that a retributive emotion is a reactive attitude of
mind, either kindly or hostile, towards a living being (or
something looked upon in the light of a living being),
regarded as a cause of pleasure or as a cause of pain; and
that a living being is regarded as a true cause of pleasure
or pain only in so far as this feeling is assumed to be
caused by its will. It is a circumstance of the greatest
importance that not only moral emotions but non-moral
retributive emotions are felt with reference to phenomena
exactly similar in their general nature to those on which
moral judgments are passed. How could we account for
this remarkable coincidence unless the moral judgments
were based on emotions and the moral emotions were
retributive emotions akin to gratitude and revenge ?
Our theory as to the nature of the moral concepts
and emotions is further supported by another and very
comprehensive set of facts. In our discussion of the
particular modes of conduct which are subject to moral
valuation and of the judgments passed on them by different
peoples and in different ages, this theory has constantly
been called in to explain the data before us. It is note-
worthy that the very acts, forbearances, and omissions
which are condemned as wrong are also apt to call forth
anger and revenge, and that the acts and forbearances
which are praised as morally good are apt to call forth
gratitude. This coincidence, again, undoubtedly bears
testimony both to the emotional basis of the moral
concepts and to the retributive character of the moral
emotions. Thus the conclusions arrived at in the first
section of the work, while helping to explain the facts
mentioned in the two other sections, are at the same time
greatly strengthened by these facts. Any attempt to
discover the nature and origin of the moral consciousness
must necessarily take into account the moral ideas of
mankind at large. And though painfully conscious of
the incompleteness of the present treatise, I think I may
confidently ask, with reference to its fundamental thesis,
whether any other theory of the moral consciousness has
ever been subjected to an equally comprehensive test.
The general uniformity of human nature accounts for
the great similarities which characterise the moral ideas of
mankind. But at the same time these ideas also present
radical differences. A mode of conduct which among one
people is condemned as wrong is among another people
viewed with indifference-or regarded as praiseworthy or
enjoined as a duty. One reason for these variations lies
in different external conditions. Hardships of life may
lead to the killing of infants or abandoning of aged parents
or eating of human bodies ; and necessity and the force of
habit may deprive these actions of the stigma which would
otherwise be attached to them. Economic conditions have
influenced moral ideas relating, for instance, to slavery,
labour, and cleanliness ; whilst the form of marriage and
the opinions concerning it have been largely determined
by such a factor as the numerical proportion between the
sexes. But the most common differences of moral esti-
mates have undoubtedly a psychical origin.
When we examine the moral rules of uncivilised races
we find that they ina very large measure resemble those
prevalent among nations of culture. In every savage
community homicide is prohibited by custom, and so is
theft. Savages also regard charity as a duty and praise
generosity as a virtue—indeed, their customs concerning
mutual aid are often much more stringent than our own ;
and many uncivilised peoples are conspicuous for their
aversion to telling lies. But at the same time there is a
considerable difference between the regard for life,
property, truth, and the general wellbeing of a neighbour,
which displays itself in primitive rules of morality and
that which is found among ourselves. Savages’ prohibi-
bitions of murder, theft, and deceit, as also their injunc-
tions of charity and kind behaviour, have, broadly
speaking, reference only to members of the same com-
munity or tribe. They carefully distinguish between an
act of homicide committed among their own people and-
one where the victim is a stranger ; whilst the former is
in ordinary circumstances disapproved of, the latter is in
most cases allowed and often considered worthy of praise.
And the same thing holds true of theft and lying and
other injuries. Apart from the privileges which are
granted to guests, and which are always of a very short
duration, a stranger is in early society devoid of all rights.
This is the case not only among savages but among nations
of archaic culture as well. When we from the lower races
pass to peoples more advanced in civilisation we find that
the social unit has grown larger, that the nation has taken
the place of the tribe, and that the circle of persons within
which the infliction of injuries is prohibited has extended
accordingly. But the old distinction between offences
against compatriots and harm done to foreigners remains.
Nay, it survives to some extent even among ourselves, as
appears from the prevailing attitude towards war and the
readiness with which wars are waged. But although the
difference between a fellow countryman and a foreigner
has not ceased to affect the moral feelings of men even in
the midst of modern civilisation, its influence has certainly
been decreasing. The doctrine has been set forth, and has
been gradually gaining ground, that our duties towards our
fellow men are universal duties, not restricted by the limits
of country or race. Those who recognise the emotional
origin of the rules of duty find no difficulty in explaining
all these facts. The expansion of the commandments
relating to neighbours coincides with the expansion of the
altruistic sentiment. And the cause of this coincidence at
once becomes clear when we consider that such command-
ments mainly spring from the emotion of sympathetic
resentment, and that sympathetic resentment is rooted in
the altruistic sentiment.
Besides the extension of duties towards neighbours so.
as to embrace wider and wider circles of men, there is
another point in which the moral ideas of mankind have
undergone an important change on the upward path from
savagery and barbarism to civilisation. They have become
more enlightened. Though moral ideas are based upon
emotions, though all moral concepts are essentially gene-
ralisations of tendencies in certain phenomena to call forth
moral approval or disapproval, the influence of intellectual
considerations upon moral judgments is naturally very
great. All higher emotions are determined by cognitions
—-sensations or ideas; they therefore vary according: as
the cognitions vary, and the nature of a cognition may
very largely depend upon reflection or insight. Ifa person
tells us an untruth we are apt to feel indignant ; but if, on
due reflection, we find that his motive was benevolent, for
instance a desire to save the life of the person to whom
the untruth was told, our indignation ceases, and may even
be succeeded by approval. The change of cognitions, or
ideas, has thus produced a change of emotions. Now,
the evolution of the moral consciousness partly consists in
its development from the unreflecting to the reflecting
stage, from the unenlightened to the enlightened. ‘This
appears from the decreasing influence of external events
upon moral judgments and from the growing discrimina-
tion with reference to motives, negligence, and other factors
in conduct which are carefully considered by a scrupulous
judge. More penetrating reflection has also reduced the
rors ee
ties
part played by disinterested likings and dislikes in the
formation of moral ideas. When we clearly realise that a
certain act is productive of no real harm but is condemned
simply because it causes aversion or disgust, we can hardly
look upon it as a proper object of moral censure—unless,
indeed, its commission is considered to imply a blamable
disregard for other persons’ sensibilities. Deliberate re-
sentment, whether moral or non-moral, is too much con-
cerned with the will of the agent to be felt towards a
person who obviously neither intends to offend anybody
nor is guilty of culpable oversight. Nay, even when the
agent knows that his behaviour is repulsive to others, he
may be considered justified in acting as he does. Some
degree of reflection easily leads to the notion that senti-
mental antipathies are no sufficient ground for interfering
with other individuals’ liberty of action either by punishing
them or by subjecting them to moral censure, provided of
course that they do not in an indelicate manner shock their
neighbours’ feelings. Hence many persons have recourse
to utilitarian pretexts to support moral opinions or legal
enactments which have originated in mere aversions ; thus
making futile attempts to reconcile old ideas with the
requirements of a moral consciousness which is duly
influenced by reflection.
In innumerable cases the variations of moral estimates
are due to differences of beliefs. Almost every chapter of
this work has borne witness to the enormous influence
which the belief in supernatural forces or beings or in a
future state has exercised upon the moral ideas of man-
kind, and has at the same time shown how exceedingly
varied this influence has been. Religion, or superstition
(as the case may be), has on the one hand stigmatised
murder and suicide, on the other hand it has commended
human sacrifice and certain cases of voluntary self-destruc-
tion. It has inculcated humanity and charity, but has also
led to cruel persecutions of persons embracing another creed.
It has emphasised the duty of truthspeaking, and has itself
been a cause of pious fraud. It has promoted both cleanly
74.6 CONCLUSION CH. LIT
habits and filthiness. It has enjoined labour and
abstinence from labour, sobriety and drunkenness, mar-
riage and celibacy, chastity and temple prostitution. It
has introduced a great variety of new duties and virtues,
quite different from those which are recognised by the
moral consciousness when left to itself, but nevertheless
in many cases considered more important than any other
duties or virtues. It seems that the moral ideas of —
uncivilised men are more affected by magic than by
religion, and that the religious influence has reached its
greatest extension at certain stages of culture which,
though comparatively advanced, do not include the
highest stage. Increasing knowledge lessens the sphere
of the supernatural, and the ascription of a perfectly
ethical character to the godhead does away with moral
estimates which have sprung from less elevated religious
conceptions.
I have here pointed out only the most general changes
to which the moral ideas have been subject in the course
of progressive civilisation; the details have been dealt
with each in their separate place. There can be no doubt
that changes also will take place in the future, and that
similar causes will produce similar effects. We have
every reason to believe that the altruistic sentiment will
continue to expand, and that those moral commandments
which are based on it will undergo a corresponding
expansion ; that the influence of reflection upon moral
judgments will steadily increase; that the influence of
sentimental antipathies and likings will diminish; and
that in its relation to morality religion will be increasingly
restricted to emphasising ordinary moral rules, and less
preoccupied with inculcating special duties to the deity.
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